THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SERGIO OAS G.R. No. L-17771 November 29, 1962 LABRADOR, J.

: FACTS: In the evening of September 4, 1958, Simeon Gallego was assaulted with a bayonet by Sergio Oas in front of the latter's house. The deceased Simeon Gallego had a debt of P5.80 to Sergio Oas on the said day. When the chief of police arrived at the place in the evening, he made an investigation and was told by the wife of Oas that Simeon Gallego was about to enter their house; that she and her daughter blocked Simeon's way but Simeon pushed the daughter aside and hit the left and right arm of Oas wife; and that upon seeing his wife hurt Oas rushed with his bayonet and in the struggle with Simeon, the latter died. The prosecution maintained at the trial through the testimony of Isabelo Gallego, son of the deceased Simeon Gallego, that in the afternoon of that day, September 4, 1958, at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, he went to the store of Sergio Oas offering to pay the sum of P2.50, which his father had sent to Oas in part payment of his debt; that on finding that the amount was less than the amount of the debt of P5.80, Oas refused to accept uttering these threatening words: "If he does not pay this afternoon something will happen to him. The defendant-appellant did not deny that he was the one who inflicted the wounds that cause the death of Simeon Gallego, but he declared that the said wounds were inflicted under the following circumstances: that it is not true that Isabelo Gallego had gone to his store offering to pay the indebtedness of his father; that he treated the deceased Simeon Gallego with respect, and as a matter of fact he loaned him money; that Simeon Gallego had asked for a loan of P10.00, but he had only P5.80 which he gave to the deceased, promising to complete the amount latter; that in the evening of September 4, Simeon Gallego appeared at the store with a cane, accompanied by a son-in-law and a son and immediately called Sergio Oas; that when Sergio went out of the store in answer to the call, Simeon immediately struck him on the right part of the head and Oas fell down in a sitting position supporting himself with his hands; that as Simeon proceeded to continue the attack, Sergio went inside the store and took, from the place where it was being hung, a cane with a bayonet and with it rushed to the door of the store meeting Simeon thereat; that in trying to ward off the blows given by Simeon, defendant unconsciously thrust the bayonet at him and wounded him and as a consequence, Simeon fell down; that fearing that the companions of Simeon would continue the attack, he closed the store. To corroborate his story Sergio presented the medical certificate of the wounds that he had received and also what his wife had suffered on the occasion of the attack by the deceased Simeon Gallego. The Court of First Instance found Oas guilty of the crime of murder. ISSUE: Whether or not Sergio Oas can be acquitted for acting in self-defense in killing Simeon Gallego.

HELD: The Court does not believe that defendant-appellant is entitled to a complete acquittal because of the absence of the third element of self-defense, namely, the reasonableness of the means used to repel the unlawful agression. With his cane the defendant-appellant could have warded off the blows made by the deceased; and even if he had actually drawn his bayonet this drawing of the bayonet would have been sufficient to prevent the deceased from continuing with the attack. In other words, if the accused had only drawn his bayonet in defense, that would have been enough to discourage and prevent the deceased when he attacked the accused. In stabbing the deceased with is bayonet, the defendant-appellant went beyond what was necessary to defend himself against the unlawful aggression made by the deceased.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENJAMIN GONDAYAO, alias "BEN", ET AL. G.R. No. L-26240 October 31, 1969 CONCEPCION, C.J.: FACTS: After grappling with Benjamin Gondayao, near the market place, in the Barrio of Paitan, Municipality of Sual, Province of Pangasinan, on November 14, 1965, Orlando Piol appeared to have, in addition to several lacerations on the head, two stab wounds on the back in consequence of which he died that same afternoon, due to a massive internal hemorrhage. Immediately after the occurrence, Benjamin assumed full responsibility for said injuries, which he claimed to have inflicted in self-defense. On November 17, 1965, Macario Aquino, Chief of Police of Sual, filed, with the Municipal Court thereof, a complaint charging Benjamin Gondayao with homicide. Twelve days later, Aquino filed an amended complaint charging murder, allegedly committed, not only by Benjamin Gondayao, but, also, by his brother, Anoy Gondayao, and Eduardo Bersamina, Eto Agbayani and Jovencio Yanday. Soon thereafter, the corresponding information for murder was filed, with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, against said five defendants. The main eyewitnesses for the prosecution were Macario Pascua and Police Chief Macario Aquino. The first testified that he saw Benjamin Gondayao and his codefendants, a few meters away, drinking gin in front of the store of Segundo Sevillena that, after consuming a bottle of gin, Benjamin Gondayao, repeatedly cursed the "Nacionalistas" for not offering a drink despite their victory in the polls; that, as Orlando Piol who was nearby, replied by cursing the losers in the elections, an exchange of unfriendly utterances followed; that, eventually, the group headed by Benjamin picked up stones and threw them at Piol, who was hit several times on the head; that, as the same began to bleed, Piol drew out a dagger and approached Benjamin, who, forthwith, embraced him; that, grappling with each other, they both fell down, with Piol on top of Benjamin; that, at this juncture, Anoy Gondayao picked up a stone and hit Piol with it on the head, and then wrestled the dagger from him; that, upon a signal given by Benjamin, who had meanwhile managed to get away from under Piol, Anoy stabbed Piol on the back and, then, leaving the dagger imbedded therein, retreated; that thereupon Benjamin pulled out the dagger and sank it again on the back of Piol who was still facing downward, in a stooping position; and that Eduardo Bersamina, Eto Agbayani and Jovencio Yanday were then about 5 meters away. Police Chief Macario Aquino did not witness the beginning of the incident. He was about 25 meters from the place of the occurrence, when he noticed a commotion. Rushing to the scene thereof, he saw Benjamin and Piol rush at each other and grapple with one another, until they fell together from a bamboo bed, locally known as "papag", on which they were standing; that he walked about 10 meters, in order to go around the fence and approach the fighting men; that, bidding them to stop, he seized the hand of Benjamin which held a dagger, with which he was poised to stab Piol then lying down on his stomach, under Benjamin; that Aquino thereupon wrested from him the dagger, which was stained with blood; and that Benjamin then said it was he who had wounded Piol.

After due trial, under a plea of not guilty, said court rendered the appealed decision convicting Benjamin Gondayao and Anoy Gondayao as charged and sentencing them as stated at the beginning of this decision, as well as acquitting their three co-defendants, for insufficiency of the evidence. Hence, this appeal by the Gondayaos. ISSUE: Whether or not the theory of self defense can be appreciated in favor of Benjamin Gondayao. HELD: It is clear that Benjamin stabbed Piol twice from behind, after disarming him. Considering, moreover, that Benjamin had provoked the incident, by hurling uncomplimentary remarks at his political opponents, one of whom was Piol; that such remarks led to an altercation with Piol, in consequence of which, stones were thrown at him, hitting him on the head; that when, owing to the impact of said stone, which could have rendered him groggy, and the lacerated injuries thus sustained by him, Piol prepared himself to fight by drawing out his dagger, Benjamin accepted the challenge resulting from this act, by "rushing" to his encounter and grappling with him; and that, accordingly, Benjamin cannot be given the benefit of either complete or incomplete selfdefense. Although Piol was stabbed from behind, Benjamin did not act with treachery, for this was merely an incident of their struggle, which had begun with both contenders facing each other, each prepared for the fight that ensued.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AVELINO MANANSALA, JR., ET AL. G.R. No. L-23514 February 17, 1970 MAKALINTAL, J.: FACTS: The prosecution, relying mainly on the testimony of two eyewitnesses, Celestino Atun and Percival Amador, and of the policemen who went to the scene of the crime upon noticing the commotion it produced, sought to establish the following: Between 1:00 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of March 27, 1962, some persons had a quarrel inside the New Bicol Carinderia, an eatery located near the Legaspi Port Market, Legaspi City. After a short while the protagonists came out through the backdoor of the carinderia. Jose Manansala had Rodrigo in a tight embrace from behind, with his arms under the latter's armpits. While Rodrigo was in that position of apparent helplessness, Avelino stabbed him with a balisong, or Batangas knife. The stabbing continued while Rodrigo was led, or dragged, by Jose to a bamboo bed (papag) nearby, and even after Rodrigo had been forced down on it in a prone position. When the policemen who responded to the commotion arrived they found Avelino still holding the fatal weapon, and Rodrigo's limp body, bathed in his own blood, stretched on the papag. A taxicab was commandeered to take the wounded man to a hospital, but he expired even before the vehicle could start. The autopsy later conducted revealed that the victim died from massive hemorrhage and shock as a result of the multiple wounds sustained by him in the chest, abdomen, back and the extremities. The accused did not take the witness stand. However, they presented two witnesses, Domingo Daria and Salvador Petilos, who said that they saw the whole incident. The substance of their testimony is as follows: Early in the afternoon of March 27, 1962 Avelino, a small-time peddler of textiles in the Legaspi Port Market, was eating his lunch inside one of the eateries dotting the market site, when Rodrigo Aringo alias Diego, a baggage boy in the same market, approached him and demanded his fee for having carried Avelino's baggage. Avelino said he was willing to pay for the services rendered at noon, but not for those rendered earlier in the morning. He then took some money from his pocket and offered it to Rodrigo. Obviously peeved at having been thus publicly rebuffed, Rodrigo brusquely brushed Avelino's hand aside and instantly gave him a fist blow in the face. Avelino fell from his seat; he tried to get up, but was given another blow, and then a third, as he reeled from the force of the last blow, a batangas knife he was carrying fell from his trousers pocket. Avelino picked up the knife, and Rodrigo, seeing that he was armed, rushed to the carinderia's kitchen and returned almost immediately with a 10-inch knife in his hand. With it he swung at his antagonist, but the latter evaded the blow. Meanwhile, appellant Jose Manansala, an uncle of Avelino, noticed the commotion from outside the carinderia, where he was loading baggage on a parked truck some six meters away. He shouted at Rodrigo to stop. Rodrigo paid no heed and instead delivered another thrust at Avelino, who again evaded it. At the third attempt, Jose embraced Rodrigo from behind, and it was at that moment that Avelino stabbed Rodrigo and inflicted the numerous wounds which proved fatal. Jose took the kitchen knife from Rodrigo and threw it away, and then released his limp body on the papag nearby. When the policemen arrived Avelino was still clutching the knife he had used. Both appellants were apprehended.

In its decision, the trial court sustained the prosecution's version of the incident and found both accused guilty of murder. However, the court credited Avelino with the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the victim, and imposed upon him a lesser penalty than that imposed on his uncle. ISSUES: 1. 2. HELD: 1. The accuseds claim is not valid. Several circumstances belie such claim. First, Avelino sustained no knife wound at all. Second, although several policemen arrived at the scene of the incident almost immediately after it happened, not one of them saw the knife allegedly used by Rodrigo. Nor was it shown to them, or at least brought to their attention, by either of the appellants. Indeed, when Avelino surrendered to the policemen he declined to give any statement, which in the natural course of things he would have done if he had acted merely to defend himself. A protestation of innocence or justification is the logical and spontaneous reaction of a man who finds himself in such an inculpatory predicament as that in which the policemen came upon the appellants, with Avelino still clutching the death weapon and his victim dying before him. 2. There is no showing that the killing was agreed upon between them beforehand. No motive for it has been shown other than the provocation given by the deceased; and such motive was true only insofar as Avelino was concerned. The circumstances indicate that if Jose embraced Rodrigo and rendered him helpless, it was to stop him from further hitting Avelino with his fists. However, Jose is not entirely free from liability, for it has been established that even after the first knife thrust had been delivered he did not try to stop Avelino, either by word or overt act. Instead Jose continued to hold Rodrigo, even forced him down on the bamboo bed with Avelino still pressing the attack. Withal it cannot be said that Jose's cooperation was such that without it the offense would not have been accomplished. But although not indispensable, it was a contributing factor. If Jose's initial intent was free from guilt, it became tainted after he saw the first knife thrust delivered. The thirteen wounds must have taken an appreciable interval of time to inflict, and Jose's cooperation facilitated their infliction. He must therefore be held liable as an accomplice. Whether or not Avelino Manansalas claim of self defense can be validly appreciated. Whether or not Jose Manansala should be considered as a co-principal in the crime committed.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. LOL-LO and SARAW G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922 MALCOLM, J.: FACTS: On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left Matuta for Peta. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to the described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored violating them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro, the two women were able to escape. Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, the trial was held, and a judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty. ISSUE: Whether or not Lol-lo and Saraw can be held liable for the crime of piracy, although the crime was committed outside the Philippine jurisdiction. HELD: All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility. It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lower court and as is again done in this court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FREDDIE LIZADA G.R. Nos. 143468-71 January 24, 2003 CALLEJO, SR., J.: FACTS: Accused-appellant was charged with four counts of qualified rape under four separate Informations. The four Informations were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 99171390, 99-171391, 99-171392 and 99-171393, respectively. Accused-appellant was arraigned on April 15, 1999, assisted by counsel de parte and entered a plea of not guilty to each of the charges. A joint trial then ensued. The facts are as follows: Ricardo Orillosa and his wife, Rose Orillosa had three children, namely: Analia, Jepsy and Rossel. However, the couple decided to part ways and live separately. Rose left Bohol and settled in Manila with her young children. She worked as a waitress to make both ends meet. In 1994, Rose met accused-appellant. They decided to live together as husband and wife. Sometime in 1996, Analia was in her room when accused-appellant entered. He laid on top of her, removed her T-shirt and underwear. He then inserted his finger in her vagina. He removed his finger and inserted his penis in her vagina. Satiated, accusedappellant dismounted but threatened to kill her if she divulged to anyone what he did to her. Petrified by the threats on her life, Analia kept to herself what happened to her. Sometime in August 1997, accused-appellant entered again the room of Analia, placed himself on top of her and held her legs and arms. He then inserted his finger into her sex organ. During the period from 1996 to 1998, accused-appellant sexually abused private complainant two times a week. On November 5, 1998, Analia and accused-appellant were in the sala of their house. Analia went into her room and lay down in bed. She did not lock the door of the room because her brother might enter any time. Accused-appellant went to his room next to the room of Analia. He, however, entered the room of Analia. Accused-appellant sat on the side of her bed, placed himself on top of her, held her hands and legs and fondled her breasts. She struggled to extricate herself. Accused-appellant removed her panty and touched her sex organ. Accused-appellant inserted his finger into her vagina, extricated it and then inserted his penis into her vagina. Momentarily, Rossel passed by the room of Analia and peeped through the door. He saw accused-appellant on top of Analia. Accused-appellant saw Rossel and dismounted. Accused-appellant berated Rossel and ordered him to go to his room and sleep. Rossel did. On November 9, 1998, Rose left the house. Accused-appellant was in the sala of the house, and Analia tended the video shop. However, accused-appellant told Analia to go to the sala. She refused. This infuriated accused-appellant. Analia ignored the invectives and threats of accused-appellant and stayed in the video shop. When Rose returned, a heated argument ensued between accusedappellant and Analia. Rose sided with her paramour and hit Analia. This prompted Analia to shout. "Ayoko na, ayoko na." Shortly thereafter, Rose and Analia left the house. When Rose inquired from her daughter what she meant by her statement, "ayoko na, ayoko na," she told her mother that accused-appellant had been touching the

sensitive parts of her body and that he had been on top of her. Rose was shocked and incensed. The two proceeded to Kagawad Danilo Santos to have accused-appellant placed under arrest. On November 10, 1998, the two proceeded to the Western Police District where Analia gave her Affidavit-Complaint to PO1 Carmelita Nocum in the presence of SPO2 Fe H. Avindante. She related to the police investigator that accusedappellant had touched her breasts and arms in August, 1998, September 15, 1998, October 22, 1998 and on November 5, 1998, Analia then submitted herself to genitalia examination by Dr. Armie Umil, a medico-legal officer of the NBI. Dr. Umil prepared and signed a report on "Living Case No. MO-98-1265" which contained her findings during her examination on Analia. Accused-appellant denied having raped Analia. He claimed that he loved the children of Rose as if they were his own children. He took care of them, as in fact he cooked and prepared their food before they arrived home from school. At times, he ironed their school uniforms and bathed them, except Analia who was already big. Analia was hard-headed because she disobeyed him whenever he ordered her to do some errands. Because of Analia's misbehavior, accused-appellant and Rose oftentimes quarreled. On May 29, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment against accused-appellant finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four counts of rape, defined and penalized in the seventh paragraph, no. 1, Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and meted on him the death penalty for each count ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Freddie Lizada should be held liable for qualified rape.
2. As to the crime of rape subject of Criminal Case No. 99-171391, whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of consummated acts of lasciviousness defined in Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code or attempted rape under Article 335 of the said Code, as amended in relation to the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code. HELD: 1. The Court agrees with accused-appellant that he is guilty only of two counts of simple rape, instead of qualified rape. The evidence on record shows that accusedappellant is the common-law husband of Rose, the mother of private complainant. The private complainant, as of October 1998, was still 13 years old, and under Article 335 as amended by Republic Act 7659, the minority of the private complainant, concurring with the fact that accused-appellant is the common-law husband of the victim's mother, is a special qualifying circumstance warranting the imposition of the death penalty. However, said circumstance was not alleged in the Informations as required by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which was given retroactive effect by this Court because it is favorable to the accused. Hence, even if the prosecution proved the special qualifying circumstance of minority of private complainant and relationship, the accused-appellant being the common-law husband of her mother, accused-appellant is guilty only of simple rape

2. The Court believes that accused-appellant intended to have carnal knowledge of private complainant. The overt acts of accused-appellant proven by the prosecution were not mere preparatory acts. By the series of his overt acts, accused-appellant had commenced the execution of rape which, if not for his spontaneous desistance, will ripen into the crime of rape. Although accused-appellant desisted from performing all the acts of execution however his desistance was not spontaneous as he was impelled to do so only because of the sudden and unexpected arrival of Rossel. Hence, accused-appellant is guilty only of attempted rape.