CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REBECCA G.

ESTRELLA

Rebecca Estrella and her granddaughter, Rachel Fletcher, were aboard a BLTB bus bound for Pasay
City, when the aforementioned vehicle was rammed from behind by a tractor-truck owned by
CDCP in the South Expressway. The strong impact caused them to suffer major injuries.

Subsequently, Rebecca and Rachel filed a complaint for damages against CDCP (Construction
Development Corporation of the Philippines) and BLTB (Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus
Corporation) as well as their respective drivers, Espiridion Payunan Jr., and Wilfredo Datinguinoo
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

As such, the Trial Court found both CDCP and BLTB and their employees jointly and severally
liable to pay for actual damages amounting to P79, 254.43, and a sum of P10, 000 as attorney’s
fees or a total of P89, 254.43.

In their decision, the RTC held that BLTB, as a common carrier, was bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the safety of its passengers. It must carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence
of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. Hence, where a passenger
dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or has acted negligently.

As for CDCP, the trial court found that the tractor-truck it owned bumped the BLTB bus from
behind. Evidence points that CDCP’s driver was reckless and was speeding at the time of the
incident. Therefore, the gross negligence of its driver raised the presumption that CDCP was
negligent either in the selection or in the supervision of its employees which it failed to refute
thus making it and its driver liable to the aggrieved party.

That said, Rebecca and Rachel were unsatisfied with the award of damages and attorney’s
fees and moved for the reconsideration of the decision. Unfortunately, this was denied. They
then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court but
modified the amount of damages.

CDCP appealed the decision contending that liability for actual damages and attorney's fees is
based on culpa contractual, thus, only BLTB should be held liable. Respondents, on the other
hand, forward that petitioner is also at fault, hence, it was properly joined as a party.

Now, the issue in this case is whether CA gravely erred in not holding BLTB and/or its driver
Wilfredo Datinginoo solely liable for the damage sustained by Rebecca and Rachel.

The Supreme Court in relation to the issue at hand, upheld the ruling of the RTC and the CA finding
both CDCP and BLTB jointly and severally liable for damages.

The case filed by Rebecca and Rachel against CDCP is an action for culpa aquiliana or
quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In this regard, Article 2180 provides that the
obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable for the acts or omissions of those persons for
whom one is responsible.

Consequently, an action based on a quasi-delict may be instituted against the employer for an
employee’s act or omission. Nevertheless, the liability for the negligent conduct of the
subordinate is direct and primary, but it is the subject to the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of the employee.

In the instant case, the trial court found that CDCP failed to prove that it exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Payunan Jr.

In addition to that, the trial court and the Court of Appeals found petitioner solidarily liable with BLTB
for the actual damages suffered by Rebecca and Rachel because of the injuries they sustained.
Moreover, it was established that Payunan, Jr. was driving recklessly because of the skid marks as
shown in the sketch of the police investigator.

It is well-settled in Fabre Jr. vs CA that the owner of the vehicle which collided with a common
carrier is solidarily liable to the injured passenger of the same. Nor should it make any
difference that the liability of petitioner (in this case, the bus owner) springs from a contract while that
of respondents (the owner and driver of the vehicle) arises from a quasi-delict.

As in this case of BLTB, Rebecca and Rachel did not base their claim against it and its driver
exclusively on that breach of contract of carriage. After all, it was permitted for them to allege
alternative causes of action and join as many parties as may be liable on such causes of
action so long as they do not recover twice for the same injury.

What is clear from the cases is the intent of the aggrieved party to recover from both the carrier and
the driver, thus justifying the holding that the carrier and the driver were jointly and severally liable
because their separate and distinct acts concurred to produce the same injury.

In a "joint" obligation, each obligor answers only for a part of the whole liability; in a "solidary" or
"joint and several" obligation, the relationship between the active and the passive subjects is
so close that each of them must comply with or demand the fulfillment of the whole
obligation.

In Worcester v. Ocampo, the Supreme Court held that–

Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The persons
injured may sue all of them or any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole damages
caused by all, and all together are jointly liable for the whole damage. It is no defense for one sued
alone, that the others who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him as defendants; nor
is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort was insignificant as compared to that of the
others.