The Philosophy of the Moral Feelings x

ence, and extending a demoralizing power alike to him who

inflicts and to those who suffer the wrong. Thus is consti-
tuted a class of evils, of which no human law can take any
adequate cognizance, and which therefore raise our views,
in a special and peculiar manner, to a supreme Moral
Governor.

II. The Desire of Wealth, commonly called Avarice;

though avarice is perhaps justly to be regarded as the mor-
bid excess or abuse of the propensity. This is properly to be
considered as originating in the desire to possess the means
of procuring other gratifications. But, by the influence of
habit, the desire is transferred to the thing itself, and it often
becomes a kind of mania, in which there is the pure love of
gain, without the application of it to any other kind of
enjoyment. It is a propensity which may, in a remarkable
manner, engross the whole character, acquiring strength by
continuance, and it is then generally accompanied by a con-
tracted selfishness, which considers nothing as mean or
unworthy that can be made to contribute to the ruling pas-
sion. This may be the case even when the propensity is reg-
ulated by the rules of justice;—if it break through this
restraint, it leads to fraud, extortion, deceit, and injustice,
and, under another form, to theft or robbery. It is therefore
always in danger of being opposed to the exercise of the
benevolent affections, leading a man to live for himself,
and to study only the means calculated to promote his own
interest.

III. The Desire of Power, or Ambition. This is the love

of
ruling,—or giving the law to a circle whether more or less
extensive. When it becomes the governing propensity, the
strongest principles of human nature give way before it,
even those of personal comfort and safety. This we see in
the conqueror, who braves every danger, difficulty, and pri-
vation, for the attainment of power; and in the statesman,
who sacrifices for it every personal advantage, perhaps
health and peace. The principle, however, assumes another
form, which, according to its direction, may aim at a higher
object. Such is the desire of exercising power over the
minds of men; of persuading a multitude, by arguments or
eloquence, to deeds of usefulness; of pleading the cause of
the oppressed; a power of influencing the opinions of oth-

25
 The Philosophy of the Moral Feelings x
to them in such a manner as to wound their feelings. There
are minds of an extreme delicacy, which, in this respect, are
peculiarly sensitive;___towards these a person of correct
feelings strives to conduct himself with suitable tenderness.
We may find, however, persons of honest and upright
minds, who would shrink from the least approach to real
injury, but yet neglect the necessary attention to the feel-
ings; and may even confer a real benefit in such a manner
as to wound the individual to whom they intended kind-
ness. The lower degrees of this principle pertain to what is
called mere good breeding, which has been defined "benev-
olence in trifles;" but the higher degrees may restrain from
conduct which, without any real injury, inflicts permanent
pain. To this head we may perhaps also refer a due regard
to the estimate which we lead a man to form of himself
This is opposed to flattery on the one hand, and on the
other to any unnecessary depreciation of his character. Flat-
tery indeed is also to be considered as a violation of
veracity.

(7.) While, upon the principles which have been referred to,
we abstain from injuring the interests, the reputation, or the
feelings of others, there is another class of injuries, of still
higher magnitude, which the conscientious mind will avoid
with peculiar anxiety, namely, injuries done to the moral
principles of other men. These form a class of offences of
which no human law takes any adequate cognizance, but
we know that they possess a character of the deepest malig-
nity. Deep guilt attaches to the man who, by persuasion or
ridicule, has unhinged the moral feelings of another, or has
been the means of leading him astray from the paths of
virtue. Of equal, or even greater malignity, is the aspect of
the writer, whose works have contributed to violate the
principles of truth and rectitude,___to pollute the imagina-
tion, or corrupt the heart. Inferior offenders are promptly
seized by public authority, and suffer the award of public
justice; but the destroyer of the moral being often walks
securely through his own scene of moral discipline, as if no
power could reach the measure of his guilt but the hand of
the Eternal.

To the same head we are to assign the extensive and impor-

tant influence of example. There are few men who have not

39 4 ■ ■

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 The Philosophy of the Moral Feelings

their objects should be beyond the reach of our full attain-

ment in the present state of being. Perfect moral purity is
not the lot of man in this transient state, and is not to be
attained by his own unaided efforts. But, subservient to it is
that warfare within, that earnest and habitual desire after
the perfection of a moral being, which is felt to be the great
object of life, when it is viewed in relation to the life which
is to come. For this attainment, however, man must feel his
total inadequacy, and the utmost efforts of human reason
have failed in unfolding the requisite aid. The conviction is
thus forced upon us, that a higher influence is necessary,
and this influence is fully disclosed by the light of revealed
truth. We are there taught to look for a power from on high,
capable of effecting what human efforts cannot accomplish,
the purification of the heart.

32 4 ■ 1

•••
 The Philosophy of the Moral Feelings x
are the natural or established result of certain intellectual
processes, and, in some sense, even of bodily action, both
of which are entirely voluntary. The emotions of compas-
sion and benevolence, for example, are the natural result of
the sight or even the description of scenes of distress; and
the primary steps in this process are entirely within our
power to perform, if we will. We can visit the afflicted fam-
ily, listen to their tale of distress, and consider their circum-
stances, that is, give our attention to them in such a
manner that the natural and proper effect may be produced
upon our moral feelings. We can give the same kind of
attention, and with a similar result, to a case which is only
described to us by another; or we may neglect all this men-
tal process. Engrossed with the business or the frivolities of
life, we may keep ourselves at a distance from the persons
and the scenes that might operate in this manner on our
moral feelings; we may refuse to listen to the tale of sor-
row, or, if compelled to hear it, we may give it little atten-
tion and no consideration. The moral feeling does not
follow, and this course, after a certain repetition, terminates
in confirmed and barren selfishness. We see many instances
in which we distinctly recognise this course of mental or
moral sequence. If, in regard to a particular case of distress,
for example, we have come to a deliberate conviction of the
worthlessness of the individual, and have determined to
withhold our aid, we refuse to see him, and we decline
hearing from another any thing more of his history; we
say, we have made up our mind not to allow our compas-
sion to be any more worked upon in his favour. We thus
recognise the natural relation between the sight or even the
description of distress, and the production of certain feel-
ings in ourselves: and we recognise also the legitimate
means for preventing this influence in certain cases, in
which, by a deliberate act of judgment, we have determined
against having these feelings excited. If, notwithstanding
this determination, we happen to be brought within the
influence of the distress which we wished to avoid, we con-
sider this as a sufficient ground for acting, in the instance,
against our sober judgment. We had determined against it,
we say, but what can you do when you see people starving.
We thus recognise as legitimate that process by which, in
certain cases, we keep ourselves beyond this influence; but
we attach no feeling of approbation to the moral condition

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 The Philosophy of the Moral Feelings x
inductions of human science, and the utmost conceptions of
human thought, that an atonement is made, a sacrifice
offered;____and that the exercise of forgiveness is consistent
with the perfections of the Deity. Thus, by a process of the
mind itself, which seems to present every element of fair
and logical reasoning, we arrive at a full conviction of the
necessity, and the moral probability, of that truth which
forms the great peculiarity of the Christian revelation. More
than any other in the whole circle of religious belief it rises
above the inductions of science, while reason, in its sound-
est conclusions, recognises its probability, and receives its
truth; and it stands forth alone, simply proposed to our
belief, and offered to our acceptance, on that high but pecu-
liar evidence by which is supported the testimony of God.

The truth of these considerations is impressed upon us in

the strangest manner, when we turn our attention to the
actual moral condition of mankind. When we contemplate
man, as he is displayed to us by the soundest inductions of
philosophy, his capacity for distinguishing truth from
falsehood, and evil from good; the feelings and affections
which bind him to his fellow men, and the powers which
enable him to rise to intercourse with God: when we con-
sider the power, which sits among his other principles and
feelings, as a faithful monitor and guide, carrying in itself a
rule of rectitude without any other knowledge, and a right
to govern without reference to any other authority; we
behold a fabric complete and harmonious in all its parts,
and eminently worthy of its Almighty Maker; we behold
an ample provision for peace, and order, and harmony, in
the whole moral world. But, when we compare with these
inductions the actual state of man, as displayed to us in the
page of history, and in our own daily observation, the con-
viction is forced upon us, that some mighty change has
taken place in this beauteous system, some marvellous dis-
ruption of its moral harmony. The manner in which this
condition arose,—or the origin of moral evil under the gov-
ernment of God, is a question entirely beyond the reach of
the human faculties. It is one of those, however, on which
it is simply our duty to keep in mind, that our business is,
not with the explanation, but with the facts;____for, even by
the conclusions of philosophy, we are compelled to believe,

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 The Philosophy of the Moral Feelings x
the power of steam, as to preserve the semblance of order
in the moral world, without those fundamental principles of
rectitude which form a part of the original constitution of
every rational being.

Farther, as each man has the consciousness of these princi-

ples in himself, he has the conviction that similar principles
exist in others. Hence arises the impression, that, as he
judges of their conduct by his own moral feelings, so will
they judge of him by corresponding feelings in themselves.
In this manner is produced that reciprocity of moral impres-
sion, by which a man feels the opinion of his fellow-men to
be either a reward or a punishment; and hence also springs
that great rule of relative duty, which teaches us to do to
others as we would that they should do to us. This unifor-
mity of moral feeling and affection even proves a check
upon those who have subdued the influence of these feel-
ings in themselves. Thus, a man who has thrown off all
sense of justice, compassion, or benevolence, is still kept
under a certain degree of control by the conviction of these
impressions existing in those by whom he is surrounded.
There are indeed men in the world, as has been remarked
by Butler, in whom this appears to be the only restraint to
which their conduct is subjected.

Upon the whole, therefore, there seems to be ground for

assuming, that the articles of belief, which have been the
subject of the preceding observations, are primary princi-
ples arising with an immediate feeling of conviction in our
moral constitution; and that they correspond with those ele-
ments in our intellectual economy, which are commonly
called First Truths, principles which are now universally
admitted to require no other evidence than the conviction
which forces itself upon every sound understanding.

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 The Philosophy of the Moral Feelings x

PART III.
ck'fx-)

OF THE MORAL
PRINCIPLE, OR
CONSCIENCE.
There has been much dispute respecting the nature and
even the existence of the Moral Principle, as a distinct ele-
ment of our mental constitution; but this controversy may
probably be considered as allied to other speculations of a
metaphysical nature, in regard to which a kind of evidence
was sought of which the subjects are not susceptible. With-
out arguing respecting the propriety of speaking of a sepa-
rate power or principle, we simply contend for the fact, that
there is a mental exercise, by which we feel certain actions
to be right and certain others wrong. It is an element or a
movement of our moral nature which admits of no analysis,
and no explanation; and is referable to no other principle
than a simple recognition of the fact, which forces itself
upon the conviction of every man who looks into the pro-
cesses of his own mind. Of the existence and the nature of
this most important principle, therefore, the evidence is
entirely within. We appeal to the consciousness of every
man, that he perceives a power which, in particular cases,
warns him of the conduct which he ought to pursue, and
administers a solemn admonition when he has departed
from it. For, while his judgment conveys to him an impres-
sion, both of the tendencies and certain of the qualities of
actions, he has, besides this, a feeling by which he views
the actions with approbation or disapprobation, in reference
purely to their moral aspect, and without any regard to their
consequences. When we refer to the sacred writings, we
find the principle of conscience represented as a power of
such importance, that, without any acquired knowledge,
or any actual precepts, it is sufficient to establish, in every

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 The Philosophy of the Moral Feelings x
respecting the character of the objects of their benevolence,
and the impositions so frequently practised by the poor.
Suspicions of this kind might tend to interfere with the
important moral process which ought to be our first object,
the necessary cautions will afterwards be learned with
little difficulty.

The best mode of contending with the evils of pauperism,

on the principles of political economy, is a problem on
which I presume not to enter. But, on the principles of
moral science, a consideration of the utmost importance
should never be forgotten, the great end to be answered
by the varieties of human condition in the cultivation of the
benevolent affections. Political science passes its proper
boundary when it is permitted in any degree to interfere
with this high principle; and, on the other hand, it is not
to be denied, that this important purpose is in a great mea-
sure frustrated by many of those institutions, which cut off
the direct intercourse of the prosperous and the wealthy
with those whom providence has committed to them, in this
scene of moral discipline, as the objects of their benevolent
care.

III. The third point, which remains to be briefly mentioned,

is the feeling of moral approbation, or rather the impression
of merit, which is frequently attached to the exercise of the
affections. This important subject has been already referred
to. When the mother, with total disregard to her health and
comfort, devotes herself to watching over her child, she is
not influenced by any sense of duty, nor do we attach to her
conduct the feeling of moral approbation. She acts simply
upon an impulse within, which she perceives to be a part of
her constitution, and which carries her forward with
unshrinking firmness in a particular course of laborious and
anxious service. She may, indeed, be sensible that the viola-
tion of these feelings would expose her to the reprobation
of her kind; but she does not imagine that the zealous fulfil-
ment of them entitles her to any special praise. The same
principle applies to all the affections. They are a part of our
moral constitution, intended to bind men together by cer-
tain offices of justice, friendship, and compassion; and have
been well named by a distinguished writer, "the voice of
God within us." They serve a purpose in our moral econo-

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 The Philosophy of the Moral Feelings

Veracity.

In our mental impressions relating to veracity, we have a

striking illustration of the manner in which we rely on this
class of moral feelings, as instinctive in the constitution of
the mind. On a certain confidence in the veracity of
mankind is founded so much of the knowledge on which
we constantly depend, that, without it, the whole system of
human things would go into confusion. It relates to all the
intelligence which we derive from any other source than
our own personal observation: for example, to all that we
receive through the historian, the traveller, the naturalist, or
the astronomer. Even in regard to the most common events
of a single day, we often proceed on a confidence in the
veracity of a great variety of individuals. There is, indeed, a
natural tendency to truth in all men, unless where this prin-
ciple is overcome by some strong selfish purpose to be
answered by departing from it: and there is an equally
strong tendency to rely on the veracity of others, until we
have learnt certain cautions by our actual experience of
mankind. Hence children and inexperienced persons are
easily imposed upon by unfounded statements:___and the
most practised liar confides in the credulity of those whom
he attempts to deceive. Deception, indeed, would never
accomplish its purpose, if it were not from the impression
that men generally speak truth. It is obvious also, that the
mutual confidence which men have in each other, both in
regard to veracity of statement, and to sincerity of intention
respecting engagements, is that which keeps together the
whole of civil society. In the transactions of commerce it is
indispensable, and without it all the relations of civil life
would go into disorder. When treating of the intellectual
powers in another work, I considered the principles which
regulate our confidence in human testimony; and it is
unnecessary to recur to them in this place. Our present
object is briefly to analyze the elements which are essential

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 The Philosophy of the Moral Feelings x

VI.

The Domestic Affections.

In this extensive and interesting class are included, conju-

gal affection, the parental feelings, filial reverence,
and the ties of brothers and sisters. These call forth, in a
still higher degree, the feelings and exertions already
referred to, and a still greater sacrifice of personal ease,
advantage, and comfort, in the anxious and diligent dis-
charge of the duties resulting from them. In the conjugal
relation, they lead us to the tenderness, the confidence, the
mutual forbearance, the united exertions of those, who have
one hope, one interest, and one course of duty. The parental
relation implies the highest possible degree of that feeling
which studies the advantage of the object of our care, the
promotion of his happiness,___the improvement of his mind,
the culture of his affections, the formation of his
habits; the anxious watching over the development of his
character, both as an intellectual and a moral being. The fil-
ial relation requires, in an equal degree, respect, affection,
submission, and confidence,____a deference to parental opin-
ion and control; and an impression that those parts of
parental management, which may often be disagreeable, are
guided by a sincere desire to promote the highest interests
of the object of this affectionate regard.

Among the feelings of our nature "which have less of earth

in them than heaven," are those which bind together the
domestic circle in the various sympathies, affections, and
duties, which belong to this class of tender relations. It is
beautiful also to observe, how these affections arise out of
each other, and how the right exercise of them tends to their
mutual cultivation. The father ought to consider the son
as, of all earthly concerns, the highest object of his anxious
care; and should watch over the development of his intel-
lectual character, and the culture of his moral feelings. In
the zealous prosecution of this great purpose, he should

52