THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 231030. January 17, 2018.]

PHILIPPINE PLASTICS INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, INC. ,

petitioner, vs. HON. ALDRIN L. SAN PEDRO, Mayor of the City
of Muntinlupa, Metropolitan Manila, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution
dated January 17, 2018, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 231030 (Philippine Plastics Industry Association, Inc.
vs. Hon. Aldrin L. San Pedro, Mayor of the City of Muntinlupa,
Metropolitan Manila). — The Court NOTES respondent City Government
of Muntinlupa's comment on the petition for review on certiorari.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeks to reverse and to set aside the Decision 2 dated June 28, 2016
and the Resolution 3 dated April 11, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 137584.
The undisputed facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Muntinlupa City enacted on January
18, 2010 Ordinance No. 10-10 4 entitled "AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE
USE OF PLASTIC BAGS ON DRY GOODS, REGULATING ITS UTILIZATION ON
WET GOODS AND PROHIBITING THE USE OF STYROFOAM/STYROPHOR IN THE
CITY OF MUNTINLUPA AND PRESCRIBING THE PENALTIES THEREOF" (subject
Ordinance). By the subject Ordinance, business establishments and/or
individuals are prohibited from selling and providing (1) plastic bags to
consumers as secondary packaging materials on wet goods; (2) plastic
bags to consumers as primary packaging material on dry goods; and
(3) Styrofoam/styrophor as containers. The herein respondent Hon. Aldrin L.
San Pedro (San Pedro), then Mayor of Muntinlupa City, later approved the
subject Ordinance. 5
The herein petitioner Philippine Plastics Industry Association, Inc.
(PPIAI), a non-stock, non-profit corporation, established to protect the
legitimate business interests of persons and entities in the country's plastics
industry, however, challenged its constitutionality before this Court via a
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Injunction and Preliminary Injunction (with
prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The case was then docketed as G.R. No. 206718. 6
After the submission of the required Comment and Reply, this Court
found that most of the issues involved are factual. Thus, on October 7, 2014,
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 this Court referred the case to the CA for hearing, reception of evidence and
rendition of judgment. In compliance therewith, the CA heard the case on
November 9, 2015 and the following facts were stipulated: (1) the
genuineness and due execution of a copy of the subject Ordinance; and (2)
Republic Act No. 9003 (RA 9003) was passed 10 years before the enactment
of the subject Ordinance. The issues raised by the petitioner before the CA
are: (1) whether Section 15 7 (a), (b) and (c) of the subject Ordinance
violates RA 9003; (2) whether the subject Ordinance complies with the
requirements for the valid enactment of police power ordinances; (3)
whether the petitioner is entitled to the writs of certiorari and prohibition; (4)
whether the petitioner is entitled to the injunctive reliefs sought in these
proceedings; and (5) whether the petitioner has locus standi in the instant
case. 8
On June 28, 2016, the CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the
Petition. While it upheld the petitioner's locus standi for not being disputed
by the City Government of Muntinlupa and for being able to show that it will
personally suffer some actual or threatened injury allegedly due to the
enactment of the subject ordinance, the CA, however, pronounced that the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition availed of are improper remedies. For
one, the respondent did not perform a judicial or quasi-judicial function in
approving the subject Ordinance; there was also no showing that the
approval was attended by grave abuse of discretion; and the petitioner failed
to show that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
available. Instead of certiorari and prohibition, the proper remedy would be a
Petition for Declaratory Relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court as the
petitioner seeks the nullification of the subject Ordinance, or at least a
portion thereof, for being unconstitutional, an invalid exercise of police
power and violative of RA 9003, which matters are beyond the scope of a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. And, even if certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus may be the appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues
and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and
executive officials, it is still incumbent upon the petitioner to show the (1)
existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights
susceptible of judicial determination; (2) the existence of personal and
substantial interest on the part of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity;
and (4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to
the decision of the case. These, the petitioner failed to do. The principle of
hierarchy of courts was also disregarded in filing the Petition directly with
this Court instead of with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The CA equally held that the petitioner failed to prove that the subject
Ordinance violated the equal protection clause and that it is discriminatory.
The petitioner simply made a general statement that there exists no
substantial distinction between the primary packaging, the secondary
packaging, and the plastic cutlery without adding anything else. But in truth,
substantial distinction does exist between the primary and the secondary
plastic packaging materials, or even between the plastic packaging materials
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 and the plastic cutlery as certain goods require a primary receptacle or
packaging. To note, primary packaging materials are wrappers or
receptacles of wet goods, snack foods, frozen foods and hardware while
secondary packaging materials are packaging materials for wet goods to
provide support to any packaging and intended for the convenience of the
handler as well. Obviously, frozen and wet goods require nonporous primary
packaging to prevent the seepage or spillage of liquid or fluid. But, no such
seepage or spillage can be had on dry goods, which do not require
refrigeration like clothing and textile. Further, as explained by the City
Government of Muntinlupa, what is prohibited in the subject Ordinance
is the sale and provision of plastic bags as packaging materials for
wet and dry goods, and not the plastic packaging or wrappers of
these goods done by the producers or manufacturers thereof. As to
the argument that the subject Ordinance is unfair and unreasonable as the
plastic bag, plastic packaging, and styrophor containers are declared by the
ordinance to be harmful to the environment when they are otherwise, the
same cannot be given any credence for lack of proof that these plastic bags,
among others, are indeed not harmful to the environment. 9
The petitioner sought reconsideration but it was denied in the
questioned Resolution dated April 11, 2017.
Hence, this Petition raising the issue of whether the enactment and the
approval of the subject Ordinance, particularly Section 15 (a) and (b) thereof,
were attended with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, inasmuch as it does not conform to the requirements of a valid
police power ordinance.
There is no merit in the instant petition.
At the outset, this Court finds it no longer necessary to discuss once
again the procedural issues raised by the petitioner for the CA had already
made a well-versed discussion on the matter to which this Court conforms.
Thus, this Court will now proceed to the main issue raised herein.
In Legaspi v. City of Cebu, et al. 10 citing City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 11
this Court made these pronouncements regarding the tests of a valid
ordinance, thus:
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line
of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not
only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to
enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
l a w , it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive ; (3) must not be
partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public
policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal
(i.e., whether the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers
of the LGU, and whether it was passed in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e., involving
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 inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the
limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the
requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public
policy). (Emphases and italics supplied.)
Here, it is beyond question that the City Government of Muntinlupa,
pursuant to Section 11 (a) (6) and (e) (13), Rule V of RA 7926, 12 in relation
to Section 458 (a) (1) (vi) and (a) (5) (xiii) of RA 7160, 13 has the power to
approve ordinances and pass resolutions in order to "[p]rotect the
environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the
environment x x x and such other activities which result in pollution,
acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological
imbalance;" and to "[p]rovide for an effective and efficient system of solid
waste and garbage collection x x x." With these, it is clear that the issuance
of the subject Ordinance, that is, the prohibition on the use of plastic bags to
consumers as secondary packaging materials on wet goods and as primary
packaging materials on dry goods, and on the use of styrofoam/styrophor as
containers, is well within the power of the City Government of Muntinlupa for
it merely acted based on its mandate to do all efforts to protect the
environment. After all, such mandate originated from the Constitution itself.
Also, its enactment is in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
Now, as to the substantive requirements of a valid ordinance, this
Court assents to the findings of the CA that, indeed, all such requirements
have been met.
Here, the petitioner argued that the subject Ordinance runs counter to
the Constitution for being violative of the equal protection clause as it
prohibits the use of plastic bags as secondary packaging materials on wet
goods without substantial distinction as opposed to primary packaging
materials of the same wet goods. Also, while the subject Ordinance prohibits
the selling of plastic bags, no such prohibition was made with regard to
plastic spoons and forks used in restaurants and eateries, which are also
harmful to the environment. To the mind of this Court, such arguments are
preposterous.
The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute,
but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized
by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be
treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must also
be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging
to the same class. In short, for classification, to be valid, it must (1) rest on
substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be
limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of
the same class. 14 As aptly observed by the CA, the subject Ordinance did
not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution, as there is
substantial distinction between the primary and secondary plastic packaging
materials, or even between plastic packaging materials and plastic cutlery.
To note, the frozen and wet goods require nonporous primary packaging to
prevent the seepage or spillage of liquid or fluid but no such seepage or
spillage can be had on dry goods that do not require refrigeration. For this
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 reason, plastic as primary packaging materials for wet goods is allowed
while the same is disallowed as primary packaging materials for dry goods.
Further, plastic is also disallowed as secondary packaging materials for wet
goods since no more seepage or spillage of liquid or fluid can be had as their
primary packaging already served the purpose of preventing the same. The
use of plastic as secondary packaging materials for wet goods is merely to
provide support to any packaging and it is intended for the convenience of
the handler. Thus, a re-usable packaging material would be enough to serve
that purpose. And as explained by the City Government of Muntinlupa, the
prohibition covers only the sale and provision of plastic bags as packaging
materials for wet and dry goods and not the plastic packaging or wrappers of
these goods done by the producers or manufacturers thereof.
The subject Ordinance is not also unfair and unreasonable. Though the
petitioner claimed that the plastic packaging materials concerned are not
harmful to the environment, it, however, failed to provide any proof in
support of such claim. To repeat, the issuance of the subject Ordinance is in
accordance with the mandate of the City Government of Muntinlupa to
protect the environment. Thus, it will not be brushed aside based on the
simple allegation that is it unfair and unreasonable.
There is also no conflict between the subject Ordinance and RA 9003.
Here we quote with approval the CA's disquisition on the matter:
x x x Petitioner now insists that the subject Ordinance prohibits
the sale and offering of all plastic packaging or bags, without regard
to whether the same are environmentally acceptable or not, and thus,
violates x x x Section 30 [of RA 9003].
x x x There is, however, no such conflict.
Under Section 5, Rule XII of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations [IRR] of [RA 9003], the prohibition on non-
environmentally acceptable products and any decision to prohibit
certain packaging types and products, must be supported by
available scientific, environmental, technical and economic
information and technical studies through, but not limited to life cycle
assessment and economic analysis. However, this requirement
pertains to the National Solid Waste Management Commission only.
This does not impose any restriction on the powers of the local
government units to adopt their own system of waste reduction or
source reduction, i.e., reduction of solid waste before it enters the
solid waste stream by methods such as product design, materials
substitution, materials re-use and packaging restrictions. Moreover,
as aptly observed by the City Government of Muntinlupa, there is
nothing in [RA 9003], or even in its [IRR], which prohibits the
regulation and/or banning of environmentally acceptable products. 15
The subject Ordinance is also general and consistent with public policy.
The CA's observation in relation to this is worth telling:
Finally, We are cognizant with the emerging trend in the nation
to prohibit and/or regulate the use of plastic bags and styrofoam
and/or styrophor either as primary or secondary packaging or as food
containers for waste or source reduction purposes. The foremost
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 consideration of the subject Ordinance, as well as the similar
ordinances enacted by other local government units in the country is
to preserve the environment and the ecological balance. This is
consistent with the mandate under the Constitution that the State
shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
16

With all the foregoing, this Court finds no grave error on the part of the
CA when it struck down the petitioner's petition. Truly, the enactment of the
subject Ordinance was not attended by grave abuse of discretion for it
complied both with the formal and substantive requirements of a valid
ordinance.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit
and the assailed CA Decision and Resolution dated June 28, 2016 and April
11, 2017, respectively, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITAN

Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo , pp. 10-57.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda with Associate Justices Sesinando
E. Villon and Pedro B. Corales, concurring, id . at 64-78.
3. Id. at 80-87.

4. Id. at 89-94.
5. CA Decision dated June 28, 2016, id . at 65.
6. CA Decision dated June 28, 2016, id .
7. It should be Section 15 (Prohibited Acts) and not Section 16 (Penalties).

8. CA Decision dated June 28, 2016, id . at 65-67.

9. CA Decision dated June 28, 2016, id . at 68-70, 73-74.
10. G.R. No. 159110, December 10, 2013.
11. G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 308.
12. Known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Muntinlupa into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Muntinlupa."
13. Known as the "Local Government Code of 1991."

14. Tiu, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 127410, January 20, 1999.
15. CA Decision dated June 28, 2016, rollo, pp. 75-76.

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 16. Id. at 77.

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