MIT15 431S11 Lec23

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Review Session:

Entrepreneurial Finance

Antoinette Schoar

MIT Sloan School of Management

15.431

Spring 2011

Four major parts to the course:

• New venture valuation


• Deal structure
• Private equity partnership structure and incentives

• Exiting from private equity investments

Evaluating a business plan/opportunity:

• Very difficult in entrepreneurial situations


• Does not mean you shouldn’t do it
• Valuation is as good as its assumptions

• We looked at three methods:


→ Discounted cash flow (APV) method
→ VC method
→ Real options

Discounted cash flow method (APV)

• Economics of business
→Where does positive NPV come from?
→Most important
• Cash flows
→Free cash flow to all equity investment =
EBIT * ( 1 - t ) + DEPR - CAPX - Δ NWC
• Discount rate

→Economics + Cash Flows + Rate = VALUE

APV Approach for New Ventures


• The Standard APV Calculations
• Step 1: Calculate Free Cash Flows (FCFs) to an “all-equity” firm
for a period of years until company has reached a “steady-state.”
Step 2: Discount these FCFs at the discount rate of an all-equity
firm (k).
• Step 3: Calculate a Terminal Value as the present value of a
growing perpetuity of FCFs assuming some growth rate in FCFs
and discounting by k.
• Step 4: Value tax shields of debt financing separately (trD) and
discount by a rate that reflects the riskiness of those cash flows.
• Step 5: Steps 1- 4 give you the Enterprise Value. To determine the
Equity Value subtract the market value of debt.

Generate cash flows:


• Value after-tax cash flows to all-equity firm / investment:
→ Start with free cash flows to all-equity firm

• For start-ups:
→ Generate different scenarios
→Expect substantial non-linearity
→Assign probabilities to the different scenarios
→ Value company as expected value of different scenarios

The Venture Capital Method

• Step 1: Forecast sales/revenues to equity for a period of years.


• Step 2: Estimate the time at which the VC will exit the
investment (typically through an IPO or sale to strategic buyer).
• Step 3: Value the exit price based on an assumed multiple of
earnings or sales or customers, etc. The multiple is typically
based on comparable public companies or comparable
transactions.
• Step 4: Discount interim cash flows and exit value at rates
ranging from 25% - 80%.
• Step5: Determine the VC’s stake

Why are Discount Rates so High?

• Such high discount rates cannot be explained as being a reward


for systematic risk. In most cases, CAPM would give discount
rates well below 25%, let alone 80%.

• Three (limited) “rationales”:


→ Compensate VC for illiquidity of investment
→ Compensate VC for adding value
→ VC market power
→ Should not use high discount rates to correct for overoptimistic
projections, better build it in cash flow scenarios

Strengths and weaknesses of methods


• APV
→ Strengths
→Model cash flows as coming from specific set of operating
strategies / assumptions
→Can see impact of changes in strategies on valuation
→Valuation tied to fundamentals

→ Weaknesses
→Difficult to know right market risk premium and risk factor
→May leave things out?
→Strategic value?
Strengths and weaknesses of methods

• VC method relies on market multiples


→ Strengths
→Implicitly uses market consensus of real options
→Market prices may capture “missing” values in DCF
→Helps to free ride on market’s research capabilities?
→ Weaknesses
→Cannot always (if ever) get close comparable
→Firm-level idiosyncrasies
→Changes in strategy
→Problem in overheated market: Herding
→Mean reversion
Conclusion: Valuation
• The different methods are not mutually exclusive

• VC method and comparables are important but


→ Do not tell you where value comes from
→ Whether comparables are really comparable

• DCF analysis (+ Real options) forces to justify valuation but


→ Only as good as the data input
→ Relies on imperfect models

• Go back and forth between the two approaches


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Venture Capitalist as Intermediaries


• VC himself faces agency issues with regard to his LPs
→ Limited partners have very little control over GPs once the money
has been invested
→ Large information asymmetries between GPs and LPs

• VCs objectives:
→ Maximize financial returns to justify the risk and effort of the
investment for their LPs (GP compensation is largly based on
carried interest)
→ Building own reputation to facilitate fundraising for later funds and
improve deal flow
→ Eventually achieve “liquidity”, since fund has limited lifetime
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Structure of compensation
• Base compensation as a % of committed capital (or assets under
management) plus carried interest
→ Management fee: 1.5% - 2.5% of capital
→ Carried interest: 20% share of profits
• Positive:
→ Induces effort
→ Attracts talented individuals (really?)
• Negative:
→ Huge incentives and potential for opportunism:
→ Increasing fund size
→ Changing deal mix

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Potential conflict of interest between VC


and entrepreneur
• The split of financial returns

• The allocation of control rights

• Perception/valuation of future success rate of the company


→ Uncertainty
→ Asymmetric information and moral hazard

• The time horizon of the venture and the type of liquidation event

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Logic behind the term sheet is to mitigate

potential conflicts between the two parties

• Financial returns divided to:


→ Reward investors for their investments in the firm
→ Provide high-powered incentives to entrepreneurs to maximize
value and stay with the firm
→ Provide VCs with incentives to add value
• Dynamic allocation of control:
→ Gives more control to entrepreneur if things turn out well
→ Gives more control to VC if things do not turn out well
• Provides incentives to achieve a liquidity event
→ Prevents entrepreneur from settling for “life-style” firm

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Most VC contracts have conversion and


redemption features
• E.g. Convertible preferred can be converted at the shareholders’
option into common stock at a pre-specified conversion price
→ Preferred feature aligns incentives of entrepreneur with VC to
strive for large payoffs, since it limits returns to the founder for
modest outcomes. The extent to which the VC wants to encourage
risk taking by the entrepreneur can be controlled by specific choice
of security. Redeemable Preferred + Common Stock >
Participating Convertible Preferred > Convertible Preferred >
Common Stock > minimum wage
→ Conversion allows VC to participate in the upside. It also reduces
VC control once the company is a success, since de facto control
goes back to management
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Example: Convertible preferred payoffs

Slope=%common

V: Liquidation Value
Slope=1 FV: Face value of
Don’t convert preferred stock
CV: Min. enterprise
value at conversion

FV CV V

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Final Exam: The Rules


• An individual effort

• Open book: Use any materials from course


→ Do not bring in outside historical or industry info
→ Final has all the information you need – it’s made up anyway!!
→ You can use excel for valuation purpose
→But do not blame me if your laptop crashes!

• What you cannot use:


→ Mobile devices, Ipad, Pda etc.
→ Your neighbors’ brains
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The Exam should be:

• Clearly label your calculations and spell out any assumptions


that are non-obvious

• Write short and price answers, no need for long


→ Do not “fish around” for an answer

• Put name on cover page only


→ We grade them anonymously

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ADVICE ?

• Exams should address the issues raised in the questions


• Be very clear about what you are assuming and calculating

!!!!! GOOD LUCK !!!!!

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15.431 Entrepreneurial Finance


Spring 2011

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