Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

A. GENERAL PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES Soon after, BBB arrived and found AAA crying. Appellant claimed he
scolded her for staying out late. BBB decided to take AAA with him. While
B. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE on their way to their maternal grandmother’s house, AAA recounted her
harrowing experience with their father. Upon reaching their grandmother’s
1) Requisites for admissibility of evidence house, they told their grandmother and uncle of the incident, after which,
they sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting.
People vs. Lauga
Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his
G.R. No. 186228 | March 15, 2010
underwear. He invited appellant to the police station, to which appellant
Ratio: Extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a obliged. At the police outpost, he admitted to him that he raped AAA
counsel, inadmissible in evidence. because he was unable to control himself.

Facts: That on or about the 15th day of March 2000, in the evening, at On the other hand, only appellant testified for the defense. He believed that
Barangay xxx, municipality of xxx, province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and the charge against him was ill-motivated because he sometimes physically
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, abuses his wife in front of their children after engaging in a heated
being the father of AAA with lewd design, with the use of force and argument, and beats the children as a disciplinary measure.
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally have
carnal knowledge with his own daughter AAA, a 13 year[s]old minor against
her will. RTC rendered its decision finding appellant guilty of rape.

On 12 October 2000, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. During the pre- CA affirmed the decision of the RTC
trial conference, the prosecution and the defense stipulated and admitted:
(a) the correctness of the findings indicated in the medical certificate of the Appellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession
physician who examined AAA; (b) that AAA was only thirteen (13) years with a "bantay bayan" and the credibility of the witnesses for the
old when the alleged offense was committed; and (c) that AAA is the prosecution.
daughter of the appellant. On trial, three (3) witnesses testified for the
prosecution, namely: victim AAA; her brother BBB; and one Moises Boy Issue: Whether or not Lauga’s extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy
Banting, a "bantay bayan" in the barangay. Their testimonies revealed the Banting was without the assistance of a counsel, in violation of his
following: constitutional right

In the afternoon of 15 March 2000, AAA was left alone at home. AAA’s Held: YES. The case of People v. Malngan is the authority on the scope of
father, the appellant, was having a drinking spree at the neighbor’s place. the Miranda doctrine provided for under Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of
Her mother decided to leave because when appellant gets drunk, he has the Constitution. In Malngan, appellant questioned the admissibility of her
the habit of mauling AAA’s mother. Her only brother BBB also went out in extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman and a neighbor
the company of some neighbors. of the private complainant. This Court distinguished. Thus:
Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this
particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for
At around 10:00 o’clock in the evening, appellant woke AAA up; removed
purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution.
his pants, slid inside the blanket covering AAA and removed her pants and
When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning
underwear; warned her not to shout for help while threatening her with his
of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the
fist; and told her that he had a knife placed above her head. He proceeded
fire that destroyed several houses. She was, therefore, already under
to mash her breast, kiss her repeatedly, and "inserted his penis inside her
custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by the Constitution should
vagina."
have already been observed or applied to her. Accused-appellant’s
confession to Barangay Chairman was made in response to the

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

‘interrogation’ made by the latter – admittedly conducted without first circumstances even strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as they
informing accused-appellant of her rights under the Constitution or done in erase doubts that such testimonies have been coached or rehearsed.
the presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-
appellant, given to Barangay Chairman, as well as the lighter found in her Case Digest: Pelagio, E.C.T.
bag are inadmissible in evidence against her.
But such does not automatically lead to her acquittal. The constitutional People vs. Abelardo Parungao
safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to those not elicited
through questioning by the police or their agents but given in an ordinary G.R. No. 125812 | November 28, 1996
manner whereby the accused verbally admits as in the case at bar when
Ratio: The general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible.
accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors.
However, the lock of objection to hearsay testimony may result in its being
Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this Court needs to
admitted as evidence. But one should not be misled into thinking that such
ascertain whether or not a "bantay bayan" may be deemed a law
declarations are thereby impressed with probative value. Admissibility of
enforcement officer within the contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the
evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence
Constitution.
whether objected to or not cannot be given credence for it has no probative
In People of the Philippines v. Buendia, this Court had the occasion to
value.
mention the nature of a "bantay bayan," that is, "a group of male residents
living in the area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their Facts: This case was predicated on the staged jailbreak by detention
community which is an accredited auxiliary of the PNP." prisoners in the Pampanga Provincial Jail where two jail guards were killed
This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer and one was seriously injured. During said jailbreak, firearms were also
organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the "bantay forcible taken from the armory.
bayan," are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions Because of this, an Information was filed against appellant
relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, Abelardo Parungao and 15 other prisoners charging them with Robbery
without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, with Homicide and Serious Physical Injuries.
and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a "bantay The prosecution presented four witnesses — Mario Quito, Ronnie Pilapil,
bayan," particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, Arnel Aldana, and Fernando Pacheco to establish the existence of
any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective conspiracy and that accused-appellant was a co-conspirator and a principal
insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided by inducement in the commission of the crime charged.
for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the
• Mario (prisoner) – his cellmates told him that the mastermind of
Miranda Rights, is concerned.
the jailbreak was Parungao
We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was
taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence. • Ronnie (detainee) – declared Mario Briones and Mario Quito told
Be that as it may, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of him that Parungao had asked them to join the jailbreak
the appellant was not deduced solely from the assailed extrajudicial • Arnel (jailguard) – he was told by Mario, Romeo and Pilapil that
confession but "from the confluence of evidence showing his guilt beyond Parungao was the mastermind of the jailbreak.
reasonable doubt." • Pacheco (jail guard trainee) – he heard Parungao ask Briones to
Appellant assails the inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her open Cell No. 1 while shouting “go ahead and kill those son of a
brother BBB. bitch”
The testimony of AAA does not run contrary to that of BBB. Both testified From this hearsay evidence, Parungao was convicted and sentenced
that they sought the help of a "bantay bayan." Their respective testimonies to lifetime imprisonment.
differ only as to when the help was sought for, which this Court could well Parungao files an appeal to the CA contending that the trial court committed
attribute to the nature of the testimony of BBB, a shortcut version of AAA’s an error by accepting and giving full probative value to the hearsay and
testimony that dispensed with a detailed account of the incident. uncorroborated testimony of the prosecution witnesses and on the basis
At any rate, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the assailed thereof, in finding him a co-conspirator and a principal by inducement.
inconsistency is too trivial to affect the veracity of the testimonies. In fact,
inconsistencies which refer to minor, trivial or inconsequential

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

Issue: Whether or not the testimonies of these four witnesses were According to the prosecution, Conchita Pasquin used Suarez travel agency
sufficient to prove Parungao guilty of said crimes. in as her residence. One morning on September 5, 1997, Conchita went to
a nearby law office and lent a magazine to a friend, Rowena Abril, a
Held: NO. As a general rule, hearsay evidence is not admissible. Thus, the secretary in the law firm. In the afternoon, Rowena heard loud noises
trial court erred in giving weight and credence to such testimonies as it was coming from Conchita’s office, but she did not pay too much attention to
violative of the hearsay rule, as it was not of their own personal knowledge the incident. Minutes later, a man passed by walking hurriedly and Rowena
but was only narrated to them by other detainees. There is nothing in their had the impression that the man came from the office of the travel agency.
testimony pointing to accused-appellant as the very source of their Rowena went to see Conchita to return the magazine, and noticed that the
information that he planned the jailbreak. door leading to Conchita’s office was open but the main door was closed.
Since nobody opened the door for her, Rowena decided to leave.
Conspiracy has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. It is a rule
that although there is no direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the At lunch time of the same day, Myla Miclat and her live-in partner Roel
crime, conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, Sicangco went to see Conchita to hand over the amount of P17,000.00 in
during, and after the crime which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted payment for Myla’s plane fare. Myla and Roel saw Johnny and Conchita
action, and concurrence of sentiments. The record is bereft of any evidence introduced him as his nephew who was a former drug addict, and that she
indicating a prior plan or agreement between accused-appellant and the was helping him mend his ways. Quizon was present when Myla gave the
other inmates in the implementation of a common design to bolt jail, kill the money to Conchita. Conchita told Myla that she was going to purchase the
guards, and rob the prison armory. There is no evidence that accused- ticket and instructed her to return later that day to pick it up. In the evening,
appellant participated in the killing of the two guards, Basa and Valencia, Myla returned but nobody opened the door. The following day, Myla
nor in inflicting injuries on Aldana. In fact, accused-appellant before, during, returned to Conchita’s office, but nobody was in sight. Myla went to the
and after the incident never left his cell. agency’s neighbor to inquire if there was someone inside the office. The
Case Digest: Magbitang, Krizia Maica G. neighbor climbed, peeped inside and saw a body covered with a blanket.

6) Direct and circumstantial evidence

The next day (September 6), a number of police officers and some people
were by then at the scene. Apparently, the policemen forced open the door
PEOPLE v. JOHNNY M. QUIZON and found the body of Conchita wrapped with a white blanket. Conchita’s
G.R. No. 142532 | November 18, 2003 jewelry box and the money paid by Myla were missing.
Ratio: The circumstances proved must be congruous with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent On the evening of September 6, Conchita’s husband received a call from
with any other hypothesis except that of guilt. A judgment of conviction his brother-in-law informing him of Conchita’s death. On his way to Angeles
based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances City, Pasquin chanced upon Conchita’s eldest brother who informed
proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable Pasquin that he received a call from Conchita who happened to mention
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the that Quizon was in her office at that time. Later, during the investigation,
guilty person. Pasquin showed Rowena a picture of Quizon and she identified him to be
the same person who passed by her in haste the afternoon of September
Facts: The RTC found Johnny M. Quizon guilty beyond reasonable doubt 5.
of the crime of Robbery with Homicide for allegedly having stolen
P17,000.00 and assorted jewelry, belonging to the Suarez Travel Agency
Upon investigation by the police, it was found out that Johnny’s relatives
and/or Conchita M. Pasquin, and on the occasion of the said robbery, he
were not aware of his whereabouts but could only say that on the morning
attacked and assaulted Conchita and as a direct result of which, Conchita September 6, Johnny and his live-in partner Fe Coronel went to Tondo,
died.
Manila. They decided to go to Fe’s house in Parañaque City and Fe’s
mother told them that Fe had left on Septmber 5 and had not returned since.

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

Johnny Quizon was arrested at his house in Quezon City by police 5. At around 2:00 o’clock of that same afternoon, Rowena Abril, a secretary
operatives a week after Conchita’s burial. of the law office adjacent to the Suarez’ office, heard three very loud noises
coming from the victim’s office. When Rowena went out after around 25
minutes to buy something at a nearby store, she saw the accused hurriedly
On the other hand, the defense’s version of the incident was that on the leaving the said office. The accused hurriedly left for Manila that same
evening of September 4, Nimfa, the second wife of Johnny’s father, asked afternoon leaving the victim behind who was also in a hurry to go to Manila
him to go and visit his aunt Conchita whose television set needed repair. to purchase the plane ticket of Myla Miclat.
At the office of Conchita, he found his aunt talking with Roel Sicangco and 6. At around 2:00 o’clock of that same afternoon, Rowena Abril heard
Myla Miclat. After Roel and Myla had left, Conchita told him that he could several knockings at the victim’s office but nobody opened the door.
not work as yet on the television set as she had a lot of other things to 7. At around 10 minutes before 5:00 p.m., Rowena Abril went to the office
attend to first in Manila. He left Conchita’s office and saw Roel and Myla of the victim to return the magazine the victim lent to her earlier, but nobody
waiting for a passenger jeepney. Johnny noticed a man on board a parked answered her, so she just left.
vehicle who was holding a clutch bag. He saw the man enter his aunt’s 8. Myla Miclat returned that evening at around 7:00 p.m. but nobody
office. This was also testified to by Roel, partner of Myla, a prosecution opened the door of the victim’s office.
witness. At home, he informed Nimfa that he was unable to repair 9. On September 7, 1997, the body of the victim was brought to the house
Conchita’s television set. The following morning, Nimfa was informed of of the accused but the latter never showed up during the entire wake for
Conchita’s death. Johnny was advised by Nimfa not to go to the wake the victim.
because Conchita’s brothers suspected him of being responsible for the 10. The police were not able to find him at his girlfriend’s house.
killing of their sister. Johnny stayed at the house of his live-in partner and 11. The accused also did not attend the burial.
came home only after the burial. 12. The alibi given by the accused for not attending the wake and the burial
of his aunt was that he was trying to avoid his uncles who were mad at him
In convicting Quizon, the RTC said that nobody actually saw how the victim because he was being suspected of killing his aunt. The accused was
was killed and how the robbery was committed. The Prosecution is relying arrested by the police at their house where the wake was held one week
only on circumstantial evidence to secure the conviction of the accused. after the burial hence, he was not really afraid of his uncles.
The circumstantial evidence introduced by the prosecution were 13. Instead of helping the police in solving the crime and apprehending the
considered by the RTC to determine whether the same would be sufficient killer of his aunt (as he claims to be innocent) the accused went into hiding
to convict the accused: immediately after the killing.
14. The victim was not able to leave for Manila to buy the plane ticket for
1. Conchita Pasquin was a victim of foul play. There were contusions and Myla Miclat but the said amount of P17,000.00 for the plane ticket was
abrasions on the upper part of the body. The steel door of the office was never recovered.
left open the whole night of the September 5 up to the early morning of
September 6, when the victim’s body was discovered. The light of the office In his appeal to the SC, Quizon raised that the RTC erred in finding him
was also on and her body was wrapped in a white blanket when discovered. guilty for the crime as he was not proved to be guilty beyond reasonable
Definitely she could not have died a natural death. doubt.
2. The accused was at the victim’s office in the afternoon of September 5, Issue: Whether or not Quizon may be held guilty beyond reasonable doubt
1997 when Myla Miclat gave the sum of P17,000.00 for the purchase of her of robbery with homicide
plane ticket in Manila.
3. The victim was in a hurry to leave for Manila to purchase Myla Miclat’s Held: NO. Section 4, Rule 133 provides:
plane ticket. In fact, Myla Miclat was told by the victim to return that evening "Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. -Circumstantial
to the office to get her ticket. evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
4. When Myla Miclat and her boyfriend left the victim’s office, there were no (a) There is more than one circumstance;
other person inside the office except the accused and the victim at around (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
2:00 o’clock in the afternoon. (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt."

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

reservation against the guilt of accused, the Court should entertain no other
The foregoing elements must all be obtaining in order to aptly warrant the alternative but to acquit him.
conviction of an accused. The circumstances proved must be congruous
Case Digest: Binua, L.J.I.
with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty
and inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilt. A judgment
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RUBEN BARON
of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the
G.R. No. 213215
circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair
and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all Ratio: The requirements for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction
others, as the guilty person. are settled. Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides
that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more
Evidently, Conchita Magpantay Pasquin was a victim of foul play. The than one circumstances; (b) The facts from which the inferences are
circumstances recited by the trial court, however, would be insufficient to derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is
convict the accused. Appellant’s mere presence at the locus criminis would such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
be inadequate to implicate him in the commission of the crime. No evidence Facts: Ruben Baron was accused of raping a 7-year-old child and drowned
was adduced that appellant was the last person to see or talk to the victim her to death. The witnesses testified that the accused was last seen with
before she was killed. Roel Sicangco testified that when he and Myla the child before the child’s mother noticed that she was missing. Eight
arrived at Conchita’s office, the latter had just finished talking to a woman witnesses, including two playmates of the child, testified of seeing the
and a man with a collector’s bag. After Roel and Myla finished their following: 1) that accused asked the child to come with him to the seawall;
transaction with Conchita, the same man and woman, whom they saw 2) that they saw a man wearing a white sleeveless shirt and shorts following
earlier, again entered Conchita’s office. Roel testified that he saw Johnny the child; 3) that they saw accused of going to and leaving the seawall; 4)
come out of the office and board a passenger jeepney. The prosecution that the trisakad used by the accused was seen parked in the seawall; 5)
failed to show that Sicangco had any good reason to lie. Even while the that accused was reluctant when the mother of the child asked the former
trial court had observed that Conchita’s jewelry and money were never to help find her; 6) that the medico-legal report shows that the child was
found, no evidence was introduced that appellant had them, or that he had indeed raped and drowned to death.
them in his possession at anytime after Conchita’s death. The trial court Accused, on the other hand, garnered witnesses for himself. He argued
found it strange that appellant did not wait for Conchita when the latter said that the prosecution has not established his involvement with certainty. The
that she was also leaving for Manila. Appellant said that he did offer to wait witnesses of the accused however, were not able to sufficiently prove that
for Conchita but she told him to go ahead as she still had some other work accused was with them during the critical time between 5-6 pm when the
to attend to. rape and killing happened.

The fact that appellant did not attend Conchita’s wake is not an indication Issue: Whether accused Ruben Baron’s guilt has been established beyond
of either flight or guilt. Nimfa Quizon would appear to have warned reasonable doubt by circumstantial evidence (YES).
appellant against going to the wake after he earned the ire of their relatives Held: A multiplicity of circumstances, which were attested to by credible
who had suspected him to be the killer. Significantly, no ill-motive was witnesses and duly established from the evidence, points to no other
ascribed on appellant to either kill or rob his own aunt. The circumstances conclusion than that accused was responsible for the rape and killing of the
recited by the trial court might be enough to create some kind of suspicion child. All the accused had offered as a defense was mere denial and an
on the part of the trial court of appellant’s involvement, but suspicion is not alibi which were not sufficiently supported by his witnesses. Likewise, the
enough to warrant conviction. A finding of guilt based on conjecture, even requisites to make circumstantial evidence sufficient pursuant to Rule 133,
if likely, cannot satisfy the need for evidence required for a pronouncement Sec 4 of the RoC were fully satisfied by the prosecution’s witnesses,
of guilt, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt of the complicity in the crime. including two children of tender age.
No matter how weak the defense is, it is still imperative for the prosecution Case Digest: Cruz, N. A.
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In case of any

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VILLACORTA testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses were candid and trustworthy
G.R. No. 172468 October 15, 2008 shall be accepted.
Ratio: Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not
per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the As regards the confession, the accused correctly pointed out the
crime. The two kinds of positive identification are as follows: 1) a witness inadmissibility of said confession thus shall be disregarded by the court.
may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of Case Digest: Cruz, N. A.
the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime,
also known direct evidence; or 2) when a witness may not have actually
seen the very act of commission of a crime, but he can positively identify a 7) Positive and negative evidence – Documented Alibi
suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime. The 2 kind pertains to
nd

an instance wherein the suspect was last seen with the victim before and Lejano vs. People
after the commission of the crime which forms part of circumstantial
G.R. No. 176389/176864| December 14, 2010
evidence.
Facts: Julie Gil was accused of deliberately setting fire a residential house. Ratio: In order for one to establish an alibi, the one accused must prove by
Accused was said to have poured kerosene on a mattress and ignited it, positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence the following: that he was present
damaging the residential house and the neighboring houses. Accused at another place at the time of the commencement of the crime; and that it
allegedly burned the house because she caught her live-in partner cheating was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
on her.
Facts: On June 30, 1991, Estrelita Vizconde and her daughter Carmela
The circumstantial evidence of the prosecution consisted of the following: nineteen and Jennifer seven were brutally slain at their home in Parañaque
1) that the accused caused a public disturbance two days prior the incident, City. Following an intense investigation, the police arrested a group of
stating that she will cause chaos and arson in the neighborhood; 2) that the suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court
accused was seen burning the mattress inside the room; 3) that accused smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the
was chased by the kagawad and was heard saying "Damay-damay na tayo identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the
diyan, huwag ninyo nang patayin ang sunog."; and 4) that the accused public whose interest were aroused by the gripping details of what
approached and admitted to a kagawad immediately after the incident that everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre. Four years later in 1995,
she was the person responsible for the conflagration. the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) announced that it had solved the
crime. It presented star witness Jessica Alfaro, one of its informers, who
claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to the accused Herbert
Accused contends that the circumstantial evidence of the prosecution failed Jeffrey Webb, Antonio “Tony Boy” Lejano, Artemio Dong Ventura, Michael
to produce the required quantum of proof to hold her criminally liable for Gatchalian, Hospicio Pyke Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel Ging
destructive arson. Specifically, that the alleged confession she made Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged police officer
before the kagawad was not admissible in evidence because she was not Gerardo Biong as an accessory after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro’s
assisted by counsel at the time it was executed. testimony, on August 10, 1995, the public prosecutors filed aninformation
Issue: Whether there is enough circumstantial evidence to convict the for rape with homicide against Webb and the others. The prosecution
accused (YES). presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating her
testimony. These included the medico-legal officer who autopsied the
Held: The chain of events before, during, and after the fire, as narrated by
bodies of the victims, the security guard of Pitong Daan subdivision, the
the prosecution’s witnesses, established beyond reasonable doubt that the
former laundry-woman of the Webb’s household, police officer Biong’s
accused committed the acts. The accused failed to show any
former girlfriend, and Lauro Vizconde, Estrelita’s husband.
"misconstrued, misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and
circumstances of substance" that could alter the outcome of the case. Issue: Whether or not, Hubert Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove
Likewise, for failure to show any motive by the witnesses to testify against his alibi.
her, the conclusive findings and observation of the trial court that the

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

Held: YES, to establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, Proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the
and satisfactory evidence that he was present at another place at the time operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
of the perpetration of the crime; and that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the scene of the crime. FACTS: Spouses Agatona Guevarra and Ciriaco Lopez had six (6)
children: Dominador Lopez, Enriqueta Lopez-Jumaquio, Victor Lopez,
Benigna Lopez-Ortiz, Rosario Lopez-dela Cruz, and Vicente Lopez—the
In the present case, Webb was able to provide positive, clear, and
father of petitioner Milagros Lopez Manongsong. The contested property
satisfactory evidence ranging from the stamps from his passport, eye
is a parcel of land in Las Piñas. The petitioners, Milagros and Carlito
witness accounts, and even a letter from the U.S. Attorney General. These
Manongsong, filed a Complaint alleging that Manongsong and
pieces of evidence, when put together strengthen his alibi that he was not
respondents are the owners pro indiviso of the Property. Invoking Article
in the location of where the massacre occurred.
494 of the Civil Code, they prayed for the partition and award to them of
an area equivalent to one-fifth (1/5) of the Property or its prevailing market
In line with this, the character of the star-witness was questioned by the value, and for damages. Petitioners alleged that Guevarra was the original
Supreme Court, and also her positive identification of the accused was owner of the Property. Upon Guevarra’s death, her children inherited the
lacking the requirements laid down by the Court. The requirements for Property. Since Dominador Lopez died without offspring, there were only
positive identification are the following, first the positive identification of the five children left as heirs of Guevarra. Each of the five children, including
offender must come from a credible witness. She is credible who can be Vicente Lopez, the father of Manongsong, was entitled to a fifth of the
trusted to tell the truth, usually based on past experiences with her. Her Property. As Vicente Lopez’ sole surviving heir, Manongsong claims her
word has, to one who knows her, its weight in gold. And second, the father’s 1/5 share in the Property by right of representation. The
witness’ story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently petitioners are the only descendants not occupying any portion of the
contrived. In this case, Alfaro’s character is already questionable because Property. Most respondents entered into a compromise agreement with
of her infamy in getting paid and squealing against other criminals. Because petitioners. The Jumaquio sisters actively opposed petitioners’ claim. The
she was also hanging around the NBI headquarters, does not help in Jumaquio sisters also presented a notarized kasulatan sa bilihan ng lupa.
enforcing a better character. Ultimately, also the time frame of when she Such kasulatan contains a provision which effected the sale of Justina
popped up as a witness was taken into account, taking a long 4 years Navarro, the mother of Agatona Guevarra, to Enriqueta Lopez-Jumaquio.
before facing the court – absent any spontaneity or sense of gravity of the The Clerk of Court certified the Kasulatan was notarized by Atty. Ruperto
situation. Q. Andrada and entered in his Notarial Register. The trial court held that
the Kasulatan was void for the reason that the lot was a conjugal property,
All of this together, the strength of the alibi of Webb, and the lack of therefore the conveyance made by Justina Navarro was invalid.
fulfillment of the requirements for positive identification wrecks the Aggrieved, the Jomaquio sisters elevated the case to the appellate court
testimony of Alfaro, destroying the eye-witness account, and setting the in which the CA reversed the ruling of the trial court and held that the
accused, and everyone else involved free; aside from those who are still at kasulatan was valid. According to the CA, no piece of evidence was
large. presented to substantiate the claim that the subject property was indeed
a conjugal property of Justina Navarro and her husband. As such, the
Case Digest by: CRUZ, Raymond Charles P. conveyance of Justina was valid.
ISSUE: Whether or not the kasulatan was valid.
C. BURDEN OF PROOF AND BURDEN OF EVIDENCE
RULING: Yes. The trial court’s conclusion that the Property was conjugal
Manongsong vs. Estimo was not based on evidence, but rather on a misapprehension of Article
160 of the Civil Code, which provides: All property of the marriage is
G.R. No. 136773 | June 25, 2003 presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. As the Court of Appeals
RATIO: The presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code applies only correctly pointed out, the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code
when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. applies only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the
marriage. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal Philtrust, rendering the entire principal loan, along with the accrued
partnership. There was no evidence presented to establish that Navarro interest and other charges, due and demandable. Philtrust repeatedly
acquired the Property during her marriage. There is no basis for applying demanded for payment, but to no avail, prompting Philtrust to file a Petition
the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code to the present case. for Extra judicial Foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, with Philtrust as
On the contrary, the Tax Declaration showed that the Property was the highest bidder at the public auction with a bid of P6M. Due to the
declared solely in Navarro’s name. This tends to support the argument insufficiency of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale to fully satisfy the
that the Property was not conjugal. Based from the foregoing, and from obligation of Shangrila, Philtrust filed the instant case. Subsequently,
the pieces of evidence presented by the Jumaquios to support their claim Philtrust filed a motion to declare Shangrila, Tan, and respondent
the property was indeed paraphernal property of Justina Navarro, it can Gabinete in default. The RTC dismissed the complaint without prejudice
be properly concluded that the conveyance effected by the kasulatan was due to the failure of Philtrust to present its evidence ex parte, while
valid. Philtrust filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted. In the
meantime, respondent Gabinete filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default
Case Digest: Masangcay, M.A.P. which was granted. After the cross-examination and re-direct examination
of Philtrust's witness, and after respondent Gabinete testified, the latter
filed a motion praying that the court direct the National Bureau of
Philtrust Bank vs. Gabinete Investigation (NBI) to conduct an analysis of respondent Gabinete's
signature appearing in the Continuing Suretyship Agreement which the
G.R. No. 216120 | March 29, 2017 RTC granted. A senior document examiner of the NBI, Efren Flores,
testified that he evaluated and made a comparative examination of the
RATIO: As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by submitted specimen and the document containing the questioned
clear, positive and convincing evidence, the burden of proof lies on the signature to determine whether they were written by one and the same
party alleging forgery. One who alleges forgery has the burden to establish person. After a thorough examination, it was found that the questioned
his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is of greater signatures and the standard sample signatures were not written by one
weight or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. In and the same person. The RTC rendered its Decision if favor of the
this case, the respondent was not able to prove the fact that his signature petitioner. The CA reversed the decision, stating that the RTC erred in not
was forged. giving due weight to the findings of the NBI Document Examiner based on
its finding that the sample standard signatures submitted by respondent
FACTS: Petitioner Philtrust Bank, a domestic commercial banking Gabinete to the NBI comprised only of his full signature and not his
corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, filed a shortened signature. The CA then concluded that there was no dearth of
complaint on March 8, 2006 against Shangrila Realty Corporation, a evidence to make an intelligent comparison of respondent Gabinete's
domestic corporation duly organized under Philippine laws, alongside shortened signature.
Elisa Tan and respondent Redentor Gabinete, alleging that petitioner ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in giving credence to the finding of
granted Shangrila's application for a renewal of its bills discounting line in
the NBI Document Examiner
the amount of P20M as shown by a letter-advice dated May 28, 1997
bearing the conformity of Shangrila's duly- authorized representatives,
RULING: Yes. The CA gravely committed an inaccurate appreciation of the
Tan and respondent Gabinete. The said loan was conditioned on the
facts and evidence presented in court. According to jurisprudence, a finding
execution of a Continuing Suretyship Agreement dated August 20, 1997,
of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting experts,
with Shangrila as borrower and respondent Gabinete and Tan as sureties,
and that the judge still exercises independent judgment on the issue of
primarily to guaranty, jointly and severally, the payment of the loan. Under
authenticity of the signatures under scrutiny. While we recognize that the
the Continuing Suretyship Agreement, the sureties shall jointly and
technical nature of the procedure in examining forged documents calls for
severally guarantee with the borrower the punctual payment at maturity of
handwriting experts, such is not mandatory or indispensable, because a
any and all instruments, loans, advances, credits and/or other obligations,
finding of forgery does not depend entirely on their testimonies. Judges
and any and all indebtedness of every kind, due, or owing to Philtrust, and
must also exercise independent judgment in determining the authenticity or
such interest as may accrue and such expenses as may be incurred by
genuineness of the signatures in question, and not rely merely on the
Philtrust. However, upon the maturity of the loan, Shangrila failed to pay

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

testimonies of handwriting expert is, to which, in this case, the RTC properly before the 15th day of each month, provided an advance rental for two (2)
exercised. Otherwise stated, a judge must therefore conduct an months is paid upon execution of the contract.
independent examination of the signature itself in order to arrive at a After the one year contract period expired, lessee Datalift continued in
reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity, and this cannot be done possession and enjoyment of the leased warehouse, evidently by
without the original copy being produced in court. Thus, Philtrust was acquiesance of lessor Belgravia or by verbal understanding of the parties.
correct in claiming that the standard signatures that were submitted to the Subsequently, Belgravia unilaterally increased the monthly rental to
NBI Questioned Documents Division could not be considered as sufficient P60,000.00 starting June 1994 to October 1994. Monthly rental was again
standards for comparison with the signature of defendant appearing on the increased from P60,000.00 to P130,000.00 beginning November 1994
Continuing Suretyship Agreement. As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed onwards, allegedly in view of the increased rental demanded by PNR on
and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence, the burden Sampaguita for the latter's lease of the former's lot whereon the warehouse
of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. One who alleges forgery has the in question stands. Because of the rental increase made by Belgravia,
burden to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence Datalift stopped paying its monthly rental for the warehouse. Thereafter,
which is of greater weight or more convincing than that which is offered in Sampaguita addressed demand letters to Datalift asking the latter to pay
opposition to it. In this case, the respondent was not able to prove the fact its rental in arrears in the amount of P4,120,000.00 and to vacate and
that his signature was forged. surrender the warehouse in dispute. The demands having proved futile,
Case Digest: Masangcay, M.A.P. Belgravia and/or Sampaguita filed with the MeTC of Manila their
complaint for ejectment against Datalift and/or its controlling stockholder,
D. PRESUMPTIONS Jaime B. Aquino.In their Answer with Counterclaim, the defendants
interposed that Lessor Belgravia likewise has no cause of action because
1) Conclusive presumptions it was neither the owner nor lessee of the lot whereon the warehouse
stands.
Datalift Movers v. Belgravia Realty Issue: Whether or not a lessor can be questioned regarding its title or better
G.R. No. 144268 | August 30, 2006 right of possession as lessor

Ratio: As one of the instances of conclusive presumptions, so long as there Held: NO. Under Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court:
is no showing that the lessor-lessee relationship has been terminated, the (b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of
lessor's title or better right of possession as against the lessee will eternally the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.
be a non-issue in any proceeding before any court. Conclusive presumptions have been defined as "inferences which the law
makes so peremptory that it will not allow them to be overturned by any
Facts: Sometime in 1987, PNR leased out the lot to Sampaguita contrary proof however strong." As long as the lessor-lessee relationship
Brokerage, Inc., pursuant to a written contract commencing on July 1, 1987 between the petitioners and Belgravia exists as in this case, the former, as
and terminating on June 30, 1990 for a monthly rental of P6,282.49, subject lessees, cannot by any proof, however strong, overturn the conclusive
to a 10% increase every year. presumption that Belgravia has valid title to or better right of possession to
Sampaguita thereafter entered into a special arrangement with its sister the subject leased premises than they have.
company, Belgravia Realty & Development Corporation whereby the latter
would put up on the lot a warehouse for its own use. True enough, Belgravia Case Digest: Tumbocon, A.J.A.
did put up a warehouse occupying an area of about 3,000 square meters
of the lot. However, instead of using the said warehouse for itself, Belgravia F) WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
sublet it to petitioner Datalift, represented by its president Jaime B. Aquino,
pursuant to a 1-year written contract of lease 1 dated October 2, 1990, 1a) Proof beyond reasonable doubt – Corpus delicti
commencing on October 5, 1990 and ending on October 5, 1991, subject
to extension upon mutual agreement by the parties. By the terms of lease, ARTURO G. RIMORIN, Sr. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Datalift shall pay Belgravia a monthly rental of P40,000.00 payable on or G.R. No. 146481 | 30 April 2003
Tickler: Blue Seal Cigarettes; Col. Panfilo Lacson

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

Ratio: Corpus delicti in its legal sense refers to the fact of the commission
of the crime, not to the physical body of the deceased or to the ashes of a Cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167 was searched and 305 cases of blue
burned building or - as in the present case - to the smuggled cigarettes. seal or untaxed cigarettes were found inside said truck. The cargo truck
The corpus delicti may be proven by the credible testimony of a sole driver known only as 'Boy' was able to escape while the other passengers
witness, not necessarily by physical evidence such as those or riders of said truck were apprehended, namely: Police Sgt. Arturo
aforementioned. Rimorin of Pasay City Police Force, Pat. Felicisimo Rieta of Kawit Police
Facts: Prosecution’s Version Force, and Gonzalo Vargas, a civilian.

October 12, 1979 - Col. Panfilo Lacson, then Chief of the Police Intelligence Petitioner’s Version
Branch of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group (MISG), received
information that certain syndicated groups were engaged in smuggling
activities somewhere in Port Area, Manila. Said activities were being done October 14, 1979 – While petitioner was at his Station at MIA, Leonardo
at nighttime and the smuggled goods in a delivery panel and delivery truck a.k.a Boy came and requested that he accompany him to Divisoria to haul
were escorted by police and military personnel. Col. Lacson fielded three household fixtures. They met at the gasoline station near Cartimar in Pasay
surveillance stake-out teams the following night along Roxas Boulevard City at 2:30 am, October 15. Boy introduced him to Gonzalo Vargas, a
and Bonifacio Drive near Del Pan Bridge to watch out for a cargo truck with mechanic and who is his co-accused herein. They went to the other
Plate No. T-SY-167 bound for Malabon but to no avail. The truck was gasoline station where he was introduced to Felicisimo Rieta who also
registered in the name of Teresita Estacio of Pasay City. boarded the truck.

October 14, 1979 (9:00 pm) - Col. Lacson and his men returned to the same They passed Roxas Boulevard on their way to Divisoria. But he noted
area, with Col. Lacson posting himself at the immediate vicinity of the 2nd something unusual. Boy, who was on the wheels, turned right before
COSAC (Constabulary Off Shore Anti-Crime Battalion) Detachment in Port reaching Del Pan Bridge and proceeded to pass under the bridge, a route
Area, Manila, because as per information given to him, the said cargo truck that will take them to Port Area and not Divisoria. Boy insists that there
will come out from the premises. About 3:00 a.m. an Isuzu panel came out would be some Cargo loaded. At a small carinderia fronting the Delgado
and returned before 4:00 a.m. of same day. Bros., Boy pulled over after Rieta commented that he was hungry. Rimorin
and Rieta got off the truck. Rimorin asked Rieta what would be loaded in
the truck but was ignored. they were ordered to pull over by men in a vehicle
October 15, 1979 (3:00-4:00 am) - 5 minutes before 4:00 am, a green cargo who upon alighting, poked guns at them. They introduced themselves as
truck with Plate No. T-SY-167 came out from the 2nd COSAC Detachment Metrocom agents. It was only two to three days later that he saw the alleged
followed and escorted closely by a light brown Toyota Corona car with Plate smuggled cigarettes at the office of the MISG when it was presented by the
No. GR-433 with 4 men on board. Lt. Col. Lacson ordered his men to investigator. They were not present when these alleged smuggled
intercept only the cargo truck. Thereafter, the cargo truck was intercepted. cigarettes were taken from the truck they rode in.
Col. Lacson noticed that the Toyota car following the cargo truck suddenly
made a sharp U-turn towards the North, unlike the cargo truck which was
going south. Almost by impulse, Col. Lacson's car also made a U-turn and After about an hour, the truck arrived. Rimorin and Rieta boarded the truck
gave chase to the speeding Toyota car, which was running between 100 and they drove towards Roxas Boulevard-Bonifacio Drive. Rimorin noted
KPH to 120 KPH. Col. Lacson sounded his siren. The chase lasted for less one more unusual thing. He expected Boy to have driven towards Rotonda
than 5 minutes, until said car made a stop along Bonifacio Drive, at the foot so they can go back to Divisoria but Boy drove straight ahead at the corner
of Del Pan Bridge. Col. Lacson and his men searched the car, and they of Aduana to Roxas Boulevard.
found several firearms, particularly: three (3) .45 cal. Pistol and one (1)
armalite M-16 rifle. He also discovered that T/Sgt. Ernesto Miaco was the RTC - Petitioner Arturo Rimorin Sr. was found violating the Tariff and
driver of the Toyota car, and his companions inside the car were Sgt. Customs Code and was guilty of smuggling 305 cases of assorted brands
Guillermo Ferrer, Sgt. Fidel Balita and Sgt. Robartolo Alincastre, the four of blue seal cigarettes which are foreign articles valued at P513,663.47
of them all belonging to the 2nd COSAC Detachment. They were found not including duties and taxes.
to be equipped with mission orders.

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

Bureau of Customs for the confiscated goods. Col. Panfilo Lacson's

CA - RTC Decision affirmed. The CA ruled that the defense of denial testimony on the apprehension of petitioner and on the seizure of the blue
interposed by petitioner paled in comparison with the overwhelming seal cigarettes was clear and straightforward.
testimonial and documentary evidence against him. It noted that while he
and his co-accused raised questions of fact in their appeal, they failed to Gregorio Abrigo, customs warehouse storekeeper of the Bureau,
show that the trial court had significantly erred in assessing the credibility categorically testify that the MISG had turned over to him the seized blue
of the testimonies of witnesses for respondent. seal cigarettes, for which he issued a Custody Receipt dated October 15,
1979.
Moreover, the CA held that the non-presentation in court of the seized blue
seal cigarettes was not fatal to respondent's cause, because the crime was We find no reason to depart from the oft repeated doctrine of giving
established by other competent evidence. credence to the narration of prosecution witnesses, especially when they
are public officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a
The appellate court, however, found no sufficient evidence against the regular manner.
other co-accused who, unlike petitioner, were not found to be in possession
of any blue seal cigarettes. It is well settled that findings of fact of lower courts are binding on this Court,
Issues: absent any showing that they overlooked or misinterpreted facts or
1. Whether it was necessary to present the seized goods to prove the circumstances of weight and substance. This doctrine applies particularly
corpus delicti. to this case in which the RTC's findings, as far as petitioner is concerned,
2. Whether petitioner knew that the cargo being transported was illegal. were affirmed by the appellate court.
3. Whether, in the sale of the seized cargo, a notice to petitioner was
required. 2. Second Issue: Knowledge of the Illegal Nature of the Goods
Held: 1. First Issue: Corpus Delicti Established by Other Evidence
The burden of proving knowledge that the seized goods were smuggled
Petitioner argues that he cannot be convicted of smuggling under the Tariff was no lodger incumbent upon respondent, as it had sufficiently
and Customs Code, because respondent failed to present the seized established the fact of possession. This point is clear from Section 3601 of
contraband cigarettes (305 cases of blue seal) in court. Corpus delicti refers the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended.
to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the body or
substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the ransom
money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person SEC. 3601 Unlawful Importation - "When, upon trial for a violation
murdered. Hence, to prove the corpus delicti, it is sufficient for the of this section, the defendant is to have or to have had possession
prosecution to be able show that (1) a certain fact has been proven — say, of the article in question, possession shall be deemed sufficient
a person has died or a building has been burned; and (2) a particular person evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant shall
is criminally responsible for the act. explain the possession to the satisfaction of the court; Provided,
however that payment of the tax due after apprehension shall not
constitute a valid defense in any prosecution under this section."
Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court
has ruled that even a single witness' uncorroborated testimony, if credible,
may suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may The prosecution competently established that (1) the 305 cases of untaxed
even be established by circumstantial evidence. blue seal cigarettes discovered inside the cargo truck were fraudulently
imported; and (2) petitioner was in control of the truck when it transported
the cargo on October 15, 1979. Petitioner was unable to satisfactorily
Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the corpus delicti had been explain his possession of the untaxed cigarettes, which the MISG agents
competently established by respondent's evidence, which consisted of the seized from him and his co-accused. Rather, he feigns ignorance of the
testimonies of credible witnesses and the Custody Receipt issued by the true nature of the cargo.

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

commission as they have already divided and distributed the balance of the
3. Third Issue: No Need for Notice to Petitioner commissions among their nephews and nieces.

The sale of the seized items, which were then already in the custody of the For their part, petitioners counter that there was a subsequent verbal
Bureau of Customs, was authorized under the Tariff and Customs Code. agreement entered into by the parties after the execution of the
Moreover, Section 2603 of the Code states that the seized goods shall be written agreement. Said verbal agreement provides that the 5% agent’s
sold at public auction after the required ten-day notice. commission shall be divided as follows: 2/5 for the agents, 2/5 for
Lourdes Raymundo, and 1/5 for the buyer, Hipolito. The share given to
Lourdes Raymundo shall be in consideration for the help she would
In the instant case, these were sold on November 15-16, 1979. Thus, extend in the processing of documents of sale of the property, the
absent any evidence to the contrary, the sale is presumed to have been payment of the capital gains tax to the Bureau of Internal Revenue and
conducted by public officers in the regular performance of their duties. in securing an order from the court. The 1/5 commission given to
Petitioner did not raise any objection to the presentation of the Notice of Hipolito, on the other hand, will be used by him for the payment of realty
Sale and the results of the auction as evidence for respondent. Clearly, his taxes.
belated protestation now comes as an afterthought.
Case Digest: Bulong, J. A. S.
Hence, for failure of the respondents to receive the balance of their agent’s
2) Preponderance of evidence commission, they filed an action for the collection of a sum of money
before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City.
Raymundo v. Lunaria
G.R. No. 171036 | October 17, 2008 RTC: 1) Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs
Facts: Sometime in May 1996, petitioners approached respondent Lunaria the amount of ₱1,834,900.00, representing the unpaid commission, plus
to help them find a buyer for their property situated at Marilao, Bulacan with interest thereon at the legal rate from the filing of this case until fully paid;
an area of 12,126 square meters for the amount of ₱60,630,000.
Respondent Lunaria was promised a 5% agent’s commission in the event 2) Ordering the defendants to, jointly and severally, pay the plaintiffs the
that he finds a buyer. After respondents found a buyer, Cecilio Hipolito, an amount of ₱200,000.00 as moral damages and the amount of ₱100,000.00
"Exclusive Authority to Sell" was executed embodying the agreement made as exemplary damages; and
by the parties. After the corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property was registered in the Registry of Deeds, a copy thereof was given
3) Ordering the defendants [to], jointly and severally, pay the plaintiffs the
to the Far East Bank and Trust Co., which was then holding in escrow the
amount of ₱150,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the costs of suit.
amount of ₱50,000,000 to be disbursed or paid against the total
consideration or price of the property.
CA: affirmed the decision of the trial court with the modification that the
amount of moral and exemplary damages awarded to respondents shall be
On February 14, 1997, Ceferino G. Raymundo, one of the co-owners,
reduced.
advised respondents to go to the bank to receive the amount of ₱1,196,000
Issues: 1. Whether the parole evidence rule should be applied in this case.
as partial payment of their total commission. Also, respondents were
instructed to return after seven days to get the balance of the commission
due them. 2. [Main issue indicated in the syllabus]: Whether the CA erred in
requiring, albeit implicitly, the petitioners to establish the verbal agreement
modifying the earlier written agreement (the Exclusive Authority to Sell) by
On February 21, 1997, respondents returned to the bank. However, the
more than a preponderance of evidence which is contrary to law that merely
check covering the balance of their commission was already given by the
requires preponderance of evidence in civil cases.
bank manager to Lourdes R. Raymundo, the representative of the
petitioners. Respondents tried to get the check from the petitioners,
however, they were told that there is nothing more due them by way of

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

3. Whether the CA erred in holding petitioners jointly and severally liable receive by virtue of the Exclusive Authority to Sell with Lourdes G.
for the payment of the entire broker’s fees. Raymundo and Hipolito, it passes understanding why no written agreement
Held: 1. NO. Anent the first issue, petitioners contend that the CA erred to that effect was ever made. The absence of such written agreement is
in applying the parol evidence rule to the facts of the case because the mute but telling testimony that no such sharing arrangement was ever
verbal agreement was entered into subsequent to the written agreement. made.
Further, they aver that there is no rule that requires an agreement modifying
an earlier agreement to be in the same form as the earlier agreement in 2. NO. As to the second issue, petitioners contend that the appellate court
order for such modification or amendment to be valid. erred in requiring them to prove the existence of the subsequent verbal
agreement by more than a mere preponderance of evidence since no rule
Conversely, respondents argue that the CA did not apply the parol of evidence requires them to do so. In support of this allegation, petitioners
evidence rule in this case. Although the appellate court stated and presented petitioner Lourdes Raymundo who testified that she was given
emphasized the general legal principle and rule on parol evidence, it did 2/5 share of the commission pursuant to the verbal sharing scheme
not apply the parol evidence rule with regard to the evidence adduced by because she took care of the payment of the capital gains tax, the
the petitioners. preparation of the documents of sale and of securing an authority from the
court to sell the property.
SC rules for the respondents. To begin with, we agree with petitioners’
claim that the parol evidence rule does not apply to the facts of this For their part, respondents counter that the appellate court did not require
case. First, the parol evidence rule forbids any addition to or petitioners to prove the existence of the subsequent oral agreement by
contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by testimony or more than a mere preponderance of evidence. What the appellate court
other evidence purporting to show that, "at or before" the execution said is that the petitioners failed to prove and establish the alleged
of the parties’ written agreement, other or different terms were agreed subsequent verbal agreement even by mere preponderance of evidence.
upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract.
Notably, the claimed verbal agreement was agreed upon not prior to but Petitioners’ abovecited allegation has no merit. By preponderance of
"subsequent to" the written agreement. Second, the validity of the evidence is meant that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side
written agreement is not the matter which is being put in issue here. is superior to that of the other. It refers to the weight, credit and value
What is questioned is the validity of the claim that a subsequent verbal of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to
agreement was agreed upon by the parties after the execution of the be synonymous with the term "greater weight of evidence" or "greater
written agreement which substantially modified their earlier written weight of the credible evidence". It is evidence which is more
agreement. convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered
in opposition thereto.
Nonetheless, even if we apply the parol evidence rule in this case, the
evidence presented by the petitioners fell short in proving that a Both the appellate court and trial court ruled that the evidence presented
subsequent verbal agreement was in fact entered into by the parties. by the petitioners is not sufficient to support their allegation that a
We subscribe to the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court subsequent verbal agreement was entered into by the parties. In fact,
that the evidence presented by petitioners did not establish the both courts correctly observed that if Lourdes Raymundo was in reality
existence of the alleged subsequent verbal agreement. As pointed out offered the 2/5 share of the agent’s commission for the purpose of assisting
by the trial court: respondent Lunaria in the documentation requirement, then why did the
petitioners not present any written court order on her authority, tax receipt
Note that no written evidence was presented by the defendants to or sales document to support her self-serving testimony? Moreover, even
show that the plaintiffs [herein respondents] agreed to the above- the worksheet allegedly reflecting the commission sharing was unilaterally
sharing of the commission. The fact is that the plaintiffs are denying prepared by petitioner Lourdes Raymundo without any showing that
having ever entered into such sharing agreement. For if the plaintiffs as respondents participated in the preparation thereof or gave their assent
sales agents indeed agreed to share the commission they are entitled to thereto. Even the alleged payment of 1/5 of the commission to the buyer to

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

be used in the payment of the realty taxes cannot be given credence since consider the increase in the award of rentals as reasonable given the
the payment of realty taxes is the obligation of the owners, and not the particular circumstances of each case.
buyer. Lastly, if the said sharing agreement was entered into pursuant to
the wishes of the buyer, then he should have been presented as witness to Facts:
corroborate the claim of the petitioners. However, he was not. Respondents-spouses Reynaldo and Maria Luisa Tanjangco own Lots 68
and 69 located at Corinthian Gardens Subdivision, Quezon City, which is
managed by petitioner Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. (Corinthian).
3. NO. Petitioners contend that the appellate court erred in holding that
On the other hand, respondents-spouses Frank and Teresita Cuaso (the
the petitioners were each jointly and severally liable for the payment of the
Cuasos) own Lot 65 which is adjacent to the Tanjangcos’ lots.
broker’s fees. They contend that the Civil Code provides that unless the
parties have expressly agreed to be jointly and severally liable for the entire
broker’s fees, each of the petitioners should only be held liable to the extent Before the Cuasos constructed their house on Lot 65, a relocation survey
of their pro-indiviso share in the property sold. was necessary. As Geodetic Engineer Democrito De Dios (Engr. De Dios),
operating under the business name D.M. De Dios Realty and Surveying,
conducted all the previous surveys for the subdivision's developer,
For their part, respondents argue that the appellate court did not err in
Corinthian referred Engr. De Dios to the Cuasos. Before, during and after
affirming the joint and several liability of the petitioners. They aver that if
the construction of the said house, Corinthian conducted periodic ocular
there was error on the part of the trial court, it was not raised or assigned
inspections in order to determine compliance with the approved plans
as error by petitioners in their appeal. It was also not included in the
pursuant to the Manual of Rules and Regulations of Corinthian.
Statement of Issues in their brief which they submitted for resolution by the
Unfortunately, after the Cuasos constructed their house employing the
Court of Appeals. In fact, the same was never mentioned, much less
services of C.B. Paraz & Construction Co., Inc. (C.B. Paraz) as builder,
questioned, by petitioners in their brief.
their perimeter fence encroached on the Tanjangcos’ Lot 69 by 87 square
meters.
On this score, SC agrees with respondents. The general rule is that once
an issue has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent
Since there was no amicable reached by both parties, the Tanjangcos
court, it can no longer be controverted anew and should be finally laid
demanded that the Cuasos demolish the perimeter fence but the latter
to rest. In this case, petitioners failed to address the issue on their
failed and refused, prompting the Tanjangcos to file with the RTC a suit
solidary liability when they appealed to the Court of Appeals. They are
against the Cuasos for Recovery of Possession with Damages.
now estopped to question that ruling. As to them, the issue on their
liability is already valid and binding.
Case Digest: Bulong, J. A. S. RTC: The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the Tanjangcos. It ruled that
the Cuasos’ perimeter wall encroached on the land of the Tanjangos by 87
square meters. It, however, ruled that the Cuasos were builders in good
faith, and gave the Tanjangcos the option to sell and the Cuasos the option
G. JUDICIAL NOTICE AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
to buy the encroaching portion of the land, at a price to be agreed upon by
the parties within sixty (60) days from receipt of the said Decision. In the
2b) Matters of Judicial Notice - Discretionary
event that the Cuasos were unable and unwilling to purchase the said
portion, the perimeter wall should be demolished at the latter’s expense.
Corinthian Garden v. Spouses Tanjangco The RTC also ordered the Cuasos to pay monthly rentals of P2,000.00
commencing from the time of the filing of the complaint.
G.R. No. 160795 | June 27, 2008

Ratio: Mere judicial notice is inadequate, because evidence is required for CA: The CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision. It held that the
a court to determine the proper rental value. However, the Court may Cuasos acted in bad faith in land-grabbing the 87 square meter-portion of
Lot 69 as of April 5, 1989. Correlatively, the CA allowed the Tanjangcos to
exercise the rights granted under the New Civil Code, which include the

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

right to demand the demolition of the offending perimeter wall after Ordinances are not included in the enumeration of matters covered by
reimbursing the Cuasos the necessary expenses for the preservation of the mandatory judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
encroached area. The Cuasos were ordered to pay monthly rentals of
P10,000.00 for the use, enjoyment and occupancy of the lot from 1989 up Facts:
to the time they vacate the property considering the location and category Petitioners in an original petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules
of the same. of Court, sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., then
Issue: mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. Ordinance No.
8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has legal basis to increase unilaterally and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the
and without proof the amount prayed for in the Complaint. reclassification to cease and desist from operating their businesses within
six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the
Held: businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of
YES. In Spouses Badillo v. Tayag, the Court held that courts may fix the the oil companies.
reasonable amount of rent for the use and occupation of a disputed
property.
This was the factual backdrop presented to the Court which became the
basis of the Court’s March 7, 2007 decision. It ruled that respondent had
In Herrera v. Bollos, this Court declared that the reasonable amount of rent the ministerial duty under the Local Government Code (LGC) to "enforce
could be determined not by mere judicial notice, but by supporting all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city," including
evidence. Ordinance No. 8027. The Court concluded that there was nothing that
legally hindered respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.
Truly, mere judicial notice is inadequate, because evidence is required for
a court to determine the proper rental value. But contrary to Corinthian's The oil companies called the Court’s attention to the fact that on April 25
arguments, both the RTC and the CA found that indeed rent was due the Chevron as well as Shell had filed two different complaints against
Tanjangcos because they were deprived of possession and use of their respondent and the City of Manila in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
property. This uniform factual finding of the RTC and the CA was based on Manila for the annulment of Ordinance No. 8027 with application for writs
the evidence presented below. Moreover, in Spouses Catungal v. Hao, we of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction
considered the increase in the award of rentals as reasonable given the and prohibition and mandamus, respectively. These two cases were
particular circumstances of each case. We noted therein that the consolidated and the RTC issued an order dated granting the applications.
respondent denied the petitioners the benefits, including rightful
possession, of their property for almost a decade.
Thereafter, in 2006, the city council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8119.
Aggrieved anew, Chevron and Shell filed a complaint in the RTC Manila
Similarly, in the instant case, the Tanjangcos were deprived of possession asking for the nullification of Ordinance No. 8119.
and use of their property for more than two decades through no fault of their Issue:
own. Thus, we find no cogent reason to disturb the monthly rental fixed by
the CA. Whether or not the trial court may take judicial notice of Ordinance No.
Case Digest: Delgado, J.W.M. 8119.

Held:
Social Justice Society v. Atienza NO. The March 7, 2007 decision did not take into consideration the
G.R. No. 156052 | February 13, 2008 passage of Ordinance No. 8119 which was approved by respondent on
June 16, 2006. The simple reason was that the Court was never informed
Ratio: While courts are required to take judicial notice of the laws enacted about this ordinance.
by Congress, the rule with respect to local ordinances is different.

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

While courts are required to take judicial notice of the laws enacted by and financial claims, which were converted into three Promissory Notes
Congress, the rule with respect to local ordinances is different. Ordinances issued by MMC in favor of GHI totaling P500M and secured by mortgages
are not included in the enumeration of matters covered by mandatory over MMC’s properties. Later, DBP and PNB transferred it to the National
judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. Government for disposition or privatization because it had become a non-
performing asset.
Even where there is a statute that requires a court to take judicial notice of
municipal ordinances, a court is not required to take judicial notice of A purchase and sale agreement was executed between GHI and Asset
ordinances that are not before it and to which it does not have access. The Privatization Trust (APT), the former bought ninety percent (90%) of MMC's
party asking the court to take judicial notice is obligated to supply the court shares and financial claims. These financial claims were converted into
with the full text of the rules the party desires it to have notice of. Counsel three Promissory Notes issued by MMC in favor of GHI totaling P500M and
should take the initiative in requesting that a trial court take judicial notice secured by mortgages over MMC's properties.
of an ordinance even where a statute requires courts to take judicial notice
of local ordinances. Upon signing of the purchase and sale agreement and satisfaction of the
stipulated down payment, GHI immediately took possession of MMC’s mine
The intent of a statute requiring a court to take judicial notice of a local site and facilities, as took over MMC’s managements and operations.
ordinance is to remove any discretion a court might have in determining However, on August 23, 1996, a labor dispute concerning refusal to bargain
whether or not to take notice of an ordinance. Such a statute does not direct collectively and unfair labor practice arose between MMC and NAMAWU,
the court to act on its own in obtaining evidence for the record and a party with the latter filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and
must make the ordinance available to the court for to take notice. Mediation Board (NCMB).
Case Digest: Delgado, J.W.M. Acting Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Secretary, now also
an Associate Justice of this Court, Arturo D. Brion, on motion of NAMAWU,
directed the issuance of a partial writ of execution (Brion Writ), and ordered
“G” Holdings, Inc. v. National Mines and Allied Workers Union Local
(NAMAWU), et. al. the DOLE sheriffs to proceed to the MMC premises for the execution of the
G.R. No. 160236| October 16, 2009 same. The Court affirmed the propriety of the issuance of Brion Writ in the
case of Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Brion and NAMAWU.
Ratio: Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine
whether or not the case pending is a moot one or whether or not a previous Unfortunately, the Brion Writ was not fully satisfied because MMC’s
ruling is applicable to the case under consideration. resident manager resisted its enforcement. On motion of NAMAWU, then
DOLE Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas ordered the issuance ofAlias Writ
Facts: Petitioner “G” Holdings, Inc. (GHI) is a domestic corporation of Execution and Break-Open Order (Sto. Tomas Writ). On October 11,
primarily engaged in the business of owning and holding shares of stocks 2002, the respondent acting sheriffs, the members of the union, and several
of different companies. It was registered in SEC. Private respondent armed men implemented the Sto. Tomas Writ, and levied on the properties
National Allied Workers Union Local 103 (NAMAWU) was the exclusive of MMC located at its compound in Sipalay, Negros Occidental.
bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of Maricalum Mining Thus, GHI filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan City,
Corporation (MMC), an entity operating a copper mine and mill complex at Negros Occidental, Special Civil Action for Contempt with Prayer for the
Sipalay, Negros Occidental. MMC was incorporated by the Development Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and the Philippine National Bank (PNB) on Injunction and to Nullify the Sheriff’s Levy on Properties.
account of their foreclosure of Marinduque Mining and Industrial
Corporation’s assets.
GHI asserted that the levied properties were the subject of a Deed of Real
Estate and Chattel Mortgage, dated September 5, 1996 executed by MMC
Later, DBP and PNB transferred it to the National Government for in favor of GHI to secure the aforesaid ₱550M promissory notes; that this
disposition or privatization because it had become a non-performing asset. deed was registered on February 24, 2000; and that the mortgaged
On October 2, 1992, GHI and Asset Privatization Trust (APT) entered into properties were already extrajudicially foreclosed in July 2001 and sold to
a Purchase and Sale Agreement, where GHI bought 90% of MMC’s shares

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

GHI as the highest bidder on December 3, 2001, as evidenced by the Issue: Whether or not the Court may take judicial notice of its decision in
Certificate of Sale dated December 4, 2001. Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Hon. Arturo D. Brion and NAMAWU.

Held: Yes.
The trial court issued ex parte a TRO effective for 72 hours, and set the
Judicial notice must be taken by this Court of its Decision in Maricalum
hearing on the application for a writ of injunction. On October 17, 2002, the
Mining Corporation v. Hon. Arturo D. Brion and NAMAWU, wherein the
trial court ordered the issuance of a Writ of Injunction (issued on October
Court held right of herein private respondent, NAMAWU, to its labor claims.
18, 2002) enjoining the DOLE sheriffs from further enforcing the Sto.
Tomas Writ and from conducting any public sale of the levied-on properties,
subject to GHI’s posting of a ₱5M bond. Upon the same principle of judicial notice, we acknowledge our Decision in
NAMAWU’s separate motions for the reconsideration of the injunction order Republic of the Philippines, through its trustee, the Asset Privatization Trust
and for the dismissal of the case, the RTC issued its December 4, 2002 v. "G" Holdings, Inc., in which GHI was recognized as the rightful purchaser
Omnibus Order, which denied the NAMAWU Local 103’s motion for of the shares of stocks of MMC, and thus, entitled to the delivery of the
reconsideration. company notes accompanying the said purchase.

Thus, NAMAWU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, These company notes, consisting of three (3) Promissory Notes, were part
assailing the orders of the RTC. The appellate court rendered a Decision of the documents executed in 1992 in the privatization sale of MMC by the
setting aside the RTC issuances and directing the immediate execution of Asset Privatization Trust (APT) to GHI. Each of these notes uniformly
the Sto. Tomas Writ. contains stipulations "establishing and constituting in favor of GHI"
mortgages over MMC’s real and personal properties. The stipulations were
subsequently formalized in a separate document denominated Deed of
CA ruled that the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage on September 5, 1996. Thereafter, the
September 5, 1996 Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage yielded the
Deed was registered on February 4, 2000. We find both decisions critically
conclusion that the deed was sham, fictitious and fraudulent; that it was
relevant to the instant dispute. In fact, they should have guided the courts
executed two weeks after the labor dispute arose in 1996, but surprisingly,
below in the disposition of the controversy at their respective levels.
it was registered only on February 24, 2000, immediately after the Court
affirmed with finality the Quisumbing Order. The CA also found that the
certificates of title to MMC’s real properties did not contain any annotation These decisions respectively confirm the right of NAMAWU to its labor
of a mortgage lien, and, suspiciously, GHI did not intervene in the long claims and affirm the right of GHI to its financial and mortgage claims over
drawn-out labor proceedings to protect its right as a mortgagee of virtually the real and personal properties of MMC, as will be explained below. The
all the properties of MMC. assailed CA decision apparently failed to consider the impact of these two
decisions on the case at bar.
It was also ruled that the subsequent foreclosure of the mortgage was
irregular, effected precisely to prevent the satisfaction of the judgment Thus, we find it timely to reiterate that: "courts have also taken judicial
against MMC. It noted that the foreclosure proceedings were initiated in notice of previous cases to determine whether or not the case
July 2001, shortly after the issuance of the Brion Writ; and, more pending is a moot one or whether or not a previous ruling is
importantly, the basis for the extrajudicial foreclosure was not the failure of applicable to the case under consideration." However, the CA correctly
MMC to pay the mortgage debt, but its failure "to satisfy any money assessed that the authority of the lower court to issue the challenged writ
judgment against it rendered by a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction, of injunction depends on the validity of the third party’s (GHI’s) claim of
in favor of any person, firm or entity, without any legal ground or reason." ownership over the property subject of the writ of execution issued by the
Further, the CA pierced the veil of corporate fiction of the two corporations. labor department.

Hence, GHI filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Accordingly, the main inquiry addressed by the CA decision was whether
GHI could be treated as a third party or a stranger to the labor dispute,
whose properties were beyond the reach of the Writ of Execution dated

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

December 18, 2001. In this light, all the more does it become imperative to Provided, however, that at the termination of the Contract, the lessee shall
take judicial notice of the two cases aforesaid, as they provide the return the two cubicles in its original conditions at their expenses; and
necessary perspective to determine whether GHI is such a party with a agreed to keep the cubicles in a safe and sanitary conditions, and shall not
valid ownership claim over the properties subject of the writ of execution. keep any kinds of flammable or combustible materials.
In Juaban v. Espina, we held that "in some instances, courts have also
taken judicial notice of proceedings in other cases that are closely It was also stipulated that in case the lessees fail to pay the monthly rental
connected to the matter in controversy. These cases may be so closely every time it falls due or violate any of the conditions, it would be a ground
interwoven, or so clearly interdependent, as to invoke a rule of judicial to terminate this Contract of Lease. The contract shall be from December
notice." The two cases that we have taken judicial notice of are of 1999 to December 2005.
such character, and our review of the instant case cannot stray from
the findings and conclusions therein.
A year after the commencement of the lease, Rosalie, through counsel,
sent the spouses a letter demanding payment of back rentals and should
they fail to do so, to vacate the leased cubicles. However, Spouses Latip
Case Digest: Maramag, I.K..
did not heed Rosalie's demand. Thus, respondent Chua instituted the
aforesaid complaint.
Spouses Latip refuted Rosalie's claims. They averred that the lease of the
two (2) cubicles had already been paid in full as evidenced by receipts
showing payment to Rosalie of the total amount of P2,570,000.00. The
three (3) receipts, in Rosalie's handwriting which states that respondent
Spouses Latip vs. Rosemarie Chua
Chua received the amount of Php 2,000,000 pesos from Spouses Latip for
G.R. No. 177809| October 16, 2009 the payment of 2 cubicles located in Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Rd.
Baclaran, Paranaque City. Spouses
Ratio: Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal
knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and Spouses Latip asserted that in October 1999, Rosalie offered for sale lease
he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not rights over two (2) cubicles in Roferxane Bldg. Having in mind the brisk sale
generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. of goods during the Christmas season, they readily accepted Rosalie's offer
to purchase lease rights in Roferxane Bldg., which was still under
Facts: construction at the time. According to Spouses Latip, the immediate
payment of P2,570,000.00 would be used to finish construction of the
Respondent Rosalie Chua (Rosalie) is the owner of Roferxane Building, a building giving them first priority in the occupation of the finished cubicles.
commercial building, located at No. 158 Quirino Avenue corner As soon as two (2) cubicles were finished, Spouses Latip occupied them
Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran, Parañaque City. On July 6, 2001, without waiting for the completion of five (5) other stalls. Spouses Latip
Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages against averred that the contract of lease they signed had been novated by their
petitioners, Spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip (Spouses Latip). Rosalie purchase of lease rights of the subject cubicles.
attached to the complaint a contract of lease over two cubicles in Roferxane
Bldg., signed by Rosalie, as lessor, and by Spouses Latip, as lessees. METC: ruled in favor of Rosalie Chua, rendering Spouses Latip to vacate
the subject property. The Spouses are also ordered to pay Rosalie the
The Contract of Lease states that the lessor leases two cubicles located at amount of Php 720,000 as rent from December 1999 to December 2000
the 1 and 2 Floor of the building with an area of 56 square meters, with a
st nd
and to pay Rosalie Php 72,000 from January 2001 to December 2002.
monthly rental of sixty (60) thousand pesos. Due to unstable power of the
peso, lessees agrees to a yearly increase of ten (10) percent of the monthly RTC: reversed the MeTC and ruled in favor of Spouses Latip. The RTC did
rental. It was also agreed that the LESSEES shall not sub-let or make any not give credence to the contract of lease, ruling that it was not notarized
alteration in the cubicles without a written permission from the LESSOR. and, incomplete.

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and

The RTC noted that the contract of lease lacked: (1) the signature of symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts
Ferdinand Chua, Rosalie's husband; (2) the signatures of Spouses Latip of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
on the first page thereof; (3) the specific dates for the term of the contract Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
which only stated that the lease is for "six (6) years only starting from departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time,
December 1999 or up to December 2005"; (4) the exact date of execution and the geographical divisions.
of the document, albeit the month of December and year 1999 are indicated
therein; and (5) the provision for payment of deposit or advance rental SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial
which is supposedly uncommon in big commercial lease contracts. notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of
The RTC believed the claim of Spouses Latip that the contract of lease was their judicial functions.
modified and supplemented; and the entire lease rentals for the two (2)
cubicles for six (6) years had already been paid by Spouses Latip in the The Court cited State Prosecutors v. Muro which held that: The doctrine of
amount of P2,570,000.00. As to Rosalie's claim that her receipt of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power
P2,570,000.00 was simply goodwill payment by prospective lessees to to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care
their lessor, and not payment for the purchase of lease rights, the RTC must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every
pointed out that Rosalie did not adduce evidence to substantiate this reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the
claim. On the whole, the RTC declared an existent lease between the negative.
parties for a period of six (6) years, and already fully paid for by Spouses
Latip. Thus, Spouses Latip could not be ejected from the leased premises Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material
until expiration of the lease period. requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
CA reversed the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MeTC, ruling that (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
the alleged defects of the contract did not render the contract ineffective. and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the
On the issue of whether the amount of P2,570,000.00 merely constituted court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed
payment of goodwill money, the CA took judicial notice of this common to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that
practice in the area of Baclaran, especially around the Redemptorist judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and
Church. According to the appellate court, this judicial notice was bolstered facts of general notoriety.
by the Joint Sworn Declaration of the stallholders at Roferxane Bldg. that But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal
they all had paid goodwill money to Rosalie prior to occupying the stalls knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and
thereat. he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not
generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial
cognizance is taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known.
Issue: Whether or not Spouses Latip should be ejected from the leased
cubicles.
Things of "common knowledge", of which courts take judicial notice,
Held: NO. may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the
course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters
which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of
No. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are
the taking of judicial notice is mandatory or discretionary on the courts, universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries
thus: or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such
universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. A judicially
judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the rentals in the Contract of Lease. However, the amount of P2,570,000.00,
trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by covering advance rentals, must be deducted from this liability of Spouses
resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be Latip to Rosalie.
questionable.
There is no evidence to prove her claim that the amount of P2,570,000.00
simply constituted the payment of goodwill money. Subsequently, Rosalie Case Digest: Maramag, I. K.
attached an annex to her petition for review before the CA, containing a
joint declaration under oath by other stallholders in Roferxane Bldg. that
3b) Judicial admissions – How judicial admissions may be contradicted
they had paid goodwill money to Rosalie as their lessor. On this score, we
emphasize that the reason why our rules on evidence provide for matters
that need not be proved under Rule 129, specifically on judicial notice, is to Cuenco v. Talisay Tourism Sports Complex
dispense with the taking of the usual form of evidence on a certain matter
so notoriously known, it will not be disputed by the parties. G.R. No. 174154 | November 19, 1982

Ratio: A party may make judicial admissions in (1) the pleadings, (2) during
In this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching the trial, by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (3) in other
documentary evidence, i.e., the Joint Affidavit of the stallholders, to stages of the judicial proceeding. The stipulation of facts at the pre-trial of a
Rosalie's appeal before the CA. In short, the alleged practice still had to be case constitutes judicial admissions. The veracity of judicial admissions
proven by Rosalie; contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the Rules of require no further proof and may be controverted only upon a clear showing
Court — What need not be proved. that the admissions were made through palpable mistake or that no
admissions were made. Thus, the admissions of parties during the pre-trial,
With regard to the receipts amounting to P2,570,000.00, the Court ruled as embodied in the pre-trial order, are binding and conclusive upon them.
that the practice of payment of goodwill money in the Baclaran area is an
inadequate subject of judicial notice. Neither was Rosalie able to provide Facts: On May 25, 1992, Cuenco leased from Talisay Sports Complex for
sufficient evidence that, apart from the belatedly submitted Joint Affidavit a period of two (2) years, from May 8, 1992 to May 8, 1994, the Talisay
of the stallholders of Roferxane Bldg., the said amount was simply for the Tourist Sports Complex, to be operated as a cockpit. The lease was
payment of goodwill money, and not payment for advance rentals by extended for another four (4) years, or until May 8, 1998.
Spouses Latip.
In interpreting the evidence before us, we are guided by the Civil Code Under the Contract of Lease, it was stipulated that Cuenco shall, like a good
provisions on interpretation of contracts, to wit: father of the family, maintain in good condition the furniture, chattels and
all other equipment and shall, at all times, keep the leased premises clean
Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, and sanitary. Any damage caused to the furniture, chattels, equipment and
their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally parts of the leased premises shall be the responsibility of Cuenco to repair
considered. and compensate.
Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract may be, they shall
not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases Furthermore, Cuenco would give a deposit equivalent to six (6) months
that are different from those which the parties intended to agree. rental to answer for whatever damages may be caused to the premises
Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several during the period of the lease.
meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that import which is most
adequate to render it effectual. Upon expiration of the contract, Talisay Sports Complex conducted a public
bidding for the lease of the property. Cuenco participated in the bidding.
The lease ended in 2005. Consequently, Spouses Latip can be ejected The lease was eventually awarded to another bidder, Mr. Rex Cuaqui
from the leased premises. They are liable to Rosalie for unpaid rentals on Salud.Thereafter, Cuenco wrote four (4) demand letters to Talisay Sports
the lease of the two (2) cubicles in accordance with the stipulations on Complex for the return of his deposit worth Php 500,000.

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

Cuenco’s Contentions
As all of Cuenco’s demand letters remained unheeded so Cuenco filed a
Complaint or sum of money, damages and attorney’s fees. He maintained • He questions the CA’s finding that there was damage caused the
that Talisay Sports Complex acted in bad faith in withholding the amount of premises while the lease was still in force.
the deposit without any justifiable reason.
• Such finding could only have been based on alleged inventory of
the property conducted by the Talisay Sports Complex.
In their Answer, Talisay Sports Complex countered that Cuenco caused • Cuenco takes exception to this evidence because of the earlier
physical damage to some portions of the leased premises and the cost of judicial admission made by Talisay Sports Complex’ counsel that
repair and replacement of materials amounted to more than ₱500,000.00. no inventory was conducted and, accordingly, any evidence
adduced by the Talisay Sports Complex contrary to or
inconsistent with the judicial admission should be rejected.
In the Pre-Trial Order issued by the RTC, among the facts stipulated by the
parties was that there was no inventory of damages.
Supreme Court

RTC: ruled in favor of Cuenco and ordered the return of his deposit • Talisay is bound by its judicial admission

• Among others, the Court considered the admission of Talisay • At the pre-trial conference, Talisay Sports Complex’s counsel
Sports Complex’ counsel during the pre-trial that no inventory of made an admission that no inventory was made on the leased
the property was conducted on the leased premises. premises, at least up to that time.

• This admission was confirmed in the Pre-Trial Order issued by the

CA: reversed the RTC and ruled in favor of Talisay Sports Complex based trial court on March 8, 1999 after the lease expired on May 8,
on 1998.

1. The testimony of Talisay’s witness that Cuenco continued to hold • Yet, on July 1, 1999, Talisay Sports Complex’ witness Coronado
cockfights two months after the expiration of the lease contract testified that there was an alleged property inventory conducted
which was not refuted by Cuenco; on June 4, 1998
2. The summary of repairs made on the property showing that
Talisay Sports Complex spent the amount of Php 573,710.17 o This is where the CA based its conclusion that the
immediately prior to the expiration of the lease contract and shortly amount of damage sustained by the leased premises
thereafter; and while in the possession of Cuenco exceeded the amount
3. The new lessor incurred expenses amounting to over Php 3 of Cuenco’s deposit.
million when he shouldered the rest of the repair and renovation
of the subject property • This contradicts the judicial admission made by Talisay Sports
Complex’ counsel which should have been binding on the Talisay
Issue: Whether or not Cuenco is entitled to the return of the amount Sports Complex
deposited

Held: YES. Talisay Sports Complex failed to present sufficient proof to Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:
warrant the retention of the full amount of the deposit given by Cuenco.

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. – An admission, verbal gave ample evidentiary weight to Talisay Sports Complex’ evidence
or written, made by a party in the course of the contradictory to the judicial admission.
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof.
The admission may be contradicted only by a showing Case Digest: Loja, F. B. M.
that it was made through palpable mistake or that no
such admission was made. Toshiba v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

G.R. No. 157594 | March 9, 2010

A party may make judicial admissions in Ratio: The admissions made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the
1. the pleadings, parties must be treated as a judicial admission. Under Section 4, Rule 129
of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof. The admission
2. during the trial, by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made through palpable
or mistake or that no such admission was made. The Court cannot lightly set
aside a judicial admission especially when the opposing party relied upon
3. in other stages of the judicial proceeding. the same and accordingly dispensed with further proof of the fact already
admitted. An admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings
does not require proof.
The stipulation of facts at the pre-trial of a case constitutes judicial
admissions. The veracity of judicial admissions require no further proof and Facts: Toshiba is a domestic corporation principally engaged in the
may be controverted only upon a clear showing that the admissions were business of manufacturing and exporting of electric machinery, equipment
made through palpable mistake or that no admissions were made. Thus, systems, accessories, and the like. It is registered with the Philippine
the admissions of parties during the pre-trial, as embodied in the pre-trial Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) as an Economic Zone (ECOZONE)
order, are binding and conclusive upon them. export enterprise in the Laguna Technopark, Inc., It is also registered with
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) in San Pedro, Laguna, as a VAT-
taxpayer.
Talisay Sports Complex did not deny the admission made by their counsel,
neither did they claim that the same was made through palpable mistake. In its VAT returns for the first and second quarters of 1997, Toshiba
As such, the stipulation of facts is incontrovertible and may be relied upon declared input VAT payments on its domestic purchases of taxable goods
by the courts. The pre-trial forms part of the proceedings and matters dealt and services in the aggregate sum of Php 3,875,139.65 with no zero-rated
therein may not be brushed aside in the process of decision-making. sales. Toshiba subsequently submitted to the BIR its amended VAT returns
Otherwise, the real essence of compulsory pre-trial would be rendered for the first and second quarters of 1997, reporting the same amount of input
inconsequential and worthless. VAT payments but, this time, with zero-rated sales with a total of Php
7,494,677,000.00.

Furthermore, an act performed by counsel within the scope of a "general

or implied authority" is regarded as an act of the client which renders Toshiba filed with the DOF One-Stop Shop) two separate applications for
Talisay Sports Complex in estoppel. By estoppel is meant that an tax credit/refund of its unutilized input VAT payments for the first half of
admission or representation is conclusive upon the person making it and 1997 in the total amount of Php 3,685,446.73. The next day, Toshiba
cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. likewise filed with the CTA a Petition for Review to toll the running of the
two-year prescriptive period under the Tax Code.

Thus, Talisay Sports Complex is bound by the admissions made by their

counsel at the pre-trial. Accordingly, the CA committed an error when it

22
Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

As per CTA’s advice, Toshiba and the CIR filed a Joint Stipulation of the CA declared that the CIR signed the said pleading through
Facts and Issues wherein the opposing parties "agreed and admitted" palpable mistake.
that, among others: –
o This palpable mistake in the stipulation of facts should
1. Toshiba is a duly registered value-added tax entity in accordance not be taken against the CIR, for to do otherwise would
with Section 107 of the Tax Code, as amended; and result in suppressing the truth through falsehood.
o The State could not be put in estoppel by the mistakes
2. Toshiba is subject to zero percent (0%) value-added tax on its or errors of its officials or agents.
export sales in accordance with then Section 100(a)(2)(A) of the
Tax Code, as amended. • Given that Toshiba was a tax-exempt entity under Republic Act
No. 7916, a special law, the export sales of Toshiba were VAT-
exempt transactions under the Tax Code of 1997.
CTA: Toshiba • Therefore, Toshiba could not claim refund of its input VAT
payments on its domestic purchases of goods and services.
• the CIR himself admitted that the export sales of Toshiba were
subject to zero percent (0%) VAT based on the Tax Code of 1977, Issue: Whether or not Toshiba is entitled to tax credit/refund of its unutilized
as amended. input VAT payments.

• Toshiba could then claim tax credit or refund of input VAT paid on Held: YES. Toshiba is entitled to tax credit/refund of its unutilized input VAT
its purchases of goods, properties, or services, directly payments.
attributable to such zero-rated sales The CIR judicially admitted that Toshiba was VAT-registered and its
export sales were subject to VAT at zero percent (0%) rate.
• CIR’s arguments that Toshiba was VAT-exempt and the latter’s
The CIR, in its Motion for Reconsider for the CTA decision, argued that export sales were VAT-exempt transactions are inconsistent with
Toshiba was not entitled to credit/refund of its in input VAT payments the explicit admissions of the CIR in the Joint Stipulation that
because as a PEZA-registered ECOZONE export enterprise, Toshiba was Toshiba was a registered VAT entity and that it was subject to
not subject to VAT. The CIR invoked several statutory and regulatory zero percent (0%) VAT on its export sales.
provisions to support its claim
• The Joint Stipulation was executed and submitted by Toshiba and
• CTA denied the Motion for Reconsideration the CIR upon CTA’s advice at the end of the pre-trial conference
• The approval of the Joint Stipulation by the CTA marked the
conclusion of the pre-trial process.
CA: reversed the CTA and ruled in favor of the CIR
• Among others, the purpose of the pre-trial is for the possibility of
• Toshiba was not entitled to the refund of its alleged unused input obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to
VAT payments because it was a tax-exempt entity under Section avoid unnecessary proof.
24 of Republic Act No. 7916. • Since CIR’s admission was made in a stipulation of facts at pre-
• As a PEZA-registered corporation, Toshiba was liable for remitting trial by the parties, it must be treated as a judicial admission.
to the national government the five percent (5%) preferential rate
on its gross income earned within the ECOZONE, in lieu of all • Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial
other national and local taxes, including VAT. admission requires no proof. The admission may be contradicted
• As to the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Issues, which stated that only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or
Toshiba was subject to zero percent (0%) VAT on its export sales, that no such admission was made.

23
Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

• The Court cannot lightly set aside a judicial admission especially Toshiba during the pre-trial conference which
when the opposing party relied upon the same and accordingly immediately preceded the execution of the Joint
dispensed with further proof of the fact already admitted. Stipulation.
• Here, when CIR made the admission in the Joint Stipulation, it • To automatically construe that the discrepancy was the result of a
already become bound by these admissions, and thus, he could palpable mistake is a wide leap which the Supreme Court is not
not eventually contradict this in his Motion for Reconsideration of prepared to take without substantial basis.
the CTA Decision Case Digest: Loja, F. B. M.
• Toshiba could not have been subject to VAT and exempt from
VAT at the same time. Similarly, the export sales of Toshiba could ADDITIONAL CASES ON JUDICIAL NOTICE
not have been subject to zero percent (0%) VAT and exempt from
VAT as well. People v. Romy Lim y Miranda
GR 231989, September 04, 2018
The CIR cannot escape the binding effect of his judicial admissions.
• The Court disagreed with the CA when it ruled that the CIR could Tickler: Missed call
not be bound by his admissions in the Joint Stipulation because
1. the said admissions were "made through palpable mistake" Case assigned under: Judicial Notice (add’l case) and Chain of
which, if countenanced, "would result in falsehood, unfairness Custody in rel. to Sec. 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
and injustice"; and of 2002
2. the State could not be put in estoppel by the mistakes of its Facts: The PDEA in Cagayan de Oro received information that a certain
officials or agents. Romy sells shabu in the area. On the night of the operation, the law
• the CIR himself never alleged in his Motion for Reconsideration, enforcement team drove to the target area and positioned themselves near
that its counsel, Atty. Biazon committed a mistake in signing the Lim’s house. The confidential informant (CI) and the poseur-buyer went to
Joint Stipulation. Since the CIR did not make such an allegation, Romy’s house and looked for Romy. After the CI had informed Eldie
neither did he present any proof in support thereof. Gorres, Lim’s stepson, of the shabu buyer, Lim told Gorres to get one inside
the bedroom. From the box Gorres handed Lim, the latter gave the poseur-
• The CIR began to aver the existence of a palpable mistake only buyer one piece of heat-sealed transparent plastic of shabu. The poseur-
after the CA made such a declaration in its Decision. buyer paid Lim with the buy-bust money and thereafter executed a missed
• The CA provided no explanation as to why the admissions of the call (the pre-arranged signal of the operation) to his team after examining
CIR in his Answer deserved more weight and credence than those the sachet. The team entered the house because the gate was opened.
he made in the Joint Stipulation. Lim and Gorres were informed of their arrest for selling dangerous drugs.
After a body search, no deadly weapon was found, but the agents found in
• The appellate court failed to appreciate that the CIR, through Lim’s pocket the buy-bust money and a small plastic box.
counsel, Atty. Biazon, also signed the Joint Stipulation and that
absent evidence to the contrary, Atty. Biazon is presumed to have
signed the Joint Stipulation willingly and knowingly, in the regular Lim and Gorres were brought to the PDEA Regional Office. After the
performance of his official duties. booking of the suspects, IO1 Orellan prepared the inventory receipt of the
seized items, but it was not signed by the suspects. Nor was it signed by
• Furthermore, the Joint Stipulation of Toshiba and the CIR was a an elected public official, and representatives of the DOJ, and the media as
more recent pleading than the Answer witnesses. Pictures of both accused and the evidence seized were taken.
o If there was any discrepancy between the admissions of The next day, the Regional Crime Laboratory examined the seized items
the CIR in his Answer and in the Joint Stipulation, the and urine samples from the suspects. Only Lim was found positive for the
more logical and reasonable explanation would be that presence of shabu, and the seized items were confirmed to be positive of
the CIR changed his mind or conceded some points to

24
Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

shabu. The buy-bust money was turned over to the fiscal’s office during the chain of custody sufficient to make evidence admissible, the proponent
inquest. needs only to prove a rational basis from which to conclude that the
evidence is what the party claims it to be. In other words, in a criminal case,
Meanwhile, the defense stated that Lim was sleeping in his house. Gorres the prosecution must offer sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact
was watching TV when he heard hearing that somebody jumped over the could reasonably believe that an item still is what the government claims
gate. Before he could reach the door, the door was already forced open by it to be. Specifically in the prosecution of illegal drugs, the well-established
men in civilian clothing. He was boxed in the chest, slapped in the ears, federal evidentiary rule in the United States is that when the evidence is not
and handcuffed. The men kicked the bedroom door open and pointed a readily identifiable and is susceptible to alteration by tampering or
gun at Lim’s head. Lim and Gorres were then brought to the PDEA office contamination, courts require a more stringent foundation entailing a chain
and the crime laboratory. During inquest, Lim admitted in fear and without of custody of the item with sufficient completeness to render it improbable
the assistance of a counsel the ownership of the seized items. that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been
contaminated or tampered with.
RTC: Lim was guilty of illegal possession and sale of shabu while Gorres
was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence linking him as a conspirator. Thus, the links in the chain of custody that must be established are: (1) the
The RTC favored the positive testimony of IO1 Orellan over the feeble and seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
uncorroborated denial of Lim. The testimony of IO1 Carin was viewed as accused by the apprehending officer; (2) the turnover of the seized illegal
simple, straightforward and without any hesitation or prevarication as she drug by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; (3) the turnover
detailed in a credible manner the buy-bust transaction that occurred. of the illegal drug by the investigating officer to the forensic chemist for
Between the two conflicting versions that are poles apart, the RTC laboratory examination; and (4) the turnover and submission of the illegal
found the prosecution evidence worthy of credence and no reason to drug from the forensic chemist to the court.
disbelieve in the absence of an iota of malice, ill-will, revenge or resentment
preceding and pervading the arrest of Lim. On the chain of custody of The immediate physical inventory and photograph of the confiscated items
evidence, it was accepted with moral certainty that the PDEA operatives at the place of arrest may be excused in instances when the safety and
were able to preserve the integrity and probative value of the seized items. security of the apprehending officers and the witnesses required by law or
of the items seized are threatened by immediate or extreme danger such
CA: Affirmed the RTC Decision. The prosecution adequately established as retaliatory action of those who have the resources and capability to
all the elements of illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous drugs. mount a counter-assault. The present case is not one of those.
The prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the confiscated drugs were not compromised. The witnesses for Evident, however, is the absence of an elected public official and
the prosecution were able to testify on every link in the chain of custody. representatives of the DOJ and the media to witness the physical inventory
Anent Lim's defense of denial and frame-up, the CA did not appreciate the and photograph of the seized items. In fact, their signatures do not appear
same. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty was in the Inventory Receipt. It must be alleged and proved that the presence
applied. of the three witnesses to the physical inventory and photograph of the
illegal drug seized was not obtained due to reason/s such as:
Issue:

1. Is Lim guilty of the crimes beyond reasonable doubt? (1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a
remote area; (2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the
Held: seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the
1. NO. Lim should be acquitted based on reasonable doubt. accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected
official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be
A. CHAIN OF CUSTODY apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media
The chain of custody rule is but a variation of the principle that real evidence representative and an elected public official within the period required
must be authenticated prior to its admission into evidence. To establish a under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault

25
Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary clearly stated in the sworn statements/affidavits of the
detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, apprehending/seizing officers, as well as the steps taken to preserve the
which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items. Certification
from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the or record of coordination for operating units other than the PDEA pursuant
offenders could escape. to Section 86 (a) and (b), Article IX of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 shall be
presented.
Earnest effort to secure the attendance of the necessary witnesses must
be proven. In this case, IO1 Orellan testified that no members of the media While the above-quoted provision has been the rule, it appears that it has
and barangay officials arrived at the crime scene because it was late at not been practiced in most cases elevated before Us. Thus, in order to
night and it was raining, making it unsafe for them to wait at Lim's house. weed out early on from the courts' already congested docket any
IO2 Orcales similarly declared that the inventory was made in the PDEA orchestrated or poorly built up drug-related cases, the following should
office considering that it was late in the evening and there were no available henceforth be enforced as a mandatory policy:
media representative and barangay officials despite their effort to contact
them. He admitted that there are times when they do not inform the 1. In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing officers
barangay officials prior to their operation as they. might leak the confidential must state their compliance with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A.
information. We are of the view that these justifications are unacceptable No. 9165, as amended, and its IRR.
as there was no genuine and sufficient attempt to comply with the law. The
prosecution likewise failed to explain why they did not secure the presence
of a representative from the Department the arresting officer, IO1 Orellan, 2. In case of non-observance of the provision, the apprehending/seizing
stated in his Affidavit that they only tried to coordinate with the barangay officers must state the justification or explanation therefor as well as the
officials and the media, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses failed steps they have taken in order to preserve the integrity and evidentiary
to show that they tried to contact a DOJ representative. value of the seized/confiscated items.

It bears emphasis that the rule that strict adherence to the mandatory 3. If there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in the sworn
requirements of Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and its IRR statements or affidavits, the investigating fiscal must not immediately file
may be excused as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the the case before the court. Instead, he or she must refer the case for further
confiscated items are properly preserved applies not just on arrest and/or preliminary investigation in order to determine the (non) existence of
seizure by reason of a legitimate buy-bust operation but also on those probable cause.
lawfully made in air or sea port, detention cell or national penitentiary,
checkpoint, moving vehicle, local or international package/parcel/mail, or 4. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the court
those by virtue of a consented search, stop and frisk (Terry search), search may exercise its discretion to either refuse to issue a commitment order (or
incident to a lawful arrest, or application of plain view doctrine where time warrant of arrest) or dismiss the case outright for lack of probable cause in
is of the essence and the arrest and/or seizure is/are not planned, arranged accordance with Section 5, Rule 112, Rules of Court.
or scheduled in advance. Case Digest: Santos, B.J.L.

B. JUDICIAL NOTICE Land Bank v. Honeycomb Farms

To conclude, judicial notice is taken of the fact that arrests and seizures GR 166259, November 12, 2012
related to illegal drugs are typically made without a warrant; hence, subject
to inquest proceedings. Relative thereto, Sections 1 (A.1.10) of the Chain Tickler: DARAB; SAC
of Custody Implementing Rules and Regulations directs: Facts: Honeycomb Farms (HFC) owned a parcel of agricultural land with
an area of 29.0966 hectares in Masbate. In 1988, HFC voluntarily offered
A.1.10. Any justification or explanation in cases of noncompliance with the the land to the DAR for coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian
requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, shall be Reform Law (CARL) for P581,932.00 (P20,000 per ha.). Pursuant to CARL

26
Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

IRR, the DAR and Land Bank (LBP) determined an acquirable and LBP’s Petition for Review on Certiorari to the SC: LBP claims that the
compensable area of 27.5871 ha., while 1.5095 ha. were excluded for CA erred in reinstating the RTC/SAC decision since it had no jurisdiction to
being hilly and underdeveloped. LBP proceeded to fix the value of the land hear HFC’s complaint while DARAB proceedings were pending. It also
at P165,739.44 and sent the Notice of Valuation to HFC. HFC rejected the claimed that the complaint should be dismissed for non-exhaustion of
valuation and filed a petition in January 1996 before the DAR Adjudication administrative remedies and forum shopping on the part of HFC. It
Board (DARAB) for determination of just compensation, claiming the proper reiterated jurisprudence on the proper determination of just compensation
amount of P25,000 per ha., or the total amount of P725,000. based on DAR AO No. 6.

Issues:
Despite the pending DARAB proceedings, HFC filed with the RTC a
Complaint for determination and payment of just compensation. HFC 1. Did the SAC properly acquire jurisdiction over HFC’s complaint despite
justified its direct filing with the RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court the pendency of the DARAB proceedings? (YES)
(SAC) by what it saw as unreasonable delay or official inaction, based on
the CARL provision that the DAR “shall decide the case within 30 days after 2. Did HFC fail to exhaust administrative remedies? (NO)
it is submitted for decision.” LBP countered HFC’s petition as premature
and lacks a cause of action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 3. Is HFC guilty of forum shopping? (NO)
In May 1988, DARAB affirmed the LBP’s valuation and denied HFC’s
petition. 4. Did the SAC err in determining just compensation? (YES)

4. Can the SAC take judicial notice of the nature of land in question
RTC/SAC: It fixed the just compensation at P931,109.20 It made its own without the requisite hearing? (NO) [EVIDENCE – TOPIC]
valuation and found “the parcel of land under consideration is located in the
side of the road. It is likewise of judicial notice that it is situated near the Held:
commercial district of Curvada, Cataingan, Masbate.” 1. YES. In Republic v. CA, we first ruled that it would subvert the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to vest original jurisdiction
in compensation cases in administrative officials and make the RTC an
Both parties appealed to the CA. HFC argued that the amount set by the
appellate court for the review of administrative decisions. In Land Bank v.
RTC/SAC is not supported by the evidence on record. LBP questioned the
Belista, we extensively discussed the reasons why the SAC can properly
jurisdiction of SAC because of the pending DARAB proceedings,
assume jurisdiction over petitions for the determination of just
emphasizing that the completion of the administrative proceedings before
compensation despite the pendency of administrative proceedings: Clearly,
the DARAB is a condition precedent for the filing of a complaint for the
under Section 50, DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
determination of just compensation before the SAC. The LBP also argued
agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
that the RTC committed a serious error when it took judicial notice of the
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under
property’s roadside location, its proximity to a commercial district, its
the exclusive jurisdiction of the DA and the DENR. Further exception to the
incomplete development as coconut and corn land, and its condition as
DAR’s original and exclusive jurisdiction are all petitions for the
grassland, to determine just compensation.
determination of just compensation to landowners and the prosecution of
all criminal offenses under RA No. 6657, which are within the jurisdiction of
CA: It reversed the RTC judgment and dismissed HFC’s complaint for the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. Thus, jurisdiction on just
failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required under CARL. compensation cases for the taking of lands under RA No. 6657 is
vested in the courts.
CA, Amended Decision: The CA REINSTATED the RTC Decision. It
concluded that the valuation made by the RTC was based on the evidence In Land Bank v. Wycoco, we upheld the RTC’s jurisdiction for the
on record since the latter considered the sketch plan of the property, the determination of just compensation even where no summary administrative
testimonies of the witnesses and the field reports of both parties. proceedings was held before the DARAB which has primary jurisdiction
over the determination of land valuation. Thus, direct resort to the SAC
[Special Agrarian Court] by private respondent is valid. To reiterate, the

27
Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

taking of property under RA 6657 is an exercise of the State’s power of and chose instead to come up with their own basis for the valuation of the
eminent domain. “The valuation of property or determination of just land in question.
compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial
function which is vested with the courts and not with administrative To guide the RTC in this function, Section 17 of RA 6657 enumerates the
agencies.” Specifically, “[w]hen the parties cannot agree on the factors that have to be taken into consideration to accurately determine just
amount of just compensation, only the exercise of judicial power can compensation. This provision states: Section 17. Determination of Just
settle the dispute with binding effect on the winning and losing Compensation. – In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition
parties.” of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and
income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the
2. NO. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not assessment made by government assessors, shall be considered. The
apply when the issue has been rendered moot and academic. In the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm
present case, the issue is now moot considering that the valuation made workers and by the Government to the property, as well as the non-
by the LBP had long been affirmed in toto by the DARAB in its May 14, payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing
1998 Decision. institution on the said land, shall be considered as additional factors to
determine its valuation.
3. NO. HFC did not commit forum shopping because the third element of
litis pendentia is lacking. The DARAB’s land valuation is only preliminary 5. NO. The SAC erred in concluding that the subject land consisting of
and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner or any 29.0966 hectares is commercial in nature, after taking judicial notice that it
other interested party. The courts, in this case, the SAC, will still have to is “situated near the commercial district of Curvada, Cataingan, Masbate.”
review with finality the determination, in the exercise of what is admittedly In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation, we
a judicial function.Thus, it becomes clear that there is no identity between categorically ruled that the parties must be given the opportunity to
the two cases such that a judgment by the DARAB, regardless of which present evidence on the nature of the property before the court a quo
party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the case before the can take judicial notice of the commercial nature of a portion of the
SAC. subject landholding. While the lower court is not precluded from taking
judicial notice of certain facts, it must exercise this right within the clear
4. YES. While the determination of just compensation is essentially a boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. The
judicial function vested in the RTC acting as a SAC, the judge cannot abuse classification of the land is obviously essential to the valuation of the subject
his discretion by not taking into full consideration the factors specifically property, which is the very issue in the present case. The parties should
identified by law and implementing rules. Special Agrarian Courts are not thus have been given the opportunity to present evidence on the nature of
at liberty to disregard the formula laid down in DAR A.O. No. 5, series of the property before the lower court took judicial notice of the commercial
1998, because unless an administrative order is declared invalid, courts nature of a portion of the subject landholdings. As we said in Land Bank of
have no option but to apply it. The courts cannot ignore, without violating the Phils. v. Wycoco [464 Phil. 83, 97-98 (2004)]:
the agrarian law, the formula provided by the DAR for the determination of
just compensation. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts
with caution especially where the case involves a vast tract of
The SAC is duty bound to take into consideration the factors fixed by land. Care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and
Section 17 of RA 6657 and apply the basic formula prescribed and laid every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly
down in the pertinent administrative regulations, in this case, DAR resolved in the negative. To say that a court will take judicial notice
Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by DAR of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of
Administrative Order No. 11, series of 1994, to determine just evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be
compensation. In the present case, we thus find no difficulty in concluding otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the
that the CA and the RTC, acting as a SAC, seriously erred when they matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice
effectively eschewed the basic formula prescribed by the DAR regulations is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge
is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to

28
Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or Minutes later after the slips were presented to the teller, Capati returned to
professionally known, the basis of his action. where the plaintiff was seating and informed the latter that the withdrawable
Case Digest: Santos, B.J.L. balance could not accommodate P200,000.00.

H. OBJECT EVIDENCE Plaintiff explained that she is withdrawing the amount of P100,000.00 only
1) Nature ff Object Evidence and then changed and correct the figure two (2) into one (1) with her
signature super-imposed thereto signifying the change, after which the
BPI v. Reyes amount of P100,000.00 in cash in two bundles containing 100 pieces of
G.R. No. 157177 | February 11, 2008 P500.00 peso bill were given to Capati with her daughter Joan witnessing
Facts: Before the SC is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 the same. Thereafter Capati prepared a deposit slip for P200,000.00 in the
of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the Decision of the CA which affirmed name of plaintiff Jesusa Reyes with the new account no. 0235-0767-48 and
with modification the Decision of the RTC requiring BPI (petitioner) to return brought the same to the teller's booth.
to spouses Jesusa P. Reyes and Conrado B. Reyes (respondents) the
amount of P100,000.00 plus interest and damages.
After a while, he returned and handed to the plaintiff her duplicate copy of
her deposit to account no. 0235-0767-48 reflecting the amount of
On December 7, 1990 at around 2:00 p.m., plaintiff Jesusa Reyes together P200,000.00 with receipt stamp showing December 7, as the date. Plaintiff
with her daughter, Joan Reyes, went to BPI Zapote Branch to open an ATM and daughter then left.
account, she being interested with the ongoing promotions of BPI entitling
every depositor with a deposit amounting to P2,000.00 to a ticket with a car
On December 14, 1990, Mrs. Jesusa received her express teller card from
as its prize to be raffled every month.
said bank. Thereafter on December 26, 1990, plaintiff left for the US and
returned to Manila on January 31, 1991. When she went to her pawnshop,
She was accommodated, in lieu of the bank manager Mr. Nicasio, by she was made aware by her statement of account sent to her by BPI bank
Cicero Capati (Pats) who was an employee of the bank and in charge of that her ATM account only contained the amount of P100,000.00 with
the new accounts and time deposits characteristically described as having interest.
homosexual inclinations. They were entertained by Capati and were made
to sit at a table occupied by a certain Liza.
She then sent her daughter to inquire, however, the bank manager assured
her that they would look into the matter. On February 6, 1991, plaintiff
Plaintiff informed Capati that they wanted to open an ATM account for the instructed Efren Luna, one of her employees, to update her savings
amount of P200,000.00, P100,000.00 of which shall be withdrawn from her account passbook at the BPI with the folded deposit slip for P200,000.00
exiting savings account with BPI bank which is account no. 0233-2433-88 stapled at the outer cover of said passbook. After presenting the passbook
and the other P100,000.00 will be given by her in cash. to be updated and when the same was returned, Luna noticed that the
deposit slip stapled at the cover was removed and validated at the back
Capati allegedly made a mistake and prepared a withdrawal slip for portion thereof.
P200,00.00 to be withdrawn from her existing savings account with said
bank and the plaintiff Jesusa Reyes believing in good faith that Capati Thereafter, Luna returned with the passbook to the plaintiff and when the
prepared the papers with the correct amount signed the same unaware of latter saw the validation, she got angry. Plaintiff then asked the bank
the mistakes in figures. manager why the deposit slip was validated, whereupon the manager
assured her that the matter will be investigated into.
While she was being entertained by Capati, her daughter Joan Reyes was
filling up the signature cards and several other forms. When no word was heard as to the investigation made by the bank, Mrs.
Reyes sent 2 demand letters thru her lawyer demanding return of the
missing P100,000.00 plus interest. The last letter prompted reply from
defendant inviting plaintiff to sit down and discuss the problem. The

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

meeting resulted to the bank promising that Capati will be submitted to a to another with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning
lie detector test. Plaintiff, however, never learned of the result of said test. the same;
Plaintiff filed this instant case. 5. That under Article 1972, the depositary is obliged to keep the thing
safely and to return it when required to the depositor or to his heirs
Defendant on the other hand claimed that BPI admitted that Jesusa Reyes and successors or to the person who may have been designated
had effected a fund transfer in the amount of P100,000.00 from her ordinary in the contract.
savings account to the express teller account she opened on December 7,
1990, however, it was the only amount she deposited and no additional
cash deposit of P100,000.00 was made. That plaintiff wanted to effect the CA: Affirmed RTC with modifications.
transfer of P200,000.00 but the balance in her account was not sufficient
and could not accommodate the same. Plaintiff thereafter agreed to reduce In finding petitioner liable for the missing P100,000.00, the CA held that:
the amount to be withdrawn from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00 with 1. the RTC correctly gave credence to the testimonies of respondent
plaintiff’s signature superimposed on said corrections; that the original copy Jesusa and Joan Reyes to the effect that aside from the fund
of the deposit slip was also altered from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00, transfer of P100,000.00 from Jesusa's savings account, Jesusa
however, instead of plaintiff signing the same, the clerk-in-charge of the also made a cash deposit of P100,000.00 in the afternoon of
bank, in this case Cicero Capati, signed the alteration himself for Jesusa December 7, 1990;
Reyes had already left without signing the deposit slip. The documents 2. that it is unlikely for these two to concoct a story of falsification
were subsequently machine validated for the amount of P100,000.00. against a banking institution of the stature of petitioner if their
claims were not true;
Defendant claimed that there was actually no cash involved with the 3. that the duplicate copy of the deposit slip showed a deposit of
transactions which happened on December 7, 1990 as contained in the P200,000.00; this, juxtaposed with the fact that it was not
bank’s teller tape. Defendant further claimed that when they subjected machine-validated and the original copy altered by the bank's
Cicero Capati to a lie detector test, the latter passed the same with flying clerk from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00 with the altered amount
colors, indicative of the fact that he was not lying when he said that there "validated," is indicative of anomaly;
really was no cash transaction involved when plaintiff Jesusa Reyes went 4. that even if it was bank employee Cicero Capati who prepared the
to the defendant bank on December 7, 1990; defendant further alleged that deposit slip, Jesusa stood her ground and categorically denied
they even went to the extent of informing Jesusa Reyes that her claim having any knowledge of the alteration therein made;
would not be given credit considering that no such transaction was really 5. that petitioner must account for the missing P100,000.00
made on December 7, 1990. because it was the author of the loss; t
6. hat banks are engaged in business imbued with public interest
and are under strict obligation to exercise utmost fidelity in dealing
RTC: The RTC found:
with its clients, in seeing to it that the funds therein invested or by
1. That petitioner's claim that respondent Jesusa deposited only
them received are properly accounted for and duly posted in their
P100,000.00 instead of P200,000.00 was hazy
ledgers.
2. That what should control was the deposit slip issued by the bank
to respondent, for there was no chance by which respondent could Issue: Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion by resolving the issue
write the amount of P200,000.00 without petitioner's employee based on a conjecture and ignoring physical evidence in favor of testimonial
noticing it and making the necessary corrections evidence in affirming the RTC holding BPI liable for the amount of
3. That it was deplorable to note that it was when respondent P100,000.00 representing an alleged additional deposit of respondents and
Jesusa's bankbook was submitted to be updated after the lapse ruling that respondent Jesusa made an initial deposit of P200,000.00 in her
of several months when the alleged error claimed by petitioner newly opened Express Teller account on December 7, 1990.
was corrected; Held: YES. The issue raises a factual question. The Court is not a trier of
4. That Article 1962 of the New Civil Code provides that a deposit is facts, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may
constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging have been committed by the lower courts. As a rule, the findings of fact of

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

the trial court when affirmed by the CA are final and conclusive and cannot For a better perspective on the calibration of the evidence on hand, it must
be reviewed on appeal by this Court, as long as they are borne out by the first be stressed that the judge who had heard and seen the witnesses
record or are based on substantial evidence. Such rule however is not testify was not the same judge who penned the decision. Thus, not having
absolute, but is subject to well-established exceptions, which are: 1) when heard the testimonies himself, the trial judge or the appellate court would
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 2) when not be in a better position than this Court to assess the credibility of
there is a grave abuse of discretion; 3) when the finding is grounded entirely witnesses on the basis of their demeanor. Hence, to arrive at the truth, the
on speculations, surmises or conjectures; 4) when the judgment of the CA SC thoroughly reviewed the transcripts of the witnesses' testimonies and
is based on a misapprehension of facts; 5) when the findings of facts are examined the pieces of evidence on record.
conflicting; 6) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues
of the case, and those findings are contrary to the admissions of both After a careful and close examination of the records and evidence
appellant and appellee; 7) when the findings of the CA are contrary to those presented by the parties, we find that respondents failed to successfully
of the trial court; 8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation prove by preponderance of evidence that respondent Jesusa made an
of specific evidence on which they are based; 9) when the CA manifestly initial deposit of P200,000.00 in her Express Teller account.
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and 10) when the
findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are Respondent Jesusa and her daughter Joan testified that at the outset,
contradicted by the evidence on record. This case falls under exception respondent Jesusa told Capati that she was opening an Express Teller
Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 9 which constrain us to resolve the factual issue. account for P200,000.00; that she was going to withdraw and transfer
P100,000.00 from her savings account to her new account, and that she
had an additional P100,000.00 cash. However, these assertions are not
It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must prove his borne out by the other evidence presented. Notably, it is not refuted that
own affirmative allegations by the degree of evidence required by law. Capati prepared a withdrawal slip for P200,000.00. This is contrary to
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his the claim of respondent Jesusa that she instructed Capati to make a
case by preponderance of evidence, or that evidence which is of fund transfer of only P100,000.00 from her savings account to the
greater weight or is more convincing than that which is in opposition Express Teller account she was opening. Yet, respondent Jesusa
to it. It does not mean absolute truth; rather, it means that the testimony signed the withdrawal slip. It is strange that she would sign the
of one side is more believable than that of the other side, and that the withdrawal slip if her intention in the first place was to withdraw only
probability of truth is on one side than on the other. Section 1, Rule P100,000.00 from her savings account and deposit P100,000.00 in
133 of the Rules of Court provides the guidelines for determining cash with her.
preponderance of evidence, thus:
Moreover, respondent Jesusa's claim that she signed the withdrawal slip
SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined.- In civil without looking at the amount indicated therein fails to convince us, for
cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a respondent Jesusa, as a businesswoman in the regular course of
preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or business and taking ordinary care of her concerns, would make sure
superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies the court may that she would check the amount written on the withdrawal slip before
consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' affixing her signature. Significantly, we note that the space provided for
manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of her signature is very near the space where the amount of P200,000.00 in
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to words and figures are written; thus, she could not have failed to notice that
which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their the amount of P200,000.00 was written instead of P100,000.00.
interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the
same legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the
number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with The fact that respondent Jesusa initially intended to transfer the amount of
the greater number. P200,000.00 from her savings account to her new Express Teller account
was further established by the teller's tape presented as petitioner's

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

evidence and by the testimony of Emerenciana Torneros, the teller The teller's tape showed that the withdrawal of the amount of P100,000.00
who had attended to respondent Jesusa's transactions. by fund transfer was resumed at 3 o'clock 17 minutes and 27 seconds; but
since it was a big amount, there was a need to override it again, and the
The teller's tape reflected various transactions involving different accounts withdrawal/fund transfer was completed. At 3 o'clock 18 minutes and 27
on December 7, 1990 which included respondent Jesusa's Savings seconds, the amount of P100,000.00 was deposited to respondent
Account No. 233243388 and her new Express Teller Account No. Jesusa's new Express Teller Account No. 235076748.
235076748. It shows that respondent Jesusa's initial intention to withdraw
P200,000.00, not P100,000.00, from her Savings Account No. 233324299 The teller's tape definitely establishes the fact of respondent Jesusa's
was begun at 3 o'clock, 12 minutes and 45 seconds. original intention to withdraw the amount of P200,000.00, and not
P100,000.00 as she claims, from her savings account, to be transferred as
In explaining the entries in the teller's tape, Torneros testified that when she her initial deposit to her new Express Teller account, the insufficiency of
was processing respondent Jesusa's withdrawal in the amount of her balance in her savings account, and finally the fund transfer of the
P200,000.00, her computer rejected the transaction because there was a amount of P100,000.00 from her savings account to her new Express Teller
discrepancy; thus, the word "BIG AMOUNT" appeared on the tape. "Big account. We give great evidentiary weight to the teller's tape,
amount" means that the amount was so big for her to approve, so she considering that it is inserted into the bank's computer terminal,
keyed in the amount again and overrode the transaction to be able to which records the teller's daily transactions in the ordinary course of
process the withdrawal using an officer's override with the latter's approval. business, and there is no showing that the same had been purposely
The letter "J" appears after Figure 288 in the fourth column to show that manipulated to prove petitioner's claim.
she overrode the transaction. She then keyed again the amount of
P200,000.00 at 3 o'clock 13 minutes and 9 seconds; however, her Respondent Jesusa's bare claim, although corroborated by her daughter,
computer rejected the transaction, because the balance she keyed in that the former deposited P100,000.00 cash in addition to the fund transfer
based on respondent Jesusa's passbook was wrong; thus appeared the of P100,000.00, is not established by physical evidence. While the
phrase "balance error" on the tape, and the computer produced the balance duplicate copy of the deposit slip was in the amount of P200,000.00 and
of P229,257.64, and so she keyed in the withdrawal of P200,000.00. Since bore the stamp mark of teller Torneros, such duplicate copy failed to show
it was a big amount, she again had to override it, so she could process the that there was a cash deposit of P100,000.00. An examination of the
amount. However, the withdrawal was again rejected for the reason "TOD, deposit slip shows that it did not contain any entry in the breakdown portion
overdraft," which meant that the amount to be withdrawn was more than for the specific denominations of the cash deposit. This demolishes the
the balance, considering that there was a debited amount of P30,935.16 testimonies of respondent Jesusa and her daughter Joan.
reflected in respondent Jesusa's passbook, reducing the available balance
to only P198,322.48.27 Furthermore, teller Torneros's explanation of why the duplicate copy of the
deposit slip in the amount of P200,000.00 bore the teller's stamp mark is
Torneros then called Capati to her cage and told him of the insufficiency of convincing and consistent with logic and the ordinary course of business.
respondent Jesusa's balance. Capati then motioned respondent Jesusa to She testified that Capati went to her cage bringing with him a withdrawal
the teller's cage; and when she was already in front of the teller's cage, slip for P200,000.00 signed by respondent Jesusa, two copies of the
Torneros told her that she could not withdraw P200,000.00 because of deposit slip for P200,000.00 in respondent Jesusa's name for her new
overdraft; thus, respondent Jesusa decided to just withdraw P100,000.00. Express Teller account, and the latter's savings passbook reflecting a
balance of P249,657.6431 as of November 19, 1990. Thus, at first glance,
This explains the alteration in the withdrawal slip with the superimposition these appeared to Torneros to be sufficient for the withdrawal of
of the figure "1" on the figure "2" and the change of the word "two" to "one" P200,000.00 by fund transfer. Capati then got her teller's stamp mark,
to show that the withdrawn amount from respondent Jesusa's savings stamped it on the duplicate copy of the deposit slip, and gave the duplicate
account was only P100,000.00, and that respondent Jesusa herself signed to respondent Jesusa, while the original copy of the deposit slip was left in
the alterations. her cage. However, as Torneros started processing the transaction, it
turned out that respondent Jesusa's balance was insufficient to
accommodate the P200,000.00 fund transfer as narrated earlier.

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

On April 15, 1991, around 8PM, [Onofre] Malaki was attending to his store.
Since respondent Jesusa had signed the alteration in the withdrawal slip Malaki's houseboy Edilberto Batin was busy cooking at the kitchen located
and had already left the teller's counter thereafter and Capati was still inside at the back of the store. Florencio Rondon, arrived at the store of Malaki
the teller's cage, Torneros asked Capati about the original deposit slip and and purchased chemical for his rice farm. Meanwhile, Batin had just
the latter told her, "Ok naman iyan," and Capati superimposed the figures finished cooking and from the kitchen, and went to the store to ask Malaki
"1" on "2" on the deposit slip to reflect the initial deposit of P100,000.00 for if supper is to be prepared. As Batin stepped inside the store, he was taken
respondent Jesusa's new Express Teller account and signed the alteration. aback when he saw appellant (Malimit) coming out of the store with while
Torneros then machine-validated the deposit slip. Thus, the duplicate copy Malaki was bathed in his own blood, was sprawled on the floor "struggling
of the deposit slip, which bore Torneros’s stamp mark and which was given for his life".
to respondent Jesusa prior to the processing of her transaction, was not
machine-validated unlike the original copy of the deposit slip. Rondon, who was outside and barely 5 meters away from the store, also
saw appellant Jose Malimit rushing out through the front door of Malaki's
While the fact that the alteration in the original deposit slip was signed by store with a blood-stained bolo Aided by the illumination coming from a
Capati and not by respondent Jesusa herself was a violation of the bank's pressure lamp ("petromax") inside the store, Rondon clearly recognized
policy requiring the depositor to sign the correction, nevertheless, we find Malimit. Batin immediately went out of the store to seek help. Outside the
that respondents failed to satisfactorily establish by preponderance store, he met Rondon and both rushed to the nearby house of Malaki's
of evidence that indeed there was an additional cash of P100,000.00 brother-in-law Eutiquio Beloy and informed Beloy of the incident. Batin,
deposited to the new Express Teller account. along with Beloy, went back to the store. Inside, they saw the lifeless body
of Malaki. Beloy readily noticed that the store's drawer was opened and
ransacked and the wallet of Malaki was missing from his pocket.
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks
high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. We have, on many occasions,
relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth. Where In his appeal, Maliksi asks for his acquittal alleging that the trial court
the physical evidence on record runs counter to the testimonial committed the following errors:
evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we consistently rule that the
physical evidence should prevail.
1. The trial court erred in giving credence to the unreliable
In addition, to uphold the declaration of the CA that it is unlikely for testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on their alleged
respondent Jesusa and her daughter to concoct a false story against a identification of the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the
banking institution is to give weight to conjectures and surmises, which we crime despite the fact they revealed their alleged "knowledge" of
cannot countenance. In fine, respondents failed to establish their claim by the crime more than five months after the incident. He posits that
preponderance of evidence. while the crime took place on April 15, it was only on September
Case Digest: Ramos, K.C. 17 when these witnesses tagged him as the culprit.
2. The trial court erred in admitting as evidence the wallet and its
People v. Jose Malimit, alias “MANOLO” contents although the circumstances which lead to its production
G.R. No. 109775 | November 14, 1996 was obtained in violation of the constitutional rights of the accused
Ratio: The right against self-incrimination does not apply to the instant case against self-incrimination.
where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement 3. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite
but an object evidence. failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
Facts: Appellant Jose Encarnacion Malimit, charged with and convicted of doubt.
robbery with homicide, was meted by the trial court the penalty of reclusion Issues:
perpetua. 1. Whether the despite the delay in the testimonies of Batin and Rondon
about Malimit as the perpetrator of the crime can be considered reliable
testimonies.

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

2. Whether the admission of Malaki’s wallets and its contents (residence Neither are we prepared to order the exclusion of the questioned pieces of
certificate, ID, keys) violate Malimit’s constitutional right against self- evidence pursuant to the provision of the Constitution pertaining to the so-
incrimination. [Main Issue in the Syllabus] called “Miranda Rights”. Infractions in violation of these render inadmissible
3. Whether the Malimit’s guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt. only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial
Held: 1. YES. Malimit posits that while the crime took place on April 15, it investigation. The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are
was only on September 17 when these witnesses tagged him as the culprit. relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not
The aforementioned date however, was merely the date when Rondon and affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.
Batin executed their respective affidavits, narrating that they saw the Concededly, appellant was not informed of his right to remain silent and to
appellant on the night of April 15 carrying a bolo stained with blood and have his own counsel by the investigating policemen during the custodial
rushing out of Malaki's store. As to appellant's claim of delay, suffice it to investigation. Neither did he execute a written waiver of these rights in
state that extant from the records are ample testimonial evidence negating accordance with the constitutional prescriptions. Nevertheless, these
appellant's protestation, to wit: (1) after having discovered the commission constitutional short-cuts do not affect the admissibility of Malaki's wallet, ID,
of the crime, Rondon and Batin immediately looked for Eutiquio Beloy, residence certificate and keys for the purpose of establishing other facts
Malaki's brother-in-law, and informed him that appellant was the only relevant to the crime. Thus, the wallet is admissible to establish the fact that
person they saw running away from the crime scene; (2) Beloy and Batin it was the very wallet taken from Malaki on the night of the robbery. The
reported the crime with the CAFGU detachment in their barangay where contents inside the wallet, on the other hand, are admissible to prove that
Batin declared that it was appellant who robbed Malaki on that fateful night; the wallet really belongs to Malaki. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo
and (3) Batin again made a similar statement later at the Silago Police that these pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the same will not detract
Station. from appellant's culpability considering the existence of other evidence and
circumstances establishing appellant's identity and guilt as perpetrator of
Even assuming arguendo that Rondon and Batin identified the appellant the crime charged.
only after the lapse of five months from commission of the crime, this fact
alone does not render their testimony less credible. The non-disclosure by 3. YES. Time and again, we ruled that there can be a verdict of conviction
the witness to the police officers of appellant's identity immediately after the based on circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proved form an
occurrence of the crime is not entirely against human experience. The unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing
findings of the trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses are given the accused, to the exclusion of all the others, as the perpetrator of the
weight and the highest degree of respect by the appellate court. This is the crime. In order that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to convict, the
established rule of evidence, as the matter of assigning values to the same must comply with these essential requisites, viz., (a) there is more
testimony of witnesses is a function best performed by the trial court which than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
can weigh said testimony in the light of the witness" demeanor, conduct are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
and attitude at the trial. 19 And although the rule admits of certain produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
exceptions, namely: (1) when patent inconsistencies in the statements of
witnesses are ignored by the trial court, or (2) when the conclusions arrived In this case, there were at least 5 circumstances constituting an unbroken
at are clearly unsupported by the evidence, we found none in this case. chain of events which by their "concordant combination and cumulative
effect", satisfy the requirements for the conviction of the appellant,
2. NO. The right against self-incrimination guaranteed under our specifically: (1) appellant was seen by Rondon and Batin, whose
fundamental law finds no application in this case. This right is a prohibition credibilities were untarnished, holding a bolo in his right hand and rushing
of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from out of Malaki's store seconds prior to their discovery of the crime; (2) Malaki
him. It is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the sustained multiple stab wounds and he died of "cardiac arrest, secondary
accused's own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. It does not apply to severe external hemorrhage due to multiple stab wounds", (3) witness
to the instant case where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an Elmer Ladica saw the appellant on August 6, 1991, accompanied by some
incriminating statement but an object evidence. policemen, retrieve Malaki's wallet underneath a stone at the seashore in
Barangay Hingatungan; (4) appellant himself admitted in his testimony that
on August 6, 1991, he accompanied several policemen to the seashore

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

where he hid Malaki's wallet; and (5) appellant's flight and his subsequent Facts: On 26 August 1998, an Information was filed against Robert
disappearance from Hingatungan immediately after the incident. Buduhan, Rudy Buduhan, Boy Guinhicna, Boyet Ginyang and three John
Does before the RTC-Maddela, Quirino, for the crime of Robbery with
On the other hand, appellant's version of the story does not inspire belief. Homicide and Frustrated Homicide.
He maintains that on that fateful night he was in his house together with his
wife and they had just arrived from a gambling spree. Surprisingly, On 20 October 1998, the accused filed a Motion to Quash, alleging that the
however, the defense did not bother to call appellant's wife to the witness court did not legally acquire jurisdiction over their persons. The accused
stand to corroborate appellant's alibi. Neither did it present as witness Maui contended they were neither caught in flagrante delicto, nor did the police
Petalcorin, or any other person who may have seen the appellant in the have personal knowledge of the commission of the offense at the time
said place, if only to provide a semblance of truth to this assertion. As the when their warrantless arrests were effected. In an Order, the RTC denied
defense of alibi is weak in view of the positive identification of the appellant the motion on the ground that the assertion of lack of personal knowledge
by the prosecution witnesses, it becomes weaker because of the on the part of the arresting officers regarding the commission of the crime
unexplained failure of the defense to present any corroboration. is a matter of defense, which should be properly taken up during the trial.
Furthermore, proof that appellant was in his house when the crime was
committed is not enough. He must likewise demonstrate that he could not When arraigned the accused entered their pleas of "Not Guilty" to the crime
have been physically present at the place of the crime or in its vicinity, at charged. With respect to accused Boy Guinhicna, counsel for the accused
the time of its commission. He himself admitted that his house was just informed the trial court of his death and thus moved for the dismissal of the
about 80 meters away from the house of Malaki. It was, therefore, not charges against him. Upon the submission of accused Boy Guinhicna's
impossible for him to have been physically present at the place of the Certificate of Death, the RTC dismissed the case against him on 14
commission of the crime. February 2000. Thereafter, trial of the case ensued.

Appellant's insistence that he merely found Malaki's wallet by chance while The People's version of the incident as narrated by its principal witness,
gathering shells along the seashore, and that he feared being implicated in Cherry Rose Salazar, is as follows:
the crime for which reason he hid the wallet underneath a stone, hardly
inspires belief. No inference can be drawn from appellant's purported
apprehension other than the logical conclusion that appellant had On 24 July 1998, Cherry Rose was working as a guest relations officer at
knowledge of the crime. Besides, proof that appellant is in possession of a the RML Canteen, a beerhouse and a videoke bar in Maddela, Quirino. At
stolen property gives rise to a valid presumption that he stole the same. about 9:00 to 10:00 p.m., there were only two groups of men inside the
Case Digest: Ramos, K.C. beerhouse. The group that went there first was that of the appellants, which
was composed of Robert Buduhan, who was wearing a white T-shirt
3) Categories of Object Evidence marked Giordano, Rudy Buduhan, who was wearing a red T-shirt, a man
wearing a blue T-shirt, and another man wearing a blue T-shirt with a black
jacket.The second group was composed of Larry Erese and his
PEOPLE vs. RUDY BUDUHAN et. al.
G.R. No. 178196 | 2008-08-06 CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: companions Gilbert Cortez (alias Abe) and Fernando Pera (alias Nanding).
Ratio: Paraffin test results are merely corroborative of the major evidence
offered by any party, and they are not conclusive with respect to the issue At 10:40 p.m., while Cherry Rose was entertaining the group of Larry Erese,
of whether or not the subjects did indeed fire a gun. As previously Robert approached them and poked a gun at Larry. Immediately, the man
mentioned, the positive and negative results of the paraffin test can also be wearing a blue T-shirt likewise approached Cherry Rose's Manager
influenced by certain factors affecting the conditions surrounding the use Romualde Almeron (alias Eddie), who was seated at the counter. The man
of the firearm, namely: the wearing of gloves by the subject, perspiration of in blue poked a gun at Romualde and announced a hold-up.Larry then
the hands, wind direction, wind velocity, humidity, climate conditions, the handed over his wristwatch to Robert. Instantaneously, all four men from
length of the barrel of the firearm or the open or closed trigger guard of the Robert's group fired their guns at Larry and Romualde, which caused them
firearm. to fall down. Abe and Nanding ran out of the RML Canteen when the
shooting occurred, and Cherry Rose hid below the table.

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

The findings and conclusion on the paraffin test that Police Inspector Chua-
For the defense, appellant Robert Buduhan testified that on the evening of Camarao conducted were contained in Physical Science Report No. C-25-
24 July 1998, he was at their boarding house in Poblacion, Maddela, 98 which yielded a negative result for all the four accused. Nonetheless,
Quirino, together with Rudy Buduhan, Boyet Ginyang, and Boy Guinhicna. the forensic chemist pointed out that the paraffin test is merely a
The group drank one bottle of San Miguel Gin, and then went to sleep. corroborative evidence, neither proving nor disproving that a person did
Unknown to him and Guinhicna, Rudy and Ginyang still went out to indeed fire a gun. The positive or negative results of the test can be
continue their drinking sessions. While he was sleeping, Ginyang arrived influenced by certain factors, such as the wearing of gloves by the subject,
and woke him up. Ginyang told him that they had to go to the beerhouse perspiration of the hands, wind direction, wind velocity, humidity, climate
where he (Ginyang) and Rudy had been to because something might have conditions, the length of the barrel of the firearm or the open or closed
happened to Rudy, as there was a fight there. Robert, Ginyang and trigger guard of the firearm.
Guinhicna then proceeded to look for Rudy. On their way there, at the
junction of the National Highway, they encountered some policemen who RTC: found appellants guilty of the charges, except with respect to accused
asked them where they were headed. When Robert said that they were Boyet Ginyang, who was acquitted of the offense charged since the
looking for Rudy, the policemen told them to board the police vehicle and prosecution had failed to overcome, with the required quantum of evidence,
the group was given a ride. As it turned out, Robert's group was taken to the constitutional presumption of innocence.
the Municipal Jail of Maddela where they were detained. The policemen
went out to look for Rudy and they likewise put him in jail. The following CA: modified the RTC decision only in that, in addition to the award already
day, the policemen confiscated the shirts worn by the group. They were given by the trial court, in consonance with current jurisprudence, the heirs
also taken to Santiago City where paraffin tests were conducted. On the of ERESE are also entitled to moral damages of P50,000 and in addition to
evening of 26 July 1998, the policemen went to the jail with three ladies the award already given by the trial court, the heirs of ALMERON are also
who were asked to identify Robert's group. The ladies, however, did not entitled to moral damages of P50,000.00.
recognize Robert and his companions. Issue: Whether appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Police Inspector Maria Leonora Chua-Camarao testified that she was the Held: YES. After a careful review of the entire records of this case, the
one who conducted the examination proper of the paraffin casts taken from Court finds no reason to disagree with the factual findings of the trial court
Robert Buduhan, Rudy Buduhan, Boyet Ginyang and Boy Guinhicna. She that all the elements of the crime of Robbery with Homicide were present
likewise brought before the trial court the original Letter Request of the and proved in this case.
Maddela Police Station for the conduct of paraffin casting; the Letter of
Request addressed to the Officer-in-Charge the PNP Crime Laboratory in
Region 2 for the conduct of paraffin examination; and the paraffin casts of To warrant conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide, one that is
subjects Rudy, Ginyang, Guinhicna and Robert. Police Inspector Chua- primarily classified as a crime against property and not against persons,
Camarao explained that the purpose of conducting a paraffin test was to the prosecution has to firmly establish the following elements: (1) the taking
determine the presence of gunpowder residue in the hands of a person of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against the
through extraction using paraffin wax. The process involves two stages: person; (2) the property thus taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is
first, the paraffin casting, in which the hands of the subject are covered with characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (4) on the occasion
paraffin wax to extract gunpowder residue; and second, the paraffin of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein
examination per se, which refers to the actual chemical examination to used in a generic sense, is committed.
determine whether or not gunpowder residue has indeed been extracted.
For the second stage, the method used is the diphenyl amine test, wherein In Robbery with Homicide, so long as the intention of the felon is to rob, the
the diphenyl amine agent is poured on the paraffin casts of the subject’s killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. It is immaterial that
hands. In this test, a positive result occurs when blue specks are produced death would supervene by mere accident, or that the victim of homicide is
in the paraffin casts, which then indicates the presence of gunpowder other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed.
residue. When no such reaction takes place, the result is negative. Once a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery,

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the felony committed is the special complex crime of Robbery with and they are not conclusive with respect to the issue of whether or not the
Homicide. subjects did indeed fire a gun. As previously mentioned, the positive and
negative results of the paraffin test can also be influenced by certain factors
The original design must have been robbery; and the homicide, even if it affecting the conditions surrounding the use of the firearm, namely: the
precedes or is subsequent to the robbery, must have a direct relation to, or wearing of gloves by the subject, perspiration of the hands, wind direction,
must be perpetrated with a view to consummate, the robbery. The taking wind velocity, humidity, climate conditions, the length of the barrel of the
of the property should not be merely an afterthought, which arose firearm or the open or closed trigger guard of the firearm.
subsequently to the killing.
Case Digest: Cabaña, P.M.H.
Likewise, the intent to gain may already be presumed in this case. Animus
lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act, which can be established through People of the Philippines v. SPO1 Virgilio G. Brecinio
the overt acts of the offender. The unlawful act of the taking of Larry’s watch
at gunpoint after the declaration of a hold-up already speaks well enough G.R. No. 138534 | March 17, 2004
for itself. No other intent may be gleaned from the acts of the appellant’s
group at that moment other than to divest Larry of his personal property. Tickler: murder, affidavit, testimonial evidence, paraffin test
Ratio: When there is no evidence of improper motive on the part of the
prosecution witness to testify falsely against an accused or implicate him in
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement the commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that no such improper
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The same motive exists and the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence
degree of proof necessary to prove the crime is required to support a finding
of criminal conspiracy. Direct proof, however, is not essential to show Facts: Appellant Brecinio was charged with murder for shooting Alberto
conspiracy. Proof of concerted action before, during and after the crime, Pagtananan, a jail inmate, who was then caught unaware and was hit on
which demonstrates their unity of design and objective is sufficient. the upper quadrant medical clavicular line, resulting in his instantaneous
As the fatal shooting of both Larry Erese and Romualde Almeron happened death, to the damage and prejudice of his surviving heirs.
on the occasion of the robbery and was subsequent thereto, both of the
appellants must be held liable for the crime of Robbery with Homicide on
For the version of the prosecution, appellant was drunk when he entered
two counts.
the cell of the victim and the other inmates. Appellant entered their cell and
asked for their names, and the reasons for their detention. After answering,
The defense of appellants of alibi is at best weak when faced with the each of them received a blow in the stomach from the appellant for no
positive identification of the appellants by the prosecution’s principal apparent reason. Appellant proceeded to the comfort room and, as he
witness. It is elemental that for alibi to prosper, the requirements of time emerged therefrom, he saw the victim Alberto Pagtananan also coming out.
and place must be strictly met. This means that the accused must not only Appellant confronted the victim and asked him where he came from. The
prove his presence at another place at the time of the commission of the victim answered that he had just urinated. Apparently not believing him,
offense but he must also demonstrate that it would be physically impossible appellant accused the victim of "hiding" and "making a fool of him." The
for him to be at the scene of the crime at that time. In the present case, victim innocently replied "hindi naman po." Irritated by the answer,
there was absolutely no claim of any fact that would show that it was well appellant berated the victim and when the latter looked at him, he asked,
nigh impossible for appellants to be present at the locus criminis. In fact, "Ba’t ang sama mong tumingin?" The victim did not reply. Appellant
they all testified that they were going towards the vicinity of the area of the punched the victim in the stomach but still the latter said nothing.
shooting incident when the police apprehended them.
Appellant pulled out his .45 caliber pistol tucked on his right waist and fired
Appellants likewise cannot rely on the negative findings of Police Inspector it twice in succession. The first shot was directed upward; the second
Chua-Camarao on the paraffin tests conducted in order to exculpate downward. The inmates inside the cell were all cowering in fear and were
themselves. The said witness herself promptly stated that paraffin test huddled together in one corner of the bed, covering their ears. Witness
results are merely corroborative of the major evidence offered by any party, Arbilo who was merely one-and-a-half meters in front of the appellant then

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saw the latter aim his gun at the victim and fire the third shot, hitting the
victim in the stomach. Seeing the victim lying prostrate on the ground, the The trial court, after weighing the evidence presented by both sides, gave
inmates lifted and laid him on the bed. At that juncture, appellant, who was no credence to the version of the appellant. On October 15, 1998, a
standing in front of the inmates, reholstered his gun on his waist and decision was rendered, convicting appellant of the crime of murder.
ordered them to get water for the victim. SPO1 Bayani Montessur then Issue: Whether the trial court erred in convicting appellant of murder?
arrived and ordered the victim to be brought to a nearby hospital but the Held: NO. A careful evaluation of the records shows that the court a quo
latter was declared dead on arrival. was correct in finding appellant guilty of killing the victim.

Filomeno Mapalad, Jr. corroborated the testimony of Robinson Arbilo.

We reiterate the familiar and well-entrenched rule that the factual findings
From a distance of only three meters behind the appellant, he saw the latter of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve great weight, given
fire the third shot at the victim. He also declared that there was no truth to the clear advantage of the trial judge (an opportunity not available to the
the statement in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated June 30, 1996 that the appellate court) in the appreciation of testimonial evidence. The trial judge
appellant slipped on the floor, causing the gun to fall and fire accidentally,
personally hears the witnesses and observes their deportment and manner
hitting Pagtananan in the stomach. SPO1 Montessur, a colleague of of testifying. Although the rule admits of certain exceptions, we find no
appellant, prepared the said affidavit and, after getting his name and reason to hold otherwise in the present case.
address, forced him to sign it. He signed the affidavit out of fear of the
appellant who threatened to kill him if he did not cooperate. After his release
from detention, Mapalad went to the NBI and gave his statement on what They gave a steadfast and credible narration of what they witnessed in a
actually transpired. manner reflective of a candid and unrehearsed testimony. Robinson Arbilo,
who stood only one-and-a-half meters in front of the assailant, was very
direct, clear and spontaneous in describing how the appellant shot the
Contrary to the prosecution’s version, appellant claimed that the shooting victim.
was accidental. He declared that he had just gone out of the comfort room
and was about to tuck his .45 caliber pistol in its holster on his waist when
he slipped on the wet floor, causing the gun to drop and fire. After picking We find that Mapalad’s recantation was satisfactorily explained. He testified
up the gun, Eric Garcia, an inmate, called his attention to the fact that one that he was threatened by the appellant. As a detainee, he was completely
of the inmates had been hit. He immediately went to the detention cell and vulnerable to the threats of the appellant, a police officer and presumably
saw the victim, Alberto Pagtananan, lying down with a wound in his his jailer. He therefore signed the said affidavit (supporting appellant’s
stomach. He called Filomeno Mapalad Jr. and ordered him to bring the "accident" version) as he was ordered to do. However, immediately after
victim to the hospital. He was not able to go with the group as he was his release from detention, he went to the NBI and narrated what really
immediately placed under arrest. transpired. He stood firm in his testimony about the direct involvement of
the appellant.
NBI forensic chemist Emilia Andro-Rosaldes was also presented by the
defense to testify on the result of the paraffin examination conducted on the In this connection, the defense never showed that Mapalad was motivated
appellant on July 2, 1996, two days after the alleged shooting incident. She by any ill-motive in implicating the appellant in the crime. When there is no
testified that it was Mrs. Gemma Orbeta who made the paraffin cast on the evidence of improper motive on the part of the prosecution witness to testify
appellant and her only participation was the examination of the paraffin cast falsely against an accused or implicate him in the commission of a crime,
taken from the appellant. According to her, there are four factors that can the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and the
affect the presence of gun powder residue in the hands of a person who testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.
fires a gun, namely, the length of the barrel of the gun, the wind velocity,
the direction of the shot(s) and the type and caliber of ammunition. She also Likewise, while the paraffin test was negative, such fact alone did not ipso
declared that the application of paraffin wax to make the paraffin cast can facto prove that the appellant was innocent. Time and again, we have held
remove gunpowder residue. She did not know whether paraffin wax had that a negative paraffin result is not conclusive proof that a person has not
been applied on the hands of the appellant before the paraffin cast was fired a gun. Stated otherwise, it is possible to fire a gun and yet be negative
made. for nitrates, as when the culprit is wearing gloves or he washes his hands

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afterwards.17 Since appellant submitted himself for paraffin testing only The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify
two days after the shooting, it was likely he had already washed his hands the pictures he has taken. The correctness of the photograph as a
thoroughly, thus removing all traces of nitrates therefrom. faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima
facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other
The trial court correctly appreciated the presence of treachery which competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to
qualified the offense to murder. For treachery to be considered, the impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs, therefore, can be
accused must have deliberately and consciously adopted a means of identified by the photographer or by any other competent witness who can
execution that rendered the person attacked with no opportunity to defend testify to its exactness and accuracy.
himself or to retaliate. FACTS: The case before us occurred at a time of great political
polarization in the aftermath of the 1986 EDSA Revolution. This was the
time when the newly-installed government of President Corazon C. Aquino
As described by the prosecution, the victim and his co-detainees were was being openly challenged in rallies, demonstrations and other public for
inside the cell when appellant, who was drunk, manhandled them and a by "Marcos loyalists," supporters of deposed President Ferdinand E.
suddenly fired three successive shots. It was the third shot that killed the Marcos. Tension and animosity between the two (2) groups sometimes
victim. The testimonies of the two eyewitnesses, co-inmates of the victim, broke into violence. On July 27, 1986, it resulted in the murder of Stephen
showed that the suddenness and mode of attack adopted by the appellant Salcedo, a known "Coryista."
placed not only the victim but also all of them in such a situation where it
was not possible for them to resist the attack or defend themselves. Even The prosecution established that on July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled
frontal attack can be treacherous when unexpected and the unarmed victim to be held at the Luneta by the Marcos loyalists. Despite having no permit
is in no position to repel the attack or avoid it. therefor, the said rally proceeded at 2:30 in the afternoon. A colonel then
gave them ten minutes to disperse. Eventually, the crowd fled towards
However, this Court finds that the trial court erred in considering the Maria Orosa Street.
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
At about 4PM, a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese Garden,
The fact that appellant did not resist arrest or deny his criminal act did not Phase III of the Luneta. There, they saw Annie Ferrer, a popular movie
constitute voluntary surrender. A surrender, to be voluntary, must be starlet and supporter of President Marcos, jogging around the fountain.
spontaneous and must clearly indicate the intent of the accused to submit They approached her and informed her of their dispersal and Annie Ferrer
himself unconditionally to the authorities. Here, the appellant, after shooting angrily ordered them. "Gulpihin ang mga Cory hecklers!" Then she
the victim, was immediately disarmed and placed under arrest. There was, continued jogging around the fountain chanting "Marcos pa rin, Marcos pa
therefore no voluntary surrender to speak of because the appellant was in rin, Pabalikin si Marcos, Pabalikin si Marcos, Bugbugin ang mga
fact arrested. nakadilaw!" The loyalists replied "Bugbugin!" A few minutes later, Annie
Ferrer was arrested by the police. Somebody then shouted "Kailangang
gumanti tayo ngayon!"
Case Digest: Serrano, L.C.
A commotion ensued and Renato Banculo, a cigarette vendor, saw the
[Sison v. People] Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard De loyalists attacking persons in yellow, the color of the "Coryistas." Renato
Los Santos, and Joselito Tamayo, took off his yellow shirt. He then saw a man wearing a yellow t-shirt being
v. People of the Philippines and Court of Appeals. chased by a group of persons shouting "Iyan, habulin iyan. Cory iyan!" The
G.R. Nos. 108280-83 | 16 November 1995 | Puno, J. man in the yellow t-shirt was Salcedo and his pursuers appeared to be
DOCTRINE: The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when Marcos loyalists. They caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked and mauled
presented in evidence, must be identified by the photographer as to him. Salcedo tried to extricate himself from the group but they again
its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they pounced on him and pummelled him with fist blows and kicks hitting him on
were produced. The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct various parts of his
representation or reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is body.
determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime.

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

Banculo saw Ranulfo Sumilang, an electrician at the Luneta, rush to The court, however, found that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of
Salcedo's aid. Sumilang tried to pacify the maulers so he could extricate the other accused and thus acquitted Raul Billosos, Gerry Nery, Rolando
Salcedo from them. But the maulers pursued Salcedo unrelentingly, boxing Fernandez, Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega.
him with stones in their fists. Somebody gave Sumilang a loyalist tag which CA: On Appeal, the Court of Appeals 23 on December 28, 1992, modified
Sumilang showed to Salcedo's attackers. They backed off a while and the decision of the trial court by acquitting Annie Ferrer but increasing the
Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo away from them. But accused Raul penalty of the rest of the accused, except for Joselito Tamayo, to reclusion
Billosos emerged from behind Sumilang as another man boxed Salcedo on perpetua.
the head. Accused Richard de los Santos also boxed Salcedo twice on the The appellate court found them guilty of murder qualified by abuse of
head and kicked him even as he was already fallen. Salcedo tried to stand superior strength, but convicted Joselito Tamayo of homicide because the
but accused Joel Tan boxed him on the left side of his head and information against him did not allege the said qualifying circumstance.
ear. Accused Nilo Pacadar punched Salcedo on his nape, shouting: "Iyan, ISSUE: [paraphrased] Whether or not the CA erroneously gave evidentiary
Cory Iyan. Patayin!" Sumilang tried to pacify Pacadar but the latter lunged weight to the photographs taken of the victim.
at the victim again. Accused Joselito Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the left jaw
and kicked him as he once more fell. Banculo saw accused Romeo Sison THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADMITTING
trip Salcedo and kick him on the head, and when he tried to stand, Sison EXHIBITS "D", "G", "O", "P", "V", TO "V-48", "W" TO "W-13", ALL OF
repeatedly boxed him. Sumilang saw accused Gerry Neri approach the WHICH WERE NOT PROPERLY IDENTIFIED.
victim but did not notice what he did. RULING: No. The CA correctly admitted the said photographs.

Salcedo somehow managed to get away from his attackers and wipe off Exhibits "V," to "V-48" are photographs taken of the victim as he was being
the blood from his face. He sat on some cement steps and then tried to flee mauled at the Luneta – starting from a grassy portion to the pavement at
towards Roxas boulevard to the sanctuary of the Rizal Monument but the Rizal Monument and along Roxas Boulevard, - as he was being chased
accused Joel Tan Nilo Pacadar pursued him, mauling Sumilang in the by his assailants and as he sat pleading with his assailants. Exhibits "W",
process. Salcedo pleaded for his life exclaiming "Maawa na kayo sa akin. "W-1" to "W-13" are photographs of Salcedo and the mauling published in
Tulungan ninyo ako." He cried: "Pulis, pulis. Wala bang pulis?" local newspapers and magazines such as the Philippine Star, Mr. and Ms.
Magazine, Philippine Daily Inquirer, and the Malaya. The admissibility of
The mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and continued along Roxas these photographs is being questioned by appellants for lack of proper
Boulevard until Salcedo collapsed and lost consciousness. Sumilang identification by the person or persons who took the same.
flagged down a van and with the help of a traffic officer, brought Salcedo to
the Medical Center Manila but he was refused admission. So they took him Doctrine. The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented
to the Philippine General Hospital where he died upon arrival. Salcedo died in evidence, must be identified by the photographer as to its production and
of "hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic." He sustained various contusions, testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. The
abrasions, lacerated wounds and skull fractures. value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or
reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is determined by its
The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and several press accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. The
people, both local and foreign. The press took pictures and a video of the photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures
event which became front-page news the following day, capturing national he has taken. The correctness of the photograph as a faithful
and international attention. From August to October 1986, several representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by
informations were filed in court against eleven persons identified as Marcos the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses,
loyalists charging them with the murder of Salcedo. after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy.
RTC: On December 16, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision finding Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the photographer or by any
Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and Joselito other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy.
Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime of murder qualified by treachery
and sentenced them to 14 years 10 months and 20 days of reclusion The court notes that when the prosecution offered the photographs as part
temporal as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. of its evidence, appellants, through counsel Atty. Lazaro, objected to their
Annie Ferrer was likewise convicted as an accomplice.

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admissibility for lack of proper identification. The objection of Atty. Lazaro damaged while its driver, John Macarubo, and its lone passenger, private
to the admissibility of the photographs is anchored on the fact that the respondent Rommel Abraham, were seriously injured.
person who took the same was not presented to identify them. We rule that
the use of these photographs by some of the accused to show their The driver and conductress of Bus 203 rushed Macarubo and Abraham to
alleged non-participation in the crime is an admission of the the nearby Fatima Hospital where Macarubo lapsed into a coma. Despite
exactness and accuracy thereof. That the photographs are faithful surgery, Macarubo failed to recover and died five days later. Abraham
representations of the mauling incident was affirmed when appellants survived, but he became blind on the left eye which had to be removed. In
Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan identified themselves addition, he sustained a fracture on the forehead and multiple lacerations
therein and gave reasons for their presence thereat. on the face, which caused him to be hospitalized for a week.

An analysis of the photographs vis-a-vis the accused's testimonies reveal

On March 26, 1985, Rommel Abraham, represented by his father,
that only three of the appellants, namely, Richard de los Santos, Nilo
Felixberto, instituted a civil case for damages against petitioners MCL and
Pacadar and Joel Tan could be readily seen in various belligerent poses
Armando Jose in the RTC Valenzuela. On July 17, 1986, the spouses Jose
lunging or hovering behind or over the victim. Appellant Romeo Sison
and Mercedes Macarubo, parents of the deceased John Macarubo, filed
appears only once and he, although afflicted with hernia, is shown merely
their own suit for damages in the same trial court.
running after the victim. Appellant Joselito Tamayo was not identified in any
RTC: Based on the foregoing facts, the trial court rendered judgment on
of the pictures. The absence of the two appellant in the photographs does
September 28, 1989, dismissing both civil cases against MCL. [the facts as
not exculpate them. The photographs did not capture the entire sequence
found by the trial court:
of the killing of Salcedo but only segments thereof. While the pictures did
Indeed the pictures taken of the two vehicles (Exh. 1, 2 and 3) will
not record Sison and Tamayo hitting Salcedo, they were unequivocally
clearly show that the MCL bus was at its proper lane and not in an
identified by Sumilang and Banculo. Appellants' denials and alibis
overtaking position while the car driven by John Macarubo was
cannot overcome their eyeball identification.
positioned in a diagonal manner and crossed the line of the MCL, which
is an indication of an overtaking act. If it were the bus that was
In view whereof, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED
overtaking at the time, the car would have been thrown farther away
(with modification of the moral damages from 30k to 100k, and an additional
from the point of the impact.
indemnity of 50k for the death of the victim).
The Court noted the respective damages of the two vehicles especially
Case Digest: Villaran, C.E.S.
the point of the impact. From these damages as shown by the picture,
it can be clearly deduced which vehicle did the bumping. It was the car
[JOSE v. CA] Armando Jose and Manila Central Bus Lines ((MCL), driven by John Macarubo that hit the MCL which was on its right and
v. Court of Appeals, Rommel Abraham, Jose and Mercedes Macarubo. correct lane.
G.R. No. 118441-2 | 18 January 2000 | Mendoza, J.
CA: The Court of Appeals rendered a decision reversing the decision of the
DOCTRINE: In People v. Vasquez , where the physical evidence on trial court. It held
record ran counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, (1) that the trial court erred in disregarding Rommel Abraham’s
we ruled that the physical evidence should prevail. uncontroverted testimony that the collision was due to the fault of the
FACTS: Petitioner Manila Central Bus Lines Corporation (MCL) is the driver of Bus 203;
operator-lessee of a public utility bus (hereafter referred to as Bus 203). (2) that the trial court erred in relying on photographs (Exhs. 1-3) which
had been taken an hour after the collision as within that span of time,
the positions of the vehicles could have been changed;
On February 22, 1985, at around six o’clock in the morning, Bus 203, then
(3) that the photographs do not show that the Ford Escort was
driven by petitioner Armando Jose, collided with a red Ford Escort driven
overtaking another vehicle when the accident happened.
by John Macarubo on MacArthur Highway, in Marulas, Valenzuela, Metro
ISSUE/S: Whether it was the driver of Bus 203 or that of the Ford Escort
Manila. Bus 203 was bound for Muntinlupa, Rizal, while the Ford Escort
who was at fault for the collision of the two vehicles.
was headed towards Malanday, Valenzuela on the opposite lane. As a
RULING: [The Court did not directly answer the issue but the body of its
result of the collision, the left side of the Ford Escort’s hood was severely
ruling show that it was the driver of the Ford Escort, the deceased John

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

Macarubo, who was at fault for the collision. Significantly, the Court noted heavier and larger than the Ford Escort. If it was overtaking another vehicle,
that there was a possibility that a mechanical defect could have been the it necessarily had to accelerate. The acceleration of its speed and its heavy
reason why the car strayed into the bus lane.] load would have greatly increased its momentum so that the impact of the
collision would have thrown the smaller and lighter Ford Escort to a
It is well-settled that a question of fact is to be determined by the evidence considerable distance from the point of impact. Exhibit 1, however, shows
offered to support the particular contention. In the proceedings below, that the Ford Escort’s smashed hood was only about one or two meters
petitioners relied mainly on photographs, identified in evidence as Exhibits from Bus 203’s damaged left front. If there had been a great impact, such
1 to 3, showing the position of the two vehicles after the collision. On the as would be the case if Bus 203 had been running at a high speed, the
other hand, private respondents offered the testimony of Rommel Abraham two vehicles should have ended up far from each other.
to the effect that the collision took place because Bus 203 invaded their
lane. Significantly, Rommel Abraham testified that on February 21, 1985, the
night before the accident, he and John Macarubo went to a friend’s house
Physical evidence prevails over testimonial evidence of the in La Loma where they stayed until 11 p.m. Abraham’s explanation as to
witnesses. The trial court was justified in relying on the photographs rather why they did not reach Valenzuela until six o’clock in the morning of the
than on Rommel Abraham’s testimony which was obviously biased and next day when the accident happened indicates that the Ford Escort
unsupported by any other evidence. Physical evidence is a mute but an careened and slammed against Bus 203 because of a mechanical defect.
eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy of
trustworthy evidence. In criminal cases such as murder or rape where the Thus, as Rommel Abraham himself admitted, the Ford Escort’s rear
accused stands to lose his liberty if found guilty, this Court has, in many crossjoint was cut/detached. This mechanism controls the movement of the
occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the rear tires. Since trouble in the cross-joint affects a car’s maneuverability,
truth. In People v. Vasquez , where the physical evidence on record ran the matter should have been treated as a serious mechanical problem. In
counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we ruled this case, when asked if they were able to repair the cross-joint, Abraham
that the physical evidence should prevail. said "Ginawaan ng paraan , ma’am," by simply welding them just so they
could reach home. His testimony indicates that the rear cross-joint was
In this case, the positions of the two vehicles, as shown in the photographs hastily repaired and that, at most, the kind of repairs made thereon were
(Exhs. 1 to 3) taken by MCL line inspector Jesus Custodio about an hour merely temporary; just enough to enable Abraham and Macarubo to reach
and fifteen minutes after the collision, disputes Abraham’s self-serving home. Given such fact, the likelihood is that while the Ford Escort
testimony that the two vehicles collided because Bus 203 invaded the lane might not have been overtaking another vehicle, it actually strayed
of the Ford Escort and clearly shows that the case is exactly the opposite into the bus’ lane because of the defective cross-joint, causing its
of what he claimed happened. Contrary to Abraham’s testimony, the driver to lose control of the vehicle.
photographs show quite clearly that Bus 203 was in its proper lane and that
it was the Ford Escort which usurped a portion of the opposite lane. The The appellate court refused to give credence to the physical evidence on
three photographs show the Ford Escort positioned diagonally on the the ground that the photographs were taken an hour after the collision and
highway, with its two front wheels occupying Bus 203’s lane. As shown by that within such span of time the bus could have been moved because
the photograph marked Exhibit 3, the portion of MacArthur Highway where there was no showing that the driver left the scene of the accident. This is
the collision took place is marked by a groove which serves as the center not correct. Constancia Gerolada, Bus 203’s conductress, testified that,
line separating the right from the left lanes. The photograph shows that the immediately after the collision, she and bus driver, petitioner Armando
left side of Bus 203 is about a few feet from the center line and that the bus Jose, took the injured driver and passenger of the Ford Escort to the Fatima
is positioned parallel thereto. This negates the claim that Bus 203 was Hospital. This fact is not disputed by private respondents.
overtaking another vehicle and, in so doing, encroached on the
opposite lane occupied by the Ford Escort. [on evidence, but not on object evidence] Rommel Abraham mentioned in
his appellant’s brief in the appellate court a sketch of the scene of the
Indeed, Bus 203 could not have been overtaking another vehicle when the accident allegedly prepared by one Patrolman Kalale, which shows Bus
collision happened. It was filled with passengers, and it was considerably 203 to be occupying the Ford Escort’s lane. However, the records of this

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

case do not show that such a sketch was ever presented in evidence in the
trial court or that Patrolman Kalale was ever presented as a witness to Facts: Lim was charged with illegal possession of shabu. His stepson,
testify on the sketch allegedly prepared by him. Under Rule 132, §3 of the Eldie Gorres (Gorres), was also indicted for illegal sale of shabu. In their
Rules on Evidence, courts cannot consider any evidence unless formally arraignment, Lim and Gorres pleaded not guilty. They were detained in the
offered by a party. city jail.

Wherefore, the decision of the CA is reversed and the complaints filed

IO1 Orellan and his teammates were at the Regional Office of the PDEA.
against [petitioners] Jose and MCL are dismissed.
Based on a report of a confidential informant (CI) that a certain "Romy" has
Case Digest: Villaran, C.E.S. been engaged in the sale of prohibited drugs. They were directed to gather
for a buy-bust operation. Thereafter, Carin and the CI alighted from the
6) Chain of Custody, in relation to Sec. 21 of RA 9165, as amended vehicle near the corner leading to the house of "Romy," while IO1 Orellan
and the other team members disembarked a few meters after and
PEOPLE v. ROMY LIM positioned themselves in the area to observe. IO1 Carin and the CI turned
G.R. No. 231989. 4 September 2018 at the corner and stopped in front of a house. Inside the house, Lim was
OBJECT (REAL) EVIDENCE sitting on the sofa while watching the television. When the CI introduced
IO1 Carin as a shabu buyer, Lim nodded and told Gorres to get one inside
Ratio: The chain of custody rule is but a variation of the principle that real
the bedroom. Gorres stood up and did as instructed. After he came out, he
evidence must be authenticated prior to its admission into evidence. To
handed a small medicine box to Lim, who then took one piece of heat-
establish a chain of custody sufficient to make evidence admissible, the
sealed transparent plastic of shabu and gave it to IO1 Carin. In turn, IO1
proponent needs only to prove a rational basis from which to conclude
Carin paid him with the buy-bust money.
that the evidence is what the party claims it to be.

After examining the plastic sachet, IO1 Carin executed a missed call to IO1
Orellan, which was the pre-arranged signal. Thereafter, they immediately
rushed to Lim's house. IO1 Orellan declared that they were PDEA agents
and informed Lim and Gorres, who were visibly surprised, of their arrest for
selling dangerous drug. They were ordered to put their hands on their
heads and to squat on the floor. IO1 Orellan recited the Miranda rights to
them. Thereafter, IO1 Orellan conducted a body search on both. When he
frisked Lim, no deadly weapon was found, but something was bulging in
his pocket. IO1 Orellan ordered him to pull it out. Inside the pocket were
the buy-bust money and a transparent rectangular plastic box about 3x4
inches in size. They could see that it contained a plastic sachet of a white
substance. As for Gorres, no weapon or illegal drug was seized. The buy-
bust team brought Lim and Gorres to the PDEA Regional Office, with IO1
Orellan in possession of the seized items.

According to the defense, Lim was sleeping in the bedroom, while Gorres
was watching the television. When the latter heard that somebody jumped
over their gate, he stood up to verify. Before he could reach the door,
however, it was already forced opened by the repeated pulling and kicking
of men in civilian clothing. They entered the house, pointed their firearms
at him, instructed him to keep still, boxed his chest, slapped his ears, and
handcuffed him. They inquired on where the shabu was, but he invoked his

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

innocence. When they asked the whereabouts of "Romy," he answered that drugs, the well-established federal evidentiary rule in the United States is
he was sleeping inside the bedroom. So the men went there and kicked the that when the evidence is not readily identifiable and is susceptible to
door open. Lim was then surprised as a gun was pointed at his head. He alteration by tampering or contamination, courts require a more stringent
questioned them on what was it all about, but he was told to keep quiet. foundation entailing a chain of custody of the item with sufficient
The men let him and Gorres sit on a bench. Lim was apprised of his completeness to render it improbable that the original item has either been
Miranda rights. Thereafter, the two were brought to the PDEA Regional exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with.
Office and the crime laboratory. During the inquest proceedings, Lim
admitted, albeit without the assistance of a counsel, ownership of the two As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires
sachets of shabu because he was afraid that the police would imprison that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to
him. support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it
to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in
such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how
and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while
in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for
someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.

Thus, the links in the chain of custody that must be established are: (1) the
seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; (2) the turnover of the seized illegal
RTC: The RTC handed a guilty verdict on Lim for illegal possession and drug by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; (3) the turnover
sale of shabu and acquitted Gorres for lack of sufficient evidence linking of the illegal drug by the investigating officer to the forensic chemist for
him as a conspirator. laboratory examination; and (4) the turnover and submission of the illegal
drug from the forensic chemist to the court. Here, IO1 Orellan took into
CA: The CA affirmed the RTC Decision. It agreed with the finding of the custody the ₱500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic sachet of white
trial court that the prosecution adequately established all the elements of substance, and a disposable lighter. IO1 Carin also turned over to him the
illegal sale of a dangerous drug as the collective evidence presented plastic sachet that she bought from Lim. While in the house, IO1 Orellan
during the trial showed that a valid buy-bust operation was conducted. marked the two plastic sachets. IO1 Orellan testified that he immediately
Likewise, all the elements of illegal possession of a dangerous drug was conducted the marking and physical inventory of the two sachets of shabu.
proven. Evident, however, is the absence of an elected public official and
representatives of the DOJ and the media to witness the physical inventory
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the chain of custody was complied with and photograph of the seized items.

RULING: No. The chain of custody rule is but a variation of the principle
that real evidence must be authenticated prior to its admission into Case Digest: Mangrobang, MLPM.
evidence. To establish a chain of custody sufficient to make evidence
admissible, the proponent needs only to prove a rational basis from which
to conclude that the evidence is what the party claims it to be. In other
words, in a criminal case, the prosecution must offer sufficient evidence
from which the trier of fact could reasonably believe that an item still is what 7) Rule on DNA Evidence
the government claims it to be. Specifically in the prosecution of illegal

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

People v. Vallejo 5. Jessiemin testified that at around 5:00 o’clock that afternoon,
while she and her daughter were in front of a store across the
G.R. No. L-46729. 19 November 1982 street from her house, accused-appellant arrived to buy a stick of
Marlboro cigarette. Accused-appellant had only his basketball
Ratio: Probative Value of DNA. In assessing the probative value of DNA shorts on and was just holding his shirt. They noticed both his
evidence, the courts should consider the following data: shorts and his shirt were wet. [7] When Ma. Nida woke up at about
(a) How the samples were collected; 5:30 o’clock after an afternoon nap, she noticed that Daisy was
(b) How these were handled; not yet home. She started looking for her daughter and proceeded
(c) The possibility of contamination of the samples; [fifth issue] to the house of Aimee, Daisy’s tutor. Aimee’s mother told Ma. Nida
(d) The procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper that Daisy was not there and that Aimee was not able to help
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests; and Daisy with her lessons because Aimee was not feeling well as she
(e) the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. had her menstrual period.
[8] Then, at about 10:00 o’clock in the morning of June 11, 1999,
Facts: [setting in Rosario, Cavite] Ma. Nida was informed that the dead body of her daughter was
[same number with SC’s circumstantial evidence] found tied to the root of an aroma tree by the river after the
The victim’s mother, Ma. Nida Diolola, testified that at around 1:00 o’clock “compuerta.” Daisy was wearing her pink short pants with her
in the afternoon of July 10, 1999, she sent her 9-year old daughter Daisy sleeveless shirt tied around her neck.
Diolola to their neighbor’s house so that Aimee Vallejo, the sister of
accused-appellant, could help Daisy with her lessons.
Cause of Death per autopsy: asphyxia by manual strangulation.
1. An hour later, Daisy came back with accused-appellant. They Genital Examination: Pubic hair, no growth. Labia majora and minora,
were looking for a book which accused-appellant could copy to gaping and congested. Hymen, moderately tall, thick with fresh
make a drawing or a poster that Daisy would submit to her lacerations, complete at 3:00, 6:00 and 9:00 o’clock positions, edges with
teacher. After finding the book, Daisy and accused- appellant blood clots.
went back to the latter’s house.
[in relation to 2 issue]
nd

2. Another witness, Jessiemin Mataverde, testified that at around Renato Abutan, Municipal Mayor of Rosario, Cavite, testified that, after
3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of that day, Daisy watched television having been informed of the incident, he immediately went proceeded to
instead from the door of Jessiemin’s house. About five minutes the municipal jail, where accused-appellant was detained, and talked to
later, accused-appellant came to the house and told Daisy the latter. Accused-appellant at first denied having anything to do with the
something, as a result of which she went with him and the two killing and rape of the child. The mayor said he told accused-appellant
proceeded towards the “compuerta.” that he could not help him if he did not tell the truth. At that point,
accused-appellant started crying and told the mayor that he killed the
3. Charito Yepes, another neighbor of Ma. Nida, also testified. She
victim by strangling her.
said that at about 4:30 o’clock in the afternoon of July 10, 1999,
while she and her husband and children were walking towards the [in relation to the 3 and 4 issues]
rd th

“compuerta” near the seashore of Ligtong, Rosario, Cavite, they Based on the statements of Jessiemin Mataverde and Charito Paras-
met accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo near the seashore and Yepes, the policemen went to the house of accused- appellant at about
noticed that he was uneasy and looked troubled. Charito said that 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of July 11, 1999 and recovered the white
accused-appellant did not even greet them, which was unusual. basketball shirt, with the name Samartino and No. 13 printed at the back,
She also testified that accused-appellant’s shorts and shirt and the violet basketball shorts, with the number 9 printed on it, worn by
(sando) were wet, but his face and hair were not. \ accused- appellant the day before. The shirt and shorts, which were
bloodstained, were turned over to the NBI for laboratory examination.
4. Xxx
[in relation to the 5 issue]
th

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

The results of the examinations conducted by Pet Byron T. Buan, the circumstantial evidence establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
Forensic Biologist of NBI, showed accused-appellant to belong to Group Vallejo:
"O". The following specimens:
a. The victim went to Aimee Vallejo's house, where accused-
a. one (1) white no. 13 athletic basketball shirt, with patches appellant was residing, at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 10, 1999, for
"Grizzlies" in front and "SAMARTINO" at the back; tutoring.
b. one (1) violet no. 9 athletic basketball short pants;
c. one (1) white small "Hello Kitty" T-shirt with reddish brown stains; b. At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, accused-appellant and
d. one (1) "cut" pink short pants with reddish brown stains; Daisy went together to the latter's house to get a book from which
e. one (1) "cut" dirty white small panty with reddish brown stains, the former could copy Daisy's school project. After getting the
were all positive for the presence of human blood showing the reactions of book, they proceeded to accused- appellant's residence.
Group "A".
c. From accused-appellant's house, Daisy then went to the house of
Moreover, Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, Forensic Chemist of the NBI, testified Jessiemin Mataverde where she watched television. Accused-
that the vaginal swabs of the victim taken during the autopsy contained the appellant thereafter arrived and whispered something to Daisy,
DNA profiles of accused-appellant and the victim. and the latter went with him towards the "compuerta."
RTC: Accused Vallejo is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the d. At about 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the spouses Iluminado and
crime of Rape with Homicide. Charito Yepes saw accused-appellant coming out of the
"compuerta," with his clothes, basketball shorts, and t-shirt wet,
ISSUE/S: although his face and hair were not. According to these witnesses,
he looked pale, uneasy, and troubled (balisa). He kept looking
[issues raised by Vallejo, on Evidence but not on DNA evidence:]
around and did not even greet them as was his custom to do so.
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting Vallejo despite
e. The fishing boat which accused-appellant used as a bomber (a
the weakness of the prosecution’s circumstantial evidence.
boat for catching fish with dynamite) was docked by the seashore.
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in giving evidentiary weight to
f. A little before 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Jessiemin Mataverde
the alleged oral confessions of Vallejo despite its being hearsay
also saw accused-appellant buying a Marlboro cigarette from a
in nature.
store. Jessiemen also noticed that accused-appellant's clothes
[phrased contentions of Vallejo pertinent to DNA] were wet but not his face nor his hair.

3. Whether or not the bloodstains found on appellant’s garments g. By 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, as Ma. Nida Diolola looked for
were proved to be that of the victim, as the victim’s blood type was not her daughter, she was told by accused-appellant that Daisy had
determined. gone to her classmate Rosario's house. The information proved
to be false.
4. Whether or not the method by which Vallejo’s garments were
recovered is valid. h. Daisy's body was found tied to an aroma tree at the part of the
river near the "compuerta."
5. Whether or not the samples submitted for DNA testing were 9. During the initial investigation, accused-appellant had
contaminated. scratches on his feet similar to those caused by the thorns of an
aroma tree.
RULING: 10. The clothes which accused-appellant wore the day before
were bloodstained. The bloodstains on accused- appellant's
1) No. The Court resolves to affirm the decision of the RTC in convicting clothes and on Daisy's clothes were found positive of human
Vallejo for the crime of Rape with Homicide. In the case at bar, the following blood type "A."

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

i. Accused-appellant has blood type "O." the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then matched with
the reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim.
j. The vaginal swabs from Daisy's body contained her DNA profile
as well as that of accused-appellant. • The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association
exists between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The
2) No. The claim of appellant is untenable. His oral confession given to the samples collected are subjected to various chemical processes to
Mayor is likewise not violative of his constitutional right because the records establish their profile. The test may yield three possible results:
show that he was apprised of the consequences of the statements he was
to make. 1. The samples are different and therefore must have
originated from different sources (exclusion). This
[SC ruling on DNA evidence] conclusion is absolute and requires no further
analysis or discussion;
3) Yes. It is the victim’s bloodstains that were found on the garments 2. It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of
examined. the test, whether the samples have similar DNA
The examination conducted by Forensic Biologist Pet Byron Buan of both types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety
accused-appellant's and the victim's clothing yielded bloodstains of the of reasons including degradation, contamination, or
same blood type "A". Even if there was no direct determination as to what failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various parts
blood type the victim had, it can reasonably be inferred that the victim was of the analysis might then be repeated with the same
blood type "A" since she sustained contused abrasions all over her body or a different sample, to obtain a more conclusive
which would necessarily produce the bloodstains on her clothing. result; or
Significantly, only blood type “A” was found, being the predominant blood 3. The samples are similar, and could have originated
in the specimens examined. from the same source (inclusion). In such a case,
4) Yes. There is no showing that Vallejo was coerced or forced into the samples are found to be similar, the analyst
producing the garments. After being questioned by the police as to the proceeds to determine the statistical significance of
clothes he wore on the day of the crime, Vallejo accompanied them to the the similarity.
back of the house where dirty clothes were kept. Significantly, a
consented warrantless search is an exception to the proscription in
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. Probative Value of DNA. In assessing the probative value of DNA
evidence, the courts should consider the following data:
5) Yes. The samples submitted for DNA testing were possibly
contaminated. a. How the samples were collected;

b. How these were handled;

[Other citations of the SC, from the Vallejo case, on DNA:] c. The possibility of contamination of the samples; [fifth issue]

• DNA is an organic substance found in a person's cells which d. The procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the
contains his or her genetic code. Except for identical twins, each proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests;
person's DNA profile is distinct and unique. and

• When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of e. the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
the crime or from the victim's body for the suspect's DNA. This is
Before they were submitted to the laboratory, the specimens consisting
the bloodstains were soaked in smirchy water and, thus, possibly

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

contaminated, thereby hampering the preservation of any DNA that could Isabel Dawang and run towards the back of the house. She later noticed
have been there before. appellant, who was wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, pacing
back and forth at the back of the house. She did not find this unusual as
However, what accounted for the negative results for the presence of appellant and his wife used to live in the house of Isabel Dawang.
human DNA is the inadequacy of the
At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her
specimens submitted for examination, and not the possibility that the house. This time, he was wearing a black shirt without collar and blue
samples had been contaminated. In this case, [1] the hair of the victim did pants. Appellant told her that he would not be getting the lumber he had
not contain any root, and [2] the vaginal smear was very, very dry and stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She noticed that appellant’s eyes were
could have chipped off the slide. Significantly, [3] the vaginal swabs taken "reddish and sharp." Appellant asked her where her husband was as he
from the victim yielded positive for the presence of human DNA and, had something important to tell him. Judilyn’s husband then arrived and
upon analysis by the experts, they showed the DNA profile of accused- appellant immediately left and went towards the back of the house of Isabel.
appellant Vallejo.
In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found
Case Digest: Mangrobang, MLMP that the lights in her house were off. She called out for her granddaughter,
Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor was open. She noticed that the
People vs. Yatar water container she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still empty.
She went up the ladder to the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn
G.R. No. 150224 | May 19, 2004 was upstairs. She found that the door was tied with a rope, so she went
down to get a knife. While she groped in the dark, she felt a lifeless body
Facts: On automatic review is a Decision of the RTC sentencing appellant
that was cold and rigid.
Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special complex crime of Rape with
Homicide, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Kathylyn D. Uba, Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it
civil indemnity. was the naked body of her granddaughter, Kathylyn. She called for help.
Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel was given a flashlight by Judilyn.
On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin,
She focused the beam and saw Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, with
seventeen year old Kathylyn Uba, were on the ground floor of the house of
her intestines protruding out of her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had
their grandmother, Isabel Dawang, in Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga. They
arrived to offer assistance. A daughter of Isabel, Cion, called the police.
were talking about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband,
appellant Joel Yatar, through Kathylyn’s friend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead
handed the letter to appellant earlier that morning. woman was found in Isabel Dawang’s house. Together with fellow police
officers, Faniswa went to the house and found the naked body of Kathylyn
At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel
Uba with multiple stab wounds.The people in the vicinity informed the police
Dawang, left for their farm in Nagbitayan some two kilometers away. Before
officers that appellant was seen going down the ladder of the house of
Judilyn and her husband departed, Kathylyn told Judilyn that she intended
Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m.
to go to Tuguegarao, but in the event she would not be able to leave, she
would just stay home and wash her clothes or go to the house of their aunt, The police discovered the victim’s panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and
Anita Wania. Kathylyn was left alone in the house. sandals beside her naked cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found
a dirty white shirt splattered with blood within 50 meters from the house of
Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng
Isabel. When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any
stopped by the house of Isabel. They saw appellant at the back of the
knowledge of Kathylyns’s death, however, he was placed under police
house. They went inside the house through the back door of the kitchen to
custody.
have a drink of water. Anita asked appellant what he was doing there, and
he replied that he was getting lumber to bring to the house of his mother. On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve
himself. Police Officer Cesar Abagan accompanied him to the toilet around
At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she
seven to ten meters away from the police station. They suddenly heard
saw appellant descend the ladder from the second floor of the house of

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

someone shout in the Ilocano dialect, "Nagtaray!" (He’s running away!). prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are
Police Officer Orlando Manuel exited through the gate of the Police Station entitled to full faith and credit.
and saw appellant running away. Appellant was approximately 70 meters
away from the station when Police Officer Abagan recaptured him. He was The weight of the prosecution’s evidence must be appreciated in light of
charged with Rape with Homicide. When he was arraigned on July 21, the well-settled rule which provides that an accused can be convicted
1998, appellant pleaded "not guilty." even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient circumstantial
evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that
After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, the accused committed the crime.
defined and penalized under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, Reference to the records will show that a total of 11 wounds, 6 stab and 5
and was accordingly, sentenced to Death. Hence, this automatic review incised, were found on the victim’s abdomen and back, causing a portion
pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. of her small intestines to spill out of her body. Rigor mortis of the vicitm’s
body was complete when Dr. Bartolo examined the victim at 9:00 a.m. on
Issues: 1. Whether the trial court gravely erred in giving much weight to the July 1, 1998. According to him, the time of death may be approximated from
evidence presented by the prosecution notwithstanding their doubtfulness. between nine (9) to twelve (12) hours prior to the completion of rigor mortis.
In other words, the estimated time of death was sometime between 9:00
2. Whether, in an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on June 30, 1998. This was within the timeframe
contends that the blood sample taken from him as well as the DNA tests within which the lone presence of appellant lurking in the house of
were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right Isabel Dawang was testified to by witnesses.
against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the
Constitution. It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the
attending physician, Dr. Pej Evan C. Bartolo, indicates that no hymenal
3. Whether DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are lacerations, contusions or hematoma were noted on the victim, Dr.
unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the Bartolo discovered the presence of semen in the vaginal canal of the
application of an ex-post facto law. victim. During his testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated that the introduction of
semen into the vaginal canal could only be done through sexual intercourse
4. Whether appellant’s twin defense of denial and alibi may be sustained. with the victim. In addition, it is apparent from the pictures submitted by
5. Whether appellant may be acquitted on the basis of reasonable doubt. the prosecution that the sexual violation of the victim was manifested
by a bruise and some swelling in her right forearm indicating
Held: Held: 1. NO. The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution resistance to the appellant’s assault on her virtue.
witnesses should be resolved against appellant. This Court will not interfere
with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid
unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and (DNA) of the sperm specimen from the vagina of the victim was
influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been identical the semen to be that of appellant’s gene type.
misinterpreted. Well-entrenched is the rule that the findings of the trial DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living
court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal organisms. A person’s DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change
unless cogent reasons are presented necessitating a reexamination if not throughout a person’s lifetime; the DNA in a person’s blood is the same as
the disturbance of the same; the reason being that the former is in a better the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax,
and unique position of hearing first hand the witnesses and observing mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. Most importantly,
their deportment, conduct and attitude. Absent any showing that the because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals
trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins.
circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, the
trial judge’s assessment of credibility deserves the appellate court’s DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely
highest respect. Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly
accused suspect, where biological evidence has been left. For purposes

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has
effecting a more accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently proven instructive.
facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of the
innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every In Daubert v. Merrell Dow: pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid
case. principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges,
under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific
crime or eliminate one from suspicion in the same principle as techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.
fingerprints are used. Incidents involving sexual assault would leave
biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a
can be left on the victim’s body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence.
clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be transferred to the Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained
victim’s body during the assault. Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was
proving that there was physical contact between an assailant and a appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is
victim. If properly collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics
DNA can be compared with known samples to place the suspect at and molecular biology.
the scene of the crime.
Independently of the physical evidence of appellant’s semen found in
The U.P. NSRI, which conducted the DNA tests in this case, used the PCR the victim’s vaginal canal, the trial court appreciated the following
amplification method by STR analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts of a circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond
specific DNA sequence can be copied exponentially within hours. Thus, reasonable doubt:
getting sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier since it
(1) Appellant and his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang
became possible to reliably amplify small samples using the PCR method.
together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba;
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should
(2) In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the house because of their frequent
consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples were
quarrels;
collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of
the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, (3) Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his
whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in estranged wife in the early morning on June 30, 1998;
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests. (4) Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00
p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang,
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar;
qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or
identification techniques. Based on Dr. de Ungria’s testimony, it was (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going down the ladder of the house of
determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this
to that of the extracts subject of examination. The blood sample taken time wearing a black shirt;
from the appellant showed that the gene types were identical with
semen taken from the victim’s vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match (6) Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was
exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample approaching;
given by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial.
(7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming down
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science the ladder of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead;
and technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be
cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

(8) The door leading to the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was a factual determination of the probative weight of the evidence
tied by a rope; presented.

(9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with her intestines 4. NO. The forensic DNA evidence and bloodied shirt, notwithstanding the
protruding from her body on the second floor of the house of Isabel eyewitness accounts of his presence at Isabel Dawang’s house during the
Dawang, with her stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along time when the crime was committed, undeniably link him to the June 30,
the periphery; 1998 incident. Appellant did not demonstrate with clear and
convincing evidence an impossibility to be in two places at the same
(10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victim’s vagina; time, especially in this case where the two places are located in the
same barangay. He lives within a 100 meter radius from the scene of the
(11) The stained or dirty white shirt found in the crime scene was found to
crime, and requires a mere five minute walk to reach one house from the
be positive with blood;
other. This fact severely weakens his alibi.
(12) DNA found at the crime scene compared with the DNA profile of the
5. NO. Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly
appellant are identical; and
established evidence and never on mere conjectures or suppositions. The
(13) Appellant escaped two days after he was detained but was legal relevancy of evidence denotes "something more than a minimum of
subsequently apprehended, such flight being indicative of guilt. probative value," suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain
a "plus value." Evidence without "plus value" may be logically relevant but
not legally sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the trial court to
Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must balance the probative value of such evidence against the likely harm that
form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable would result from its admission.
conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is the The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant
perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there is sufficient evidence from which the court can properly find or infer that the accused is
circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur: (1) there is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires
more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are moral certainty of guilt in order to sustain a conviction. Moral certainty is
derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances that degree of certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and
is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act
2. NO. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond reasonable doubt. This
testimonial compulsion. The right against self- incrimination is simply requires that the circumstances, taken together, should be of a conclusive
against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an nature and tendency; leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion
admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be that the accused, and no one else, committed the offense charged. In view
excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence. of the totality of evidence appreciated thus far, we rule that the
present case passes the test of moral certainty.
A person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing,
However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the
paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved.
requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, motive is essential for
It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood conviction when there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit.
sampling which was conducted in open court on March 30, 2000, in the
presence of counsel. Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of the victim,
testified that she last saw the victim alive in the morning of June 30, 1998
3. NO. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science at the house of Isabel Dawang. She witnessed the appellant running down
of DNA typing involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the stairs of Isabel’s house and proceeding to the back of the same house.
the evidence obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas an ex-post She also testified that a few days before the victim was raped and killed,
facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires the latter revealed to her that "Joel Yatar attempted to rape her after she
came from the school." The victim told Judilyn about the incident or attempt

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

of the appellant to rape her five days before her naked and violated body house. Being a relative by affinity within the third civil degree, he is deemed
was found dead in her grandmother’s house on June 25, 1998. In addition, in legal contemplation to have moral ascendancy over the victim.
Judilyn also testified that when her auntie Luz Dawang Yatar, wife of
appellant, separated from her husband, "this Joel Yatar threatened to kill Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of death is
our family." According to Judilyn, who was personally present during an imposed when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is
argument between her aunt and the appellant, the exact words uttered by committed. Although 3 Justices of this Court maintain their position that
appellant to his wife in the Ilocano dialect was, "If you leave me, I will kill all R.A. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, they
your family and your relatives.” These statements were not contradicted by nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is not
appellant. unconstitutional, and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the
case at bar.
Thus, appellant’s motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was
evident in the instant case. It is a rule in criminal law that motive, being a Case Digest: Malaluan, G.C. Q.
state of mind, is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or
statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission of ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG vs. Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ,
the offense, deeds or words that may express it or from which his motive Represented by Her Mother and Guardian, Jinky C. Diaz
or reason for committing it may be inferred. G.R. No. 171713 | 17 December 2007
Tickler: DNA Testing after death.
Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond
Topic: Rule on DNA Evidence (A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC)
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of rape with homicide.
Ratio: The New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA
Appellant sexually assaulted Kathylyn Uba, and by reason or on the
testing, either motu proprio or upon application of any person who has a
occasion thereof, in order to conceal his lustful deed, permanently sealed
legal interest in the matter in litigation. The death of the petitioner does not
the victim’s lips by stabbing her repeatedly, thereby causing her untimely
ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist
demise.
appropriate biological samples of his DNA.
The following are the elements constitutive of rape with homicide: (1) the Facts: The present petition calls for the determination of filiation of minor
appellant had carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a Joanne for purposes of support in favor of the said minor. A Complaint for
woman was achieved by means of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation was filed
reason or on the occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force, by minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz, represented by her mother and guardian,
threat or intimidation, appellant killed the woman. However, in rape Jinky C. Diaz, against Rogelio G. Ong before the RTC of Tarlac City.
committed by close kin, such as the victim’s father, step-father, uncle, or
the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force Jinky alleged that she and Rogelio got acquainted in Tarlac City sometime
or intimidation be employed. Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place in November 1993 and later on fell in love. At this time, Jinky was already
of violence and intimidation. The fact that the victim’s hymen is intact does married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding
not negate a finding that rape was committed as mere entry by the penis solemnized in February 1993.
into the lips of the female genital organ, even without rupture or laceration
of the hymen, suffices for conviction of rape. The strength and dilatability
From January 1994 to September 1998, they cohabited and lived together.
of the hymen are invariable; it may be so elastic as to stretch without
Thereafter, Joanne Rodjin Diaz was born on February 25, 1998 at the
laceration during intercourse. Absence of hymenal lacerations does not
Central Luzon Doctors' Hospital, Tarlac City.
disprove sexual abuse especially when the victim is of tender age.

In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the victim’s aunt. He is seven Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky
years older than the victim Kathylyn Uba. Before he and his wife separated, home after delivery. He paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal
appellant lived in the house of his mother-in-law, together with the victim expenses and provided for all of Joanne's needs, recognizing the child as
and his wife. After the separation, appellant moved to the house of his his.
parents, approximately one hundred (100) meters from his mother-in-law’s

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned Joanne and Jinky, and stopped Issues: Whether or not the appellate court's decision remanding the case
supporting Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father of the child. to the trial court for the conduct of DNA testing is proper given that the
Despite Jinky's remonstrance, he failed and refused to give support for the petitioner has already died.
child and to acknowledge her as his daughter, thus leading to the filing of Held: Yes. Amidst the protestation of petitioner against the DNA analysis,
the complaint. the resolution thereof may provide the definitive key to the resolution of the
issue of support for minor Joanne.
After service of summons upon Rogelio, he failed to file any responsive
pleading despite repeated motions for extension. The trial court declared With the advancement in the field of genetics, and the availability of new
him in default. Rogelio's submitted his Answer with Counterclaim and technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether
Special and Affirmative Defenses to the trial court. Jinky was allowed to Rogelio is the biological father of the minor, through DNA testing.
present her evidence ex parte on the basis of which the trial court rendered
a decision granting the reliefs prayed for in the complaint (Ordering The New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing, either
defendant to recognize plaintiff as his natural child; ordering defendant to motu proprio or upon application of any person who has a legal interest in
provide plaintiff with a monthly support of P10,000.00 and payment of the matter in litigation.
attorney’s fees.)
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order . - The appropriate
Rogelio filed a motion to lift the order of default and a motion for court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any
reconsideration. Rogelio filed a motion for new trial with prayer that the person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a
decision of the trial court be vacated and the case be considered for trial DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice
de novo which the RTC granted. to the parties upon a showing of the following:

RTC - declared Joanne Rodjin Diaz to be the illegitimate child of defendant (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
Rogelio Ong with plaintiff Jinky Diaz.
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the
Rogelio filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied. Rogelio type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously
appealed to the CA. During the pendency of the case with the CA, Rogelio subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation
died. He was substituted by the Estate of Rogelio Ong in the case. for good reasons;

CA – Appeal granted. The case is remanded to the court a quo for the (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
issuance of an order directing the parties to make arrangements for DNA
analysis for the purpose of determining the paternity of plaintiff minor
Joanne Rodjin Diaz. (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new
information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case;
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Records
showed that the late defendant-appellant Rogelio G. Ong, in the early stage (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may
of the proceedings volunteered and suggested that he and plaintiff's mother consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the
submit themselves to a DNA or blood testing to settle the issue of paternity, DNA testing.
as a sign of good faith. However, the trial court did not consider resorting
to this modern scientific procedure notwithstanding the repeated denials of The death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of
defendant that he is the biological father of the plaintiff even as he admitted DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his
having actual sexual relations with plaintiff's mother. DNA. The term "biological sample" means any organic material originating
from a person's body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible

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to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues,
hairs and bones. The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of
legitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not
Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the
enumerated above as may be available, may be used for DNA testing. In contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code.
this case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of obtaining an
appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA Additional Notes on DNA and Paternity Tests
testing. And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA
testing.
DNA is the fundamental building block of a person's entire genetic make-
up. DNA is found in all human cells and is the same in every cell of the
In People vs. Umanito, citing Tecson vs. Commission on Elections, this same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a person's DNA profile can
Court held: determine his identity.

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological
satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, sample obtained from an individual is examined. The DNA is processed to
which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual from whom the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent sample is taken. This DNA profile is unique for each person, except for
could be resorted to. identical twins.

Under Section 4 of the Rules, the courts are authorized, after due Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, "matches" are determined.
hearing and notice, motu proprio to order a DNA testing. However, To illustrate, when DNA or fingerprint tests are done to identify a suspect
while this Court retains jurisdiction over the case at bar, in a criminal case, the evidence collected from the crime scene is compared
capacitated as it is to receive and act on the matter in controversy, with the "known" print. If a substantial amount of the identifying features are
the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not, in the the same, the DNA or fingerprint is deemed to be a match. But then, even
course of daily routine, conduct hearings. Hence, it would be more if only one feature of the DNA or fingerprint is different, it is deemed not to
appropriate that the case be remanded to the RTC for reception have come from the suspect.
of evidence in appropriate hearings, with due notice to the parties.
As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show variations between
Additional Notes on Filiation Proceedings people. In each of these regions, a person possesses two genetic types
called "allele," one inherited from each parent. In a paternity test, the
Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an
also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the
support, or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person mother and child, it is possible to determine which half of the child's DNA
who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child. was inherited from the mother. The other half must have been inherited
There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action from the biological father. The alleged father's profile is then examined to
which parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which match the
presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative paternal types in the child. If the man's DNA types do not match that of the
father and child. child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is
not excluded as the father.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed Case Digest: Malaluan, G.C.Q.
legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of
legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code.

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

I. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE In its defense, ESHRI claimed having overpaid BF for Progress Billing Nos.
1 to 13 and, by way of counterclaim with damages, asked that BF be
3d) Requisites for introduction of secondary evidence ordered to refund the excess payments. ESHRI also charged BF with
incurring delay and turning up with inferior work accomplishment.
EDSA Shangri-la v. BF Corporation
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
G.R. No. 145842 | June 27, 2008 in disregarding issues of law raised by petitioners in their appeal particularly
in admitting in evidence photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, PMIs
Ratio: The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or and WVOs.
control of the party against whom it is offered does not warrant the
admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must prove that he has done Held: NO. The Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
all in his power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said
party to produce the document. The notice may be in the form of a motion Petitioners fault the CA, and necessarily the trial court, on the matter of the
for the production of the original or made in open court in the presence of admission in evidence of the photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19
the adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party and the complementing PMIs and the WVOs. According to petitioners, BF,
in custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the same. When before being allowed to adduce in evidence the photocopies adverted to,
such party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to ought to have laid the basis for the presentation of the photocopies as
produce it or refuses to produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted. secondary evidence, conformably to the best evidence rule.
Facts: The case involves two (2) consolidated petitions for review under
Rule 45 to nullify certain issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA). Respondent BF, on the other hand, avers having complied with the laying-
the-basis requirement. Defending the action of the courts below in admitting
into evidence the photocopies of the documents aforementioned, BF
Both petitions stemmed from a construction contract denominated as
Agreement for the Execution of Builder's Work for the EDSA Shangri-la explained that it could not present the original of the documents since they
were in the possession of ESHRI which refused to hand them over to BF
Hotel Project that ESHRI and BF executed for the construction of the EDSA
despite requests.
Shangri-la Hotel starting May 1, 1991. Among other things, the contract
stipulated for the payment of the contract price on the basis of the work
accomplished as described in the monthly progress billings. Under this Secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument or document
arrangement, BF shall submit a monthly progress billing to ESHRI which refers to evidence other than the original instrument or document itself. A
would then re-measure the work accomplished and prepare a Progress party may present secondary evidence of the contents of a writing not only
Payment Certificate for that month's progress billing. when the original is lost or destroyed, but also when it is in the custody or
under the control of the adverse party. In either instance, however, certain
From May 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992, BF submitted a total of 19 progress explanations must be given before a party can resort to secondary
evidence.
billings following the procedure agreed upon. Based on Progress Billing
Nos. 1 to 13, ESHRI paid BF PhP 86,501,834.05. According to BF,
however, ESHRI, for Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, did not re-measure the The trial court correctly allowed the presentation of the photocopied
work done, did not prepare the Progress Payment Certificates, let alone documents in question as secondary evidence. Any suggestion that BF
remit payment for the inclusive periods covered. In this regard, BF claimed failed to lay the required basis for presenting the photocopies of Progress
having been misled into working continuously on the project by ESHRI Billing Nos. 14 to 19 instead of their originals has to be dismissed.
which gave the assurance about the Progress Payment Certificates already
being processed. After several futile attempts to collect the unpaid billings, Four factual premises are readily deducible from the stenographic notes of
BF filed, on July 26, 1993, before the RTC a suit for a sum of money and the following exchanges between Atty. Andres and Atty. Autea, counsel for
damages. BF and ESHRI, to wit: (1) the existence of the original documents which
ESHRI had possession of; (2) a request was made on ESHRI to produce

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

the documents; (3) ESHRI was afforded sufficient time to produce them; participated in the first couple’s alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth
and (4) ESHRI was not inclined to produce them. insofar as the specific allegations herein were concerned.

Facts: The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) was

Clearly, the circumstances obtaining in this case fall under the exception
created by President Corazon C. Aquino after the People Power Revolution
under Sec. 3(b) of Rule 130. In other words, the conditions sine qua non
in 1986. The PCGG was tasked to investigate and recover ill-gotten wealth
for the presentation and reception of the photocopies of the original
amassed by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
document as secondary evidence have been met. These are: (1) there is
relatives and associates.
proof of the original document's execution or existence; (2) there is proof of
the cause of the original document's unavailability; and (3) the offeror is in
good faith. The PCGG, acting on behalf of the Republic with the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a Complaint for Reversion, Reconveyance,
Restitution, Accounting and Damages against Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda
The Court said in Magdayao v. People:
R. Marcos; and the respondents Imee Marcos-Manotoc, Irene Marcos-
To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a
Araneta, Bongbong Marcos, Tomas Manotoc, and Gregorio Araneta III.who
writing is in the custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule
was later substituted by his estate upon his death on July 16, 1987.
130 provides that the adverse party must be given reasonable notice, that
he fails or refuses to produce the same in court and that the offeror offers
satisfactory proof of its existence. An amended Complaint was filed and Constante Rubio was added as a
defendant. On February 9, 1988, the Complaint was amended again amnd
Nemesio G. Co and the respondents Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho,
The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of
and Yeung Chun Fan were included as defendants. For the third time, the
the party against whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of
PCGG amended the complaint and added Imelda Cojuangco, the estate of
secondary evidence. The offeror must prove that he has done all in his
Ramon Cojuangco, and Prime Holdings, Inc. as defendants.
power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said party to
produce the document. The notice may be in the form of a motion for the
production of the original or made in open court in the presence of the
adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party in The allegations contained in the Complaint specific to herein respondents
custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the same. When such are the following:
party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce
it or refuses to produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted.
Case Digest: Verona, G.J. 1. “Defendants Imelda (IMEE) R. Marcos-Manotoc, Tomas Manotoc,
Irene R. Manotoc (sic) Araneta, Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, and
Republic v. Imelda “Imee” Marcos-Manotoc Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., actively collaborated, with Defendants
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos among others, in
G.R. No. 171701 | February 8, 2012 confiscating and/or unlawfully appropriating funds and other
property, and in concealing the same as described above.
Ratio: In order that secondary evidence may be admissible, there must be
proof by satisfactory evidence of (1) due execution of the original; (2) loss,
destruction or unavailability of all such originals and (3) reasonable In addition, each of the said Defendants, either by taking undue
diligence and good faith in the search for or attempt to produce the original. advantage of their relationship with Defendants Ferdinand E.
None of these requirements were complied with by the plaintiff. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, or by reason of the above-
described active collaboration, unlawfully acquired or received
Thus, absent any convincing evidence to hold otherwise, it follows that property, shares of stocks in corporations, illegal payments such
petitioner failed to prove that the Marcos siblings and Gregorio Araneta III as commissions, bribes or kickbacks, and other forms of improper
collaborated with former President Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos and privileges, income, revenues and benefits. Defendant Araneta in
particular made use of Asialand Development Corporation which

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

is included in Annex "A" hereof as corporate vehicle to benefit in With regard to the siblings Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos,
the manner stated above.” Jr., the court noted that their involvement in the alleged illegal activities was
never established. In fact, they were never mentioned by any of the
witnesses presented. Neither did the documentary evidence pinpoint any
2. “Defendants Nemesio G. Co, Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho specific involvement of the Marcos children. Moreover, the court held that
and Yeung Chun Fan are the controlling stockholders of Glorious Sun the evidence were considered hearsay because their originals were not
Fashion Manufacturing Corporation (Phils.). Through Glorious Sun (Phils.), presented in court, nor were they authenticated by the persons who
they acted as fronts or dummies, cronies or otherwise willing tools of executed them. Furthermore, the court pointed out that petitioner failed to
spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and/or the family, particularly of provide any valid reason why it did not present the originals in court. These
Defendant Imelda (Imee) Marcos-Manotoc, in the illegal salting of foreign exhibits were supposed to show the interests of Imee Marcos-Manotok in
exchangeby importing denim fabrics from only one supplier – a Hong Kong the media networks IBC-13, BBC-2 and RPN-9, all three of which she had
based corporation which was also owned and controlled by defendant allegedly acquired illegally. These exhibits also sought to prove her alleged
Hong Kong investors, at prices much higher than those being paid by other participation in dollar salting through De Soleil Apparel.
users of similar materials to the grave and irreparable damage of Plaintiff.”
Meanwhile, as far as the Yeungs were concerned, the court found the
allegations against them baseless. Petitioner failed to demonstrate how
Thereafter, petitioner presented and formally offered its evidence against their business, Glorious Sun Fashion Garments Manufacturing, Co. Phils.
herein respondents. However, the latter objected to the offer primarily on (Glorious Sun), was used as a vehicle for dollar salting; or to show that they
the ground that the documents violated the best evidence rule of the Rules themselves were dummies of the Marcoses. Again, the court held that the
of Court, as these documents were unauthenticated; moreover, petitioner documentary evidence relevant to this allegation was inadmissible for
had not provided any reason for its failure to present the originals. being mere photocopies, and that the affiants had not been presented as
witnesses.
On 11 March 2002, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution admitting the
pieces of evidence while expressing some reservation. In its resolution, the Finally, the court also granted the Demurrer filed by PEA-PTGWO. While
Sandiganbayan stated: “taking note of the objections of accused Marcoses the court held that there was no evidence to show that Pantranco was
and the reply thereto by the plaintiff, all the documentary exhibits formally illegally acquired, the former nevertheless held that there was a need to
offered by the prosecution are hereby admitted in evidence; however, their first determine the ownership of the disputed funds before they could be
evidentiary value shall be left to the determination of the Court.” ordered released to the rightful owner.

Thereafter, the respondents filed their respective Demmurers to Evidence. Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the demurrers to
On 6 December 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution, evidence filed by respondents Ma. Imelda (Imee) R. Marcos and Ferdinand
which granted all the Demurrers to Evidence except the one filed by Imelda (Bongbong) R. Marcos, Jr.; respondent-Spouses Gregorio Araneta Iii And
R. Marcos. The demurrer filed by Imelda R. Marcos was denied because Irene Marcos Araneta and respondents Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun
she had categorically admitted that she and her husband owned properties Fan, and Yeung Chun Ho.
enumerated in the Complaint, while stating that these properties had been Held: NO. The Sandiganbayan is correct in granting the respondents
lawfully acquired. The court held that the evidence presented by petitioner respective demurrers to evidence.
constituted a prima facie case against her, considering that the value of the
properties involved was grossly disproportionate to the Marcos spouses’
lawful income. Thus, this admission and the fact that Imelda R. Marcos was It is petitioner’s burden to prove the allegations in its Complaint. For relief
the compulsory heir and administratrix of the Marcos estate were the to be granted, the operative act on how and in what manner the Marcos
primary reasons why the court held that she was responsible for accounting siblings participated in and/or benefitted from the acts of the Marcos couple
for the funds and properties alleged to be ill-gotten. must be clearly shown through a preponderance of evidence. Should
petitioner fail to discharge this burden, the Court is constrained and is left
with no choice but to uphold the Demurrer to Evidence filed by respondents.

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

Concepcion Chua Gaw v. Suy Ben Chua

Petitioner does not deny that what should be proved are the contents of the
G.R. NO. 160855 | April 16, 2008
documents themselves. It is imperative, therefore, to submit the original
documents that could prove petitioner’s allegations. Thus, the photocopied Ratio: Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually
documents are in violation Rule 130, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court, otherwise executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its
known as the best evidence rule, which mandates that the evidence must execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence
be the original document itself. is admissible.

Petitioner did not even attempt to provide a plausible reason why the Facts: Chua Chin died, leaving his wife Chan Chi and his seven children
originals were not presented, or any compelling ground why the court as his only surviving heirs. His surviving heirs executed a Deed of
should admit these documents as secondary evidence absent the Partition, wherein they settled their interest in Hagonoy Lumber, the
testimony of the witnesses who had executed them. decedent’s business. They agreed to renounce and waive their shares over
Hagonoy Lumber in favor of their co-heir, Chua Sioc Huan.
Petitioner asked respondent to lend them P200,000.00 which they will use
The presentation of the originals of the aforesaid exhibits is not validly for the construction of their house. Respondent issued a China Bank
excepted under Rule 130, Section 3 (a), (b), and (d) of the Rules of Court. check.
Under paragraph (d), when ‘the original document is a public record in the Then, their sister, Chua Sioc Huan, executed a Deed of Sale over all her
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office,’ presentation of rights and interests in Hagonoy Lumber for P255,000.00 in favor of
the original thereof is excepted. However, as earlier observed, all except respondent.
one of the exhibits introduced by the plaintiff were not necessarily public Petitioner failed to pay the amount they borrowed from respondent. Thus,
documents. The transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) of the proceedings respondent filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against the spouses Gaw
purportedly before the PCGG, the plaintiff’s exhibit "Q", may be a public with the RTC.
document, but what was presented by the plaintiff was a mere photocopy In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, the spouses Gaw
of the purported TSN. The Rules provide that when the original document contended that the P200,000.00 was not a loan but petitioner's share in the
is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its profits of Hagonoy Lumber, one of her family's businesses. To insure that
contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in she will defer her demand, respondent allegedly gave her P200,000.00 as
custody thereof. Exhibit "Q" was not a certified copy and it was not even her share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber.
signed by the stenographer who supposedly took down the proceedings. In his Answer to Amended Counterclaim, respondent explained that his
sister, Chua Sioc Huan, became the sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber when
In order that secondary evidence may be admissible, there must be proof the heirs executed the Deed of Partition. In turn, he became the sole
by satisfactory evidence of (1) due execution of the original; (2) loss, owner of Hagonoy Lumber when he bought it from Chua Sioc Huan, as
destruction or unavailability of all such originals and (3) reasonable evidenced by the Deed of Sale.
diligence and good faith in the search for or attempt to produce the original. In their reply, petitioner countered that the documents on which plaintiff
None of these requirements were complied with by the plaintiff. anchors his claim of ownership over Hagonoy Lumber were not true and
valid agreements and do not express the real intention of the parties. They
Thus, absent any convincing evidence to hold otherwise, it follows that claimed that these documents are mere paper arrangements.
petitioner failed to prove that the Marcos siblings and Gregorio Araneta III The RTC ruled in favor of respondent Chua and ordered petitioner to pay.
collaborated with former President Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos and It also dismissed petitioner’s counterclaim. It ruled that although
participated in the first couple’s alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth respondent failed to produce the originals of the documents, petitioner
insofar as the specific allegations herein were concerned. judicially admitted the due execution of the Deed of Partition, and even
Case Digest: Verona, G.J. acknowledged her signature thereon, thus constitutes an exception to the
best evidence rule.
The CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC. It also denied the MR.

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

Issues: deeds. The petitioner never even denied their due execution and admitted
that she signed the Deed of Partition. As for the Deed of Sale, petitioner
(1) Was the 200,000Php a loan? had, in effect, admitted its genuineness and due execution when she failed
to specifically deny it in the manner required by the rules. The petitioner
(2) Did the RTC err in admitting in evidence a copy of the Deed of Partition
merely claimed that said documents do not express the true agreement and
and the Deed of Sale in violation of the best evidence rule?
intention of the parties since they were only provisional paper
Held: (1) YES. On the issue of whether the P200,000.00 was really a loan, arrangements made upon the advice of counsel. Apparently, the petitioner
it is well to remember that a check may be evidence of indebtedness. A does not contest the contents of these deeds but alleges that there was a
check, the entries of which are in writing, could prove a loan transaction. It contemporaneous agreement that the transfer of Hagonoy Lumber to Chua
is pure naiveté to insist that an entrepreneur who has several sources of Sioc Huan was only temporary.
income and has access to considerable bank credit, no longer has any An agreement or the contract between the parties is the formal expression
reason to borrow any amount. of the parties' rights, duties and obligations. It is the best evidence of the
The petitioner's allegation that the P200,000.00 was advance on her share intention of the parties. The parties' intention is to be deciphered from the
in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber is implausible. Even assuming, arguendo, language used in the contract, not from the unilateral post facto assertions
that the check was an advance on the petitioner's share in the profits of the of one of the parties, or of third parties who are strangers to the
business, it was highly unlikely that the respondent would deliver a check contract. Thus, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
drawn against his personal, and not against the business enterprise's writing, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
account. between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such
It is also worthy to note that both the Deed of Partition and the Deed of Sale terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
were acknowledged before a Notary Public. The notarization of a private
document converts it into a public document, and makes it admissible in
court without further proof of its authenticity. It is entitled to full faith and Case Digest: Rayco, R.U.
credit upon its face. A notarized document carries evidentiary weight as to
its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary public
have in their favor the presumption of regularity. Such a document must be Sasan, Sr. et al v. NLRC, E-PCI Bank and Helpmate, Inc.
given full force and effect absent a strong, complete and conclusive proof
of its falsity or nullity on account of some flaws or defects recognized by G.R. No. 176240 | October 17, 2008
law. A public document executed and attested through the intervention of
a notary public is, generally, evidence of the facts therein express in clear Ratio: Even assuming that petitioners were given mere photocopies,
unequivocal manner. again, we stress that proceedings before the NLRC are not covered by the
(2) NO. The "best evidence rule" as encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3, of technical rules of evidence and procedure as observed in the regular
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure applies only when the content of such courts.
document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether
such document was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances Facts: Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against E-PCIBank
relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not and their contractor, Helpmate, Inc. (HI). They claimed that they had
apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. Any other substitutionary become regular employees of E-PCIBank with respect to the activities for
evidence is likewise admissible without need to account for the which they were employed, having continuously rendered janitorial and
original. Moreover, production of the original may be dispensed with, in the messengerial services to the bank for more than one year.
trial court's discretion, whenever the opponent does not bona fide dispute Private respondents averred that HI is an independent job contractor.
the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served The LA ruled that HI was not a legitimate job contractor on the ground that
by requiring production. it did not possess the required substantial capital or investment.
Accordingly, we find that the best evidence rule is not applicable to the Then, HI submitted before the NLRC several documents which it did not
instant case. Here, there was no dispute as to the terms of either deed; present before the LA. These are:
hence, the RTC correctly admitted in evidence mere copies of the two

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

1. Certificate of Filing of Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock, Certificate of evidence, such as documents and affidavits, submitted by the parties for
Filing Amended Articles of Incorporation, and General Information Sheet the first time on appeal. The submission of additional evidence on appeal
Stock Corporation of HI showing therein that it increased its authorized capital does not prejudice the other party for the latter could submit counter-
stock from ₱1,500,000.00 to ₱20,000,000.00 on 12 March 1999 with the evidence.
Securities and Exchange Commission;
2. Audited Financial Statement of HI showing therein that it has Total Assets For the same reasons, we cannot find merit in petitioners’ protestations
of ₱20,939,935.72 as of 31 December 2000; against the documentary evidence submitted by HI because they were
3. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 110173 and Tax Declaration No. GR2K-09- mere photocopies. Evidently, petitioners are invoking the best evidence
063-00582 registered under the name of HI showing that it has a parcel of rule, espoused in Section 3, Rule130 of the Rules of Court. It provides that:
land with Market Value of ₱1,168,860.00 located along Rizal Avenue (now
Bacalso Avenue), Cebu City, and Section 3. – Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the
4. Tax Declaration No. GR2K-09-063-00583 registered under the name of HI subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
showing that it has a commercial building constructed on the preceding lot admissible other than the original document itself x x x.
located along Bacalso Avenue, Cebu City with market value of
₱2,515,170.00. The above provision explicitly mandates that when the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself. Notably, certified true copies of these
The NLRC promulgated its Decision modifying the ruling of the LA. The documents, acceptable under the Rules of Court were furnished to the
NLRC took into consideration the documentary evidence presented by petitioners. Even assuming that petitioners were given mere photocopies,
HI for the first time on appeal and, on the basis thereof, declared HI as a again, we stress that proceedings before the NLRC are not covered by the
highly capitalized venture with sufficient capitalization, which cannot be technical rules of evidence and procedure as observed in the regular
considered engaged in "labor-only contracting." courts. Technical rules of evidence do not apply if the decision to grant the
petition proceeds from an examination of its sufficiency as well as a careful
It also ruled that the charge of illegal dismissal was prematurely filed look into the arguments contained in position papers and other documents.
because temporary "off-detail" is not equivalent to dismissal. The CA
affirmed. Petitioners had more than adequate opportunity when they filed their
motion for reconsideration before the NLRC, their Petition to the Court of
Issues: Appeals and even to this Court, to refute or present their counter-evidence
to the documentary evidence presented by HI. Having failed in this respect,
(1) Did the NLRC validly admit in evidence the documents submitted by HI? petitioners cannot now be heard to complain about these documentary
evidences presented by HI upon which the NLRC and the Court of Appeals
(2) Were petitioners illegally dismissed from their employment?
based its finding that HI is a legitimate job contractor.
Held: (1) YES. This is not a novel procedural issue and our jurisprudence (2) NO. HI is a legitimate job contractor. We take note that HI has been
is already replete with cases allowing the NLRC to admit evidence, not issued by the DOLE a Certificate of Registration. Having been issued by a
presented before the Labor Arbiter, and submitted to the NLRC for the first public officer, this certification carries with it the presumption that it was
time on appeal. Technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases. issued in the regular performance of official duty.
Labor officials should use every reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law Once it is established that an entity such as in this case, HI has substantial
or procedure, all in the interest of due process. capital, it was no longer necessary to adduce further evidence to prove that
The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited it does not fall within the purview of "labor-only" contracting. There is even
by its New Rules of Procedure. After all, rules of evidence prevailing in no need for HI to refute the contention of petitioners that some of the
courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor cases. The NLRC and activities they performed such as those of messengerial services are
labor arbiters are directed to use every and all reasonable means to directly related to the principal business of E- PCIBank.
ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to
technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of substantial justice. Case Digest: Rayco, R.U.
In keeping with this directive, it has been held that the NLRC may consider

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

DECS v. Julia Del Rosario, Maria Del Rosario, Pacencia Del Rosario, political meeting in the residence of Isaias, and that he actually saw Isaias
and Heirs of Santos Del Rosario and Mayor Ramos sign a document (deed of donation), in the presence of
G.R. No. 146586 | January 26, 2005 Judge Natividad, then municipal counselor;

Ratio: Secondary evidence of the contents of a document refers to

Vidal de Jesus, tetsified that as barangay councilman, he was aware of the
evidence other than the original document itself. A party may introduce
land problem of KPPS. During a meeting between Isaias’ children and the
secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument not only when
barangay council, in the presence of Judge Natividad, the latter told Isaias’
the original is lost or destroyed, but also when it cannot be produced in
children that the land had been donated by their father. The children agreed
court, provided there is no bad faith on the part of the offeror. However, a
but requested to rename the school after their father’s name. When the
party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary evidence
barangay council tried to get a copy of the deed at the municipal hall, the
before he can resort to secondary evidence. A party must first present to
deed got lost, only they were able to get a copy of the tax declaration in the
the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for non-production
name of the municipality, a certification to that effect was issued by the
of the original instrument. The correct order of proof is as
mayor. They went to the DECS Office but could not secure such copy
follows: existence, execution, loss, contents, although the court in its
discretion may change this order if necessary.
Facts: On February 14, 1982, respondents Julia, Maria, Pacencia, and the Judge Eli Natividad testified that Isaias Del Rosario was his near relative;
Heirs of Santos Del Rosario, filed before the RTC of Bulacan a complaint that KPPS is near his house and that the lot where KPPS is located is
for Recovery of Possession against petitioner Department of Education, formerly owned by Isaias. As far as he knows, the Municipality is now the
Culture and Sports. They alleged that they own a 1,181-square meter land owner of the land. He testified that as far as he knows, it is the Municipality
(Property) situated in Kaypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, registered in 1976 who now owns the land. During his incumbency as municipal counselor,
under TCT No. T-222432. Respondents alleged that the Kaypombo Isaias went to his house and told him that eh wanted to have a primary
Primary School Annex (KPPS) under DECS was occupying a portion of the school in their place and was willing to donate a portion of the questioned
property through respondents’ tolerance, yet KPPS refused to vacate the lot for school site.
premises despite their valid demands to do so.
Respondents, for their part, presented two witnesses: (1) Eugenia R.
DECS countered that KPPS’s occupation of a portion of the respondents’ Ignacio testified that Isaias del Rosario died on April 18, 1966, long after
property was with the express consent and approval of their late father the construction of the school and that she does not know everything about
Isaias Del Rosario. DECS alleged that in 1959, Isaias donated a portion of the donation because her father never informed them of his dealings and
the Property to the Municipality of Sta. Maria, Bulacan for school site she did not inquire from him about the occupancy of the lot by the school.
purposes. It was Atty. Ely Natividad who prepared the deed of donation and (2) Maria del Rosario-Esteban testified that that she knows the property in
acceptance. KPPS started occupying the donated site in 1962. question and that they own it by virtue of succession and that she cannot
recall how the school was constructed on the land; that her parents never
donated any property because that is their only property. Also, she stated
During the pre-trial conference held on 3 September 1992, DECS admitted
that their father told them that he just lent the property temporarily to the
the existence and execution of TCT No. T-222432, Tax Declaration No.
municipality and she never found any document conveying the lot in
6310), and the tax receipts in respondents’ names for the years 1991 and
question to the municipality
1992. Respondents admitted the existence of Judge Natividad’s affidavit
that he prepared the deed of donation and the tax declaration for 1985 in
the Municipality’s name. The parties agreed to a reverse trial with DECS RTC: The RTC dismissed respondents ‘complaint, finding that the defense
presenting its evidence first with three witnesses: was able to prove the due execution of the deed of donation and its
acceptance, as well as the loss of the same, in accordance with Rule 130,
Sec. 4.
Ricardo Nicolas testified that during the duration of his residency in
CA: Upon appeal, the CA reversed the RTC ruling, ordering DECS to
Kaypombo, he came across a public elementary school (KPPS), situated
vacate the subject premises. The Court of Appeals held that DECS failed
at a land owned by the late Isaias Del Rosario, alter donated to the
to prove the existence and due execution of the deed of donation as well
Municipality.He further testified that the act of donation was made during a

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

as the Resolution of the municipal council accepting the donation. The CA loss, contents, although the court in its discretion may change this order if
denied DECS’ motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. necessary.

Issue: Whether or not DECS failed to prove the due execution or existence
The testimony of Ricardo Nicolas may have established to some extent
of the deed of donation and the resolution of the municipal council
the existence of the deed of donation since he testified that he was present
accepting the donation as well as the loss of the documents as the cause
when Isaias and the mayor talked about the donation and that he witnessed
of their unavailability
the signing of the document.1a\^/phi1.net However, Ricardo Nicolas
Held: YES, DECS failed to prove the due execution or existence of the admitted during cross-examination that he did not read and did not have
deed of donation and resolution of the municipal council. The best or personal knowledge of the contents of the document that Isaias and the
primary evidence of a donation of real property is an authentic copy of the mayor supposedly signed.
deed of donation with all the formalities required by Article 749 of the Civil
Code. The duty to produce the original document arises when the subject In the same vein, Vidal De Jesus’ testimony does not help to establish the
of the inquiry are the contents of the writing in which case there can be no deed of donation’s existence, execution and contents. He testified that he
evidence of the contents of the writing other than the writing itself. Simply never saw the deed of donation. On cross-examination, Vidal De Jesus
put, when a party wants to prove the contents of the document, the best admitted that the information that Isaias donated the lot to the Municipality
evidence is the original writing itself. A party may prove the donation by was only relayed to him by Judge Natividad himself. If at all, DECS offered
other competent or secondary evidence under the exceptions in Section 3, Vidal De Jesus’ testimony to establish the loss of the deed of donation.
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Section 3 reads: Vidal de Jesus testified that the barangay council tried to get a copy of the
deed but the Municipality informed the barangay council that the deed was
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the lost when the municipal office was transferred to a new building. DECS also
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be made a search in the DECS office in Malolos but this proved futile too.
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases: This leaves us with Judge Natividad’s testimony. Judge Natividad testified
that he prepared and notarized the deed of donation. He further testified
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be that there was a municipal council Resolution, signed in the Office of the
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror; Secretary and of the Mayor, accepting the donation and expressing
gratitude to the donor. He furnished the municipal government, the DECS
Division Office of Bulacan and the clerk of court of Sta. Maria a copy of the
In relation to this, Section 5 of Rule 130 reads: deed of donation.
SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. – When the original
document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its DECS did not introduce in evidence the municipal council Resolution
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, accepting the donation. There is also no proof that the donee
or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the communicated in writing its acceptance to the donor aside from the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated. circumstance that DECS constructed the school during Isaias’ lifetime
Secondary evidence of the contents of a document refers to evidence other without objection on his part. There is absolutely no showing that these
than the original document itself. A party may introduce secondary steps were noted in both instruments.
evidence of the contents of a written instrument not only when the original Case Digest: Gopez, S.F.A.
is lost or destroyed, but also when it cannot be produced in court, provided
there is no bad faith on the part of the offeror. However, a party must first Rogelio Dantis v. Julio Maghinang, Jr.
satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary evidence before he can G.R. No. 191696 | April 10, 2013
resort to secondary evidence. A party must first present to the court proof
of loss or other satisfactory explanation for non-production of the original Ratio: Accordingly, the offeror of the secondary evidence is burdened to
satisfactorily prove the predicates thereof, namely: (1) the execution or
instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution,

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

existence of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or its CA: The CA held that Exhibit “4” was an indubitable proof of the sale of the
non-production in court; and (3) the unavailability of the original is not due 352-square meter lot between Emilio and Julio, Sr. It also ruled that the
to bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror. Proof of the due execution partial payment of the purchase price, coupled with the delivery of the res,
of the document and its subsequent loss would constitute the basis for the gave efficacy to the oral sale and brought it outside the operation of the
introduction of secondary evidence. statute of frauds. Rogelio moved for reconsideration but was denied.
Facts: Petitioner Rogelio Dantis filed a complaint for quieting of title and Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
recovery of possession with damages against respondent Julio Maghinang,
alleging that he was the owner of a 5,657-square meter land in Sta. Rita, Issue: Whether or not Exhibit “3” and Exhibit “4” are devoid of evidentiary
San Miguel Bulacan, covered by TCT No. T-125918, acquiring ownership value.
therein through a deed of extrajudicial partition of the estate of his
deceased father, Emilio. He alleged that he had been paying the realty Held: YES, Exhibit “3” and Exhibit “4” are devoid of evidentiary value,
taxes on the said property. Rogelio also stated that Julio, Jr. occupied and hence, deserve scant consideration.
built a house on a portion of his property without any right at all. Despite
demands to vacate the premises, Julio, Jr. did not comply with such, this, It is an age-old rule in civil cases that he who alleges a fact has the burden
creating a cloud of doubt over Rogelio’s title and right of possession of his of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence. After carefully sifting
property, through the evidence on record, the Court finds that Rogelio was able to
establish a prima facie case in his favor tending to show his exclusive
To refute said allegations, defendant Julio, Jr. claimed that he was the ownership of the parcel of land under TCT No. T-125918 with an area of
actual owner of the 352-square meter subject lot, which he claimed to 5,657 square meters, which included the 352-square meter subject lot.
having been in open and continuous possession of such property for almost From the records, it appears that TCT No. T-125918 is a derivative of TCT
30 years. He presented an affidavit executed on September 3, 1953, No. T-256228, which covered a bigger area of land measuring 30,000
attested by Ignacio Dantis, petitioner’s grandfather, which alleged that square meters registered in the name of Emilio Dantis; that Emilio died
Emilio Dantis agreed to sell 352 square meters of the lot to defendant on intestate on November 13, 1952; that Emilio’s five heirs, including Rogelio,
installment. He could not say that he is the owner because there is still executed an extra-judicial partition of estate on December 22, 1993 and
question about the lot. He claimed that his father, Julio Maghinang (Sr.), divided among themselves specific portions of the property covered by TCT
bought the said lot from the parents of Rogelio Dantis. He admitted that the No. T-256228, which were already set apart by metes and bounds; that the
affidavit was not signed by the alleged vendor, Emilio Dantis, the father of land known as Lot 6-D-1 of the subdivision plan Psd-031421-054315 with
Rogelio Dantis. The receipt he presented was admittedly a mere an area of 5,657 sq. m. went to Rogelio, the property now covered by TCT
photocopy. No. T-125918; and that the property was declared for realty tax purpose in
the name of Rogelio for which a tax declaration was issued in his name;
and that the same had not been transferred to anyone else since its
RTC: The RTC declared Rogelio as the true owner of the entire 5,657- issuance.
square meter lot in question, as evidenced by his TCT over the same. The
RTC did not lend any probative value on the documentary evidence of sale In light of Rogelio’s outright denial of the oral sale together with his
adduced by Julio, such as the affidavit allegedly executed by Ignacio Dantis insistence of ownership over the subject lot, it behooved upon Julio, Jr. to
(Exhibit 3), attesting the sale of the lot made by his son, Emilio, to Julio, contravene the former’s claim and convince the court that he had a valid
and an undated handwritten receipt of initial downpayment amounting to defense. The burden of evidence shifted to Julio, Jr. to prove that his father
P100.00 (Exhibit 4). The RTC ruled that even if these documents were bought the subject lot from Emilio Dantis, Julio, Jr. failed to discharge this
adjudged as competent evidence, still, they would only serve as proofs that burden. His pieces of evidence, Exhibit “3” and Exhibit “4,” cannot prevail
the purchase price for the subject lot had not yet been completely paid and, over the array of documentary and testimonial evidence that were adduced
hence, Rogelio was not duty-bound to deliver the property to Julio, Jr. The by Rogelio. The totality of Julio, Jr.’s evidence leaves much to be desired.
RTC found Julio, Jr. to be a mere possessor by tolerance. Julio moved for
reconsideration, but his motion was denied. To begin with, Exhibit “3,” the affidavit of Ignacio, is hearsay evidence and,
thus, cannot be accorded any evidentiary weight. Evidence is hearsay
when its probative force depends on the competency and credibility of

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to be produced. contradictions which tend to erode his credibility and raise doubt on the
The exclusion of hearsay evidence is anchored on three reasons: 1) veracity of his evidence.
absence of cross-examination; 2) absence of demeanor evidence; and 3) Case Digest: Gopez, S.F.A.
absence of oath.
4c) Parol Evidence Rule – Distinctions between the best evidence rule
Jurisprudence dictates that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where and parol evidence rule
its affiant/maker did not take the witness stand. The sworn statement of
Ignacio is of this kind. The affidavit was not identified, and its averments
ACI Phil. Inc. v. Coquia
were not affirmed by affiant Ignacio. Accordingly, Exhibit “3” must be
excluded from the judicial proceedings being an inadmissible hearsay G.R. No. 174466 | July 14, 2008
evidence. It cannot be deemed a declaration against interest for the matter
to be considered as an exception to the hearsay rule because the declarant
was not the seller (Emilio), but his father (Ignacio). Ratio: Section. 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that a party may
present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the agreement if
Exhibit “4,” on the other hand, is considered secondary evidence being a he puts in issue in his pleading the failure of the written agreement to
mere photocopy which, in this case, cannot be admitted to prove the express the true intent and agreement of the parties. Since an exception to
contents of the purported undated handwritten receipt. The best evidence the parol evidence rule was squarely raised as an issue in the answer, the
rule requires that the highest available degree of proof must be produced. trial court should not have been so inflexible as to completely disregard
For documentary evidence, the contents of a document are best proved by petitioner’s evidence.
the production of the document itself to the exclusion of secondary or
substitutionary evidence, pursuant to Rule 130, Section 3.
Facts: Petitioner ACI Philippines, Inc., engaged in the business of
manufacturing fiberglass, contracted with respondent Editha Coquia for the
A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule
purchase of one lot of flint cullets, consisting of 2,500 to 3,000 metric tons,
130, Section 5, which states that: when the original has been lost or
at a price of P4.20 per kilo under Purchase Order No. 106211.
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of
Several deliveries made by respondent were accepted and paid for by
its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without
petitioner at the unit price of P4.20 per kilo as indicated in said purchase
bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital
order. However, petitioner demanded the reduction of the purchase price to
of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
P3.65 per kilo, to which respondent acceded. Petitioner accordingly issued
witnesses in the order stated. Accordingly, the offeror of the
Purchase Order No. 106373, and deliveries were again made by
secondary evidence is burdened to satisfactorily prove the predicates
respondent on November 5, 8, and 12 in 1994 under Delivery Receipt Nos.
thereof, namely: (1) the execution or existence of the original; (2) the
901, 719, and 735, respectively.
loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and
(3) the unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part
of the proponent/offeror. Proof of the due execution of the document Petitioner accepted the deliveries but refused to pay for them even at the
and its subsequent loss would constitute the basis for the reduced price of P3.65 per kilo, demanding instead that the unit price be
introduction of secondary evidence. In MCC Industrial Sales further reduced to P3.10 per kilo, prompting respondent to file a Complaint
Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, it was held that where the missing for specific performance and damages against petitioner seeking payment
document is the foundation of the action, more strictness in proof is for the deliveries made under Delivery Receipt Nos. 901, 719, and 735,
required than where the document is only collaterally involved. amounting to 46,390 kilos at the renegotiated price of P3.65 per kilo.

Guided by these norms, the Court holds that Julio, Jr. failed to prove the Three days after the Complaint was filed against petitioner, the latter paid
due execution of the original of Exhibit “4” as well as its subsequent loss. A for the flint cullets under the aforementioned delivery receipts at the unit
nexus of logically related circumstance rendered Julio, Jr.’s evidence highly price of P3.65 per kilo.
suspect. Also, his testimony was riddled with improbabilities and

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The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent, ordering petitioner to accept
deliveries of the flint cullets contracted under the delivery receipts at the unit The Court cannot, therefore, apply the rule on contracts of adhesion in
pride of P3.65.
construing the provisions of the purchase orders in this case. Even the
conditions of purchase, enumerated at the reverse side of the purchase
The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court but further held that the orders, do not reveal any hint of one-sidedness in favor of petitioner.
purchase order was a contract of adhesion, thus, its terms must be strictly
construed against petitioner. It also deemed as contrary to the original
agreement petitioner’s willful refusal to pay for the deliveries unless the price Petitioner raised the failure of the purchase order to express the true intent
is reduced, for which petitioner should be held liable. of the parties, i.e., that petitioner entered into a contract with respondent
conditioned upon the latter’s prompt delivery of flint cullets, as an issue in
The appellate court denied petitioners Partial Motion for Reconsideration, its Answer with Counterclaims. Unfortunately, the trial court sustained
as well as respondents’ Urgent Ex Parte Application for Attachment. respondent's objection based on the parol evidence rule.

It is a cardinal rule of evidence, not just one of technicality, but of substance,

Petitioner claimed that the CA erred in ruling that Purchase Order No.
106211 was a contract of adhesion despite the fact that respondent was an that the written document is the best evidence of its own contents. It is also
established businesswoman who had the freedom to negotiate the terms a matter of both principle and policy that when the written contract is
and conditions of any contract she entered into. It stressed that said established as the repository of the parties stipulations, any other evidence
purchase order was superseded by Purchase Order No. 106373 and that, is excluded and the same cannot be used as a substitute for such contract,
in both contracts, it was made clear to respondent that her assurance of nor even to alter or contradict them. This rule, however, is not without
prompt delivery of the flint cullets motivated the transaction. exception. Section. 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that a party may
present evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of the agreement if
Moreover, petitioner maintained that it entered into a contract with he puts in issue in his pleading the failure of the written agreement to
respondent upon the latter’s assurance that she could promptly deliver the express the true intent and agreement of the parties. Since an exception to
2,500 to 3,000 metric tons of flint cullets required by petitioner. However, it the parol evidence rule was squarely raised as an issue in the answer, the
averred that the trial court and the appellate court erroneously refused to trial court should not have been so inflexible as to completely disregard
receive evidence aliunde to prove that time was an important element of the petitioner’s evidence.
agreement. The Court found that although respondent was not given definite days
during which she should have delivered the flint cullets, she was indeed
apprised of petitioner’s urgent need for large quantities thereof.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court and the appellate court erroneously
Furthermore, petitioner presented the unrebutted testimony of Ermilinda
refused to receive evidence aliunde to prove that time was an important
Batalon, its materials control manager, to prove that it agreed to the P4.20
element of the agreement.
per kilo purchase price only because respondent assured it of prompt
deliveries sufficient for petitioner’s production requirements. These
Held: YES. A contract of adhesion is one wherein a party, usually a testimonies give a more complete picture of the transaction between the
corporation, prepares the stipulations in the contract, and the other party parties and allow for a more reasoned resolution of the issues, without over-
merely affixes his signature or his "adhesion" thereto. reliance on the tenuous application of the rule on contracts of adhesion.
There is every indication in this case that respondent, a presumably astute
businesswoman who has dealings with big corporations, gave her assent to Case Digest: Villaflor, R.M.P.
Purchase Order No. 106211 with full knowledge. She was, in fact, the one
who sought a contract with petitioner upon learning of the latter’s need for a
supply of flint cullets.

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Seaoil Petroleum Corporation v. Autocorp Uniline. On the other hand, Yu is the president and stockholder of Seaoil,
as well as the owner of Focus.
G.R. No. 164326 | October 17, 2008
Uniline allegedly chartered MV Asia Property in the amount of $315,711.71
Ratio: Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a from its owner Focus. However, it was not able to settle the said amount.
contract, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract Thus, Uniline, through Rodriguez, proposed to settle the obligation through
additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the conveyance of vehicles and heavy equipment. Consequently, four units of
writing unless there has been fraud or mistake. Evidence of a prior or Tatamobile pick-up trucks procured from Autocorp were conveyed to Focus
contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, as partial payment.
contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract. The Vehicle Sales
Invoice is the best evidence of the transaction. The excavator in controversy was allegedly one part of the vehicles
conveyed to Focus. Seaoil claimed that Rodriguez initially issued 12
Facts: Seaoil Petroleum Corporation purchased one unit of ROBEX 200 LC postdated checks in favor of Autocorp as payment for the excavator.
Excavator, Model 1994 from Autocorp Group. The original cost of the unit However, due to the fact that it was company policy for Autocorp not to
was P2,500,000.00 but was increased to P3,112,519.94 because it was honor postdated checks issued by its own directors, Rodriguez requested
paid in 12 monthly installments up to September 30, 1995. Yu to issue 12 PBCOM post dated checks in favor of Autocorp. In turn, said
The sales agreement was embodied in a Vehicle Sales Invoice and Vehicle checks would be funded by the corresponding 12 Monte de Piedad
Sales Confirmation. Both documents were signed by Francis Yu, president postdated checks issued by Rodriguez. These Monte de Piedad checks
of Seaoil, on behalf of said corporation. It was further agreed that despite were postdated three days prior to the maturity of the PBCOM checks.
delivery of the excavator, ownership thereof was to remain with Autocorp
until the obligation is fully settled. Thereafter, Seaoil’s contractor, Romeo Seaoil claimed that Rodriguez issued a stop payment order on the 10
Valera, issued 12 post dated checks. Autocorp, however, refused to accept checks, thus constraining the former to also order a stop payment order on
the checks because they were not under Seaoil’s name. Thus, Yu, on behalf the PBCOM checks. In short, Seaoil averred that the real transaction was
of Seaoil, signed and issued 12 post dated checks for P259,376.62 each that Uniline, through Rodriguez, owed money to Focus. In lieu of payment,
with Autocorp as payee. Uniline instead agreed to convey the excavator to Focus. This was to be
paid by checks issued by Seaoil but which in turn were to be funded by
The excavator was subsequently delivered and was received by Seaoil in checks issued by Uniline.
its depot in Batangas. The relationship started to turn sour when the first The trial court ruled that the transaction between Autocorp and Seaoil was
check bounced. However, it was remedied when Seaoil replaced it with a a simple contract of sale payable in installments. It also held that the
good check. The second check was also good when presented for payment. obligation to pay the remainder of the purchase price of the excavator solely
However, the remaining 10 checks were not honored by the bank since devolved upon Seaoil.
Seaoil requested that payment be stopped.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision in toto, ruling that the
Despite repeated demands, Seaoil refused to pay the remaining balance of transaction between Yu and Rodriguez was merely verbal. It cannot alter
P2,593,766.20, prompting Autocorp to file a complaint for recovery of the sales contract between Seaoil and Autocorp as it will run counter to the
personal property with damages and replevin in the Regional Trial Court of parol evidence rule which prohibits the introduction of oral and parol
Pasig. evidence to modify the terms of the contract. The claim that it falls under the
exceptions to the parol evidence rule has not been sufficiently proven.
Moreover, it held that Autocorp's separate corporate personality cannot be
Seaoil, however, claimed that Seaoil and Autocorp were only utilized as disregarded and the veil of corporate fiction pierced.
conduits to settle the obligation of one foreign entity named Uniline Asia, in
favor of another foreign entity, Focus Point International, Incorporated. Paul
Rodriguez, a stockholder and director of Autocorp, was also the owner of

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Seaoil was not able to show that Autocorp was merely an alter ego of Uniline unless there had been fraud or mistake. Evidence of a prior or
or that both corporations were utilized to perpetrate a fraud. Lastly, it held contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary,
that the trial court was correct in dismissing the third-party complaint since contradict, or defeat the operation of a valid contract.
it did not arise out of the same transaction on which the plaintiff's claim is
based, or that the third party’s claim, although arising out of another In the present case, the Vehicle Sales Invoice is the best evidence of the
transaction, was connected to the plaintiff’s claim. transaction. A sales invoice is a commercial document. Commercial
documents or papers are those used by merchants or businessmen to
promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions. At the very least, they serve
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in partially applying the parol evidence as an acknowledgment that a business transaction has in fact transpired.
rule to prove only some terms contained in one portion of the document Such documents are not mere scraps of paper bereft of probative value, but
since the same did not reflect the true agreement of the parties vital pieces of evidence of commercial transactions. They are written
memorials of the details of the consummation of contracts.
Ruling: NO. Seaoil did not question the validity of the vehicle sales invoice,
rather, it merely argued that the same did not reflect the true agreement of The terms of the subject sales invoice are clear: Autocorp sold to Seaoil one
the parties. However, Seaoil only had its bare testimony to back up the unit Robex 200 LC Excavator paid for by checks issued by one Romeo
alleged arrangement with Rodriguez. Unsubstantiated testimony, offered as Valera. This does not, however, change the fact that Seaoil Petroleum
proof of verbal agreements which tends to vary the terms of a written Corporation, as represented by Yu, is the customer or buyer. The moment
agreement, is inadmissible under the parol evidence rule. Rule 130, Section a party affixes his or her signature thereon, he or she is bound by all the
9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence embodies the parol evidence rule. terms stipulated therein and is subject to all the legal obligations that may
arise from their breach.
A party, however, may present evidence to modify, explain, or add to the
terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading: Oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an
interest in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on human
a. An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. Thus,
agreement; Seaoil’s contention that the document falls within the exception to the parol
b. The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and evidence rule is untenable. The exception obtains only where the written
agreement of the parties thereto; contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual intention
c. The validity of the written agreement; or of the parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument.
d. The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their In such a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the contract, of
successors-in-interest after the execution of the written agreement. the relations of the parties to each other, and of the facts and circumstances
surrounding them when they entered into the contract may be received to
enable the court to make a proper interpretation of the instrument
The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms
of a written agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting to show Case Digest: Villaflor, R.M.P.
that different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of
the written contract. Under this, Seaoil would have the Court rule that this Marquez vs. Espejo
case falls within the exceptions, particularly that the written agreement failed
to express the true intent and agreement of the parties; however, such G.R. No. 168387 | August 25, 2010
argument is untenable.
Ratio: In case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties that
prevails, for the intention is the soul of a contract, not its wording which is
Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities.
it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing,

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Facts: Respondents were the original registered owners of two parcels of

land located in Brgy. Lantap, (the Lantap property) while the other is located Petitioners: Insisted that they bought the Murong property as farmer-
in Brgy. Murong, both properties were in Nueva Vizcaya. The Lantap beneficiaries thereof. They maintained that they have always displayed
property is tenanted by Nemi Fernandez (the husband of Elenita Espijo, good faith, paid lease rentals to RBBI when it became the owner of the
while the Murong property is tenanted by Salun-at Marquez and Nestor Murong property, bought the same from RBBI upon the honest belief that
Dela Cruz they were buying the Murong property, and occupied and exercised acts of
ownership over the Murong property. Petitioners also argued that what
To secure certain loans, the respondent mortgaged both land to Rural Bank respondents Espejos repurchased from RBBI in 1985 was actually the
of Bayombong, Inc and due to their failure to pay the said loans, the Lantap property, as evidenced by their continued occupation and
mortgaged properties were foreclosed and sold to RBBI. TCTs were issued possession of the Lantap property through respondent Nemi.
in the name of RBBI but said TCT only described their respective subjects
as located in “Bagabag Townsite, K-27 and without any reference to either RBBI answered that it was the Lantap property which was the subject of
Barangay Lantap or Barangay Murong. Later on, respondents bought back the buy-back transaction with respondents Espejos. It denied committing a
one of their lots from RBBI. However, the Deed of Sale did not also mention grave mistake in the transaction and maintained its good faith in the
the barangay where the property was located but it did mention the title of disposition of its acquired assets in conformity with the rural banking rules
the property which was the one issued for the Murong property.There is no and regulations.
evidence that respondents took possession of the Murong property, or
demanded lease rentals from the petitioners (who continued to be the
tenants of the Murong property), or otherwise exercised acts of ownership RARAD’s Decision: Since TCT No. T-62096 appeared on respondents’
over the Murong property. Deed of Sale and the said title refers to the Murong property, the OIC-
RARAD concluded that the subject of sale was indeed the Murong property.
On the other hand, since the petitioners’ VLTs referred to TCT No. T-62836,
On the other hand, respondent Nemi (husband of respondent Elenita and which corresponds to the Lantap property, the OIC-RARAD ruled that
brother-in-law of the other respondents), continued working on the other petitioners’ CLOAs necessarily refer to the Lantap property. As for the
property -- the Lantap property -- without any evidence that he ever paid particular description contained in the VLTs that the subject thereof is the
rentals to RBBI or to any landowner. The Deed of Sale was annotated on Murong property, the OIC-RARAD ruled that it was a mere typographical
TCT No. T-62096 almost a decade later error.

Meanwhile, RBBI executed separate Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer Further, since the VLTs covered the Lantap property and petitioners are
(VLT) in favor of petitioners, the tenants of the Murong property. The not the actual tillers thereof, the OIC-RARAD declared that they were
subject of the VLT is covered by the TCT of the Lantap property. After disqualified to become tenants of the Lantap property and ordered the
petitioners completed the payment of the purchase price to RBBI, DAR cancellation of their CLOAs. It then ordered RBBI to execute a leasehold
issued the Certificates of Land Ownership Award to the petitioners contract with the real tenant of the Lantap property, Nemi.

More than 10 years after the Deed of Sale in favor of the respondents and The OIC-RARAD recognized that petitioners’ only right as the actual tillers
almost seven years after the execution of VLTs in favor of the petitioners, of the Murong property is to remain as the tenants thereof after the
respondents filed a Complaint before the Regional Agrarian Reform execution of leasehold contracts with and payment of rentals in arrears to
Adjudicator (RARAD) for the cancellation of petitioners’ CLOAs and the respondents.
execution of a deed of voluntary land transfer by RBBI in favor of
respondent Nemi. The complaint was based on respondents’ theory that
the Murong property, occupied by the petitioners, was owned by the DARAB Decision: Upon appeal filed by petitioners, the DARAB reversed
respondents by virtue of the 1985 buy-back, as documented in the Deed of the OIC-RARAD Decision.
Sale. They based their claim on the fact that their Deed of Sale refers to
the TCT which pertains to the Murong property.

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It ruled that in assailing the validity of the CLOAs issued to petitioners as they be declared free from any liability to the parties as it did not enrich
bona fide tenant-farmers, the burden of proof rests on the respondents. itself at anyone’s expense. RBBI’s petition was dismissed for lack of merit
There being no evidence that the DAR field personnel were remiss in the
performance of their official duties when they issued the corresponding Issues:
CLOAs in favor of petitioners, the presumption of regular performance of
duty prevails. This conclusion is made more imperative by the respondents’ 1. Whether or not the CA erred in utilizing the Best Evidence Rule to
admission that petitioners are the actual tillers of the Murong property, determine the subject of the contracts
hence qualified beneficiaries thereof.
2. Whether or not the admitted contents of the documents adequately and
As for respondents’ allegation that they bought back the Murong property correctly express the true intention of the parties.
from RBBI, the DARAB ruled that they failed to support their allegation with Held:
substantial evidence. It gave more credence to RBBI’s claim that 1. YES. The Best Evidence Rule states that when the subject of inquiry is
respondents repurchased the Lantap property, not the Murong property. the contents of a document, the best evidence is the original document
Respondents, as owners of the Lantap property, were ordered to enter into itself and no other evidence (such as a reproduction, photocopy or oral
an agricultural leasehold contract with their brother-in-law Nemi, who is the evidence) is admissible as a general rule. The original is preferred because
actual tenant of the Lantap property. it reduces the chance of undetected tampering with the document.
In the instant case, there is no room for the application of the Best Evidence
CA’s Decision: In appealing to the CA, the respondents insisted that the Rule because there is no dispute regarding the contents of the documents.
DARAB erred in ruling that they repurchased the Lantap property, while the It is admitted by the parties that the respondents’ Deed of Sale referred to
petitioners were awarded the Murong property. The CA agreed with the TCT No. T-62096 as its subject; while the petitioners’ Deeds of Voluntary
respondents. Using the Best Evidence Rule embodied in Rule 130, Section Land Transfer referred to TCT No. T-62836 as its subject, which is further
3, the CA held that the Deed of Sale is the best evidence as to its contents, described as located in Barangay Murong.
particularly the description of the land which was the object of the sale. 2. YES. As to the Deed of Sale, petitioners (and RBBI) maintain that while
Since the Deed of Sale expressed that its subject is the land covered by it refers to TCT No. T-62096, the parties actually intended the sale of the
TCT No. T-62096 – the Murong property – then that is the property that the Lantap property (covered by TCT No. T-62836).
respondents repurchased. As to the VLTs, respondents contend that the reference to TCT No. T-
62836 (corresponding to the Lantap property) reflects the true intention of
The CA further ruled that as for petitioners’ VLTs, the same refer to the RBBI and the petitioners, and the reference to "Barangay Murong" was a
property with TCT No. T-62836; thus, the subject of their CLOAs is the typographical error. On the other hand, petitioners claim that the reference
Lantap property. The additional description in the VLTs that the subject to "Barangay Murong" reflects their true intention, while the reference to
thereof is located in Barangay Murong was considered to be a mere TCT No. T-62836 was a mere error.
typographical error. The CA ruled that the technical description contained This dispute reflects an intrinsic ambiguity in the contracts, arising from an
in the TCT is more accurate in identifying the subject property since the apparent failure of the instruments to adequately express the true intention
same particularly describes the properties’ metes and bounds. of the parties. To resolve the ambiguity, resort must be had to evidence
outside of the instruments.
Though the CA cited the Best Evidence Rule, it appears that what it actually
Both the RBBI and petitioners filed their respective motions for applied was the Parol Evidence Rule instead. The Parol Evidence Rule
reconsideration, which were separately denied. excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by which a party seeks to contradict,
vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a valid agreement or instrument.
RBBI filed a separate Petition for Review on Certiorari before the SC. RBBI Thus, it appears that what the CA actually applied in its assailed Decision
raised the issue that the CA failed to appreciate that respondents did not when it refused to look beyond the words of the contracts was the Parol
come to court with clean hands because they misled RBBI to believe at the Evidence Rule, not the Best Evidence Rule. The appellate court gave
time of the sale that the two lots were not tenanted. RBBI also asked that

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primacy to the literal terms of the two contracts and refused to admit any petitioners. This may be seen from the contemporaneous and
other evidence that would contradict such terms. subsequent acts of the parties.

However, even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in

the case at bar. In the first place, respondents are not parties to the VLTs
executed between RBBI and petitioners; they are strangers to the written Case Digest: Ferriols, I.M.M.
contracts. Rule 130, Section 9 specifically provides that parol evidence rule
is exclusive only as "between the parties and their successors-in-interest." 6) Rules on Electronic Evidence – Audio, photographic, video and
The parol evidence rule may not be invoked where at least one of the ephemeral evidence
parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written document
in question, and does not base his claim on the instrument or assert a right
People v. Enojas
originating in the instrument.
G.R. No. 204894 | 4 March 2014
The resolution of the instant case necessitates an examination of the
parties’ respective parol evidence, in order to determine the true intent of Ratio: Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who
the parties. Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them.
of the contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the soul of a
contract, not its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or Facts: Appellants Enojas, Gomez, Santos and Jalandoni were charged
ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence to with murder. PO2 Gregorio testified that while he and PO2 Pangilinan were
mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements. patrolling, they spotted a taxi that was suspiciously parked in front of the
In this regard, guidance is provided by the following articles of the Civil Aguila Auto Glass shop. The officers approached the taxi and asked the
Code involving the interpretation of contracts: driver, later identified as accused Enojas, for his documents. The latter
complied but, they asked him to come with them to the police station in their
Article 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon mobile car for further questioning.
the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations
shall control.
Accused Enojas voluntarily went with the police officers and left his taxi
If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the behind. On reaching the 7-11 convenience store on the Zapote-Alabang
latter shall prevail over the former. Road, PO2 Pangilinan came upon two suspected robbers and shot it out
with them. PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect dead, but someone fired at
Article 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their PO2 Pangilinan causing his death. On hearing the shots, PO2 Gregorio
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered. came around and fired at an armed man. Upon returning to the mobile car,
accused Enojas already fled.
Rule 130, Section 13 which provides for the rules on the interpretation of
documents is likewise enlightening:
Suspecting that accused Enojas, the taxi driver who fled, was involved in
Section 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. – For the proper the attempted robbery, they searched the abandoned taxi and found a
construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which it was made, mobile phone that Enojas apparently left behind. PO3 Cambi and PO2
including the situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be Rosarito testified that they monitored the messages in accused Enojas'
shown, so that the judge may be placed in the position of those whose mobile phone and, posing as Enojas, communicated with the other
language he is to interpret. accused. The police conducted an entrapment operation that resulted in
the arrest of accused Santos and Jalandoni. Subsequently, the police were
Applying the foregoing guiding rules, it is clear that the Deed of Sale also able to capture accused Enojas and Gomez. The prosecution
was intended to transfer the Lantap property to the respondents, presented the transcripts of the mobile phone text messages between
while the VLTs were intended to convey the Murong property to the Enojas and some of his co-accused.

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Ssangyong Manila Office sent, by fax, a letter addressed to Gregory Chan,

Manifesting in open court that they did not want to adduce any evidence or MCC Manager and President of Sanyo Seike Stainless Corp., to confirm
testify in the case, the accused opted to instead file a trial memorandum their order of 220 metric tons (MT) of hot rolled stainless steel. As stated in
their defense. They pointed out that they were entitled to an acquittal since the pro forma invoice, payment for the ordered steel products would be
they were all illegally arrested and since the evidence of the text messages made through an irrevocable letter of credit (L/C) at sight in favor of
were inadmissible, not having been properly identified. Ssangyong.

Issue: Whether or not the text messages are admissible in evidence. MCC could open only a partial letter of credit, thus, the order for 220MT of
steel was split into two, one for 110MT covered by Pro Forma Invoice No.
Held: YES. Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person ST2-POSTS0401-1 and another for 110MT covered by ST2- POSTS0401-
who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them. Here, 2.
PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with
the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of
those messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Ssangyong, through its Manila Office, informed Sanyo Seiki and Chan, by
Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and was competent to way of a fax transmittal, that it was ready to ship 193.597MT of stainless
testify on them. steel. Chan affixed his signature on the fax transmittal and returned the
same, by fax, to Ssangyong.
The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid warrant of
arrest. But, assuming that this was so, it cannot be a ground for acquitting Ssangyong sent a letter to Sanyo Seiki requesting for the opening of the
them of the crime charged but for rejecting any evidence that may have L/C covering payment of the first 100MT. Ssangyong received, by fax, a
been taken from them after an unauthorized search as an incident of an letter signed by Chan, requesting an extension of time to open the L/C
unlawful arrest, a point that is not in issue here. At any rate, a crime had because MCC's credit line with the bank had been fully availed of in
been committed — the killing of PO2 Pangilinan — and the investigating connection with another transaction, and MCC was waiting for an additional
police officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the persons credit line. Despite Ssangyong's letters, MCC failed to open a letter of
they were to arrest had committed it. The text messages to and from the credit.
mobile phone left at the scene by accused Enojas provided strong leads on
the participation and identities of the accused. Indeed, the police caught Ssangyong then filed a civil action for damages due to breach of contract
them in an entrapment using this knowledge. against defendants MCC, Sanyo Seiki and Gregory Chan before the RTC.
Ssangyong alleged that defendants breached their contract when they
Case Digest: Poncardas, Zeinn Karleen A. refused to open the L/C in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the remaining
100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and
MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation ST2- POSTS0401-2.

G.R. No. 170633 | 17 October 2007 Defendants filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that Ssangyong failed to
present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil
Ratio: A facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic
action was based. The court denied the demurrer, ruling that the
evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best
documentary evidence presented had already been admitted and their
Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.
admissibility finds support in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise
Facts: Petitioner MCC Industrial Sales (MCC), a domestic corporation known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000.
engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel
Issue: Whether or not the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile
products. One of its suppliers is the Ssangyong Corporation (Ssangyong).
transmissions are electronic evidence and admissible as such.

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Held: NO. R.A. No. 8792,64 otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as
Act of 2000, considers an electronic data message or an electronic electronic evidence.
document as the functional equivalent of a written document for evidentiary
purposes. The Rules on Electronic Evidence regards an electronic Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an
document as admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on "electronic document," and cannot be considered as electronic evidence by
admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws, and is the Court, with greater reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission
authenticated in the manner prescribed by the said Rules. An electronic not electronic evidence. In the present case, therefore, Pro Forma Invoice
document is also the equivalent of an original document under the Best Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2, which are mere
Evidence Rule, if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, photocopies of the original fax transmittals, are not electronic evidence,
shown to reflect the data accurately. contrary to the position of both the trial and the appellate courts.

Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be Case Digest: Poncardas, Zeinn Karleen A.
considered as the functional equivalent of an original document under the
Best Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an "electronic data 7b) Authentication and proof of documents – Public and private
message" or an "electronic document." documents

The definitions under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, its IRR and the Romeo I. Suerte-Felipe v. People of the Philippines
Rules on Electronic Evidence, at first glance, convey the impression that G.R. No. 170974 | March 3, 2008
facsimile transmissions are electronic data messages or electronic Ratio: At the outset, we must stress that while physical evidence ranks
documents because they are sent by electronic means. The expanded very high in the hierarchy of trustworthy evidence and can be relied
definition of an "electronic data message" under the IRR, consistent with upon principally to ascertain the truth, presentation thereof is not
the UNCITRAL Model Law, further supports this theory. absolutely indispensable to sustain a conviction. Petitioner’s stance
that the insufficiency of physical evidence inevitably leads to acquittal is
However, when Congress formulated the term "electronic data message," flawed, as we have, on several occasions, sustained convictions based on
it intended the same meaning as the term "electronic record" in the Canada purely testimonial evidence. In the same manner, guilt beyond
law. This construction of the term "electronic data message," which reasonable doubt may be produced by the amalgamation of certain
excludes telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, is in harmony physical and testimonial evidence which, when taken separately,
with the Electronic Commerce Law's focus on "paperless" communications would have been insufficient to sustain a conviction.
and the "functional equivalent approach" that it espouses. Facsimile
transmissions are not, in this sense, "paperless," but verily are paper- Entries in the Certificate of Identification of Dead Body are deemed
based. prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein and this cannot be
rebutted by an extremely meticulous fault-finding inquiry into the
The law's definition of "electronic data message," which is interchangeable chain of custody of the body of the victim. What petitioner is asking of
with "electronic document," could not have included facsimile the Court is not to be sedulous anymore, but to be paranoid and
transmissions, which have an original paper-based copy as sent and a unreasonably mistrustful of the persons whom our very rules require us to
paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two copies are distinct from trust.
each other, and have different legal effects. Facts: Suerte-Felipe (petitioner) was charged with homicide. According to
a certain Rodolfo Alumbres, the witness of the prosecution, he was present
at the scene of the incident and testified that the petitioner was arguing with
The terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined Godofredo Ariate (victim). He further claimed that the petitioner was
under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile accompanied by two police officers and were all armed. All of a sudden,
transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be the petitioner fired around four shots at his victim. Having witnessed what
considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent happened, Alumbres immediately went to the aid of the victim. However,

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the petitioner shot him twice and hit him once on the right leg. Fearing for 1. Whether or not there is a clear evidence to support that it was
his life, Alumbres pretended to be dead. indeed the victim’s body that was autopsied.
2. Whether or not the testimonies given by the witnesses are
William Ariate, one of the victim’s sons, and Pio Arce, the Barangay inadmissible because of their lack of credibility as the trial court
Chairman, likewise witnessed the incident. Arce even attempted to itself expressly acknowledged.
appease the petitioner but to no avail. Instead, the petitioner fired at him.
Held: The arguments presented concerning the guilt or innocence of the
Arce defended himself by using his .38 caliber revolver. An exchange of
petitioner can be divided into two sets: a) those concerning physical
fire took place between them.
evidence; and, b) those concerning physical evidence.

Meanwhile, the victim was already declared dead on arrival at the Pasay
ON PHYSICAL EVIDENCE
City General Hospital. Edgardo, another son of the victim, identified the
body and requested an autopsy examination, which showed that the victim
sustained three gunshot wounds which caused his death. The first wound 1. YES. The Court does not find any convincing reason to depart
was located at the outer portion of his right arm; the second at the right from the findings of the Court of Appeals. The presentation of
flank; and, the third, at the epigastric area. Armando Mancera, evidence of the Certificate of Identification of Dead Body is
photographer of the Medico-Legal Division of the NBI, took pictures of the governed by Rule 132, Sections 19 and 23, of the Rules of Court,
body. Ballistics examination of the slug revealed that the slug was fired from which provides:
a .45 caliber pistol.
SEC. 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose
However, the petitioner defended himself when he testified that it was the of their presentation in evidence, documents are
deceased, and his six to seven companions, who were the unlawful either public or private.
aggressors. According to him, Godofredo was irked when he chided him
for cursing and slapping a retarded boy in the streets. To his surprise, Public documents are: (a) The written official acts,
Godofredo and his companions suddenly attacked and repeatedly stabbed or records of the official acts of the sovereign
him. Ultimately, he was claiming that he only acted in self-defense when he authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
drew his .45 caliber firearm and accidentally fired it in an upward direction. officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign
His claim and testimony were backed up by a certain Danilo Villa, a street country; (b) Documents acknowledged before a
vendor who allegedly witnessed the incident. The defense would have also notary public except last wills and testaments; and,
presented as its witness Dr. Roger Archangel, the doctor who performed (c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private
surgeries on petitioner. However, his testimony was dispensed with after documents required by law to be entered therein.
the prosecution agreed that Dr. Archangel was the one who attended and
treated the accused for the injuries he sustained as reflected in the Medical
All other writings are private.
Records As such, his testimony is dispensed with and the fact, among
others, that the accused sustained injuries now form part of the record of
this case as evidence for the accused. xxx

RTC Ruling: The trial court found the petitioner guilty as charged and SEC. 23. Public documents as evidence.
sentenced the accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 8 years and 1 Documents consisting of entries in public records
day of prision mayor as minimum, to 17 years of reclusion temporal, as made in the performance of a duty by a public officer
maximum. are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
All other public documents are evidence, even
against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to
CA Ruling: The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the lower court.
their execution and of the date of the latter.
Issue:

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inconsistencies when a witness is testifying in court, which only

Thus, entries in the Certificate of Identification of Dead Body are shows that both men witnessed the unfolding of the shooting
deemed prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein and this incident from different vantage points. The slight divergence in
cannot be rebutted by an extremely meticulous fault-finding their testimonies also goes to show that both men were not
inquiry into the chain of custody of the body of the victim. What rehearsed before they testified at the trial, but testified based on
petitioner is asking of the Court is not to be sedulous anymore, but their own perceptions.
to be paranoid and unreasonably mistrustful of the persons whom
Case Digest: Azurin, M.G.D.
our very rules require us to trust.

ON TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE Republic of the Philippines v. Carmen Santorio Galeno

G.R. No. 215009 | January 23, 2017
Ratio:
2. NO. The Court has constantly held that the trial judge is the best
and the most competent person who can weigh and evaluate the
testimonies of witnesses. Likewise, the trial court is in the best position to Facts: Sometime in September 2003, the respondent Galeno filed a
assess the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies because of its petition for correction of the area of Lot No. 2285 covered by OCT No.
unique opportunity to observe the witnesses, their demeanor, conduct, and 46417, Dingle Cadastre before the RTC. She alleged therein that she is
attitude on the witness stand. one of the co-owners of the subject property as supported by a Deed of
Sale. The survey and subdivision of the subject property was then duly
approved by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Hence, other than the reasons expressly stated by the trial court
(DENR).
in its Decision, the witnesses' demeanor, conduct and attitude on
the witness stand were also taken in account by the court. This is
particularly relevant in cases such as this, where different Moreover, the respondent likewise alleged that when she and her co-
interpretations can be had of the same set of testimonies. Indeed, owners had the subject property resurveyed for the purpose of partition,
if petitioner's testimony is interpreted the way he explains it now they discovered a discrepancy in the land area of the subject property
before us, his story can be adjudged consistent. indicated in the OCT and that which was provided by the DENR Office of
the Regional Technical Director, Lands Management Services in its
Certification. Hence, she sought to correct the area of the subject property
As regards the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of
in order to avoid further confusion, and claimed to have notified the
Alumbres and Arce, the Court finds these “inconsistencies” either
adjoining owners.
trivial or readily explainable. The Court has always held that
inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses on minor details
and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their There being no opposition to the petition, the RTC allowed the presentation
declarations, their veracity, or the weight of their testimonies; of respondent's evidence ex parte before the Branch Clerk as well as for
slight contradictions in fact serve to strengthen the sincerity of a the satisfaction of the jurisdictional requirements.
witness and prove that his testimony is not rehearsed. It is settled
that so long as the witnesses’ testimonies concur on substantial Ruling of the RTC: The trial court granted the petition upon a finding that
matters, the inconsistencies and contradictions do not affect the the respondent was able to substantiate the allegations in her petitions.
witnesses’ credibility or the verity of their testimonies.
Ruling of the CA: The appellate court affirmed the findings of the lower
All things considered, there is nothing to indicate that both court. It found that the respondent, by a preponderance of evidence, was
Alumbres and Arce deviated from the gist of their testimonies, i.e., able to prove her allegations.
that both of them saw the petitioner gun down Godofredo Ariate.
The aforesaid alleged contradictory statements are but minor

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Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in upholding the correction of the As such, without the testimonies of those officers who issued the
area of the subject property. respondent's documentary evidence to confirm the veracity of its contents,
Held: YES. A scrutiny of evidence marked and formally offered by the the same are bereft of probative value and cannot, by their mere issuance,
respondent before the court a quo shows that the former failed to prove prove the facts stated therein. At best, they may be considered only as
that there was indeed a sufficient basis to allow the correction of the area prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but
of the subject property. Moreover, record reveal that the respondent offered do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
in evidence the following documents: a) a Certification which states the true
and correct are of the subject property; b) the technical description of the
subject property; and, c) the approved subdivision plan. On the strength of Moreover, the contents of the certifications presented by the respondent
can be considered as mere hearsay because the respondent's sole witness
these pieces of evidence, the respondent sought a reconciliation of the area
of the subject property with the records of the DENR. and attorney-in-fact was incompetent to testify on the veracity of their
contents as she did not prepare any of the certifications nor was she a
public officer of the concerned government agencies. Notably, while it is
Unfortunately, the foregoing documentary evidence are not sufficient to true that the public prosecutor who represented petitioner interposed no
warrant the correction prayed for. In Republic v. Medida, the Court held that objection to the admission of the foregoing evidence in the proceedings in
certifications of the Regional Technical Director, DENR cannot be the court below, it should be taken note that hearsay evidence, whether
considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, holding that objected to or not, has no probative value unless the proponent can show
public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule,
Rules on Evidence as follows: which do not, however, obtain in this case. The Court has constantly
explained that the general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible.
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given credence for
the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and it has no probative value.
public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign
country; In fine, the Court holds that the respondent did not present any competent
evidence to prove her claims. Accordingly, her petition for the correction of
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public the Certificate of Title of the subject property must be denied, and the
except last wills and testaments; and present petition be granted.
Case Digest: Azurin, M.G.D.
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private
documents required by law to be entered therein.
7c) Authentication of and proof of documents – When a private writing
requires authentication; proof of a private writing
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred
to in Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced Llemos vs. Llemos
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy. G.R. No. 150162 | January 26, 2007

Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that Ratio: The authenticity of private writings therefore be proved as are all
“documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance other private writings in accordance with the rules of evidence. SEC. 20.
of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated Proof of private document. – Before any private document offered as
therein. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must
person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the be proved either:
latter.”

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or respondents’ cause of action had already prescribed at the time of the
filing of their Complaint on August 10, 1992.
b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of
the maker. CA held that the entries in the Registry Book of St. John
Metropolitan Cathedral in Dagupan City may be considered as
Facts: Respondents and petitioners are the heirs of the late Saturnina entries made in the course of business under then Section 37 of
Salvatin Llemos, being their grandmother. The late Saturnina Salvatin Rule 130,6 which is an exception to the hearsay rule; that Saturnina
Llemos had four (4) children, namely: Adriano Llemos, Santiago Llemos, passed away on March 12, 1938 as stated by the Book of the Dead of the
Domingo Llemos, who were the predecessors-in-interest of respondents, Catholic Church; that, for this reason, the Deed of Absolute Sale
and Felipe Llemos, who was the predecessor-in-interest of petitioners. purportedly executed on November 5, 1964 is invalid, as there could
During her lifetime, the late grandmother Llemos acquired a parcel of land not possibly be a meeting of the minds between a dead person and a
with OCT No. 38564, which all the parties presently occupy. living one; that all the parties in the instant suit are presently occupying
the property in question; and finally, that the petitioners cannot invoke the
Register of Deeds of Dagupan, Pangasinan, cancelled Original Certificate indefeasibility of title since it may still be attacked even beyond the one
of Title No. 38564 and issued a new one, TCT No. 15632 in the name of year period reckoned from the date of its issuance on the ground of fraud.
Felipe Llemos, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale thumb marked by
grandmother Llemos conveying said property to Felipe Llemos Issue: Whether or not an unauthenticated private document like a
(petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest) for a consideration of P200.00 Certificate of Death issued by the Catholic Churcha private document is
admissible as evidence.
Jovita Llemos Laca, one of the respondents, decided to improve her
residential house on said parcel of land and borrowed the title of the Held: NO. It is well-settled that Church registries of births, marriages, and
property from one of the petitioners, Felisa Llemos, for purposes of deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 6813
securing a building permit. It was on such instance that respondents and the passage of Act No. 19014 are no longer public writings, nor are
discovered that the title of the property was already in the name of they kept by duly authorized public officials. They are private writings and
petitioners. their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other private writings
in accordance with the rules of evidence.
Respondents filed the instant action for Declaration of Nullity of said TCT
No. 15632 and for damages. The complaint was amended to include Respondents failed to establish the due execution and authenticity of the
additional plaintiffs who are likewise heirs of grandother Llemos. Certificate of Death in accordance with Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court which provides:
The RTC held that although respondent Eusebia Ll. Fernandez testified
that grandmather Llemos was her grandmother and that she died in 1938,
Eusebia did not testify on the fact of death of Saturnina from personal
knowledge; that the respondents’ cause of action heavily rests on the SEC. 20. Proof of private document. – Before any private document
Certificate of Death only and no other evidence; that since at the time offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
Saturnina died, there was already an existing public registry by virtue of authenticity must be proved either:
Act 3753, hence, no other entity, not even the Catholic Church, had the a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
authority to issue a certificate regarding the fact of death which can
qualify as a public document; that, for these reasons, the Certificate of b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of
Death is a private document and must be authenticated to be the maker.
admissible as evidence; that respondents failed to notarize or
otherwise authenticate the same and, hence, the facts stated therein Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is
are hearsay; and finally, since the deed in question was registered as claimed to be.
early as 1964, more than 20 years had already lapsed, hence, the
Respondents did not submit as evidence the Register of Dead, Book No.
20 of St. John Metropolitan Cathedral. Under Section 3, Rule 130, Rules

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

of Court, the original document must be produced and no evidence shall Respondents failed to establish the date of death of their predecessor-in-
be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the interest which could have proven that the thumbmark of Saturnina in the
following cases: Deed of Absolute Sale was fraudulently affixed because she had died
before the deed of sale was purportedly executed by her. Therefore,
a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be respondents failed to establish by preponderance of evidence their claim
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror; that petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest obtained his title through fraud.
b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the Case Digest: Fajilagutan, D.R.F.
party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice; Bermejo vs. Barrio
c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other G.R. No. L-23614 | February 27, 1970
documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of
time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the Ratio: A "document" is defined as a deed, instrument or other duly
general result of the whole; and authorized paper by which something is proved, evidenced or set forth.
“Defendant's pleadings and papers, which were involved in civil actions
d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public and which were in custody of county clerk as ex-oficio clerk of superior
officer or is recorded in a public office. court in which action was pending, were 'public documents' and were
within scope of subject matter of statute making alteration of court records
None of the exceptions are attendant in the present case. The Register of an offense."
Dead is in the custody of St. John Metropolitan Cathedral but respondents
failed to show that it presented the Certificate of Death because the Facts: Pedro M. Bermejo and Julia "Doe" (her identity at the time was
Register of Dead cannot be produced in court. Further, respondents failed unknown) were charged in the city court of Roxas City. The information
to present an authentic document that recites the contents of the Register alleges that the two accused, being private individuals, stated and made it
of Dead. appear in the amended petition for habeas corpus entitled "Pedro M.
Bermejo and Jovita Carmorin, petitioners, vs. Jose M. Bernales and
The Court notes the absence of evidence showing that "Salvatin Salvatin" Wilfredo Bernales, respondents", that the same was signed and sworn to
mentioned in the Certificate of Death is the same "Saturnina Salvatin" by Jovita Carmorin as one of the petitioners when in truth and in fact the
referred to by them as their predecessor-in-interest; and that Father said Jovita Carmorin never signed and swore to it, because it was in fact
Natividad has personal knowledge of the date of death of "Salvatin the accused Julia "Doe" who signed and swore to that petition as Julia
Salvatin". The CA merely relied on the Register of Dead of the parish Carmorin.
which, as earlier pointed out, was not presented in court.
City Judge Barrios issued an order for the arrest of the two accused
On the other hand, petitioners presented the questioned Deed of Absolute based on the certification of the city fiscal that a preliminary investigation
Sale dated November 5, 1964. It is a notarized document which, as has been conducted and that the witnesses under oath were examined by
correctly found by the RTC, had been executed with all the formalities of the city fiscal but to prevent their incarceration, they posted bond. Upon
law and ratified by a notary public who attested that the vendor Saturnina arraignment, both accused, arraigned separately, filed a motion to quash
Salvatin appeared before him and acknowledged her deed to be her free the information on the grounds that the information did not charge an
act and deed. It was executed in the presence of two witnesses. Maria offense because the document allegedly falsified is not a document
Llemos Jimenez likewise testified that the deed was properly executed for contemplated under Art. 172 of the RPC and that the court did not acquire
valuable consideration at the time. jurisdiction over the person of the accused because the warrant of arrest
A notarized document is executed to lend truth to the statements issued were illegal, having been issued by Judge Barrios without first
contained therein and to the authenticity of the signatures. Notarized examining the witnesses uder oath and I the form prescribed by R.A.
documents enjoy the presumption of regularity which can be overturned 3828.
only by clear and convincing evidence.

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City fiscal contended that the petition for habeas corpus is a public petition is a public or official document as contemplated in Art. 171 and
document that the provisions of Republic Act 3828 are applicable only to Art. 172 of the RPC.
municipal judges and not to city judges; and that the principle of res
judicata, or conclusiveness of judgment, cannot be invoked by the On procedural matters:
accused. Judge Barrios issued an order denying the two motions to
While the city fiscal failed to notify petitioner Bermejo that his request for
quash.
postponement was granted, which should have been done, it can also be
Both accused filed their respective motion for reconsideration, but it was said that Bermejo was not entirely blameless if the preliminary
denied for lack of merit. They then filed a petition for certiorari and investigation was conducted in his absence. It was he himself who set the
prohibition with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of date of the investigation in his request for postponement, but he did not
Capiz, Judge Isidro Barrios and City Fiscal Quirico Abela as respodents, bother to come on the date he fixed. Neither did he try to find out what
contending that City Fiscal Abela committed a grave abuse of discretion action the city fiscal had taken on his request for postponement, on any
in filing an information against him without conducting the proper day before the date of the hearing set by him, although he is living in
preliminary investigation, and that the City Judge committed a grave Roxas City where the city fiscal holds his office.
abuse of discretion in denying his motion to quash, raising practically the
Since petitioner Bermejo was afforded the opportunity to appear at the
same issues that he raised in the motion to quash before the city court,
preliminary investigation but did not take advantage of it, he has no one to
and praying that respondent City Judge be enjoined from hearing the
blame but himself. Anyway, said petitioner's rights can still be amply
criminal case against him during the pendency of the special civil action in
protected in the regular trial of the case against him in the city court where
the Court of First Instance.
he can cross examine the witnesses and present his evidence.
Issue: Whether or not a petition for habeas corpus is a public document
Having arrived at the conclusion that respondent city fiscal did not abuse
thereby falsification of such would constitute a violation of Art. 172 of the
his discretion in conducting the preliminary investigations and that he filed
RPC.
the informations against herein petitioners in accordance with law, there
Held: NO. A "document" is defined as a deed, instrument or other duly is, therefore, no merit in the assertion of petitioners that the warrants of
authorized paper by which something is proved, evidenced or set forth. In arrest issued for their arrest were illegal. Besides, granting arguendo that
U.S. v. Asensi,7 this Court The Court held that any instrument authorized the orders of arrest were tainted with irregularity, still the posting by
by a notary public or a competent public official, with the solemnities petitioners of their bail bonds amounted to a waiver of the effect of said
required by law, is a public document. Section 38, Rule 123 of the old defects.
Rules of Court,8 enumerates the following as public writings:
Case Digest: Fajilagutan, D.R.F.
(a) The written acts or records of the acts of the sovereign authority,
of official bodies and tribunals, and of public officers, legislative,
Domingo vs. Robles
judicial and executive, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign
country; G.R. No. 153743 | March 18, 2005
(b) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private writings. Ratio: It is a well-settled rule, however, that a notarized instrument enjoys
The same principle also obtains that "defendant's pleadings and papers, a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution. Clear and
which were involved in civil actions and which were in custody of county convincing evidence must be presented to overcome such legal
clerk as ex-officio clerk of superior court in which action was pending, presumption. Forgery cannot be presumed; hence, it was incumbent upon
were 'public documents' and were within scope of subject matter of petitioner to prove it. This, she failed to do.
statute making alteration of court records an offense." The contended Facts: Sps. Domingo were the registered owners of Lot 19, Blk 1 located
petition for habeas corpus, being duly subscribed and sworn to before the at Cristina Subdivion, Concepcion, Marikina. On this lot, Norma Domingo
Clerk of Court an files with the Court of First Instance of Capiz, which discountinued the construction of her house allegedly for failure of her
became a part of the court recordings, cannot be disputed that the said

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husband to send the necessary financial support and so she decided to

dispose of the property. CA held that the respondents were purchaser in good faith and for value.
A Petition for Review under Rule 45 was filed before the SC.
Bacani, her friend, volunteered to act as an agent. Domingo delivered their Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to her claims.
owner’s copy to Bacani. Later, the title was said to have been lost thus
prompting a petition for its reconstitution. Domingo gave Bacai all receipts Held: NO. It is a well-settled rule, however, that a notarized instrument
of payment of real estate taxes. At the same time, Bacani asked Domingo enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution. Clear
to sign what she recalled was a record of exhibits. Thereafter, Domingo and convincing evidence must be presented to overcome such legal
waited but Bacani did not show up anymore. presumption. Forgery cannot be presumed; hence, it was incumbent upon
petitioner to prove it. This, she failed to do. On this point, the CA observed:
On Nov. 1, 1994, Norma visited the lot and was surprised to see Robles
starting to build a house on the lot. A verification with the Register of Deeds "What surprises the Court is that a comparison of the signature of appellant
revealed that the reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title No. 53412 had Norma Domingo in the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the appellees and
already been cancelled with the registration of a Deed of Absolute Sale the signature in the verification of the complaint manifest a striking similarity
dated May 9, 1991 signed by Norma B. Domingo and her husband to the point that without any contrary proof, it would be safe to conclude
Valentino Domingo, as sellers, and Yolanda Robles, for herself and that said signatures were written by one and the same person. Sadly,
representing the other minor, as buyers. As a consequence, Transfer appellant left that matter that way without introducing counteracting
Certificate of Title No. 201730 was issued on June 10, 1991 in the name of evidence."
Robles. Claiming not to have met the Robles nor having signed ant sale
[her husband was allegedly out of the country at that time], Domingo Petitioner also failed to convince the trial court that the person with whom
assumed that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 9. 1991 is a forgery Respondent Yolanda Robles transacted was in fact not Valentino Domingo.
and, therefore, could not validly transfer ownership of the lot. Hence, the Except for her insistence that her husband was out of the country, petitioner
case for nullity and its reconveyance. failed to present any other clear and convincing evidence that Valentino
was not present at the time of the sale. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated
Robles responded alleging to be buyers in good faith and for value. They by evidence, are not equivalent to proof.
narrate that the subject lot was offered to them by Flor Bacani, as the agent
of the owners; that after some time when they were already prepared to Petitioner now stresses the issue of good faith on the part of respondents.
buy the lot, Bacani introduced to them the supposed owners and agreed In the absence of a finding of fraud and a consequent finding of authenticity
on the sale; then, on May 9, 1991, Bacani and the introduced seller and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, a discussion of whether
presented a Deed of Absolute Sale already signed by Valentino and Norma respondents were purchasers in good faith is wholly unnecessary. Without
Domingo needing only Robles’ signature. Presented likewise at that a clear and persuasive substantiation of bad faith, a presumption of good
meeting, where she paid full purchase price, was the original of the owner’s faith in their favor stands.
duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 53412.
The sale was admittedly made with the aid of Bacani, petitioner’s agent,
Then sometime later, Robles contracted to sell the lot in issue in favor of who had with him the original of the owner’s duplicate Certificate of Title to
Sps. Danilo and Herminigilda Deza for ₱250,000.00. Robles even had to the property, free from any liens or encumbrances. The signatures of
secure a guardianship authority over the persons and properties of her Spouses Domingo, the registered owners, appear on the Deed of Absolute
minor children from the RTC Pasig. When only ₱20,000.00 remained Sale. Petitioner’s husband met with Respondent Yolanda Robles and
unpaid of the total purchase price under the contract to sell, payment was received payment for the property. The Torrens Act requires, as a
stopped because of the letter received by Yolanda Robles that Domingo prerequisite to registration, the production of the owner’s certificate of title
intends to sue her. and the instrument of conveyance. The registered owner who places in the
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered its Decision dismissing the hands of another an executed document of transfer of registered land
complaint.

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

effectively represents to a third party that the holder of such document is directors of the plaintiff never enacted a resolution authorizing herein
authorized to deal with the property. defendant Agana to sell herein subject property to defendant Prima or to
Case Digest: Jorge, J.A.G. anyone else for that matter. Plaintiff further claimed that defendant Prima
in collusion with Agana acted maliciously and in bad faith in relying on the
forged authority without taking any step to verify the same with the plaintiff
St. Mary’s Farm Inc. vs. Prima Real Properties Inc.
as owner of the subject property. According to plaintiff, the deed of absolute
G.R. No. 158144 | July 31, 2008 sale entered into between defendants Prima and Agana being the result of
fraudulent transaction was void thereby, among others, causing damage to
Ratio: Thus, in the instant case, it cannot readily be concluded that a the plaintiff. For canceling Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-1648 (11521-
particular signature appearing in those documents is not genuine for lack A) knowing fully well that the authorization to sell to Agana was a forgery,
of proper identification and a more accurate comparison of signatures. defendant Alejandro R. Villanueva was likewise made liable for damages.
Mere allegation of forgery is not evidence and the burden of proof lies in
the party making the allegation. Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the Prima separately with Agana in their respective answers, sought and
petitioner failed to discharge this burden. insisted constantly on the dismissal of the complaint based solidly on the
ground that Venice B. Agana and Ma. Natividad A. Villacorta who filed in
Facts: St. Mary’s Farm was the registered owner of an originally 25,598
behalf of the plaintiff the original complaint and the amended and the
sq. m. of land situated at Bo. Pugad Lawin, Las PInas City.
second amended complaints as well, respectively, lacked legal capacity to
sue because they were not authorized therefor by the board of directors of
St. Mary’s Farm passed and approved on 27 June 1988 a board resolution the plaintiff. Furthermore, defendant Prima argued that it acted in good faith
authorizing defendant Agana to cede to T.S. Cruz Subdivision 4,000 sq. m. when it relied solely on the face of the purported authorization of Agana
of the land covered by the TCT No. S-1648 (11521-A). Allegedly, after the and entered into the deed of absolute sale. This fact, according to
consummation of this transaction, Agana did not return to plaintiff the defendant Prima, made it a buyer in good faith and for value. To cap its
borrowed aforementioned title and, instead, allegedly forged a board argument, defendant Prima in adopting the defense of Agana asserted that
resolution of the corporation supposedly to the effect that plaintiff had even assuming that the authorization of Agana was forged when plaintiff,
authorized him to sell the remaining 21,598 sq. m. of the subject property. through its President, Marcelino A. Agana, Jr. (brother of Rodolfo)
A series of transactions thereafter took place between defendant Agana accepted/received part of the aforestated purchase price knowing fully well
and defendant Prima Real Properties, Inc. (Prima) which transactions the same to be the proceeds of the sale of the subject property, plaintiff has
culminated to the signing on 5 September 1988 of an absolute deed of sale been precluded as it is now estopped from asking for rescission of the deed
transferring the ownership of the subject land from herein plaintiff to herein of absolute sale and reconveyance of the subject property.
defendant Prima. After the consummation of the sale, defendant Prima
effected the cancellation of TCT No. S-1648 (11521-A) in the name of
RTC dismissed the complaint and found respondent as a buyer in good
plaintiff and in lieu thereof another TCT No. T-6175 in the name of
faith and for value. CA affirmed in toto. A petition for review on certiorari
defendant Prima was issued by defendant Alejandro R. Villanueva in his
under Rule 45 was file before the SC.
capacity as Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City. On 6 October 1988,
Issues: 1. Whether or not Agana was duly authorized to enter into the sale
defendant Prima duly purchased from T.S. Cruz Subdivision the
of the subject property.
aforementioned 4,000 sq. m. portion of the subject property which
development thereafter led to the cancellation of the aforementioned 2. Whether or not Prima was the author of its own damage by not making
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6175 and the issuance by the Registry of reasonable and prudent inquiries into the fact, nature and extent of Agana’s
Deeds of Las Piñas City of two separate titles both in the name of defendant authority, and by causing the issuance of checks in the name of Agana.
Prima.
Held:
St. Mary’s Farm alleged that the authorization certified to by Agcaoili, 1. YES. Despite this insistence, we find no cogent reason to deviate
Corporate Secretary of the plaintiff and used by defendant Agana in selling from the findings and conclusions of the respondent court
the subject property to defendant Prima was a forgery as the board of affirming those of the trial court on this matter. Anent the forged

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

signature of Atty. Agcaoili, the CA did not err in not giving property. Undeniably then, the respondent is an innocent purchaser for
evidentiary weight to the findings of the Document Examiner of value in good faith.
the NBI on the ground that the findings were not really conclusive.
In the first place, the procedure for the investigation of To prove good faith, a buyer of registered and titled land need only
questionable handwriting was not properly followed. There is show that he relied on the face of the title to the property. He need
nothing on record that will conclusively show that the alleged not prove that he made further inquiry for he is not obliged to
standard sample signatures of Atty. Antonio Agcaoili, which were explore beyond the four corners of the title. Such degree of proof
submitted to the NBI and made the basis of comparison, were the of good faith, however, is sufficient only when the following
genuine signatures of the same Atty. Antonio Agcaoili. Moreover, conditions concur: first, the seller is the registered owner of the
the examiner testified that it was possible to have variations in the land; second, the latter is in possession thereof; and third, at the
standard signatures of Atty. Agcaoili, caused by certain factors time of the sale, the buyer was not aware of any claim or interest
such as passage of time, pressure and physical condition of the of some other person in the property, or of any defect or restriction
writer which may have decisive influences on his handwriting’s in the title of the seller or in his capacity to convey title to the
characteristics. Thus, in the instant case, it cannot readily be property.
concluded that a particular signature appearing in those
documents is not genuine for lack of proper identification and a
more accurate comparison of signatures. Mere allegation of
forgery is not evidence and the burden of proof lies in the party All the conditions enumerated in the aforementioned case are
making the allegation. Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the present in the case at bar, enough for us to consider Prima as a
petitioner failed to discharge this burden. buyer in good faith. Prima Real Properties, Inc. is a company
engaged in the buying and selling of real properties.
Further challenging the due execution of the board resolution
bearing the Secretary’s Certification, petitioner wants us to When the document under scrutiny is a special power of attorney
consider the same as inadmissible on the ground that Atty. that is duly notarized, we know it to be a public document where
Agcaoili did not appear before a notary public for notarization. We the notarial acknowledgment is prima facie evidence of the fact of
do not agree, because in the past, we have already held that the its due execution. A buyer presented with such a document would
non-appearance of the party before the notary public who have no choice between knowing and finding out whether a forger
notarized the deed does not necessarily nullify or render the lurks beneath the signature on it.
parties’ transaction void ab initio. However, the non-appearance
of the party exposes the notary public to administrative liability In sum, all things being equal, a person dealing with a seller who
which warrants sanction by the Court. This fact notwithstanding, has [in his] possession title to the property but whose capacity to
we agree with the respondent court that it is not enough to sell is restricted, qualifies as a buyer in good faith if he proves that
overcome the presumption of the truthfulness of the statements he inquired into the title of the seller as well as into the latter’s
contained in the board resolution. To overcome the presumption, capacity to sell; and that in his inquiry, he relied on the notarial
there must be sufficient, clear and convincing evidence as to acknowledgment found in the seller’s duly notarized special power
exclude all reasonable controversy as to the falsity of the of attorney. He need not prove anything more for it is already the
certificate. In the absence of such proof, the document must be function of the notarial acknowledgment to establish the
upheld. Notarization converts a private document into a public appearance of the parties to the document, its due execution and
document, making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity.
authenticity.

Case Digest: Jorge, J.A.G.

2. No. On the basis of this notarized board resolution, respondent
had every reason to rely on Rodolfo Agana’s authority to sell the subject J. TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE

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1) Qualifications of a witness Frustrated, Chiong went to Calvo at the PCG counter and inquired if she
had money so he could obtain a boarding pass from the "man in barong."
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Chiong Calvo, who already saw that something was amiss, insisted that Chiong's
plane ticket was confirmed and as such, he could check-in smoothly and
G.R. No. 155550 | January 31, 2008 board the plane without shelling out US$100.00 for a boarding pass.
Ultimately, Chiong was not allowed to board Northwest Flight No. 24 bound
Ratio: A witness' relationship to the victim does not automatically affect the for San Diego that day and, consequently, was unable to work at the M/V
veracity of his or her testimony. While this principle is often applied in Elbia by April 1, 1989. Thus, Chiong filed a Complaint for breach of contract
criminal cases, we deem that the same principle may apply in this case, of carriage before the RTC. In its Answer, Northwest contradicted the claim
albeit civil in nature. If a witness' relationship with a party a witness' that it breached its contract of carriage with Chiong, reiterating that Chiong
relationship to the victim does not automatically affect the veracity of his or had no cause of action against it because per its records, Chiong was a
her testimony. While this principle is often applied in criminal cases, we "no-show" passenger.
deem that the same principle may apply in this case, albeit civil in nature.
Issue: Whether or not Chiong satisfied the burden of proof required in civil
Facts: On March 14, 1989, Philimare Shipping and Seagull Maritime cases, i.e., preponderance of evidence.
Corporation (Philimare), as the authorized Philippine agent of TransOcean
Lines (TransOcean), hired respondent Steven Chiong as Third Engineer of Held: YES. In this regard, the Court notes that, in addition to his testimony,
TransOcean's vessel M/V Elbia at the San Diego, California Port. Chiong's evidence consisted of a Northwest ticket for the April 1, 1989
Subsequently, on March 27, 1989, Philimare dispatched a Letter of Flight No. 24, Chiong's passport and seaman service record book duly
Guarantee to CL Hutchins & Co., Inc., TransOcean's agent at the San stamped at the PCG counter, and the testimonies of Calvo, Florencio
Diego Port, confirming Chiong's arrival thereat in time to board the M/V Gomez, and Philippine Overseas Employment and Administration (POEA)
Elbia which was set to sail on April 1, 1989. For this purpose, Philimare personnel who all identified the signature and stamp of the PCG on
purchased for Chiong a Northwest plane ticket for San Diego, California Chiong's passport.
with a departure date of April 1, 1989 from Manila.
Indeed, Chiong's Northwest ticket for Flight No. 24 on April 1, 1989, coupled
On April 1, 1989, Chiong arrived at the Manila International Airport (MIA). with the PCG stamps on his passport showing the same date, is direct
Marilyn Calvo, Philimare's Liaison Officer, met Chiong at the departure evidence that he was present at MIA on said date as he intended to fly to
gate, and the two proceeded to the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) Counter the United States on board that flight. As testified to by POEA personnel
to present Chiong's seaman service record book for clearance. Thereafter, and officers, the PCG stamp indicates that a departing seaman has passed
Chiong's passport was duly stamped, after complying with government through the PCG counter at the airport, surrendered the exit pass, and
requirements for departing seafarers. complied with government requirements for departing seafarers. Calvo,
Philimare's liaison officer tasked to assist Chiong at the airport,
corroborated Chiong's testimony on the latter's presence at the MIA and
Calvo remained at the PCG Counter while Chiong proceeded to queue at his check-in at the PCG counter without a hitch. Calvo further testified that
the Northwest check-in counter. When it was Chiong's turn, the Northwest she purposely stayed at the PCG counter to confirm that Chiong was able
personnel informed him that his name did not appear in the computer's list to board the plane, as it was part of her duties as Philimare's liaison officer,
of confirmed departing passengers. Chiong was then directed to speak to to confirm with their principal, TransOcean in this case, that the seafarer
a "man in barong" standing outside Northwest's counters from whom had left the country and commenced travel to the designated port where
Chiong could allegedly obtain a boarding pass. Posthaste, Chiong the vessel is docked. Thus, she had observed that Chiong was unable to
approached the "man in barong" who demanded US$100.00 in exchange check-in and board Northwest Flight No. 24, and was actually being given
therefor. Without the said amount, and anxious to board the plane, Chiong the run-around by Northwest personnel.
queued a number of times at Northwest's Check-in Counter and presented
his ticket. However, the Northwest personnel at the counter told him to
simply wait and that he was being a pest. It is of no moment that Chiong's witnesses - who all corroborated his
testimony on his presence at the airport on, and flight details for, April 1,

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

1989, and that he was subsequently bumped-off - are, likewise, employees and that his passport was accordingly stamped, obviously for purposes of
of Philimare which may have an interest in the outcome of this case. his departure on that day.

We mentioned in Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, thus: As to the criminal case, it is well to note that there is no final determination,
as yet, of Chiong's guilt by the courts. But even if Chiong is adjudged guilty,
it will have little effect on the outcome of this case. As we held in Leyson v.
(T)his Court has repeatedly held that a witness' relationship to the Lawa:
victim does not automatically affect the veracity of his or her
testimony. While this principle is often applied in criminal cases, we deem
that the same principle may apply in this case, albeit civil in nature. If a The testimony of a witness must be considered in its entirety instead of in
witness' relationship with a party does not ipso facto render him a truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to consider
biased witness in criminal cases where the quantum of evidence only its isolated parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts.
required is proof beyond reasonable doubt, there is no reason why In ascertaining the facts established by a witness, everything stated by him
the same principle should not apply in civil cases where the quantum on direct, cross and redirect examinations must be calibrated and
of evidence is only preponderance of evidence. considered.

It must be stressed that facts imperfectly or erroneously stated in answer

The foregoing documentary and testimonial evidence, taken together, to one question may be supplied or explained as qualified by his answer to
amply establish the fact that Chiong was present at MIA on April 1, 1989, other question. The principle falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not strictly
passed through the PCG counter without delay, proceeded to the applied in this jurisdiction. The doctrine deals only with the weight of
Northwest check-in counter, but when he presented his confirmed ticket evidence and is not a positive rule of law, and the same is not an inflexible
thereat, he was not issued a boarding pass, and ultimately barred from one of universal application. The testimony of a witness can be believed as
boarding Northwest Flight No. 24 on that day. to some facts and disbelieved as to others.

Northwest likewise insists - now that there is a pending criminal case for
Case Digest: Carsi Cruz, A.L.L.
False Testimony against Chiong - that a falsified part of Chiong's testimony
would indicate the falsity of his entire testimony, consistent with the "falsus
3a) Disqualifications of witnesses – by reason of marriage
in uno, falsus in omnibus" doctrine. Following Northwest's flawed logic, this
would invariably lead to the conclusion that the corroborating testimonies
Alvarez v. Ramirez
of Chiong's witnesses are also false.
G.R. No. 143439 | October 14, 2005
The legal maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, cited by Northwest, is not
a positive rule of law and is not strictly applied in this jurisdiction. Before Ratio: The better rule is that, when an offense directly attacks, or directly
this maxim can be applied, the witness must be shown to have willfully and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to
falsified the truth on one or more material points. The principle presupposes the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a
the existence of a positive testimony on a material point contrary to criminal prosecution for a crime committee (by) one against the other.'
subsequent declarations in the testimony. However, the records show that
Chiong's testimony did not contain inconsistencies on what occurred on Facts: Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in
April 1, 1989. Yet, Northwest never even attempted to explain or impugn Criminal Case No. 19933-MN for arson pending before the Regional Trial
the evidence that Chiong passed through the PCG counter on April 1, 1989, Court, Branch 72, Malabon City. The accused is Maximo Alvarez, herein
petitioner. He is the husband of Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of respondent.

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On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the 'The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person
witness stand as the first witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner is too narrow; and the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting
and his counsel raised no objection. domestic harmony comes within the exception is too broad. The better rule
is that, when an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the
On June 30, 1999, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion to disqualify conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute that one shall
Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a
Rules of Court on marital disqualification. crime committee (by) one against the other.'

Issue: Whether or not Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the
in the Criminal Case. conjugal relation between him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as
embodied in the Information for arson filed against him, eradicates all the
Held: Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by
which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes.
"Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. 'During their marriage,
neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without
the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against Case Digest: Carsi Cruz, A. L. L.
the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the
other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants." People Vs. Pasensoy

The reasons given for the rule are: G.R. No. 140634 | September 12, 2002

1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;

2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger
of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private
life, even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent Ratio: under the marital disqualification rule. Under this rule, neither the
domestic disunion and unhappiness; and husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in
one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other. a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latters
direct descendants or ascendants. However, objections to the competency
of a husband and wife to testify in a criminal prosecution against the other
But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own may be waived as in the case of other witnesses generally. The objection
exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases to the competency of the spouse must be made when he or she is first
for offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the offered as a witness.
exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases,
outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the
marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more
harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed,
the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case,
identity of interests disappears, and the consequent danger of perjury
based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the
security and confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting,
will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a void
in the unhappy home.

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Facts: Analie Pansensoy is the legitimate wife of Roberto Pasensoy Ratio: With regard to Gina Quidato's testimony, the same must also be
(accused) and that she had been living-in with the victim, Hilario Reyes. disregarded, accused-appellant having timely objected thereto under the
One day, she and Hilario were in the house they were renting at Lumang marital disqualification rule, the disqualification is between husband and
Bayan, Antipolo, Rizal, She stood up when she heard a knocking on the wife, the law not precluding the wife from testifying when it involves other
door. As she opened the door, she saw appellant holding a gun. She parties or accused. Hence, Gina Quidato could testify in the murder case
embraced appellant and tried to wrest the gun away from him but she failed. against Reynaldo and Eddie, which was jointly tried with accused-
Hilario went out of the house and sat on a bench. Appellant approached appellant's case. This testimony cannot, however, be used against
Hilario and asked him if he really loves his wife. Hilario answered yes. accused-appellant directly or through the guise of taking judicial notice of
Appellant next asked Hilario if he was still single. Hilario answered yes. the proceedings in the murder case without violating the marital
Appellant counted one to three and at the count of three shot Hilario. Hilario disqualification rule. "What cannot be done directly cannot be done
was hit on the forehead and sprawled on the ground. The accused invoked indirectly" is a rule familiar even to law students.
that he killed the victim as self defense as he claimed that he saw his wife
and the victim lying together in their underwear and that the accused was
reaching for a gun, and while wrestling for the gun, it suddenly went off and Facts: Accused Bernardo Quidato Jr was accused of parricide. He and
killed the victim. two co-conspirators allegedly attacked with a bolo and iron bars hack and
The RTC ruled in convicting accused for the crime of murder. stab the victim, Bernardo Quidato Sr., appellant’s father and namesake,
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of Analie, the marital wife of the which caused the victim’s untimely demise.
accused, should be disqualified under the marital disqualification rule? Among those presented as witness were accused’s wife and brother. Also
presented were the extrajudicial confessions of appellant’s two other co-
accused. Appellant’s wife testified that while the accused were drinking
tuba she overheard them saying that they were planning to go to the
victim’s house on the night of the incident in order to “get money” and that
Held: NO. The court ruled that under the marital disqualification rule, she had no idea of what later transpired. Appellant objected to his wife’s
neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other testimony as it was prohibited by the rule on marital
without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one disqualification. Appellant likewise denies the allegations of his co-
against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one accused who in their extrajudicial confession pointed to the participation of
against the other or the latters direct descendants or ascendants. appellant.
However, objections to the competency of a husband and wife to testify in
a criminal prosecution against the other may be waived as in the case of
other witnesses generally. The objection to the competency of the spouse Issue: Whether or not the testimony of appellant’s wife is disqualified.
must be made when he or she is first offered as a witness. In this case,
the incompetency was waived by appellants failure to make a timely Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions should be given credence as
objection to the admission of Analies testimony. they were obtained in violation of the constitutional right of appellant to
confront witnesses.
Case Digest: GEPTY, V A, A.
Held: 1. NO. They should not be given credence, and indeed, appellant
should be acquitted. The prosecution relied heavily on appellant’s co-
People Vs. Quidato accused’s affidavits. However, the failure to present the affiants in the
witness stand gives these affidavits the character of hearsay. It is
G.R. No. 117401 | October 1, 1998 hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants themselves take the witness
stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be
excluded from the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay. “The
voluntary admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not
admissible in evidence against his co-accused when the latter had not
been given an opportunity to hear him testify and cross-examine him.”

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Section 30, Rule 130 is not applicable in this case because it refers to of Articles 171 and 172 (falsification of public document) of the Revised
confessions made during the existence of the conspiracy. In this case, Penal Code. Respondent alleged that complainant made false entries in
the conspiracy had clearly ended by the time the confession was made. the Certificates of Live Birth of her children, Angelica and Katelyn Anne.
2. YES. The testimony of appellant’s wife must be disregarded. As
correctly observed by the court a quo, the disqualification is between • More specifically, complainant allegedly indicated in said
husband and wife, the law not precluding the wife from testifying when it Certificates of Live Birth that she is married to a certain Ferdinand
involves other parties or accused, but not where the testimony will be Fernandez, and that their marriage was solemnized on April 11,
used against the accused-husband directly or indirectly. 1979, when in truth, she is legally married to Ruben
G. Mercado and their marriage took place on April 11, 1978.
Case Digest: GEPTY, V A, A.
Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint for falsification of public
3b) Disqualifications of witnesses – by reason of privileged document disclosed confidential facts and information relating to the civil
communications case for annulment, then handled by respondent Vitriolo as her counsel. >

Mercado v. Vitriolo • Complainant denied the accusations of respondent against her.

She denied using any other name than "Rosa F. Mercado." She
A.C. 5110 | May 26, 2005 also insisted that she has gotten married only once, on April 11,
1978, to Ruben G. Mercado.
Ratio: In fine, the factors of attorney- client relationship are:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-
client relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client This prompted her to bring this action against respondent. She claims that,
made the communication. in filing the criminal case for falsification, respondent is guilty of breaching
(2) The client made the communication in confidence. their privileged and confidential lawyer-client relationship, and should be
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional disbarred.
capacity. CASES FILED BY MERCADO:
OFC OF THE CITY PROSEC PASIG: Libel suit
The evidence on record fails to substantiate complainant's allegations. We PCGG: Administrative case for dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct
note that complainant did not even specify the alleged communication in prejudicial to the best interest of the service, pursuit of private business,
confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims were couched in vocation or profession without the permission required by Civil Service
general terms and lacked specificity. The Court cannot be involved in a rules and regulations, and violations of the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt
guessing game as to the existence of facts which the complainant must Practices Act.
prove. OMBUDSMAN: dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service. Found guilty of misconduct and meted out
Facts: the penalty of one month suspension without pay.
Mercado’s husband filed an annulment case with the RTC of Pasig City. It SANDIGANBAYAN: violation of Sec. 7(b)(2), “recommend any person to
was dismissed by the RTC, and became final and executory on July 15, any position in a private enterprise which has a regular or pending official
1992. transaction with their office.”

In August 1992, Atty. De Leon, the original counsel of Mercado died, and Vitriolo filed a MTD where he alleged that:
Vitriolo entered his appearance before the trial court as collaborating
counsel for the complainant. On February 7, 1992, Vitriolo filed a notice of • Complaint for disbarment was all hearsay, misleading and
substitution, informing the RTC that he is substituting Atty. De Leon. irrelevant because all the allegations leveled against him are
subject of separate fact-finding bodies.
On April 13, 1999, Atty. Vitriolo filed a criminal action against complainant
Mercado before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City, for violation

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• Pending cases against him are not grounds for disbarment, and (1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective
that he is presumed to be innocent until proven otherwise. attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship
• Decision of the Ombudsman finding him guilty of misconduct and that the client made the communication.
imposing upon him the penalty of suspension for one month Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the
without pay is on appeal with the Court of Appeals. He adds that rule on privileged communication even if the prospective client does not
he was found guilty, only of simple misconduct, which he thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter declines the employment. The
committed in good faith. reason for this is to make the prospective client free to discuss whatever
he wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he tells the lawyer will be
divulged or used against him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to
Respondent maintains that his filing of the criminal complaint for obtain information from the prospective client.
falsification of public documents against complainant does not violate the On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a
rule on privileged communication between attorney and client because the lawyer for some purpose other than on account of the (prospective)
bases of the falsification case are two certificates of live birth which are attorney-client relation is not privileged. Instructive is the case of Pfleider
public documents and in no way connected with the confidence taken v. Palanca, where the client and his wife leased to their attorney a 1,328-
during the engagement of respondent as counsel. According to hectare agricultural land for a period of ten years. In their contract, the
respondent, the complainant confided to him as then counsel only matters parties agreed, among others, that a specified portion of the lease rentals
of facts relating to the annulment case. Nothing was said about the alleged would be paid to the client-lessors, and the remainder would be delivered
falsification of the entries in the birth certificates of her two daughters. The by counsel-lessee to client's listed creditors. The client alleged that the list
birth certificates are filed in the Records Division of CHED and are of creditors which he had "confidentially" supplied counsel for the purpose
accessible to anyone. of carrying out the terms of payment contained in the lease contract was
Court referred the administrative case to the IBP. disclosed by counsel, in violation of their lawyer-client relation, to parties
iBP: Vitriolo is guilty of violating the rule on privileged communication whose interests are adverse to those of the client. As the client himself,
between attorney and client, and recommending his suspension from the however, states, in the execution of the terms of the aforesaid lease
practice of law for one (1) year. contract between the parties, he furnished counsel with the "confidential"
list of his creditors. We ruled that this indicates that client delivered the list
• Upon receiving the IBP report, Mercado wrote a letter of of his creditors to counsel not because of the professional relation then
desistance and said she has now found forgiveness for Vitriolo. existing between them, but on account of the lease agreement. We then
However, Court stated that letter of complainant to the Chief held that a violation of the confidence that accompanied the delivery of
Justice imparting forgiveness upon respondent is that list would partake more of a private and civil wrong than of a breach
inconsequential in disbarment proceedings. of the fidelity owing from a lawyer to his client.

Issue: Whether or not respondent violated the rule on privileged (2) The client made the communication in confidence.
communication between attorney and client when he filed a criminal case The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of
for falsification of public document against his former client. confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to be
confidential
Held: NO. Dean Wigmore cites the factors essential to establish the A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by
existence of the privilege, viz: (1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought voluntary act of disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and
(2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission
the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was
disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be given.
waived. Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a
In fine, the factors are as follows: compromise agreement prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction
of his client and delivered to the opposing party, an offer and counter-offer

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for settlement, or a document given by a client to his counsel not in his Regala v. Sandiganbayan
professional capacity, are not privileged communications, the element of
confidentiality not being present. G.R. No. 105938| September 20, 1996

Ratio: The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case

at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant case falls under the first
and third exception. The attorney-client privilege, as currently worded in the
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his Rules of Court provides the disqualification by reason of privileged
professional capacity. communication.
The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended Facts: The matters raised in the present case are an offshoot of the
for mere information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his institution of the PCGG against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the
attorney as to his rights or obligations. The communication must have principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which
been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking includes shares of stocks in the several corporations in PCGG Case No.
legal advice. 33, entitled “Republic of the Philippines vs Eduardo Cojuangco, et al.”
Petitioners in this case are all partners in ACCRA, referred to as ACCRA
If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal lawyers. Likewise, private respondent ROCO is also a partner in ACCRA.
assistance, and not legal advice, the privilege does not attach to a
communication disclosed for such purpose. ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients, which included,
among others, the organization and acquisition of business associations
Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the evidence on and/or organizations, with the correlative and incidental services where its
record fails to substantiate complainant's allegations. We note that members acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders.
complainant did not even specify the alleged communication in
confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims were couched in The complaint in PCGG Case No. 0033 alleged that the ACCRA
general terms and lacked specificity. She contends that respondent LAWYERS and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each other in
violated the rule on privileged communication when he instituted a setting up through the use of coconut levy funds the financial and corporate
criminal action against her for falsification of public documents because framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM
the criminal complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil case for and others and that through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA,
annulment then handled by respondent. She did not, however, spell out using its wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation,
these facts which will determine the merit of her complaint. The Court became the holder of approximately fifteen million shares representing
cannot be involved in a guessing game as to the existence of facts which roughly 3.3% of the total capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987.
the complainant must prove. Indeed, complainant failed to attend the
hearings at the IBP. Without any testimony from the complainant as to the • Read Coconut levy fund scam! Basically, Marcos and cronies
specific confidential information allegedly divulged by respondent without taxed coconut farmers and promised them a share in the
her consent, it is difficult, if not impossible to determine if there was any investments but the fund was used for personal profit.
violation of the rule on privileged communication. Such confidential
information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on
privileged communication between attorney and client. It is not enough to
The PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA lawyers that Mr.
merely assert the attorney-client privilege. The burden of proving that the
Cojuangco is their client and it was Cojuangco who furnished all the monies
privilege applies is placed upon the party asserting the privilege.
to the subscription payment; hence, ACCRA LAWYERS acted as
Case Digest: Moreno, T.M.C. dummies, nominees and/or agents by allowing themselves, among others,
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE – BY REASON OF PRIVILEGED to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through
COMMUNICATIONS government concessions, etc., which acts constitute gross abuse of

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official position and authority, flagrant breach of public trust, unjust 1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that
enrichment, violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the revealing the client's name would implicate that client in the very activity
Philippines. for which he sought the lawyer's advice.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability
On August 20, 1991, PCGG filed a “Motion to Admit Third Amended 3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's
Complaint” which EXCLUDED private respondent ROCO from the client unless, by revealing the client's name, the said name would furnish
complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as party-defendant, whereas ACCRA the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict
LAWYERS still were included still as defendants. an individual of a crime.

ACCRA LAWYERS subsequently filed their Comment/Opposition with The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at
Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant case falls under the first
to them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded private respondent and third exception. The attorney-client privilege, as currently worded in
ROCO. the Rules of Court provides the disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court further emphasizes the
importance of maintaining client confidence. Furthermore, this duty is
PCGG in its comment agreed to exclude the ACCRA LAWYERS on the ff explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
conditions: Responsibility. Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also
demands a lawyer's fidelity to client. The Resolutions of respondent
• the disclosure of the identity of its clients; Sandiganbayan are hereby annulled and set aside.
• submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client
relationship;
• the submission of the deeds of assignments ACCRA LAWYERS Case Digest: Moreno, T.M.C.
executed in favor of its clients covering their respective
shareholdings.
People v. Invencion

G.R. No. 131636 | March 5, 2003

SANDIGANBAYAN RULING: DENIED the exclusion of ACCRA
LAWYERS in PCGG Case No. 33 for their refusal to comply with the Ratio: The filial privilege rule is not strictly a rule on disqualification
conditions required by respondent because a descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to testify against
PCGG. an ascendant. The rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be
invoked or waived like other privileges.
ACCRA LAWYERS argue they are prohibited from revealing the identity
of their principal under their sworn mandate and fiduciary duty as lawyers Facts: Artemio was charged before the RTC with 13 counts of rape. The
to uphold at all times the confidentiality of information obtained during cases were consolidated and jointly tried. At his arraignment Artemio
such lawyer-client relationship. entered a plea of not guilty in each case.

Issue: Whether or not client’s identity in a case involving and acquiring The witnesses presented by the prosecution in its evidence in chief were
companies allegedly sourced from ill-gotten wealth is privileged and Elven Invencion, Eddie Sicat, Gloria Pagala, Dr. Rosario Fider, and Atty.
disclosure of such is unethical. Florencio Canlas. Presented as rebuttal witnesses were Gloria Pagala and
Celestino Navarro.
Held: YES. The court held that the client identity in this case is privileged.
As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded in
mystery. This general rule is however qualified by some important Elven Invencion, an 8-year-old grade two testified that he is a half-brother
exceptions: of Cynthia and son of Artemio with his second common-law wife. Sometime
before the end of the school year in 1996, while he was sleeping in one

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room with his father Artemio, Cynthia, and two other younger brothers, he On rebuttal, Gloria Pagala testified when she went to the place where
was awakened by Cynthia’s loud cries. Looking towards her, he saw his Artemio used to, she noticed that the destroyed portions of the hut’s sawali
father on top of Cynthia, doing a pumping motion. After about two minutes, walls were not yet repaired. Rebuttal witness Celestino Navarro, stepfather
his father put on his short pants. Elven further declared that Artemio was a of Artemio, confirmed the testimony of Eddie Sicat.
very strict and cruel father and a drunkard. He angrily prohibited Cynthia
from entertaining any of her suitors. Whenever he was drunk, he would The trial court convicted Artemio for one count of rape. Artemio challenges
maul Elven and quarrel with his stepfather, Celestino Navarro. the competency and credibility of Elven as a witness. He argues that Elven,
as his son, should have been disqualified as a witness against him under
pursuant to the rule on filial privilege.
Eddie Sicat, a 40-year-old farmer and neighbor of Artemio, testified that
while he was passing by the house of Artemio on his way to the field to Thereafter, Artemio attacks the competency and credibility of Elven as a
catch fish, he heard somebody crying. He then peeped through a small witness. He argued that Elven, as his son, should have been disqualified
opening in the destroyed portion of the sawali wall of Artemio’s house. He as a witness against him under Section 20(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of
saw Cynthia lying on her back and crying, while her father was on top of Court.
her, doing a pumping motion. Eddie observed them for about fifteen
seconds, and then he left and proceeded to the field to catch fish. He The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the affirmation of
reported what he had witnessed to Artemio’s stepfather, Celestino, later Artemio’s conviction.
that morning.
Issue: Whether or not Elven Invencion should be disqualified as a witness
pursuant to the rule on filial privilege
Gloria Pagala, the mother of Cynthia and former common-law wife of
Artemio, testified that she and Artemio started living together in February Held: NO. The competency of Elven to testify is not affected by Section 25,
1969. Out of their common-law relationship, they had six children, one of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the rule on “filial
whom was Cynthia. In March 1982, she and Artemio parted ways privilege.” This rule is not strictly a rule on disqualification because a
permanently. When Artemio’s mother died, Cynthia lived with Artemio. descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an
Thereafter, her son Novelito told her that Cynthia was pregnant. Gloria then ascendant. The rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked
went to the house of Artemio and asked Cynthia about her condition. The or waived like other privileges. As correctly observed by the lower court,
latter confessed that she had been sexually abused by her father. Gloria Elven was not compelled to testify against his father; he chose to waive
then went to the office of the NBI and reported the matter. that filial privilege when he voluntarily testified against Artemio. Elven
declared that he was testifying as a witness against his father of his own
Dr. Rosario Fider testified that she examined Cynthia. She found Cynthia accord and only “to tell the truth.” Hence, his testimony is entitled to full
to be five to six months pregnant. Lastly, Atty. Florencio Canlas, an NBI credence.
agent, testified that, Cynthia, accompanied by her mother, complained Moreover, the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of both Elven and
before him that she was raped by her father Artemio. Gloria do not impair the credibility of these witnesses. The Court agree with
the trial court that they are minor inconsistencies, which do not affect the
The defense did not present Artemio as a witness. Instead, his counsel de credibility of the witnesses. The Court held in a number of cases that
parte, Atty. Salamida, took the witness stand and testified for the defense. inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses that refer to minor and
He declared that, he and his secretary went to the house of Artemio. When insignificant details do not destroy the witnesses’ credibility.
he went around the house and tried to peep through the old sawali walls,
he could not see anything inside the room where Artemio and his children Case Digest: Empaynado, A.M.E.
used to sleep. Atty. Salamida then concluded that prosecution witness
Eddie Sicat was not telling the truth when he declared having seen what Gonzales v. CA
Artemio did to Cynthia when he peeped through a small opening in the
sawali wall of the house. G.R. No. 117740 | October 30, 1998

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Ratio: The rule on confidential communications between physician and Petitioners presented the affidavit of Dr. Pedro Arenas, Ricardo Abad’s
patient requires that: a) the action in which the advice or treatment given or physician, declaring that in 1935, he had examined Ricardo Abad and
any information is to be used is a civil case; b) the relation of physician and found him to be infected with gonorrhea, and that the latter had become
patient existed between the person claiming the privilege or his legal sterile as a consequence thereof.
representative and the physician; c) the advice or treatment given by him
or any information was acquired by the physician while professionally The lower court ruled in favor of respondents. two appeals were elevated
attending the patient; d) the information was necessary for the performance by to the appellate court but such was denied.
of his professional duty; and e) the disclosure of the information would tend
to blacken the reputation of the patient. Issue: Whether or not the three (3) children were entitled to inherit

Facts: Petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and Held: YES. First, the evidence presented by petitioners to prove that Jose
Cesar de Mesa Tioseco sought the settlement of the intestate estate of Libunao died in 1971 are, to say the least, far from conclusive. Failure to
their brother, Ricardo de Mesa Abad. In their petition, petitioners claimed indicate on an enrolment form that ones parent is deceased is not
that they were the only heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad, as the latter necessarily proof that said parent was still living during the time said form
allegedly died a bachelor, leaving no descendants or ascendants, whether was being accomplished. Furthermore, the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao
legitimate or illegitimate. Thereafter, petitioners amended their petition by and Alejandro Ramos as to the supposed death of Jose Libunao in 1971 is
alleging that the real properties listed as belonging to the decedent were not competent evidence to prove the latters death at that time, being merely
actually only administered by him and that the true owner was their late secondary evidence thereof. Jose Libunaos death certificate would have
mother, Lucila de Mesa. In June 1972, the trial court appointed Cesar de been the best evidence as to when the latter died. Petitioners have,
Mesa Tioseco as administrator of the intestate estate of Ricardo de Mesa however, inexplicably failed to present the same, although there is no
Abad. showing that said death certificate has been lost or destroyed as to be
unavailable as proof of Jose Libunaos death. More telling, while the records
of Loyola Memorial Park show that a certain Jose Bautista Libunao was
Meanwhile, petitioners executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of indeed buried there in 1971, this person appears to be different from
their late mother Lucila de Mesa, copying the technical descriptions of the Honoria Empaynados first husband, the latters name being Jose
lots. By virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds cancelled the TCTs in the SantosLibunao. Even the name of the wife is different. Jose Bautista
name of Ricardo Abad and issued in the name of Dolores de Mesa Abad, Libunaos wife is listed as Josefa Reyes while the wife of Jose Santos
the other TCT in the name of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco and the other one in Libunao was Honoria Empaynado.
the name of Carolina Abad Gonzales. The three promptly executed real
estate mortgages over the real properties in favor of Mrs. Josefina Viola,
the wife of their counsel, Escolastico Viola. As to Dr. Arenas affidavit, the same was objected to by private respondents
as being privileged communication under Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. The rule on confidential communications between physician
Thereafter, private respondents Honoria, Cecilia, and Marian filed a motion and patient requires that: a) the action in which the advice or treatment
to set aside proceedings and for leave to file opposition. In their motion, given or any information is to be used is a civil case; b) the relation of
they alleged that Honoria Empaynado had been the common-law wife of physician and patient existed between the person claiming the privilege or
Ricardo Abad for twenty-seven years before his death, or from 1943 to his legal representative and the physician; c) the advice or treatment given
1971, and that during this period, their union had produced two children, by him or any information was acquired by the physician while
Cecilia and Marian. Private respondents also disclosed the existence of professionally attending the patient; d) the information was necessary for
Rosemarie Abad, a child allegedly fathered by Ricardo Abad with another the performance of his professional duty; and e) the disclosure of the
woman, Dolores Saracho. As the law awards the entire estate to the information would tend to blacken the reputation of the patient.
surviving children to the exclusion of collateral relatives, private Petitioners do not dispute that the affidavit meets the first four requisites.
respondents charged petitioners with deliberately concealing the existence They assert, however, that the finding as to Ricardo Abads sterility does
of said three children in other to deprive the latter of their rights to the estate not blacken the character of the deceased. Petitioners conveniently forget
of Ricardo Abad. that Ricardo Abads sterility arose when the latter contracted gonorrhea, a
fact which most assuredly blackens his reputation. In fact, given that society

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holds virility at a premium, sterility alone, without the attendant (NBN) Project, where the Philippine Government entered a contract with
embarrassment of contracting a sexually-transmitted disease, would be the Chinese firm Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE).
sufficient to blacken the reputation of any patient. We thus hold the affidavit
inadmissible in evidence. And the same remains inadmissible in evidence,
notwithstanding the death of Ricardo Abad. As stated by the trial court: When petitioner testified before the Senate Committees, he disclosed that
then COMELEC Chairman Abalos, brokering for ZTE, offered him P200
In the case of Westover vs. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 99 N.Y. 59, it million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project.
was pointed out that: The privilege of secrecy is not abolished or terminated • He informed President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo about the bribery
because of death as stated in established precedents. It is an established attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
rule that the purpose of the law would be thwarted and the policy intended
• However, when petitioner was asked the following three
to be promoted thereby would be defeated, if death removed the seal of
questions, he refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege.”
secrecy, from the communications and disclosures which a patient should
make to his physician. After one has gone to his grave, the living are not
permitted to impair his name and disgrace his memory by dragging to light
communications and disclosures made under the seal of the statute.
• In particular, he refused to answer the questions on
Case Digest: Empaynado, A.M.E. o 1.) Whether or not the President followed up the NBN
Project,
ROMULO L. NERI, Petitioner, -versus- SENATE COMMITTEE ON o 2.) Whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, o 3.) Whether or not she directed him to approve it.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY
Respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to
G.R. No. 180643| March 25, 2008 petitioner.
Ratio: Three elements should be met for a communication to be
considered presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable power" of However, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita sent a letter to the
the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other Committees requesting them to dispense with Neri’s testimony on the
countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive ground of executive privilege and that the three (3) questions "fall under
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally conversation and correspondence between the President and public
been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications
45
officials" necessary in "her executive and policy decision-making process"
are "received" by a close advisor of the President. Under the "operational and, that "the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
proximity" test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People's Republic of
member of President Arroyo's cabinet. And third, there is no adequate China."
showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege • Simply put, the bases are presidential communications
and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy
investigating authority. or foreign relations.
• Neri did not appear before the respondent Committees.
Facts: Petitioner Romulo Neri, then Director General of the NEDA, was
invited by the respondent Senate Committees to attend their joint
investigation on the alleged anomalies in the National Broadband Network A Show Cause Letter was sent to Neri for his failure to attend the scheduled
hearing.

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

• Neri replied that his nonappearance was upon the order of the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized
President, and that such matters relate to national security and in Philippine jurisprudence.
diplomatic matters and the possible loss of confidence of foreign • Second, the communications are "received" by a close advisor of
investors. the President. Under the "operational proximity" test, petitioner
• Respondents found the explanation unsatisfactory, and later on can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President
issued an Order citing Neri in contempt and consequently ordering Arroyo's cabinet.
his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At- • And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that
Arms until he appears and gives his testimony. would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
Neri filed the petition asking the Court to nullify both the Show Cause Letter
and the Contempt Order for having been issued with grave abuse of The Court expounded further on the third element and ruled that
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and stressed that his Presidential communications are presumptively privileged and that the
refusal to answer was anchored on executive privilege in accordance with presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public need by the
the ruling in the 2006 landmark case of Senate vs. Ermita. branch seeking access to conversations. In this case, the record is bereft
of any categorical explanation from respondent Committees to show a
compelling or critical need for the answers to the three (3) questions in the
The Senate Committees argued that they did not exceed their authority in enactment of a law.
issuing the assailed orders because there is no valid justification for Neri’s
claim to executive privilege.
• Instead, the questions veer more towards the exercise of the
• Also, the refusal of petitioner to answer the three questions legislative oversight function under Section 22 of Article VI rather
violates the people’s right to public information, and that the than Section 21 of the same Article.
executive is using the concept of executive privilege as a means
• In Senate v. Ermita, the Court ruled that the "the oversight function
to conceal the criminal act of bribery in the highest levels of
of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the
government.
extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation."
Issues:
1. Whether or not the three questions that petitioner Neri refused to answer
were covered by executive privilege, making the arrest order issued by the To distinguish if the inquiry is in aid of legislation or in the exercise of
respondent Senate Committees void? oversight function of Congress, it will depend on the content of the
2. Whether or not the claim of executive privilege is properly invoked? questions and the manner the inquiry is conducted.
Held:
• Senate v. Ermita stressed that the validity of the claim of executive
privilege depends not only on the ground invoked but, also, on
1. YES. The Court cited the US cases of Nixon, In Re Sealed the procedural setting or the context in which the claim is made.
Case and Judicial Watch, in determining the communications elicited by
the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications In United States v. Nixon, the Court held that "demonstrated, specific need
privilege. for evidence in pending criminal trial" outweighs the President's
"generalized interest in confidentiality."
• First, the communications relate to a "quintessential and non-
delegable power" of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an • However, the present case does not have the same
executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the circumstances with the Nixon case. In Nixon, there is a pending
President to enter into executive agreements without the criminal proceeding where the information is requested and it is

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the demands of due process of law and the fair administration of Chua Gaw vs. Chua
criminal justice that the information be disclosed.
• Unlike in Nixon, the information here is elicited, not in a criminal G.R. No. 160885 | April 16, 2008
proceeding, but in a legislative inquiry. Ratio: Unlike an ordinary witness, the calling party may impeach an
adverse witness in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse
• In Nixon, the President did not interpose any claim of need to
party, except by evidence of his bad character. Under a rule permitting the
protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets.
impeachment of an adverse witness, although the calling party does not
• In the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita categorically vouch for the witness' veracity, he is nonetheless bound by his testimony if
claims executive privilege on the grounds of presidential it is not contradicted or remains unrebutted.
communications privilege in relation to her executive and policy Facts: Spouses Chua Chin and Chan Chi were the founders of three
decision-making process and diplomatic secrets. business enterprises namely: Hagonoy Lumber, Capitol Sawmill
Corporation, and Columbia Wood Industries. The couple had seven (7)
2. YES. children including petitioner Conception Chua Gaw and respondent Suy
To properly invoke executive privilege, there must be a formal claim of Ben Chua. At the time of Chua Chin's death, the net worth of Hagonoy
privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the Lumber was P415,487.20.
matter."
The surviving heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and
• A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a Renunciation of Hereditary Rights in Favor of a Co-Heir a Deed of Extra-
"precise and certain reason" for preserving their confidentiality.
57
Judicial Partition and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights in Favor of a Co-
Heir. In said document, Chan Chi and the six children likewise agreed to
voluntarily renounce and waive their shares over Hagonoy Lumber in favor
The Letter dated of Executive Secretary Ermita serves as the formal claim of their co-heir, Chua Sioc Huan.
of privilege, where he expressly states that "this Office is constrained to
invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v.
In May 1988, petitioner Concepcion Chua Gaw and her husband, Antonio
Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly." Gaw, asked respondent, Suy Ben Chua, to lend them P200,000.00 which
• The Court ruled that he is referring to the Office of the President. they will use for the construction of their house in Marilao, Bulacan.
• The case of Senate v. Ermita only requires that an allegation be However, the latter failed to pay the amount within the designated period.
made "whether the information demanded involves military or Suy Ben sent them a demand letter, requesting to settle their obligation
diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc." with the warning that he will take the appropriate legal action if they fail to
• The particular ground must only be specified. The enumeration is do so. Failing to heed his demand, Suy Ben filed a Complaint
not even intended to be comprehensive." 58 for Sum of Money against the spouses Gaw with the Regional Trial Court.
• As held further in Senate v. Ermita, the Congress must not
59

require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such During trial, the spouses Gaw called the Suy Ben to testify as adverse
particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the witness under Section 10, Rule 132. On direct examination, Suy Ben
privilege is meant to protect. testified that Hagonoy Lumber was the conjugal property of his parents
Chua Chin and Chan Chi, who were both Chinese citizens. He narrated
that, initially, his father leased the lots where Hagonoy Lumber is presently
located from his godfather, Lu Pieng, and that his father constructed the
two-storey concrete building standing thereon. According to Suy Ben, when
Case Digest: Chavez, F. M. N. M. C. he was in high school, it was his father who managed the business
but he and his other siblings were helping him. Later, his sister, Sioc Huan,
managed Hogonoy Lumber together with their other brothers and sisters.
5d) Examination og a witness – Methods of impeachment of adverse
He stated that he also managed Hagonoy Lumber when he was in high
party’s witness

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 Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

school, but he stopped when he got married and found another job. Concepcion contends that her case was unduly prejudiced by the RTC's
He said that he now owns the lots where Hagonoy Lumber is operating. treatment of the Suy Ben's testimony as adverse witness during cross-
examination by his own counsel as part of her evidence. Concepcion
On cross-examination, respondent explained that he ceased to be a argues that the adverse witness' testimony elicited during cross-
stockholder of Capitol Sawmill when he sold his shares of stock to the other examination should not be considered as evidence of the calling party.
stockholders on January 1, 1991. He further testified that Chua Sioc Huan Issue: Whether or not the adverse witness' testimony elicited during cross-
acquired Hagonoy Lumber by virtue of a Deed of Partition, executed by the examination should be considered as evidence of the calling party
heirs of Chua Chin. He, in turn, became the owner of Hagonoy Lumber Held: YES. A party who calls his adversary as a witness is, therefore, not
when he bought the same from Chua Sioc Huan through a Deed of Sale bound by the latter's testimony only in the sense that he may contradict him
dated August 1, 1990. by introducing other evidence to prove a state of facts contrary to what the
witness testifies on. A rule that provides that the party calling an adverse
witness shall not be bound by his testimony does not mean that such
On re-direct examination, Concepcion stated that he sold his shares of testimony may not be given its proper weight, but merely that the calling
stock in Capitol Sawmill for P254,000.00, which payment he received in party shall not be precluded from rebutting his testimony or from
cash. He also paid the purchase price of P255,000.00 for Hagonoy
impeaching him. This, Concepcion failed to do.
Lumber in cash, which payment was not covered by a separate receipt as
he merely delivered the same to Sioc Huan at her house in Paso de Blas,
Valenzuela. Although he maintains several accounts at Planters Bank, In the present case, Concepcion, by her own testimony, failed to discredit
Paluwagan ng Bayan, and China Bank, the amount he paid to Sioc Huan the Suy Ben's testimony on how Hagonoy Lumber became his sole
was not taken from any of them. He kept the amount in the house because property. The petitioner admitted having signed the Deed of Partition, but
he was engaged in rediscounting checks of people from the public market. she insisted that the transfer of the property to Sioc Huan was only
temporary. On cross-examination, she confessed that no other document
RTC: - ruled in favor of Suy Ben declaring that the latter is entitled to the was executed to indicate that the transfer of the business to Sioc Huan was
payment of the amount of P200,000.00 with interest. a temporary arrangement. She declared that, after their mother died in
• further held that the validity and due execution of the Deed of 1993, she did not initiate any action concerning Hagonoy Lumber, and it
Partition and the Deed of Sale, evidencing transfer of ownership was only in her counterclaim in the instant that, for the first time, she raised
of Hagonoy Lumber from Chua Sioc Huan to respondent, was a claim over the business.
never impugned.
• Although respondent failed to produce the originals of the Due process requires that in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider
documents, petitioner judicially admitted the due execution of the entire evidence presented. All the parties to the case, therefore, are
the Deed of Partition, and even acknowledged her signature considered bound by the favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the
thereon, thus constitutes an exception to the best evidence rule. evidence. As already mentioned, in arriving at a decision, the
entirety of the evidence presented will be considered, regardless of the
party who offered them in evidence. In this light, the more vital
CA: - affirmed the decision of the RTC. consideration is not whether a piece of evidence was properly
attributed to one party, but whether it was accorded the opposite probative
• denied Concepcion's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
weight by the court. The testimony of an adverse witness is evidence in the
• It noted that the petitioner failed to show that the inclusion of case and should be given its proper weight, and such evidence becomes
respondent's testimony in the statement of facts in the assailed weightier if the other party fails to impeach the witness or contradict his
decision unduly prejudiced her defense and counterclaims. testimony.
Case Digest: dela Pena, D.D.I.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court. 6b) Admissions and confessions – Admission by a party

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

Patis vs. Alusitain

434 SCRA 419 | July 14, 2004.

6. By his computation, he claimed that he was entitled to P86,710.00
8 broken down as follows:

Facts of the case: Retirement Benefits = ½ month salary for every year of service
1. In March 1948, Alusitain was hired as a laborer at the Rufina Patis One-half month salary = P1,885.00
Factory owned and operated by petitioner Lucas. Years of Service = 47 years
Retirement Benefits = P86,710.00

2. After close to forty-three years or on February 19, 1991, Alusitain

admittedly tendered his letter of resignation. 7. Lucas, however, refused to pay the retirement benefits of
Alusitain, prompting the latter to make a written demand on September 20,
1995.
3. On May 22, 1991, Alusitain executed a duly notarized affidavit of
separation from employment and submitted the same on even date to the
Pensions Department of the Social Security System (SSS). 8. Lucas, however, remained adamant in his refusal to give in to
Alusitain's demands.

4. On January 7, 1993, Republic Act No. 764, "AN ACT AMENDING

ARTICLE 287 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 442, AS AMENDED 9. Having failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, Alusitain filed on
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, BY November 17, 1995, a complaint before the NLRC against petitioners
PROVIDING FOR RETIREMENT PAY TO QUALIFIED PRIVATE Rufina Patis Factory and Lucas for non-payment of retirement benefits.
SECTOR EMPLOYEES IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY RETIREMENT PLAN
IN THE ESTABLISHMENT," took effect providing, among other things,
thusly: Argument of the Parties:

Art. 287. Retirement . — xxx In the absence of a retirement plan or

agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the
establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or • Petitioner Patis Factory and Lucas: maintained that Alusitain had
more, but not beyond sixty five (65) years which is hereby declared the resigned from the company on February 19, 1991, per his letter of
compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the resignation and the Affidavit of Separation dated May 22, 1991
said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay
equivalent to at least one half (½) month salary for every year of service, a
fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.
xxx
• Alusitain maintained that he continued working for petitioners until
5. Sometime in 1995, Alusitain, claiming that he retired from the
January 1995, the date of actual retirement.
company on January 31, 1995, having reached the age of 65 and due to
poor health, verbally demanded from petitioner Lucas for the payment of Procedural History:
his retirement benefits. a) Executive Labor Arbiter upheld Alusitain's position. Stating:
“WHEREFORE judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondents

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

"Rufina Patis Factory" and Jesus Lucas, Sr., jointly and severally to pay It is a basic rule in evidence, however, that the burden of proof is on the
complainant Juan Alusitain his retirement benefits in the amount of part of the party who makes the allegations— ei incumbit probatio, qui dicit,
P88,595.00. non qui negat. If he claims a right granted by law, he must prove his claim
by competent evidence, relying on the strength of his own evidence and
b) On appeal, the NLRC, by Resolution, affirmed the Labor Arbiter's not upon the weakness of that of his opponent.
decision.
In the case at bar, it was incumbent on Alusitain to prove that he retired on
c) petitioners brought the case on certiorari to the Court of Appeals which, January 31, 1995 and not on February 20, 1991 as indicated on his letter
by the assailed decision, dismissed it, holding that the NLRC committed no of resignation.
error much less any grave abuse of discretion.
As the following discussion will show, he utterly failed to discharge the
d) Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of onus.
Appeals by Resolution, petitioners lodged the present petition. (The
present petition is a petition for review on certiorari.) Respondent's letter of resignation and May 22, 1991 Affidavit of Separation
Issue: which he admittedly voluntarily executed constitute admissions against his
own interest. The said documents belie his claim that he retired on January
(1) Main issue on the Case: Whether or not the retirement benefits should 31, 1995.
be awarded to Juan? (No)
Being an admission against interest, the documents are the best evidence
which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. The rationale for
(2) Issue on Evidence: Whether or not the documents filed by Juan the rule is based on the presumption that no man would declare anything
Alusitian shall be construed as admissions against his interest? (Yes) against himself unless such declaration was true. Thus, it is fair to presume
Ruling on the first and second Issue: (No, Juan should not be given that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his fault if it does
retirement benefits.) not.

This Court held in Oro that R.A. 7641 should be given retroactive effect. While these two documents may have facilitated the release of Alusitain's
retirement benefits from the SSS, hence, beneficial to him at that time, they
may still be considered admissions against interest since the disserving
The doctrine enunciated in Oro has been clarified in several cases. In CJC quality of the admission is judged as of the time it is used or offered in
Trading, Inc. v. NLRC, this Court, speaking through Justice Florentino evidence and not when such admission is made.
Feliciano, held that R.A. 7641 may be given retroactive effect where (1) the
claimant for retirement benefits was still the employee of the employer at
the time the statute took effect; and (2) the claimant had complied with the Thus, it matters not that the admission is self-serving when it was made, so
requirements for eligibility under the statute for such retirement benefits. long as it is against respondent's present claim. No doubt, admissions
against interest may be refuted by the declarant. it bears stressing,
however, that Alusitain's Affidavit of Separation filed with the SSS is a
It is thus clear that in order for respondent to claim retirement benefits from notarial document, hence, prima facie evidence of the facts expressed
petitioner Rufina Patis Factory, he has to prove that he was its employee therein. Since notarial documents have in their favor the presumption of
at the time R.A . 7641 took effect. regularity, to contradict the facts stated therein, there must be evidence that
is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.
DISCUSSION ON EVIDENCE

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

In fine, Alusitain having failed to prove that he was an employee of 1. at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, AAA, a thirteen-year old
petitioner at the time R.A. 7641 took effect, his claim for retirement benefits first year high school student, together with her friends, siblings
thereunder must be disallowed. Joy and Ricky Agbuya, went to the mango orchard located at the
back of ZZZ Elementary School to gather fallen mangoes.
Case Digest: Abella, Marc Gabriel A. 2. When they were bound for home at around 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, AAA's short pants got hooked on the fence. AAA asked
Joy and Ricky to wait for her but they ran away and left her.
6c) Admissions and confessions – Offer of Compromise 3. While AAA was trying to unhook her short pants, Larry suddenly
grabbed and pulled her. Poking a knife at her neck, Larry
People v. Erguiza, threatened to hurt her if she would make a noise.
xxx
G.R. No. 171348 | November 26, 2008

Facts: The Court is confronted with another case of rape. The victim, a 13- Version of the Defense
year-old girl. The Information reads as follows:
1. On January 5, 2000, Larry Erguiza helped in the repair of CCC's
house from 8:00 o'clock in the morning up to 5:00 o'clock in the
That on or about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of January 5, afternoon.
2000, at the back of the Bical Norte Elementary School, 2. When he reached home at around 5:00 pm, his mother Albina
municipality of Bayambang, province of Pangasinan, Erguiza instructed him to fetch a "hilot" as his wife Josie was
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable already experiencing labor pains. He proceeded to fetch the "hilot"
Court, the above-named accused, armed with a kitchen Juanita Angeles and stayed in their house until his wife delivered
knife, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, a baby at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 6, 2000.
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual intercourse 3. Juanita Angeles corroborated Larry's testimony that he indeed
with AAA, a minor of 13 years old, against her will and fetched her at around 5:10 pm on January 5, 2000 to attend to his
consent and to her damage and prejudice. wife who was experiencing labor pains and who delivered a baby
at about 3:00 a.m. of January 6, 2000; and that Larry never left his
wife's side until the latter gave birth.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded "not guilty". Thereafter trial 4. Joy Agbuya testified that she and AAA were at the mango orchard
ensued. of Juanito Macaraeg on January 5, 2000; that she never left AAA
when her short pants got hooked; that they went together to the
Procedural History: store of Auntie Beth where they parted.

(a) Ruling of the RTC, the RTC found appellant guilty of the (c) The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
crime of rape, (d) Hence, the petition for review in the Supreme Court.
Issue:
(b) On appeal, the CA aptly summarized the respective versions
of the parties, based on the evidence presented before the trial (1) Whether or not the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient to
court. convict Erguiza. (No)

(2) Whether or not the offer of compromised is an implied admission. (No)

Arguments in the Court of Appeals:
Version of the Prosecution Ruling of the Supreme Court: The prosecution's evidence does not
pass the test of moral certainty.

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

This Court has ruled that in the review of rape cases, the Court is guided A. No, sir, it was they who were the ones offering for settlement, but we
by the following precepts: (a) an accusation of rape can be made with never offer them any settlement, sir
facility, but it is more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove
it; (b) the complainant's testimony must be scrutinized with extreme On cross-examination, appellant gave the following statements:
caution since, by the very nature of the crime, only two persons are
normally involved; and (c) if the complainant's testimony is convincingly
credible, the accused may be convicted of the crime. Q. Before the filing of this case with this Honorable Court, your parents
and you were pleading to the parents of AAA not to continue anymore the
case, is it not?
This Court does not agree with the CA. The Court is not unmindful of the
general rule that findings of the trial court regarding credibility of
witnesses are accorded great respect and even finality on A. Yes, sir, so that the case will not be filed and our relationship will not
appeal. However, this principle does not preclude a reevaluation of the be destroyed, sir.
evidence to determine whether material facts or circumstances have been
overlooked or misinterpreted by the trial court. Q. In fact you asked your parents to do so, is it not?
A. No, sir. They were the ones who went to the house of AAA, sir.
Generally, when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was
committed. And so long as her testimony meets the test of credibility and The alleged offer of the parents of appellant to settle the case cannot be
unless the same is controverted by competent physical and testimonial used against appellant as evidence of his guilt. Appellant testified that he
evidence, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. did not ask his parents to settle the case. Moreover, appellant was not
present when the offer to settle was allegedly made. An offer of
After a judicious examination of the records of the case, the Court finds compromise from an unauthorized person cannot amount to an admission
that there is testimonial evidence that contradicts the findings of the RTC of the party himself. Although the Court has held in some cases that an
and CA on the basis of which no conviction beyond reasonable doubt attempt of the parents of the accused to settle the case is an implied
could arise. It is the unrebutted testimony of a credible defense witness. admission of guilt, we believe that the better rule is that for a compromise
The testimony of Joy Agbuya (Joy) casts doubt as to the possibility of to amount to an implied admission of guilt, the accused should have been
rape having taken place as narrated by complainant. In addition, the present or at least authorized the proposed compromise. Moreover, it has
testimony of a disinterested defense witness, Juanita Angeles (Juanita) been held that where the accused was not present at the time the offer for
corroborated the alibi of appellant. monetary consideration was made, such offer of compromise would not
save the day for the prosecution.
Discussion on Offer of Compromise.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
The offer of compromise allegedly made by Albina is critical to the case at is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Larry Erguiza is ACQUITTED and
bar in light of law and jurisprudence that an offer of compromise in a ordered immediately RELEASED from custody, unless he is being held
criminal case may be received in evidence as an implied admission of for some other lawful cause.
guilt. In the case at bar, the offer of compromise was first testified to by
Case Digest: Abella, Marc Gabriel A.
BBB on cross-examination, to wit:
6e) Admissions and confessions – Admission by a co-partner or agent
Q. Is it not a fact that there was an offer by you to the mother of the
accused that they pay you 1 million and you have reduced it to Republic vs. Sandiganbayan
P250,000.00?
G.R. No. 152154 | July 15, 2003

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

Ratio: The declarations of a person are admissible against a party In the interim, the Zurich District Attorney granted petitioner’s additional
whenever a "privity of estate" exists between the declarant and the party; request for the immediate transfer of the deposits to an escrow account in
"privity of estate" generally denotes a succession in rights. Consequently, the PNB. Consequently, respondent Marcos’s children moved that the
an admission of one in privity with a party to the record is competent and funds be placed in custodia legis because the deposit in escrow in the PNB
where several co-parties to the record are jointly interested in the subject was allegedly in danger of dissipation by petitioner. The Sandiganbayan
matter of the controversy, the admission of one is competent against all. granted the motion.

The pre-trial was held and the case was set for trial. Petitioner filed another
Facts: Petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good motion for summary judgment pertaining to the forfeiture of the Swiss
Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General deposits. After hearing, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner’s motion for
(OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan seeking the summary judgment. The Sandiganbayan rendered judgment in favor of the
declaration of the $356 USD million deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill- Republic of the Philippines, declaring the Swiss deposits.
gotten wealth. As well as the forfeiture of $25 USD million and $5 million
USD in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple's salaries, other
However, after respondents’ successful reconsideration, the
lawful income as well as income from legitimately acquired property. The
Sandiganbayan reversed its previous decision. In the now assailed
funds were previously held by five account groups, using various foreign
resolution before this Court, the Sandiganbayan denies petitioner's motion
foundations in certain Swiss banks.
for summary judgment, declares its prior decision set aside and the case
set for further proceedings.
Imelda Marcos, Maria Manotoc, Irene Araneta and Ferdinand R. Marcos,
Jr. respondents filed their Answer; claiming that the funds were lawfully Issue: Whether or not the individual and separate admissions of each
acquired without substantiating the claim. respondent bind all of them, to the effect that such became judicial
admissions of ownership of the Swiss deposits.
Before the case was set for pre-trial, respondents and then PCGG
Chairman executed a General Agreement and the Supplemental Held: YES. Pursuant to sections 29 & 31 of the 1997 Rules of Court [now
Agreements [General Agreement] for a global settlement of the assets of sections 30 and 32, respectively], such admissions are binding.
the Marcos family. The General Agreement was premised on the judgment
by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court declaring the various deposits in the The declarations of a person are admissible against a party whenever a
name of the enumerated foundations to be of illegal sources and ordered "privity of estate" exists between the declarant and the party; "privity of
that they be frozen to await the final verdict in favor of the parties entitled estate" generally denotes a succession in rights. Consequently, an
to restitution. Respondents filed a motion for the approval of said admission of one in privity with a party to the record is competent and where
agreements and for the enforcement thereof. Hearings were conducted by several co-parties to the record are jointly interested in the subject matter
the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the General Agreements. of the controversy, the admission of one is competent against all.

Meanwhile, respondent Imelda Marcos filed a Constancia, praying for the Privity exists among the respondents in this case. Respondents made
approval of the General Agreement and the subsequent release and judicial admissions of their ownership of the subject Swiss bank deposits in
transfer of the $150 million to the rightful owner. their: (1) Answer, (2) the General/Supplemental Agreements, and (3)
Imelda Marcos' Manifestation and Constancia.
Subsequently, respondent Imelda Marcos filed a Manifestation claiming By qualifying their acquisition of the Swiss bank deposits as lawful, in their
she was not a party to the motion for approval of the General Agreement Answer, respondents unwittingly admitted their ownership thereof.
and that she owned 90% of the funds with the remaining 10% belonging to Additionally, respondents’ willingness to agree to an amicable settlement—
the Marcos estate. via General Agreement—with the Republic only affirmed their ownership of
the Swiss deposits for the simple reason that no person would acquiesce

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to any concession over such huge dollar deposits if he did not in fact own Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds respondent Licerio Antiporda, Jr.
them. and his son, respondent Lloyd Antiporda. Columna affirmed his affidavit
before the investigating prosecutor who subjected him to clarificatory
Furthermore, in her Manifestation, respondent Imelda Marcos revealed she questions.
owns 90% of the subject matter of the above-entitled case, being the sole
beneficiary of the dollar deposits and that only 10% of the subject matter Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold Tamargo filed a complaint
belongs to the estate of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. against those implicated by Columna.

Likewise, in her Constancia, respondent Imelda Marcos prayer admitted During the preliminary investigation, respondent Licerio presented
the Marcoses' ownership of the Swiss deposits as in fact "the Marcoses Columna's unsolicited handwritten letter dated to respondent Lloyd, sent
defend that it (Swiss deposits) is a legitimate (Marcos) asset." from Columna's jail cell in Manila. In the letter, Columna disowned the
contents of his March 8, 2004 affidavit and narrated how he had been
tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession. The handwritten letter
Case Digest: Ungria, F.E.A. stated that those he implicated had no participation in the killings.

Tamargo vs Awigan Due to the submission of Columna's letter and affidavit, the investigating
prosecutor set a clarificatory hearing, to enable Columna to clarify his
G.R. No. 177727 | January 19, 2010 contradictory affidavits and his unsolicited letter. During the hearing,
Columna categorically admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the
Ratio: An extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not
unsolicited letter. He affirmed the second affidavit and denied that any
admissible against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay
violence had been employed to obtain or extract the affidavit from him.
against them.
Preceding from this, the city Prosecutor dismissed the charges filed against
respondents.
The reason for this rule is that: it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but
also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere
Meanwhile, in another handwritten letter addressed to City Prosecutor,
unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of
Columna said that he was only forced to withdraw all his statements against
strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against
respondents during the clarificatory hearing because of the threats to his
him.
life inside the jail.

Facts: Atty. Tamargo and his 8 y.o. daughter were shot and killed along Aggrieved by the dismissal of the charges, petitioner filed an appeal to the
Nueva st. cor. Escolta st. Binondo, Manila. The police had no leads on the Department of Justice (DOJ). The DOJ Secretary reversed the dismissal
perpetrators of the crime until a certain Geron surfaced and executed an and ordered the filing of the Informations for murder on the ground that the
affidavit stating that Lucio Columna told him during a drinking spree that March 8, 2004 affidavit was not effectively impeached by the subsequent
Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by respondent Lloyd Antiporda and that recantation and that there was enough evidence to prove the probable guilt
he (Columna) was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo. of respondents.

On the strength of Geron's affidavit the corresponding Informations for However, upon respondent Antipordas' successful motion for
murder were filed against Columna and three John Does. reconsideration, the DOJ Secretary directed the withdrawal of the
Informations; declaring that the March 8, 2004 affidavit was inadmissible
While in detention, Columna executed an affidavit [March 8, 2004 affidavit] against respondents and that, even if it was admissible, it was not
wherein he admitted his participation as "look out" during the shooting and corroborated by other evidence.
implicated respondent Romulo Awingan as the gunman and one Richard

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RTC - Granted the motion to withdraw the Informations in an order dated

October 26, 2005. Subsequently, petitioner’s Motion for reconsideration Therefore, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received
was granted which was based on Columna's March 8, 2004 affidavit which against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that:
he affirmed before the investigating prosecutor. In response, respondent
Antipordas moved for reconsideration but was denied; prompting him to
elevate the matter to the CA. (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission
itself
(b) the admission relates to the common object and
CA - RTC judge gravely abused her discretion. Columna's extrajudicial (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
confession was not admissible against the respondents because, aside conspiracy.
from the recanted confession, there was no other piece of evidence
presented to establish the existence of the conspiracy.
Absent these requisites it cannot be used against the alleged co-
conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with
Additionally, the confession was made only after Columna was arrested the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.
and not while the conspirators were engaged in carrying out the In the present case, besides the March 8, 2004 affidavit (which was
conspiracy. The CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, recanted) recanted, no other piece of evidence was presented to prove the
prompting petitioner to elevate the matter to this Court. alleged conspiracy. There was no other evidence, direct or circumstantial,
Issue: Whether or not Columna’s March 8, 2004 affidavit implicating which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the
respondents established probable cause to hold them for trial. recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence
against respondents, had no probative value and was inadmissible as
Held: NO. Columna's extrajudicial confession in his March 8, 2004 affidavit
evidence against them.
was not admissible as evidence against respondents in view of the rule on
res inter alios acta. Case Digest: Ungria, F.E.A.

The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be People v. Vda. de Ramos
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Thus, an
extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible G.R. No. 144621 | May 9, 2003
against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them.
Ratio: The hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely recites
The reason for this rule is that: it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but what someone else has told him, whether orally or in writing. In Sanvicente
also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere v. People, we held that when evidence is based on what was supposedly
unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of told the witness, the same is without any evidentiary weight for being
strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against patently hearsay. Familiar and fundamental is the rule that hearsay
him. testimony is inadmissible as evidence.
Facts: An amended Information for Robbery with Double Homicide was
filed against Masinag, Guittap, Morelos, Osabel, Dador, Guilling and one
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a John Doe.
conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the 1997 Rules of Court [now It was alleged that on July 17, 1992, in Lucena, the appellants conspired
section 31] and confederated with one another, and armed with bladed weapons, by
means of violence, and with intent to gain, did then and there willfully and
The rule on Admission by a conspirator prescribes that the act or unlawfully take, steal and carry away the following items:
declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that 1. Solid gold ring
the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside from the 2. One diamond ring
extrajudicial confession. 3. One necklace with pendant

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4. Cash (4,500) the two were no longer there. He proceeded to the house of Osabel and
5. Samsonite bag found him there with Purcino. They were counting the money they got from
6. .22 Cal Squibbman the victims. They gave him P300.00. Later, when Dador accompanied the
7. One pair of sandals two to Sta. Cruz, Manila to dispose of the karaoke machine, he received
8. One karaoke another P500.00. Osabel had the rifle repaired in Gulang-Gulang, Lucena
9. One jacket City.
10. One pair of shoes
Dador and Osabel were subsequently arrested for the killing of a certain
with a total value of P67,800.00, owned by and belonging to spouses Cesar M. Sante. During the investigation, Dador executed an extrajudicial
Romualdo Jael and Lionela Caringal, without the consent and against the confession admitting complicity in the robbery and killing of the Jael
will of the latter, to the damage and prejudice of the aforementioned spouses and implicating appellant and Osabel in said crime. The
offended parties in the aforestated sum of P67,800.00, Philippine Currency, confession was given with the assistance of Atty. Rey Oliver Alejandrino, a
and, on the same occasion of such robbery, the said accused, conspiring former Regional Director of the Human Rights Commission Office.
and confederating with one another, armed with the same bladed weapons, Thereafter, Osabel likewise executed an extrajudicial confession of his and
taking advantage of superior strength, and employing means to weaken the appellant's involvement in the robbery and killing of the Jaels, also with the
defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity, and with intent assistance of Atty. Alejandrino.
to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab both of
said spouses Romualdo Jael and Lionela Caringal thereby inflicting upon Simeon Tabor, a neighbor of the Jaels, testified that at 8:00 in the morning
the latter several fatal wounds which directly caused the death of the of July 17, 1992, he noticed that the victims, who were known to be early
aforenamed spouses. risers, had not come out of their house. He started calling them but there
Upon arraignment, appellant Masinag pleaded "not guilty." Trial on the was no response. He instructed his son to fetch the victims' son, SPO1
merits thereafter ensued. Accused Ariel Dador was discharged as a state Lamberto Jael. When the latter arrived, they all went inside the house and
witness while accused Purcino remained at large. found bloodstains on the floor leading to the bathroom. Tabor opened the
During the trial, state witness Ariel Dador testified that in the evening of July bathroom door and found the lifeless bodies of the victims.
15, 1992, Cesar Osabel asked him and a certain Purcino to go with him to
Appellant Masinag, for her part, denied involvement in the robbery and
see appellant Masinag at her house in Isabang, Lucena City. When they
homicide. She testified that she knew the victims because their houses
got there, Osabel and Masinag entered a room while Dador and Purcino
were about a kilometer apart. She and Osabel were friends because he
waited outside the house. On their way home, Osabel explained to Dador
courted her, but they never had a romantic relationship. She further claimed
and Purcino that he and Masinag planned to rob the spouses Romualdo
that the last time she saw Osabel was six months prior to the incident. She
and Leonila Jael. He further told them that according to Masinag, the
did not know Dador and Guilling at the time of the incident. According to
spouses were old and rich, and they were easy to rob because only their
her, it is not true that she harbored resentment against the victims because
daughter lived with them in their house.
they berated her son for stealing their daughter's handbag. On the whole,
The following day, at 7:00 p.m., Dador, Osabel, and Purcino went to the she denied any participation in a conspiracy to rob and kill the victims.
house of the Jael spouses to execute the plan. Osabel and Purcino went
inside while Dador stayed outside and positioned himself approximately 30
meters away from the house. Moments later, he heard a woman shouting RTC: The RTC found Cesar Osabel and Decena Masinag guilty beyond
for help from inside the house. After two hours, Osabel and Purcino came reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide.
out, carrying with them one karaoke machine and one rifle. Osabel's hands
were bloodied. He explained that he had to tie both the victims' hands with
the power cord of a television set before he repeatedly stabbed them, He From the decision convicting appellant Masinag and Osabel, only the
killed the spouses so they can not report the robbery to the authorities. former appealed, based on the lone assigned error:

Osabel ordered Dador to hire a tricycle while he and Purcino waited inside The trial court committed reversible error in finding accused-appellant guilty
the garage of a bus line. However, when Dador returned with the tricycle, beyond reasonable doubt of conspiring with her co-accused to commit the

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crime of robbery with homicide despite the absence of her actual by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as
participation in the commission of the said crime. evidence against him.

The rule on admissions made by a conspirator, while an exception to the

foregoing, does not apply in this case. In order for such admission to be
Issue: Whether or not the appeal should prosper admissible against a co-accused, Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court requires that there must be independent evidence aside from the
Held: Yes. Appellant contends that the extrajudicial confessions of Osabel extrajudicial confession to prove conspiracy. In the case at bar, apart from
and Dador were insufficient to establish with moral certainty her Osabel's extrajudicial confession, no other evidence of appellant's alleged
participation in the conspiracy. Firstly, Dador was not present to hear participation in the conspiracy was presented by the prosecution. There
appellant instigate the group to rob the Jael spouses. He only came to know being no independent evidence to prove it, her culpability was not
about the plan when Osabel told him on their way home. Thus, Dador had sufficiently established.
no personal knowledge of how the plan to rob was actually made and of
appellant's participation thereof. Secondly, while Osabel initially implicated Unavailing also is rule that an extrajudicial confession may be admissible
her in his extrajudicial confession as one of the conspirators, he repudiated when it is used as a corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to
this later in open court when he testified that he was forced to execute his establish the guilt of his co-accused. The implication of this rule is that there
statements by means of violence. must be a finding of other circumstantial evidence which, when taken
The Court found that the testimony of Dador was not based on his own together with the confession, establishes the guilt of a co-accused beyond
personal knowledge but from what Osabel told him. reasonable doubt. As earlier stated, there is no other prosecution
16

He admitted that he was never near appellant and that he did not talk to evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession may
her about the plan when they were at her house on July 15, 1992. Thus, corroborate.
his statements are hearsay and does not prove appellant's participation in
In People v. Berroya, we held that to hold an accused liable as co-principal
17
the conspiracy.
by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act
Under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court, a witness can testify only in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy. That overt act may consist
to those facts which he knows of his own personal knowledge, i.e., which of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may
are derived from his own perception; otherwise, such testimony would be consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the
hearsay. Hearsay evidence is defined as "evidence not of what the witness time of the commission of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over
knows himself but of what he has heard from others." The hearsay rule
10 the other co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the
bars the testimony of a witness who merely recites what someone else has conspiracy.
told him, whether orally or in writing. In Sanvicente v. People," we held
11 12

In the case at bar, no overt act was established to prove that appellant
that when evidence is based on what was supposedly told the witness, the
same is without any evidentiary weight for being patently hearsay. Familiar shared with and concurred in the criminal design of Osabel, Dador and
and fundamental is the rule that hearsay testimony is inadmissible as Purcino. Assuming that she had knowledge of the conspiracy or she
evidence. Osabel's extrajudicial confession is likewise inadmissible against acquiesced in or agreed to it, still, absent any active participation in the
commission of the crime in furtherance of the conspiracy, mere knowledge,
appellant. The res inter allos acta rule provides that the rights of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate is not sufficient to constitute
another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only upon
14
one as a party to a conspiracy.Conspiracy transcends mere
the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason companionship. 19

for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a Conspiracy must be proved as convincingly as the criminal act itself. Like
man's own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. any element of the offense charged, conspiracy must be established by
So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly proof beyond reasonable doubt. Direct proof of a previous agreement
20

inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the need not be established, for conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of
acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound appellant pointing to a joint purpose, concerted action and community of
interest. Nevertheless, except in the case of the mastermind of a crime, it

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must also be shown that appellant performed an overt act in furtherance of would get near the man, the latter would glare at him. Andales admitted,
the conspiracy. however, that he did not report the suspicious characters to the police.
As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue
All told, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of appellant with moral and EDSA, the two men insisted on getting off the bus. According to
certainty. Its evidence falls short of the quantum of proof required for Andales, the bus driver initially did not want to let them off the bus, because
conviction. Accordingly, the constitutional presumption of appellant's a Makati ordinance prohibited unloading anywhere except at designated
innocence must be upheld and she must be acquitted. bus stops. Eventually, the bus driver gave in and allowed the two
passengers to alight. The two immediately got off the bus and ran towards
Case Digest: Sapugay, BK Ayala Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an explosion. He then saw fire
quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus towards a nearby mall. After
People v. Baharan a while, he went back to where the bus was. He saw their bus passengers
G.R. No. 188314 | January 10, 2011 either lying on the ground or looking traumatized. A few hours after, he
made a statement before the Makati Police Station narrating the whole
Ratio: The Supreme Court also reiterated in a long line of cases that the incident.
conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of
mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not been Justice, confirming that shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of
under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the Abu Sayyaf Group – Abu Solaiman – announced over radio station
the significance, effects, and consequences of their guilty plea. This DZBB that the group had a Valentine’s Day "gift" for former President Gloria
requirement is stringent and mandatory. Macapagal-Arroyo. After the bombing, he again went on radio and warned
Facts: On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual of more bomb attacks.
southbound route, from its Navotas bus terminal towards its Alabang bus As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News
terminal via Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). Around 6:30 to 7:30 in Network an exclusive interview sometime after the incident, confessing his
the evening, while they were about to move out of the Guadalupe-EDSA participation in the Valentine’s Day bombing incident. In another exclusive
southbound bus stop, the bus conductor noticed two men running after the interview on the network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the
bus. The two insisted on getting on the bus, so the conductor obliged and bombing incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview,
let them in. confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices for the 14 February
According to Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, he immediately became 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified the accused Baharan and
wary of the two men, because, even if they got on the bus together, the two Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two men who had entered the
sat away from each other – one sat two seats behind the driver, while the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February.
other sat at the back of the bus. At the time, there were only 15 passengers Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group – namely Khaddafy Janjalani, Gamal B.
inside the bus. He also noticed that the eyes of one of the men were Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, Gappal Bannah Asali, Jainal Asali, Rohmat
reddish. When he approached the person near the driver and asked him Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, and other "John" and "Jane Does"
whether he was paying for two passengers, the latter looked dumb struck – were then charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder.
by the question. He then stuttered and said he was paying for two and gave Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the other
PhP20. Andales grew more concerned when the other man seated at the accused remain at-large.
back also paid for both passengers. At this point, Andales said he became On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-
more certain that the two were up to no good, and that there might be a 476), Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On the other
holdup. hand, upon arraignment for the multiple frustrated murder charge (Crim.
Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious because both men Case No. 05-477), accused Asali pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and
kept on asking him if the bus was going to stop at Ayala Avenue. The Baharan pled not guilty. Rohmat pled not guilty to both charges
witness also noticed that the man at the back appeared to be slouching, In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused
with his legs stretched out in front of him and his arms hanging out and Baharan and Trinidad were amenable to changing their "not guilty" pleas
hidden from view as if he was tinkering with something. When Andales to the charge of multiple frustrated murder, considering that they pled
"guilty" to the heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent
inconsistency in their pleas. Defense counsel conferred with accused

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Baharan and Trinidad and explained to them the consequences of the Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be
pleas. The two accused acknowledged the inconsistencies and manifested deemed satisfied in cases in which it was the defense counsel who
their readiness for re-arraignment. After the Information was read to them, explained the consequences of a "guilty" plea to the accused, as it appears
Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated in this case. In People v. Alborida, this Court found that there was still an
murder. improvident plea of guilty, even if the accused had already signified in open
After being discharged as state witness, accused Asali testified that while court that his counsel had explained the consequences of the guilty plea;
under training with the Abu Sayyaf in 2004, Rohmat, a.k.a Abu Jackie or that he understood the explanation of his counsel; that the accused
Zaky, and two other persons taught him how to make bombs and understood that the penalty of death would still be meted out to him; and
explosives. The trainees were told that they were to wage battles against that he had not been intimidated, bribed, or threatened.
the government in the city, and that their first mission was to plant bombs The Supreme Court also reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct
in malls, the Light Railway Transit (LRT), and other parts of Metro Manila. of a searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by
the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not been under
RTC: The RTC accepted the plea of guilt of Trinidad and Baharan despite coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the
the insufficiency of searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full significance, effects, and consequences of their guilty plea. This
comprehension of the consequences of the said plea. requirement is stringent and mandatory.
Issue: Whether or not the Court should have made a searching inquiry Insofar as accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad are concerned, the
evidence for the prosecution, in addition to that which can be drawn from
Held: NO. the Court deem it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the the stipulation of facts, primarily consisted of the testimonies of the bus
searching inquiry in this instance. Remanding the case for re-arraignment conductor, Elmer Andales, and of the accused-turned-state-witness, Asali.
is not warranted, as the accused plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the Andales positively identified accused Baharan and Trinidad as the two men
condemnatory judgment under consideration. who had acted suspiciously while inside the bus; who had insisted on
As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that "all getting off the bus in violation of a Makati ordinance; and who had
trial judges … must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea scampered away from the bus moments before the bomb exploded. On the
of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty other hand, Asali testified that he had given accused Baharan and Trinidad
bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads the TNT used in the bombing incident in Makati City. The guilt of the
guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an accused Baharan and Trinidad was sufficiently established by these
inevitable conviction." Thus, trial court judges are required to observe the corroborating testimonies, coupled with their respective judicial admissions
following procedure under Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court: (pretrial stipulations) and extrajudicial confessions (exclusive television
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When interviews, as they both stipulated during pretrial) that they were indeed the
the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a perpetrators of the Valentine’s Day bombing. Accordingly, the Court
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the upholds the findings of guilt made by the trial court as affirmed by the Court
consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his of Appeals.
guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present Anent accused Rohmat, the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the
evidence in his behalf. (Emphasis supplied) testimony of accused-turned-state-witness Asali.
The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to
of re-arraignment. In People v. Galvez, the Court noted that since accused- Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It is true that under the rule,
appellant's original plea was "not guilty," the trial court should have exerted statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible
careful effort in inquiring into why he changed his plea to "guilty." According only when made during the existence of the conspiracy. However, as the
to the Court: Court ruled in People v. Buntag, if the declarant repeats the statement in
The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt, court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission, making
especially in a case involving the death penalty, is imposed upon the trial the testimony admissible as to both conspirators. Thus, in People v. Palijon,
judge in order to leave no room for doubt on the possibility that the accused the Court held the following
might have misunderstood the nature of the charge and the consequences We must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions.
of the plea. An extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence against the
confessant but not against his co-accused as they are deprived of the

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opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial confession is admissible 2476-D, among others, was adjudicated to Ricardo Gevero who was then
against the declarant’s co-accused since the latter are afforded opportunity alive at the time of extra-judicial settlement and partition in 1966.
to cross-examine the former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony at trial Private respondent Del Monte Development Corp. (DELCOR) filed an
where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine action with the CFI (now RTC) of Misamis Oriental to quiet title and/or
the declarant. Mercene’s admission implicating his co-accused was given annul the partition made by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar as
on the witness stand. It is admissible in evidence against appellant Palijon. the same prejudices the land which it acquired a portion of lot 2476. It
Moreover, where several accused are tried together for the same offense, proved that before purchasing Lot 2476-A it first investigated and checked
the testimony of a co-accused implicating his co-accused is competent the title of Luis Lancero and found the same to be intact in the office of the
evidence against the latter. Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City. The same with the subdivision
Case Digest: Sapugay, BK plan (Exh. "B"), the corresponding technical description (Exh. "P") and the
Deed of Sale executed by Ricardo Gevero — all of which were found to be
6g) Admissions and confessions – Admission by privies unquestionable. By reason of all these, Del Monte Corp claims to have
bought the land in good faith and for value, occupying the land since the
Gevero vs. IAC and Del Monte Development Corp. sale and taking over from Lancero's possession until May 1969, when the
defendants Abadas forcibly entered the property.
G.R. No. 77029 | August 30, 1990

Ratio: It is however stressed that the admission of the former owner of a The trial court rendered judgment declaring the corporation as the true and
property must have been made while he was the owner thereof in order absolute owner of that portion of Lot No. 2476 of the Cagayan Cadastre,
that such admission may be binding upon the present owner. particularly Lot No. 2476-D. From said decision, defendant heirs of Ricardo
Gevero (petitioners) appealed to the IAC (now Court of Appeals) which
Facts: The parcel of land under litigation is Lot No. 2476 of the Subdivision subsequently affirmed the decision appealed from. Petitioners filed a
Plan Psd-37365 containing an area of 20,119 square meters and situated motion for reconsideration but was denied.
at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. Said lot was acquired by purchase from the
late Luis Lancero on September 15, 1964 as per Deed of Absolute Sale
executed in favor of plaintiff and by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 4320 was issued to plaintiff (DELCOR for brevity). Luis Lancero, Issue: Whether or not admission of the former owner of a property must
in turn acquired the same parcel from Ricardo Gevero on February 5, 1952 have been made while he was the owner thereof binding upon the present
per deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero which was duly annotated as owner.
entry No. 1128 at the back of Original Certificate of Title No. 7610 covering
the mother lot identified as Lot No. 2476 in the names of Teodorica
Babangha — 1/2 share and her children: Maria; Restituto, Elena, Ricardo,
Held: YES. Petitioners maintain that the deed of sale is entirely invalid: (1)
Eustaquio and Ursula, all surnamed surnamed Gevero, 1/2 undivided
the signature of Ricardo was forged without his knowledge of such fact; 2)
share of the whole area containing 48,122 square meters.
Lancero had recognized the fatal defect of the 1952 deed of sale when he
signed the document in 1968 entitled "Settlement to Avoid the Litigation";
Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II and was survived by 3) Ricardo's children remained in the property notwithstanding the sale to
her six children aforementioned. The heirs of Teodorica Babangha on Lancero; 4) the designated Lot No. is 2470 instead of the correct number
October 17,1966 executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement and Partition of being Lot No. 2476; 5) the deed of sale included the share of Eustaquio
the estate of Teodorica Babangha, consisting of two lots, among them was Gevero without his authority; 6) T.C.T. No. 1183 of Lancero segregated the
lot 2476. By virtue of the extra-judicial settlement and partition executed by area of 20,119 square meters from the bigger area (OCT No. 7616) without
the said heirs of Teodorica Babangha, Lot 2476-A to Lot 2476-I under the consent of the other co-owners; 7) Lancero caused the 1952
subdivision plan duly approved by the Land Registration Commission, Lot Subdivision survey without the consent of the Geveros' to bring about the
segregation of the 20,119 square meters lot from the mother lot 2476 which

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Evidence Case Digests UST Block 3A

brought about the issuance of his title T-1183 and to DELCOR's title T4320, raised for the first time on appeal as it would be offensive to the basic
both of which were illegally issued; and 8) the area sold as per document rules of fair play, justice and due process.
is 20,649 square meters whereas the segregated area covered by TCT No.
T-1183 of Lancero turned out to be 20,119 square meters. Petitioners aver that the 1/2 share of interest of Teodorica (mother of
Ricardo) in Lot 2476 under OCT No. 7610 was not included in the deed of
As to petitioners' claim that the signature of Ricardo in the 1952 deed of sale as it was intended to limit solely to Ricardos' proportionate share out
sale in favor of Lancero was forged without Ricardo's knowledge of such of the undivided 1/2 of the area pertaining to the six (6) brothers and sisters
fact will be observed that the deed of sale in question was executed with listed in the Title and that the Deed did not include the share of Ricardo, as
all the legal formalities of a public document. The 1952 deed was duly inheritance from Teodorica, because the Deed did not recite that she was
acknowledged by both parties before the notary public, yet petitioners did deceased at the time it was executed. The hereditary share in a
not bother to rebut the legal presumption of the regularity of the notarized decedents' estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the
document. In fact it has long been settled that a public document moment of the death of the "causante" or predecessor in interest (Civil
executed and attested through the intervention of the notary public is Code of the Philippines, Art. 777), and there is no legal bar to a
evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. successor disposing of his hereditary share immediately after such
It has the presumption of regularity and to contradict all these, evidence death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until
must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. Forgery the subsequent liquidation of the estate.
cannot be presumed, it must be proven. Likewise, petitioners allegation of
absence of consideration of the deed was not substantiated. Under Art. Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II, hence, the rights to the
1354 of the Civil Code, consideration is presumed unless the contrary succession were transmitted from the moment of her death. It is therefore
is proven. incorrect to state that it was only in 1966, the date of extrajudicial partition,
when Ricardo received his share in the lot as inheritance from his mother
As to petitioners' contention that Lancero had recognized the fatal defect of Teodorica. Thus, when Ricardo sold his share over lot 2476 that share
the 1952 deed when he signed the document in 1968 entitled "Settlement which he inherited from Teodorica was also included unless
to Avoid Litigation", it is a basic rule of evidence that the right of a party expressly excluded in the deed of sale. Petitioners contend that
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Ricardo's share from Teodorica was excluded in the sale considering that
This particular rule is embodied in the maxim "res inter alios acta alteri a paragraph of the aforementioned deed refers merely to the shares of
nocere non debet." Under Section 31, Rule 130, Rules of Court "where one Ricardo and Eustaquio.
derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of
the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property is evidence An instrument notarized by a notary public as in the case at bar is a public
against the former." It is however stressed that the admission of the instrument. The execution of a public instrument is equivalent to the
former owner of a property must have been made while he was the delivery of the thing and is deemed legal delivery. Hence, its execution was
owner thereof in order that such admission may be binding upon the considered a sufficient delivery of the property. Besides, the property sold
present owner. Hence, Lanceros' declaration or acts of executing the 1968 is a registered land. It is the act of registration that transfers the ownership
document have no binding effect on DELCOR, the ownership of the land of the land sold. If the property is a registered land, the purchaser in good,
having passed to DELCOR in 1964. faith has a right to rely on the certificate of title and is under no duty to go
behind it to look for flaws. Under the established principles of land
Petitioners' claim that they remained in the property, notwithstanding the registration law, the person dealing with registered land may generally rely
alleged sale by Ricardo to Lancero involves a question of fact already on the correctness of its certificate of title and the law will in no way oblige
raised and passed upon by both the trial and appellate courts. As a finding him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property.
of fact, it is binding upon this Court. Suffice it to say that the other flaws This notwithstanding, DELCOR did more than that. It did not only rely on
claimed by the petitioners which allegedly invalidated the 1952 deed of sale the certificate of title. The Court of Appeals found that it had first
have not been raised before the trial court nor before the appellate court. It investigated and checked the title in the name of Luis Lancero. It likewise
is settled jurisprudence that an issue which was neither averred in the inquired into the Subdivision Plan, the corresponding technical description
complaint nor raised during the trial in the court below cannot be and the deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero in favor of Luis Lancero

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and found everything in order. It even went to the premises and found Luis the Committee on Justice for joint investigation. Representatives Heherson
Lancero to be in possession of the land to the exclusion of any other Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to
person. DELCOR had therefore acted in good faith in purchasing the land impeach the petitioner.
in question. Consequently, DELCOR's action is not barred by laches.
Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement in behalf of the
The petition is dismissed and the decision of the CA is affirmed. Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila, asking petitioner to step
down from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern. The
Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines joined the cry for the
resignation of the petitioner. Four days later, former President Corazon C.
Aquino also demanded that the petitioner take the "supreme self-sacrifice"
Case Digest: Ramos, T.A.D.
of resignation. Former President Fidel Ramos also joined the chorus. On
October 12, respondent Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the Department of
6h) Admissions and confessions – admission by silence
Social Welfare and Services and later asked for petitioner's resignation.
However, petitioner strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign.
Estrada vs. Desierto

G.R. No. 146710-15 | March 2, 2001 Four senior economic advisers, members of the Council of Senior
Economic Advisers, resigned. Secretary Mar Roxas II also resigned from
Ratio: The Supreme Court used the totality test to arrive at the conclusion the Department of Trade and Industry. The month of November ended with
that the former President has resigned, and the reference by the Court to a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November 13, House Speaker Villar
certain newspapers reporting the events as they happened does not make transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives, or
them inadmissible evidence for being hearsay as the merely buttressed more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the
known facts to the court. The Court used the Angara Diary to decipher the Senate. This caused political convulsions in both houses of Congress.
intent to resign on the part of the former president— it is not unusual for Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President.
courts to distill a person’s subjective intent from the evidence before them. Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative Fuentebella. On November
While pressure was exerted for the former president to resign, it is difficult 20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner.
to believe that the pressure completely vitiated the voluntariness of his Twenty-one senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief
resignation. An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction as an admission of Justice Davide,Jr., presiding.
something stated or implied by the other person.—It is, however, argued
that the Angara Diary is not the diary of the petitioner, hence, nonbinding
The day to day trial was covered by live TV and during its course enjoyed
on him. The argument overlooks the doctrine of adoptive admission.
the highest viewing rating. The dramatic point of the December hearings
was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of
Equitable-PCI Bank. She testified that she was one foot away from
Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature "Jose Velarde" on
was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was documents involving a P500 million investment agreement with their
elected Vice- President. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a bank on February 4, 2000. After the testimony of Ocampo, the
longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas. When it
family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The resumed on January 2, 2001, more bombshells were exploded by the
next day, October 5, 2000, Senator Guingona, Jr., then the Senate Minority prosecution. On January 11, Atty. Espiritu who served as petitioner's
Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled "I Secretary of Finance took the witness stand. He alleged that the
Accuse." He accused the petitioner of receiving some ₱220M in jueteng petitioner jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante
money from Governor Singson from November 1998 to August 2000. He Tan who was facing charges of insider trading. Then came the fateful
also charged that the petitioner took from Governor Singson ₱70M on day of January 16, when by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled
excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained
referred by the Senate President Drilon to the Blue Ribbon Committee and evidence showing that petitioner held ₱3.3B in a secret bank account under

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the name "Jose Velarde." The public and private prosecutors walked out in At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-
protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the
President. The ruling made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our
outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. By midnight, country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and
thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to
were delivered against the petitioner and the eleven (11) senators. The be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in
public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering their our civil society. It is for this reason that I now leave
collective resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this
Appearance with the impeachment tribunal. Senator Roco quickly moved country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
for the indefinite postponement of the impeachment proceedings until the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people
House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue of resignation of with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our
the public prosecutors. people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come
ahead in the same service of our country. I call on all my
A 10-kilometer line of people holding lighted candles formed a human chain supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a
from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. May the
EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's Almighty bless our country and beloved people. MABUHAY!
resignation. Students and teachers walked out of their classes in Metro
Manila to show their concordance. On January 19, petitioner Estrada
informed Executive Secretary Angara that General Reyes, Chief of Staff of On the same day, he signed the following letter:
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner
agreed to the holding of a snap election for President where he would not
be a candidate. However, it did not diffuse the growing crisis. In the By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the
presence of former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and hundreds of Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I
thousands of cheering demonstrators, General Reyes declared that "on am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By
behalf of your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be
Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support to this the Acting President.
government." The PNP Chief, Director General Lacson and the major
service commanders gave a similar stunning announcement. Some
Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and bureau On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo
chiefs quickly resigned from their posts. Rallies for the resignation of the immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. On the
petitioner exploded in various parts of the country. To stem the tide of rage, same day, the Court issued a Resolution in Administrative Matter.
petitioner announced he was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as
of the highly controversial second envelope. January 20 turned to be the ambassadors and special envoys. She was even recognized by foreign
day of surrender and the first round of negotiations for the peaceful and governments and the US President George Bush gave her a telephone call
orderly transfer of power started. The negotiations consumed all morning conveying recognition of her government. Belmonte was elected as the
until the news broke out that CJ Davide would administer the oath to new speaker of HOR and the House passed a Resolution expressing their
respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine. At about 12:00 noon full support to respondent Arroyo. She then nominated Senator Guingona
Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as Jr as her VP. the Senate adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the
President of the Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly nomination of Senator Guingona, Jr. Senators Miriam Defensor- Santiago,
left Malacañang Palace. Juan Ponce Enrile, and John Osmeña voted "yes" with reservations, citing
as reason the pending challenge on the legitimacy of respondent Arroyo's
He issued the following press statement: presidency before the Supreme Court. Guingona Jr took his oath 2 days
later.

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On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the Capulong, et al., dated February 20, 2001. The second and third parts of
impeachment court is functus officio and has been terminated. the Diary were earlier also attached as Annexes 12 and 13 of the Comment
Subsequently, petitioner’s legal problems appeared and several cases of private respondents Capulong, et al., dated February 12, 2001. In fact,
which were previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman petitioner even cited in his Second Supplemental Reply Memorandum both
were set in motion (six yung case pero puro siya about bribery graft and the second part of the diary, published on February 5, 2001, and the third
corruption). A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the part, published on February 6, 2001. It was also extensively used by
respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the petitioner. Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez in his oral arguments. Thus,
The petitioner sought to enjoin the Ombudsman from conducting any petitioner had all the opportunity to contest the use of the Diary but
further proceedings and filed a quo warranto praying for the judgment unfortunately failed to do so. Even assuming arguendo that the
"confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Angara Diary was an out of court statement, still its use is not covered
Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his by the hearsay rule. Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force
office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath and to be holding depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some
the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it. There
provisions of the Constitution." are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross
examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence, and (3) absence of the
oath. Not all hearsay evidence, however, is inadmissible as evidence. Over
the years, a huge body of hearsay evidence has been admitted by courts
due to their relevance, trustworthiness and necessity.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s silence can be taken as an admission by
him.
It is, however, argued that the Angara Diary is not the diary of the petitioner,
hence, non-binding on him. The argument overlooks the doctrine of
Held: YES. Petitioner insists he is the victim of prejudicial publicity. Among adoptive admission. An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a
others, he assails the Decision for adverting to newspaper accounts of the statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat
events and occurrences to reach the conclusion that he has resigned. In the party’s reaction as an admission of something stated or implied
our Decision, we used the totality test to arrive at the conclusion that by the other person. Jones explains that the “basis for admissibility of
petitioner has resigned. We referred to and analyzed events that were admissions made vicariously is that arising from the ratification or adoption
prior, contemporaneous and posterior to the oath-taking of respondent by the party of the statements which the other person had made.” To use
Arroyo as president. All these events are facts which are well-established the blunt language of Mueller and Kirkpatrick, “this process of attribution is
and cannot be refuted. Thus, we adverted to prior events that built up the not mumbo jumbo but common sense.” In the Angara Diary, the options of
irresistable pressure for the petitioner to resign, x x x All these prior events the petitioner started to dwindle when the armed forces withdrew its support
are facts which are within judicial notice by this Court. There was no need from him as President and commander-in-chief. Thus, Executive Secretary
to cite their news accounts. The reference by the Court to certain Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel to advise petitioner to
newspapers reporting them as they happened does not make them consider the option of “dignified exit or resignation.” Petitioner did not
inadmissible evidence for being hearsay. The news account only object to the suggested option but simply said he could never leave
buttressed these facts as facts. For all his loud protestations, petitioner has the country. Petitioner’s silence on this and other related suggestions
not singled out any of these facts as false. can be taken as an admission by him.

To begin with, the Angara Diary is not an out of court statement. The Again, petitioner errs in his contention. The res inter alios acta rule has
Angara Diary is part of the pleadings in the cases at bar. Petitioner several exceptions. One of them is provided in section 29 of Rule 130 with
cannot complain he was not furnished a copy of the Angara Diary. Nor can respect to admissions by a co-partner or agent. Executive Secretary
he feign surprise on its use. To be sure, the said Diary was frequently Angara as such was an alter ego of the petitioner. He was the Little
referred to by the parties in their pleadings. The three parts of the Diary President. Indeed, he was authorized by the petitioner to act for him in the
published in the PDI from February 4-6, 2001 were attached as Annexes critical hours and days before he abandoned Malacañang Palace. Thus,
A-C, respectively, of the Memorandum of private respondents Romeo T. according to the Angara Diary, the petitioner told Secretary Angara: “Mula

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umpisa pa lang ng kampanya, Ed, ikaw na lang pinakikinggan ko. At Estrada vs. Desierto
hanggang sa huli, ikaw pa rin.” (Since the start of the campaign, Ed, you G.R. No. 146710-15 | April 3, 2001
have been the only one I’ve listened to. And now at the end, you still are.)” Facts: For resolution are petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in G.R.
This statement of full trust was made by the petitioner after Secretary Nos. 146710-15 and Omnibus Motion in G.R. No. 146738 of the Court's
Angara briefed him about the progress of the first negotiation. True to this Decision of March 2, 2001.
trust, the petitioner had to ask Secretary Angara if he would already leave
Malacañang after taking their final lunch on January 20, 2001 at about 1:00 Same facts. Same ruling.
p.m. The Angara Diary quotes the petitioner as saying to Secretary Angara:
Issues:
“Ed, kailangan ko na bang umalis? (Do I have to leave now?)” Secretary 1. Whether or not the Angara Diary is inadmissible for being violative of
Angara told him to go and he did. Petitioner cannot deny that Secretary the following rules on evidence: hearsay, best evidence,
Angara headed his team of negotiators that met with the team of the authentication, admissions and res inter alios acta.
respondent Arroyo to discuss the peaceful and orderly transfer of power
2. Whether or not reliance on newspaper accounts is violative of the
after his relinquishment of the powers of the presidency. The Diary shows
hearsay rule.
that petitioner was always briefed by Secretary Angara on the
progress of their negotiations. Secretary Angara acted for and in
behalf of the petitioner in the crucial days before respondent Arroyo
took her oath as President. Consequently, petitioner is bound by the Held:
acts and declarations of Secretary Angara. Under our rules of 1. NO. To begin with, the Angara Diary is not an out of court
evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on statement. The Angara Diary is part of the pleadings in the cases
the principal (petitioner). Jones very well explains the reasons for the at bar. Petitioner cannot complain he was not furnished a copy of
rule, viz.: “What is done, by agent, is done by the principal through him, as the Angara Diary. Nor can he feign surprise on its use. To be sure,
through a mere instrument. So, whatever is said by an agent, either in the said Diary was frequently referred to by the parties in their
making a contract for his principal, or at the time and accompanying the pleadings. The Angara Diary is not prohibited by the hearsay rule.
performance of any act within the scope of his authority, having relation to, Petitioner may disagree with some of the inferences arrived at by
and connected with, and in the course of the particular contract or the Court from the facts narrated in the Diary but that does not
transaction in which he is then engaged, or in the language of the old make the Diary inadmissible as evidence. Same as the previous
writers, dum fervet opus is, in legal effect, said by his principal and digest.
admissible in evidence against such principal.”

Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently 2. NO. Clearly, the newspaper reproduction is not the best evidence
relevant statements. These are statements which are relevant of the Angara diary. It is secondary evidence, of dubious authenticity. It was
independently of whether they are true or not. They belong to two (2) however used by this Honorable Court without proof of the unavailability of
classes: (1) those statements which are the very facts in issue, and (2) the original or duplicate original of the diary. The "Best Evidence Rules"
those statements which are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue. should have been applied since the contents of the diary are the subject of
The second class includes the following: a. Statement of a person showing inquiry. The rule is that, except in four (4) specific instances, "when the
his state of mind, that is, his mental condition, knowledge, belief, intention, subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
ill will and other emotions; b. Statements of a person which show his admissible other than the original document itself."
physical condition, as illness and the like; c. Statements of a person from
which an inference may be made as to the state of mind of another, that is, It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only a copy
the knowledge, belief, motive, good or bad faith, etc. of the latter; d. of the Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer
Statements which may identity the date, place and person in question; and on February 4- 6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did not, however,
e. Statements showing the lack of credibility of a witness. violate the best evidence rule.
Case Digest: Ramos, T.A.D.

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The petitioner had an opportunity to object to the admissibility of

the Angara Diary when he filed his Memorandum dated February Few days after, Romeo called and informed the group that the victim was
20, 2001, Reply Memorandum dated February 22, 2001, at the construction site. The group commuted to the site. Roger Seraspe,
Supplemental Memorandum dated February 23, 2001, and personal driver of the victim, drove a blue Pajero carrying Engr. Ruth
Second Supplemental Memorandum dated February 24, 2001. Roldan and the victim to visit the project site. After the site inspection, the
He was therefore not denied due process. In the words of three engineers walked towards the direction of the Pajero. Seraspo saw
Wigmore, petitioner had "been given an opportunity to the three engineers stood together and suddenly laid prostrate on the
inspect" the Angara Diary but did not object to its ground. Seraspe and Chavez saw an unidentified man standing near the
admissibility. It is already too late in the day to raise his three engineers. Three more armed men surrounded the Pajero, two of
objections in an Omnibus Motion, after the Angara Diary has been whom approached Seraspe and Chavez. Muit poked a gun and ordered
used as evidence and a decision rendered partly on the basis the two to lay prostrate on the ground.
thereof.
Case Digest: Ramos, T.A.D.
Deputy Chief of Police, Supt. Mission received a radio message that a
6i) Admissions and confessions – Confession kidnapping was ongoing. A barricade was immediately put up. While two
policemen approached the Pajero, the driver and front passenger opened
People v. Muit, et al. their car doors and started firing at the policemen. All the occupants of the
Pajero died except the driver and the front passenger (Muit) who managed
G.R. No. 181043 | October 8, 2008 to escape whom they apprehended.

Ratio: Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence states that Pancho, Jr. proceeded to their agreed meeting place but did not find
circumstantial evidence is sufficient if: (a) there is more than one Hermano’s group there. When Pancho, Jr. returned to Ferraer's house, he
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are told Ferraer what happened to their operation. The next day, Ferraer saw
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to Pancho, Sr. and Pancho, Jr. watching the TV. That night, Ferraer saw on
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. the news program TV Patrol a footage showing the cadavers of Udon,
Morales, Manuel, Bokbok and the victim. Ferraer also saw Muit in
Facts: In 1997, Orestes Julaton, a relative of Joseph Ferraer, arrived at the
handcuffs.
latter’s house in Nasugbu, Batangas with Sergio Pancho, Sr., Sergio
Pancho, Jr., Rolando Dequillo and four other men. Julaton introduced them
to Ferraer and told the latter that Pancho, Sr. is also their relative. Pancho, Prosecution presented several witnesses including Ferraer as the state
Sr. told Ferraer that they wanted to use his house as a safehouse for their witness and Atty. Narzal Mallare, the lawyer who assisted appellants
“visitor.” At first, Ferraer was hesitant because he thought it was risky for Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo in executing their respective sworn statements as
him and his family. However, Hermano assured him to not worry because witnesses. Their accounts were corroborated by the prosecution’s
they are not killers. Hermano told him that their line of work is kidnap for documentary evidence such as the extra judicial confessions of Pancho,
ransom. He was also told that the money they will get would be shared Jr. and Dequillo, which were executed with the assistance of Atty. Mallare.
equally among them. Further, Ferraer and Pancho, Sr. would guard their Muit executed two extra judicial confessions: one assisted by Atty. Vergara,
victim. and the second statement in which he was assisted by Atty. De Jesus and
witnessed by his uncle and his brother.
Five other men came and they were introduced to Ferraer including Millano
Muit. Morales handed to Ferraer a big paper bag and a green backpack Dequillo stated that he was question about the guns used at the CIDG
containing guns. Few days after, Ferraer saw Pancho, Jr., and Hermano Detention Center. He was allegedly tortured when he denied any
with a companion, Romeo. The next day, they said to Ferraer that they knowledge about the kidnapping and was forced to sign a statement
would proceed with their plan. Romeo would be the informant since he is without being allowed to read it. Atty. Mallare only came in after he had
an insider and a trusted general foreman of the victim. already signed the statement. Pancho, Jr. claimed that he was arrested and
transferred to Camp Crame. He alleged that the police tortured him and

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forced him to sign the written confession of his participation in the crimes. after he talked with them alone and informed them of their constitutional
Muit claimed that he was near the place of shootout and just attended a rights. On the other hand, Muit was assisted by counsels in each instance
gathering of the Rizalistas and was waiting for his uncle Bonifacio when the when he executed his two extra judicial confessions; his second statement
police arrested him. was even witnessed by his uncle, Bonifacio, and his brother, Dominador.
Muit cannot just conveniently disclaim any knowledge of the contents of his
RTC found Muit, Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Romeo guilty. It held that mere extra judicial confession. Further, he was also positively identified by
denials and alibis of appellants cannot prevail over the positive declarations Seraspe and Chavez as the one who pointed a gun at them during the
of the prosecution's witnesses. RTC did not give credence to the claims of kidnapping and ordered them to lay prostrate on the ground.
appellants that their extra judicial confessions were procured through
torture as these were belied by the testimony of Atty. Mallare and Appellants' claims of torture are not supported by medical certificates from
appellants' medical certificates which were issued during their incarceration the physical examinations done on them. These claims of torture were
and after the execution of their statements. mere afterthoughts as they were raised for the first time during trial;
appellants did not even inform their family members who visited them while
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. It held that RTC was correct in they were imprisoned about the alleged tortures. Dequillo also had the
convicting appellants for kidnapping and carnapping. Appellants executed opportunity to complain of the alleged torture done to him to the Department
extra judicial confessions, duly assisted by their counsels, detailing their of Justice when he was brought there. also had the opportunity to complain
participation in the kidnapping. As for Muit, other than his extra judicial of the alleged torture done to him to the Department of Justice when he
confession, he was also positively identified during the kidnapping by was brought there.
eyewitnesses Seraspe and Chavez. The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit also
strengthened the prosecution's case against Romeo. The rule that an extra
judicial confession is evidence only against the person making it recognizes
various exceptions. One such exception is where several extra judicial
Issue: Whether or not RTC erred in giving credence to the extra-judicial
statements had been made by several persons charged with an offense
confessions of Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo, and to the sworn statement and
and there could have been no collusion with reference to said several
testimony of Ferraer in convicting them
confessions, the fact that the statements are in all material respects
Held: NO. Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence states that identical is confirmatory of the confession of the co-defendants and is
circumstantial evidence is sufficient if: (a) there is more than one admissible against other persons implicated therein.
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to They are also admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. implicated therein to show the probability of the latter's actual participation
in the commission of the crime and may likewise serve as corroborative
The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit evidence if it is clear from other facts and circumstances that other persons
strengthened the case against them. There is nothing on record to support had participated in the perpetration of the crime charged and proved. These
appellants’ claim that they were coerced and tortured into executing their are known as “interlocking confessions.”
extra judicial confessions. One of the indicia of voluntariness in the
execution of appellants' extra judicial statements is that each contains RTC, in convicting Romeo, relied not only on the aforesaid extra judicial
many details and facts which the investigating officers could not have statements but also on Ferraer's testimony that Romeo was introduced to
known and could not have supplied, without the knowledge and information him in his house as the informant when they were planning the kidnapping.
given by appellants. However, pursuant to R.A. No. 9346 which prohibits the penalty, the
penalties imposed are commuted to reclusion perpetua with all its
Moreover, the appellants were assisted by their lawyers when they accessory penalties and without eligibility for parole
executed their statements. Atty. Mallare testified that Pancho, Jr. and Case Digest: De Peralta, D.K.
Dequillo executed their statements voluntarily and affixed their signatures

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People v. Satorre Bonifacio Ayag, NBI Ballistician, testified that the deformed bullet taken
from Pantilgan's head wound was fired from the gun surrendered by
G.R. No. 133858 | August 12, 2003 appellant's brothers to the Carcar Police.
Ratio: An extrajudicial confession forms but a prima facie case against the
party by whom it is made. Such confessions are not conclusive proof of that Appellant claimed that he was asleep inside his house at the time of the
which they state. An extrajudicial confession will not support a conviction incident and alleged that Rufino had a grudge against him. He denied
where it is uncorroborated. There must be such corroboration that, when having confessed to the killing of Pantilgan and disclaimed ownership over
considered in connection with confession, will show the guilt of accused the revolver. Abraham Satorre corroborated appellant's testimony. He
beyond a reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient denied having accompanied appellant to Castañares' house to surrender
corroboration of a confession. him. Rosalio Satorre, claimed that he never accompanied appellant to
Castañares' house to surrender. Felis said that he never surrendered any
Facts: Appellant Herminiano Satorre alias Emiano Satorre was charged firearm to anybody.
with Murder in an Information. The Information stated that Herminiano
Satorre “with intent to kill, with the use of .38 paltik revolver and by means Court a quo gave credence to the prosecution's evidence and rendered a
of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, decision convicting appellant of Murder.
unlawfully and feloniously attack and shoot Romero Pantilgan, hitting the
latter at the head which caused his instantaneous death.” Issue: Whether or not the alleged confession or admission of appellant is
inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay and for being obtained without
Gliceria Saraum, wife of Pantilgan, testified that she and her two children a competent and independent counsel of his choice
were asleep inside the house of her parents in Cebu. Her husband,
Held: YES. The bare allegation that he confessed or admitted killing
Romero, went out to attend a fiesta. While she was asleep, she was
Romero Pantilgan is not proof of guilt. Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of
awakened by a gunshot. She found, in their porch, her dead husband lying
on the ground. Court defines an admission as an “act, declaration or omission of a party
as to a relevant fact.” A confession, on the other hand, under Section 33 of
the same Rule is the “declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of
Rufino Abayata, a barangay kagawad, testified that his fellow barangay the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein.” Both
kagawad, Pio Alvarado, fetched him from his house. They went to verify a may be given in evidence against the person admitting or confessing. On
report regarding a dead person on the porch of the Saraum residence. the whole, a confession, as distinguished from an admission, is a
Upon confirming the incident, they reported the matter to the Carcar Police. declaration made at any time by a person, voluntarily and without
Rufino narrated that appellant’s father, Abraham Satorre, informed them compulsion or inducement, stating or acknowledging that he had
that it was appellant who shot Pantilgan. committed or participated in the commission of a crime.

They looked for appellant but the latter already left. Appellant’s brothers Appellant's alleged declaration owning up to the killing before the Barangay
went to Rufino's house and surrendered the gun which was allegedly used Captain was a confession. Since the declaration was not put in writing and
in killing Pantilgan. Flavio Gelle narrated that he accompanied appellant made out of court, it is an oral extrajudicial confession. There is no question
and his father to the Barangay Captain of Can-asohan, Carcar, Cebu where as to the admissibility of appellant's alleged oral extrajudicial confession.
appellant admitted killing Pantilgan. Cynthia Castañares, Barangay Indeed, as far as admissibility is concerned, Rule 130, Section 33 of the
Captain, testified that Abraham Satorre and Gelle brought appellant to her Rules of Court makes no distinction whether the confession is judicial or
residence where he confessed having killed Pantilgan. Appellant allegedly extrajudicial.
informed her that he killed Pantilgan because the latter struck him with a
piece of wood. That same evening, she went to the Carcar Police Station
with appellant where she executed an affidavit. She claimed that appellant The rationale for the admissibility of a confession is that if it is made freely
and voluntarily, a confession constitutes evidence of a high order since it is
voluntarily narrated that he killed Pantilgan with the use of a handgun which
supported by the strong presumption that no sane person or one of normal
he wrestled from his possession.
mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator

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of a crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience. The basic test for the weight to the confession and helps convince the court that it was freely and
validity of a confession is — was it voluntarily and freely made. The term voluntarily made. If possible, the confession, after being reduced to writing,
"voluntary" means that the accused speaks of his free will and accord, should be read to the defendant, have it read by defendant, have him sign
without inducement of any kind, and with a full and complete knowledge of it, and have it attested by witnesses.
the nature and consequences of the confession, and when the speaking is
so free from influences affecting the will of the accused, at the time the Further, in this case, there was no circumstantial evidence to corroborate
confession was made, that it renders it admissible in evidence against him. the extrajudicial confession of appellant. More importantly, the said
confession does not contain details which could have only been known to
The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such appellant. The events alleged in the confession are inconsistent with the
that if, upon its face, the confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances physical evidence. An extrajudicial confession will not support a conviction
tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details — which where it is uncorroborated. There must be such corroboration that, when
could only be supplied by the accused — reflecting spontaneity and considered in connection with confession, will show the guilt of accused
coherence, it may be considered voluntary. beyond a reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient
corroboration of a confession. The prosecution was not able to conclusively
The problem with appraising voluntariness occurs when the confession is establish the ownership of the gun other than the bare testimony of
an oral extrajudicial confession because the proof of voluntariness cannot prosecution witnesses that appellant's brothers surrendered the gun to
be inferred from the testimony of a witness who allegedly heard the them. Thus, the Court reversed and set aside RTC’s decision.
confessant since there is no written proof that such confession was Case Digest: De Peralta, D.K.
voluntarily made. The problem posed therefore by an oral extrajudicial
confession is not only the admissibility of the testimony asserting or 6j) Admission and confessions – Similar acts as evidence
certifying that such confession was indeed made, but more significantly
whether it was made voluntarily. Boston Bank of the Philippines (formerly Bank of Commerce) v.
Perla Manalo and Carlos Manalo
The intelligence of the accused or want of it must also be taken into G.R. No. 15814 | February 9, 2006
account. It must be shown that the defendant realized the import of his act.
Here, appellant was a 19-year-old farmer who did not even finish first Tickler: similar acts of evidence, xavierville estate, usage
grade. Granting that he made the confession in the presence of Barangay Ratio: Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be proved like any
Captain Castañares, he may not have realized the full import of his other facts. Courts must contend with the caveat that, before they admit
confession and its consequences. Due to the aforesaid personal evidence of usage, of habit or pattern of conduct, the offering party must
circumstances of appellant, the voluntariness of his alleged oral confession establish the degree of specificity and frequency of uniform response that
may not be definitively appraised and evaluated. ensures more than a mere tendency to act in a given manner but rather,
conduct that is semi-automatic in nature. The offering party must allege and
An extrajudicial confession forms but a prima facie case against the party prove specific, repetitive conduct that might constitute evidence of habit.
by whom it is made. Such confessions are not conclusive proof of that Facts: The Xavierville Estate, Inc. (XEI) was the owner of parcels of land
which they state. They are, at best, to be regarded as only cumulative proof in Quezon City, known as the Xavierville Estate Subdivision, with an area
which affords but a precarious support and on which, when uncorroborated, of 42 hectares. XEI caused the subdivision of the property into residential
a verdict cannot be permitted to rest. lots, which was then offered for sale to individual lot buyers.

A confession is not required to be in any particular form. It may be oral or On September 8, 1967, XEI, through its General Manager, Antonio Ramos,
written, formal or informal in character. It may be recorded on video tape, as vendor, and The Overseas Bank of Manila (OBM), as vendee, executed
sound motion pictures, or tape. However, while not required to be in writing a "Deed of Sale of Real Estate" over some residential lots in the
to be admissible in evidence, it is advisable, if not otherwise recorded by subdivision, including Lot 1, Block 2, with an area of 907.5 square meters,
video tape or other means, to reduce the confession to writing. This adds and Lot 2, Block 2, with an area of 832.80 square meters. The transaction

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was subject to the approval of the Board of Directors of OBM, and was and that the interests on the unpaid balance of the purchase price of
covered by real estate mortgages in favor of the Philippine National Bank ₱278,448.00 from September 1, 1972 to July 31, 1973 amounted to
as security for its account amounting to ₱5,187,000.00, and the Central ₱30,629.28. The spouses were informed that they were being billed for said
Bank of the Philippines as security for advances amounting to unpaid interests.
₱22,185,193.74.4 Nevertheless, XEI continued selling the residential lots
in the subdivision as agent of OBM. On January 25, 1974, the spouses Manalo received another statement of
account from XEI, inclusive of interests on the purchase price of the lots. In
Sometime in 1972, then XEI president Emerito Ramos, Jr. contracted the a letter dated April 6, 1974 to XEI, Manalo, Jr. stated they had not yet
services of Engr. Carlos Manalo, Jr. who was in business of drilling deep received the notice of resumption of Lei’s selling operations, and that there
water wells and installing pumps under the business name Hurricane had been no arrangement on the payment of interests; hence, they should
Commercial, Inc. For ₱34,887.66, Manalo, Jr. installed a water pump at not be charged with interest on the balance of the downpayment on the
Ramos’ residence at the corner of Aurora Boulevard and Katipunan property. Further, they demanded that a deed of conditional sale over the
Avenue, Quezon City. Manalo, Jr. then proposed to XEI, through Ramos, two lots be transmitted to them for their signatures. However, XEI ignored
to purchase a lot in the Xavierville subdivision, and offered as part of the the demands. Consequently, the spouses refused to pay the balance of the
downpayment the ₱34,887.66 Ramos owed him. XEI, through Ramos, downpayment of the purchase price.
agreed.
Sometime in June 1976, Manalo, Jr. constructed a business sign in the
In a letter dated August 22, 1972 to Perla Manalo, Ramos confirmed the sidewalk near his house. In a letter dated June 17, 1976, XEI informed
reservation of the lots. He also pegged the price of the lots at ₱200.00 per Manalo, Jr. that business signs were not allowed along the sidewalk.
square meter, or a total of ₱348,060.00, with a 20% down payment of the
purchase price amounting to ₱69,612.00 less the ₱34,887.66 owing from Subsequently, XEI turned over its selling operations to OBM, including the
Ramos, payable on or before December 31, 1972; the corresponding receivables for lots already contracted and those yet to be sold. On
Contract of Conditional Sale would then be signed on or before the same December 8, 1977, OBM warned Manalo, Jr., that "putting up of a business
date, but if the selling operations of XEI resumed after December 31, sign is specifically prohibited by their contract of conditional sale" and that
1972, the balance of the downpayment would fall due then, and the his failure to comply with its demand would impel it to avail of the remedies
spouses would sign the aforesaid contract within five (5) days from as provided in their contract of conditional sale.
receipt of the notice of resumption of such selling operations. It was
also stated in the letter that, in the meantime, the spouses may introduce
improvements thereon subject to the rules and regulations imposed by XEI Meanwhile, on December 5, 1979, the Register of Deeds issued Transfer
in the subdivision. Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-265822 over Lot 1, Block 2, and TCT No. T-
265823 over Lot 2, Block 2, in favor of the OBM.20 The lien in favor of the
Central Bank of the Philippines was annotated at the dorsal portion of said
The spouses Manalo were notified of the resumption of the selling title, which was later cancelled on August 4, 1980.
operations of XEI. However, they did not pay the balance of the
downpayment on the lots because Ramos failed to prepare a contract of
conditional sale and transmit the same to Manalo for their signature. On Subsequently, the Commercial Bank of Manila (CBM) acquired the
August 14, 1973, Perla Manalo went to the XEI office and requested that Xavierville Estate from OBM. CBM wrote Edilberto Ng, the president of
the payment of the amount representing the balance of the downpayment Xavierville Homeowners Association that, as of January 31, 1983, Manalo,
be deferred, which, however, XEI rejected. Jr. was one of the lot buyers in the subdivision.22 CBM reiterated in its
letter to Ng that, as of January 24, 1984, Manalo was a homeowner in the
subdivision.
On August 10, 1973, XEI furnished her with a statement of their account as
of July 31, 1973, showing that they had a balance of ₱34,724.34 on the
downpayment of the two lots after deducting the account of Ramos, plus In a letter dated August 5, 1986, the CBM requested Perla Manalo to stop
₱3,819.6810 interest thereon from September 1, 1972 to July 31, 1973, any on-going construction on the property since it (CBM) was the owner of
the lot and she had no permission for such construction. She agreed to

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have a conference meeting with CBM officers where she informed them The appellate court sustained the ruling of the RTC that the appellant and
that her husband had a contract with OBM, through XEI, to purchase the the appellees had executed a Contract to Sell over the two lots but declared
property. When asked to prove her claim, she promised to send the that the balance of the purchase price of the property amounting to
documents to CBM. However, she failed to do so. On September 5, 1986, ₱278,448.00 was payable in fixed amounts, inclusive of pre-computed
CBM reiterated its demand that it be furnished with the documents interests, from delivery of the possession of the property to the appellees
promised, but Perla Manalo did not respond. on a monthly basis for 120 months, based on the deeds of conditional sale
executed by XEI in favor of other lot buyers. The CA also declared that,
On July 27, 1987, CBM filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the while XEI must have resumed its selling operations before the end of 1972
spouses with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was and the downpayment on the property remained unpaid as of December
docketed as Civil Case No. 51618. CBM claimed that the spouses had 31, 1972, absent a written notice of cancellation of the contract to sell from
been unlawfully occupying the property without its consent and that despite the bank or notarial demand therefor as required by Republic Act No. 6552,
its demands, they refused to vacate the property. The latter alleged that the spouses had, at the very least, a 60-day grace period from January 1,
they, as vendors, and XEI, as vendee, had a contract of sale over the lots 1973 within which to pay the same.
which had not yet been rescinded. Issue: Whether or not the CA correctly held that the terms of the deeds of
conditional sale executed by XEI in favor of the other lot buyers in the
subdivision, which contained uniform terms of 120 equal monthly
In the meantime, the CBM was renamed the Boston Bank of the installments, constitute evidence that XEI also agreed to give the Manalo
Philippines. After CBM filed its complaint against the spouses Manalo, the spouses the same mode and timeline of payment.
latter filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against the
bank before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on October 31, Held: NO. We have reviewed the records and we find that, indeed, the
1989. ruling of the appellate court dismissing petitioner’s appeal is contrary to law
and is not supported by evidence. A careful examination of the factual
The plaintiffs alleged therein that they had always been ready, able and backdrop of the case, as well as the antecedental proceedings constrains
willing to pay the installments on the lots sold to them by the defendant’s us to hold that petitioner is not barred from asserting that XEI or OBM, on
remote predecessor-in-interest, as might be or stipulated in the contract of one hand, and the respondents, on the other, failed to forge a perfected
sale, but no contract was forthcoming; they constructed their house worth contract to sell the subject lots.
₱2,000,000.00 on the property in good faith; Manalo, Jr., informed the
defendant, through its counsel, on October 15, 1988 that he would abide (CIVIL LAW RELATED)
by the terms and conditions of his original agreement with the defendant’s We agree with petitioner’s contention that, for a perfected contract of sale
predecessor-in-interest; during the hearing of the ejectment case on or contract to sell to exist in law, there must be an agreement of the parties,
October 16, 1988, they offered to pay ₱313,172.34 representing the not only on the price of the property sold, but also on the manner the price
balance on the purchase price of said lots; such tender of payment was is to be paid by the vendee.
rejected, so that the subject lots could be sold at considerably higher prices
to third parties.
In a contract to sell property by installments, it is not enough that the parties
agree on the price as well as the amount of downpayment. The parties
The trial court ruled that under the August 22, 1972 letter agreement of XEI must, likewise, agree on the manner of payment of the balance of the
and the plaintiffs, the parties had a "complete contract to sell" over the lots, purchase price and on the other terms and conditions relative to the sale.
and that they had already partially consummated the same. It declared that Even if the buyer makes a downpayment or portion thereof, such payment
the failure of the defendant to notify the plaintiffs of the resumption of its cannot be considered as sufficient proof of the perfection of any purchase
selling operations and to execute a deed of conditional sale did not prevent and sale between the parties.
the defendant’s obligation to convey titles to the lots from acquiring binding
effect. Consequently, the plaintiffs had a cause of action to compel the
It is not difficult to glean from the aforequoted averments that the petitioners
defendant to execute a deed of sale over the lots in their favor.
themselves admit that they and the respondent still had to meet and agree
on how and when the down-payment and the installment payments were

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to be paid. Such being the situation, it cannot, therefore, be said that a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom
definite and firm sales agreement between the parties had been perfected or usage, and the like.
over the lot in question.
However, respondents failed to allege and prove, in the trial court, that, as
The fact, therefore, that the petitioners delivered to the respondent the sum a matter of business usage, habit or pattern of conduct, XEI granted all lot
of ₱10,000.00 as part of the downpayment that they had to pay cannot be buyers the right to pay the balance of the purchase price in installments of
considered as sufficient proof of the perfection of any purchase and sale 120 months of fixed amounts with pre-computed interests, and that XEI and
agreement between the parties herein under article 1482 of the New Civil the respondents had intended to adopt such terms of payment relative to
Code, as the petitioners themselves admit that some essential matter – the the sale of the two lots in question. Indeed, respondents adduced in
terms of payment – still had to be mutually covenanted. evidence the three contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and other
lot buyers merely to prove that XEI continued to sell lots in the subdivision
We have meticulously reviewed the records, including Ramos’ February 8, as sales agent of OBM after it acquired said lots, not to prove usage, habit
1972 and August 22, 1972 letters to respondents,61 and find that said or pattern of conduct on the part of XEI to require all lot buyers in the
parties confined themselves to agreeing on the price of the property subdivision to pay the balance of the purchase price of said lots in 120
(₱348,060.00), the 20% downpayment of the purchase price (₱69,612.00), months. It further failed to prive that the trial court admitted the said deeds
and credited respondents for the ₱34,887.00 owing from Ramos as part of as part of the testimony of respondent Manalo, Jr.
the 20% downpayment. The timeline for the payment of the balance of the
downpayment (₱34,724.34) was also agreed upon, that is, on or before XEI Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be proved like any other
resumed its selling operations, on or before December 31, 1972, or within facts. Courts must contend with the caveat that, before they admit evidence
five (5) days from written notice of such resumption of selling operations. of usage, of habit or pattern of conduct, the offering party must establish
The parties had also agreed to incorporate all the terms and conditions the degree of specificity and frequency of uniform response that ensures
relating to the sale, inclusive of the terms of payment of the balance of the more than a mere tendency to act in a given manner but rather, conduct
purchase price and the other substantial terms and conditions in the that is semi-automatic in nature. The offering party must allege and prove
"corresponding contract of conditional sale," to be later signed by the specific, repetitive conduct that might constitute evidence of habit. The
parties, simultaneously with respondents’ settlement of the balance of the examples offered in evidence to prove habit, or pattern of evidence must
downpayment. be numerous enough to base on inference of systematic conduct. Mere
similarity of contracts does not present the kind of sufficiently similar
(EVIDENCE RELATED) circumstances to outweigh the danger of prejudice and confusion.
The bare fact that other lot buyers were allowed to pay the balance of the
purchase price of lots purchased by them in 120 or 180 monthly The respondents inexplicably failed to adduce sufficient competent
installments does not constitute evidence that XEI also agreed to give the evidence to prove usage, habit or pattern of conduct of XEI to justify the
respondents the same mode and timeline of payment of the ₱278,448.00. use of the terms of payment in the contracts of the other lot buyers, and
thus grant respondents the right to pay the ₱278,448.00 in 120 months,
Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence that presumably because of respondents’ belief that the manner of payment of
one did a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did the the said amount is not an essential element of a contract to sell. There is
same or similar thing at another time, although such evidence may be no evidence that XEI or OBM and all the lot buyers in the subdivision,
received to prove habit, usage, pattern of conduct or the intent of the including lot buyers who pay part of the downpayment of the property
parties. purchased by them in the form of service, had executed contracts of
conditional sale containing uniform terms and conditions. Moreover, under
the terms of the contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and three lot
Similar acts as evidence. – Evidence that one did or did not do a certain buyers in the subdivision, XEI agreed to grant 120 months within which to
thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the pay the balance of the purchase price to two of them, but granted one 180
same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a months to do so. There is no evidence on record that XEI granted the same
right to buyers of two or more lots.

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Case Digest: Serrano, L.C. Overcome with emotion over being separated from Mary Jane, HeGary
then went to Ernesto’s house, but was not able to enter as no one went out
7c) Hearsay rule – Exceptions to the hearsay rule (Dying declaration) of the house to let him in. He instead shouted his pleas from the outside,
asking Ernesto what he had done wrong that caused Ernesto to break him
People of the Philippines v. Alberto Tabarnero and Gary Tabarnero and Mary Jane up, and voicing out several times that he loved Mary Jane
and was ready to marry her. When he Gary was about to leave, the gate
G.R. No. 168169 | February 24, 2010 opened and Ernesto purportedly struck him with a lead pipe. Ernesto was
aiming at Gary’s head, but the latter blocked the blow with his hands,
Tickler: dying declaration, self-defense, treachery causing his left index finger to be broken. Gary embraced Ernesto, but the
Ratio: "It must be shown that a dying declaration was made under a latter strangled him. At that point, Gary felt that there was a bladed weapon
realization by the decedent that his demise or at least, its imminence -- not tucked at Ernesto’s back. Losing control of himself, Gary took the bladed
so much the rapid eventuation of death -- is at hand. This may be proven weapon and stabbed Ernesto, although he cannot recall how many times
by the statement of the deceased himself or it may be inferred from the he did so.
nature and extent of the decedent’s wounds, or other relevant
circumstances. ”
According to Gary, Ernesto fell to the ground, and pleaded, "saklolo,
Facts: Late at night on October 23, 1999, Gary went to the house of the tulungan niyo po ako" three times. Gary was stunned, and did not notice
deceased Ernesto Canatoy (Ernesto), where he the former used to reside his father, co-appellant Alberto, coming. Alberto asked Gary, "anak, ano
as the live-in partner of Mary Jane Acibar (Mary Jane), Ernesto’s ang nangyari?" To which Gary responded "nasaksak ko po yata si Ka
stepdaughter. Gary and Ernesto had a confrontation during which the latter Erning," referring to Ernesto. Gary and Alberto fled, ran, since they were
was stabbed nine times, causing his death. The versions of the prosecution afraid allegedly out of fear.
and the defense would later diverge as regards the presence of other
persons atin the scene and other circumstances concerning Ernesto’s
death. Gary denied that he and Alberto conspired to kill Ernesto. Gary claims that
it was he and Ernesto who had a fight, and that he had no choice but to
stab Ernesto, who was going to kill him
On March 3, 2000, Gary and his father, Alberto, were charged with the
crime of Murder. On 27 March 2000, warrants for the arrest of Gary and
Alberto were issued by the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. On April 22, 20021, On August 5, 2001, Alberto was apprehended. On August 20, 2001, he
Gary surrendered to Barangay Tanod Edilberto Alarma. When he was pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charge. However, while Alberto’s defense is
arraigned on April 30, 2001, Gary pleaded NOT GUILTY to the crime denial and not self-defense like Gary’s, the court decided to proceed with
charged. 6 During this time, Alberto remained at large. the reverse inverted trial, as it had already started that way

On May 21, 2001, a pre-trial conference was conducted. Therein, Gary Next on the witness stand was Edilberto Alarma (Alarma), who was a
admitted having killed Ernesto, but claimed that it was an act of self- barangay tanod of Longos, Malolos, Bulacan since February 2000. Alarma
defense. testified that while he was in a meeting at around 4:00 p.m. on April 22,
2001, Gary arrived and told him of his intention to surrender to him. Gary
told him that he was responsible for the "incident [that] happened at Daang
Gary, a 22-year-old construction worker at the time of his testimony in June Riles." Together with his co-fellow barangay tanod Zaldy Garcia, Alarma
2001, testified that he stayed in Ernesto’s house from 1997 to 1999, as he brought Gary to the Malolos Police Station, where the surrender was
and Mary Jane were living together. Mary Jane is the daughter of Teresita entered in the blotter report.
Acibar, the wife of Ernesto. However, Gary left the house shortly before the
October 23, 1999 incident because of a misunderstanding with Ernesto
when the latter allegedly stopped the planned marriage of Gary and Mary Appellant Alberto, a construction worker employed as leadman/foreman of
Jane, who was pregnant at that time. Alicia Builders, was 45 years old at the time of his testimony in September
2001. He testified that on October 23, 1999, at the time when of the
incident, he was living in Norzagaray, Bulacan. On October 23, 1999,

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however, ,he went to visit his children, Gary and Gemarie, in Barangay 11:00 p.m., when he heard someone calling from for them outside, but was
Longos, Malolos, Bulacan. Before going to sleep at 11:00 p.m., he realized not sure if it was Gary. Emerito neither saw Ernesto leaving the room, nor
that Gary was not in the place where he would usually sleep. He went the fight between Ernesto and Gary. All he saw was the stabbing, which
downstairs, thinking that Gary was just urinating. He waited for five minutes; happened seven to eight meters away from the doorway where he was
when Gary did not show up, he proceeded to Daang Bakal, where Gary standing him. He was sure that there were four assailants, two of whom
had many friends. He walked for about 10 minutes. About 400 hundred went to a bridge 8 to 10 meters from the incident, where they boarded a
meters from where the site of the incident, happened, he saw Gary and yellow XLT-type car.
asked him what happened and why he was in a hurry, to which Gary
replied: "Wag na kayong magtanong, umalis na tayo, napatay ko po yata Senior Police Officer 2 (SPO2) Ronnie Morales of the Malolos Philippine
si Kuya Erning." Alberto and Gary ran in different directions. National Police testified that he was on duty at the police station on the
night of October 23, 1999. During that night, Emerito reported at the police
Alberto claims that he had no knowledge of the accusation that he station that Ernesto had been stabbed. SPO2 Morales and Emerito
conspired with Gary in killing Ernesto. It was three months after the incident proceeded to the Bulacan Provincial Hospital, where SPO2 Morales saw
that he came to know that he was being charged for a crime. At this time, Ernesto in the operating room, very weak due to multiple injuries. While in
he was already residing in Hensonville Plaza, Angeles City, Pampanga, the presence of the two doctors on duty, SPO2 Morales asked Ernesto who
where he was assigned when his engineer, Efren Cruz, got secured a stabbed him. Ernesto answered that the assailants were the father and son,
project in said place. Gary and Alberto Tabarnero from Longos, Bulacan.

During the cross-examination, Alberto repeated that he did not return to Cross-examined, SPO2 Morales clarified that it was already 1:00 a.m. of
Gary’s house after the incident. He said that it did not occur to him to call the following day when he and Emerito proceeded to the hospital. As they
inform the authorities about the killing of Ernesto. Later, Alberto learned went to the hospital, Emerito did not inform SPO2 Morales that he
from his sibling, whom he talked to by phone, that Gary had already witnessed the incident. SPO2 Morales did not find it odd that Emerito did
surrendered. He did not consider surrendering because, although he not tell him who the suspects were when Emerito reported the incident,
wanted to clear his name, nobody would work to support his family. He said because they immediately proceeded to the hospital, considering that the
that he had no previous misunderstanding with Ernesto victim, Ernesto, was still alive. Ernesto was not able to affix his signature
on the Sinumpaang Salaysay because he could no longer talk after the
The first to testify for the prosecution was its eyewitness, Emerito Acibar fourth question. Answering questions from the court, SPO2 Morales further
(Emerito). Emerito, the brother of Mary Jane was inside their house in stated that he could not remember talking to Emerito on their way to the
Daang Bakal, Longos, Malolos, Bulacan with his brother and his stepfather, hospital, since they were in a hurry.
Ernesto, at around eleven o’clock on the night of the incident on October
23, 1999. He heard somebody calling for Ernesto, but ignored it. He then The RTC rendered its Decision convicting Gary and Alberto of the crime of
heard a "kalabog," followed by Ernesto’s plea asking for help. Emerito was murder. The CA affirmed the conviction with modification as regards
about to go outside, but, while he was already at the door of their one-room exemplary damages, disposing of the case.
house, he saw Ernesto being held by a certain Toning "Kulit" and another Issues:
person, while Gary and Alberto were stabbing Ernesto with a fan knife. 1. Whether the court a quo gravely erred in not considering the
Emerito lost count of the number of thrusts made by Gary and Alberto, but justifying circumstance of self-defense and the mitigating
each inflicted more than one, and the last stab was made by Alberto. circumstance of voluntary surrender interposed by accused-
Emerito shouted for help. The four assailants left when somebody arrived, appellant Gary Tabarnero.
allowing Emerito to approach Ernesto and bring him to the Bulacan 2. Whether the court a quo gravely erred in finding that there was
Provincial Hospital. conspiracy in the case at bar (EVIDENCE TOPIC)
3. Assuming arguendo that accused-appellants are culpable, the
On cross-examination, Emerito stated that on the night of the incident, at court a quo gravely erred in appreciating the qualifying
past 11:00 p.m., Emerito was fixing his things inside their house at past circumstance of treachery.

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Held: mitigating circumstance, regardless even assuming of the presence of the

other two elements of self-defense.
FIRST ISSUE: THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE
ON THE PART OF GARY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED. GARY IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
The requisites for self-defense are: 1) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; 2) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused; and The trial court did not err in disregarding the mitigating circumstance of
3) employment of reasonable means to prevent and repel aggression. voluntary surrender. To benefit an accused, the following requisites must
be proven, namely: (1) the offender has not actually been arrested; (2) the
The defense invokes the said justifying circumstance, claiming that all of offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender
the above three elements are present in the case at bar. The Court of was voluntary. A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing
Appeals noted that the only evidence presented by the defense to prove the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities,
the alleged unlawful aggression was Gary’s own testimony. Citing Casitas either because he acknowledges his guilt, or he wishes to save them the
v. People, the Court of Appeals held that the nine stab wounds inflicted trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture.
upon Ernesto indicate Gary’s intent to kill, and not merely an intent to Voluntary surrender presupposes repentance. In People v. Viernes, we
defend himself. The number of wounds also negates the claim that the held that going to the police station to clear one’s name does not show any
means used by Gary to defend himself was reasonable. intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities.

We agree with the Court of Appeals. Unlawful aggression is an In the case at bar, appellant surrendered to the authorities after more than
indispensable requirement of self-defense of self-defense. As ruled by the one year had lapsed since the incident and in order to disclaim
Court of Appeals, the evidence presented by Gary to prove the alleged responsibility for the killing of the victim. This neither shows repentance or
unlawful aggression, namely, his own testimony, is insufficient and self- acknowledgment of the crime nor intention to save the government the
serving. The alleged sudden appearance of Ernesto and his first attack with trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture.
the lead pipe the very moment Gary decided to leave seems to this Court Besides, at the time of his surrender, there was a pending warrant of arrest
to be all too convenient, considering that there was no one around to against him. Hence, he should not be credited with the mitigating
witness the start of the fight. circumstance of voluntary surrender.

It also bears to emphasize that by invoking self-defense, Gary, in effect, The records show that Gary surrendered on April 22, 2001.48 The
admitted killing Ernesto, thus, shifting upon him the burden of evidence to commitment order commanding that he be detained was issued on April
prove the elements of the said justifying circumstance. A plea of self- 24, 2001. The surrender was made almost one year and six months from
defense cannot be justifiably appreciated where it is not only the October 23, 1999 incident, and almost one year and one month from
uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence, but also the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him on March 27, 2000. We,
extremely doubtful in itself. therefore, rule that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
cannot be credited to Gary.
The defense further argues that assuming that Gary is not qualified to avail
of the justifying circumstance of self-defense, he would nevertheless be SECOND ISSUE (EVIDENCE ISSUE): ALBERTO IS A PRINCIPAL BY
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense under DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN THE KILLING OF ERNESTO
Article 13(1) of the Revised Penal Code. Unlawful aggression is a condition
sine qua non, without which there can be no self-defense, whether The basis of Alberto’s conviction, however, is not solely conspiracy. A
complete or incomplete. There is incomplete self-defense when the review of the proven facts shows that conspiracy need not even be proven
element of unlawful aggression by the victim is present, and any of the by the prosecution in this case, since Alberto was categorically pointed by
other two essential requisites for self-defense. Having failed to prove the the eyewitness, Emerito, as one of the assailants who actively and directly
indispensable element of unlawful aggression, Gary is not entitled to the participated in the killing of Ernesto.

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Emerito had testified that he saw Ernesto being held by two persons, while
Having actually participated in the stabbing of Ernesto, it was adequately Gary and Alberto were stabbing him with a fan knife.
proven that Alberto is a principal by direct participation.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
Even more persuasive is the statement of the victim himself, Ernesto, as the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
testified to by SPO2 Morales, that it was "the father and son, Gary and which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
Alberto Tabarnero from Longos, Bulacan" who stabbed him. While Ernesto himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
was not able to testify in court, his statement is considered admissible
under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides: The Solicitor General argues that treachery was amply demonstrated by
the restraint upon Ernesto, which effectively rendered him defenseless and
Sec. 37. Dying declaration. — The declaration of a dying person, made unable to effectively repel, much less evade, the assault.
under the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any
case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause We agree with the Solicitor General.
and surrounding circumstances of such death.
There is treachery where the victim was stabbed in a defenseless situation,
In applying this exception to the hearsay rule, we held as follows: as when he was being held by the others while he was being stabbed, as
the accomplishment of the accused's purpose was ensured without risk to
"It must be shown that a dying declaration was made under a realization by him from any defense the victim may offer. In the instant case, it has been
the decedent that his demise or at least, its imminence -- not so much the established that the accused-appellant stabbed the victim on the chest
rapid eventuation of death -- is at hand. This may be proven by the while his companions held both of the victim's arms.
statement of the deceased himself or it may be inferred from the nature and
extent of the decedent’s wounds, or other relevant circumstances." We, therefore, rule that the killing of Ernesto was attended by treachery.
However, even assuming for the sake of argument that treachery should
In the case at bar, Ernesto had nine stab wounds which caused his death not be appreciated, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior
within the next 48 hours. At the time he uttered his statement accusing Gary strength would nevertheless qualify the killing to murder. Despite being
and Alberto of stabbing him, his body was already very rapidly alleged in the Information, this circumstance was not considered in the trial
deteriorating, as shown by his inability to speak and write towards the end court as the same is already absorbed in treachery. The act of the accused
of the questioning. in stabbing Ernesto while two persons were holding him clearly shows the
deliberate use of excessive force out of proportion to the defense available
in to the person attacked. In People v. Gemoya, we held:
We have considered that a dying declaration is entitled to the highest
credence, for no person who knows of his impending death would make a
careless or false accusation. When a person is at the point of death, every Abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is a notorious
motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assessing a
powerful consideration to speak the truth. It is hard to fathom that Ernesto, superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor which is
very weak as he was and with his body already manifesting an impending selected or taken advantage of in the commission of the crime. When four
demise, would summon every remaining strength he had just to lie about armed assailants, two of whom are accused-appellants in this case, gang
his true assailants, whom he obviously would want to bring to justice. up on one unarmed victim, it can only be said that excessive force was
purposely sought and employed.
Case Digest: Serrano, L.C
THIRD ISSUE: THE KILLING OF ERNESTO IS QUALIFIED BY .
TREACHERY 7c) Hearsay rule – Exceptions to the hearsay rule (Statement of
decedent or person of unsound mind)

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Sanson, et. al v. CA RTC: Finding that the Dead Man’s Statute does not apply to the witnesses
G.R. No. 127745 | April 22, 2003 who testified in support of the subject claims against the estate, Melecia
was ordered to pay the petitioners.
Ratio: In any event, what the Dead Man’s Statute proscribes is the CA: The CA set aside the RTC Decision.
admission of testimonial evidence upon a claim which arose before the Issue: 1. Whether or not the testimony of Jade Montinola is sufficient to
death of the deceased. prove the claims of claimants Angels and Eduardo
Tickler: Dead Man Statute 2. Whether or not Felicito Sanson is qualified to testify on the claim of
Facts: Petitioner Felicito Sanson, in his capacity as creditor, filed before Celedonia Sanson and vice-versa
the RTC a petition for the settlement of the estate of Juan Bon Fing Sy.
Sanson claimed that the deceased was indebted to him in the amount of Held:
P630,000 and to his sister Celedonia in the amount of P360,000.
Petitioners Eduardo Montinola Jr, and his mother Angeles Montinola, filed 1. YES. The genuineness of the deceased’s signature having been shown,
separate claims against the estate, alleging the deceased owed them he is prima facie presumed to have become a party to the check for value,
P50,000 and P150,000 respectively. following Section 24 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. Since, with respect
to the checks issued to the Montinolas, the prima facie presumption was
not rebutted or contradicted by the administratrix who expressly manifested
During the hearing of the claims against the estate, Sanson, Celedonia and
that she was dispensing with the presentation of evidence against their
Jade Montinola, wife of claimant Eduardo, testified on the transnactions
claims, it has become conclusive.
that gave rise thereto, over the objection of the administratix, Melecia Sy,
the surviving spouse, who invoked Sec. 23 Rule 130 of the ROC otherwise
known as the Dead Man’s Statute.
As for the administratrix’s invocation of the Dead Man’s Statute, the same
does not likewise lie. The rule renders incompetent: 1) parties to a case; 2)
Sanson, in support of the claim of Celedonia, testified that she had a their assignors; or 3) persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted. The
transaction with the deceased which is evidenced by six checks issued by rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope by implication
him. Celedonia presented the checks to the bank for payment but were so as to disqualify persons not mentioned therein. Mere witnesses who are
dishonored. Celedonia, likewise testified that the deceased issued five not included in the above enumeration are not prohibited from testifying as
checks to Sanson in settlement of a debt, but said checks were dishonored to a conversation or transaction between the deceased and a third person,
also upon presentment. Moreover, Jade, in support of the claims of if he took no active part therein.
Eduardo and Angeles, testified that in separate occasions the deceased
from them as shown by three checks issued by the deceased.
Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an assignor nor a person in
The adminitratix, denying having any knowledge or information sufficient to whose behalf the case is being prosecuted. She testified as a witness to
form a belief as to the truth of the claims, nevertheless alleged that if they the transaction. In transactions similar to those involved in the case at bar,
ever existed, they had been paid and extinguished, are usurious and illegal the witnesses are commonly family members or relatives of the parties.
and are barred by prescription. And she objected to the admission of the Should their testimonies be excluded due to their apparent interest as a
checks and check return slips-exhibits offered in evidence by the claimants result of their relationship to the parties, there would be a dearth of
upon the ground that the witnesses who testified thereon are disqualified evidence to prove the transactions. In any event, as will be discussed later,
under the Dead Man’s Statute. Specifically with respect to the checks- independently of the testimony of Jade, the claims of the Montinolas would
exhibits identified by Jade, the administratrix asserted that they are still prosper on the basis of their documentary evidence—the checks.
inadmissible because Jade is the daughter-in-law of claimant Angeles and
wife of claimant Eduardo Montinola, Jr., hence, she is covered by the
above-said rule on disqualification. 2. YES. Sanson’s and Celedonia’s claims against the same estate arose
from separate transactions. Sanson is a third party with respect to

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Celedonia’s claim. And Celedonia is a third party with respect to Sanson’s However, in 1958, Mr. Tan Keh sold the subject properties to Remigio Tan,
claim. One is not thus disqualified to testify on the other’s transaction. his brother and father of petitioners, with the understanding that the subject
properties are to be held in trust by Remigio for the benefit of Tan Kiat and
that Remigio would execute the proper documents of transfer in favor of
In any event, what the Dead Man’s Statute proscribes is the admission Tan Kiat should the latter at anytime demand recovery of the subject
of testimonial evidence upon a claim which arose before the death of the properties. Consequently, a TCT was issued in the name of Remigio.
deceased. The incompetency is confined to the giving of testimony. Since
the separate claims of Sanson and Celedonia are supported by checks- Meanwhile, another lease contract was executed between Tan Keh and
documentary evidence, their claims can be prosecuted on the bases of said Tan Kiat, but Tan Kiat never paid any rental and no demand was made on
checks. him. In 1968, Tan Keh died. At his wake, Tan Kiat reminded the petitioners
ownership of the subject properties, and in turn they promised to transfer
the same. However, they never made good of such promise.
In fine, as the claimants-herein petitioners have, by their evidence, Issue: 1. W/N private respondent’s complaint states a cause of action.
substantiated their claims against the estate of the deceased, the burden 2. W/N private respondent’s cause of action has prescribed.
of evidence had shifted to the administratrix who, however, expressly opted 3.W/N private respondent is barred by laches.
not to discharge the same when she manifested that she was dispensing Held: 1. NO. First: The execution of a lease contract between Remigio Tan
with the presentation of evidence against the claims. as lessor and private respondent as lessee over the subject properties, the
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the impugned May 31, 1996 Decision of existence of which is established not only by a copy thereof attached to
the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE and another rendered ordering petitioners' motion to dismiss but by private respondent's own admission
the intestate estate of the late Juan Bon Fing Sy, through Administratrix reflected in paragraph 6 of the complaint, already belies private
Melecia T. Sy, to pay. respondent's claim of ownership.
Case Digest: Martinez, M.J.A.

Tan, et. al v. CA and Fernando Tan Kiat Second: In the Memorandum of Encumbrances found at the back of TCT
G.R. No. 125861 | Sept. 9, 1998 issued in the name of Remigio Tan, there appears a mortgage constituted
by Remigio Tan over the subject properties in favor of Philippine
Ratio: The object and purpose of the rule (Dead Man’s Statute) is to guard Commercial and Industrial Bank in 1963 to guarantee a principal obligation
against the temptation to give false testimony in regard of the transaction in the sum of P245,000.00. Remigio could not have mortgaged the subject
in question on the part of the surviving party, and further to put the two properties had he not been the true owner thereof, inasmuch as under
parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard to the opportunity to giving Article 2085 of the New Civil Code, one of the essential requisites for the
testimony. If one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying validity of a mortgage contract is that the mortgagor be the absolute
by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled owner of the thing mortgaged.
to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained
account of the transaction.

Tickler: Dead Men tell no tales Third: There being no trust, express or implied, established in favor of
Facts: The respondent (Tan Kiat) filed a complaint claiming that he bought private respondent, the only transaction that can be gleaned from the
2 parcels of land, the subject in controversy, from Mr. Alejandro Tan Keh in allegations in the complaint is a double sale. Private respondent alleged
1954, built his house thereon, but was unable to effect immediate transfer that he bought the subject properties from Alejandro Tan Keh in 1954 but
of title in his favor for being a foreigner at the time of the sale. Nonetheless, nonetheless failed to present any document evidencing the same, while
as assurance in good faith of the sale agreement, Mr. Tan Keh turned over Remigio Tan, as the other buyer, had in his name TCT No. 53284 duly
to Tan Kiat the owner’s duplicate copy of the certificate of title, and registered in the Registry of Deeds of Manila on October 13,
executed a lease contract in favor of Tan Kiat for a duration of forty years. 1958. Remigio Tan, beyond doubt, was the buyer entitled to the subject
properties since the prevailing rule is that in the double sale of real property,

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the buyer who is in possession of a Torrens title and had the deed of sale should be instituted. Private respondent's cause of action, assuming that it
registered must prevail. exists, has clearly prescribed.

Fourth: Petitioners are in possession of TCT No. 117898 which 3. YES. Finally, private respondent is guilty of laches. Private respondent's
possession of the subject properties cannot be made the basis to deflect
evidences their ownership of the subject properties. On the other
the effects of laches because he is a mere lessee who, to repeat, cannot
hand, private respondent relies simply on the allegation that he is
assert any adverse claim of ownership over the subject properties against
entitled to the properties by virtue of a sale between him and
Alejandro Tan Keh who is now dead. Obviously, private respondent the lessor-owner. What ought to be in focus is that, as alleged by private
respondent in his complaint, he was not able to effect the transfer of title
will rely on parol evidence which, under the circumstances obtaining,
over the subject properties in his favor upon his purchase thereof from
cannot be allowed without violating the "Dead Man's Statute" found
Alejandro Tan Keh in 1954 because he was still a foreigner at that time.
in Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The object and purpose
of the rule is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony But private respondent later on claimed that he was already a Filipino
national when he reminded petitioners of his ownership of the subject
in regard of the transaction in question on the part of the surviving
properties during Remigio Tan's wake sometime in 1968. It may be
party, and further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of
reasonably deduced from these allegations that private respondent
equality in regard to the opportunity to giving testimony. If one party
to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, acquired Filipino citizenship by naturalization, thus entitling him to own
properties in the 1960's, more or less. His mistake, if it is one, is that he
insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to
tarried for thirty (30) years before formally laying claim to the subject
the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and
properties before the court. Considerable delay in asserting one's right
unexplained account of the transaction.
before a court of justice is strongly persuasive of the lack of merit of his
claim, since it is human nature for a person to enforce his right when the
same is threatened or invaded. Thus, private respondent is estopped by
2. YES. TCT No. 53284 in the name of Remigio Tan was registered on
laches from questioning the ownership of the subject properties.
October 13, 1958, while TCT No. 117898 in the name of his heirs, herein
petitioners, was issued on April 21, 1975. Private respondent filed his Case Digest: Martinez, M.J.A.
complaint on October 18, 1993. Respondent court held that the ten (10)-
year prescriptive period for the reconveyance of property based on an
implied trust cannot apply in this case since private respondent was in Razon vs. Cusi, Jr.
actual possession of the subject properties. In this case, however, private G.R. No.74306 | March 16, 1992
respondent's occupation of the subject properties was never in the concept
of an owner since he was a mere lessee who, as hereinbefore discussed, Ratio: The reason for the dead man’s rule is that if persons having a claim
is estopped from denying the title of Remigio Tan as owner-lessor. At best, against the estate of the deceased or his properties were allowed to testify
private respondent's stay on the properties as lessee was by "license or by as to the supposed statements made by him (deceased person), many
mere tolerance" which, under Article 1119 of the Civil Code, "shall not be would be tempted to falsely impute statements to deceased persons as the
available for the purposes of possession." latter can no longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly subjecting their
properties or rights to false or unscrupulous claims or demands. The
purpose of the law is to "guard against the temptation to give false
It thus becomes evident that the filing of private respondent's complaint in testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving
1993 — thirty five (35) years after TCT No. 53284 in the name of Remigio party.
Tan was registered and eighteen (18) years after the issuance of TCT No. The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is
117898 in the names of petitioners — was way beyond the ten (10)-year applicable to a case against the administrator or its representative of an
time limit within which reconveyance of property based on an implied trust estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person.

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Facts: The instant case is a consolidated petition that is centered on the It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of Razon is not within the prohibition
ownership of 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. Vicente (as the of the rule. The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate,
administrator of the estate of his deceased father Juan) filed a complaint nor was it filed upon claims against the estate.
for the delivery of the subject shares of stocks. Vicente argued that the Further, Vicente never objected to the testimony of Razon as regards the
stock certificate for the shares of stock was issued in the name of Juan and true nature of his transaction with the late Juan. Razon’s testimony was
Razon had not questioned the same. subject to cross-examination by the VIcente’'s counsel. Hence, granting
In the answer, Razon alleged that he owned the shares of stock and that it that the Razon’s testimony is within the prohibition of Section 20(a), Rule
remained in his possession. He also argued that the late Juan did not pay 130 of the Rules of Court, the private respondent is deemed to have waived
any amount for the shares in question. Further, he testified that after the rule.
organizing E. Razon, Inc., he distributed shares of stock previously placed
in the names of the withdrawing nominal incorporators to some friends, Case Digest: Siena, V. A.
including Juan. The stock certificates covering the shares in question were
personally delivered by Juan to their corporate secretary. Since then, Bordalba vs. CA
Razon was in possession of the shares of stock even during the lifetime of
Juan since it was the former who paid for all the subscription on the said G.R. No. 112443 | January 25, 2002
shares.
Ratio: The dead man’s statute does not operate to close the mouth of a
CFI: Declared that the owner of the shares of stock is Enrique Razon.
witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way
IAC: Reversed the decision of the CFI and ruled that Juan Chuidian, the
than through personal dealings with the deceased person, or
father of Vicente, is the owner of the shares of stock. The testimony of
communication made by the deceased to the witness.
Razon was excluded because of the Dead Man’s Rule under Section 20(a)
of the Rules of Court although such testimony was not objected to during Facts: The instant controversy stemmed from Lot No. 1242 with an area of
trial. 1,853 square meters and located at Barrio Looc, Mandaue City. The
subject land was originally owned by the late spouses Jayme.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner’s testimony is admissible.
In 1947, an extra-judicial partition was executed where the property was
Held: Yes. The Court held that the reason for the Dead Man’s Rule is that disposed as follows: a) ⅓ in favor of Nicanor Jayme (the deceased spouse
if persons having a claim against the estate of the deceased or his of private respondent Flores), and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay (whose heirs
properties were allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made by are private respondents Baclay and Jayme-Daclan; b) ⅓ to Elena Jayme
him (deceased person), many would be tempted to falsely impute Vda. de Perez (mother of petitioner); and c) ⅓ to an unidentified party.
statements to deceased persons as the latter can no longer deny or refute In 1964, petitioner’s mother filed with the trial court an application for the
them, thus unjustly subjecting their properties or rights to false or registration of the subject lot. She alleged that the lot was originally a part
unscrupulous claims or demands. The purpose of the law is to "guard of a land owned by her late parents; and that ⅓ of said lot was adjudicated
against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction to her in an extra-judicial partition. She further stated that a portion of the
in question on the part of the surviving party. land for which title is applied for is occupied by Nicanor Jayme with her
The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is permission.
applicable to a case against the administrator or its representative of an Nicanoy Jamy and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay then filed their opposition. They
estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person. contend that the said application included the ⅓ portion that they inherited
In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of in the 1947 extrajudicial partition. The case was dismissed for lack of
Razon, to the effect that the late Juan and Razon agreed in the lifetime of interest by the parties.
Juan that the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned by In 1979, petitioner filed with the Bureau of Lands of Cebu CIty an
Razont unless the deceased Juan opted to pay the same which never application for the issuance of Free Patent over the same lot subject of the
happened. The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late aborted application of her mother. The application was granted and
Juan to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the petitioner caused the subdivision and titling of the subject lot into 6 lots.
late Juan. Upon learning of the issuance of the Free Patent and Original Certificate of
Title over the subject lot and the conveyances made by petitioner, the

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private respondents filed the instant complaint with the trial court of Version of the Prosecution: Lito Santos testified that he was eating
Mandaue City. supper in their kitchen when he heard a gunshot. He also noticed smoke
Petitioner averred that the subject lot was acquired by her through and fire coming from the muzzle of a big gun. Moments later, he saw
purchase from her mother who was in possession of the lot in the concept Artemio clasping his chest and staggering backwards to the direction of
of an owner since 1947. She further claimed that private respondents' Lito’s kitchen. Artemio shouted to him Help me, Pre, I was shot by the
occupation of a portion of the lot was by mere tolerance of her mother. On captain. However, Lito did not approach Artemio right after the shooting
cross-examination, she admitted that the properties of the late spouses incident because his wife warned him that he might also be shot. Lito did
Jayme were partitioned by their heirs in 1947 but she was not aware of the not see the person who shot Artemio because his attention was then
existence of the said Deed of Extrajudicial Partition. However, she identified focused on Artemio. Shortly, Lito saw Ernita, the wife of Artemio, coming
one of the signatures in the said Deed to the signature of her mother. from her house towards the direction where Artemio was sprawled on the
RTC: Declared the Patent and Title void and ordered its cancellation. It ground. Ernita was hysterical, jumping and shouting, ‘Kapitan, bakit mo
found that fraud was employed by the petitioner in obtaining the said Patent binaril ang asawa ko.’ She also repeatedly cried for help. Lito then went out
and Title . The private respondents were declared as the owner of the of their house and approached Artemio who was lying dead near a banana
subject lot and ordered the issuance of certificate of title in their names. trunk from his house. Some of their neighbors answered Ernita’s call for
CA: Affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. It ruled that help and approached them. When the shooting incident happened Lito’s
since private respondents are entitled only to ⅓ portion of the subject lot, house was illumined by a lamp. Their kitchen has no walls. It is an open-
the petitioner should be ordered to reconvey only ⅓ of the lot to private type kitchen giving him an unobstructed view of Artemio. Although there
respondents. was tree growing in the space in between his house and the store of
The petitioner then filed the instant petition. She contends that the Artemio, the same did not block his view of Artemio.
testimonies given by the witnesses for private respondents which touched
on matters occurring prior to the death of her mother should not have been At the same instance, Ernita was also in their kitchen preparing
admitted by the trial court, as the same violated the dead man’s statute. milk for her baby. When she was about to put the bottle into the baby’s
mouth, she suddenly heard the sound of a gun burst followed by a shout,
Issue: Whether or not the testimonies given by the witnesses should not
She immediately pushed open the window of their kitchen and saw
have been admitted as they violated the dead man’s statute.
Marturillas wearing a black jacket and camouflage pants running towards
Held: No. The Court held that the dead man’s statute does not operate to the direction of the back portion of Lito’s house. From there, Marturillas
close the mouth of a witness as to any matter of fact coming to his crossed the street and disappeared. Ernita saw Marturillas carrying with
knowledge in any other way than through personal dealings with the him a long firearm which looked like an M-14 rifle. Ernita also sensed that
deceased person, or communication made by the deceased to the witness. appellant had some companions with him because she heard the crackling
Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses sound of the dried leaves around the place. Ernita had a clear view of
in the instant case is based on the 1947 Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and appellant at that time because their place was well-illumined by the full
other documents, and not on dealings and communications with the moon that night and by the two (2) fluorescent lamps in their store which
deceased, the questioned testimonies were property admitted by the trial were switched on at the time of the incident. Ernita immediately went out of
court. their house and ran towards Artemio. Artemio tried to speak to her but he
could not do so because his mouth was full of blood. Upon seeing the pitiful
Case Digest: Siena, V. A. sight of her husband, Ernita shouted several times. After more than two (2)
hours, the police arrived. Armed with the information that appellant was the
7c) Hearsay Rule - Exception to hearsay rule (Part of the res gestae) one responsible for the shooting of Artemio, the police proceeded to the
house of Marturillas and informed him that he was a suspect in the killing
CELESTINO MARTURILLAS v. PEOPLE of Artemio. He then invited Marturillas to go with him to the police station
G.R. No. 163217 | April 18, 2006 and also to bring along with him his M-14 rifle. Marturillas did not say
FACTS: anything. He just got his M-14 rifle and went with the police to the police
station where he was detained the whole night. Marturillas did not also give
any statement to anybody about the incident.

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Davao City, testified that the gunshot wound in Artemio’s body had been
Alicia Pantinople, the sister of Artemio, she was at home watching caused by a bullet that is of the same size as that fired from an M-14
television. She heard a gunshot but did not mind it because she was Rifle. However, the same expert witness testified that Marturillas’ hands
already used to hearing the sound of guns fired indiscriminately in their do not contain gunpowder nitrates.
place. After a few minutes, Junjun, a child came knocking at their door.
Junjun informed them that Artemio was shot. At the Bunawan Police Based on the Affidavits executed by Ernita and Lito, then 2nd Asst. City
Station, Alicia was informed by the police that appellant was at the Police Prosecutor Bendigo issued a Resolution finding sufficient evidence to indict
Station. She then went around the Bunawan Police Station and noticed a Marturillas for the crime of Homicide and not Murder.
locked door. When she peeped through the hole of the said door, she saw
Marturillas reclining on a bench. Appellant’s left leg was on top of the bench The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC that the guilt of petitioner had been
while his right leg was on the ground. Appellant was wearing a brown shirt, established beyond reasonable doubt. According to the appellate court, he
black jacket and a pair of camouflage pants. He was also wearing brown was positively identified as the one running away from the crime scene
shoes but he had no socks on his feet. At the police station, Alicia immediately after the gunshot. Hence, this Petition.
confronted appellant. Appellant did not answer her. Nevertheless, she was ISSUE: Whether the prosecution’s evidence is credible and enough to
sure that appellant was awake because he was tapping the floor with his convict Marturillas of homicide?
right foot. RULING: YES. All the doubts raised by Marturillas are sufficiently
addressed by the clear, direct and convincing testimony of the witness,
Version of the Defense: On that same evening Celestino Marturillas who Ernita. She positively identified him as the one "running away" immediately
is the former Barangay Captain was roused from his sleep at his house after the sound of a gunshot. Certain that she had seen him, she even
since the Kagawads wanted to see him. He was informed that a resident of described what he was wearing, the firearm he was carrying, and the
his barangay, Artemio Pantinople, had just been shot. Marturillas at once direction towards which he was running. She also clarified that she had
ordered his Kagawads to assemble the members of the Special Civilian heard the statement, "Help me pre, I was shot by the captain," uttered after
Armed Auxiliary so that they could be escorted to the crime scene. the shooting incident. Settled is the rule that on questions of the credibility
Marturillas was met by Ernita who was very mad. She immediately accused of witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, findings of the trial court
him of having shot her husband instead of Lito Santos who was his enemy. are given the highest degree of respect.
Marturillas was taken aback by the instant accusation against him. He
explained that he just came from his house where he was roused by his Ernita testified on the crime scene conditions that had enabled her to make
Kagawads from his sleep. Not being able to talk sense with Ernita, a positive identification of petitioner. Her testimony was even corroborated
Marturillas and his companions backed off to avoid a heated confrontation. by other prosecution witnesses. Ernita’s recognition of the assailant was
He instead decided to go back to his house along with his companions.
made possible by the lighted two fluorescent lamps in their store and by the
Upon reaching his house, he instructed Kagawad Jimmy Balugo to contact full moon. In corroboration, Lito testified that the place where the shooting
the Bunawan Police Station and inform them what transpired. Moments occurred was bright. The trees and plants growing in between Ernita’s
later, police officers arrived at his house and when confronted by them, he house and the place where Artemio was shot to death did not impede her
was informed that he was the principal suspect in the slaying of Artemio.
view of the assailant. In this case, the full moon and the light coming from
Upon their invitation, he immediately went with the said police officers for two fluorescent lamps of a nearby store were sufficient to illumine the place
questioning at the Bunawan Police Station. He also took with him his where petitioner was; and to enable the eyewitness to identify him as the
government-issued M-14 Rifle and one magazine of live M-14 ammunition person who was present at the crime scene. Settled is the rule that when
which he turned over for safe keeping with the Bunawan PNP.
conditions of visibility are favorable and the witnesses do not appear to be
biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally
PO2 Operario indorsed with the Bunawan PNP an empty shell fired from a be accepted. But even where the circumstances were less favorable, the
carbine rifle which was recovered by the said police officer from the crime familiarity of Ernita with the face of petitioner considerably reduced any
scene in the night of the incident. At the same time, they conducted a error in her identification of him.
paraffin test on Marturillas and a ballistics examination made on the M-14
rifle which he surrendered. Dr. Danilo Ledesma, a medico-legal officer for

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Dying Declaration 1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; 2) the
statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or
Having established that the victim indeed uttered those words, the question devise; and 3) the statements concerned the occurrence in question
to be resolved is whether they can be considered as part of the dying and its immediately attending circumstances. All these requisites are
declaration of the victim. To be admissible, a dying declaration must 1) present in this case. The principal act, the shooting, was a startling
refer to the cause and circumstances surrounding the declarant’s occurrence. Immediately after, while he was still under the exciting
death; 2) be made under the consciousness of an impending death; influence of the startling occurrence, the victim made the declaration
3) be made freely and voluntarily without coercion or suggestions of without any prior opportunity to contrive a story implicating petitioner. Also,
improper influence; 4) be offered in a criminal case, in which the death the declaration concerned the one who shot the victim. Thus, the latter’s
of the declarant is the subject of inquiry; and 5) have been made by a statement was correctly appreciated as part of the res gestae. Aside from
declarant competent to testify as a witness, had that person been the victim’s statement, which is part of the res gestae, that of Ernita may be
called upon to testify. considered to be in the same category. Her statement was about the same
startling occurrence; it was uttered spontaneously, right after the shooting,
while she had no opportunity to concoct a story against petitioner; and it
The statement of the deceased certainly concerned the cause and related to the circumstances of the shooting.
circumstances surrounding his death. He pointed to the person who had
shot him. As established by the prosecution, Marturillas was the only
person referred to as kapitan in their place. It was also established that the Sufficiency of Evidence
declarant, at the time he had given the dying declaration, was under a The following circumstances proven by the prosecution produce a
consciousness of his impending death. conviction beyond reasonable doubt:

Res Gestae First. Santos testified that he had heard a gunshot; and seen smoke
coming from the muzzle of a gun, as well as the victim staggering
backwards while shouting, "Help me p’re, I was shot by the captain." This
The fact that the victim’s statement constituted a dying declaration does not statement was duly established, and the testimony of Santos confirmed the
preclude it from being admitted as part of the res gestae, if the elements of events that had occurred.
both are present.
Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides: "Part of the res
gestae. -- Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is Second. Ernita testified that she had heard a gunshot and her husband’s
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the utterance, then saw petitioner in a black jacket and camouflage pants
circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. running away from the crime scene while carrying a firearm.
So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue,
and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae." Third. Ernita’s statement, aptain, why did you shoot my husband?" was
established as part of the res gestae.
Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the victims of,
or the spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its Fourth. The version of the events given by petitioner is simply implausible.
commission. These statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance As the incumbent barangay captain, it should have been his responsibility
inspired by the excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for the to go immediately to the crime scene and investigate the shooting. Instead,
declarant to fabricate a false statement. An important consideration is he avers that when he went to the situs of the crime, the wife of the victim
whether there intervened, between the occurrence and the statement, any was already shouting and accusing him of being the assailant, so he just
circumstance calculated to divert the mind and thus restore the mental left. This reaction was very unlikely of an innocent barangay captain, who
balance of the declarant; and afford an opportunity for deliberation. would simply want to investigate a crime. Often have we ruled that the first
impulse of innocent persons when accused of wrongdoing is to express
A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence their innocence at the first opportune time.
as an exception to the hearsay rule, when the following requisites concur:

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Fifth. The prosecution was able to establish motive on the part of petitioner. were sufficient funds to cover them. Furthermore, under a special
The victim’s wife positively testified that prior to the shooting, her husband arrangement with Security Bank’s branch manager then, Mr. Qui, Eric Gan
was trying to close a real estate transaction which Marturillas tried to block. was allowed to transfer funds from his account to another person’s account
This showed Marturillas’ antagonism towards the victim. also within the same branch.

These pieces of evidence indubitably lead to the conclusion that it was Eric Gan availed of such arrangement several times by depositing checks
petitioner who shot and killed the victim. This Court has consistently held in his account and even before they cleared, he withdrew the proceeds
that, where an eyewitness saw the accused with a gun seconds after the thereof and transferred them to the other account. These transactions were
gunshot and the victim’s fall, the reasonable conclusion is that the accused covered by what were known as "debit memos" since respondent had no
had killed the victim. Further establishing petitioner’s guilt was the definitive sufficient funds to cover the amounts he transferred.
statement of the victim that he had been shot by the barangay captain.
Clearly, petitioner’s guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt. The Later on, Eric Gan purportedly incurred an overdraft or negative balance in
circumstantial evidence described above satisfies the requirements of the his account. The overdraft balance came up to P153,757.78. According to
Rules of Court, which we quote: "SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when Security Bank, Gan refused to heed Security Bank’s repeated demands for
sufficient. -- Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There payment. The total obligation of respondent reached P297,060.01,
is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are inclusive of interest. Thus, in 1991, Security Bank filed a complaint for sum
derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is of money against Eric Gan to recover the P297,060.01 with 12% interest
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt." per annum.

Paraffin Test Eric Gan denied liability to Security bank for the said amount. He contended
that the alleged overdraft resulted from transactions done without his
This Court has held that a negative paraffin test result is not a conclusive knowledge and consent.
proof that a person has not fired a gun. In other words, it is possible to fire
a gun and yet be negative for nitrates, as when culprits wear gloves, wash The trial court dismissed the complaint. It held that Security Bank was not
their hands afterwards, or are bathed in perspiration. Besides, the able to prove that Eric Gan owed it the amount claimed considering that the
prosecution was able to establish the events during the shooting, including ledger cards it presented were merely hearsay evidence. On Security
the presence of petitioner at the scene of the crime. Hence, all other Bank’s appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.
matters, such as the negative paraffin test result, are of lesser probative ISSUE: Whether or not the ledger cards and the testimony of Mr. Patricio
value. Mercado constituted the best evidence of the transactions made by Eric
Case Digest: Laxamana, F.J.C. Gan relative to his account?
RULING: NO. Both the trial court and the CA found that petitioner failed to
7c) Hearsay Rule - Exception to hearsay rule (Records of regularly conducted substantiate its claim that Eric Gan knowingly incurred an overdraft against
business activity) his account. The Court see no reason to disturb this finding. To prove its
claim, Security Bank presented Patricio Mercado who was the
SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. ERIC GAN bookkeeper who handled the account of Eric Gan and recorded his
G.R. No. 150464 | June 27, 2006 transactions in a ledger. Based on this ledger, Eric Gan allegedly had a
RATIO: negative balance of P153,757.78. This resulted from transfers of funds
FACTS: Security Bank and Trust Company is a banking institution duly from Gan’s current account to another person’s account. These transfers
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. In 1981, were made under the authority of Qui. Gan categorically denied that he
respondent Eric Gan opened a current account with petitioner at its Soler ever authorized these "funds transfers." The entries in the ledger, as
Branch in Santa Cruz, Manila. Petitioner alleged that it had an agreement testified to by Mercado, were not competent evidence to prove that Gan
with respondent wherein the latter would deposit an initial amount in his consented to the transfers of funds. These entries merely showed that
current account and he could draw checks on said account provided there the transfers were indeed made and that Qui approved them. Security

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Bank’s claim that Eric Gan availed of a special arrangement to transfer

funds from his account to another person’s account was a bare allegation The Court agrees entirely with the following discussion of the trial court
that was never substantiated. Admittedly, Mercado had no personal which was affirmed by the CA: Security bank submits that the ledger cards
knowledge of this arrangement. In fact, when asked about the details of the constituted the best evidence of the transactions made by Eric Gan with
alleged consent given by Eric Gan to the transfers, he stated that he could the bank relative to his account, pursuant to Section 43 of Rule 130 of the
not remember because respondent talked to Qui and not to him. Security Revised Rules on Evidence. There is no question that the entries in the
Bank could have presented Qui whom they alleged allowed the special ledgers were made by one whose duty it was to record transactions in the
arrangement with respondent. But it did not. Neither can the Court accept ordinary or regular course of the business. But for the entries to be prima
Security Bank’s argument that the entries made by Mercado in the ledger facie evidence of the facts recorded, the Rule interposes a very important
were competent evidence to prove how and when the negative balance condition, one which we think is truly indispensable to the probative worth
was incurred. of the entries as an exception to the hearsay rule, and that is that the entrant
must be "in a position to know the facts therein stated."
Security Bank invokes Section 43 of Rule 130: Entries in the course of
business. – Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which Undeniably, Mr. Mercado was in a position to know the facts of the
they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position check deposits and withdrawals. But not the transfers of funds
to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, through the debit memos in question. At the outset, what the
if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the transactions covered by the debit memos are. They are, at bottom, credit
performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or accommodations said to have been granted by the bank’s branch manager
duty. Mr. Qui to Eric Gan, and they are, therefore loans, to prove which
competent testimonial or documentary evidence must be presented. In the
Under this exception to the hearsay rule, the admission in evidence face of the denial by Eric Gan of the existence of any such agreement, and
of entries in corporate books required the satisfaction of the following the absence of any document reflecting it, the testimony of a party to the
conditions: transaction would be necessary.
1. the person who made the entry must be dead, or unable to testify;
2. the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to Security Bank failed to explain why it did not or could not present any
which they refer; party or witness to the transactions, but even if it had a reason why it
3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries; could not, it is clear that the existence of the agreements cannot be
4. the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the established through the testimony of Mr. Mercado, for he was not in a
performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or religious; position to know those facts. As a subordinate, he could not have done
and more than record what was reported to him by his superior the branch
5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business manager, and unless he was allowed to be privy to the latter’s dealings with
or duty. the defendant, the information that he received and entered in the ledgers
was incapable of being confirmed by him.
The ledger entries did not meet the first and third requisites. Mercado,
Security Bank’s bookkeeper who prepared the entries, was presented to There is good reason why evidence of this nature is incorrigibly hearsay.
testify on the transactions pertaining to the account of Gan. It was in the Entries in business records which spring from the duty of other employees
course of his testimony that the ledger entries were presented. There was, to communicate facts occurring in the ordinary course of business are
therefore, neither justification nor necessity for the presentation of prima facie admissible, the duty to communicate being itself a badge of
the entries as the person who made them was available to testify in trustworthiness of the entries, but not when they purport to record what
court. Moreover, Mercado had no personal knowledge of the facts were independent agreements arrived at by some bank officials and a
constituting the entries, particularly those entries which resulted in client. In this case, the entries become mere casual or voluntary reports of
the negative balance. He had no knowledge of the truth or falsity of the official concerned. To permit the ledgers, prepared by the bank at its
these entries. own instance, to substitute the contract as proof of the agreements with

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third parties, is to set a dangerous precedent. Business entries are allowed Note: This is in relation to the January 27, 1999 case (same parties), as
as an exception to the hearsay rule only under certain conditions specified this is a resolution of that case.
in Section 43, which must be scrupulously observed to prevent them from
being used as a source of undue advantage for the party preparing them. JANUARY 27, 1999 CASE
Thus, Security Bank did not prove that REric Gan had incurred a negative FACTS: Meralco Employees and Workers Association (MEWA) informed
balance in his account. Consequently, there was nothing to show that Gan MERALCO of its intention to re-negotiate the terms and conditions of their
was indebted to it in the amount claimed. existing 1992-1997 CBA covering the remaining period of two years.
MERALCO signified its willingness to re-negotiate through its letter and
Security Bank’s next argument is that Eric Gan was estopped from denying formed a CBA negotiating panel for the purpose. MEWA submitted its
the claim of Security Bank since he benefited from the special arrangement proposal to MERALCO, which, in turn, presented a counter-proposal.
accorded to him resulting in the negative balance. This must likewise fail. Despite the series of meetings between the negotiating panels of
The so-called special arrangement was never established. There is no MERALCO and MEWA, the parties failed to arrive at "terms and conditions
scope here for the application of estoppel against Eric Gan, since it was not acceptable to both of them." As a result, MEWA filed a notice of strike with
established that he had ever received copies of the ledgers, and therefore the NCMB on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and ULP. NCMB then
given the opportunity to review the correctness of the entries. As we see it, conducted a series of conciliation meetings but the parties failed to reach
the case of Security Bank suffers from its failure to document its an amicable settlement. Faced with the imminence of a strike, MERALCO
transactions with its clients, and it is hardly right to close our eyes to that filed an Urgent Petition with DOLE praying that the Secretary assume
infirmity at the expense of Eric Gan. The temporary overdraft allegedly jurisdiction over the labor dispute and to enjoin the striking employees to
accorded by Security Bank to Eric Gan has not benefited Gan in any go back to work. The Labor Secretary granted the petition, pursuant to
manner. The 3 debit memos amounting to P150,000.00 appearing on Eric Article 263(g) of the Labor Code and deputizing USEC. Espanol, Jr. to
Gan’s ledger consisted of fund transfers from and not to Gan’s account. conduct conciliation conferences between the parties. Thereafter, both
The transfers resulted in the benefit of other accounts, not that of Eric Gan. parties submitted their memoranda in which Economic Demands (such as
In view of the foregoing, the CA did not err in affirming the decision of wages, Red Circle Rate (RCR) Allowances etc. were generally granted
the trial court. except for resignation benefits, night work) and Political Demands (such as
Case Digest: Laxamana, F.J.C. scope of the collective bargaining unit, union recognition and security,
transfer of assignment and job security) were granted.
7c) Hearsay Rule - Exception to hearsay rule (Commercial lists and the like)
Both parties filed separate motions with regard thethe Secretary’s order,
thus, Secretary issued an Order resolving the parties’ separate motions,
Meralco v. Quisumbing with modifications on his previous Order. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed this
G.R. No. 127598, February 22, 2000 petition contending that the Secretary of Labor gravely abused his
Ratio: The cited report is a mere newspaper account and not even a discretion, especially with regard the wage increases, wherein he ordered
commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion which carries no wage increase to P2,200.
persuasive weight for purposes of this case as no sufficient figures to
support it were presented. Neither did anybody testify to its accuracy. It
cannot be said that businessmen generally rely on news items such as this ISSUE: W/N DOLE Secretary Quisimbing committed GAD.
in their occupation. Besides, no evidence was presented that the
publication was regularly prepared by a person in touch with the market RULING: YES. The Secretary of Labor disregarded and misappreciated
and that it is generally regarded as trustworthy and reliable. Absent evidence, particularly with respect to the wage award. We find after
extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these reports are not admissible. In the considering the records that the Secretary gravely abused his discretion in
same manner, newspapers containing stock quotations are not admissible making this wage award because he disregarded evidence on record.
in evidence when the source of the reports is available. With more reason, Where he considered MERALCO’s evidence at all, he apparently
mere analyses or projections of such reports cannot be admitted. misappreciated this evidence in favor of claims that do not have evidentiary
support. To our mind, the MERALCO projection had every reason to be

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reliable because it was based on actual and undisputed figures for the first should retroact to such time granted by the Secretary, citing the 1993
six months of 1996. On the other hand, the union projection was based on decision of St. Luke's v. Torres.
a speculation of Yuletide consumption that the union failed to substantiate. Issues:
In fact, as against the union’s unsubstantiated Yuletide consumption claim, [RELATED TO TOPIC] (1) W/N the All Asia Capital Report can be used as
MERALCO adduced evidence in the form of historical consumption data an accurate basis and conclusive determinant of the rate of wage increase.
showing that a lengthy consumption does not tend to rise during the (2) W/N the award should retroact only from such time that the Secretary
Christmas period. Additionally, the All-Asia Capital Report was nothing of Labor rendered the award.
more than a newspaper report that did not show any specific breakdown or Held: (1) NO. Petitioner warns that if the wage increase of P2,200.00 per
computations. While the union claimed that its cited figure is based on month as ordered by the Secretary is allowed, it would simply pass the cost
MERALCO’s 10-year income stream, no data or computation of this 10- covering such increase to the consumers through an increase in the rate of
year stream appear in the record. electricity. This is a non sequitur. The Court cannot be threatened with such
a misleading argument. An increase in the prices of electric current needs
While the Secretary is not expected to accept the company-offered figures the approval of the appropriate regulatory government agency and does
wholesale in determining a wage award, we find it a grave abuse of not automatically result from a mere increase in the wages of petitioner's
discretion to completely disregard data that is based on actual and employees. Besides, this argument presupposes that petitioner is capable
undisputed record of financial performance in favor of the third-hand and of meeting a wage increase. The All Asia Capital report upon which the
unfounded claims the Secretary eventually relied upon. At the very least, Union relies to support its position regarding the wage issue cannot be an
the Secretary should have properly justified his disregard of the company accurate basis and conclusive determinant of the rate of wage increase.
figures. The Secretary should have also reasonably insured that the figure Section 45 of Rule 130 Rules of Evidence provides:
that served as the starting point for his computation had some substantial Commercial lists and the like. — Evidence of statements of
basis. The SC ordered the payment of wages amounting to P1,900.00 for matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained
1995-96, instead of the Secretary’s order of P2,200. in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is
admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so
stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged
FEBRUARY 22, 2000 RESOLUTION in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them
FACTS: In the 1999 SC decision, the Court granted the petition and set therein.
aside the orders of the Secretary. The Court also ordered the parties to
execute a CBA incorporating the terms and conditions contained in the
unaffected portions of the Secretary of Labor's orders.Dissatisfied with the Under the afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical,
Decision, some alleged members of MEWA filed a motion for intervention may be admitted only "if that compilation is published for use by persons
and a motion for reconsideration of the said Decision. A separate engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them
intervention was likewise made by the supervisor's union (FLAMES) of therein." As correctly held in our Decision dated January 27, 1999, the cited
petitioner corporation alleging that it has bona fide legal interest in the report is a mere newspaper account and not even a commercial list. At
outcome of the case. most, it is but an analysis or opinion which carries no persuasive weight for
The issues raised in the motions for reconsideration had already been purposes of this case as no sufficient figures to support it were presented.
passed upon by the Court in the January 27, 1999 decision. No new Neither did anybody testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said that
arguments were presented for consideration of the Court. Nonetheless, businessmen generally rely on news items such as this in their occupation.
certain matters will be considered herein, particularly those involving the Besides, no evidence was presented that the publication was regularly
amount of wages and the retroactivity of the Collective Bargaining prepared by a person in touch with the market and that it is generally
Agreement (CBA) arbitral awards. regarded as trustworthy and reliable. Absent extrinsic proof of their
accuracy, these reports are not admissible. In the same manner,
newspapers containing stock quotations are not admissible in evidence
Petitioners based their position on the wage issue on the All Asia Capital when the source of the reports is available. With more reason, mere
Report. On the other hand, petitioner claims that the award should retroact analyses or projections of such reports cannot be admitted. In particular,
only from such time that the Secretary of Labor rendered the award, citing
the source of the report in this case can be easily made available
Union of Filipino Employees v. NLRC. The Union argues that the award

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considering that the same is necessary for compliance with certain government. Despite the silence of the law, the Court rules herein that CBA
governmental requirements. arbitral awards granted after six months from the expiration of the last CBA
shall retroact to such time agreed upon by both employer and the
Nonetheless, by petitioner's own allegations, its actual total net income for employees or their union. Absent such an agreement as to retroactivity, the
1996 was P5.1 billion. An estimate by the All Asia financial analyst stated award shall retroact to the first day after the six-month period following the
that petitioner's net operating income for the same year was about P5.7 expiration of the last day of the CBA should there be one. In the absence
billion, a figure which the Union relies on to support its claim. Assuming of a CBA, the Secretary's determination of the date of retroactivity as part
without admitting the truth thereof, the figure is higher than the P4.171 of his discretionary powers over arbitral awards shall control.
billion allegedly suggested by petitioner as its projected net operating
income. The P5.7 billion which was the Secretary's basis for granting the In other words, the law contemplates retroactivity whether the agreement
P2,200.00 is higher than the actual net income of P5.1 billion admitted by be entered into before or after the said six-month period. The agreement of
petitioner. It would be proper then to increase this Court's award of the parties need not be categorically stated for their acts may be considered
P1,900.00 to P2,000.00 for the two years of the CBA award. For 1992, the in determining the duration of retroactivity. In this connection, the Court
agreed CBA wage increase for rank-and-file was P1,400.00 and was considers the letter of petitioner's Chairman of the Board and its President
reduced to P1,350.00; for 1993; further reduced to P1,150.00 for 1994. For addressed to their stockholders, which states that the CBA "for the rank-
supervisory employees, the agreed wage increase for the years 1992-1994 and-file employees covering the period December 1, 1995 to November 30,
are P1,742.50, P1,682.50 and P1,442.50, respectively. Based on the 1997 is still with the Supreme Court," as indicative of petitioner's recognition
foregoing figures, the P2,000.00 increase for the two-year period awarded that the CBA award covers the said period. Earlier, petitioner's negotiating
to the rank-and-file is much higher than the highest increase granted to panel transmitted to the Union a copy of its proposed CBA covering the
supervisory employees. As mentioned in the January 27, 1999 Decision, same period inclusive. In addition, petitioner does not dispute the allegation
the Court does "not seek to enumerate in this decision the factors that that in the past CBA arbitral awards, the Secretary granted retroactivity
should affect wage determination" because collective bargaining disputes commencing from the period immediately following the last day of the
particularly those affecting the national interest and public service "requires expired CBA. Thus, by petitioner's own actions, the Court sees no reason
due consideration and proper balancing of the interests of the parties to the to retroact the subject CBA awards to a different date. The period is herein
dispute and of those who might be affected by the dispute." The Court takes set at two (2) years from December 1, 1995 to November 30, 1997.
judicial notice that the new amounts granted herein are significantly higher Case Digest: Paz, J.N.A.
than the weighted average salary currently enjoyed by other rank-and-file
employees within the community. It should be noted that the relations 8b) Opinion rule – Opinion of ordinary witness
between labor and capital is impressed with public interest which must yield
to the common good. Neither party should act oppressively against the Domingo v. Domingo
other or impair the interest or convenience of the public. Besides, matters G.R. No. 150897, April 11, 2005
of salary increases are part of management prerogative.
Ratio: Genuineness of a handwriting may be proven, under Rule 132,
Section 22, by anyone who actually saw the person write or affix his
(2) YES. The Court in the January 27, 1999 Decision, stated that the CBA signature on a document. Petitioner has shown no reason why the ruling
shall be "effective for a period of 2 years counted from December 28, 1996 made by the trial court on the credibility of the respondent’s witnesses
up to December 27, 1999." Parenthetically, this actually covers a three- below should be disturbed by us. Findings by the trial court as to the
year period. Labor laws are silent as to when an arbitral award in a labor credibility of witnesses are accorded the greatest respect, and even finality
dispute where the Secretary had assumed jurisdiction by virtue of Article by appellate courts, since the former is in a better position to observe their
263 (g) of the Labor Code shall retroact. In general, a CBA negotiated demeanor as well as their deportment and manner of testifying during the
within six months after the expiration of the existing CBA retroacts to the trial.
day immediately following such date and if agreed thereafter, the effectivity Facts: Bruno B. Domingo, a widower and retired military man, was the
depends on the agreement of the parties. On the other hand, the law is registered owner, as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of a house
silent as to the retroactivity of a CBA arbitral award or that granted not by and lot with an area of 269.50 square meters, located in Project 4, Quezon
virtue of the mutual agreement of the parties but by intervention of the City. Bruno needed money for his medical expenses, so he sold said

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properties. On December 28, 1970, he signed a Deed of Absolute Sale

conveying the abovementioned properties to his children Leonora, Nuncia, The RTC dismissed the compliant and disregarded the conflicting reports
Abella, and Jose for a consideration of ₱10,000. The deed was witnessed of the police crime laboratory and the NBI "for failure of the offering party
by Concesa Ibañez and Linda Noroña and notarized by Atty. Rosauro V. or parties to show that the standard or specimen signatures were indeed
Noroña. Jose then brought the deed to the Register of Deeds of Quezon those of Bruno B. Domingo." The trial court likewise found that petitioner
City, as a result of which the old TCT was cancelled and a new title was failed to substantiate his claim that prior PHHC approval was needed
issued in the names of the vendees. Bruno Domingo died on April 6, 1975. before a valid sale of the properties in dispute could be made. Dissatisfied,
petitioner elevated the case to the CA. On January 11, 2000, petitioner filed
Sometime in 1981 petitioner, who by then was residing on the disputed a motion for new trial with the appellate court on the ground of newly
property, received a notice from the Quezon City Hall declaring him a discovered evidence consisting of a letter of Bruno purportedly requesting
squatter and directing him to demolish his shanty on the lot. Petitioner from PHHC permission to mortgage the property. Petitioner also filed a
found out that the planned demolition was at the instance of his brother, supplemental motion for new trial with the Court of Appeals, attaching the
Jose and sister, Leonora. Sometime in 1986, petitioner learned of the letter of PHHC to Bruno granting the latter’s request. The CA denied all
existence of the assailed Deed of Absolute Sale when an ejectment suit foregoing motions. The CA noted that there was no showing whatsoever
was filed against him. Upon advice of his counsel, he had the then that "the letter-request could not have been discovered and produced prior
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP, now to the trial below by the exercise of reasonable diligence and…is of such a
Philippine National Police or PNP) Crime Laboratory compare the signature character as would probably change the result." It likewise pointed out that
of Bruno on the said deed against specimen signatures of his father. As a both the motion for new trial and the supplemental motion for new trial were
result, the police issued him Questioned Document Report to the effect that "not accompanied by affidavits showing the facts constituting the grounds
the questioned signature and the standard signatures were written by two therefor and the newly discovered evidence." Petitioner insists that both the
different persons. Another Questioned Document Report subsequently trial court and the appellate court should have considered the PC-INP
issued by the police came up with the same conclusion. questioned document report as reliable, without showing any cogent
reason or sufficient arguments why said report should be deemed reliable.
Petitioner filed a complaint for forgery, falsification by notary public, and Issue: Did the court a quo err when it held that the trial court correctly
falsification by private individuals against his siblings and Atty. Noroña applied the rules of evidence in disregarding the conflicting PC-INP and
before the public prosecutor of Quezon City. But after it conducted an NBI questioned document reports?
examination of the questioned documents, NBI came up with the Held: NO. Under the Rules of Court, the genuineness of a handwriting may
conclusion that the questioned signature and the specimen signatures be proved by the following:
were written by one and the same person, Bruno B. Domingo. The public (1) A witness who actually saw the person writing the instrument;
prosecutor dismissed the criminal complaint. Petitioner appealed the order (2) A witness familiar with such handwriting and who can give his
of dismissal to the DOJ but the latter affirmed the prosecutor’s action. A opinion thereon, such opinion being an exception to the opinion
similar criminal complaint filed by petitioner before the public prosecutor of rule;
Manila was likewise dismissed. (3) A comparison by the court of the questioned handwriting and
admitted genuine specimen thereof; and
(4) Expert evidence.
Petitioner instituted a civil case before the RTC for the declaration of the
nullity of the Deed of Sale, reconveyance of the disputed property, and
cancellation of new title. Petitioner alleged that Bruno B. Domingo’s The law makes no preference, much less distinction among and between
signature on the deed in question was forged. He likewise averred that the the different means stated above in proving the handwriting of a person. It
sale was done in violation of the restriction annotated at the back of Bruno’s is likewise clear from the foregoing that courts are not bound to give
title, to the effect that prior approval of the People’s Homesite and Housing probative value or evidentiary value to the opinions of handwriting experts,
Corporation (PHHC) was needed to effect any sale. In their answer, private as resort to handwriting experts is not mandatory.
respondents relied heavily on the findings of the NBI that Bruno B.
Domingo’s signature on the deed was genuine, and hence, the Deed of In finding that the trial court correctly disregarded the PC-INP Crime
Absolute Sale was not a forgery. Laboratory questioned document report, the appellate court observed that

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the PC-INP used as standards of comparison the alleged signatures of 9b) Character evidence – Civil cases
Bruno in two documents, namely: letter to the Bureau of Treasury dated in
1958 and Republic Bank Check No. dated in 1962. These documents 44. People v. Noel Lee
precede by more than eight years the questioned Deed which was G.R. No. 139070, 29 May 2002
executed on 1970. This circumstance makes the PC-INP’s finding Tickler: Victim was a thief
questionable. Ratio: Ordinarily, if the issues in the case were allowed to be influenced by
evidence of the character or reputation of the parties, the trial would be apt
We find no reason to disagree with the Court of Appeals. The passage of to have the aspects of a popularity contest rather than a factual inquiry into
time and a person’s increase in age may have decisive influence in his the merits of the case. After all, the business of the court is to try the case,
handwriting characteristics. Thus, in order to bring about an accurate and not the man; and a very bad man may have a righteous cause.
comparison and analysis, the standards of comparison must be as close Facts: Accused was charged for the murder of Joseph Marquez. he
as possible in point of time to the suspected signature. As correctly found pleaded not guilty to the charge. Among the prosecution witnesses is
by the appellate court, the examination conducted by the PC-INP Crime Herminia, mother of the victim.
Laboratory did not conform to the foregoing standard. Recall that in the
case, the signatures analyzed by the police experts were on documents Herminia narrated that on the evening of the crime, she and her son were
executed several years apart. A signature affixed in 1958 or in 1962 may watching a basketball game on the television. When she looked away from
involve characteristics different from those borne by a signature affixed in the game and casually glanced at her son, she saw the accused peering
1970. Hence, neither the trial court nor the appellate court may be faulted through the window and holding the gun aimed at Joseph. Before she could
for refusing to place any weight whatsoever on the PC-INP questioned warn him, Joseph turned his body towards the window, and simultaneously,
document report. the appellant fired his gun hitting Joseph’s head. Joseph slumped on the
sofa. Accused fired a second shot at Joseph and three (3) shots more—
We likewise sustain the trial court and the Court of Appeals concerning the two hit the sofa and one hit the cement floor. When no more shots were
testimonies of Clerma Domingo, Leonora, and Jose to the effect that they fired, Herminia ran to the window and saw accused, in a blue sando, flee
saw Bruno affixing his signature to the questioned deed. They were towards the direction of his house. With the aid of her neighbor
unrebutted. Genuineness of a handwriting may be proven, under Rule 132, and kumpare, Herminia brought Joseph to the MCU Hospital where he later
Section 22, by anyone who actually saw the person write or affix his died.
signature on a document. Petitioner has shown no reason why the ruling
made by the trial court on the credibility of the respondent’s witnesses On the other hand, the accused presented a letter handwritten by Herminia,
below should be disturbed by us. Findings by the trial court as to the addressed to the mayor of Caloocan City. In the letter, Herminia was
credibility of witnesses are accorded the greatest respect, and even finality surrendering her son to the mayor for rehabilitation because he was hooked
by appellate courts, since the former is in a better position to observe their on shabu, a prohibited drug, and was a thief. Herminia was scared that
demeanor as well as their deportment and manner of testifying during the eventually Joseph might not just steal but kill her and everyone in their
trial. household because of his drug habit.

Finally, the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale in the present case is a The RTC found the accused guilty and sentenced him to death.
notarized document. Being a public document, it is prima facie evidence of Issue: Whether the trial court erred in not considering the shady character
the facts therein expressed. It has the presumption of regularity in its favor of the victim.
and to contradict all these, evidence must be clear, convincing, and more Ruling: NO. The rule is that the character or reputation of a party is
than merely preponderant. Petitioner has failed to show that such regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a controversy, so that
contradictory evidence exists in this case. evidence relating thereto is not admissible. There are exceptions to this rule
Case Digest: Paz, J.N.A. however and Section 51, Rule 130 gives the exceptions in both criminal
and civil cases.

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Sub-paragraph (3) of Section 51 of the said Rule refers to the character of G.R. No. 142930 | March 28, 2003
the offended party. Character evidence, whether good or bad, of the
offended party may be proved "if it tends to establish in any reasonable Ratio: Under Sections 19 to 21 of the Rule on Examination of a Child
degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged." Such Witness which took effect on December 15, 2000, child witnesses may
evidence is most commonly offered to support a claim of self-defense in an testify in a narrative form and leading questions may be allowed by the trial
assault or homicide case or a claim of consent in a rape case. court in all stages of the examination if the same will further the interest of
justice. Objections to questions should be couched in a manner so as not
to mislead, confuse, frighten and intimidate the child
In homicide cases, a pertinent character trait of the victim is
admissible in two situations: (1) as evidence of the deceased’s Facts: The spouses Paquito Cañete and Sedaria Cañete had three
aggression; and (2) as evidence of the state of mind of the accused. children, one of whom was Alma, who was born on March 24, 1983. In
The pugnacious, quarrelsome or trouble-seeking character of the 1986, the spouses decided to live separately. Sedaria resided in Pook
deceased or his calmness, gentleness and peaceful nature, as the case West, Cubala, Biliran, with some of her children by Paquito. The latter
may be, is relevant in determining whether the deceased or the accused decided to live in Basey, Samar, and brought Alma with him. Thereafter,
was the aggressor. When the evidence tends to prove self-defense, the Paquito decided to live with his older brother, Kakingcio Cañete, and the
known violent character of the deceased is also admissible to show that it latter’s common-law wife, Alejandra Cañete, whom Alma called Yaya
produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the Alejandra, and their two children, five and four years old, respectively, in
accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was Barangay Gayad, Capoocan, Leyte. After some years, Paquito and Alma
necessary. decided to return to and live in Basey, Samar. In the meantime, Paquito
became blind and a paralytic. In January 1996, Kakingcio had Paquito and
In the instant case, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is Alma fetched from Basey, Samar, and brought to Barangay Gayad,
irrelevant to determine the probability or improbability of his killing. Capoocan, Leyte, to live with him and his family. By then, Alma was already
Accused-appellant has not alleged that the victim was the aggressor or that twelve years old. She noticed that her uncle Kakingcio was nice and
the killing was made in self-defense. There is no connection between the amiable to her.
deceased’s drug addiction and thievery with his violent death in the hands
of accused-appellant. In light of the positive eyewitness testimony, the On February 1, 1996, Alejandra visited her daughter in Montebello,
claim that because of the victim’s bad character he could have been killed Kananga, Leyte, leaving behind Kakingcio and their two young children and
by any one of those from whom he had stolen, is pure and simple Paquito and Alma. At about 8:00 p.m., Alma was already asleep. Paquito
speculation. was sleeping near her feet. The house was dark. Momentarily, Alma was
awakened when she felt someone caressing her. When she opened her
Moreover, proof of the victim’s bad moral character is not necessary eyes, she saw her uncle Kakingcio who was wearing a pair of short pants
in cases of murder committed with treachery and premeditation. The but naked from waist up. He was beside her with his left palm touching her
evidence shows that there was treachery. Joseph was sitting in his living forehead, down to her face, hand and feet. She could smell liquor from his
room watching television when the accused-appellant peeped through the breath. He poked an 8-inch long knife on her neck and whispered to her:
window and, without any warning, shot him twice in the head. There was "Ma, don’t tell your yaya because I will do something to you." Kakingcio
no opportunity at all for the victim to defend himself or retaliate against his then removed his short pants, lifted her skirt and pulled down her panties.
attacker. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack ensured his He threatened to kill her if she made a sound. Alma was terrified. Kakingcio
death without risk to the assailant. then inserted his private organ into Alma’s vagina and made a push and
Case Digest: Rens, M.E. pull movement of his body. Alma felt pain in her private part and could do
nothing but cry as Kakingcio ravished her. In the process, Alma lost
10) Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC) consciousness. When she regained consciousness, it was already 6:00 in
the morning of February 2, 1996. She was weak and could hardly stand up.
She noticed blood in her vagina. By then, Kakingcio had already left the
People vs. Canete
house. Alma could do nothing but cry. Kakingcio arrived back home after
lunch time. Alma hid from her uncle.

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Held: NO. The Court does not agree with the appellant’s submission. In
On February 3, 1996, at 8:00 in the evening, Alma was asleep in the sala People v. Ancheta, this Court emphasized that a presiding judge enjoys a
of their house. She was awakened when her uncle attempted to rape her great deal of latitude in examining witnesses within the course of
again. She rushed to the house of a neighbor Ka Caring to whom Alma evidentiary rules. The presiding judge should see to it that a testimony
revealed that her uncle raped her and that he was about to rape her again. should not be incomplete or obscure. After all, the judge is the arbiter and
Caring advised Alma not to return to their house. Alma slept in the house he must be in a position to satisfy himself as to the respective claims of the
of Caring. Alma returned to their house the next day, February 4, 1996. By parties in the criminal proceedings.
then, Kakingcio was no longer in the house.
The Court finds nothing improper in the questions posed by the trial court.
On February 5, 1996, Alejandra went up the hill to gather camote tops. She Neither are the questions prejudicial to the appellant or suggestive of any
was then armed with a bolo. Alma followed Alejandra to the hills and partiality of the trial court. It bears stressing that from the testimony of the
revealed to her that Kakingcio raped her on February 1, 1996. Alejandra private complainant, the appellant was wearing his short pants before he
was livid with rage. She rushed back to the house and confronted Kakingcio mounted her and even when he was already on top of her and managed to
with the charge of Alma. Alejandra and Kakingcio quarreled. She berated penetrate her sexual organ with his penis. The public prosecutor wanted
him for having taken advantage of his own flesh and blood. She told him to the private complainant to explain to the court how the appellant could have
leave the house. Kakingcio agreed on the condition that he would bring his inserted his penis into her vagina considering that he was still wearing his
personal belongings with him. After Kakingcio left, Alejandra accompanied short pants. Although crudely and ungrammatically phrased, the question
Alma to the barangay captain and complained against Kakingcio. On April of the public prosecutor "where did he let his penis exit considering that he
26, 1996, an Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Leyte, is then wearing a short pants" was not leading. The trial court should have
Branch 36, charging Kakingcio with rape. overruled the objection and allowed the private complainant to answer the
question. However, the trial court was not precluded from asking questions
to avoid further wrangling between the public prosecutor and the
On February 4, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision finding Kakingcio appellant’s counsel which may frightened or unnerved the private
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and imposing on him the penalty of complainant, a minor and who was unused to judicial proceedings. After
death in view of the presence of the special qualifying circumstance of the all, the trial court was mandated to discover the truth. As it turned out, the
minority of private complainant Alma and her relationship to Kakingcio and private complainant cried profusely as she testified impelling the trial court
the special aggravating circumstance of use of a deadly weapon and to order a continuance. Even the counsel of the appellant agreed to a
without any mitigating circumstance in the commission of the crime. continuance.

The appellant avers that the prosecution had a difficulty proving that the Parenthetically, under Sections 19 to 21 of the Rule on Examination of a
appellant raped the private complainant in light of her testimony that when Child Witness which took effect on December 15, 2000, child witnesses
the appellant mounted her, he still had his short pants on. When the may testify in a narrative form and leading questions may be allowed by the
prosecution tried to elicit from the offended party how appellant’s penis trial court in all stages of the examination if the same will further the interest
could have been inserted into her vagina with his pants still on and the of justice. Objections to questions should be couched in a manner so as
appellant’s counsel objected to the question, the presiding judge himself not to mislead, confuse, frighten and intimidate the child:
took the cudgels for the prosecution and propounded questions on the Sec. 19. Mode of questioning. – The court shall exercise control over the
private complainant. Worse, the presiding judge posed leading questions questioning of children so as to (1) facilitate the ascertainment of the truth,
to the private complainant. The presiding judge was biased and partial to (2) ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the
the prosecution. developmental level of the child, (3) protect children from harassment or
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in participating directly and undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of time.
actively in the presentation and reception of the prosecution’s evidence The court may allow the child witness to testify in a narrative form.
thereby failing to uphold the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
While it may be true that it was dark when the appellant ravished the private
complainant in his house, it cannot, however, be gainsaid that the private

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complainant could have sufficiently identified the appellant as the culprit.

The appellant was the uncle of the private complainant. She and her father
Paquito had been living with the appellant and his family off and on for Case Digest: Yu, S.D.
years before she and her father were brought back with appellant in
January 1996 to Capoocan, Leyte, to live anew with the appellant and his Adoptive admission and hearsay
family. The private complainant was thus familiar not only with the physical
build of the appellant but also with his voice and peculiar smell. A person Estrada vs. Desierto
may be identified by these factors. Once a person has gained familiarity
with another, identification is quite an easy task. G.R. No. 146710-15 | March 2, 2001 (Decision)/ April 3, 2001
(Resolution)
Accused failed to attribute any ill motive on the part of the victim to testify Facts: From the beginning of petitioner Joseph Estrada’s term as President
falsely and impute against him the commission of a grave offense such as of the Philippines, he was plagued by a plethora of problems that caused
rape. To the contrary, the trial court observed that the victim lived in place his downfall. Calls for resignation of Estrada filled the air. However, he
“more rural than most rural villages” in the country, and was still “unaffected strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign. Thereafter,
by the wordly ways of urban life.” “It is highly inconceivable for a young impeachment trial against him started.
barrio lass, inexperienced with the ways of the world, to fabricate a charge
of defloration, undergo a medical examination of her private parts, subject
But by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of a
herself to public trial, and tarnish her family’s honor and reputation unless
second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that Estrada
she was motivated by a potent desire to seek justice for the wrong
held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name “Jose Velarde.”
committed against her.”
The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets
of the metropolis. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA
This Court agrees with the trial court that the appellant used a knife in Shrine which led to the EDSA II Revolution.
committing the crime charged and that he is the uncle of the private
complainant and, hence, her relative within the third civil degree. However,
Thereafter, Estrada left Malacanang Palace and issued a press statement
as to the latter, there is no allegation in the Information that the appellant is
containing Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s takeover due to him leaving the seat
the uncle of the private complainant as required by Section 8 of Rule 110
of presidency. However, Estrada filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. In People v. Bernaldez, this
quo warranto, praying for a judgment confirming him to be the lawful and
Court held that the minority of the private complainant and her relationship
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable
to the appellant must be alleged in the Information because these
to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring Macapagal-Arroyo only
circumstances are special qualifying circumstances for rape to warrant the
in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution. But the
imposition of the death penalty. Although this rule took effect on December
Supreme Court ruled that indeed, Estrada resigned as President. In coming
1, 2000, or before the crime charged in the Information was committed, the
up with the decision, the Court used Executive Secretary Angara’s diary
Court has consistently applied the rule retroactively. Thus, since the
(Angara Diary) published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI) to prove
relationship of the private complainant and the appellant was not alleged in
Estrada’s state of mind on the issue of his resignation.
the Information, the appellant cannot be convicted of qualified rape,
otherwise he would be deprived of his right to be informed of the nature of
the charge against him. The appellant may only be convicted of simple rape Now, Estrada files a Motion for Reconsideration for the Supreme Court’s
with the special aggravating circumstance of use of a deadly weapon in the decision on the ground that the Court’s alleged improper use of the Angara
commission of the crime. Rape with use of a deadly weapon is punishable Diary violates the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence.
by reclusion perpetua to death under the third paragraph of Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Since the prosecution failed to Issue: Whether the Angara Diary is inadmissible
prove any aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime, the
Held: NO. The Court ruled that the Angara Diary is not an out of court
appellant may be meted only the penalty of reclusion perpetua conformably
statement but a part of the pleadings in the cases at bar. To be sure, the
with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
diary was frequently referred to by the parties in their pleadings. The three

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parts of the diary published in the PDI from 4-6 February 2001 were to treat the party’s reaction as an admission of something stated or implied
attached as Annexes A-C, respectively, of the Memorandum of private by the other person. The basis for admissibility of admissions made
respondents. Likewise, the second and third parts of the Diary were earlier vicariously is that arising from the ratification or adoption by the party of the
attached as Annexes 12 and 13 of the Comment of private respondents. It statements which the other person had made. This process of attribution is
was also extensively used by Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez in his not mumbo jumbo but common sense. In this case, the Angara Diary show
oral arguments. Thus, Estrada had all the opportunity to contest the use of that the options of Estrada started to dwindle when the armed forces
the diary but unfortunately failed to do so. withdrew its support from him as President and commander-in-chief. Thus,
Executive Secretary Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel to
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of advise Estrada to consider the option of “dignified exit or resignation.”
court statement, still its use is not covered by the hearsay rule. Evidence is Estrada did not object to the suggested option but simply said he could
called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the never leave the country. Estrada’s silence on this and other related
competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by suggestions can be taken as an admission by him.
whom it is sought to produce it. There are three reasons for excluding
hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross-examination; (2) absence of Estrada further contends that the use of the Angara Diary against him
demeanor evidence; and (3) absence of the oath. However, not all hearsay violated the rules on res inter alios acta. The rule is expressed in section
evidence is inadmissible as evidence. Over the years, a huge body of 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides that the rights of a party
hearsay evidence has been admitted by the courts due to their relevance, cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except
trustworthiness, and necessity. as hereinafter provided. Again, the Court held that Estrada errs in his
contention. The res inter alios acta rule has several exceptions. One of
them is provided in Section 29 of Rule 130 with respect to admissions by a
A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that the Court further co-partner or agent.
determine whether the hearsay evidence is one exempted from the rules
of exclusion. A more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will
show that they do not cover admissions of a party and the Angara Diary Executive Secretary Angara was his alter ego; he was the Little President.
belongs to this class. Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that “the act, Indeed, he was authorized by Estrada to act for him in the critical hours and
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in days before he abandoned Malacanang Palace. Thus, the Angara Diary
evidence against him.” It has long been settled that these admissions are contained a statement of full trust made by Estrada after Secretary Angara
admissible even if they are hearsay. briefed him about the progress of the first negotiation. True to this trust,
Estrada had to ask Secretary Angara if he would already leave Malacanang
after taking their final lunch.
The Angara Diary contains direct statements of Estrada which can be
categorized as admissions of a party: his proposal for a snap presidential
election where he would not be a candidate; his statement that he only Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent are binding on the
wanted the five-day period promised by Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes; his principal. The reasons for this rule are: “What is done, by agent, is done by
statements that he would leave by Monday if the second envelope would the principal through him, as through a mere instrument. So, whatever is
be opened by Monday and “Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado said by an agent, either in making a contract for his principal, or at the time
nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga.” The Court and accompanying the performance of any act within the scope of his
noted that days before, Estrada has repeatedly declared that he would not authority, having relation to, and connected with, and in the course of the
resign despite the growing clamor for his resignation. The reason for the particular contract or transaction in which he is then engaged.”
meltdown is obvious--- his will not to resign has wilted.
Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently
It is however argued that the Angara Diary is not the diary of Estrada; relevant statements. These are statements which are relevant
hence, non-binding on him. But the Court held that the argument overlooks independently of whether they are true or not. They belong to two (2)
the doctrine of adoptive admission. An adoptive admission is a party’s classes: (1) those statements which are the very facts in issue; and (2)
reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable those statements which are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue.
The second class includes the following:

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(a)Statement of a person showing his state of mind, that is, his mental the CTA rendered a Decision denying Atlas' claim for tax credit or refund.
condition, knowledge, belief, intention, ill will and other emotions; (b.) It held that Atlas failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant the grant
Statements of a person which show his physical condition, as illness and of tax credit or refund for the alleged input taxes paid by Atlas.
the like; (c.) Statements of a person from which an inference may be made On Atlas' appeal, the CA denied and dismissed Atlas' petition on the ground
as to the state of mind of another, that is, the knowledge, belief, motive, of insufficiency of evidence to support Atlas' action for tax credit or refund.
good or bad faith, etc. of the latter; (d.) Statements which may identify the
date, place and person in question; and (e.) Statements showing the lack Issues:
of credibility of a witness.
1. Whether Atlas has sufficiently proven entitlement to a tax credit or
As aforediscussed, The Angara Diary contains statements of the petitioner refund.
which reflect his state of mind and are circumstantial evidence of his intent
to resign. It also contains statements of Secretary Angara from which we 2. Whether Atlas should have been accorded a new trial.
can reasonably deduce petitioner’s intent to resign. They are admissible Held: 1. NO. Atlas failed to show sufficient proof.
and they are not covered by the rule on hearsay. This has long been a quiet First, we reiterate the prevailing rule that the findings of fact of the CA are
area of our law on evidence and petitioners attempt to foment a belated generally conclusive and binding and the Court need not pass upon the
tempest cannot receive our imprimatur. supporting evidence. For, it is not this Court's function to analyze or weigh
Case Digest: Silverio, M.C.S. evidence all over again.
Second, the Rules of Court, which is suppletory in quasi-judicial
K_ OFFER AND OBJECTION proceedings, particularly Sec. 34 of Rule 132, Revised Rules on Evidence,
is clear that no evidence which has not been formally offered shall be
1) Offer of evidence considered. Thus, where the pertinent invoices or receipts purportedly
evidencing the VAT paid by Atlas were not submitted, the courts a quo
ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING AND DEVELOPMENT evidently could not determine the veracity of the input VAT Atlas has paid.
CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE Moreover, when Atlas likewise failed to submit pertinent export documents
to prove actual export sales with due certification from accredited banks on
G.R. No. 159490 | February 18, 2008
the export proceeds in foreign currency with the corresponding conversion
Ratio: The Rules of Court, which is suppletory in quasi-judicial rate into Philippine currency, the courts a quo likewise could not determine
proceedings, particularly Sec. 34 of Rule 132, Revised Rules on Evidence, the veracity of the export sales as indicated in Atlas' amended VAT return.
is clear that no evidence which has not been formally offered shall be It must be noted that the most competent evidence must be adduced and
considered. presented to prove the allegations in a complaint, petition, or protest before
a judicial court. And where the best evidence cannot be submitted,
Facts: Atlas is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine secondary evidence may be presented. In the instant case, the pertinent
laws engaged in the production of copper concentrates for export. It is documents which are the best pieces of evidence were not presented.
registered as a VAT entity and was issued a VAT Registration Certificate. Third, the summary presented by Atlas does not replace the pertinent
For the first quarter of 1993, Atlas' export sales amounted to PhP642 invoices, receipts, and export sales documents as competent evidence to
million. Its proceeds were received in acceptable foreign currency and prove the fact of refundable or creditable input VAT.
inwardly remitted in accordance with Central Bank regulations. For the Fourth, Atlas' mere allegations of the figures in its amended VAT return for
same period, Atlas paid PhP7 million for input taxes. Thereafter, Atlas filed the first quarter of 1993 as well as in its petition before the CTA are not
a VAT return for the first quarter of 1993 with the Bureau of Internal sufficient proof of the amount of its refund entitlement. They do not even
Revenue (BIR) and also filed an amended VAT return. Atlas applied with constitute evidence adverse to CIR against whom they are being
the BIR for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund under Section presented.
106 (b) of the Tax Code. 2. NO. There was no denial of due process.
Atlas then filed a petition for review with the CTA in 1995 to prevent the
running of the prescriptive period under Sec. 230 of the Tax Code. In 1997,

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Clearly, Atlas attempted or showed willingness to submit the required Nevertheless, the CTA did not fully adopt the assessment made by the BIR
documents only after the CTA rendered its decision. Atlas is guilty of and it came up with its own computation of the deficiency estate tax.
inexcusable negligence in the prosecution of its case. Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA via a petition for review. The CA
affirmed the CTA's ruling. Hence, a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Case Digest: Diaz, M.L.S. Rule 45 was filed, seeking the reversal of the CA’s Decision.
The petitioner claims that in as much as the valid claims of creditors against
the Estate are in excess of the gross estate, no estate tax was due; that
DIZON v. COURT OF TAX APPEALS the lack of a formal offer of evidence is fatal to BIR's cause; that the doctrine
laid down in Vda. de Oñate has already been abandoned in a long line of
G.R. No. 140944 | April 30, 2008 cases in which the Court held that evidence not formally offered is without
any weight or value; that Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence
Ratio: The Court relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not
requiring a formal offer of evidence is mandatory in character; that, while
formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court provided
BIR's witness Alberto Enriquez (Alberto) in his testimony before the CTA
the following requirements are present, viz.: first, the same must have been
identified the pieces of evidence aforementioned such that the same were
duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must
marked, BIR's failure to formally offer said pieces of evidence and depriving
have been incorporated in the records of the case.
petitioner the opportunity to cross-examine Alberto, render the same
Facts: In 1987, Jose P. Fernandez died. Thereafter, a petition for the inadmissible in evidence.
probate of his will was filed with Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court On the other hand, respondent counters that the documents, being part of
(RTC) of Manila (probate court). The probate court then appointed retired the records of the case and duly identified in a duly recorded testimony are
Supreme Court Justice Arsenio P. Dizon and petitioner Atty. Rafael Arsenio considered evidence even if the same were not formally offered.
P. Dizon as Special and Assistant Special Administrator, respectively, of
Issue: Whether or not the CTA and the CA gravely erred in allowing the
the Estate of Jose.
admission of the pieces of evidence which were not formally offered by the
Justice Dizon informed respondent Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
BIR.
Revenue (BIR) of the special proceedings for the Estate. Justice Dizon
authorized Atty. Jesus M. Gonzales to sign and file on behalf of the Estate Held: YES. Under Section 8 of RA 1125, the CTA is categorically described
the required estate tax return and to represent the same in securing a as a court of record. As cases filed before it are litigated de novo, party-
Certificate of Tax Clearance. litigants shall prove every minute aspect of their cases. Indubitably, no
BIR Regional Director for San Pablo City, Osmundo G. Umali issued evidentiary value can be given the pieces of evidence submitted by the
Certifications stating that the taxes due on the transfer of real and personal BIR, as the rules on documentary evidence require that these documents
properties of Jose had been fully paid and said properties may be must be formally offered before the CTA. Pertinent is Section 34, Rule 132
transferred to his heirs. of the Revised Rules on Evidence which reads:
In 1990, Justice Dizon passed away. The probate court appointed SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. — The court shall consider no evidence which
petitioner as the administrator of the Estate. Petitioner requested the has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is
probate court's authority to sell several properties forming part of the offered must be specified.
Estate, for the purpose of paying its creditors. Although in a long line of cases many of which were decided after Vda. de
Atty. Gonzales moved for the reconsideration of the said estate tax Oñate, the Court held that courts cannot consider evidence which has not
assessment. However, the BIR Commissioner denied the request and been formally offered, nevertheless, petitioner cannot validly assume that
reiterated that the estate is liable for the payment of P66 million as the doctrine laid down in Vda. de Oñate has already been abandoned.
deficiency estate tax. Recently, in Ramos v. Dizon, the Court, applying the said doctrine, ruled
Petitioner filed a petition for review before respondent CTA. The CTA that the trial court judge therein committed no error when he admitted and
denied the said petition for review. Citing the Court's ruling in Vda. de Oñate considered the respondents' exhibits in the resolution of the case,
v. Court of Appeals, the CTA opined that the aforementioned pieces of notwithstanding the fact that the same were not formally offered. Likewise,
evidence introduced by the BIR were admissible in evidence. in Far East Bank & Trust Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
the Court made reference to said doctrine in resolving the issues therein.

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Indubitably, the doctrine laid down in Vda. De Oñate still subsists in this
jurisdiction. Republic of the Philippines vs. Espinosa,
The Court relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally
offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the G.R. No. 186603, April 5, 2017
following requirements are present, viz.: first, the same must have been
duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must Ratio: Land Registration Proceedings. In land registration proceedings, the
have been incorporated in the records of the case applicant has the burden of overcoming the presumption of State
From the foregoing declaration, however, it is clear that Vda. de Oñate is ownership.
merely an exception to the general rule. Being an exception, it may be
applied only when there is strict compliance with the requisites mentioned Reversion of property. Reversion is the remedy where the State, pursuant
therein; otherwise, the general rule in Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules to the Regalian doctrine, seeks to revert land back to the mass of the public
of Court should prevail. domain.34 It is proper when public land is fraudulently awarded and
In this case, the requirements have not been satisfied. The assailed pieces disposed of to private individuals or corporations. 35 There are also
of evidence were presented and marked during the trial particularly when instances when we granted reversion on grounds other than fraud, such as
Alberto took the witness stand. Alberto identified these pieces of evidence when a “person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by
in his direct testimony. He was also subjected to cross-examination and re- oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, or
cross examination by petitioner. But Alberto's account and the exchanges when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because
between Alberto and petitioner did not sufficiently describe the contents of it is of the public domain
the said pieces of evidence presented by the BIR.
A common fact threads through Vda. de Oñate and Ramos that does not Remedial Law. The rules require that documentary evidence must be
exist at all in the instant case. In the aforementioned cases, the exhibits formally offered in evidence after the presentation of testimonial evidence,
were marked at the pre-trial proceedings to warrant the pronouncement and it may be done orally, or if allowed by the court, in writing.
that the same were duly incorporated in the records of the case.
While the CTA is not governed strictly by technical rules of evidence, as Facts: A cadastral decree was issued in favor of Espinosa. The Original
rules of procedure are not ends in themselves and are primarily intended Certificate of Title was issued in the name of Espinosa who later sold to
as tools in the administration of justice, the presentation of the BIR's Caliston which a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued.
evidence is not a mere procedural technicality which may be disregarded
considering that it is the only means by which the CTA may ascertain and The Sated through Regional Executive Director of the DENR filed a
verify the truth of BIR's claims against the Estate. The BIR's failure to Complaint for annulment of title and reversion of land with the RTC claiming
formally offer these pieces of evidence, despite CTA's directives, is fatal to the property is inalienable public land because it fell within the timberland
its cause. Such failure is aggravated by the fact that not even a single area.
reason was advanced by the BIR to justify such fatal omission. This is taken
against the BIR.
RTC ruled in favor of the State and ordered reversion of the property.
The formal offer of one's evidence is deemed waived after failing to submit
it within a considerable period of time. It explained that the court cannot
admit an offer of evidence made after a lapse of three (3) months because CA ruled in favor of Espinosa and found that the State failed to prove fraud
to do so would "condone an inexcusable laxity if not non-compliance with or misrepresentation when she was issued the Original Certificate of Title.
a court order which, in effect, would encourage needless delays and derail It further ruled that the State failed to prove that the property is forest land.
the speedy administration of justice." The lone piece of evidence consisting of LC Map No, 2978 was not
Petitioners' failure to comply with the rule on admissibility of evidence is authenticated pursuant to Section 24 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It
anathema to the efficient, effective, and expeditious dispensation of noted that the parties stipulated only as to the existence of the map, but not
justice. as to genuineness of truthfulness of its content. Assuming that the map is
admitted in evidence, Espinosa’s rights over the property, which accrued in
Case Digest: Diaz, M.L.S.

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1962, should not be prejudiced by a subsequent classification by the State Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is of the public
done in 1986, or after 24 years. domain.”36

Issue: Whether or not the State has sufficiently proved that the property is In this case, the State, through the Solicitor General, alleges neither fraud
part of inalienable forest land at the time Espinosa was granted the nor misrepresentation in the cadastral proceedings and in the issuance of
cadastral decree and issued a title. the title in Espinosa’s favor. The argument for the State is merely that the
property was unlawfully included in the certificate of title because it is of the
Held: No. The State failed to prove that the property was classified as forest public domain.
land at the time of the grant of the cadastral decree and issuance of title to
Espinosa. Since the case is one for reversion and not one for land registration, the
burden is on the State to prove that the property was classified as
In land registration proceedings, the applicant has the burden of timberland or forest land at the time it was decreed to Espinosa.37 To
overcoming the presumption of State ownership. It must establish, through reiterate, there is no burden on Caliston to prove that the property in
incontrovertible evidence, that the land sought to be registered is alienable question is alienable and disposable land.38 At this stage, it is reasonable
or disposable based on a positive act of the government.30 Since cadastral to presume that Espinosa, from whom Caliston derived her title, had
proceedings are governed by the usual rules of practice, procedure, and already established that the property is alienable and disposable land
evidence, a cadastral decree and a certificate of title are issued only after considering that she succeeded in obtaining the OCT over it. 39 In this
the applicant proves all the requisite jurisdictional facts-that they are reversion proceeding, the State must prove that there was an oversight or
entitled to the claimed lot, that all parties are heard, and that evidence is mistake in the inclusion of the property in Espinosa’s title because it was of
considered.31 As such, the cadastral decree is a judgment which public dominion. This is consistent with the rule that the burden of proof
adjudicates ownership after proving these jurisdictional facts. 32 rests on the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the
case, asserts the affirmative of an issue. 40
Here, it is undisputed that Espinosa was granted a cadastral decree and
was subsequently issued OCT No. 191-N, the predecessor title of Here, the State hinges its whole claim on its lone piece of evidence, the
Caliston’s TCT No. 91117. Having been granted a decree in a cadastral land classification map prepared in 1986. The records show, however, that
proceeding, Espinosa can be presumed to have overcome the presumption LC Map No. 2978 was not formally offered in evidence. The rules require
that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.33 This that documentary evidence must be formally offered in evidence after the
means that Espinosa, as the applicant, was able to prove by presentation of testimonial evidence, and it may be done orally, or if allowed
incontrovertible evidence that the property is alienable and disposable by the court, in writing.41Due process requires a formal offer of evidence for
property in the cadastral proceedings. the benefit of the adverse party, the trial court, and the appellate courts. 42
This gives the adverse party the opportunity to examine and oppose the
This is not to say, however, that the State has no remedy to recover the admissibility of the evidence.43 When evidence has notbeen formally
property if indeed it is part of the inalienable lands of the public domain. offered, it should not be considered by the court in arriving at its decision.44
The State may still do so through an action for reversion, as in the present Not having been offered formally, it was error for the trial court to have
case. considered the survey map. Consequently, it also erred in ordering the
reversion of the property to the mass of the public domain on the basis of
Reversion is the remedy where the State, pursuant to the Regalian the same.
doctrine, seeks to revert land back to the mass of the public domain. 34 It is
proper when public land is fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private Moreover, even assuming that the survey can be admitted in evidence, this
individuals or corporations.35 There are also instances when we granted will not help to further the State’s cause. This is because the only fact
reversion on grounds other than fraud, such as when a “person obtains a proved by the map is one already admitted by the State, that is, that the
title under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which land was reclassified in 1986.45 This fact does not address the presumption/
cannot be registered under the Torrens system, or when the Director of conclusion that Espinosa has, at the time of the cadastral proceedings

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conducted in 1955, proved that the land is alienable and disposable, as amount to taking of private property without just compensation and due
evidenced by the decree issued in his favor in 1962. process of law.53 This, however, is not what our Constitution envisions;
fairness and due process are paramount considerations that must still be
At this juncture, we agree with the CA’s application of SAAD Agro- observed.
Industries, Inc.,50 which involved a complaint for annulment of title and
reversion of a lot covered by a free patent and original title. To support its Case Digest: WEI
claim that the lot was part of the timberland and forest reserve, the State
submitted as evidence a photocopy of a land classification map. This map 7) Tender of excluded evidence
also became the basis of the testimonies of City Environment and Natural
Resources Office officers declaring that the lot falls within the timberland or Cruz-Arevalo vs. Layosa
forest reserve. The State, however, failed to submit either a certified true
copy or an official publication of the map, prompting the trial court to deny A.M.RTJ-06-2005 | July 14, 2006
its admission in evidence. After proceedings, the trial court dismissed the
complaint due to the State’s failure to show that the subject lot therein is Ratio:
part of the timberland or forest reserve or has been classified as such Evidence formally offered by a party may be admitted or excluded by the
before the issuance of the free patent and the original title. The CA, relying court. If a party’s offered documentary or object evidence is excluded, he
on the map, reversed the trial court. may move or request that it be attached to form part of the record of the
case. If the excluded evidence is oral, he may state for the record the name
and other personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of the
When the case was brought before this court, we reinstated the trial court’s
proposed testimony.
decision. We held that the photocopy of the land classification map cannot
be considered in evidence because it is excluded under the best evidence
rule. We emphasized that all parties, including the Government, are bound Facts:
by the rules of admissibility and must comply with it- Josefina Cruz-Arevalo filed an administrative complaint against Judge
Querubin-Layosa (judge) for manifest bias and partiality and ignorance of
The rules of admissibility must be applied uniformly. The same rule holds the law relative to a civil case entitled Cruz-Arevalo and Conrado Cruz v.
true when the Government is one of the parties. The Government, when it Home Development Mutual Fund.
comes to court to litigate with one of its citizens, must submit to the rules of
procedure and its rights and privileges at every stage of the proceedings Conrado Cruz executed an authorization letter and SPA in her favor to
are substantially in every respect the same as those of its citizens; it cannot represent him in the said civil case while Conrado undergoes a medical
have a superior advantage. This is so because when a [sovereign] submits treatment in the USA. Notwithstanding the presentation of said letter and
itself to the jurisdiction of the court and participates therein, its claims and SPA, the judge declared Cruz non-suited due to his absence during pre-
rights are justiciable by every other principle and rule applicable to the trial. The judge also excluded several paragraphs in the Affidavit which was
claims and rights of the private parties under similar circumstances. Failure adopted as the direct testimony of her witness without giving her counsel a
to abide by the rules on admissibility renders the L.C. Map submitted by chance to comment on the objections raised by the defendants. Moreover,
respondent inadmissible as proof to show that the subject lot is part of the she refused to issue a written order excluding certain paragraphs thus
forest reserve.51 depriving Cruz-Arevalo the opportunity to file certiorari proceedings.
Complainant likewise accuses respondent judge of inaction, indifference or
The result would have been different had the State proved that the property collusion by silence with the defendants for not acting on her Motions for
was already classified as part of forest land at the time of the cadastral Writs of Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad Testificandum thus providing
proceedings and when title was decreed to Espinosa in 1962. However, it opportunity for defendant Quimbo to avoid compliance therewith.
failed to discharge this burden; the grant of title which carries with it the Cruz-Arevalo prays for the re-raffling of the case to ensure impartiality. The
presumption that Espinosa had already proved the alienable character of judge inhibited herself from trying the case.
the property in the cadastral proceedings stands. To grant the reversion
based on a subsequent reclassification, more so on lack of evidence, would

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The judge explained that the letter presented by Cruz-Arevalo is defective for purposes of appeal. If an adverse judgment is eventually rendered
because it was not notarized and authenticated. The against the offeror, he may in his appeal assign as error the rejection of the
SPA is also defective because it gave Cruz-Arevalo the authority to receive excluded evidence. The appellate court will better understand and
Cruz’s contribution to the PAG-IBIG fund and not to represent him in the appreciate the assignment of error if the evidence involved is included in
case. As regards the exclusion of several paragraphs in the Affidavit the record of the case.
constituting as the direct testimony of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., the judge
points out On the other hand, the ruling on an objection must be given immediately
that she gave the other party the chance to go over the affidavit and make after an objection is made, as what respondent judge did, unless the court
objections thereto like any direct testimonial evidence. She claims that no desires to take a reasonable time to inform itself on the question presented;
written order is necessary as demanded by complainants counsel because but the ruling shall always be made during the trial and at such time as will
her rulings were made in open court during the course of trial and are give the party against whom it is made an opportunity to meet the situations
already reflected in the transcript of the stenographic notes. With regard to presented by the ruling. Respondent judge correctly ordered the striking
complainant's Motions for Writs of Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad out of portions in Atty. Arevalo's affidavit which are incompetent, irrelevant,
Testificandum, respondent judge avers that they were not given due course or otherwise improper. Objections based on irrelevancy and immateriality
because the legal fees for said motions were unpaid and the person alleged need no specification or explanation. Relevancy or materiality of evidence
to have possession or control of the documents sought to be produced is is a matter of logic, since it is determined simply by ascertaining its logical
not named or specified therein connection to a fact in issue in the case.

Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the accusations The Court agrees with OCA’s observation that: “There is also
unmeritorious and recommended the dismissal of the administrative case nothing irregular when respondent [judge] did not issue an order
for lack of merit. to reflect the objections of the defense counsel to each of the
Issue: allegations in the sworn affidavit which was adopted as the direct
testimony of complainant’s counsel as the court’s rulings thereto
1. Whether or not Judge Layosa should be administratively liable-NO were made during the trial. As pointed out by respondent [judge],
these matters are already reflected in the transcript of
2. Whether or not Judge Layosa erred in ordering the exclusion of several stenographic notes and are not subject to written order. Orders
paragraphs in the affidavit-NO resolving motions for continuance made in the presence of the
adverse party, or those made in the course of a hearing or trial,
Held: may properly be made orally. Moreover, the acts of a judge in
1. No. While non-appearance of a party may be excused if a duly his/her judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even
authorized representative shall appear in his behalf, however Cruz failed to though erroneous in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or
validly constitute complainant because his authorization letter and SPA corruption which complainant failed to prove in the instant case.”
were not respectively authenticated and specific as to its purpose. Without
any authorized representative, the failure of Cruz to appear at the pre-trial
made him non-suited. Respondent judge thus correctly dismissed the Finally, complainant failed to present evidence to show the alleged bias of
complaint in so far as he is concerned. respondent judge; mere suspicion that a judge was partial is not enough.
Bare allegations of partiality will not suffice in an absence of a clear showing
2. No. As regards the exclusion of certain paragraphs in the affidavit of that will overcome the presumption that the judge dispensed justice without
complainants witness, the rule is that evidence formally offered by a party fear or favor. Hence, the Court ruled that the instant administrative
may be admitted or excluded by the court. If a party’s offered documentary complaint against Judge Layosa is dismissed for lack of merit.
or object evidence is excluded, he may move or request that it be attached
to form part of the record of the case. If the excluded evidence is oral, he Case Digest: Martinez, Y.P.Y
may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the
witness and the substance of the proposed testimony. These procedures
are known as offer of proof or tender of excluded evidence and are made

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