What (Good) Is Historical Epistemology

What (Good) is Historical Epistemology?
Editors' Introduction
Author(s): Uljana Feest and Thomas Sturm
Source: Erkenntnis (1975-) , November 2011, Vol. 75, No. 3, WHAT (GOOD) IS
HISTORICAL EPISTEMOLOGY? (November 2011), pp. 285-302
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Erkenn (201 1) 75:285-302
DOI 1 0.1007/s 1 0670-0 1 1-9345-4
What (Good) is Historical Epistemology? Editors'

Introduction
Uljana Feest * Thomas Sturm
Received: 27 September 201 1 / Accepted: 27 September 201 1 / Published online: 25 October 201 1
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 201 1
Abstract We provide an overview of three ways in which the expression "His-

torical epistemology" (HE) is often understood: (1) HE as a study of the history of
higher-order epistemic concepts such as objectivity, observation, experimentation, or
probability; (2) HE as a study of the historical trajectories of the objects of research,
such as the electron, DNA, or phlogiston; (3) HE as the long-term study of scientific
developments. After laying out various ways in which these agendas touch on current
debates within both epistemology and philosophy of science (e.g., skepticism,
realism, rationality of scientific change), we conclude by highlighting three topics as
especially worthy of further philosophical investigation. The first concerns the
methods, aims and systematic ambitions of the history of epistemology. The second
concerns the ways in versions of HE can be connected to versions of naturalized and
social epistemologies. The third concerns the philosophy of history, and in particular
the level of analysis at which a historical analysis should aim.
1 Introduction
There is a universalizing tendency in epistemology and philosophy of science: a

tendency to not only analyze its subject matter - from concepts of knowledge,
Uljana Feest and Thomas Sturm have contributed equally to this article.
U. Feest (El)
Institut für Philosophie, Literatur-, Wissenschafts- und Technikgeschichte, Technische Universität
Berlin, Straße des 17. Juni 135, 10623 Berlin, Germany
e-mail: [email protected]
T. Sturm
Departament de Filosofia, Universität Autónoma de Barcelona, Edifici В, 08193 Bellaterra,
Barcelona, Spain
e-mail: [email protected]
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286 U. Feest, Т. Sturm
belief, justification, ob
from the notorious arm
possess some kind of
advocates of the claim
social, historical, mate
of this context. In th
naturalized, evolutiona
family of approaches i
approaches just mentio
by historians of scienc
1987; Kmita 1988; Tiles
in any of the leadin
Encyclopedia of Philoso
article in major com
However, we think tha
one, and that it deserv
are therefore grateful
publication.
The question posed in the title of this essay might suggest that our aim is, first, to
explain what historical epistemology really is, and then to evaluate its advantages
and drawbacks vis-à-vis traditional analyses of knowledge. This is not our objective,
however. Right from the outset we wish to emphasize that there are - sometimes
strikingly - different versions of historical epistemology, and that we do not intend
to declare which one is the right kind. Our primary interest here is to compare the
aims and methods of existing versions of historical epistemology with those of
related traditions, projects, and approaches in philosophy. Simply put, advocates of
historical epistemology frequently describe their approach as challenging standard
notions of epistemology (including its history) and the philosophy of science. For
that reason alone the idea needs philosophical scrutiny.
Our assertion that historical epistemology is a concept currently often invoked
by historians of science, but largely ignored by philosophers, needs to be qualified.
A little bit of history will help here (and elsewhere in this introduction). The
concept was chosen to express the guiding idea of the kind of research pursued at
the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science in Berlin (MPIWG) when it
was founded in 1994. To a large extent, this was a contributing cause of the
current popularity of the label among historians. But there was a philosophical
motivation behind this choice as well, which persists until today. A philosopher,
Lorenz Krüger (1932-1994), was chosen to become one of the founding directors,
and it was only his premature death that prevented this appointment. In his own
prior work, he had not only attempted to build bridges between history and
philosophy of science, but to strengthen the ties between history of science and
history of philosophy as well (e.g. Krüger 1973, 1982, 1987; Krüger et al. 1987a,
b; and the essays collected in Krüger 2005). 'Historical epistemology' was
employed as a useful term for expressing these different combinations (cp.
Zwijtink 1995, p. 23), and it became a guiding concept of the new institute (Renn
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What (Good) is Historical Epistemology? 287
1995a; Hacking 1999).1 Today, the institute is

science - Lorraine Daston, Jürgen Renn, and Han
have philosophical interests and defend some ver
One common denominator of their approaches is
epistemic aspects of science, thereby aiming t
history of science which studies scientific think
their historical development."3 Many philosop
philosophy - including the editors of this vo
invited to pursue their scholarly work at the Inst
Having both been trained in the analytic traditi
and puzzled by the term "historical epistem
questions raised by this notion have a familiar rin
epistemology? Is it useful? If so, in what ways a
questions have often been raised for the whole o
1987; Sorell and Rogers 2005). Also, there is
Thomas Kuhn' s work: How should the relation b
history of science be understood? Is it an intima
either convenience or reason? (Giere 1973; Mc
1977; Krüger 1982; Domsky and Dickson 2010; Sc
questions as well. One central issue in this latter
between 'philosophers' history' and 'historians' h
with regard to historical epistemology, e.g. how
devoted to epistemological questions? What are t
analytical tools to employ in history of science, a
choose in constructing a historical narrative? Mor
philosophers about the history of epistemology
science (cf. e.g. Friedman 1993; Hatfield 1996) -
historical epistemology? And most importantly,
some historical epistemologists that their hist
epistemology? Do the boundaries between ph
redrawn? If so, how?
With these admittedly wide-ranging and c
organized an interdisciplinary conference in
special issue of this journal is an outcome of thi
level, it is devoted to two major questions: First,
epistemic aspects of science be a form of epis
historical enterprise is historical epistemolog
develop an overview of three main conception
overview will be supplemented by brief account
1 The "Lorenz Krüger postdoctoral fellowship" at the MPIW

who combine the history of science with the philosophy of s
2 The latter of the three has recently retired from his direct
3 http://www.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de/en/institute/index.htm
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in this special issue

questions they addres
2 Historical Epistem
Only very little about

term was introduced
Bachelard' s approach
physics and Euclidean
human knowledge in
1984, 1987). He becam
French academic circl
extended to the work
Georges Canguilhem
Davidson 2002; Chim
edition of Canguilhem
Lecourt in fact borrow
it as a label for his ow
use the term 'historic
so and why (e.g., Km
Partly because of s
epistemology is muc
epistemology or socia
for or against each ot
in order to critically
need a representative
approaches we will c
historical epistemol
Rheinberger and Jü
historical epistemolog
such epistemologies. F
theoretical ideas, th
epistemology, but th
resulting from these
have moved beyond t
Drawing on these thr
historical epistemolog
1 . Histories of episte
2. Histories of episte
3. Dynamics of long-t
The following over

identify questions an
philosophical and hist
issue.
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2.1 Epistemic Concepts
In a recent book review, Lorraine Daston has rec

Ian Hacking's Emergence of Probability (D
published 1975]). This book, she writes, prompte
epistemology" for a certain kind of research she
and philosophically. According to Hacking, Dasto
take for granted that epistemic concepts - such
good reason, objectivity, probability" (Hacking 1
nature that can be identified by means of co
concepts, and the standards and ideals to whi
emerge within specific practices and contexts, ov
domains of application, and sometimes become s
no history. By emphasizing that frequently scient
explicit concepts of them, these authors emp
traditional history of ideas.4 Furthermore, Dast
emphasize that there is a Kantian flavor to their
how objectivity (or probability....) is possible - alt
possibility in historical terms. It is the task of th
backgrounds and contexts of these concepts.
To be fair, it must be pointed out that these ide
conception of historical epistemology, developed
1979b, 1983a, b, 1987), one of the founders of th
Philosophy and History of Science. He was the
American philosophy of science. Among other thi
to develop his view concerning the debate about
between history and philosophy of science (War
differences between his and Daston' s or Hackin
volume). Being a Marxist, Wartofsky thought
scientific representations more generally) are
practices and modes of representation of knowledge
much upon scientific research practices. Nor did
and Hacking have done, as possessing a Kantian fla
between their and Wartofsky' s versions of histor
enumerate here. This is food for future histories
In any case, under the guiding influence of Hac
number of research projects have studied the his
probability (Krüger et al. 1987a, b; Daston
knowledge and belief (understood mostly as the
4 Critics of traditional history of ideas often view it as closely

concepts are assumed to be consciously represented in the
herself from such a view, Lorraine Daston therefore view
unfortunate choice of words to describe her approach. Inst
epistemic categories as covering explicit concepts as well a
traditional meanings of the term "category", however, this e
it here.
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religion; Kleeberg an
observation (Daston 200
program - that fund
historical change - giv
of identity of a particu
that it has a history? S
down the path of rel
questions can be answ
adopted in historical i
what does it mean to s
rise to historical accou
The first two question
provide an argument
(objectivity, probabilit
change in some respects
the other hand, if Dast
conditions of the identi
certainly be open. Taki
Kusch's contribution t
up to the relativism th
and Galison have tried
identical to relativizing
and Galison 2007, p. 3
offers what can be con
charge. He does so by
objectivity, according
while being in continui
question can neverthel
What about the third q
study of epistemic con
Jutta Schickore addres
practices for understan
and explanation - and
"historical epistemolo
systematic contribution
ambition that Thomas
inherent problems of t
historical epistemology
epistemic concepts. The
of empirical knowledg
between perception and
pursued by philosophic
than a history of pra
reconstruction of the
thereby enable us to ev
past arguments may ha
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a history of research practices may have virtues

argues that its philosophical significance stands at
Of course, this reasoning does not deny that ep
The other two papers in this group not only make
such histories, but do so with the explicit aim to c
In this vein, Jutta Schickore intends her historical
in the philosophy of science about the epistemolog
recent literature on this topic, there is an empha
replicability of experiments and the robustness of
however, there is to this day not much consensus
mean. She therefore seeks to examine the ways in
robustness have changed over time, using late sev
experiments on snake venom as an instructive case
cases draw attention to several distinctions absen
discussions, such as the distinctions between (a
peoples' experiments, (b) re-doing different form
(c) undertaking first- and second-order experimen
Norton Wise suggests that close historical stu
specific epistemological assumptions. In his cas
epistemology of history. His article proceeds by
of explanation that appears to characterize much
that whereas deductions from partial differen
regarded as paradigm cases of physical explanatio
computer simulations brings with it a new mode
what might be regarded as a historical narrative.
some dearly held assumptions within the philosop
assimilate historical explanations to the deductive
of reference being Hempel's DN-model of hist
DN-model with reference to the narrative nature
2.2 Epistemic Things
The term "epistemic thing" has been on the agen

Hans-Jörg Rheinberger^ influential book, Towar
Synthesizing Proteins in the Test Tube (Rheinb
historical analysis of the time period betwee
molecular biology, as we know it today, was form
protein synthesis as central to this episode. Rheinb
hard to grasp, especially for those trained in ana
help to introduce his views. First, his work, like
epistemologists, is influenced by Bachelard and Ca
or Hacking (see e.g. Lecourt 1969, 1975; Tiles 1984
5 More accurately, we should say that even though Rheinbe

epistemology of experimentation, we have not been able to fin
Hacking's writings on historical epistemology.
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This heritage gives ris

historical epistemology
resilience" (Rheinberge
related - a question
traditional epistemol
original vision of the
technologies, or what
to single out specific p
"epistemic things". Bo
My use of the term ep

a synonym for a theor
that makes knowledge
tradition, especially in
here, following the F
under which, and th
knowledge. It focuses
ways in which it is in
This version of histor

with a metaphor tha
context - the "birth"
Daston 2000, pp. 1-1
heredity (Müller-Wille
else from mathematic
mortality (see the con
What are we to mak
metaphors like the bir
One might simply say
and disappearance of ob
sometimes also the com
more serious. To begin
anticipated by a numbe
European philosophy
might attain an undis
conditions had to be
knowledge under his
Evaluating this histori
However, even if it sh
sufficient grounds for
may be asked whether
of things can really be
6 In this quote, Rheinberger

Much of the literature uses
7 This version of historic
"historical ontology" and D
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aim at an analysis of how things become resea

scientific researcher), the knower and her beliefs
brought back into the picture. Finally, where do
with respect to the types of questions commonl
philosophers of science in the analytic tradition,
realism and anti-realism and about conceptu
addressed in different ways by the contribut
Theodore Arabatzis, Uljana Feest, and Hasok Chan
how to make sense of the notion of an epistemic
object, while its coming into being is at the same
historically variable, conditions.
In his contribution, Arabatzis, after laying out
might raise about such objects, focuses his attent
he calls "hidden entities," such as the electron. A
interesting questions about the interplay of the
mental practice, though separate from both. Thi
autonomy to such objects. As a consequence, the
electrons does not imply the historicity of elect
question of what criteria determine that changin
to be about the same object - a question Araba
stability of experimental set-ups that have been
In a similar vein, Uljana Feest emphasizes the e
to investigate presumed objects of research - in
focus is not so much on the question of whether
fact ensures realism or stability of reference of sc
shape the scientific (especially, experimental) pra
of new knowledge, including knowledge that ma
existence of the presumed object of research. Fee
an analytical reconstruction of Rheinbergers not
emphasizes the insight that such things are in
However, she complements this insight with the
proceed, some constitutive and normative princi
Hasok Chang, finally, also considers the individu
case, however, the focus is on scientists' decisions
objects as knowledge develops. The chief object d
commonly presumed to have been rightly killed
argues that the reasons for the death sentence were
made out to be, and he suggests that phlogiston ou
contemporary chemistry. His point is motivated on
writing a winner's history, and on the other ha
epistemic pluralism as contributing to the aim of
2.3 Dynamics of Long-Term Scientific Develop
We now turn to the last of the three usages o

discussion here, i.e., the one proposed by Jürgen
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this work investigat

discontinuous, of major
of mechanics or the re
et al. 2004). The appr
progress brought to th
mean that their approa
it from the aforementi
matter, also certain but
of this version of hist
relation between the v
et al. 2004, p. 45). Secon
albeit not a reductivist
highly dependent upon
symbol systems, and so
transformations of sys
and the social world of
that this analysis is co
and he names four: the
(3) challenging object
opinion, a particularly
literature on qualitativ
see e.g. Gentner and St
models are representat
objects even when only
structures are assumed
and located in specifi
when confronted wit
reorganization of the v
historical epistemolo
approach by applying
program might at first
science aims to do in ge
its tools of inquiry aim
this vein, Renn (1995b
which made it possib
factors (environment)
mology, which is sup
development of knowl
While this analogy som
raises questions about
science are. Two issues
project intends to tra
familiar questions ab
8 For example, Jürgen Renn

more immediate inspiration
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continuity of reference. On the other hand, the

questions about the naturalistic aspect in this wa
models meant as mere heuristic devices, or are t
how scientific change is made possible by
fundamental to human knowledge?
None of the three contributions to this topic m
work, but all address these questions in one way
"Extending the dynamics of reason," Michael Fr
work to provide an account of scientific change t
Kuhn, while avoiding the kind of relativism
Kuhn's work. His own Neo-Kantian analysis stud
scientific knowledge-claims and standards but, a
developments in philosophy (cf. also Friedman 1
helps to explain how historical changes can be
Friedman argues that bringing into play th
institutional, political) contexts of scientific
rationality of scientific developments; quite the
reference to the relation between the Copernica
one side, and early modern calendar reform and
and religious practices, on the other side.
A quite different approach is taken by Peter Ba
Kuhn as a point of departure. He provides a sum
from his recent book, The Cognitive Structure
et al. 2006). This book presents a way of modelin
psychological accounts of concepts and conceptu
theory of frames), here illustrated by case studie
the Copernican revolution. As in the case of Ren
approach raises questions about the kind of w
supposed to do, i.e., whether it is a mere heuris
whether this approach points in the direction o
latter topic is addressed in Michael Heidelberger
of human reasoning not merely as a way of mod
case, of theories-, but as literally constituting
scientific and other kinds of knowledge. Sp
reasoning prevalent in primitive physics cons
cognitive structure that provides the foundation
knowledge.
Barker and Heidelbergers contributions may be
science to naturalized epistemology, understoo
cognitive mechanisms necessary for knowledge.
those by Feest and Kitcher) also explicitly tie th
broadly naturalistic outlook, but without comm
say, biology or cognitive science play a dominant
(see, for example, Kitcher' s pragmatic natur
traditional, individualist, conception of knowledg
the light of the fact that Wartofsky (e.g. 1979b
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others have been opp

naturalized epistemo
methods and contents
that his or her own n
continue to change as
This, however, leads
here: What is the substance of such a naturalism?
3 So, What (Good) is It?
With this overview in mind, we can now return to our guiding questions: What kind
of enterprise is historical epistemology? And what, if anything, might more
mainstream approaches to epistemology or the philosophy of science learn from it?
It should by now be abundantly clear that "historical epistemology" denotes no
one approach to history of science and its epistemological dimensions. This has led
one recent critic to denounce the label as just that, a label, suggesting neither a
coherent movement, nor a real contribution to epistemology (Gingras 2010).
According to Gingras, of the three more recent projects that have adopted the name
"historical epistemology," only one (that of Hans-Jörg Rheinberger) reflects on the
genealogy of this name and self-consciously situates his approach within the
philosophical tradition within which the expression was coined. To Gingras, this
suggests that Daston and Renn are not practicing epistemology at all, whereas
Rheinberger works in a tradition that has effectively redefined what epistemology is,
thereby making his work of limited use to mainstream epistemology. Gingras
correctly points out that there was some disagreement about whether the resulting
project in the study of knowledge was to be called 'historical epistemology' or
'epistemological history' (of science). Canguilhem himself seems to have preferred
the latter, and in that sense his (and Rheinbergers) approach could be read as
primarily addressing questions in the history - rather than epistemology - of
science. At this point, it is illuminating to note that Rheinberger (2010, p. 3f.)
claims that there were two converging tendencies throughout the twentieth century:
a "historicization of the philosophy of science", and an "epistemologization of the
history of science", and that both can be "combined under the concept of historical
epistemology" - which he himself favors. In this way, Rheinberger emphasizes the
philosophical ambitions of his research.
But Gingras's assertion is not quite accurate for another reason. Wartofsky
(1979a, p. 121) referred back to the French backgrounds, but he also compared his
conception to Piaget's "genetic epistemology" (Wartofsky 1983a) and Quine's call
for an "epistemology naturalized" (Wartofsky 1987). Renn (1996, p. 242) explicitly
refers to Wartofsky, albeit without adopting the latter's conception. Hacking and
Daston, in turn, do not refer to Wartofsky, but share some of his ideas: the Kantian
goal of explaining concepts of knowledge or science, and the emphasis upon
practices in explaining the emergence and development of these concepts. If
9 We owe this point and phrase to Sandra Mitchell.
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Gingras were right in claiming that Daston and R

all, we would probably have to say the same
programs, such as Piaget' s or Quine' s, or the m
within the philosophy of science as well. The m
tries to do, on terminological grounds. If one w
value of such forms of history of science, on
methods, theories, and their concrete research r
this special issue make some suggestions pertain
Moreover, and more importantly, rather than d
tout court , it is more helpful to look examine sp
be launched against specific types of historical
more focused debates. One such criticism is met
of certain types of concepts within the narrativ
issue Martin Kusch raises when he urges that his
historical events must not be divided into internal/external, and theoretical
constructs must not be treated as quasi-organisms. He charges that Daston, in her
recent work on objectivity, explicitly rejects these points, claiming for her historical
thesis about types of objectivity a type of middle-range generality that will be
missed if one exclusively focuses on micro-causal accounts or "big" social factors.
Given that all three versions of historical epistemology differ about the ways in
which various levels of historical analysis (specifically, the social and the
intellectual) are to be integrated, these questions concerning the presuppostions of
history of science surely deserve more attention. Similar critical analyses of
Rheinbergers and Renn's historiographical foundations are therefore called for.
Apart from the specific approaches that go by the name of historical
epistemology, there are also more general arguments in favor of historical
investigations as informing theories of knowledge. Two contributions that formulate
such arguments, albeit in different ways, are those by Barry Stroud and Philip
Kitcher. Both of these authors are skeptical about some of the assumptions
underlying much contemporary epistemology. Their reflections explicate ways in
which historical investigations might be beneficial (a) for philosophical epistemol-
ogy narrowly conceived (Stroud) and (b) for an analysis of the kinds of
epistemological questions typically raised by philosophy of science (Kitcher).
Stroud, unlike Sturm, does not compare the history of epistemology with
historical epistemology, but rather argues for more history of epistemology by
demanding "a greater sensitivity to the sources of the problems of epistemology."
The history of epistemology can help epistemology if it is carried out with a
"diagnostic interest," namely to unearth (and potentially re-evaluate) the emergence
of crucial assumptions that lie at the heart of what are considered fundamental
epistemological problems, or what the underlying conceptions of the nature and
aims of epistemology are. One such assumption identified by Stroud is engrained in
a particular way of understanding the nature of perception as closely related to
sensation. He argues that this virtual assimilation has resulted in an impasse,
whereby it is impossible to see how human knowledge is possible. Stroud's
emphasis upon the diagnostic function of the history of epistemology converges
with points made by, among others, Daston and Galison (2007, pp. 371-381). His
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point is independent of
whether epistemologic
in passing that early m
mutually informed one
the history of science m
conceived by him. How
made by historical epis
can and should replace
Kitcher's arguments f
epistemology are closer
explicitly calls for an i
epistemology of mathe
history of mathemat
mathematics as descrip
Kitcher's more general
neglect its own history
of tradition." Accordi
individualist conceptio
problems are. By contra
we should use history t
the history of science
material in support of
naturalism." Kitcher's
assumption that practic
this in the realm of stu
Mary Tiles, finally, de
debates. In this, she foc
As she lays out, Bruno
French historical epist
Pierre Bourdieu. Latour
far enough in rejecting
and nature, a separatio
critique is unwarranted,
readings of what this "
Latour' s project of ana
conceptualize seemingl
terminology and back
analytical philosophers,
are quite similar to rec
distinction between ep
4 Conclusion and Outlook
We are aware that this special issue offers only a glimpse of the kinds of questions
raised by the approaches subsumed under the label "historical epistemology." In
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this introduction, we have pointed to a number of

small, that are raised by the articles. Let us try to
some questions for further research.
First and foremost, the central question at stake
the historical study of knowledge (and theories t
porary epistemology. As we saw, proposed an
different flavors, namely (a) a proposal to look a
diagnostic tool towards understanding the origin
current epistemological problems (Stroud), (b) a p
science as a laboratory for methods of belief
reconstruction of arguments about epistemic conc
look at the history of science with the aim of re
promoting epistemological pluralism (Chang). Wh
clear philosophical significance, none of them ha
heading of historical epistemology. Perhaps s
examples for strengthening the philosophical age
A second question is whether a turn towards the
one specific conception of knowledge currently b
and in particular, how historical epistemology is
Again, as we saw, different arguments for the r
point in rather different directions. Roughly,
proposal to model scientific change in accord
conceptual development (Barker) pointing toward
cognitive basis of individual knowledge (Heidelbe
scientific knowledge as in important ways d
(Kitcher). The former proposal suggests that there
historical and naturalized epistemologies than prop
have typically recognized, whereas the latter poi
historical epistemology as an extension of the rela
of social epistemology (see also Kusch 2010). In tur
debate over whether a principled line can be draw
occur in- and outside the realm of science (Tiles).
A third question is what kind of historiographi
by epistemologists who accept the relevance of
different answers are suggested by the contribut
in general some agreement about the need to
science, which includes not only a narrow focus
also of practices, material cultures, and philosoph
conceptions of how these aspects ought to be
contribution is critical of the current trend amon
scientific practices (Sturm), others highlight the
paying attention to particular kinds of scientific
reasoning about one's methodologies (Feest; S
constructing physical explanations (Wise). These
and nature of scientific practices draw our atten
analyze a question not addressed by historical epis
â Springer

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meant by the word "

practices? In addition,
rather inferred fro
historiography of scie
the question how prof
history really is.
Last but not least, th
debates in historical
(Stroud), the empirica
Chang), or the ration
offering distinct argu
not so much part of t
Once again, we do no
"right" one. It does
disagreements betwee
and their at least part
provoke new discuss
history, and confront
Acknowledgments The aut

of the 2008 conference. In a
as well as John Carson, Lor
for various comments and s
Ministry for Science and I
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