Economic Vulnerability and Resilience Concepts and Measurements
Economic Vulnerability and Resilience Concepts and Measurements
To cite this article: Lino Briguglio , Gordon Cordina , Nadia Farrugia & Stephanie Vella (2009)
Economic Vulnerability and Resilience: Concepts and Measurements, Oxford Development
Studies, 37:3, 229-247, DOI: 10.1080/13600810903089893
1. Introduction
Many small states1 manage to generate a relatively high GDP per capita in comparison
with other developing countries2 in spite of their high exposure to exogenous economic
shocks. This would seem to suggest that there are factors that may offset the disadvantages
associated with economic vulnerability. This phenomenon is termed by Briguglio (2003)
the “Singapore Paradox”, referring to the reality that although Singapore is highly exposed
to exogenous shocks, this small island state has managed to register high rates of economic
growth and to attain high GDP per capita. This reality can be explained in terms of the
ability of Singapore to build resilience in the face of external shocks.
Economic vulnerability, from the conceptual and empirical viewpoints, is well
documented in the literature (see e.g. Briguglio, 1995, 2003; Atkins et al., 2000). Most
studies on economic vulnerability provide empirical evidence that small states,
particularly island ones, tend to be characterized by high degrees of economic openness
and export concentration. These lead to exposure to exogenous shocks, that is, economic
vulnerability, which could constitute a disadvantage to economic development by
Lino Briguglio, Gordon Cordina, Nadia Farrugia and Stephanie Vella, Economics Department, University of Malta,
Msida, MSD2080, Malta. Emails: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
and [email protected]
ISSN 1360-0818 print/ISSN 1469-9966 online/09/0300229-19
q 2009 International Development Centre, Oxford
DOI: 10.1080/13600810903089893
230 L. Briguglio et al.
magnifying the element of risk in the growth process, without necessarily compromising
its overall viability. Cordina (2004a, b) shows that increased risk can adversely affect
economic growth, as the negative effects of downside shocks would be commensurately
larger than those of positive shocks. The high degree of fluctuations in GDP and in export
earnings registered by many small states is considered to be one of the manifestations of
exposure to exogenous shocks.
This paper is structured as follows. The next section revisits the so-called
“Singapore Paradox”. Sections 3 and 4, respectively, deal with the definitions of
economic vulnerability and economic resilience. Section 5 reviews alternative approaches
to constructing a resilience index and presents the results of a feasible methodology.
Section 6 deals with the relationship between GDP per capita, resilience and vulnerability.
The potential uses of the resilience index are discussed in Section 7. Section 8 concludes
the study with some implications relating to the resilience index.
Scores on this index would, therefore, reflect the appropriateness of policy measures.
Third, the combination of the two indices would indicate the overall risk of being harmed
by external shocks due to inherent vulnerability features counterbalanced to different
extents by policy measures.
Given that vulnerability refers to inherent characteristics that render countries prone to
exogenous shocks, vulnerability scores for a particular country should not differ much
over time, and therefore it is not expected that a country will move vertically along the
quadrants of Figure 1; but horizontal movement is possible for those countries that adopt
measures that build resilience and vice versa. It would thus be possible for countries to
switch between the worst-case and the self-made scenarios, or the prodigal son and the
best-case scenarios, through changes in their economic policies.
By distinguishing between inherent economic vulnerability and nurtured economic
resilience, it is possible to create a methodological framework for assessing the risk of
being affected by external shocks, as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2 shows that risk has two elements, the first is associated with the inherent
conditions of the country that is exposed to external shocks and the second associated with
policy measures developed to absorb, cope with or bounce back from adverse shocks. The
risk of being adversely affected by external shocks is therefore the combination of the two
elements. The negative sign in front of the resilience element indicates that the risk is
reduced as resilience builds up.
3. Economic Vulnerability
Empirical work on the construction of an economic vulnerability index (see Briguglio,
1995; Briguglio & Galea, 2003; Farrugia, 2004) is often based on the premise that a
country’s proneness to exogenous shocks stems from a number of inherent economic
232 L. Briguglio et al.
index of merchandise trade (UNCTAD, 2003, Section 8). Briguglio (1997) and Briguglio &
Galea (2003) have devised an alternative index that also takes services into account.
4. Economic Resilience
In this paper, economic resilience refers to the policy-induced ability of an economy to
recover from or adjust to the negative impacts of adverse exogenous shocks and to benefit
from positive shocks.7 The term is used in two senses in this paper, relating to the ability
to: (1) recover quickly from a shock; and (2) withstand the effect of a shock.8
vulnerability considerations and resilience factors. For example, some studies argue that
small economic size presents an economic advantage on the basis of simple correlations
between small size and indicators of economic performance, such as GDP growth and
GDP per capita. However, a proper analysis of the relationship between size of countries
and economic performance should factor in control variables, such as good economic
governance. This paper suggests that the relatively good performance of some small states
is certainly not due to small size, but can be attributed to nurtured economic resilience. In
other words, the relatively good economic performance of a number of small states is not
because of, but in spite of, their small size and inherent economic vulnerability.
Consideration of economic resilience building also conveys the message that small
vulnerable states should not be complacent in the face of their economic vulnerability, but
could and should adopt policy measures to enable them to improve their ability to cope
with or bounce back from external shocks.
price inflation and an unemployment rate close to the natural rate, as well as by external
balance, as reflected in the international current account position or by the level of external
debt. These can be considered to be variables that are highly influenced by economic
policy and that could act as good indicators of an economy’s resilience in facing adverse
shocks.
The macroeconomic stability component of the resilience index proposed in this study
consists of three variables, namely: (1) the fiscal deficit-to-GDP ratio; (2) the sum of the
unemployment and inflation rates; and (3) the external debt-to-GDP ratio. The variables
are available for a reasonably wide set of countries spread over a spectrum of stages of
development, size and geographical characteristics.
Fiscal deficit. The government budget position is suitable for inclusion in the resilience
index because it is the result of fiscal policy, which is one of the main tools available to
government, and relates to resilience of a shock-counteracting nature. This is because a
healthy fiscal position would allow adjustments to taxation and expenditure policies in the
face of adverse shocks. The fiscal deficit, standardized as a ratio to GDP, is thus included
in the resilience index proposed in this study.
Inflation and unemployment. Price inflation and unemployment are also considered to be
suitable indicators of resilience and at the same time they potentially provide additional
information to that contained in the fiscal deficit variable. This is because price inflation
and unemployment are strongly influenced by other types of economic policy, including
monetary and supply-side policies. They are associated with resilience because if an
economy already has high levels of unemployment and inflation, it is likely that adverse
shocks would impose significant costs on it. If, on the other hand, the economy has low
levels of inflation and unemployment, then it can withstand adverse shocks to these
variables without excessive welfare costs. In this sense, therefore, unemployment and
inflation are associated with resilience of a shock-absorbing nature. The sum of these two
variables, also known as the economic discomfort index (or economic misery index), is
thus included in the resilience index proposed here.
External debt. The adequacy of external policy may be gauged through the inclusion of
the external debt-to-GDP ratio. This is considered to be a good measure of resilience,
because a country with a high level of external debt may find it more difficult to mobilize
resources in order to offset the effects of external shocks. Thus, this variable would
indicate resilience of a shock-counteracting nature.9
The variables utilized for the macroeconomic component of the resilience index are
measured as period averages across business cycles so as to eliminate the effects of
cyclical fluctuations and policies. The sources of the data and country rankings associated
with this component are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix. As can be seen, a number
of small states, notably Singapore and Hong Kong, obtain relatively high scores on this
component.
Microeconomic market efficiency. The science of economics views markets and their
efficient operation through the price mechanism as the best way to allocate resources in the
economy. If markets adjust rapidly to achieve equilibrium following an external shock, the
risk of being negatively affected by such a shock will be lower than if market disequilibria
236 L. Briguglio et al.
tend to persist. Indeed, with very slow or non-existent market adjustment, resources will
not be efficiently allocated in the economy, resulting in welfare costs, manifested, for
instance, in unemployed resources and waste or shortages in the goods markets. These
considerations have important implications for shock-absorbing resilience.
Not many indicators of market efficiency that span a sufficiently wide range of
countries—as required for the purpose of this study—are available. Following a search for
suitable indicators, it was decided to use a component of the Economic Freedom of the
World Index (Gwartney & Lawson, 2005), titled “regulation of credit, labour and business”,
which is aimed at measuring the extent to which markets operate freely, competitively and
efficiently across countries. It is designed to identify the effect of regulatory restraints and
bureaucratic procedures on competition and the operation of markets.
In the financial market, this index assesses the extent to which: (1) the banking industry
is dominated by private firms; (2) foreign banks are permitted to compete in the market;
(3) credit is supplied to the private sector; and (4) controls on interest rates interfere with
the credit market. All these relate to the degree of interference by government in the
financial market, which could prevent the economy from reacting flexibly to shocks.
Similar considerations apply in the case of the labour market. Here interference relates
to unduly high unemployment benefits (which could undermine the incentive to accept
employment), dismissal regulations, minimum wage impositions, centralized wage
setting, extensions of union contracts to non-participating parties and conscription. All
these are viewed as possibly precluding work effort, thereby limiting the ability of a
country to recover from adverse shocks. A country would have a higher market efficiency
score if it allowed market forces to determine wages and establish conditions of dismissal,
avoid excessive unemployment and refrain from the use of conscription.
Bureaucratic control of business activities is also thought to inhibit market efficiency.
This subcomponent is designed to identify the extent to which bureaucratic procedures
limit competition and the operation of markets. When such activities retard entry into
business and increase the cost of production, when prices are not market-determined and
when governments use their power to extract financial payments and reward some
businesses at the expense of others, private sector involvement is discouraged, thereby
inhibiting the capacity of freely operating markets to absorb shocks.
The relative data and country-ranking results with regard to this component of the
resilience index are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix. Small vulnerable countries can
be found across the entire range of this component, indicating that such countries are
adopting different policy approaches in terms of microeconomic market efficiency.10
which has been questioned recently with the market failures associated with the financial
turmoil, is here balanced by an emphasis on appropriate government intervention to foster
economic resilience as measured by the governance index. Thus, the resilience index
proposed here views properly functioning markets and a framework of appropriate
governance as two essential aspects of economic resilience.
The Economic Freedom of the World Index has a component that focuses on legal
structure and security of property rights.11 This is considered to be useful in the context of
the present exercise in deriving an index of good governance. The component covers five
subcomponents, namely: (1) judicial independence; (2) impartiality of courts; (3) the
protection of intellectual property rights; (4) military interference in the rule of law; and
(5) the political system and the integrity of the legal system.
The relative data and country-ranking results are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix.
The highest rankings on the governance component are the more economically advanced
countries, with the first five placings occupied by major industrialized economies.
Singapore, which was among the most resilient economies according to economic criteria,
ranks fifteenth in terms of governance. Vulnerable economies tend to obtain lower rankings
on this count, but it still appears to be the case that the vulnerable economies enjoying a
higher per capita GDP also tend to have better systems of governance.
The relative data and country ranking results are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix.
Small island developing states occupy the entire range of the component, with those with a
high per capita GDP obtaining higher rankings.
Correlation between the components of the index. The components discussed above have
been found to be positively related to each other, as shown in Table 1, but the correlation is
somewhat weak. The highest correlation scores relate to good governance and social
development and good governance and market efficiency.
The question arises therefore as to whether or not the good governance component is
redundant. Given that its correlation with market efficiency and social development is not
unduly high, it was decided to retain all four components in the composite index.
Computation of the composite index. The composite index was computed by taking a
simple average of the four components just described, namely: macroeconomic stability,
microeconomic market efficiency, good governance and social development. Data for 86
countries were obtained. All observations of the components of the index were
standardized using the well-known transformation:
where: XSij is the value of the standardized observation for country i of component j; Xij is
the actual value of the same observation; and min Xj and max Xj are the minimum and
maximum values of the same observations for component j.
Economic Vulnerability and Resilience 239
This transforms the values of observations in a particular variable array so that they take
a range of values from zero to unity.
The results. The results of averaging the four components of the economic resilience
index are given in Table A1 in the Appendix. These show that most of the small island
states included in the index, namely Singapore, Barbados, Malta and Cyprus, register
relatively high resilience scores. Other small states with relatively high resilience scores
include Iceland, Hong Kong, Slovenia and Estonia. Unfortunately, data for small island
developing states that register low resilience scores were available for two countries only,
namely Jamaica and Papua New Guinea. It is, therefore, not possible to adequately
compare the performance of country groupings in this regard. However, it appears that the
worst performers in terms of resilience building were a number of larger African, Asian
and South American countries.
The results are shown in Figure 3. It should be pointed out that the cut-off values chosen
for the quadrants (represented by the dashed lines in Figure 3) are the averages of the
vulnerability and resilience scores for all countries. This decision is subjective and the
classification of countries will change if different cut-off points are chosen. Consequently,
it was decided to allow a “borderline” margin of ^ 5% for the vulnerability and resilience
indices (shown by the dotted lines on each side of the dashed lines), and countries falling
within these margins are classified as “borderline” cases.
Table A2 in the Appendix shows the classification of countries within the different
quadrants. The overall tendencies that can be derived from Table A2 are that:
. countries falling in the best-case quadrant are mostly the large “developed
countries”;
. countries falling in the self-made quadrant include a number of small states with a
high vulnerability score;
. countries that fall in the prodigal son quadrant include mostly large Third World
countries;
. countries falling in the worst-case quadrant include a few vulnerable small
countries with weak economic performance.
8. Concluding Considerations
This paper has dealt with conceptual and methodological aspects associated with
economic resilience and its measurement. The index developed here covers four aspects of
economic resilience, namely macroeconomic stability, microeconomic market efficiency,
good governance and social development. Each of these components contains variables
that are considered suitable to gauge the extent to which the policy framework is
conducive to absorbing and counteracting the effects of economic shocks.
The results of this exercise can provide an explanation as to why inherently vulnerable
countries may register high levels of GDP per capita. It is argued that countries may be
economically successful because they are inherently not vulnerable, or because they are
resilient in the face of the vulnerability they face. The obverse is also true, in that countries
may be unsuccessful because they are not sufficiently resilient.
The paper has also shown that GDP per capita is positively related to economic
resilience and negatively related to economic vulnerability. Furthermore, per capita GDP
was found to be more sensitive to resilience variables than to vulnerability variables.
242 L. Briguglio et al.
Notes
1
In this study, the words “state” and “country” are used synonymously. There is no generally agreed
definition as to which variable should be used to measure the size of countries and as to what should be
the cut-off point between a small country and other countries. Generally speaking, population is used
as an indicator of country size.
2
This finding is reported in many studies. See, for example, Briguglio (1995).
3
Cordina (2004a, b) introduces the concept of exposure to shocks within a mainstream model of
economic growth based on the neo-classical paradigm to show that the per capita GDP of a country
depends positively on its resources and productivity and negatively on its inherent vulnerability. It is
further shown that the negative impact of vulnerability depends on the degree of diminishing marginal
productivity in a country, which can be influenced by policy actions and is therefore consistent with the
notion of resilience. The application of this approach shows that capital formation and the fostering of
economic conditions that retard the onset of diminishing marginal productivity, including, among
others, macroeconomic buffers and microeconomic market flexibility, can be important sources of
resilience.
4
The analogy with the prodigal son is that these countries, though “born in a good family”, squander
their riches.
5
Farrugia (2004) elaborates further on these ideas by considering the economic strength of trading
partners as a proxy for the probability of shocks to exports.
6
This issue is discussed at length in Guillaumont (2004).
7
Most dictionaries define resilience in terms of the ability to recover quickly from the effect of an
adverse incident. This definition originates from the Latin resilire, “to leap back” or “to jump up
again”.
8
An analogy relating to an attack of influenza virus may help explain the two senses in which the term
“resilience” is used. A person exposed to the virus may: be infected but recover quickly; and/or
withstand the effect of the virus, possibly by being immunized.
9
It is recognized, however, that certain countries may have external debt not because of a weak policy
framework but because of highly developed international financial activity. This is a weakness in the
use of this indicator. However, the inclusion of other variables related to market efficiency and
governance would, to an extent, “correct” this weakness, as these variables either exacerbate the effect
of external debt in the presence of a weak policy framework or counteract it otherwise.
10
An attempt was made to augment the microeconomic market efficiency indicator used in the
resilience index by assessing the degree of exchange rate and financial controls exercised by
countries covered in the resilience index. The premise is based on the notion that countries that use
capital controls are not likely to have efficient financial markets. In turn, owing to the strong
interlinkages between financial markets and the entire economy, inefficiencies in the financial
markets are likely to reflect and result in inefficiencies in other sectors of the economy. The IMF
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (2006) was used to identify
the presence of such controls. This approach, however, met with a number of practical difficulties,
including the fact that the IMF yields a de jure classification of exchange rate regimes based on
the stated intentions of the central banks. However, difficulties arise when actual policies diverge
from the stated intentions. Moreover, given the numerous and often complicated controls exercised
by a number of countries, a relevant comparison of the controls across countries is difficult to
obtain.
11
An alternative governance index is presented by the World Bank (Kaufmann et al., 2006). A Pearson
correlation test of the World Bank governance indicators and the Economic Freedom of the World’s
“legal structure and security of property rights” component yielded a value of 0.92. Thus, both indices
are likely to be measuring a similar phenomenon. In fact, when the Kaufmann index was used in the
compilation of the resilience index, the ranking of countries changed only marginally.
12
Esty et al. (2005) did produce some results for a few small states, but they are reluctant to include them
in the Environmental Sustainability Index.
13
The relationship between GDP per capita and the resilience index (i.e. excluding the vulnerability
variable) exhibits a high correlation coefficient (R 2 ¼ 0.77) and t-statistic (t ¼ 16.7). However, the
inclusion of the vulnerability variable in the equation improves the results by producing a higher
correlation coefficient and a higher t-statistic on the resilience variable, as shown above.
Economic Vulnerability and Resilience 243
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Appendix
b
Borderline with worst case.
c
Borderline with best case.
d
Borderline with self-made.
Borderline with prodigal son.
Economic Vulnerability and Resilience 247