Nature of the right to appeal

PROBLEM: Petitioner Editha was a lessee of a riceland in Roxas City and paying rent to the
heirs of Rosario. Editha met with the respondents who purchased the lots from the heirs of
Rosario at the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Roxas City. Asserting she had
legal right to redeem the property, Editha filed a complaint for redemption before the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) but dismissed after she failed to consign the full amount
of the repurchase price. DARAB affirmed the PARAD’s decision in toto.  Editha then filed
before the CA a motion for 15 days extension to file a Rule 43 petition for review. Editha’s new
counsel moved for an extension of 30 days to file the petition for review but dismissed for
having been filed out of time as CA was devoid of authority to grant her second motion of
extension. Editha filed for an MR but likewise denied. Editha comes before the SC via Rule 65
Petitioner for certiorari. Whether Editha used the proper mode of appeal.

ANSWER: No. The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the CA is a petition for
review under Rule 45; and such is not similar to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. Rule 45 provides that final orders or resolutions of the CA in any case, i.e.,
regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to this Court by
filing a petition for review, which in essence is a continuation of the appellate process over the
original case. Certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter
remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence. Adoption of an improper remedy
already warrants outright dismissal of this petition. (Albor vs. CA, G.R. No. 196598, January
17, 2018)

Period to appeal

PROBLEM:
Petitioner Filmeno Gonzales filed an ejectment suit against respondent Quirino Gonzales before
MTC QC Br. 35. During the pendency of the case, respondent passed away and was substituted
by his wife, Eufemia Gonzales. 
Respondent moved for the suspension of the proceedings on the ground that she instituted a case
for an annulment of title against petitioner before RTC QC Br. 84. MTC denied such motion and
submitted the case for decision. MTC ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered the respondent to
vacate the property and pay for the rentals. 
Respondent appealed before the RTC and was ordered by the latter to submit a memorandum
discussing the errors of the MTC. However, instead of filing a memorandum of appeal, she
moved for the consolidation of such case with the annulment of title she filed before the RTC
QC Br. 84. RTC denied the motion for consolidation for lack of merit and ordered the issuance
of writ of execution for the judgment of the MTC. 
RTC directed the dismissal of respondent’s appeal for failing to file the necessary memorandum
of appeal. Respondent then filed an Omnibus Urgent Motion for Reconsideration praying that the
counsel be allowed to submit required appeal memorandum or adopt the respondent’s position in
the memorandum filed before the MTC. RTC denied the motion for lack of merit and for being
dilatory. Still, she filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Honorable Court
praying for the reconsideration of her Omnibus Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. RTC
likewise denied the same for lack of merit and for being in the nature of a second motion for
reconsideration, which is a prohibited pleading. 
Respondent then filed a petition for review on certiorari before the CA. CA partially granted the
petition and reversed its order.  Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was
subsequently denied by the CA. Hence, this petition. 
Whether CA erred in reversing and setting aside the RTC order dismissing the respondent’s
appeal for failure to file the necessary memorandum of appeal.

ANSWER:
YES, CA erred in granting such petition filed by the respondent. As provided in Section 7(b) of
Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, failure of the appellant to file a memorandum shall be a ground
for dismissal of appeal. Hence, it was obligatory on the part of the respondent to submit or file a
memorandum of appeal within 15 days from receipt of order enjoining the filing of said
pleading. Even though there is no prohibition to the adoption of a party’s position paper earlier
filed, such option must be manifested during the period within which to file the required
memorandum of appeal. In the case at bar, respondent failed to file such memorandum of appeal
within the allotted period. Respondent’s manifestation of adopting her position paper in the MTC
only came about after the dismissal of the appeal had already been ordered. Hence, RTC did not
err in dismissing the respondent’s appeal. (Gonzales vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 151376)

Fresh Period Rule

DOMINGO NEYPES, et. al. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 141524)

PROBLEM:
Petitioners Neypes et.al. filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or 
reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the Bureau of
Forest Development Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo
del Mundo. In the course of the proceedings, petitioners filed a motion to declare respondents’ in
default, and the latter filed a motion to dismiss.

The trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint and motion for reconsideration on the ground
that the action had already prescribed. Five days later, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and
paid the appeal fees. However, the court denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed
eight days late. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was also denied. Petitioners assailed the
dismissal of the notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals wherein they argued that the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they
received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they
filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well
within the reglementary period for appeal. However, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that
the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned the day they received the order
dismissing their complaint which is February 12,1998. 

What should be deemed as the final order, receipt of which triggers the start of the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July
1, 1998 order dismissing the MR? Did the petitioners filed their notice of appeal in time? 

ANSWER

The Supreme Court ruled that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of
dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order. The Court sustains petitioners view
that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final order
contemplated in the Rules. 

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to
file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a
new trial or motion for reconsideration. 

Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, five days from receipt of the order
denying their motion for reconsideration. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh
appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed. Thus, petitioners seasonably filed their notice of
appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998, the date of receipt of
notice denying their motion for reconsideration.

Thus a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the RTC
decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the final order denying his motion for new trial
or motion for reconsideration. The new 15-day period  may be availed of only if either motion is
filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal
period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.

Requisites of summary judgment

PROBLEM: The petitioner was convicted for Unfair Competition thus he filed a motion for
reconsideration before the RTC on the 15th day or the last day of the reglementary period to
appeal. The RTC denied his motion for reconsideration which prompted him to file his Notice of
Appeal. However, his Notice of Appeal was denied on the ground of its being filed out of time
under Sec. 6, Rule 122, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The petitioner now asserts the
applicability of the “fresh period rule” (Neypes rule) under Rules 42, 43 and 45. (NO)

ANSWER: No, the Court held that the “fresh period rule”, as laid down in Neypes vs. CA, is not
applicable to Rules 42, 43 and 45.
The fresh period rule in Neypes need not apply to Rules 42, 43 and 45 as there is no interruption
in the 15-day reglementary period to appeal. It is explicit in Rules 42, 43 and 45 that the
appellant or petitioner is accorded a fresh period of 15 days from the notice of the decision,
award, judgment, final order or resolution or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed. (Rodriguez vs. People, G.R. No. 192799)

REMEDY ON DENIAL ON MOTION TO INTERVENE

PROBLEM:
VRC acquired several properties at a public auction held by the Municipal Treasurer of
Paranaque. RTC Makati ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel transfer certificates of title,
including TCT No. 435402, and to issue new titles in the name of VRC. Spouses Galang
purchased the Property from VRC through a Deed of Absolute Sale. 
Romeo Galang came home from Saudi Arabia and discovered a hollow block fence along the
perimeter of the Property; Gallego built the fence. Spouses Galang brought the matter to the
Barangay Lupon for possible settlement, but Gallego failed to appear at the barangay hall and
instead sent his lawyer. Spouses Galang filed a complaint for Quieting of Title with Damages
against Gallego. The case was raffled to the RTC Makati. 
Gallego failed to appear at the pre-trial conference and to submit his pre-trial brief, RTC issued
an order declaring Gallego in default and allowing the Spouses Galang to present their
evidence ex parte. RTC-Branch denied Gallegos motion but granted petitioners motion and
admitted the answer-in-intervention.
RTC-Branch set a pre-trial conference between the Spouses Galang and petitioner. However, the
pre-trial did not push through because petitioner filed a motion to admit third-party complaint,
which RTC granted. Summonses were issued on third-party defendant VRC, as well on the
Municipality Treasurer, and Register of Deeds of Paranaque. VRC failed to file an answer to the
third-party complaint. 
Gallego and petitioner jointly filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals praying to
annul the order. The appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a
motion to inhibit Judge Abad Santos who granted the motion and inhibited himself. The case was
re-raffled to the RTC Makati. The trial court eventually decided the original case in favor of the
Spouses Galang and denied petitioners intervention and third-party complaint. Whether the RTC
gravely erred in not ruling that the answer-in-intervention is a direct attack, not collateral, on the
title of spouses Galang.

ANSWER:
The court has on occasion held that an order denying a motion for intervention is appealable
Where the lower court’s denial of a motion for intervention amounts to a final order, an appeal
is the proper remedy, as when the denial leaves the intervenor without further remedy or
resort to judicial relief.
The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of
the court hearing the case. This discretion, once exercised, is not reviewable
by certiorari or mandamus save in instances where such discretion is exercised in an arbitrary or
capricious manner. Petitioner has not shown that the trial court acted capriciously or arbitrarily.
That the trial court initially allowed petitioner to intervene but subsequently reconsidered and
withdrew its permission does not prove, by itself, that the trial court acted in a manner
warranting review. This is certainly not the first time a trial court initially allowed a motion for
intervention and later reconsidered and denied it. A prospective intervenor’s right to appeal
applies only to the denial of his intervention. Not being a party to the case, a person whose
intervention the court denied has no standing to question the decision of the court. (Foster
Gallego v.  Sps.  Galang, G.R. No. 130228, July 27, 2004)

TOPIC: MULTIPLE APPEALS

PROBLEM: The RTC of Cebu decreed legal separation between Aida and respondent Gabriel on
the ground of Sexual Infidelity. Dissolution of conjugal property and division of net conjugal
assets forfeiture of Gabriel’s half share in the net assets in favor of common children, payment of
attorney’s fees, and surrender of a Mazda car and a small residential house to petitioner and
common children 15 days from receipt of decision was also decreed by the same court.
Respondent appealed. Aida filed a motion for execution pending appeal. The RTC gave due
course to execution pending appeal and issued a writ of execution commanding the sheriff to
order the respondent to vacate the house and surrender the Mazda car. It also ordered the
petitioner to post bond to answer for all damages that respondents may suffer. The CA set aside
the judgment. Upon motion, Aida prayed that she and her children be allowed to occupy the
house for she did not have the chance to occupy it besides, she posted a bond for damages that
respondent may suffer. Respondent argued that Aida chose not to live in the house for she owned
two houses in the United States where she resides. Whether or not multiple appeals are allowed
in the action for legal separation?
ANSWER: No, the issues involved in the legal separation case will necessarily relate to the same
marital relationship between the parties. The effects of legal separation, such as entitlement to
live separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute community or conjugal partnership,
and custody of the minor children, follow from the decree of legal separation. They are not
separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by the court and become final prior to or apart
from the decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere incidents of legal separation. Thus,
they may not be subject to multiple appeals. (Banez vs Banez, G.R. No. 132592, January 23,
2002)

Note: Mr. Beadle what was assigned to me was Mendoza vs Bautista however the GR
Number herein provided also embodied a different case (GR no. 155810, August 13, 2004,
Sumipat vs Banga). I don’t know which one is prevailing, is it the case title of the case or
the GR no., so I just included both cases. Thank you 

G.R. NO. 143666. March 18, 2005

SOLEDAD MENDOZA vs.PURITA BAUTISTA

PROBLEM: Petitioners concede that they did not specifically raise the applicability of P.D. No.
1517 in the assignment of errors in their appeal brief, but nonetheless insist that the Court of
Appeals is accorded a broad discretionary power to waive the lack of assignment of errors and
consider plain errors. They argue that respondent has no cause of action against them. She did
not allege in her complaint that the property is within an area proclaimed both as an Area of
Priority Development (APD) and an Urban Land Reform Zone (ULRZ), much less did she prove
them, to warrant the application of P.D. No. 1517. They posit that respondent's lack of cause of
action cannot be cured by their failure to assign it as error on appeal because granting respondent
the right of first refusal under P.D. No. 1517, when she is not entitled thereto, will deny
petitioners substantial justice.

In her Comment, respondent maintains that petitioners' appeal did not contest the substance of
the trial court's decision but merely assailed procedural errors long settled by this Court.
Respondent contends that petitioners' argument on the non-applicability of P.D. No. 1517 is a
matter of defense which must be pleaded in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, otherwise it is
deemed waived under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. Whether or not higher court may
can entertain matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below,
but ventilated for the first time only in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal?

ANSWER: As a rule, no issue may be raised on appeal unless it has been brought before the
lower tribunal for its consideration. Higher courts are precluded from entertaining matters neither
alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below, but ventilated for the first time
only in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal.

However, as with most procedural rules, this maxim is subject to exceptions. Indeed, our rules
recognize the broad discretionary power of an appellate court to waive the lack of proper
assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned.

Thus, an appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not
assigned as errors in the appeal in these instances: (a) grounds not assigned as errors but
affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are
evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (c) matters not assigned as errors
on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete
resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice;
(d) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are
matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or
which the lower court ignored; (e) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to
an error assigned; and (f) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the
determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent.

G.R. No. 155810   August 13, 2004

LYDIA SUMIPAT vs. BRIGIDO BANGA

PROBLEM: Parenthetically, as Placida’s Complaint is entitled Declaration of Nullity of Titles;

Contracts; Partition, Recovery of Ownership and Possession; Reconveyance; Accounting and
Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Receivership, the validity of the deed was
directly assailed, but its absolute nullity was not specifically raised as an issue. Nevertheless,
both the RTC and the appellate court took the cue from Placida’s theory that the deed is merely
voidable as regards her conjugal share of the properties. However, since the real issue is whether
the questioned deed has validly transferred ownership of the litigated properties, it is appropriate
for the Court to inquire into the form of the deed and the existence of valid consent thereto to
ascertain the validity or nullity of the deed. Whether or not the appellate court may consider even
errors not assigned?

ANSWER: Conformably, we have ruled in a number of cases that an appellate court is accorded
broad discretionary power to consider even errors not assigned. We have applied this tenet, albeit
as a matter of exception, in the following instances: (1) grounds not assigned as errors but
affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are
evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (3) matters not assigned as errors
on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete
resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice;
(4) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are
matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or
which the lower court ignored; (5) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to
an error assigned; and (6) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the
determination of a question properly assigned is dependent.

PROBLEM: Petitioner Sarmiento filed an ejectment case against respondent Zaratan, in the
MeTC. The MeTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. Respondent filed her notice of
appeal. The RTC directed respondent to submit her memorandum in accordance with the
provisions of Section 7(b) of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court and petitioner to file a reply
memorandum within 15 days from receipt. Respondent’s counsel had until 3 June 2003 within
which to file the requisite memorandum. But on 3 June 2003, he filed a “Motion for Extension
of Time” of five days due to his failure to finish the draft of the said Memorandum. He cited as
reasons for the delay of filing his illness for one week, lack of staff to do the work due to storm
and flood. On 9 June 2003, respondent filed her Memorandum, however, the RTC dismissed the
appeal as the memorandum was filed beyond the reglementary period.

The Motion for reconsideration was hinged on the "Motion for Extension of Time to File
Memorandum", an argument without merit. The trial court did not take cognizance of defendant-
appellant's "Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum," and rightly so, because it did
not contain a notice of hearing as required by Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, an
omission for which it could offer no explanation. Petitioner avers that, because of the failure of
respondent to include a Notice of Hearing in her Motion for Extension of Time to file
Memorandum on Appeal in the RTC, the latter’s motion is a worthless piece of paper with no
legal effect.Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals, by which the latter
nullified and set aside Orders of the RTC and ordered the reinstatement of respondent’s appeal
which is the "Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum". Aggrieved petitioner
appealed to the SC with the issue: Whether the lack of notice of hearing in the Motion for
Extension of Time to file Memorandum on Appeal is fatal, such that the filing of the motion is a
worthless piece of paper?
ANSWER: No. As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist
the relief sought by the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his right be not
affected without an opportunity to be heard. The three-day notice required by law is intended not
for the benefit of the movant but to avoid surprises upon the adverse party and to give the latter
time to study and meet the arguments of the motion. Principles of natural justice demand that the
right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard. The test is the
presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and
meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. Considering the
circumstances of the present case, we believe that procedural due process was substantially
complied with.

There are, indeed, reasons which would warrant the suspension of the Rules: (a) the existence of
special or compelling circumstances, b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of rules, (d) a lack of
any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will
not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. Elements or circumstances (c), (d) and (e) exist in the present
case. (Sarmiento vs. Zaratan, G.R. No. 167471. February 5, 2007)

Samson vs. Sps. Gabor, June 23, 2014

PROBLEM: Respondent spouses Gabor executed a Deed of Assignment transferring undivided
portion of the aforementioned parcel of land situated in Tanay Rizal in favor of petitioner
Samson as attorney’s fees. Samson executed a Deed of Assignment transferring the same
undivided portion in favor of Ramos. Upon learning of the sale, Spouses Gabor filed an action
for legal redemption with the RTC of Tanay Rizal where the RTC dismissed the suit but CA
reversed the decision and upheld the legal right of redemption by the spouses. No appeal was
pursued thereafter.
Samson filed with the RTC of Morong Rizal a Partition of Real Property and Damages, which
was dismissed the same on the ground that the finality of a previous judgment effectively barred
the action for partition.
Samson again filed a Complaint before the RTC of Pasig City for Recovery of Property or its
Value which was then again dismissed on the grounds of improper venue, res judicata, and that
the complaint states no cause of action. On appeal, CA likewise dismissed the case. Whether the
complaint is barred by res judicata?
ANSWER: Yes. The test often used in determining whether causes of action are identical is to
ascertain whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second action would have
been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first, even if the forms or nature of the two actions
be different. While the two cases are captioned differently, petitioner cannot claim that there is
no res judicata by simply changing the title of the action from "Complaint for Partition of Real
Property and Damages" to a "Complaint for Recovery of Property or its Value." The records
clearly reveal that the evidence submitted by the parties in both cases are identical.
The foundation principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought not to
be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that when a right or fact has been
judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains
unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or
estate.

Guzman vs. Guzman, G.R. No. 172588, Rule 41

PROBLEM: Petitioner Isabel filed with the MTC of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan a complaint for
ejectment against her children.  
Isabel alleged that she owned the portions of land, under a valid TCT. The respondents occupied
the land by tolerance; they did not comply with her written demand to vacate the property; and
Brgy. Conciliation failed to settle their differences.
They insist that Isabel transferred her property rights except her usufructuary rights. And that she
committed forum shopping. MTC ruled in favor of Isabel. RTC reversed the decision. 
Isabel resorted to filing of It resulted to subsequent filing of motion for reconsideration for three
(3) times. It was all denied by the RTC.  She filed a Rule 65 petition with the CA. It was
dismissed by the CA. Is the CA correct in dismissing the petition?  
ANSWER: Yes. Under Rule 41 of the Rules of court. Subjects for appeal may be taken from a
judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein
when declared by these Rules to be appealable. However, No appeal may be taken from an order
denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration. Thus, CA correctly dismissed petition.

Land bank vs. CA, G.R. No. 190660

PROBLEM: Elizabeth Diaz was the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land measuring
approximately 15 hectares, situated in San Ricardo, Talavera, Nueva Ecija and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 197132. 10 hectares of the land were expropriated by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order
No. 228. DAR valued the expropriated land (the land) at ₱54,880.59 plus increment of
₱143,041.59 or a total of ₱197,922.18. 
On November 28, not satisfied with the valuation, Elizabeth, through her attorney-in-fact
Francisca P. De Guzman, filed a complaint against the LBP and RTC before the TC of Guimba,
Nueva Ecija, Branch 33, acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC). Complaint – prayed that just
compensation be fixed at P350,000 per hectare for a total of P5,250,000.
June 21, 2006, the SAC, adopted the DAR’s valuation. It held that the given formula used in
Gabatin vs. LBP, the Commissioner's Report and the FMV of the land cannot be considered in
the valuation.
Elizabeth’s motion for reconsideration was denied by Order dated August 31, 2006. She elevated
the case to the CA. Land Bank and the DAR failed to file their appellees’ brief.
Land Bank filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Defendant-Appellee[’s] Motion to Dismiss
Appeal, maintaining that the appeal should be dismissed because an ordinary appeal is the wrong
remedy, the proper mode being by way of a petition for review, citing Section 60 of Republic
Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
LBP concluded that the appellate court had no jurisdiction over the case, the SAC decision
having attained finality following Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon which held that
failure of a party to file the proper remedy within fifteen days from receipt of notice of the
assailed decision renders it final.
June 2, 2009, the appellate court denied Land Bank’s motion to dismiss. It faulted Land Bank for
not filing an appellee’s brief as directed, and for filing the motion to dismiss the appeal after the
lapse of 157 days from the last day for filing the brief. Should the respondent’s appeal be
dismissed?
ANSWER: Yes. In the case of Land Bank vs Deleon, the proper mode of appeal from the
decisions of the RTC sittings as SACs is by petition for review under Rule 42 and not through an
ordinary appeal under Rule 41. 
The Court, in the immediately cited case of Land Bank, observing that “before the instant case
reached us, Land Bank of the Philippines had no authoritative guideline on how to appeal
decisions of SACs considering the seemingly conflicting provisions of Sections 60 and 61 of RA
6657,” held that “Sec. 60 of RA 6657 clearly and categorically states that the said mode of
appeal (petition for review) should be adopted.” (Land bank vs. CA, G.R. No. 190660)

Rule 65 
Problem: Aricayos alleged in a complaint for illegal dismissal that he worked as Operations
Manager of St. Martin Funeral Home. However, there was no contract of employment executed
between him and St. Martin nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll.
Subsequently, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000
which was intended for payment by St. Martin of its V.A.T. to the B.I.R.
The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of St. Martin. However, the NLRC set aside the questioned
decision and remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter. St. Martin filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC. Thereafter, St. Martin filed a petition for certiorari
before the Supreme Court alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. Whether
or not a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper vehicle for judicial review by
the Supreme Court of decisions of the NLRC.
Answer: Under the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals from the decision of
the NLRC. Nonetheless, there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such
agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute.
The remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition
for any further or subsequent remedy, and then seasonably avail of the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65, a special original action limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues,
that is, lack or excess of jurisdiction and, in almost all cases that have been brought to SC, grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, for which the reglementary period fixed
was 60 days from notice of the decision. Curiously, although the 10-day period for finality of the
decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated in Labor Code, the Supreme
Court may still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due process
considerations if filed within the reglementary period under Rule 65.
SC held that all supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and
declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such
petitions should be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on
the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired. (G.R. No. 130866; ST.
MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, vs. NLRC and BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS)

DE LIMA v. CITY OF MANILA

Quasi-judicial in nature

PROBLEM: The City Council of Manila passed Ordinance No. 8331, entitled “An Ordinance
Enacting the 2013 Omnibus Revenue Code of the City of Manila.” The said ordinance took
effect on December 9, 2013, after due publication in two newspapers of general circulation Per
the petitioner's Order dated February 3, 2014, the respondent filed its Comment, whereby it
submits that Ordinance No. 8331 was enacted in compliance with the procedural requirements
under the law and therefore has in its favor the presumption of validity. Moreover, the
respondent argued that its imposition of retail tax under the Ordinance is a valid exercise of its
power to impose rates that are within the limits provided for under Section 143(d), and as such,
must be sustained.

On April 7, 2014, the petitioner issued a Resolution declaring Section 104 of Ordinance No.
8331 void for being contrary to Section 191 of the LGC. In the case of the respondent, the
petitioner found that it has elected to exercise such power when it enacted Ordinance No. 7794 in
1993 and its amendment passed two months thereafter - Ordinance No. 7807. In this light, the
petitioner ratiocinated that any further amendment of the tax rates through the enactment of a
new revenue ordinance would have to comply with the 10% maximum ceiling of increase under
the LGC. The petitioner adjudged that the adjustment of tax rates from Ordinance Nos. 7794 and
7807 to Ordinance No. 8331 violate the said ceiling and as such are invalid.

The respondent filed a Petition for Review Ad Cautelam before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila on May 15, 2014. On May 19, 2014, the RTC issued an Order treating the Petition for
Review Ad Cautelam as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. After the
parties filed their respective Comment and Reply, the RTC rendered its Decision on July 25,
2014, dismissing the petition. Did the CA erred in ruling that the RTC has the jurisdiction to
resolve an appeal from the resolution of the Secretary of Justice.

ANSWER: Yes. While respondent’s resort to the remedy of certiorari is proper the same has
been erroneously lodged before the RTC instead of the CA. Preliminarily, it must be stated that
although denominated as “Petition for Review Ad Cautelam” the allegations and grounds raised
in the pleading filed by the respondent before the RTC shows that it is in the nature of a special
civil action for certiorari. The determination by the petitioner of the constitutionality or legality
of the subject ordinance involves an exercise of quasi-judicial power that is the proper subject of
a Special Civil Action for Certiorari cognizable by the CA and not by the RTC. (De Lima vs.
City of Manila, 883 SCRA 618, G.R. No. 222886 October 17, 2018)

Basiana Mining vs. Sec of DENR, March 7, 2016 

RULE 43
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies bars recourse to the courts at the very first instance

PROBLEM: Petitioner BMEC, headed by its President Basiana, applied for a Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) with the DENR for the extraction of nickel and other
minerals covering an area of 6,642 hectares in Tubay and Jabonga, Agusan del Norte, docketed
as MPSA (XIII)-00014. Basiana and SRMI executed a Memorandum of Agreement where SRMI
agreed, among others, to undertake technical and geological tests, exploration and small-scale
mining operations of the site subject of MPSA (XIII)-00014.9 Necessary permits and certificates
were then issued by the DENR and the Provincial Government of Agusan del Norte to SRMI,
San R Construction Corporation (San R) and Galeo Equipment Corporation (Galeo) After
sometime, DENR Secretary issued a cease and desist order against the mining operations due to
excess in annual production, maximum capitalization and labor cost to equipment utilization.
The Minerals Development Council, also advised SRMI, San R and Galeo to immediately stop
all mining activities in Tubay, which were conducted under the pretext of small-scale mining.
Basiana then filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City for rescission of
contract, abuse of rights and damages against SRMI. Subsequently, the Director of the Mines
and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), recommended the approval of APSA-000014-XIII filed by
SRMI. Thus, BMEC and Basiana filed with the MGB Panel of Arbitrators (MGB-POA) a
petition to deny and/or disapprove and/or declare the nullity of the application for MPSA and/or
cancellation, revocation and termination of MPSA.15 Pending resolution of the protest before the
MGB-POA, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DENR Secretary entered into
MPSA No. 261-2008-XIII with SRMI for the development and commercial utilization of nickel,
cobalt, iron and other associated mineral deposits in the 572.64-ha area in Tubay, Agusan del
Norte.

Hence, the petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA assailing the issuance of MPSA No.
261-2008-XIII. The CA initially granted the petition and declared MPSA No. 261-2008-XIII null
and void. According to the CA, MPSA No. 261-2008-XIII should be stricken down for the
reasons that the DENR Secretary has no authority and jurisdiction to approve SRMI's application
pending resolution by the MGB-POA of the petitioners' protest. The CA also found that the
petitioners adopted the wrong mode of appeal when it filed a petition for review before it. SRMI
filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA decision, which was granted by the CA. CA
Amended Decision ruling that the petition for review was premature due to the absence of any
decision or resolution rendered by a competent body exercising a quasi-judicial function and the
petitioners should have exhausted all administrative remedies available before it filed the petition
for review. W/N the immediate recourse of the Petitioners to the CA was correct?

ANSWER: NO. First, the act of the DENR Secretary in approving SRMI's application and
entering into MPSA No. 261-2008-XIII is not an exercise of its quasi-judicial power; hence, it
cannot be reviewed by the CA, whether by a petition for review under Rule 43 or a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, even assuming, for the sake
of argument, that recourse to the courts may be had by the petitioners, the circumstances of this
case do not warrant its intervention at this point for the following reasons:

For one, in their petition for review filed with the CA, the petitioners prayed that MPSA No.
261-2008-XIII be set aside and its implementation enjoined. In effect, the petitioners seek a
cancellation of MPSA No. 261-2008-XIII. As earlier discussed, however, the power to approve
and enter into agreements or contracts rests primarily with the DENR Secretary. Perforce, the
power to cancel an MPSA likewise lies with the DENR Secretary.

Given that it is the DENR Secretary that has the primary jurisdiction to approve and cancel
mining agreements and contract, it is with the DENR Secretary that the petitioners should have
sought the cancellation of MPSA No. 261-2008-XIII, and not with the courts. The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction instructs that if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized training and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before resort to the courts is had.
For another, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies bars recourse to the courts at
the very first instance.

The doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first made
with the administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their
jurisdiction before the controversy may be elevated to a court of justice for review. A premature
invocation of a court's intervention renders the complaint without cause of action and
dismissible.

The DENR Secretary, no doubt, is under the control of the President; thus, his decision is subject
to review of the latter. Consequently, the petitioners should have appealed its case to the Office
of the President under A.O. No. 18, series of 1987,56 instead of directly seeking review by the
court.

Art. 276 vs. Rule 43

PROBLEM: Petitioner Guagua National Colleges’ Board of Trustees approved instead the
funding of the retirement program out of the 70% net incremental proceeds arising from the
tuition fee increases for the purpose of saving the depleting funds of the petitioner's Retirement
Plan. Consequently, respondents GNC-Faculty Labor Union and GNC Non-Teaching
Maintenance Labor Union challenged the petitioner's unilateral decision by claiming that the
increase violated Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 6728. Thereafter, the parties referred the matter to
voluntary arbitration after failing to settle the controversy by themselves. 
The Voluntary Arbiter, after hearing the parties, rendered his decision dated June 16, 2008 in
favor of the petitioner, holding that retirement benefits fell within the category of "other benefits"
that could be charged against the 70% net incremental proceeds pursuant to Section 5(2) of R.A.
No. 6728. The respondents, after receiving a copy of the decision on June 16, 2008, filed an
Urgent Motion for Extension praying that the CA grant them an extension of 15 days from July
1, 2008, or until July 16, 2008, within which to file their petition for review. 
On July 2, 2008, the CA granted the Urgent Motion for Extension. Hence, the respondents filed
the petition for review on July 16, 2008. Subsequently, the petitioner filed its Motion to Dismiss,
asserting that the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator had already become final and executory
pursuant to Article 276 of the Labor Code. However, the CA denied the Motion to Dismiss on
December 15, 2008. Which governs between the two periods found in Article 276 of the Labor
Code and Section 4 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the appeal from the decision or award by
the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Arbitrators?

ANSWER: The SC stated that there is no conflict between Article 276 of the Labor Code and
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The SC clarified that Article 276 should be understood as the time
within which the adverse party may move for reconsideration from the decision or award of the
VA. Thereafter, the aggrieved party may appeal to the CA within 15 days from notice pursuant
to Rule 43. (Guagua National Colleges V. Court Of Appeals, G.R. No. 188492, August 28,
2018)
                       

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, SPS. ERNESTO REYES and LORNA REYES, respondents. 

FACTS:
Private respondent spouses filed a notice of appeal and elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
They raised three issues: the lawfulness of dismissing the second cause of action (to compel the
sale of the lot); the propriety of holding that there was no contract of sale between the parties;
and ordering the payment of rental arrearages from October 1986 without any hearing on the
merits. 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case involved multiple appeals.
RULING:
No. The case at bar is not one where multiple appeal can be taken or are necessary. Multiple
appeals are allowed in special proceedings, in actions for recovery of property with accounting,
in actions for partition of property with accounting, in the special civil actions of eminent domain
and foreclosure of mortgage. The rationale behind allowing more than one appeal in the same
case is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is
resolved by the court and held to be final. he disputes in the case below for specific performance
have arisen from the demand to make adjustments on the property where the adjacent owner is
alleged to have usurped a part thereof, the exercise of the right of pre-emption and the payment
of rental arrearages. A ruling on the issue of encroachment will perforce be determinative of the
issue of unpaid rentals. These two points do not arise from two or more causes of action, but
from the same cause of action. Hence, this suit does not require multiple appeals. 

Non-submission of copies of record on appeal not a ground for dismissal of appeal

PROBLEM: The Monetary Board issued Resolutions ordering the closure and liquidation of the
Mindanao Savings and Loan Association. The PDIC was appointed as its receiver and liquidator.
PDIC filed before the RTC-Davao City a Petition seeking from the said court assistance in the
liquidation of the MSLA which was approved. Atty. Villarica filed a motion to dismiss the
PDIC’s petition for liquidation. The RTC terminated the liquidation proceedings. PDIC filed a
Notice of Appeal. The RTC approved the PDIC's record of appeal. Petitioners filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Appeal for its failure to comply with under Section 4, Rule 44 on the mandatory or
jurisdictional requirement of filing seven legible copies of the approved Record on Appeal.
Whether the appeal should be dismissed.

ANSWER: NO. Section 4, Rule 44 does not provide that non-submission of copies of the
approved record on appeal is a ground to dismiss an appeal. The rule only reads that should there
be "any unauthorized alteration, omission or addition in the approved record of appeal,"
the same should be considered as a ground for dismissal. (University of Mindanao v. PDIC)

DOLORITA C. BEATINGO, Petitioner, v. LILIA BU GASIS, Respondent. (G.R. No.

179641; February 9, 2011)

Failure to file appellant’s brief

PROBLEM: Petitioner Dolorita Beatingo bought a piece of land, denominated as Lot No. 7219
from Flora G. Gasis on May 19, 1998. Petitioner went to the Register of Deeds to have the sale
registered. She, however, failed to obtain registration as she could not produce the owner’s
duplicate certificate of title. She, thus, filed a petition for the issuance of the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title but was opposed by respondent Lilia Bu Gasis, claiming that she was in
possession of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) as she purchased the subject property from
Flora on January 27, 1999.

Petitioner filed a Complaint for Annulment and Cancellation of Sale, Reconveyance, Delivery of
Title and Damages against respondent before the Regional Trial Court. Respondent claimed that
she purchased the subject property from Flora without knowledge of the prior sale of the same
subject property to petitioner, which makes her an innocent purchaser for value.

The RTC considered the controversy as one of double sale and since the two sales – that of
petitioner and that of respondent – were not registered with the Registry of Property, the RTC
held that whoever was in possession had the better right. Hence, it decided in favor of
respondent.

Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a Notice of Appeal. However, due to pressures of
work in equally important cases with other clients, counsel for petitioner requested for an
extension of ninety (90) days within which to file the brief. Instead of filing the Appellant’s Brief
within the extended period, petitioner twice moved for extension of time to file the brief.

The CA denied the motions for extension to file brief. Thus, for failure to file the Appellant’s
Brief, the appellate court dismissed the appeal. WHETHER the CA err in not reviewing the
merits of the appeal?

ANSWER: Evidently, petitioner’s counsel was negligent in failing to file the required brief not
only within 45 days from receipt of the notice but also within the extended period of ninety (90)
days granted by the appellate court. The excuse forwarded above is unacceptable. An attorney is
bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with utmost
diligence. Failure to file brief certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence, more so if the delay
results in the dismissal of the appeal.

The failure to file the Appellant’s Brief, though not jurisdictional, results in the abandonment of
the appeal which may be the cause for its dismissal.

Nevertheless, to put an end to the controversy, the Court carefully perused the records of the case
and reached the conclusion that the decision dated December 29, 2005 of the RTC is in perfect
harmony with law and jurisprudence. The rules on double sales, as discussed above,
apply. DENIED.

G.R. No. 165575, Feb. 2, 2011

Mendoza vs. UCPB

TOPIC: STATEMENT OF ISSUES VS. ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

PROBLEM: 

On November 5, 2001, petitioner Adelia Mendoza, attorney-in-fact of petitioner Alice

Malleta, filed a Complaint for annulment of titles, foreclosure proceedings and certificate of sale
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa City, Fourth Judicial Region.

On April 15, 2003, the RTC of Lipa City, Branch 12 issued an Order dismissing the case.

Thereafter, petitioners appealed the trial court’s Orders to the Court of Appeals and filed
an Appellant’s Brief on April 5, 2004.
 On May 20, 2004, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground that the
Appellant’s Brief failed to comply with the requirements under Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.

On July 2, 2004, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal for
failure to comply with Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioners’ appeal on the ground that their
Appellants’ Brief failed to comply with Section 13, Rule 44.

ANSWER: 

The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law. An appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly
comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.

The assignment of errors and page references to the record in the statement of facts are
important in an Appellant’s Brief as the absence thereof is a basis for the dismissal of an appeal
under Section 1 (f), Rule 50, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rules 44 and 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are designed for the proper and
prompt disposition of cases before the Court of Appeals.35 Rules of procedure exist for a noble
purpose, and to disregard such rules in the guise of liberal construction would be to defeat such
purpose.

Questions that may be raised on appeal

PROBLEM: Jose Serrano purchased a land amounting to P2,500.00, adjoining to his own land
from Archbishop Caceres. Benjamin Dihiansan, requested Serrano to allow him to purchase the
said property subject to condition that Dihiansan will re-sell the property to Serrano if the latter
wishes to re-purchase it.

On May 2, 1970, Serrano exacted in writing that Dihiansan re-sell the property to him but the
latter refused. Serrano found that the property was sold to Ramon King. A case was filed with
the trial court. The trial court and the Court of Appeals both ruled in favor of Serrano.

In this petition, Dihiansan claimed that the property does not fall under the purview of Article
1622 of the Civil Code on the right of preemption or redemption by adjoining owner(s) of small
urban land. Whether or not the appeal should be decided by the court.

ANSWER: (NO)
We affirm on the strength of controlling and established jurisprudence "that this Court decides
appeals which only involve questions of law and that it is not the function of the Supreme Court
to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing
errors of law that might have been committed by the lower court.  

As to the allegation of petitioners that the land subject of Exhibit "A" does not fall under the
purview of Article 1622 of the Civil Code (on the right of preemption or redemption by
adjoining owner(s) of small urban land which cannot be used for any practical purpose), we hold
that this is a question of fact which should have been raised in the lower court. Petitioners
waived their right to present testimonial evidence in the lower court. They chose to remain silent.
Consequently, they are now barred from raising said issue for the first time in this Court. "It is a
well-settled rule that, except questions on jurisdiction no question will be entertained on appeal
unless it has been raised in the court below and it is within the issues made by the parties in their
pleadings. (G.R. No. L-49539 September 14, 1987 BENJAMIN DIHIANSAN, LOURDES
LARGOZA and RAMON KING vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS * and JOSE
SERRANO)