Legalethics Casedigest

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 84324 April 5, 1990
SANTIAGO AQUINO, TERENCIO YUMANG, JR. and FULGENCIO ICARO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. GUILLERMO R. LUNTOK, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch XXIX,
Libmanan, Camarines Sur and LUDOVICO B. PERALTA, respondents.
Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. for private respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
In this special civil action for certiorari, with an application for preliminary injunction and/or restraining
order, petitioners seek the annulment of the following orders of respondent judge in Civil Case No. L-
361 of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur, entitled "Ludovico B. Peralta vs. Henry B. Rañola
et al.," to wit: (1) Temporary restraining order (TRO, for brevity), dated August 27, 1987, enjoining
petitioners herein for a period of twenty (20) days from proceeding or taking action against herein
private respondent; (2) Order, dated September 16, 1987, extending the efficacy of said TRO for
another period of twenty (20) days; (3) Order, dated October 6, 1987, indirectly extending the
efficacy of the TRO for an uncertain period; (4) Order, dated November 4, 1987, granting the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction; and (5) Order, dated November 5, 1987, approving the
bond filed by private respondent which led to the eventual issuance of the writ of November 11,
1987.
It is of record, however, that the Court of Appeals had previously rendered judgment on May 11,
1988, in CA-G.R. SP No. 13186, likewise an original action for certiorari for the annulment of the
1
aforesaid orders of August 27, 1987, September 16, 1987 and October 6, 1987, wherein it dismissed
the petition for being moot since a writ of preliminary injunction had already been issued by
respondent judge. We take cognizance of the finality and entry of such judgment, for which reason
2
this Court shall primarily consider only the prayer for the annulment of the orders, dated November
4, 1987 and November 5, 1987, and the writ of November 11, 1987 in the present petition.
Reduced to its essential terms, the present petition raises a question, apparently of first impression,
concerning the validity of a writ of preliminary injunction issued beyond the 20-day period of the
effectivity of a restraining order and during the extended efficacy of such order. Indeed, in the cases
treating on the matter of TROs, it appears that only the propriety of orders extending the efficacy of
the initial TRO, or the issuance of another TRO after the first had automatically expired after the
twentieth day of its issuance, have been squarely ruled upon, but not the question of the validity of a
writ of preliminary injunction issued to restrain the same act complained of after the lapse of the 20-
day period of the TRO.
The records show that petitioners, in their capacity as Provincial Auditor of Camarines Sur, State
Auditor I of the Provincial Auditor's Office and State Examiner of the Provincial Auditor's Office,
respectively, conducted an audit of private respondent's accounts as Municipal Treasurer of
Libmanan, Camarines Sur and found a cash shortage of P274,011.17 under his accountability. 3
Allegedly pursuant to Section 157, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, petitioners seized private
respondent's cash, books, papers and accounts and the latter was suspended from office. As a
consequence, private respondent requested reinvestigation by the Commission on Audit. Pending 4
action on the request, private respondent filed a petition dated August 26, 1987 with the trial court,
presided over by respondent judge, for prohibition with injunction and with a prayer for a restraining
order and damages. 5
Forthwith, respondent judge issued the TRO of August 27, 1987, enjoining all respondents therein,
their agents and/or representatives, for a period of twenty (20) days from date thereof, to desist from
proceeding or taking action against private respondent based on petitioner Yumang's report and
from exercising such derivative powers and functions. 6
On September 16, 1987, which was the last day of effectivity of the TRO, respondent judge, on
motion filed by private respondent, issued an order extending the efficacy of the TRO for another
period of twenty (20) days, or until October 6, 1987. 7
On September 24, 1987, likewise upon motion of private respondent, respondent judge issued an
order directing petitioners to return to private respondent the cash, books and other papers they had
seized. Thereupon, petitioner Aquino filed a motion for the reconsideration of said order, to which
private respondent filed his opposition. Under date of October 5, 1987, petitioners also filed their
answer to the petition, with an opposition to the application for preliminary injunction. 8
On October 6, 1987, the last day of the extended effectivity of the TRO, private respondent filed
another motion for extension of the efficacy of the restraining order. On the same date, respondent
judge issued an order directing petitioners to refrain from taking any action against private
respondent until the motion is resolved. 9
In a petition dated October 27, 1987, petitioners instituted in the Court of Appeals an original action
for certiorari, with an application for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order, docketed therein
as CA-G.R. SP No. 13186 and entitled "Santiago Aquino, et al. vs. Hon. Guillermo Luntok, et al.,"
precisely putting in issue and assailing the validity of the aforesaid multiple restraining orders dated
August 27, 1987, September 16, 1987 and October 6, 1987. 10
While said petition was pending, respondent judge issued an order, dated November 4, 1987,
granting the application of private respondent for a writ of preliminary injunction. A day later,
11
respondent judge issued another order, dated November 5, 1987, approving the bond filed by
private respondent. On November 11, 1987, respondent judge issued the corresponding writ of
12
preliminary injunction. 13
As an offshoot thereof and as hereinbefore noted, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision on May
11, 1988 dismissing the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 13186 on the ground of mootness,
since respondent judge had already granted the writ of preliminary injunction, thus:
Under the factual milieu of this case, no practical effect could be had since the respondent
court had already granted a writ of preliminary injunction on November 4, 1987. 14
As earlier explained, the other orders of respondent judge, dated November 4, 1987 and November
5, 1987, and the validity of the writ issued on November 11, 1987, are now before us for resolution in
the present action.
Petitioners asseverate that the questioned writ of preliminary injunction is null and void, it being in
reality a fourth restraining order issued beyond the 20-day effectivity of the preceeding
TRO. Further, petitioners claim that the injunction was issued in utter disregard of the doctrine of
15
exhaustion of administrative remedies, private respondent having brought the action below pending
his request for reinvestigation with the Commission on Audit. 16
On the charge of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, although it is well-settled in our

jurisdiction that, unless otherwise provided by law or required by public interest, before bringing an
action in or resorting to the courts of justice all remedies of administrative character affecting or
determinative of the controversy at that level should first be exhausted by the aggrieved party, this
17
doctrine is not a hard and fast rule. In the present case, we are inclined to subscribe to private
respondent's invocation of the urgency of judicial intervention, as one of the admitted exceptions to
the rule, which likewise would be in keeping with the court's broad discretion in granting
18
injunctions. Whatever circumstances warranted the grant of injunction in the court below would be
no different than the circumstances which created the urgency, and there can ordinarily be no better
judge to determine the existence thereof than the trial court itself.
Thus, it has been said that the court which is to exercise the discretion of granting an injunction is
the court of original jurisdiction and not the appellate court; and a preliminary injunction will usually
19
be granted when it is made to appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and
one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause
irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the
merits of the case. The only limitations to such discretion would be that it must have been exercised
upon the grounds and in the manner provided by law, an inquiry into which is precisely part of the
20
subject of our immediately succeeding discussion on the matter of the status of the injunction in
controversy.
Contrary to petitioners' position, we are disposed to sustain the validity of the writ of preliminary
injunction in question. A temporary restraining order, while being in effect a species of injunction, is
in some respects to be distinguished therefrom. It is an interlocutory order or writ issued by the court
as a restraint on the defendant until the propriety of granting a preliminary injunction can be
determined, thus going no further in its operation than to preserve the status quo until that
determination. When such determination is made, the whole force of the order ceases by its own
limitations and become functus officio, having by then served its purpose. 21
On this basis lies the mootness of the issue on the propriety of the issuance of successive
restraining orders upon the approval of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, as ruled by
the Court of Appeals. With the grant of the writ, hearing the petition which sought the annulment of
the three antecedent TROs would be inutile as the writ has been substituted for and subserves the
purpose of the prior restraining orders.
It is worth noting, nonetheless, that Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, as amended by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 224 effective April 16, 1982, sets a specific period for the juridical life span of a TRO,
thus:
No preliminary injunction shall be granted without notice to the defendant. If it shall appear
from the facts shown by affidavits or by the verified complaint that great or irreparable injury
would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the judge to whom
the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue a restraining order to be
effective only for a period of twenty days from date of its issuance. Within said twenty-day
period, the judge must cause an order to be served on the defendant, requiring him to show
cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, and
determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted,
and shall accordingly issue the corresponding order. In the event that the application for
preliminary injunction is denied, the restraining order is deemed automatically vacated. . . .
The 20-day period of effectivity of a TRO is non-extendible; the restraining order automatically
terminates at the end of such period without the need of any judicial declaration to that effect. Any
22
extension would, therefore, ordinarily, be disallowed. But, when injunction is subsequently granted,
as in the case at bar, any defect in the order brought about by the extension of its enforceability is
deemed cured. 23
The status or validity of the writ of preliminary injunction itself, however, remains in question. From a
reading of the above-cited provision, it may appear that the order granting the injunction must issue
within the same 20-day period. Be that as it may, we are constrained to enunciate, since the contrary
is not expressed or otherwise indicated therein, that the mandatory tenor of the aforecited provision
should not be taken to mean that a writ issued beyond the time frame is an absolute
nullity, provided that, aside from the existence of any of the grounds for its issuance the
determination of which is largely addressed to the trial court, the other requirements prescribed by
the rules are present, namely, healing and posting of a bond. Instead, the obligatory import of the
rule should be considered as a directive for the judge to act with corresponding dispatch on the
application for preliminary injunction within the 20-day period if a TRO has been issued, with a
proscription against an ex parte proceeding on such application since it would deprive the affected
parties of the opportunity to be heard.
Indeed, a look at the history of the provision would reveal that Batas Pambansa Blg. 224 was
adopted precisely as a reaction against the indiscriminate issuance of writs of preliminary injunction
which, not infrequently, converted the writ from an instrument in furtherance of justice to a shield for
injustice. This was made possible not only by unscrupulous lawyers and adventurous litigants but
24
also by idle and corrupt judges who tolerated the improvident and ex parte issuance thereof and, in
the case of TRO's apparently oblivious of or insensitive to the fact that these were not conditioned on
the posting of bonds to indemnify the parties against whom they were issued.
In the instant case, we note that the protection of such bond has been required. Also, it is of record
1âwphi1
that herein petitioners and private respondent were given an opportunity to be heard and, in fact, a
hearing was conducted by the trial court before the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to
determine the existence of a valid ground therefor. 25
We are constrained to sustain such action of the trial court since, except for the delay in the
resolution of the application for and the subsequent issuance of the writ, the other requisites
provided by the rules for the grant thereof have been observed. These considerations
notwithstanding, we are aware that under the present state of the law which does not nullify a writ of
preliminary injunction issued beyond the 20-day period where a TRO has been granted, the courts
may thereby be allowed to do by indirection that which should not be done directly. This is a matter,
however, which should be remedied by the corresponding amendment of the rule if the intent is to
nullify a writ of preliminary injunction thus belatedly issued.
Consequently, there being no other sufficient ground to dissolve the injunction in controversy, the
26
grant of the writ must sequences of the be upheld but without prejudice to the consequences of the
conduct of respondent judge. The circumstances under which the writ was granted after a protracted
delay, punctuated by dubious orders issued in the interim, certainly cannot be countenanced lest
such conduct be replicated in circumvention of the rules. Specifically, respondent judge failed to
observe Rule 3.01 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which calls for a judge to be faithful
to the law and maintain professional competence, and Rule 3.05 which admonishes all judges to
dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Definitely,
this Court cannot gloss over the challenged actuations of respondent judge which are amply
reflected in the records of this case.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the present petition is hereby DISMISSED. The grant of the
writ of preliminary injunction by respondent judge is hereby SUSTAINED and the Regional Trial
Court at Libmanan, Camarines Sur or to which Civil Case No. L-361 is presently assigned is hereby
DIRECTED to expediently hear and decide the same on the merits within a mandatory period of
thirty (30) days from the finality of this judgment. Respondent judge is hereby REPRIMANDED with
a stern warning that a repetition of the same or any similar action shall be more severely dealt with
by the Court. The temporary restraining order issued pursuant to our resolution of August 22, 1988 is
hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 704-RTJ June 14, 1990
FELDMERTO M. LONGBOAN, complainant,
vs.
HON. EMILIO L. POLIG, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
A letter-complaint was addressed to the Court Administrator on July 18, 1986 charging the
respondent judge with gross negligence of duty or abuse of authority for his failure to
apprise complainant of the status of Civil Case No. 641 despite the former's registered letters
requesting the status.
Civil Case No. 641 involved a dispute for collection of a sum of money between the
complainant as plaintiff and one Arsenic Cunaden as defendant. The complainant obtained a
favorable judgment from Municipal Circuit Judge Flora M. Tel-equen of the 2nd Municipal
Circuit Court of Bauko-Sibangan, Mountain Province on October 26, 1981. It was on appeal
when the matter subject of the letter-complaint came about.
It appears that on February 20, 1984, the complainant was informed by Regional Trial Court
Judge Nicasio A. Baguilat that respondent judge, his predecessor, was in possession of the
records of Civil Case No. 641 considering that the appeal thereto had been perfected prior to
respondent judge's transfer to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 at Lagawe, Ifugao. On
August 8, 1984, Judge Baguilat's Clerk of Court certified, among others, that Civil Case No.
641 was among the cases retained by respondent judge and that as of the said date no
decision therein had been received from the said judge.
Meanwhile, the complainant had sent five registered letters inquiring about the status of Civil
Case No. 641. Due to respondent Judge's failure to make any reply as requested, the Office of
the Court Administrator sent respondent judge three tracers dated August 12, 1985, April 15,
1986 and June 23, 1986, respectively in relation to the records of Civil Case No. 641. Still, the
respondent judge made no reply.
In our resolution dated September 9, 1986, we ordered the respondent judge to: (a) show
cause why no disciplinary or administrative action should be taken against him, and (b)
comply with the inquiry within ten (10) days from notice thereof with a warning that failure
still to do so would be dealt with accordingly.
In our resolution dated July 31, 1987, we suspended the respondent judge "immediately and
continuing until further orders" for his willful disobedience and disregard of our previous
resolution. The respondent judge was further ordered to show cause and comply with
complainant's inquiry with a warning that failure to do so would be dealt with more severely.
On May 30, 1989, we resolved to dispatch an audit team headed by Deputy Court
Administrator Juanito A. Bernad to conduct a physical inventory of the cases pending in the
respondent judge's sala on the basis of the communication from Judge Baguilat informing
the Office of the Court Administrator that Civil Case No. 641 had already been decided by him
and that he could not decide the other cases pending before the respondent judge's former
sala because the records thereof could not be located and the respondent judge could not be
contacted.
On June 1, 1989, a manifestation from the respondent judge with prayer for the lifting of his
suspension and reinstatement to his office was received by us stating that the respondent
judge was unable to submit his comment within the time allotted because the record of Civil
Case No. 641 was somehow mislaid on account of his transfer to Lagawe, Ifugao; that while
in the process of locating the said record, we suspended respondent judge; that eventually
the said record was found inadvertently mixed up with the disposed and archived cases and
upon discovery, respondent judge immediately transmitted the same to Judge Baguilat's sala
for disposition since he was under suspension; that Civil Case No. 641 had already been
decided by the Regional Trial Court of Bontoc, Mountain Province; that respondent judge
failed to ask for extension of time to make and submit his comment to our show-cause
resolution due to "awful shock and anxiety at the thought that the record of the said case
may have been lost beyond recovery"; that it took respondent judge a long time to plead for
the lifting of his suspension due to "self-reproach and disgust of himself for his omission";
and that upon realizing that he still has to support two boys in high school and two boys in
college and considering the present high cost of living, respondent judge deemed his two-
year suspension as enough punishment for his omission, thus, resumption of his judicial
functions should be ordered.
On June 27, 1989, Deputy Court Administrator Juanita A. Bernad conducted the physical
inventory of the cases pending before respondent judge's sala. In a memorandum dated July
4, 1989, Deputy Court Administrator Bernad reported that all the cases inventoried were
accounted for except four (4) criminal cases where the accused are not under detention and
four (4) civil cases which remained missing as of June 29, 1989.
On July 6, 1989, we resolved to refer the instant case for investigation and recommendation
to Associate Justice Jesus Elbinias of the Court of Appeals.
After hearing, the investigating officer recommended the lifting of respondent judge's
suspension and the resumption of his official duties. A fine equivalent to two month's pay to
be paid through equitable salary deductions was further recommended. As to the missing
cases, the investigating officer stated that:
With regard to the missing four (4) criminal cases without prisoners and four
(4) civil cases referred to by Deputy Court Administrator Bernad in his
memorandum for the Chief Justice, it is my view that this is a matter entirely
outside the scope of the administrative complaint under inquiry. While the
instant case is privately initiated in the sense that a member of the public
instituted it, in the matter of the missing cases without the parties involved in
them having as yet initiated any action, I believe the decision of whether or not
to require respondent Judge to account for them lies with the Honorable
Supreme Court or Office of the Court Administrator.
After a careful perusal of the records of the instant administrative case coupled with
painstaking deliberations, we are convinced that the respondent judge's continued silence as
to the status of Civil Case No. 641 despite repeated written queries from one of the parties,
his failure to reply to the tracers of the Office of the Court Administrator, and his willful
disobedience and disregard to our show-cause resolutions constituted grave and serious
misconduct affecting his fitness and the worthiness of the honor and integrity attached to his
office. Once again, we hold with great emphasis that:
...The Judge is the visible representation of the law of justice. From him, the
people draw their will and awareness to obey the law ..." (see Call A. Impao., et
al. v. Judge Jacosalem D. Makilala, A.M. No. MTJ 88-184, October 13, 1989;
Atty. David G. Ompoc, Jr. v. Judge Norito E. Torres, A.M. No. MTJ 86-11,
September 27, 1989)
How can the respondent judge expect others to respect the law when he himself cannot obey
orders as simple as the show cause resolution?
Moreover, it is not enough that the complaining litigant was eventually appeased by the turn
of circumstances. What is more important is whether or not in the course of the judicial
process, judicial norms have been maintained. It is with this end in view that we stress
diligence and efficiency attendant to the discharge of a judge's function in the present Code
of Judicial Conduct. Canon 3, Rule 3.08, of the said Code provides that:
A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain

professional competence in court management and facilitate the performance
of the administrative functions of other judges and court personnel.
In the instant case, respondent judge even impeded the speedy disposition of cases by his
successor on account of missing records of cases. This fact reflects an inefficient and
disorderly system in the recording of cases assigned to his sala. Although blame can also be
conveniently laid on the court personnel's mismanagement of the records of cases, proper
and efficient court management is as much the judge's responsibility for the Court personnel
are not the guardians of a Judge's responsibilities. (See. of Justice v. Legaspi, 107 SCRA 233
[1981])
With respect to the inventoried four (4) criminal cases without prisoners and four (4) civil
cases missing, we find no justification for the failure to present them to the Deputy Court
Administrator when required and their absence from the place where court records are
stored. A judge is expected to ensure that the records of cases assigned to his sala are
intact. There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events. The loss of not
one but eight records is indicative of gross misconduct and inexcusable negligence
unbecoming of a judge. For true professionalism in the bench to exist, judges whose acts
demoralize the ethical standards of a judicial office and whose acts demonstrate unfitness
and unworthiness of the prestige and prerequisites attached to said office must be weeded
out.
Lastly, the report on the physical inventory of the records of the cases in RTC, Branch 14,
Lagawe, Ifugao, which was respondent judge's last assignment before his suspension
revealed that a total of 35 cases submitted for decision have remained
unresolved beyond the 90-day reglementary period. We have consistently held that failure to
decide a case within the required period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency.
(Ubarra v. Tecson, 134 SCRA 4 [1985]; De Leon v. Castro, 104 SCRA 241 [1981]; and In re:
Judge Jose F. Madara, 104 SCP A, 245 [1981]).
In sum, the Court finds respondent judge guilty of inexcusable negligence, gross inefficiency
and grave and serious misconduct in the discharge of his functions.
ACCORDINGLY, the COURT RESOLVED to DISMISS RESPONDENT JUDGE from the service
with forfeiture of all his accrued retirement benefits, leave and other privileges, if any, and
with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government,
including government owned or controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Griño-Aquino, J., is on leave.
SYLLABI/SYNOPSIS

EN BANC
[A.M. No. 97-6-182-RTC. March 19, 1999]

RE: REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 68, CAMILING, TARLAC
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
In view of the fact that Judge Prudencio V. L. Ruiz was due to retire from the service, as he
did, on April 28, 1997, the Office of Court Administrator [1] caused to be conducted from
February 25 to 27, 1997, a Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of the cases then pending
before Branch 68 of the Regional Trial Court in Camiling, Tarlac presided over by Judge Ruiz.[2]
The report, dated March 11, 1997, submitted by the team tasked to undertake the Judicial
Audit and Physical Inventory of the cases involved, disclosed that as of February 27, 1997,
subject Regional Trial Court had a caseload of 419 cases, consisting of 215 criminal cases and
204 civil cases. Of the aforesaid cases, there were three (3) criminal and fourteen (14) civil cases
which ripened for disposition, as follows:[3]
CASE TITLE DATE DEEMED
SUBMITTED FOR
NUMBER DECISION
CRIMINAL
1. 467 People vs. Fernando et. al. 2 23 - 97
2. 566 People vs. Riparip 2 01 - 97
3. 591 People vs. Andres 12 08 96
CIVIL
1. 307 Gabay, et. al. vs. Mangabay, 1 30 97
et al.
2. 206 Tan vs. Chan 9 19 96
3. 283 De la Cruz vs. De la Cruz, et. 5 15 96
al.
4. 289 Galtoc vs. Juan 2 04 97
5. 431 Jose et. al. vs. Luis et. al. 1 28 97
6. 480 Simon et. al. vs. de la Cruz 8 09 96
7. 96-07 Sps. Subiate et. al. vs Sps. de 6 26 - 96
la Cruz et. al.
8. 97-06 Fernandez vs. Dr. Bengzon 1 26 - 97
9. 397 Molina vs. Tolentino et. al. 1 20 97
10. 419 Vda. de Quidez vs. Quidez 2 21 97
11. 96-22 Rural Bank, Sta Ignacia vs. 1 27 97
Sps. Soliven
12. SP-221 Adoption of Minor Bautista 2 17 97
Sps. Bautista, Petitioner
13. SP-209 Adoption of Minor Pabilona 2 04 - 97
Sps. Abad, Petitioner
14. SP-229 Correction of Entry on Birth 12 26 - 96
Certificate J. Agustin,
Petitioner

Of the above-mentioned cases Civil Case Nos. 206, 283, 480, and 96-07 were pending decision
beyond the 90-day period prescribed for deciding the same.[4]
The same report also indicated that there were fifteen (15) cases, one criminal and
fourteen (14) civil, appealed from various Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial
courts under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court in Camiling, Tarlac. Of the said cases,
three (3) civil cases were awaiting further hearings. In Civil Case No. 97-10, entitled Sagun et al.
vs. Sps. Palaganas et al., no action had been taken thereon since it was instituted on January 29,
1997. The following cases were considered submitted for resolution, to wit:[5]
CASE NUMBER TITLE DATE DEEMED
SUBMITTED
FOR
RESOLUTION
1. 96-69 People vs. Neri 12 12 96
2. 96-33 Villegas Sr. vs. Sabangan et. al. 9 13 96
3. 96-56 Juan vs. Concepcion 1 11 97
4. 96-53 Alipio et. al. vs. Cabungan et. 12 23 96
al.
5. 96-47 Marcos et. al. vs. Gragasin et. 1 02 97
al.
6. 95-08 Robinos et. al. vs. Felix et. al. 5 11 95
7. 97-08 Bueno vs. Sanchez 2 22 97
8. 95-75 Dacayanan vs. Martin 9 09 95
9. 96-08 Villegas vs. Velasco et al. 3 23 96
10. 97-03 Dr. Bengzon vs. Celario 2 13 97
11. 96-57 Dancel vs. Sps. Bartolo et al. 1 17 97
Of the said appealed cases, Civil Case Nos. 96-33, 95-08, 95-75 and 96-08 were undecided or
unresolved beyond the 90-day period within which to decide or resolve the same.[6]
The same judicial audit and investigation report noted that the decision dated November 8,
1994 in Criminal Case No. 492 (People vs. Acosta) could not be promulgated because of the
flight of the accused, whose cash bond was consequently confiscated and who was then ordered
arrested. In Criminal Case No. 95-82, (People vs. Oriente) there was presented on January 6,
1997 a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the accused was dead. A draft Order dated
February 25, 1997 was prepared for the dismissal of the said case. There were also two civil
cases with pending motions. In Civil Case No. 94-26 (Tarlac Agro, etc. vs. Loquiao) a motion to
declare the defendant in default was filed on February 17, 1997 but the motion remained
unresolved. In Civil Case No. 96-48 (De Leon Sr., et al. vs. De Leon, et. al.). [7] a motion to lift
order of default was filed after the plaintiff had sent in the comment on February 18, 1997 but
the incident was also unacted upon.
The same report disclosed further that aside from the appealed Civil Case No. 97-10 earlier
referred to, there were two (2) land registration cases on which no action was taken since the
institution of the same. These were LRC Case Nos. 95-33 and 96-08 for Judicial Reconstitution,
filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform, Tarlac office, on December 5, 1995 and November
21, 1996, respectively. Officer-in-charge Noel M. Subiate explained that the Department of
Agrarian Reform did not follow up the said cases and as a result, the corresponding summons
had not been issued because the required fee for service of summons was not paid.
Then, too, there were forty-seven (47) cases, twelve (12) criminal and thirty-five (35) civil
cases, which were never called or heard for a considerable length of time.
On the aforestated report derogatory to him, Judge Ruiz sent in his comment. He explained
that the lack of action on the cases in question, was due to his recurring illness and
hospitalization, as reflected in the records of the Leave Section of the Court.[8]
As regards pending special proceedings, most of the adoption cases have been idle, some for
as long as five years, by reason of the absence of a Social Case Study Report. [9] On August 31,
1998, the Court received Noel M. Subiates letter dated August 12, 1998, together with pertinent
records[10].
On November 4, 1998, there was received from the Court Administrator his final report and
recommendation dated October 19, 1998, for the exoneration of Officer-in-Charge Noel M.
Subiate of administrative liability and for the imposition of a fine of Ten
Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos on Judge Prudencio V. L. Ruiz for failure to decide and/or resolve
seven (7) cases within the 90-day reglementary period.[11]
The aforementioned finding, report and recommendation of the Court Administrator on the
absence of any administrative liability of Officer-in-Charge Noel M. Subiate, after satisfactory
compliance with the resolutions of this Court, merit approval.
With respect to Judge Prudencio V. L. Ruiz, however, considering the attendant facts and
circumstances. Particularly his entire service record, we believed that the recommended fine
of P10,000.00 is too severe, a fine of P2,000.00 should suffice.
As earlier alluded to, Judge Ruiz retired from the service on April 28, 1997 but after the
judicial audit was completed, he immediately sent his letter dated March 20, 1997 to the Court
Administrator, including copies of his Decisions and Orders in Civil Case Nos. 206, 210, 307,
312, 480, 95-08, 95-25, 96-07, 96-08, 96-33, 96-53, 96-56 and 96-69. As regards the cases
submitted and pending decision within the 90-day period, Judge Ruiz decided almost all of such
cases except Civil Case Nos. 289 and 419 which remained undecided, as indicated in the status
report.[12] The sincere effort of the respondent Judge to clear his docket before retirement is
unmistakably gleanable from the certification under oath dated August 12, 1998 of OIC Clerk of
Court Noel M. Subiate, to the effect that Judge Ruiz decided and resolved the pending incidents
in the cases listed in said document. (Annex A-C ibid., pp. 214-216)
Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 enjoins all judges to attend promptly to the business of the court and
decide cases within the time fixed by law.[13] A Judge is mandated to render judgment not more
than ninety (90) days from the time the case is submitted for decision. We have held that the
failure of a judge to render the decision within the prescribed period of ninety (90) days from
submission of a case for decision constitutes serious misconduct, to the detriment of the honor
and integrity of his office and in derogation of speedy administration of justice. [14] Inability to

decide a case within the required period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficieny. [15] We
cannot countenance such undue delay by a judge, especially at a time when clogging of court
dockets is still the bane of the judiciary, whose present leadership has launched an all out
program to minimize, if not totally eradicate, docket congestion and undue delay in the
disposition of cases. Judges are called upon to observe utmost diligence and dedication in the
performance of their judicial functions and duties.[16] It is thus decisively clear that the failure or
inability of a judge to decide a case within the period fixed by law subjects him to administrative
sanctions.[17]
Taking into account, however, the explanation of Judge Ruiz for his failure to decide or
dispose on time subject cases and his quick response and action thereon, before his compulsory
retirement on April 28, 1997, after he was reminded by the audit team to decide said cases, let
alone his letter of March 20, 1997 to the Court Administrator, addressed less than a month after
completion of the judicial audit, to the effect that he had already decided the aforesaid cases, we
can indeed perceive a determined effort on the part of Judge Ruiz to attend to his duties with
greater concern and zeal. Then, too, as observed by the Court Administrator, worthy of
appreciation was the determination of Judge Ruiz to decide not only cases pending decision
beyond the 90-day period but even those not yet overdue for decision.Certainly, the said
accomplishments of respondent judge made up for his past shortcomings and failure to decide
the seven (7) cases within the 90-day period, and should serve to mitigate his administrative
liability.
WHEREFORE, Judge Prudencio V. L. Ruiz, former Presiding Judge of Branch 68 of the
Regional Trial Court in Camiling, Tarlac, is adjudged administratively liable for delay in
deciding subject cases and is FINED Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, which amount may be
deducted from whatever retirement benefits due him.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-38139 May 16, 1983
TEODORO DOMANICO and CONCEPCION C. DOMANICO, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and TRINIDAD BAMBA, respondents.
Jose Lozada Lapak for petitioners.
Edmundo Narra for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals which
affirmed the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of respondent Trinidad Bamba, as plaintiff in
Civil Case No.1731 lodged before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte.
We had earlier denied due course to the petition but upon the petitioners' insistence that they were
denied substantial justice because of the allegedly biased participation of the trial judge in the
examination of the petitioner, we reconsidered the resolution denying the petition.
The facts antecedent to this petition were narrated by the Court of Appeals as follows:
In its Civil Case No. 1713, the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte rendered
judgment, ordering 'the defendants to pay the plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 as
plaintiff's share of the profits of the store; likewise ordering the defendants to make
the inventory of the store of Stall No. 17, and thereafter, to pay the plaintiff the
orresponding value of ½ of the inventory goods of the store and also ordering the
defendants to pay the plaintiff the sum of P500.00 for attorney's fees and incidents 1
expenses as well as to pay the costs, and after the above amounts had been paid to
the plaintiff, the partnership between the plaintiff and defendants is ordered dissolved
and cancelled.
It appears from the evidence of plaintiff, that sometime in 1952, at her own initiative,
she and defendants formed a partnership, putting up a store at the old market,
located in the former Japanese camp site at Larap J. Panganiban, Camarines Norte.
They agreed to invest P200.00 each as the initial capital to start their business,
plaintiff making the purchases of rice and other goods at the Central Trading in Daet.
The necessary license was paid for and issued in the name of plaintiff. She and
defendants helped each other in managing the store. When later defendant Teodoro
Domanico became sick, he asked plaintiff to "divide their Capital including the profit,"
as he was in need of money for medical treatment. At that time the store was worth
P700.00, When they made the division, "there were some goods and some cash
left." After defendant Teodoro Domanico had recovered from his sickness. he
returned to the store and continued managing it They used the cash left as capital of
the store.
In 1956, they transferred to a new market operated by the Philippine iron Mines, Inc.,
as lessor of the stalls therein. When they transferred to the new market, they put up
their store in Stall No. 10, but after two days the market supervisor told them to leave
as it was not their place. Plaintiff then suggested to defendants that they pay their
obligation and returned the remaining goods to the Central Trading, and in case they
would find a place they would continue with their store business. Later, they acquired
Stall No. 6 in the same market from spouses Teotimo Lozano and Pura Ramosa.
They had their store in that stall for about 10 months.
Defendant Teodoro Domanico became sick again, this time of stomach trouble. The
management of the store was left to plaintiff and his (Teodoro's) wife. After two
weeks, Teodoro Domanico saw plaintiff and told her that he would manage the store.
As Stall No. 6 was being taken from them, she looked for another stall and found
Stall No. 17 in the same market, which she acquired from Soledad Esmena who
allowed her to occupy said stall in the meantime that she could not pay her debt of
Pl,400.00 to plaintiff. Soledad Esmena signed a statement, confirming that fact
(Exhibit "B").
Plaintiff and defendants occupied Stall No. 17, the latter managing the store they put
in that stall and the former participating in the management, "because I help" — "I am
still a partner." At that time, defendants told plaintiff not to deduct anything from the
profit, but just to get her share from the sale of empty sacks, In the course of time,
the goods and merchandise in the store "became bigger."
In 1958, whenever plaintiff went to the store, defendants "always have sour faces
showing that they were not trusting me any more." On time, when she met defendant
Teodoro Domanico at the house of one Rufino Mazo whom they visited as the latter
was then sick, plaintiff told him, "I am already old. If I will be allowed, I want a
liquidation. You ask and talk with your wife and whatever your decision would be, I
will agree." Defendant Teodoro Domanico did not say anything.
he last time she went to the store in 1958, the store was worth P5,000.00, "that is the
profit because when we left the (former) Japanese camp we already withdrew our
investment." According to plaintiff, the profit of the store remained in the possession
of defendants and she did not receive any share from them. She claims "that (Court
of Appeals" the profit is the one we utilized again as capital decision, pp. 2-4).
xxx xxx xxx
The Court of Appeals found no reversible error in the decision of the trial court and affirmed the
same.
The petitioners raised the following alleged errors in their petition for review:
First Assigned Error
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE

ATTITUDE OF AND ACTUATIONS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT DEPRIVE
THE PETITIONERS OF A FAIR CHANCE TO AIR THEIR SIDE OF THE CASE.
Second Assigned Error
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE WHOM IT FOUND
"LACKED THE MODERATION EXPECTED OF HIM AS A TRIAL JUDGE."
Third Assigned Error
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT SETTING

ASIDE THE DECISION AND ORDERING A NEW TRIAL TO AFFORD THE
PETITIONERS A FAIR CHANCE TO PRESENT THEIR EVIDENCE.
Relative to the first and second assignments of errors, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled that:
The criticisms and complaint against the trial judge have the support of the record.
He lacked the moderation expected of him as a trial judge. (Decision of Court of
Appeals, p. 13).
Petitioners argue that with the findings of the respondent court that the criticisms of the trial judge
have the support of the record it becomes clear that the petitioners have not been tried by a fair and
impartial judge and thereby were unduly deprived of their right to due process. Where a party to a
case was not given a fair trial, the petitioners state that a new trial should have been ordered.
We quorte the portions of the testimony upon which the petitioners based this petition:
ATTY. ARNOBIT :
xxx xxx xxx
Q Is the market in the Japanese camp still existing today?
A No more.
Q Where was it transfered, if it was transferred?
Q It was transferred to the main camp
Q What year was that?
A 1956
COURT:
Incompetent.
ATTY. ARNOBIT
He is aware because he is selling in that market. "
ATTY. NARRA:
That becomes now immaterial as to where the store is located. The

fact is there as partnership.
COURT:
Objection sustained.
xxx xxx xxx
Q when, for the first time, did you start your business in the new
market?
A I started in 1956.
Q When for the first time, did you start your business in the new
market?
A I started in 1956.
Q When you started in 1956, did you have any goods remaining
coming from the Japanese camp market?
ATTY. NARRA:
That has been admitted that the partnership existed and there was a
store, and he transferred to the public market.
ATTY. ARNOBIT:
What happened to the goods that remained when you transferred to

the public market?
ATTY. NARRA:
We object, because that becomes misleading The goods were

transferred to the main camp.
ATTY. ARNOBIT:
Precisely, we are trying to find out what happened to the goods.
ATTY. NARRA:
It is very leading.
COURT:
ATTY. ARNOBIT:
Were you in partnership with the plaintiff herein?
ATTY. NARRA:
Counsel is impeaching his witness.
COURT:
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Go to the point.
Q If the business was good, what was the reason why in 1956, you
have to terminate the partnership between you and the plaintiff?
A Because when the old market was removed from the Japanese
Camp, we were not able to get a place anymore in the new market.
Q Is it not a fact that after you transferred you bought the store of
Cabales?
A I was able to buy it.
Q And the business continued and as a matter of fact, it expanded?
A But in my name already, because the partnership was already

terminated.
Q How did you terminate the partnership.
A We divide and liquidated.
Q When you first entered into a partnership, did you put down or draft
an article or partnership between you and the plaintiff?
A There is.
Q Where is it?
A It is not existing now.
Q Where is the original agreement of partnership or the articles?
A It was burned in Larap during the fire.
Q When you terminated the partnership did you reduce that also in
writing.
A No more.
Q Did you make a liquidation of all the assets and liabilities of the
partnership?
A We had a liquidation when we divided here in Daet.
Q You did not reduce that into writing.?
A No more.
Q Will you tell the Court why is it that when you entered into a
partnership, you made it into writing and when you terminated it in the
height of making good profit and the business is progressing, you did
not care to write down the termination of your partnership and
liquidation? "
A Because both party (sic) knew that our partnership was already
terminated.
Q You are not answering my question. You answer my question.
A Because I did not know that she will do this to me because of my

confidence.
Q What is this termination of this partnership? Was this suggested by

you or this was suggested by the plaintiff?
A By both of us.
Q But, at the time you parted, according to you, not according to the
plaintiff, the business was a going concern and as a matter of fact, it
was making profits?
A Yes, it was making profits.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
From the start of the business, Mr. Domanico, did you buy any
license to operate the business?
A Yes sir.
Q In whose name was it placed?
A In my name.
Q Not in the name of the partnership?
A No, sir.
Q So the partnership has no partnership name?
A In our partnership, it was in her name.
Q What do you mean to say, no partnership name or in your name?
A There is none.
Q When did you first purchase a license for the business?
A In 1953.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What is the volume of business that you have in that place from
1953 to the present, what is the average?
A It is only small.
Q How much gross sale do you realize every year?
A I could not estimate now because of the length of time.
Q Do you have any daily sales report as required by the Bureau of

Internal Revenue?
A We have.
Q Last year, what was your gross sale?
A I had a gross sale of P3,000.00 plus.
Q Selling rice in that side of the store according to Exhibits E and E-1
to E-4.
A Yes, sir.
Q So, you are a tax evader?
A That income is true.
Q What is your license here? Do you understand what is gross sales?
A Well it is about P10,000 gross sales.
Q Do you file any income tax return?
A I am filing but I am not paying yet.
Q How many years have you started to file your income tax?
A Four years already.
Q And you have not paid any tax yet?
A None yet.
(T.s.n., pp. 34-38; 49-51; 54-57, hearing of May 19, 1971).
Petitioners submit that the foregoing incidents are incontrovertible proof demonstrating how the trial
court interferred in the proceedings to obstruct and impede the petitioners in the presentation of their
evidence.
The rule is that a judge may properly intervene in a trial of a case to promote expedition and prevent
unnecessary waste of time or to clear up some obscurity. But he should bear in mind that his undue
interference, impatience, or participation in the examination of witnesses or a severe attitude on his
part toward witnesses, especially those who are excited or terrified by the unusual circumstances of
a trial may tend to prevent the proper presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of the truth in
respect thereto (People v. Catindihan, 97 SCRA 196; See also Paragraph 14, Canons of Judicial
Ethics, Administrative Order No. 162 dated August 1, 1946, 42 O.G. 1803):
Judges are not mere referees like those of a boxing bout, only to watch and decide
the results of a game; they should have as much interest as counsel in the orderly
and expeditious presentation of calling attention of counsel to points at issue that are
overlooked directing them to ask the question that would elicit the facts on the issues
involved, clarifying ambiguous remarks by witnesses, etc. (Ventura vs. Judge Yatco,
105 Phil. 287, 294, and also Cited in People v. Catindihan, supra.)
In the instant case, whatever apparent bias might have been exhibited by the trial judge showing
some impatience against Page 226 the defendants did not preclude the defense from making an
adequate presentation of its side of the case. The Court of Appeals examined the cited testimony
carefully and correctly ruled that "the appealed decision was not based on any immaterial matters
elicited by the trial judge during his examination of defendant-appellant Domanico."
Relative to the third assignment of error the petitioners allege that the respondent Court of Appeals
erred in not ordering a new trial to afford the petitioners a fair chance to present their evidence.
We hold that the records do not show any error or irregularity that may be a ground for a new trial.
The attitudes and actuations of the trial judge did not deprive the petitioners of a fair chance to
present their side of the case. Petitioners were given all the opportunity to present their evidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby denied for lack of merit. The decisieon
of the respondent Court of Appeals is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Plana, Escolin * and Vasquez, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera and Relova, JJ., are on leave.
Footnotes
* Mr. Justice Escolin was designated to sit with the First Division under Special Order
No. 241 dated April 28, 1983.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 90626 August 18, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RICARDO ALCORIZA LASCUNA, ROSITA DIONISIO VILLENA, CELSO CANO ALGOBA and
PLACIDO AQUINO PALANGOY, accused. PLACIDO AQUINO PALANGOY, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Joel Angelo C. Cruz for accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Accused Ricardo Alcoriza Lascuna, Rosita Dionisio Villena, Celso Cano Algoba and Placido Aquilino
Palangoy 1were charged on 16 January 1989 with robbery with homicide, rape and physical injuries
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan in an information 2 with the following
accusatory portion:
That on or about the 16th day of October, 1988, in the municipality of Malolos,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with Danilo Lagasca who is still at large and against
whom the preliminary investigation has not yet been completed by the Municipal Trial
Court of Malolos, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another,
with intent of (sic) gain and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away with them toys, cash,
assorted clothes, wrist watches and valuable documents worth P4,900.00 all
belonging to Luisa A. Villena, to the damage and prejudice of the said Luisa A.
Villena in the total amount of P4,900.00; that by reason or on the occasion of the said
robbery, the above-named accused, with Danilo Lagasca who is still at large as
aforesaid, in furtherance of their conspiracy, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously with intent to kill one Honesto Altiche, attack, assault and strangle the
said Honesto Altiche, thereby resulting to his death; did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with force and intimidation and with lewd designs, have
carnal knowledge of Luisa A. Villena against her will; did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strangle the said Luisa A. Villena,
inflicting on her slight physical injuries which required medical attendance and
incapacitated her from, performing her customary labor for a period of nine (9) days.
Contrary to law.
Each of the four accused pleaded not guilty upon being arraigned on 1 February 1989. 3
On 10 February 1989, the trial court directed the assistant public prosecutor to amend the
information by including Danilo Lagasca as co-accused. 4
On 17 March 1989, after the principal prosecution witness, Luisa Villena y Altiche, had completed
her testimony on direct examination, accused Ricardo Lascuna and Celso Algoba sought leave of
court to change their not guilty plea to guilty. The trial court granted the request, re-arraigned them
and issued an order 5 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment, of conviction is imposed upon the accused Ricardo

Alcoriza Lascuna and Celso Cano Algoba by (sic) proof beyond reasonable doubt
are found guilty and they are sentenced to a straight penalty of 12 years and 1 day to
20 years.
SO ORDERED.
Thereupon, trial proceeded against accused Rosita Villena and Placido Palangoy. Aside from Luisa
Villena y Altiche, the other witnesses presented by the prosecution were Patrolmen Felicito de
Belen, Oscar Enriquez and Jose Marcelino, Jr. of the Integrated National Police (INP) of Malolos,
Bulacan, Dr. Juanito Sacdalan, Dr. Rolando Victoria, Dr. Isadora Gatbonton and Eduardo Vinuya, a
neighbor of the victims. The defense, on the other hand, presented Celso Algoba who was by then
already serving sentence, Rosita Villena and Placido Palangoy. Accused Ricardo Lascuna, who was
likewise serving sentence, was subpoenaed but failed to appear. Apparently, on 26 July 1989, he
escaped from detention. 6
The prosecution's evidence establishes the following facts:
Luisa Villena y Altiche, together with her eight-month-old daughter and brother Honesto Altiche, was
in her house at Bgy. Cofradia, Malolos, Bulacan on the night of 16 October 1988. Honesto was
staying with her since her husband was working abroad. While both Honesto and Luisa were
watching a television show at around 7:00 o'clock, the latter's sister-in-law, Rosita Villena, knocked
on the door of the house. When Luisa opened the door, Rosita came in with her daughter and four
strangers, three of whom the former later identified in court as the accused Celso Algoba, Ricardo
Lascuna and Placido Palangoy. The fourth person, identified as Danilo Lagasca, was not present in
court. Ricardo Lascuna and Danilo Lagasca were both carrying knives which they poked at Luisa
and Honesto while, Celso Algoba and Placido Palangoy started ransacking the house. Luisa and her
brother were then gagged and their hands and feet were tied. 7 Both were herded inside the bedroom
where Luisa was raped by Ricardo Lascuna while Honesto was asked to turn his back. Thereafter, Luisa
was dragged into the kitchen 8where she heard her brother, who was still inside the bedroom with Danilo
Lagasca and Ricardo Lascuna, start moaning. She then lost consciousness and was left for dead after
being strangled with pieces of cloth. Before this, however, Luisa noticed that Rosita Villena was the
person giving out instructions to her co-accused. Luisa claims that she was able to recognize the persons
who entered her house since they stayed there from 7:00 o'clock in the evening of 16 October 1998 up to
2:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day. Based on what she heard from them, it appears that the
accused could not leave earlier because of a checkpoint in the area. It was only after regaining
consciousness at around 3:00 o'clock that same morning that Luisa was able to free herself. Upon doing
so, she proceeded to the bedroom where she found her brother who was already dead. She also
discovered that an instamatic camera, a man's gold ring, a gold wrist watch, assorted clothes, a ladies'
gold ring, P400.00 in cash and a pair of toy walkie-talkies were missing. All told, her loss amounted to
P4,900.00. 9 Luisa then sought the help of a neighbor, Eduardo Vinuya. Vinuya brought her to his house
and, together with his cousin and nephew, later proceeded to her house; upon reaching the house, they
discovered its kitchen and living room in disarray. Inside the bedroom, they found the body of Honesto
with an electric cord tied around his neck. They immediately reported the crime to the barangay captain of
Cofradia and the police authorities. 10 As a result thereof, a police team was dispatched to the scene of
the crime. At around 6:00 o'clock that same morning, Luisa Villena was questioned in the police station
where she revealed that one of the persons who entered her house was her sister-in-law, Rosita Villena.
A police team was thus dispatched to apprehend the latter in Bgy. Ibayo, Marilao, Bulacan. While being
ferried to the station in the police car, Rosita, when asked who her companions were, implicated Celso
Algoba — her live-in partner — a certain Dong, Placido (Palangoy) and Danny (Danilo Lagasca). She
then led the policemen to the latter's respective houses. With the exception of Danilo Lagasca who was
able to escape, the other accused were apprehended and brought to the police station where they were
identified by Luisa. 11 At the station, accused Palangoy was wearing a polo shirt and a pair of pants
(Exhibits "F-2" and "F-3") which were among the items taken from Luisa's house. 12
Pat. Jose Marcelino, Jr., a member of the team dispatched to the crime scene, prepared a sketch of
the house where the crime was committed. He likewise stated that the house was in disarray when
he entered it and that the body of Luisa's brother was inside the bedroom with its hands bound
together by an electric cord; an electric, cord was also coiled around its neck. For her part, accused
Rosita Villena admitted participating in the commission of the crime but such admission was not
reduced to writing. 13
The autopsy, of Honesto Altiche's body, conducted by Dr. Juanito Sacdalan, Municipal Health Officer
of Malolos, Bulacan, revealed that there were marks on the neck and wrists of the victim. Honesto's
death was attributed to "[A]spyxia (sic) due to occluded trachea and esophagus" and the breaking of
the trachea as a result of strangulation. 14
On the other hand, Dr. Rolando, Victoria found abrasions in the neck of Luisa Villena 15 while Dr.
Isadora Gatbonton's internal examination revealed "a normal looking external genitalia; labia minora and
majora; clitoris were all intact with superficial abrasion 0-3 cm. over the posterior fourchette; negative
bleeding; . . . nagative (sic) tenderness, negative abnormal discharge (sic); . . . negative
spermatozoa." 16 Dr. Gatbonton declared that the superficial abrasion "could possibly be secondary to
irritation wherein a patient has a tendency to scratching (sic) so that abrasion is brought about and
another possible cause is violent (sic) attempt of penetration or insertion of any object." 17
Testifying for the defense, Celso Algoba admitted that he robbed Luisa Villena's house on 16
October 1989 together with Ricardo Lascuna, Danilo Lagasca and another person whose name he
does hot know. Celso, however, denied that Rosita Villena—his live-in partner—and accused
Placido Palangoy were with them at the time. According to him, Rosita was in their apartment in
Marilao, Bulacan at the time of the commission of the crime. While claiming to have no knowledge of
Luisa's rape, Algoba declared that Ricardo Lascuna and Danilo Lagasca strangled the latter and
killed Honesto Altiche. When presented with an item recovered from Placido Palangoy, Algoba
stated that he sold the same to the latter for P60.00. 18
For her part, Rosita Villena denied any participation in the crime. She testified that she was at home
with her daughter on the night of 16 October 1988 and that when she woke up at 7:00 o'clock the
next morning, some, policemen arrived, searched their things and took the toy walkie-talkies from
them. She averred that it was Celso who brought the said toy walkie-talkies home and recounted to
her the robbery staged in the house of Luisa Villena. Although she wanted to report the matter to the
authorities, Rosita desisted because Celso threatened her. 19 Placido Palangoy also denied
participating in the commission of the crime. He claimed that on the night of 16 October 1988, he was
washing his child's diapers upon orders of his wife. After doing so, he went to sleep. The next morning,
after hanging the diapers out to dry and taking a bath, he was approached by a stranger who sold him
clothes for P60.00. A few moments later, the same stranger returned to Palangoy's house with some
policemen. Palangoy was thereupon brought to the police station with three other men; in the station, they
were confronted by a lady who declared that they were the persons who robbed her house. 20
On 21 August 1989, immediately after accused Rosita Villena and Placido Palangoy had finished
testifying and the prosecution had announced that it had no rebuttal evidence to present, the trial
judge declared:
COURT:
Promulgation of Judgment.
By proof beyond reasonable doubt, the Court finds both accused, Rosita Villena and
Placido Palangoy guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, Rape and Serious
Physical Injuries covered by Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code and applying Art. 294
paragraphs 1 and 2. They are sentenced to suffer life imprisonment, reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the family of the deceased Honesto Altiche the amount of
P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED. 21
Thereafter, the trial court promulgated a 10-page decision, 22 the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Rosita Dionisio Villena and Placido Aquino
Palanggoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the Information
and hereby sentences each of them to suffer life imprisonment (reclusion perpetua)
in accordance with Art. 294, pars. 1 and 2, and to indemnify the family of the
deceased the amount of P30,000.00 each.
Accused Rosita Villena and Placido Palangoy filed their notice of appeal on 23 August 1989. 23 The
records of the case were, however, erroneously forwarded to the Court of Appeals which, upon orders of
the Presiding Justice thereof, properly transmitted the same to this Court on 30 October 1989. 24 We
accepted the appeal on 29 May 1991. 25
On 16 March 1992, accused-appellant Rosita Villena filed a motion to withdraw her appeal 26 which
this Court granted on 3 March 1991. 27 In view thereof, this decision concerns only the accused Placido
Palangoy, hereinafter referred to as the Appellant.
In his Brief, the appellant avers that the RTC erred:
1.1
. . . IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE ACCUSED'S ALLEGED ADMISSION OF GUILT
1.2
. . . IN HOLDING AGAINST APPELLANT PLACIDO PALANGGOY THAT HE WAS

WEARING THE PANTS AND SHIRT TAKEN FROM THE VILLENA HOUSEHOLD
AT THE TIME OF (HIS) APPREHENSION
1.3
. . . IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO PLACIDO PALANGGOY'S DEFENSE OF ALIBI

1.4
. . . IN FINDING THAT RAPE WAS COMMITTED AGAINST LUISA VILLENA
1.5
. . . IN HOLDING AS AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT PALANGGOY THAT THE

HOMICIDE AND RAPE WAS (sic) PART OF THE CONSPIRACY
1.6
. . . IN NOT APPLYING ARTICLE 13, PAR. 3 OR 10 (OF THE REVISED PENAL

CODE) AS MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE (sic) FOR ACCUSED-APPELLANT
1.7
. . . THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DEPRIVED APPELLANT HIS (sic) RIGHT TO

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS BY DISPLAYING MANIFEST BIAS AGAINST
ACCUSED AND PREJUDGING THE CASE.
Subject to the observations and modifications hereinafter indicated, we are left with no choice but to
affirm the judgment of conviction.
The first assigned error results from a misreading of the challenged decision for as correctly
contended by the appellee, the appellant's conviction is not based on the admissions of the accused
Rosita Villena. It appears that the appellant's conclusion proceeds from the trial court's summary of
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses found under the sub-heading PROSECUTION'S
EVIDENCE. It is to be observed that the court's own findings of fact, capsulized under the sub-
heading FINDINGS AND FACTS, do not even make any reference to any admission made by the
appellant.
At the bottom of the second imputed error lies the issue of the sufficiency of the appellant's
explanation of his possession of the pair of "maong" pants and polo shirt which were among the
personal items taken from Luisa Villena's house on the night of the incident. The appellant claims to
have purchased the same from Celso Algoba in the morning of 17 October 1988 while he (appellant)
was drying his child's diapers. We are not persuaded at all by this concocted story. At the police
station's information section where he was seen by Luisa Villena wearing the said items of clothing,
the appellant did not even volunteer the information that Celso had sold the clothes to him. The latter
only offered his explanation when he testified in court. As hereinafter discussed, he was positively
identified by Luisa Villena as one of the perpetrators of the robbery. Thus, he miserably failed to
overcome the presumption that a person found to be in possession of the effects belonging to a
person robbed and killed is considered the author of the aggression, death of the person and the
robbery committed. 28
In his third assigned error, the appellant faults the trial court for not giving due weight to his alibi and
contends that he was not positively and clearly identified as one of the perpetrators of the crime; he
avers that Luisa Villena did not single him out from a police line-up. Moreover, he claims that Luisa
Villena did not know, with the exception of Rosita Villena — her sister-in-law, any of the accused
before they were presented to her. Again, we are not persuaded. In the first place, while it is true that
Rosita was the only person whom Luisa knew by name, it does not necessarily follow that the latter
could not identify the rest of the accused. In fact, Luisa did Just that at the police station and in court
during trial. Secondly, it was Rosita Villena who revealed the identities of her co-accused and even
led the police team to the latter's houses where they, with the exception of Danilo Lagasca, were
apprehended.
There is no doubt in our minds that Luisa Villena was able to positively identify the appellant when
he was inside her house since he and his co-accused stayed there from 7:00 o'clock in the evening
of 16 October 1988 to 2:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day. In fact, she remembered the
appellant very well because while the latter was inside the house, he changed into the very pair of
maong pants and polo shirt which he was wearing when apprehended. 29 It is a fundamental juridical
dictum that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused. 30
Appellant's arguments in support of his fourth assigned error are no more persuasive than those
invoked to buttress the earlier errors. We cannot agree with his proposition that the evidence
presented does not support the trial court's conclusion that rape was committed. According to him,
the details of the alleged sexual assault were applied only through the leading and misleading
questions propounded by the court to the witnesses. Dr. Victoria, the physician who examined Luisa
in the morning after the incident, testified that the latter did not complain to him that she had been
raped; on the other hand, Dr. Gatbonton, the obstetrician who examined Luisa in the afternoon,
could not say whether the latter was raped or not. Hence, the appellant concludes that any doubt
should be resolved in his favor.
Luisa Villena satisfactorily explained that she did not initially report the rape committed against her
because she was ashamed to admit it. 31 When she testified in open court, however, she did not waver
in her account of the assault on her. In fact, the overzealous defense counsel elicited, during cross-
examination, further details on how the despicable deed was consummated:
ATTY. DELA CRUZ:
Q How can the accused Lascuna be able to rape you when you said
that your brother was beside you and your child who may be one
year old beside (sic) you?
A What can my brother do, he was tied up?
ATTY. DELA CRUZ:
Q Assuming that your brother did not do anything but your child is
beside you, is it not?
A Ricardo Lascuna made me lie down and he was thrusting the knife
on my neck, sir.
Q And you did not struggle, is it not?
A I was struggling, sir, but what can I do I am just a woman and I

have a weaker strength (sic). 32
It is settled that when a woman says that she had been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary
to show that she had indeed been raped, and if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the
accused may be convicted on the basis of the victims testimony. 33 There is no reason for Luisa Villena
to claim that she had been raped if it was not true. Considering a Filipina's inbred modesty and antipathy
in airing publicly things that affect her honor, it is hard to conceive that Luisa would undergo the expense,
trouble and inconvenience of a public trial, suffer the scandal, embarrassment and humiliation such action
would indubitably invite and allow the examination of her private part if she had not been raped and her
motive was other than to bring to justice the person who committed the crime. 34
While it is true that the examining obstetrician declared that she was not sure whether Luisa had
actually been raped, the former nevertheless admitted that it was possible that she was.
And even if the trial court had indeed asked "leading and misleading questions," it is now too late for
the appellant to raise his objection thereto in this appeal. His counsel should have interposed the
appropriate objections to such questions at the time they were asked.
In support of his fifth assigned error, the appellant contends that granting, arguendo, that he was
indeed one of the malefactors, the trial court nonetheless erred in finding him guilty of rape and
homicide since no evidence was presented to show his participation in or knowledge of the
commission thereof. He adds that the doctrine in this jurisdiction — that when the homicide takes
place as a consequence of or on occasion of a robbery, all those who took part in the robbery are
guilty as principals of the crime of robbery with homicide, unless proof is presented that the accused
tried to prevent the killing — should not be applied to him since he could not have prevented
someone from doing something which he (appellant) was not even aware of in the first place.
Such reasoning is terribly flawed. The general rule is that whenever a homicide is committed as a
consequence, or on occasion of a robbery, all those who took part therein are liable as principals of
the crime of robbery with homicide, although some did not actually take part in the
homicide. 35 Besides, it is difficult to believe that the appellant was not aware of the killing of Honesto
Altiche. Luisa Villena's house was not large enough to allow any of the accused to have his privacy as the
same is a mere one bedroom affair, with a sala and kitchen which have no partitions at all. 36 During the
seven hours that they were inside Luisa's house, each of them had access to all the areas therein. When
Honesto was killed, the bedroom door was even ajar. 37 It is likewise not believable that the appellant did
not know that Luisa was also strangled because this was done in the kitchen.
For his sixth ascribed error, the appellant would have us credit him with the mitigating circumstances
described under either paragraph 3 or 10, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, 38 he asseverates
that if such circumstances are not appreciated in his favor, an injustice would result since a light sentence
was meted out to Ricardo Lascuna, Luisa's actual rapist.
Paragraph 3, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code addresses itself to the intention of the offender at
the particular moment when he executes or commits the criminal act, and not to his intention during
the planning stage. 39 Thus, while it may be argued that the agreement was only to rob the victims, the
perpetrators' acts at the time of the incident show that the conspiracy not only contemplated the
commission of the robbery, but also the elimination of any witnesses to the crime. Therefore, the
mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong cannot be appreciated in favor of
the appellant. Besides, conspiracy having been proven in this case, the act of one is the act of all.
Corollarily, the circumstance of "analogous circumstances" cannot find application in the instant case.
We find, however, the straight penalty of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years imposed on Ricardo
Lascuna and Celso Algoba after they had changed their plea from not guilty to guilty, to be
erroneous. The penalty for robbery with homicide under the first paragraph of Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Since, as hereinafter discussed, the rape
committed against Luisa aggravated the crime, the imposable penalty would have been death had
its imposition not been prohibited by Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Accordingly,
the penalty that should have been imposed upon them is reclusion perpetua. Additionally, both
should have been made civilly liable for their acts. While we are not concerned here with accused
Lascuna and Algoba as the judgment against them has become final by their service of sentence,
the trial court's mistake in imposing the said penalty on the two cannot now benefit the appellant.
Finally, we find ourselves unable to accommodate the appellant in his last assigned error. He claims
that he was denied due process because the trial judge displayed manifest bias and prejudice
against him by asking questions which led witnesses to a preconceived notion of what the facts are,
and of promulgating a judgment "right in the hearing when the defense presented its case and within
seconds after both sides rested their cases. 40
While the trial court's decision leaves much to be desired, we cannot agree with the appellant's
sweeping conclusion. The questions propounded by the trial judge merely sought to clarify important
matters. Judges are not mere referees like those of a boxing bout, only to watch and decide the
results of a game; they should have as much interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious
presentation of evidence, calling the attention of such counsel to points at issue that are overlooked,
directing them to ask questions that would elicit the facts on the issues involved, clarifying
ambiguous remarks by witnesses and so on. 41
It is true that as earlier adverted to, the trial court orally "promulgated" its judgment by dictating the
same to the stenographer on 21 August 1989 after the completion of the testimonies of both Rosita
Villena and the appellant and the prosecutor's manifestation that no rebuttal evidence was to be
presented. Thus:
COURT:
Promulgation of Judgment.
By proof beyond reasonable doubt, the Court finds both accused, Rosita Villena and
Placido Palanggoy guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, Rape and Serious
Physical Injuries covered by Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code and applying Art. 294
paragraphs 1 and 2. They are sentenced to suffer life imprisonment, reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the family of the deceased Honesto Altiche the amount of
P30,000.00. 42
Such behavior does not manifest bias or prejudice per se for in view of the fact that the parties did
not opt to submit their respective memoranda, the court forthwith considered the case submitted for
decision. A trial judge who has painstakingly listened to the testimonies of the witnesses, taken
notes of such testimonies and meticulously observed the latter's deportment and manner of testifying
may logically be presumed to have properly made up his mind on what the decision should be. What
may therefore remain for him is the actual writing of the decision. Judges are not required to await
the transcription of the stenographic notes before they can render their decisions; 43 if this were so,
there would be undue delays in the criminal justice system with judges easily finding justification for failing
to comply with the mandatory period to decide cases. Hence, the promulgation of judgment by a Judge
who, on the same hour, had first considered the case submitted for his decision, does not ipso
facto warrant a presumption of bias. This is true in the instant case where our own review of the evidence
sustains beyond reasonable doubt the judgment of conviction.
It must, however, be stressed here that the "verbal" judgment promulgated by the trial court was
incomplete as it does not contain findings of fact and is not signed by the Judge. The Constitution
provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. 44 In criminal cases, Section 2, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court requires that a "judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly
prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts
proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based." Be that as it may, the
infirmity was corrected by the trial court itself when it subsequently issued a full-blown Judgment — dated
21 August 1989 — which contains a summary of the evidence for the parties, findings of fact and the
signature of the Judge. The records do not, however, yield any proof that this full-blown Judgment was
promulgated. Such a promulgation was necessary considering that the sentence dictated by the trial
judge on 21 August 1989 is not similar in all respects to the dispositive portion of the full-blown decision.
In view of the fact that in the Notice of Appeal, the appellant explicitly refers to the Judgment dated 21
August, 1989, it is logical to presume that the same was properly promulgated.
In any event, we take this opportunity to advise Judges to strictly comply with the rules on the form
of judgments and their rendition.
We agree with the Solicitor General's observation that the crime committed was erroneously
designated as robbery with homicide, rape and physical injuries, The proper designation is robbery
with homicide aggravated by rape. When rape and homicide co-exist in the commission of robbery, it
is the first paragraph of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code which applies, the rape to be
considered as an aggravating circumstance. 45 The physical injuries inflicted on Luisa Villena and the
killing of Honesto Villena should be merged in the composite, integrated whole — that is, robbery with
homicide — it being clear that both the killing and physical injuries were perpetrated with the end in view
of removing all opposition to the robbery, suppressing the relevant evidence or both. 46
Once again, we note in this case the imposition by a trial judge of the penalty of "life imprisonment
(reclusion perpetua)" in a manner that would make the former seem equivalent to or synonymous
with the latter. Not only have we repeated in a number of cases that the two penalties are not
synonymous, we have likewise advised Judges to apply the appropriate penalty and even warned
them against lapsing into the same error. 47 All trial judges should seriously take heed of our
pronouncement on this matter.
We also observe that the trial court failed to order the accused to pay the offended party actual
damages in the amount of P4,900.00 representing the cash and the value of the articles taken by
them.
Finally, conformably with the current policy of this Court, moral damages in the amount of
P40,000.00 should be awarded to the rape victim, Luisa Villena y Altiche while the indemnity for the
death of Honesto Altiche should be increased to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of Branch 15 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan in
Criminal Case No. 105-M-89 is AFFIRMED subject to the above modifications. As modified,
Appellant PLACIDO AQUINO PALANGOY (or PALANGGOY) is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as principal, of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide aggravated by
rape under the first paragraph of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all its accessories, indemnify the heirs of Honesto Altiche in
the amount of P50,000.00 and pay Luisa Villena y Altiche the sums of P4,900.00 as actual damages
and P40,000.00 as moral damages.
Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Griño-Aquino, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Limpin v IAC
Facts:
Four lots were mortgaged by the spouses Jose and Marcelina Aquino to Guillermo Ponce and his wife
Adela (since deceased) as security for a loan of P2,200,000.00. The mortgages were registered. Two of
the lots, those covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837, were afterwards sold by the Aquinos to the
Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation, which caused an adverse claim to be annotated on the certificates
of title.
Gregorio Y. Limpin, Jr. obtained a money judgment against Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation in
Court of First Instance of Davao. To satisfy the judgment, the lots covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and
92837 were levied upon on and sold at public auction to Limpin as the highest bidder for the sum of
P517,485.41.
On order of the trial court, the covering titles were cancelled and issued to Limpin. Limpin sold the two lots
to Rogelio M. Sarmiento. By virtue of said sale, TCTs Nos. 285450 and 285451 were cancelled on
November 4, 1983, and TCT’S were replaced in Sarmiento's name.
Ponce filed suit against the Aquino spouses for judicial foreclosure of the mortgage over the Aquinos' four
lots. Judgment was rendered in favor of Ponce. After the judgment became final, the Trial Court, directed
the sale at public auction of the 4 mortgaged lots to satisfy the judgment.
The 4 lots, including those formerly covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837, were sold to Ponce himself
whose bid was the highest and exactly correspond to the judgment debt. On the same day, the sheriff's
certificate of sale was registered.
Ponce then moved for the confirmation of the sale and the issuance of a writ of possession in his favor
covering the four lots. But the Trial Court confirmed only the sale of the lots covered by TCTs Nos. 02839
and 92840, refusing to confirm the sale or issue a writ of possession in regard to the lots covered by
TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837 on the ground that those titles had already been cancelled and new ones
issued to Gregorio F. Limpin.
Limpin refused to participate in the hearings contending that the Court had no jurisdiction over his person;
but he did comment that the mortgage over the lots covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837 had been
released by Ponce by virtue of a "Partial Release of Real Estate Mortgage". The Trial Court denied
Ponce's motion for reconsideration, whereupon he sought corrective relief by filing a special civil action
for certiorari and mandamus in the Intermediate Appellate Court, impleading Limpin and Sarmiento, as
private respondents.
IAC set aside the judgment of the Trial Court and issue a writ of possession to Ponce with respect
thereto, subject to Sarmiento's equity of redemption.
Issue:
Whether or not IAC erred in according superiority to the mortgage rights of Ponce over the levy and sale
in favor of Limpin and the subsequent sale to Sarmiento.
Held:
NO. The superiority of the mortgagee's lien over that of a subsequent judgment creditor is now expressly
provided in Rule 39, Section 16 of the Revised Rules of Court, which states with regard to the effect of
levy on execution that it shall create a lien in favor of a judgment creditor over the right title and interest of
the judgment debtor in such property at the time of the levy, subject to the liens or encumbrances then
existing.
Using jurisprudence in Santiago v Dionisio, the Court in that case held that:
... [T]he effect of the failure to implead a subordinate lienholder or subsequent purchaser or both is to
render the foreclosure ineffective as against them, with the result that there remains in their favor the
"unforeclosed equity of redemption." But the foreclosure is valid as between the parties to the suit.
Applied to this case, this means that the sale to Ponce, as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale of the
two lots in question should have been confirmed, subject to Limpin's (and now Sarmiento's equity to
redemption. The registration of the lands, first in the name of Limpin and later of Sarmiento, was
premature. At most what they were entitled to was the registration of their equity of redemption.
It is well settled that a recorded mortgage is a right in rem, a lien on the property whoever its owner may
be. The recordation of the mortgage in this case puts the whole world on constructive notice of its
existence and warned everyone who thereafter dealt with the property on which it was constituted that he
would have to reckon with that encumbrance. Hence, Limpin's subsequent purchase of the "interests and
participation" of Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation in the lots covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and
92837, as well as the sale of the same to Sarmiento were both subject to said mortgage.
--
Additional rulings not related to topic:
* The fact that at the time Ponce foreclosed the mortgage on October 21, 1983, the lots had already been
bought by Limpin and subsequently sold to Sarmiento is of no consequence, since the settled doctrine is
that the effects of the foreclosure sale retroact to the date of registration of the mortgage, i.e., March 1,
1973 in the present case.
* As regards the claim that Ponce executed a deed of partial release of his mortgage on July 20, 1977,
the evidence discloses that Ponce and Jose Aquino, the mortgagor, thereafter executed separate
affidavits dated December 1, 1983, stating that the said partial release was void, not only for want of
consideration but also for lack of the signatures of Ponce's two sons who at the time of the execution of
the document, were co-mortgagees as successors and heirs of Mrs. Adela Ponce. Moreover, the Deed of
Partial Release was not registered but had simply been attached.
PEOPLE vs. RICARDO LASCUNA, ET. AL. (GR 90626; August 18, 1993)
Accused Ricardo Lascuna, Rosita Villena, Celso Algoba and Placido Palangoy were charged on
16 January 1989 with robbery with homicide, rape and physical injuries before the RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan.
Luisa Villena y Altiche, together with her 8-month-old daughter and brother Honesto Altiche,
was in her house on the night of 16 October 1988. Honesto was staying with her since her
husband was working abroad. While both Honesto and Luisa were watching a television show at
around 7:00 o'clock, the latter's sister-in-law, RositaVillena, knocked on the door of the house.
When Luisa opened the door, Rosita came in with her daughter and four strangers, three of
whom the former later identified in court as the accused Algoba, Lascuna and Palangoy. The
fourth person, identified as Danilo Lagasca, was not present in court. Lascuna and Lagasca were
both carrying knives which they poked at Luisa and Honesto while, Algoba and Palangoy started
ransacking the house. Luisa and her brother were then gagged and their hands and feet were
tied. Both were herded inside the bedroom where Luisa was raped by Lascuna while Honesto
was asked to turn his back. Thereafter, Luisa was dragged into the kitchen where she heard her
brother, who was still inside the bedroom with Lagasca and Lascuna, start moaning. She then
lost consciousness and was left for dead after being strangled with pieces of cloth. Before this,
however, Luisa noticed that Rosita Villena was the person giving out instructions to her co-
accused. Luisa claims that she was able to recognize the persons who entered her house since
they stayed there from 7:00 o'clock in the evening of 16 October 1998 up to 2:00 o'clock in the
morning of the following day. Based on what she heard from them, it appears that the accused
could not leave earlier because of a checkpoint in the area. It was only after regaining
consciousness at around 3:00 o'clock that same morning that Luisa was able to free herself.
Upon doing so, she proceeded to the bedroom where she found her brother who was already
dead. She also discovered that an instamatic camera, a man's gold ring, a gold wrist watch,
assorted clothes, a ladies' gold ring, P400.00 in cash and a pair of toy walkie-talkies were
missing. All told, her loss amounted to P4,900.00. Luisa then sought the help of a neighbor,
Eduardo Vinuya. Vinuya brought her to his house and, together with his cousin and nephew,
later proceeded to her house; upon reaching the house, they discovered its kitchen and living
room in disarray. Inside the bedroom, they found the body of Honesto with an electric cord tied
around his neck. They immediately reported the crime to the barangay captain of Cofradia and
the police authorities. As a result thereof, a police team was dispatched to the scene of the crime.
At around 6:00 o'clock that same morning, Luisa Villena was questioned in the police station
where she revealed that one of the persons who entered her house was her sister-in-law, Rosita
Villena. A police team was thus dispatched to apprehend the latter. While being ferried to the
station in the police car, Rosita, when asked who her companions were, implicated Algoba — her
live-in partner, Placido and Danilo Lagasca. She then led the policemen to the latter's respective
houses. With the exception of Danilo Lagasca who was able to escape, the other accused were
apprehended and brought to the police station where they were identified by Luisa. At the
station, accused Palangoy was wearing a polo shirt and a pair of pants which were among the
items taken from Luisa's house.
RULING:The proper designation is robbery with homicide aggravated by rape. When rape and
homicide co-exist in the commission of robbery, it is the first paragraph of Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code which applies, the rape to be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
The physical injuries inflicted on Luisa Villena and the killing of Honesto Villena should be
merged in the composite, integrated whole — that is, robbery with homicide — it being clear that
both the killing and physical injuries were perpetrated with the end in view of removing all
opposition to the robbery, suppressing the relevant evidence or both.
Appellant PLACIDO PALANGOY was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide aggravated by rape under the first paragraph of
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, with all its accessories, indemnify the heirs of Honesto Altiche.

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 84324 April 5, 1990

SANTIAGO AQUINO, TERENCIO YUMANG, JR. and FULGENCIO ICARO, petitioners,

Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. for private respondents.

On the charge of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, although it is well-settled in our

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

A.M. No. 704-RTJ June 14, 1990

A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain

Griño-Aquino, J., is on leave.

[A.M. No. 97-6-182-RTC. March 19, 1999]

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-38139 May 16, 1983

TEODORO DOMANICO and CONCEPCION C. DOMANICO, petitioners,

Jose Lozada Lapak for petitioners.

Edmundo Narra for private respondent.

xxx xxx xxx

First Assigned Error

THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE

Second Assigned Error

THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE

Third Assigned Error

THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT SETTING

xxx xxx xxx

Q Is the market in the Japanese camp still existing today?

Q Where was it transfered, if it was transferred?

Q It was transferred to the main camp

Q What year was that?

He is aware because he is selling in that market. "

That becomes now immaterial as to where the store is located. The

xxx xxx xxx

What happened to the goods that remained when you transferred to

We object, because that becomes misleading The goods were

Precisely, we are trying to find out what happened to the goods.

Were you in partnership with the plaintiff herein?

Counsel is impeaching his witness.

xxx xxx xxx

A I was able to buy it.

Q And the business continued and as a matter of fact, it expanded?

A But in my name already, because the partnership was already

Q How did you terminate the partnership.

A We divide and liquidated.

A It is not existing now.

Q Where is the original agreement of partnership or the articles?

A It was burned in Larap during the fire.

A We had a liquidation when we divided here in Daet.

Q You did not reduce that into writing.?

Q You are not answering my question. You answer my question.

A Because I did not know that she will do this to me because of my

Q What is this termination of this partnership? Was this suggested by

A Yes, it was making profits.

xxx xxx xxx

Q In whose name was it placed?

Q Not in the name of the partnership?

Q So the partnership has no partnership name?

A In our partnership, it was in her name.

Q What do you mean to say, no partnership name or in your name?

xxx xxx xxx