G.R. No.

154130             October 1, 2003

BENITO ASTORGA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of a Decision of
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986, dated July 5, 2001, as well as its Resolutions dated
1 

September 28, 2001 and July 10, 2002.

On October 28, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman filed the following Information against Benito
Astorga, Mayor of Daram, Samar, as well as a number of his men for Arbitrary Detention:

That on or about the 1st day of September, 1997, and for sometime subsequent thereto, at the
Municipality of Daram, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of Daram, Samar, in
such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving, confederating and mutually
helping with unidentified persons, who are herein referred to under fictitious names JOHN DOES,
who were armed with firearms of different calibers, with deliberate intent, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously detain Elpidio Simon, Moises dela Cruz, Wenifredo Maniscan, Renato
Militante and Crisanto Pelias, DENR Employees, at the Municipality of Daram, by not allowing them
to leave the place, without any legal and valid grounds thereby restraining and depriving them of
their personal liberty for nine (9) hours, but without exceeding three (3) days.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 2

On September 1, 1997, Regional Special Operations Group (RSOG) of the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Office No. 8, Tacloban City sent a team to the island of
Daram, Western Samar to conduct intelligence gathering and forest protection operations in line with
the government’s campaign against illegal logging. The team was composed of Forester II Moises
dela Cruz, Scaler Wenifredo Maniscan, Forest Ranger Renato Militante, and Tree Marker Crisanto
Pelias, with Elpidio E. Simon, Chief of the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Section, as team
leader. The team was escorted by SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian. 3

The team stopped at Brgy. Bagacay, Daram, Western Samar at 2:00 p.m., where they saw two
yacht-like boats being constructed. After consulting with the local barangay officials, the team
learned that the boats belonged to a certain Michael Figueroa. However, since Figueroa was not
around at the time, the team left Brgy. Bagacay. 4

En route to Brgy. Manungca, Sta. Rita, Samar, the team spotted two more boats being constructed
in the vicinity of Brgy. Lucob-Lucob, Daram, Samar, between 4:30-5:00 p.m., prompting them to stop
and investigate. Thus, Maniscan and Militante disembarked from the DENR’s service pump boat and
proceeded to the site of the boat construction. There, they met Mayor Astorga. After conversing with
the mayor, Militante returned to their boat for the purpose of fetching Simon, at the request of Mayor
Astorga.5
When Simon, accompanied by dela Cruz, SPO3 Cinco, and SPO1 Capoquian, approached Mayor
Astorga to try and explain the purpose of their mission, Simon was suddenly slapped hard twice on
the shoulder by Mayor Astorga, who exclaimed, "Puwede ko kamo papaglanguyon pag-uli ha
Tacloban. Ano, di ka maaram nga natupa ako? Natupa baya ako. Diri kamo makauli yana kay
puwede kame e charge ha misencounter." (I can make you swim back to Tacloban. Don’t you know
that I can box? I can box. Don’t you know that I can declare this a misencounter?) Mayor Astorga 6 

then ordered someone to fetch "reinforcements," and forty-five (45) minutes later, or between 5:00-
6:00 p.m., a banca arrived bearing ten (10) men, some of them dressed in fatigue uniforms. The
men were armed with M-16 and M14 rifles, and they promptly surrounded the team, guns pointed at
the team members. At this, Simon tried to explain to Astorga the purpose of his team’s mission. He
7  8 

then took out his handheld ICOM radio, saying that he was going to contact his people at the DENR
in Catbalogan to inform them of the team’s whereabouts. Suddenly, Mayor Astorga forcibly grabbed
Simon’s radio, saying, "Maupay nga waray kamo radio bis diri somabut an iyo opisina kon hain
kamo, bis diri kamo maka aro hin bulig." (It’s better if you have no radio so that your office would not
know your whereabouts and so that you cannot ask for help). Mayor Astorga again slapped the right
9 

shoulder of Simon, adding, "Kong siga kamo ha Leyte ayaw pagdad-a dinhi ha Samar kay diri kamo
puwede ha akon." (If you are tough guys in Leyte, do not bring it to Samar because I will not tolerate
it here.) Simon then asked Mayor Astorga to allow the team to go home, at which Mayor Astorga
10 

retorted that they would not be allowed to go home and that they would instead be brought to
Daram. Mayor Astorga then addressed the team, saying, "Kon magdakop man la kamo, unahon an
11 

mga dagko. Kon madakop niyo an mga dagko, an kan Figueroa dida ha Bagacay puwede ko liwat
ipadakop an akon." (If you really want to confiscate anything, you start with the big-time. If you
confiscate the boats of Figueroa at Brgy. Bagacay, I will surrender mine.) Simon then tried to
12 

reiterate his request for permission to leave, which just succeeded in irking Mayor Astorga, who
angrily said, "Diri kamo maka uli yana kay dad on ko kamo ha Daram, para didto kita mag uro
istorya." (You cannot go home now because I will bring you to Daram. We will have many things to
discuss there.) 13

The team was brought to a house where they were told that they would be served dinner. The team
had dinner with Mayor Astorga and several others at a long table, and the meal lasted between 7:00-
8:00 p.m. After dinner, Militante, Maniscan and SPO1 Capoquian were allowed to go down from the
14 

house, but not to leave the barangay. On the other hand, SPO3 Cinco and the rest just sat in the
15 

house until 2:00 a.m. when the team was finally allowed to leave. 16 
1awphi1.nét

Complainants filed a criminal complaint for arbitrary detention against Mayor Astorga and his men,
which led to the filing of the above-quoted Information.

Mayor Astorga was subsequently arraigned on July 3, 2000, wherein he pleaded not guilty to the
offenses charged. At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of SPO1 Capoquian and
17 

SPO3 Cinco, as well as their Joint Affidavit. However, the presentation of Simon’s testimony was
18 

not completed, and none of his fellow team members came forward to testify. Instead, the members
of the team sent by the DENR RSOG executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance. 19

On July 5, 2001, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Decision, disposing of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused BENITO

ASTORGA Y BOCATCAT guilty of Arbitrary Detention, and in the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year and eight (8)
months of prision correctional as maximum.

SO ORDERED. 20
The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated July 11, 2001 which was denied by the
21 

Sandiganabayan in a Resolution dated September 28, 2001. A Second Motion for Reconsideration
22 

dated October 24, 2001 was also filed, and this was similarly denied in a Resolution dated July 10,
23 

2002. 24

Hence, the present petition, wherein the petitioner assigns a sole error for review:

5.1. The trial court grievously erred in finding the accused guilty of Arbitrary Detention as defined
and penalized under Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code, based on mere speculations, surmises
and conjectures and, worse, notwithstanding the Affidavit of Desistance executed by the five (5)
complaining witnesses wherein the latter categorically declared petitioner’s innocence of the crime
charged. 25

Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to establish the required quantum of evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused, especially in light of the fact that the private complainants executed a
26 

Joint Affidavit of Desistance. Petitioner asserts that nowhere in the records of the case is there any
27 

competent evidence that could sufficiently establish the fact that restraint was employed upon the
persons of the team members. Furthermore, he claims that the mere presence of armed men at the
28 

scene does not qualify as competent evidence to prove that fear was in fact instilled in the minds of
the team members, to the extent that they would feel compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. 29

Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds,
detains a person. The elements of the crime are:
30 

1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.

2. That he detains a person.

3. That the detention is without legal grounds. 31

That petitioner, at the time he committed the acts assailed herein, was then Mayor of Daram, Samar
is not disputed. Hence, the first element of Arbitrary Detention, that the offender is a public officer or
employee, is undeniably present.

Also, the records are bereft of any allegation on the part of petitioner that his acts were spurred by
some legal purpose. On the contrary, he admitted that his acts were motivated by his "instinct for
self-preservation" and the feeling that he was being "singled out." The detention was thus without
32 

legal grounds, thereby satisfying the third element enumerated above.

What remains is the determination of whether or not the team was actually detained.

In the case of People v. Acosta, which involved the illegal detention of a child, we found the
33 

accused-appellant therein guilty of kidnapping despite the lack of evidence to show that any physical
restraint was employed upon the victim. However, because the victim was a boy of tender age and
he was warned not to leave until his godmother, the accused-appellant, had returned, he was
practically a captive in the sense that he could not leave because of his fear to violate such
instruction. 34

In the case of People v. Cortez, we held that, in establishing the intent to deprive the victim of his
35 

liberty, it is not necessary that the offended party be kept within an enclosure to restrict her freedom
of locomotion. At the time of her rescue, the offended party in said case was found outside talking to
the owner of the house where she had been taken. She explained that she did not attempt to leave
the premises for fear that the kidnappers would make good their threats to kill her should she do so.
We ruled therein that her fear was not baseless as the kidnappers knew where she resided and they
had earlier announced that their intention in looking for her cousin was to kill him on sight. Thus, we
concluded that fear has been known to render people immobile and that appeals to the fears of an
individual, such as by threats to kill or similar threats, are equivalent to the use of actual force or
violence. 36

The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention is that the curtailment of the victim’s
liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon the victim’s person. If the acts and actuations of
the accused can produce such fear in the mind of the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the
extent that the victim is compelled to limit his own actions and movements in accordance with the
wishes of the accused, then the victim is, for all intents and purposes, detained against his will.

In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is evident. Inspite of their pleas, the witnesses and
the complainants were not allowed by petitioner to go home. This refusal was quickly followed by
37 

the call for and arrival of almost a dozen "reinforcements," all armed with military-issue rifles, who
proceeded to encircle the team, weapons pointed at the complainants and the witnesses. Given 38 

such circumstances, we give credence to SPO1 Capoquian’s statement that it was not "safe" to
refuse Mayor Astorga’s orders. It was not just the presence of the armed men, but also the evident
39 

effect these gunmen had on the actions of the team which proves that fear was indeed instilled in the
minds of the team members, to the extent that they felt compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. The
intent to prevent the departure of the complainants and witnesses against their will is thus clear.

Regarding the Joint Affidavit of Desistance executed by the private complainants, suffice it to say
that the principles governing the use of such instruments in the adjudication of other crimes can be
applied here. Thus, in People v. Ballabare, it was held that an affidavit of desistance is merely an
additional ground to buttress the defenses of the accused, not the sole consideration that can result
in acquittal. There must be other circumstances which, when coupled with the retraction or
desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the testimony given by the witnesses at the trial and
accepted by the judge. Here, there are no such circumstances. Indeed, the belated claims made in
40 

the Joint Affidavit of Desistance, such as the allegations that the incident was the result of a
misunderstanding and that the team acceded to Mayor Astorga’s orders "out of respect," are belied
by petitioner’s own admissions to the contrary. The Joint Affidavit of Desistance of the private
41 

complainants is evidently not a clear repudiation of the material points alleged in the information and
proven at the trial, but a mere expression of the lack of interest of private complainants to pursue the
case.  This conclusion is supported by one of its latter paragraphs, which reads:
1awphi1.nét

11. That this affidavit was executed by us if only to prove our sincerity and improving DENR relations
with the local Chiefs Executive and other official of Daram, Islands so that DENR programs and
project can be effectively implemented through the support of the local officials for the betterment of
the residence living conditions who are facing difficulties and are much dependent on government
support. 42

Petitioner also assails the weight given by the trial court to the evidence, pointing out that the
Sandiganbayan’s reliance on the testimony of SPO1 Capoquian is misplaced, for the reason that
SPO1 Capoquian is not one of the private complainants in the case. He also makes much of the fact
43 

that prosecution witness SPO1 Capoquian was allegedly "not exactly privy to, and knowledgeable of,
what exactly transpired between herein accused and the DENR team leader Mr. Elpidio E. Simon,
from their alleged ‘confrontation,’ until they left Barangay Lucob-Lucob in the early morning of 2
September 1997." 44
It is a time-honored doctrine that the trial court’s factual findings are conclusive and binding upon
appellate courts unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been
overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted. Nothing in the case at bar prompts us to deviate
45 

from this doctrine. Indeed, the fact that SPO1 Capoquian is not one of the private complainants is
completely irrelevant. Neither penal law nor the rules of evidence requires damning testimony to be
exclusively supplied by the private complainants in cases of Arbitrary Detention. Furthermore, Mayor
Astorga’s claim that SPO1 Capoquian was "not exactly privy" to what transpired between Simon and
himself is belied by the evidence. SPO1 Capoquian testified that he accompanied Simon when the
latter went to talk to petitioner. He heard all of Mayor Astorga’s threatening remarks. He was with
46  47 

Simon when they were encircled by the men dressed in fatigues and wielding M-16 and M-14
rifles. In sum, SPO1 Capoquian witnessed all the circumstances which led to the Arbitrary Detention
48 

of the team at the hands of Mayor Astorga.

Petitioner submits that it is unclear whether the team was in fact prevented from leaving Brgy.
Lucob-Lucob or whether they had simply decided to "while away the time" and take advantage of the
purported hospitality of the accused. On the contrary, SPO3 Cinco clearly and categorically denied
49 

that they were simply "whiling away the time" between their dinner with Mayor Astorga and their
departure early the following morning. SPO1 Capoquian gave similar testimony, saying that they did
50 

not use the time between their dinner with Mayor Astorga and their departure early the following
morning to "enjoy the place" and that, given a choice, they would have gone home. 51

Petitioner argues that he was denied the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge", because the ponente
of the assailed decision acted both as magistrate and advocate when he propounded "very
extensive clarificatory questions" on the witnesses. Surely, the Sandiganbayan, as a trial court, is not
an idle arbiter during a trial. It can propound clarificatory questions to witnesses in order to ferret out
the truth. The impartiality of the court cannot be assailed on the ground that clarificatory questions
were asked during the trial.52

Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Sandiganbayan finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Arbitrary Detention. Article 124 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that, where the
detention has not exceeded three days, the penalty shall be arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period, which has a range of four (4) months and one (1) day to
two (2) years and four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner is entitled to
a minimum term to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, or arresto mayor in its minimum
and medium periods, which has a range of one (1) month and one (1) day to four (4) months. Hence,
the Sandiganbayan was correct in imposing the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum.

Before closing, it may not be amiss to quote the words of Justice Perfecto in his concurring opinion
in Lino v. Fugoso, wherein he decried the impunity enjoyed by public officials in committing arbitrary
or illegal detention, and called for the intensification of efforts towards bringing them to justice:

The provisions of law punishing arbitrary or illegal detention committed by government officers form
part of our statute books even before the advent of American sovereignty in our country. Those
provisions were already in effect during the Spanish regime; they remained in effect under American
rule; continued in effect under the Commonwealth. Even under the Japanese regime they were not
repealed. The same provisions continue in the statute books of the free and sovereign Republic of
the Philippines. This notwithstanding, and the complaints often heard of violations of said provisions,
it is very seldom that prosecutions under them have been instituted due to the fact that the erring
individuals happened to belong to the same government to which the prosecuting officers belong. It
is high time that every one must do his duty, without fear or favor, and that prosecuting officers
should not answer with cold shrugging of the shoulders the complaints of the victims of arbitrary or
illegal detention.

Only by an earnest enforcement of the provisions of articles 124 and 125 of the Revised Penal Code
will it be possible to reduce to its minimum such wanton trampling of personal freedom as depicted
in this case. The responsible officials should be prosecuted, without prejudice to the detainees’ right
to the indemnity to which they may be entitled for the unjustified violation of their fundamental
rights.
53

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986, dated July 5, 2001 finding petitioner BENITO
ASTORGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and sentencing him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year
and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Azcuna, J., on leave.

People v. Ali, G.R. No. 222965

G.R. No. 222965

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
USTADZ IBRAHIM ALI y KALIM, ABDUL HASSAN AND TWO OTHER COMPANIONS
IDENTIFED ONLY AS "JUL" AND "AMAT," Accused,
USTADZ IBRAHIM ALI y KALIM, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This is an appeal from the 30 April 2015 Decision  of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC
1

No. 00473-MIN, which affirmed the 30 July 1999 Decision  of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16,
2

Zamboanga City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 15599, finding accused Ustadz Ibrahim
Ali y Kalim (Ali) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention, defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

THE FACTS

In an Information dated 17 December 1998, Ali, together with Abdul Hassan (Hassan), and

individuals identified as "Jul" and Amat," were charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention under Article 267 of the RPC. Only Ali was the subject of the criminal proceedings
because his co-accused Hassan, Jul, and Amat remain at large. The accusatory portion of the
information reads:

That on or about December 14, 1998, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused being then armed with high powered
firearm, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting with one another, by
means of force and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, KIDNAP the
person of CHRISTIA OLIZ y EUCOGCO, a young woman, 19 years old, particularly on the occasion
when she was together with her employer named Antonio Yu Lim Bo and the latter's wife and
daughter, on board a Blue Nissan Vehicle then driven by one Rene Igno who was ordered by the
herein accused to stop said vehicle somewhere at the vicinity of EAAB at Sta. Maria Road, this City,
and thereafter through intimidation, commandeered and drove said vehicle with all its occupants
aboard towards San Roque and finally to the area of Pitogo beach with the clear intention on the part
of the accused to extort ransom money from said victim or other person; however, when victim
Christia Oliz alighted from the vehicle and was walking towards the direction of Pitogo beach she
was able to run away and with the timely assistance of some residents thereat as well as the arrival
of the police authorities, prompted all the accused to escape except accused Ustadz Ibrahim Ali y
Kalim who was arrested thus briefly depriving the liberty of said victim against her will; furthermore,
the commission of said crime has been attended by the aggravating circumstance of NIGHT TIME
AND USE OF MOTOR VEHICLE. 3

During his arraignment, Ali, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded "Not Guilty." 4

Evidence for the Prosecution

The prosecution presented six (6) witnesses, namely: Senior Police Officer 2 Salvador F. Arcillas,
Police Inspector Jesus Belarga, private complainant Christia Oliz (Oliz), Police Inspector Jose
Bayani Gucela, Mario C. Agarte, Police Officer 3 Bernardino Bayot. Their combined testimonies
tended to establish the following:

On 14 December 1998, at around 7:30 P.M., Antonio Lim (Antonio), Mary Lim (Mary), and Cherry
Lim (Cherry) left their family-owned grocery and were on their way to their house in Pasonanca,
Zamboanga City, on board a Nissan vehicle. With them were their driver Rene Igno (Jgno) and Oliz,
their helper. 5

When they were near Edwin Andrews Airbase (EAAB) along Sta. Maria Road, Igno stopped the car
to avoid bumping into a motorcycle with three persons on board. The three men, later identified as
Ali, Hassan, and Amat, approached the Nissan vehicle and told the passengers that they were
policemen.  They ordered Antonio and Igno to transfer to the back of the vehicle and sit with Oliz,
6

Mary, and Cherry. The passengers were told that they would be brought to the police station on a tip
that they were transporting contraband goods. Thereafter, the three armed men boarded the Nissan
vehicle with Amat in the driver's seat, Ali beside him, and Hassan at the back with the other
passengers. Once inside, Ali instructed Hassan to handcuff Igno and Antonio. 7

Amat did not stop when they reached the Sta. Maria police station but kept on driving. Due to the
buildup of traffic at the intersection after the Sta. Maria police station, Mary was able to escape her
captors by jumping out of the vehicle. 8

Amat continued to drive towards Pitogo and then veered towards the beach. There, the occupants
were ordered to alight from the vehicle. Oliz was able to escape when she saw a woman walking
nearby because only Antonio, Cherry, and Igno were guarded. She then told the woman that her
employer was being kidnapped. 9

Oliz was then accompanied to a nearby house where they contacted the authorities. Before the
police arrived, Oliz heard a commotion outside and saw bystanders mauling Ali. Oliz told the people
around that he was their abductor. When the police arrived, Ali was turned over to the authorities
who brought him to the police station together with Oliz. 10

Evidence for the Defense

The defense presented four (4) witnesses, namely: Ali's sister Nauda Ali (Nauda), Ali's wife Rahima
Saulan (Rahima), Ali's cousin Siddik Alfad Abubakar (Siddik), and the accused himself. Their
testimonies sought to prove the following:

On 14 December 1998, Ali, Rahima, and Nauda left Manalipa to proceed to Sinunuc and stay in
Siddik's house before going home to Pagadian City. On their way to Sinunuc, they parted ways in
Zamboanga City because Ali wanted to pray at the Sta. Barbara Mosque; Rahima and Nauda went
ahead to Siddik's place.11

At around 7:00 P.M., while Ali was waiting outside the Mosque for a ride to Sinunuc, he met Hassan,
who was riding a motorcycle with Amat. Hassan told him to ride with them as they would be going
somewhere in Recodo. When they were near the EAAB, Hassan overtook a motor vehicle and
almost collided with it. Amat approached the driver of the motor vehicle while Hassan went to the
other side. Amat and Hassan eventually boarded the vehicle with the latter forcing Ali to do the
same. Hassan pushed Ali inside while he was holding a gun and told him to follow or he would be in
trouble. Meanwhile, Hassan ordered a certain Jun  to ride the motorcycle and follow them.
12 13
As Amat was driving, Ali asked what they were doing but was told to stop talking and just follow.
Upon reaching Sinunuc, Ali asked Amat to stop the vehicle so he could get off but he was ignored.
Eventually, they stopped at the seashore of Pitogo. 14

There, all the occupants alighted with Hassan and Amat escorting and guarding Antonio, Cherry,
Igno, and Oliz further down the seashore. Ali remained by the vehicle. Later, Jun arrived on
Hassan's motorcycle. After sensing something suspicious with his companions, Ali decided to walk
away and proceed to the main road to catch a ride to Sinunuc. While he was waiting for
transportation, several persons suddenly held him and beat him up, accusing him of being a thief. Ali
was eventually brought to a house where the beatings continued. 15

After a few minutes, policemen arrived at the house where Ali was held. He was made to board the
police vehicle where he was blindfolded and beaten again. Ali was detained at the police station
where he was forced to admit to the kidnapping. 16

The RTC Ruling

In its 30 July 1999 decision, the RTC found Ali guilty of violating Article 267 of the RPC, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the

accused IBRAHIMALIyKALIMGUILTYBEYONDREASONABLEDOUBT as principal of the crime of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention defined and penalized under Article 267, paragraphs 2 and
of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659, and SENTENCES
said accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSIONPERPETUA with the accessory penalties provided
by law and to pay the costs. 17

Aggrieved, Ali appealed before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its assailed 30 April 2015 decision, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated
30 July 1999 of the trial court is AFFIRMED in toto. 18

Hence, this appeal, anchored on the following:

ISSUES

WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF SERIOUS ILLEGAL

DETENTION; AND

II

WHETHER THE ACCUSED WAS IDENTIFIED WITH MORAL CERTAINTY.

THE COURT'S RULING

The appeal has no merit.

Period of detention immaterial if

victim is a female

Ali argues that he could not be guilty of the crime of Serious Illegal Detention because the alleged
deprivation of liberty did not last for more than three (3) days as the incident only lasted for about an
hour or two. In order for the accused to be guilty of serious illegal detention, the following elements
must concur: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he or she kidnaps or detains another, or in
any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal;
and (d) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed by simulating public
authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or
threats to kill the victim are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a
public officer.
19

In other words, deprivation of liberty is qualified to serious illegal detention if at least one of the
following circumstances exists: (a) detention lasts for more than three (3) days; (b) accused
simulated public authority; (c) victim suffers serious physical injuries or is threatened to be killed; or
(d) the victim is a minor, female or public officer.

In the case at bar, the elements of serious illegal detention were duly proven by the
prosecution. First, Ali and his cohorts were clearly private individuals. Second, they deprived Oliz of
her liberty. This was manifested by the fact that they forcibly boarded the vehicle and placed Igno
and Antonio in handcuffs evincing their intent to detain the occupants of the motor vehicle. Third,
Oliz was a female victim. The CA was correct in ruling that the period of detention became
immaterial in view of the victim's circumstances. If, during the deprivation of liberty, any of the
circumstances under Article 267(4) of the RPC occurs, i.e, the victim was a female, the crime of
serious illegal detention is consummated. 20

Intent to detain or restrain the

victim's movement is tantamount to
illegal detention.

Ali likewise assails that there was insufficient evidence to hold that he forcefully transported, locked
up or restrained Oliz and her companions especially considering that the alleged handcuffs were
never presented in court. The essence of serious illegal detention is the actual deprivation of the
victim's liberty, coupled with the indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect such deprivation-it
is enough that the victim is restrained from going home.  It contemplates situations where the victim
21

is restricted or impeded in one's liberty to move.  Oliz's testimony clearly demonstrates the intent of
22

the accused to deprive her and her companions of their liberty, to wit:

FISCAL NUVAL:

Q: Aside from asking the license of the driver, what else did they tell you?

A: They told us there was a tip that we were bringing contraband goods.

Q: Did they identify themselves?

A: Yes.
Q: What did they tell you?

A: They said that they are policemen.

Q: Then, what happen (sic) after that?

A: They went inside our vehicle and they asked the driver and this Boa to transfer at the back seat,
together with us.

xxxx

Q: You said three persons approached your vehicle two of them went inside the front seat, one on
the behind the steering wheel (sic) and other one sitting beside him and the other one went at the
back of that vehicle, now, tell us where did this accused sat (sic)?

A: At the front seat also.

Q: Was he behind the steering wheel?

A: No, he was sitting at the side of the driver.

Q: And after he sat beside the driver's seat, what did this person do?

A: He instructed that Rene will be handcuffed.

Q: To whom did he instruct to handcuffed (sic) this Rene?

A: His companion, the one sitted (sic) at the back.

Q: What did this person at the back do, after this accused instructed him to handcuffed (sic) Rene
Egno?

A: Then his companion handcuffed Egno.

xxxx

COURT:

Then after Sta. Maria, road, where did you proceed?

A: Then they said we will brought (sic) to the police station.

[FISCAL NUVAL:]

Q: Were you able to go the police station?

A: None, (sic) we just passed by. 23

Oliz's testimony clearly shows the intent of Ali and his cohorts to deprive the liberty and restrain the
movement of the occupants of the motor vehicle. They misrepresented themselves as policemen
and claimed they would bring Oliz and her companions to the police station; but they never got there
and were let go only when they arrived at Pitogo. Further, Oliz categorically stated that Ali ordered
his companions to handcuff Antonio and Igno. As pointed out by the CA, Oliz's testimony
demonstrates that her freedom of movement was effectively restrained by the abductors who
exercised complete control and dominion over the person of the victims.

Otiz identified Ali as the accused in a

categorical and straightforward
manner.

Ali also challenges Oliz's identification of him claiming that her testimony was marred with
inconsistencies and that she was only able to identify him after reading the newspapers two days
after the incident. We have held that inconsistencies on immaterial details do not negate the
probative value of the testimony of a witness regarding the very act of the accused.  In fact, minor
24

inconsistencies tend to strengthen the credibility of the witness because it shows that the testimony
was not rehearsed. 25

In the case at bar, the inconsistencies, e.g., the position of the occupants inside the vehicle, assailed
by Ali, pertain to trivial matters. On the contrary, Oliz remained consistent in identifying Ali as one of
those involved in the kidnapping, viz:

FISCAL NUVAL:

xxxx

Q: Now, madam witness, can you recognize those three persons who approached you and identified
themselves as policemen and that person who went inside that car, can you identify those three
persons?

A: Yes.

Q: Are they inside this courtroom, will you please look around and tell us if they are inside this
courtroom? A: There is one here.

COURT:

Go down and touch him

A: (Witness went down from the witness stand and approached the accused and at the same time
holding his hand, and when the accused was asked, identified himself as Ibrahim Ali).

xxxx

[Cross-Examination]

ATTY. PAK.AM: xxx

Q: Madam witness, how far were you sitted (sic) to the rear of the car from accused Ibrahim Ali?
From where you were sitted (sic) to the rear of the car, how far were you to Ibrahim Ali?

A: Ten inches in distance.

Q: You were sitted (sic) ten inches according to you, from Ibrahim Ali, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: Is there a bar that separates you from Ibrahim Ali?

A: Yes.

Q: What is this?

A: Just after the seat from the driver there is a sort of bar, a wall or bar, it is an iron bar.

xxxx

Q: You said accused Ibrahim Ali instructed that Rene be handcuffed, who did he give the
instruction?

A: He instructed his companion to handcuffed (sic) Rene. 26

Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity.  In order that identification be deemed
27

with moral certainty enough to overcome the presumption of innocence, it must be impervious to
skepticism on account of its distinctiveness.  Such distinctiveness is achieved through identification
28

evidence which encompass unique physical features or characteristics like the face, voice or any
other physical facts that set the individual apart from the rest of humanity.  In the case at bar, it is
29

unquestionable that Ali was identified with moral certainty. Oliz was able to distinguish and identify
accused considering their proximity inside the vehicle and the duration of the captivity. Thus, she
was intimately familiar with Ali's facial features and voice-enough to lend credibility to her
identification of the accused.

Ali's contention that Oliz was only able to identify him after reading the newspaper is erroneous.
During cross-examination, she merely stated that she became aware of Ali's name after reading the
dailies. To wit:

ATTY. PAKAM:

Q: Now, specifically you mentioned the name Ali Ibrahim, by the way, do you know Ali Ibrahim
before? A: No.

Q: When did you come to know the name Ali Ibrahim?

A: At the police station and in the newspaper.

Q: You come to know the name Ali Ibrahim thru newspaper and police station, where?

A: Southcom.

Q: So, not at the police station?

A: At Southcom.
Q: Who told you that his person's name is Ali Ibrahim?

A: When I read the newspaper.

Q: When did you read the newspaper?

A: Last December 16. 30

Clearly, the only information Oliz derived from newspapers or third-party sources is the name of the
accused. It was reasonably expected that she would be oblivious of Ali's name because the latter
was a stranger to her prior to the abduction. Nevertheless, Oliz was able to sufficiently and
consistently identify Ali as her abductor even if she did not know his name.

Further, Ali challenging his identification is absurd considering that he himself admits his presence
during the abduction. In his cross-examination, he narrated:

PROSECUTOR NUVAL:

xxxx

Q: Now, you said you overtook a jeep. What kind of a jeep was this, will you please describe?

A: Well, I do not know what kind of a jeep is this.

Q: Is that the color blue?

A: Yes.

Q: Is it a pick up type?

A: Well, I do not know. I did not examine.

COURT:

Q: Is it not a fact that you were following this jeep while it was travelling in front of you before you
overtook it?

A: Yes, Your Honor, but, I do not know, I was not thinking that it will happen like that Your Honor.

Q: Since when did you notice that you were following this blue jeep?

A: When we were already near the gate of that Air Base Your Honor.

Q: But, before you overtook this jeep you already noticed that this jeep was travelling ahead of you?

A: I do not know, Your Honor. I was not thinking about that jeep Your Honor.

xxxx

PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: And this Hassan, when you overtook this jeep almost bumped this jeep?

A: Yes.

Q: And he purposely stopped this motorcycle?

A: Yes.

Q: And, he also make the motorcycle fell on the ground (sic), correct?

A: No. Well, it was not the motorcycle, he was just about to fall down.

Q: Were you able to fall down?

A: No.

Q: So, what did he do with his motorcycle?

A: It was on a stop, standing.

Q: And then, what happened next?

A: All of us alighted.

Q: What about the motorcycle?

A: It was just in front of the jeep.

COURT:

Q: You blocked the jeep?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: So, the jeep had no choice but to stop otherwise, it will run over your motorcycle?

A: Yes.

Q: Did the driver of the jeep apply the break so as to avoid running over the motorcycle which
stopped in front?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx
1awp++i1

PROSECUTOR NUVAL:

Q: And then, you said the three of you approached the driver?
A: No.

Q: So, when you stopped, was it parked purposely in front of the jeep, this motorcycle?

A: Yes.

Q: With its stand?

A: Yes.

Q: And, you alighted from the motorcycle?

A: Yes.

Q: Who alighted first from the motorcycle?

A: It was Ahmad, the one driving.

Q: And followed by you?

A: Then we were together with Hassan who alighted from the motorcycle.

Q: And then, when you alighted from that motorcycle, what did you do?

A: I was just there at the side of the motorcycle.

Q: And, what did this Ahmad do?

A: I approached the driver.

Q: What about Abduhassan, what did he do?

A: Abduhassan, went to the right side of the jeep and I was called by him.

Q: How did he call you?

A: You (sic) said, "you come with me".

Q: Did you approach him?

A: Well, I was following him from behind.

Q: And what happened Mr. Witness?

A: Then, he instructed me to go up immediately in that jeep so that we will not be in trouble.

Q: You went immediately? Okey (sic). Who was the driver of that jeep at that time?

A: When I boarded already the jeep, I saw Ahmad was already in the place of the driver.
xxxx

Q: Okey (sic), from the Air Base, you said, this Abduhassan called you. And voluntarily, you
approached him?

A: I was just behind.

Q: And, he asked you to go inside the vehicle?

A: Yes, I was instructed to go up in fact, he was pushing me.

Q: He just pushed you, no more no less?

A: Yes, I was being pushed.

Q: Did he not poke his gun to you and threatened you to go inside?

A: No. I was just pushed.

Q: He did not also utter any words which threatened you if you will not go with them, Mr. Witness?

A: No, but what he said was just to hurry up in going up that vehicle so that there will be no trouble.

Q: So you just followed his command, you also hurriedly went up inside that jeep?

A: Well, I did not hurry but, I just went up the jeep. And according to him, to avoid trouble. 31

Instead of refuting the version of Oliz, Ali's testimony in fact corroborates its material points. He
admitted that he was with Hassan and Amat when their motorcycle stopped in front of the Nissan
vehicle; and that the three decided to board the vehicle and take control. Ali merely denied his
participation feigning that Hassan coerced him.

This, however, is refuted by the categorical and straightforward testimony of Oliz that it was Ali who
was giving commands to his companions. Thus, he could not have been an unwilling participant as
he was in fact the one calling the shots. Further, even if Ali were to be believed, nothing in his
testimony shows that Hassan exerted such force or coercion or uttered threats that would have
deprived Ali with the free exercise of his will. Absent any showing that Oliz was motivated by ill will to
falsely testify against Ali, her testimony should be granted credence  especially since it was candid,
32

straightforward, and devoid of any material inconsistencies.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The 30 April 2015 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 00473-MIN is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson

(On Official Leave)

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(On Leave)
ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 179080               November 26, 2014

EDIGARDO GEROCHE, ROBERTO GARDE and GENEROSO MARFIL alias

"TAPOL", Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision  dated November 18, 2005 and Resolution  dated June 19, 2007
1 2

of the Court of Appeals (CA) in G.R. CR No. 26418, which set aside the November 15, 2001
Decision  of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17, Kidapawan City, Cotabato.
3

Petitioners Edigardo Geroche, Roberto Garde and Generoso Marfil alias "Tapol" were charged with
the crime of Violation of Domicile under Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).  The
4

Information dated May 3, 1990 reads:

The undersigned accuses EDIGARDO GEROCHE, ROBERTO GARDE AND GENEROSO MARFIL
Alias "TAPOL" of the crime of Violation of Domicile, committed as follows:

That at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening of May 14, 1989, at Sitio New Lantawan, Barangay
Greenhills, Municipality of President Roxas, Province of Cotabato, Philippines, the above-named
accused EDIGARDO GEROCHE, being a Barangay Captain and the rest being CAFGUs, hence,
persons inauthority, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with garand
rifles, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without proper judicial order, entered
the house of ROBERTO MALLO by forcibly breaking the door of said house against the will of the
occupants thereof, search the effects of the house without the previous consent of the owner and
then mauled one of the occupant BARILIANO LIMBAG inflicting injuries to the latter.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 5

During the arraignment on November5, 1990, all the petitioners pleaded not guilty.  Thereafter, trial
6

ensued.

Baleriano Limbag (Baleriano) testified that the crime happened around 10:00 o’clock in the evening
of May 14, 1989 inside the house which he already bought from Roberto Mallo. He roused from
sleep when petitioners, who were not armed with search warrant, suddenly entered the house by
destroying the main door. The petitioners mauled him, striking with a garand rifle, which caused his
injuries. They looked for firearms but instead found and took away his airgun. Roberto Limbag,
Baleriano’s nephew who was living with him, witnessed the whole incident and corroborated his
testimony.
Aside from presenting SPO4 Felomino Calfoforo, the Subpoena and Warrant Officer of President
Roxas Police Station who testified on the police blotter, Dr. Antonio Cabrera also took the witness
stand for the prosecution. Essentially, he affirmed the medical certificate that he issued. His findings
indicated that Baleriano suffered hematoma on the left side of the nose, back portion of the body at
the level of the hip region, and back portion at the right side of the scapular region as well as
abrasion on the right side of the breast and left side of the body at the axilliary region.  Dr. Cabrera
7

opined that the injuries inflicted would heal from seven to ten days.  For the defense, petitioners
8

denied the crime charged, declaring in unison that they were in their respective houses the entire
evening of May 14, 1989. They alleged, however, that the night before, on May 13, 1989, they
conducted a roving footpatrol, together with other barangay officials, due to the rampant cattle
rustling in the area. At the time, they recovered a stolen carabao owned by a certain Francisco
Pongasi  from three unidentified persons who managed to escape.
9

On November 15, 2001, the trial court found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Less Serious Physical Injuries under the Article 265 of the RPC. They were sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of arresto mayor maximum, that is, four (4) months and one (1) day to
six (6) months. According to the RTC, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioners are public
officers, which is an essential element of Article 128 of the RPC. It held:

The prosecution who has that onus probandifailed to prove one of the essential elements of the
crime; on the issue of whether or not all the accused were public officers; while it is true that accused
were named CVO’s and the other as a barangay captain and that even if the same were admitted by
them during their testimony in open court, such an admission is not enough to prove that they were
public officers; it is for the prosecution to prove by clear and convincing evidence other than that of
the testimony of witnesses that they werein fact public officers; there exist a doubt of whether or not
all the accused were in fact and in truth public officers; doubts should be ruled in favorof the
accused; that on this lone and essential element the crime charged as violation of domicile is ruled
out; that degree of moral certainty of the crime charged was not established and proved by
convincing evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt; x x x.  Petitioners elevated the case to the
10

CA, which, on November 18, 2005, set aside the trial court’s judgment. While it agreed with both
parties that petitioners should not be convictedfor Less Serious Physical Injuries, the CA still ruled
that they are guilty of Violation of Domicile considering their judicial admissions that they were
barangay captain (in the case of Geroche) and part of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit
(in the case of Garde and Marfil). The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision states:

WHEREFORE, pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and the evidence on
hand, the appealed decision is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered finding the accused-
petitioners GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Domicile under Article 128
of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing them to an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) Months,
One (1) Day of arresto mayor maximum to Six (6) Months and One (1) Day of prision [correccional]
minimum with the accessory penalty of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a
professionor calling pursuant to Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED. 11

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this petition. They argue that there is
double jeopardy since the trial court already acquitted them of Violation of Domicile and such
judgment, being now final and executory, is res judicata. Petitioners insist that their appeal before
the CA is limited to their conviction for the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries, focusing their
arguments and defense for acquittal from said crime, and that the CA violated their constitutional
right to due process when it convicted them for Violation of Domicile.
We deny.

An appeal in a criminal case opensthe entire case for review on any question including one not
raised by the parties.  When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court,he or she
12

waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the
review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice
dictate.  An appeal confers upon the appellate court jurisdiction to examine the records, revise the
13

judgment appealed from, increase (or reduce) the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal
law.  The appellate court may, and generally does,look into the entire records to ensure that no fact
14

of weight or substance has been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court. 15

Thus, when petitioners appealed the trial court’s judgment of conviction for Less Serious Physical
Injuries, they are deemed to have abandoned their right to invoke the prohibition on doublejeopardy
since it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the assailed
judgment. Petitioners could not have been placed twice in jeopardy when the CA set aside the ruling
of the RTC by finding them guilty of Violation of Domicile as charged in the Information instead of
Less Serious Physical Injuries.

The Court adopts the findings of factand conclusions of law of the CA. In their testimony before the
open court as well as in the pleadings they filed, neither Geroche denied that hewas a barangay
captain nor Garde and Marfil refuted that they were CAFGU members. In holding such positions,
they are considered as public officers/employees. 16

As to the penalty imposed by the CA, however, We modify the same. Under Article 128 of the RPC,
the penalty shall be prision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods (two [2] years, four [4]
months and one [1] day to six [6] years) if Violation of Domicile be committed at nighttime or if any
papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the search
made by the offender. In this case, petitioners barged in the house of Baleriano while they were
sleeping at night and, in addition, they took away with them his airgun.

In imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the RPC, the Indeterminate Sentence
Law  requires courts to impose upon the accused an indeterminate sentence. The maximum term of
17

the prison sentence shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the said Code.  Yet the penalty prescribed by Article 128 of the RPC is
1âwphi1

composed of only two, not three, periods. In which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the
division into three equal portions the time included in the penalty, forming one period of each of the
three portions. Applying the provision, the minimum, medium and maximum periods of the penalty
prescribed by Article 128 are:

Minimum – 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 3 years, 6 months and 20 days

Medium – 3 years, 6 months and 21 days to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days

Maximum – 4 years, 9 months and 11 days to 6 years

Thus, applying in this case, the maximum term should be within the medium period or from 3 years,
6 months and 21 days to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days, in light of the provisions of Article 64 of the
Revised Penal Code that if there are no other mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending the
commission of the crime, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period.
On the other hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the RPC for the crime. The penalty next lower to that prescribed by Article 128 is
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period (or 4 months and
1 day to 2 years and 4 months).

The foregoing considered, in view of the attending circumstances in this case, the Court hereby
sentences the petitioners to suffer the indeterminate penalty from two (2) years and four (4) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to four ( 4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision
correccional, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision dated November 18, 2005 and Resolution dated
June 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 26418 finding petitioners Edigardo
Geroche, Roberto Garde and Generoso Marfil alias "Tapol" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Domicile, penalized under Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code, with the
MODIFICATION that the penalty that should be imposed is an indeterminate sentence from two (2)
years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years, nine (9) months and
ten (10) days of prision correccional, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

 Penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja, with Associate Justices Myrna Dimaranan
1

Vidal and Ricardo R. Rosario concurring; rol/o, pp. 25-36.

2
 Rollo, pp. 38-39.

3
 Penned by Judge Rodolfo M. Serrano (Records, pp. 326-332; id. at 17-23).

 Art. 128. Violation of domicile. - The penalty of pr is ion correccional in its minimum period
4

shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who, not being authorized by judicial
order, shall enter any dwelling against the wilI of the owner thereof, search papers or other
effects found therein without the previous consent of such owner, orhaving surreptitiously
entered said dwelling, and being required to leave the premises, shall refuse to do so.

If the offense be committed in the night-time, or if any papers or effects not

constituting evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the search made
by the offender, the penalty shall be prision correccionalin its medium and maximum
periods.

5
 Records, p. 31.

6
 Id. at 36.

7
 Records, p. 4.

8
 TSN, December 7, 1993, p. 4. (Id. at 140).

9
 Spelled as "Pungasi" is some parts of the Records (Seerecords, pp. 318-319).

10
 Records, p. 331; Rollo, p. 22.

11
 Rollo, pp. 35-36.

12
 People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo Torres, et al., G.R. No. 189850, September 22, 2014.

13
 People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo Torres, et al., G.R. No. 189850, September 22, 2014.

14
 Garces v. People, 554 Phil. 683, 696-697 (2007).

15
 People v. Dela Rosa, G.R. No. 201723, June 13, 2013, 698 SCRA 548, 554.

 The CAFGU was created pursuant to Executive Order No. 264 for the purpose of
16

complementing the operations of the regular force formations in a locality. It was composed
of civilian volunteers who were tasked to maintain peace and order in their localities, as well
as to respond to threats to national security. As such, they were provided with weapons, and
given the authority to detain or order detention of individuals. (See People v. Flores, 410
Phil. 578, 587 [2001]).

 Act No. 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225 and Republic Act No. 4203.
17
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 181440               April 13, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
AIDA MARQUEZ, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For review is the August 29, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00467,
which affirmed with modification the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC) January 21, 2004 Decision2 in
Criminal Case No. 99-106, wherein accused-appellant Aida Marquez (Marquez), also known as Aida
Pulido, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Failure to Return a
Minor as defined and penalized under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 18;3 was sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and was ordered to
pay the offended party Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages and Twenty
Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) as exemplary damages.

On December 28, 1998, Marquez was charged with Kidnapping under Article 270 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 18, before the RTC, Branch 140 of Makati City.4 The
Information reads in part as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of September, 1998, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being entrusted with the custody of a
minor, JUSTINE BERNADETTE C. MERANO, a three (3) month old baby girl, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously deliberately fail to restore the latter to her parent, CAROLINA
CUNANAN y MERANO (sic).5

Marquez pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in her arraignment on October 10, 2002.6 Trial on
the merits followed the termination of the pre-trial conference.

According to the complainant, Carolina Cunanan Merano (Merano), she met Marquez at the beauty
parlor where she was working as a beautician. Merano confessed to easily trusting Marquez
because aside from her observation that Marquez was close to her employers, Marquez was also
nice to her and her co-employees, and was always giving them food and tip.7

On September 6, 1998, after a trip to a beach in Laguna, Marquez allegedly borrowed Merano’s then
three-month old daughter Justine Bernadette C. Merano (Justine) to buy her some clothes, milk and
food. Merano said she agreed because it was not unusual for Marquez to bring Justine some things
whenever she came to the parlor. When Marquez failed to return Justine in the afternoon as
promised, Merano went to her employers’ house to ask them for Marquez’s address. However,
Merano said that her employers just assured her that Justine will be returned to her soon.8
Merano averred that she searched for her daughter but her efforts were unsuccessful until she
received a call from Marquez on November 11, 1998. During that call, Marquez allegedly told
Merano that she will return Justine to Merano the following day and that she was not able to do so
because her own son was sick and was confined at the hospital. Marquez also allegedly asked
Merano for Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) for the expenses that she incurred while Justine was
with her.9 When the supposed return of Justine did not happen, Merano claimed that she went to
Marquez’s house, using the sketch that she got from her employers’ driver, but Marquez was not
home. Upon talking to Marquez’s maid, Merano learned that Justine was there for only a couple of
days. Merano left a note for Marquez telling her that she will file a case against Marquez if Justine is
not returned to her.10

Merano afterwards went to see then Mayor Alfredo Lim to ask for his help. Merano said that Mayor
Lim referred her to Inspector Eleazar of San Pedro, Laguna, who assigned two police officers to
accompany her to Marquez’s house. When Merano did not find Justine in Marquez’s house, she
went back to Inspector Eleazar who told her to come back the following day to confront Marquez
whom he will call. Merano came back the next day as instructed but Marquez did not show up.11

On November 17, 1998, Merano gave her sworn statement to the police and filed a complaint
against Marquez. On February 11, 1999, Marquez allegedly called Merano up again to tell her to
pick up her daughter at Modesto Castillo’s (Castillo) house in Tiaong, Quezon. The following day,
Merano, accompanied by Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Diosdado Fernandez and SPO4 Rapal, went
to the house of Castillo in Quezon. Merano claimed that Castillo told her that Marquez sold Justine
to him and his wife and that they gave Marquez Sixty Thousand Pesos (₱60,000.00) supposedly for
Merano who was asking for money. Castillo even gave Merano a photocopy of the handwritten
"Kasunduan" dated May 17, 1998, wherein Merano purportedly gave Justine to the Castillo
spouses.12 The Castillos asked Merano not to take Justine as they had grown to love her but Merano
refused. However, she was still not able to take Justine home with her because the police advised
her to go through the proper process as the Castillos might fight for their right to retain custody of
Justine.13 Merano then learned from Castillo that in an effort to legalize the adoption of Justine, the
Castillos turned over custody of Justine to the Reception and Study Center for Children of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development.14

To defend herself, Marquez proffered her own version of what had happened during her
testimony.15 Marquez said that she had only formally met Merano on September 6, 1998 although
she had known of her for some time already because Merano worked as a beautician at the beauty
parlor of Marquez’s financier in her real estate business. Marquez alleged that on that day, Merano
offered Justine to her for adoption. Marquez told Merano that she was not interested but she could
refer her to her friend Modesto Castillo (Castillo). That very same night, while Marquez was taking
care of her son who was then confined at the Makati Medical Center, Merano allegedly proceeded to
Marquez’s house in Laguna and left Justine with Marquez’s maid. The following day, while Marquez
was at the hospital again, Castillo, accompanied by his mother, went to Marquez’s house to pick up
Justine. Since Marquez was out, she instructed her maid not to give Justine to Castillo for fear of
possible problems. However, she still found Justine gone upon her return home that evening.
Marquez allegedly learned of the encounter between the Castillos and Merano when a San Pedro
police officer called Marquez to tell her that Merano, accompanied by two police officers, went to
Castillo’s house to get Justine. This was confirmed by Castillo who also called Marquez and told her
that Merano offered Justine to him for adoption.16

SPO2 Fernandez, one of the police officers who accompanied Merano to Castillo’s house in
February 1999, was presented by the defense to prove that he was a witness to the execution of a
document wherein Merano gave up her right to Justine to the Castillo spouses. Fernandez said that
on February 12, 1999, he and SPO4 Rapal accompanied Merano to the house of Castillo where
Justine was allegedly being kept. When they arrived at Castillo’s house, where they found baby
Justine, Merano and Castillo talked and after sometime, they arrived at an agreement regarding
Justine’s adoption. SPO2 Fernandez averred that he, Castillo, Merano and SPO4 Rapal left
Castillo’s house to go to a lawyer near Castillo’s house. After the agreement was put into writing,
they all signed the document, entitled "Kasunduan sa Pagtalikod sa Karapatan at Pagpapa-ampon
sa Isang Anak,"17 with Castillo and Merano as parties to the agreement, and SPO2 Fernandez and
SPO4 Rapal as witnesses. SPO2 Fernandez claimed that he was surprised that Merano gave up
Justine for adoption when they supposedly went there to get Justine back.18

On January 21, 2004, the RTC found Marquez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused AIDA MARQUEZ a.k.a. AIDA
PULIDO, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of KIDNAPPING AND FAILURE TO RETURN
A MINOR under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act. No. 18 and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.

For the Civil aspect, accused is ordered to pay private complainant FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(PHP50,000.00) for moral damage and TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (PHP20,000.00) for
exemplary damage.

Costs against the accused.19

The RTC recounted in detail the factual antecedents of the case and made a comprehensive
synopsis of the testimonies of all the witnesses presented. In finding for the prosecution, the RTC
held that the testimony of the complainant mother, Merano, was enough to convict the accused
Marquez because it was credible and was corroborated by documentary evidence.20

On intermediate appellate review, the Court of Appeals was faced with the lone assignment of error
as follows:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF

KIDNAPPING AND FAILURE TO RETURN A MINOR WHEN THE LATTER’S GUILT WAS NOT
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.21

On August 29, 2007, the Court of Appeals found Marquez’s appeal to be unmeritorious and affirmed
the RTC’s decision with modifications on the damages awarded, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision, dated January 21 2004, of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that
nominal damages of ₱20,000.00 is hereby awarded in addition to the ₱50,000.00 moral damages,
while the award for exemplary damages is accordingly deleted for lack of basis.22

The Court of Appeals, in affirming Marquez’s conviction, relied on the satisfaction of the elements of
the crime as charged. It said that the conflicting versions of the parties’ testimonies did not even
matter as the fact remained that Marquez had, at the very least, constructive custody over Justine
and she failed to return her when demanded to do so.

The accused Marquez is now before us, still praying for a reversal of her conviction on the same
arguments she submitted to the Court of Appeals.23
After a painstaking scrutiny of the entire records of this case, this Court finds no reason to reverse
the courts below.

Marquez argues that her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because the elements
constituting the crime of serious illegal detention or kidnapping are not present in this case.24

The crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention falls under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, viz:

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private individual who shall kidnap or
detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of
the parents, female or a public officer.

Marquez further contends that it is illogical for her to voluntarily divulge to Merano the whereabouts
of Justine, even recommending the assistance of police officers, if she were indeed guilty of
kidnapping.

Accused is mistaken, if not misled, in her understanding and appreciation of the crime she was
charged with and eventually convicted of.

A reading of the charge in the information shows that the act imputed to Marquez was not the illegal
detention of a person, but involves her deliberate failure to restore a minor baby girl to her parent
after being entrusted with said baby’s custody.

Contrary to Marquez’s assertions, therefore, she was charged with violation of Article 270, and not
Article 267, of the Revised Penal Code.

The Revised Penal Code considers it a crime when a person who has been entrusted with the
custody of a minor later on deliberately fails to return said minor to his parent or guardian. This may
be found in Article 270, which reads:

Art. 270. Kidnapping and failure to return a minor. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon any person who, being entrusted with the custody of a minor person, shall
deliberately fail to restore the latter to his parents or guardians.25

This crime has two essential elements:

1. The offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person; and

2. The offender deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or guardians.26
This Court, in elucidating on the elements of Article 270, stated that while one of the essential
elements of this crime is that the offender was entrusted with the custody of the minor, what is
actually being punished is not the kidnapping but the deliberate failure of that person to restore the
minor to his parents or guardians.27 As the penalty for such an offense is so severe, the Court further
explained what "deliberate" as used in Article 270 means:

Indeed, the word deliberate as used in Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code must imply something
more than mere negligence - it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally
and maliciously wrong.28 (Emphasis ours.)

It is clear from the records of the case that Marquez was entrusted with the custody of Justine.
Whether this is due to Merano’s version of Marquez borrowing Justine for the day, or due to
Marquez’s version that Merano left Justine at her house, it is undeniable that in both versions,
Marquez agreed to the arrangement, i.e., to temporarily take custody of Justine. It does not matter,
for the first element to be present, how long said custody lasted as it cannot be denied that Marquez
was the one entrusted with the custody of the minor Justine. Thus, the first element of the crime is
satisfied.

As to the second element, neither party disputes that on September 6, 1998, the custody of Justine
was transferred or entrusted to Marquez. Whether this lasted for months or only for a couple of days,
the fact remains that Marquez had, at one point in time, physical and actual custody of Justine.
Marquez’s deliberate failure to return Justine, a minor at that time, when demanded to do so by the
latter’s mother, shows that the second element is likewise undoubtedly present in this case.

Marquez’s insistence on Merano’s alleged desire and intention to have Justine adopted cannot
exonerate her because it has no bearing on her deliberate failure to return Justine to Merano. If it
were true that Marquez merely facilitated Justine’s adoption, then there was no more need for
Merano to contact Marquez and vice-versa, since Merano, as Marquez claimed, had direct access to
Castillo. The evidence shows, however, that Merano desperately searched for a way to
communicate with Marquez. As testified to by both Merano and Marquez, Marquez frequented the
beauty parlor where Merano worked in, and yet, curiously, Marquez was nowhere to be found after
September 6, 1998. It took Marquez more than two months before communicating with Merano
again, after she supposedly facilitated the adoption of Justine. If Marquez were indeed surprised to
learn about the charges against her, she would have made every effort to clear her name when she
found out that there was a standing warrant for her arrest. She would have immediately contacted
either Merano or Castillo to confront them on why she was being implicated in their arrangement.
Finally, even if it were true that Merano subsequently agreed to have Castillo adopt Justine, as
evidenced by the "Kasunduan sa Pagtalikod sa Karapatan at Pagpapa-ampon sa Isang Anak," this
would still not affect Marquez’s liability as the crime of kidnapping and failure to return the minor had
been fully consummated upon her deliberate failure to return Justine to Merano.

Marquez avers that the prosecution’s "evidence has fallen short of the quantum of proof required for
conviction" and that it has "failed to establish [her] guilt with moral certainty."29 Marquez argues that
her testimony was not only straightforward and consistent but also corroborated by a duly respected
police officer. She insists that Merano’s testimony should not be believed as the only reason Merano
filed this charge was because she failed to get the money she demanded from Marquez.30

This Court is constrained to once again reiterate the time-honored maxim that the trial court’s
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to the highest respect.31 In People v. Bondoc,32 a
case also involving the accused’s failure to return a minor, we explained the rationale of this maxim:
We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court. The issue involved in this appeal is
one of credibility, and this Court has invariably ruled that the matter of assigning values to the
testimony of witnesses is best performed by the trial courts because they, unlike appellate courts,
can weigh the testimony of witnesses in the light of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the
witnesses at the trial, except when circumstances of weight or influence were ignored or disregarded
by them which does not obtain in the present case.

Unless there is a showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact
or circumstance of weight that would have affected the result of the case, this Court will not disturb
factual findings of the lower court. Having had the opportunity of observing the demeanor and
behavior of witnesses while testifying, the trial court more than this Court is in a better position to
gauge their credibility and properly appreciate the relative weight of the often conflicting evidence for
both parties. When the issue is one of credibility, the trial court's findings are given great weight on
appeal.33 (Emphases ours.)

The RTC, in finding Merano credible, stated:

Between the two conflicting allegations, the Court, after taking into account all the testimonies and
evidences presented by the prosecution and the defense, finds for the prosecution. The lone
testimony of the complainant inspired credibility and was corroborated by the documents, to wit, she
is the mother of the child and she searched for her child when accused failed to return her baby, filed
this complaint when she failed to get her child and she was able to recover the child from the DSWD
at its Reception and Study Center for Children (RSCC) as evidenced by the Discharge Slip after
accused informed her that the child was with Modesto Castillo. If indeed the complainant had given
up or have sold her baby, she would not have exhausted all efforts possible to find her baby.
Further, the child would not have been in RSCC but it would have been with Modesto Castillo as per
the document allegedly executed by Complainant. The testimony of the complainant was
straightforward and devoid of any substantial inconsistencies.34

The RTC found Marquez’s defense of denial to be weak. It also outlined the inconsistencies in
Marquez’s testimonies which further destroyed her credibility.

The manner of appreciating the defense of denial was discussed by this Court in this wise:

As to the defense of denial, the same is inherently weak. Denial is a self-serving negative evidence,
which cannot be given greater weight than that of the declaration of a credible witness who testifies
on affirmative matters. Like alibi, denial is an inherently weak defense, which cannot prevail over the
positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Denial cannot prevail over the
positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any ill motive to testify
against petitioner.35

Merano’s credibility has been established by the trial court, to which the Court of Appeals agreed.
This Court finds no reason to depart from these findings, especially since it was the trial court which
had the opportunity to evaluate and assess the credibility of the witnesses presented before it. Both
courts found Merano’s testimony to be straightforward and consistent. Thus, Marquez’s denial and
inconsistent statements cannot prevail over Merano’s positive and credible testimony.

Anent Marquez’s claim that SPO2 Fernandez’s testimony corroborated hers, a perusal of the
transcript of SPO2 Fernandez’s testimony will reveal that its focus was mainly on how the agreement
on Justine’s adoption came to be. The fact that SPO2 Fernandez may have corroborated Marquez’s
defense of adoption by testifying that he witnessed how Merano gave up her child for adoption to
Castillo is irrelevant. As we have discussed above, the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a
minor had been fully consummated way before the execution of the agreement in February 1999,
the validity of which is not in issue before us now. Moreover, even if Merano had indeed given up
Justine to Castillo on February 12, 1999, Merano’s consent to have Justine adopted in 1999 has no
impact on her demand to regain custody of Justine in 1998. 1avvphi1

In People v. Bernardo,36 we held that the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor under
Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code is clearly analogous to illegal and arbitrary detention or arrest,
thereby justifying the award of moral damages.

The award of nominal damages is also allowed under Article 2221 of the New Civil Code which
states that:

Article 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.

It took Merano almost a year to legally recover her baby. Justine was only three months old when
this whole debacle began. She was already nine months old when Merano saw her again. She spent
her first birthday at the Reception and Study Center for Children of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development.37 Evidently, Merano’s right as a parent which was violated and invaded must be
vindicated and recognized, thereby justifying the award of nominal damages.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 29, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR. HC No.
00467 finding Aida Marquez GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of KIDNAPPING AND
FAILURE TO RETURN A MINOR under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby
AFFIRMED. No Costs.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 4-18; penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam with Associate Justices Martin
S. Villarama, Jr. (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) and Sesinado E. Villon,
concurring.

2
 CA rollo, pp. 15-27; penned by Judge Leticia P. Morales.

 An Act to Amend Articles Sixty-Two, Two Hundred and Sixty-Seven, Two Hundred and
3

Sixty-Eight, Two Hundred and Seventy, Two Hundred and Seventy-One, Two Hundred and
Ninety-Four, and Two Hundred and Ninety-Nine of the Revised Penal Code. Approved on
September 25, 1946.

4
 This case was originally raffled to Branch 62. Upon the parties’ joint manifestation that the
alleged kidnapped victim was a minor, the court ordered the transfer and reraffle of the case
to the appropriate Family Court. Records, p. 26.