Language and the Analysis of Social Laws

Author(s): Claude Lévi-Strauss

Source: American Anthropologist , Apr. - Jun., 1951, New Series, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Apr. -
Jun., 1951), pp. 155-163
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Anthropological Association

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 AM.ERI.CAN ANTHROPOLOGIST
VOL. 53 APRIL-JUNE, 1951 No. 2

LANGUAGE AND THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL LAWS

By CLAUDE L]VI-STRAUSS
N A recent work, whose importance from the point of view of the future
of the social sciences can hardly be overestimated, Wiener poses, and re-
solves in the negative, the question of a possible extension to the social sciences
of the mathematical methods of prediction which have made possible the
construction of the great modern electronic machines. He justifies his position
by two arguments.'
In the first place, he maintains that the nature of the social sciences is
such that it is inevitable that their very development must have repercussion
on the object of their investigation. The coupling of the observer with th
observed phenomenon is well known to contemporary scientific thought, and
in a sense, it illustrates a universal situation. But it is negligible in fields which
are ripe for the most advanced mathematical investigation; as, for example,
in astrophysics, where the object has such vast dimensions that the influenc
of the observer need not be taken into account, or in atomic physics, where the
object is so small that we are only interested in average mass effects in which
the effect of bias on the part of the observer plays no role. In the field of the
social sciences, on the contrary, the object of study is necessarily affected by
the intervention of the observer, and the resulting modifications are on th
same scale as the phenomena that are studied.
In the second place, Wiener observes that the phenomena subjected to
sociological or anthropological inquiry are defined within our own sphere of
interests; they concern questions of the life, education, career, and death of
individuals. Therefore the statistical runs available for the study of a given
phenomenon are always far too short to lay the foundation of a valid induction.
Mathematical analysis in the field of social sciences, he concludes, can bring
results which should be of as little interest to the social scientist as those of
the statistical study of a gas would be to an individual about the size of a
molecule.
These objections seem difficult to refute when they are examined in terms
of the investigations toward which their author has directed them, the data of
research monographs and of applied anthropology. In such cases, we are deal-
1 Wiener, N., 1948, p. 189-191.
155

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156 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST [53, 1951

ing with a study of individual behavior, direct

self an individual; or with a study of a culture
tern, by an observer who cannot dissociate himse
or from the culture out of which his working
observation, which are themselves cultural pat
There is, however, at least one area of the s
objections do not seem to be applicable, wher
as a requirement for a valid mathematical stu
rigorously met. This is the field of language, wh
tural linguistics, with particular reference to ph
Language is a social phenomenon; and, of al
one which manifests to the greatest degree tw
which make it susceptible of scientific study.
guistic behavior lies on the level of unconscio
are not conscious of the syntactic and morph
Moreover, we are not ordinarily conscious of
to convey different meanings; and we are rarely
logical oppositions which reduce each phonem
features. This absence of consciousness, moreo
come aware of the grammar or the phonemic
this awareness is but the privilege of the scholar
lives and develops only as a collective constru
guistic knowledge always remains dissociated from
agent, for his mode of speech is not affected by
guage on a higher level. We may say, then, tha
not fear the influence of the observer on the
the observer cannot modify the phenomenon
of it.

Furthermore, as regards Wiener's second po

appeared very early in human history. There
scientifically only when written documents a
back a considerable distance, and furnishes lon
a valid subject for mathematical analysis. For
our disposal in studying Indo-European, Semiti
about four or five thousand years old. And,
dimension is lacking, the multiplicity of coexiste
other linguistic families, a spatial dimension t
We thus find in language a social phenomen
dependence of the object and long statistical ru
cate that language is a phenomenon fully qual
mathematicians for the type of analysis Wien
It is, in fact, difficult to see why certain lin

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LiVI-STRAUSS) LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL LAWS 157

solved by modern calculating machines. With knowledge of t

structure of a language and the laws which govern the grouping
and vowels, a student could easily use a machine to compute
tions of phonemes constituting the words of n syllables existing
lary, or even the number of combinations compatible with t
the language under consideration, such as previously defined.
into which would be "fed" the equations regulating the typ
with which phonemics usually deals, the repertory of soun
speech organs can emit, and the minimal differential values,
psycho-physiological methods, which distinguish between the ph
to one another, one would doubtless be able to obtain a com
totality of phonological structures for n oppositions (n being
wished). One could thus construct a sort of periodic table of l
tures that would be comparable to the table of elements whi
introduced into modern chemistry. It would then only remain
the place of known languages in this table, to identify the p
relationships of the languages whose first-hand study is still
give us a proper theoretical knowledge of them, and to disco
languages that have disappeared, are unknown, yet to come, or si
To add a last example: Jakobson has recently suggested th
may possess several coexisting phonological structures, each
intervene in a different kind of grammatical operation.2 Sinc
viously be a relationship between the different structural modali
language, we arrive at the concept of a "metastructure" which
thing like the law of the group (loi du groupe) consisting of its m
If all of these modalities could be analyzed by our machine, es
matical methods would permit it to construct the "metastr
language, which would in certain complex cases be so intricat
difficult, if not impossible, to achieve on the basis of purely em
gation.
The problem under discussion here can, then, be defined as follows. Among
all social phenomena, language alone has thus far been studied in a manner
which permits it to serve as the object of truly scientific analysis, allowing us
to understand its formative process and to predict its mode of change. This
results from modern researches into the problems of phonemics, which have
reached beyond the superficial conscious and historical expression of linguistic
phenomena to attain fundamental and objective realities consisting of systems
of relations which are the products of unconscious thought processes. The
question which now arises is this: is it possible to effect a similar reduction
in the analysis of other forms of social phenomena? If so, would this analysis
lead to the same result? And if the answer to this last question is in the affirma-
2Jakobson, R., 1948.

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158 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST [53, 1951

tive, can we conclude that all forms of social

nature-that is, do they consist of systems of
jection, on the level of conscious and socialized t
regulate the unconscious activities of the min
made here to do more than to sketch this probl
of reference and projecting the principal lines a
be effective.
Some of the researches of Kroeber appear to
in suggesting approaches to our problem, par
the styles of women's dress.' Fashion actually
nomenon which depends on the unconscious a
take note of why a particular style pleases us,
demonstrated that this seemingly arbitrary
These laws cannot be reached by purely empi
consideration of phenomena, but result from
ships between the various elements of costum
can be expressed in terms of mathematical fu
at a given moment, make prediction possible.
Kroeber has thus shown how even such a hi
behavior is susceptible of scientific study. Hi
pared not only with that of structural lingu
natural sciences. There is a remarkable analog
those of a contemporary biologist, G. Teissier, o
certain crustaceans.4 Teissier has shown that
of this growth, it has been necessary to cons
the component parts of the claws, and not the e
There, relationships allow us to derive con
of which it is possible to derive the laws which
organisms. The object of a scientific zoology,
mately concerned with the forms of animals an
ly perceived, but is to establish certain abstra
which constitute the basic nature of the phenom
An analogous method has been followed in
social organization, particularly marriage ru
been shown that the complete set of marriage
societies, and usually classified under different
tions, preferential forms of marriage, and the l
so many different ways of insuring the circulat
group, or, of substituting the mechanism of a s
for that of a biologically determined consan
3 Kroeber, A. L. and Richardson, J., 1940.
4 Teissier, G., 1936.
5 LMvi-Strauss, C., 1949, passim.

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LMVI-STRAUSS] LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL LAWS 159

hypothesis, it would only be neccesary to make a m

possible type of exchange between n partners to enab
ly to arrive at every type of marriage rule actually o
and, eventually, to discover others which are mer
understand their function and the relationships
others.
This approach was fully validated by the demon
deduction, that the mechanisms of reciprocity known
-namely, those based on dual organization and exc
two partners or whose number is a multiple of tw
of a wider kind of reciprocity between any numbe
tended to remain unnoticed, because the partners
of giving and receiving from one another, do not giv
receive, and do not receive from those to whom t
receive from different partners to whom they are bo
operates only in one direction.
This type of organization, no less important tha
thus far been observed and described only imperfe
ing with the results of mathematical study, data h
real extension of the system was shown and its first
At the same time, it became possible to explain th
marriage rules such as preferential marriage betw
or with only one kind of cross-cousin, on the fath
that of the mother (matrilateral). Thus, for example,
been unintelligible to anthropologists,' they were per
as illustrating different modalities of the laws of exc
reduced to a still more basic relationship between
the rules of descent.8
Now, these results have only been achieved by treating marriage regula-
tions and kinship systems as a kind of language, a set of processes permitting
the establishment, between individuals and groups, of a certain type of com-
munication. That the mediating factor, in this case, should be the women of
the group, who are circulated between clans, lineages, or families, in place of
the words of the group, which are circulated between individuals, does not at all
change the fact that the essential aspect of the phenomenon is identical in
both cases.
We may now ask whether, in extending the concept of communication so a
to make it include exogamy and the rules flowing from the prohibition of
cest, we may not, reciprocally, achieve insight into a problem that is still very
obscure, that of the origin of language. For marriage regulations, in rela
6 Ibid., pp. 278-380.
7 Ibid., pp. 558-566.
8 Ibid., pp. 547-550.

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160 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST [53, 1951

to language, represent a complex much more rou

It is generally recognized that words are sign
only ones who know that words have also been
are held by the social group to be values of the m
have difficulty in understanding how these value
endowed with a significant function. This amb
the reactions of persons who, on the basis of
referred to,9 have laid against it the charge of "
are referred to as objects.1' Of course, it may
women conceived as mere parts of a meaningf
keep in mind that the processes by which pho
though in an illusory manner-their characte
to pure signs, will never lead to the same results
For words do not speak, while women do; as prod
be reduced to the status of symbols or tokens
that the position of women, as actually found in
between men that is made up of marriage regula
may afford us a workable image of the type
existed at a very early period in the developm
beings and their words. As in the case of wom
compelled men to exchange words must be sough
tion which pertains to the symbolic function
simultaneously perceived as having a value
listener, the only way to resolve this contradicti
mentary values, to which all social existence r
These speculations may be judged utopian. Ye
tions made here are legitimate, a very import
susceptible of immediate verification. That i
whether the different aspects of social life (i
can not only be studied by the methods, and wit
to those employed in linguistics, but also wh
phenomena whose inmost nature is the same a
the words of Voegelin, we may ask whether t
but also "substantial comparabilities" between
How can this hypothesis be verified? It wil
analysis of the different features of social life, e
a complex of societies, so that a deep enough
possible to cross from one to the other; or to exp

9 Ibid., p. 616.
1o Ibid., p. 45 sq.
11 "Language and Culture: substantial and operational
by C. F. Voegelin to the symposium held at the 29th In
New York, 5-12 September, 1949, where these reflections w

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LAVI-STRAUSS] LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL LAWS 161

each in terms of a sort of general language, valid fo

and for all of them taken together. It would thus b
one had reached their inner nature, and to determin
same kind of reality. In order to develop this point,
tempted. It will consist, on the part of the anthropo
basic features of the kinship systems from different p
general enough to be meaningful to the linguist, and
by the latter to the description of the languages fro
could thus ascertain whether or not different types of
in the same societies-that is, kinship and language-
identical unconscious structures. Should this be the
of having reached a truly fundamental formulation.
If then, a substantial identity were assumed to e
structure and kinship systems, one should find, in the
world, languages whose structures would be of a typ
systems in the following terms:
1. Indo-European: As concerns the kinship systems
riage regulations of our contemporary civilization a
principle that, a few negative prescriptions being
fluidity of the population will achieve by itself the
societies have sought in more complicated sets of r
obtained by marriage in degrees far removed or ev
This statistical solution has its origin in a typical featur
European systems. These belong, in the author's te
formula of generalized reciprocity (formule simple d
However, instead of prevailing between lineages, th
tween more complex units of the brastsvo type, wh
of lineages, each of which enjoys a certain freedom wit
of general reciprocity in effect at the level of the clust
said that a characteristic feature of Indo-European
the fact that a problem set in simple terms always a
Should the linguistic structure be homologous wit
it would thus be possible to express the basic featu
guages as follows: The languages have simple struct
elements. The opposition between the simplicity of the
plicity of elements is expressed in the fact that sev
occupy the same positions in the structure.
2. Sino-Thibetan kinship systems exhibit quite a diffe
ity. They belong to or derive directly from the simples
procity, namely mother's brother's daughter marr
shown,"3 while this type of marriage insures social
12 L6vi-Strauss, C., 1949, pp. 583-591.
'3 Ibid., 1949, pp. 291-380.

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 162 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST [53, 1951

way, at the same time it permits this to be in

clude any number of participants.
Translated into more general terms appli
correspond to the following linguistic pattern
is complex, while the elements are few, a feat
tonal structure of these languages.
3. The typical feature of African kinship sy
bride-wealth system, coupled with a rather fr
with the wife's brother's wife. The joint result is
ity already more complex than the one with t
while the types of unions resulting from the cir
approaches, to some extent, the statistical m
society.
Therefore one .could say that African languages have several modalities
corresponding in general to a position intermediate between 1) and 2).
4. The widely recognized features of Oceanic kinship systems seem to lead
to the following formulation of the basic characteristics of the linguistic pat-
tern: simple structure and few elements.
5. The originality of American kinship systems lies with the so-called Crow-
Omaha type which should be carefully distinguished from other types showing
--the same disregard for generation levels.'4 The important point with the Crow-
Omaha type is not that two kinds of cross-cousins are classified in different
generation levels, but rather that they are classified with consanguineous kin
instead of with affinal kin as it occurs, for instance, in the Miwok system. But
systems of the Miwok type belong equally to the Old and the New World;
while when considering the differential systems just referred to as Crow-
Omaha, one must admit that, apart from a few exceptions, these are only typi-
cal for the New World. It can be shown that this quite exceptional feature of
the Crow-Omaha system results from the simultaneous application of the two
simple formulas of reciprocity, both special and general (echange restreint and
_change gindralise),16 Which elsewhere in the world were generally considered
to be incompatible. It thus became possible to achieve marriage within remote
degrees by using simultaneously two simple formulas, each of which independ-
ently applied could only have led to different kinds of cross-cousin marriages.
The linguistic pattern corresponding to that situation would be that cer-
tain of the American languages offer a relatively high number of elements,
which succeed in becoming organized into relatively simple structures by com-
pelling these to assume an asymmetrical form.

14 From this point of view, G. P. Murdock's suggestion that the Crow-Omaha type be merged
with the Miwok type (1949, pp. 224, 340) should be challenged.
15 L6vi-Strauss, C., 1949, pp. 228-233.

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LAVI-STRAUSS] LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL LAWS 163

It must be kept in mind that in the above highly

anthropologist proceeds from what is known to
namely from kinship structures to linguistic stru
differential characteristics thus outlined have a m
spective languages are concerned, remains for the lin
being a social anthropologist, and not a linguist, can
to which specific features of kinship systems he
toward a generalized formulation. Since the gener
have been fully developed elsewhere,16 short sket
for the purpose of this paper.
If the general characteristics of the kinship sys
areas, which we have tried to bring into juxtapo
characteristics of the linguistic structures of tho
linguists as an approach to equivalences of their
will be apparent, in terms of our preceding discussio
to the understanding of the fundamental characte
have been accustomed to think.
The road will then be open for a comparative structural analysis of cus-
toms, institutions, and accepted patterns of behavior. We will be in a position
to understand basic similarities between forms of social life, such as language,
art, law, religion, that, on the surface, seem to differ greatly. At the same time,
we will have the hope of overcoming the opposition between the collective
nature of culture and its manifestations in the individual, since the so-called
"collective consciousness" would, in the final analysis, be no more than the
expression, on the plane of individual thought and behavior, of certain time and
space modalities of these universal laws which make up the unconscious
activity of the mind.
MUS'E DE L'HOMME
PARIS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

JAKOBSON, R., 1948, The phonemic and grammatical aspect of language in their int
Actes du 66 Congrds International des linguistes, Paris.
KROEBER, A. L., and J. RICHARDSON, 1940, Three centuries of women's dress fashions
pological Records, Berkeley.
LivI-STRAuss, C., 1949, Les Structures Aidmentaires de la Parente, Paris.
MURDOCK, G. P., 1949, Social Structure, New York.
TEISSIER, G., 1936, La description math6matique des faits biologiques, Revue de Mi
et de Morale, Paris, Jan.
WIENER, N., 1948, Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in the Animal and t
Paris, Cambridge, New York.

16 Ibid.

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