G.R. No.

189800, July 09, 2018 - PRESIDENTIAL

COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT,
SECOND DIVISION
Petitioner, v. HON. MA. MERCEDITAS
GUTIERREZ, IN HER CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN,
RENATO D. TAYAG, ISMAEL REINOSO, JUAN
TRIVINO, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, MARIO ORTIZ, G.R. No. 189800, July 09, 2018
GENEROSO TANSECO, FAUSTINO SY CHANGCO,
VICENTE ABAD SANTOS, EUSEBIO VILLATUYA,
MANUEL MORALES, JOSE ROÑO, TROADIO T. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
QUIAZON, RUBEN ANCHETA, FERNANDO GOVERNMENT, Petitioner, v. HON. MA.
MARAMAG, JR., GERONIMO VELASCO, MERCEDITAS GUTIERREZ, IN HER CAPACITY AS
EDGARDO L. TORDESILLAS, JAIME C. LAYA, OMBUDSMAN, RENATO D. TAYAG, ISMAEL
GERARDO P. SICAT, ARTURO R. TANCO, JR., REINOSO, JUAN TRIVINO, JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
PLACIDO L. MAPA, JR., PANFILO DOMINGO, MARIO ORTIZ, GENEROSO TANSECO, FAUSTINO
VICTORINO L. OJEDA, TEODORO DE VERA, SY CHANGCO, VICENTE ABAD SANTOS, EUSEBIO
ALEJANDRO LUKBAN, JR., ROMEO TAN, LUIS VILLATUYA, MANUEL MORALES, JOSE ROÑO,
RECATO, BENITO S. DYCHIAO, ELPIDIO M. BORJA, TROADIO T. QUIAZON, RUBEN ANCHETA,
Respondents.: FERNANDO MARAMAG, JR., GERONIMO
VELASCO, EDGARDO L. TORDESILLAS, JAIME C.
LAYA, GERARDO P. SICAT, ARTURO R. TANCO, JR.,
PLACIDO L. MAPA, JR., PANFILO DOMINGO,
VICTORINO L. OJEDA, TEODORO DE VERA,
ALEJANDRO LUKBAN, JR., ROMEO TAN, LUIS
RECATO, BENITO S. DYCHIAO, ELPIDIO M. BORJA,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 189800, July 09, 2018 - PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT,
Petitioner, v. HON. MA. MERCEDITAS DECISION
GUTIERREZ, IN HER CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN,
RENATO D. TAYAG, ISMAEL REINOSO, JUAN
TRIVINO, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, MARIO ORTIZ,
GENEROSO TANSECO, FAUSTINO SY CHANGCO,
VICENTE ABAD SANTOS, EUSEBIO VILLATUYA, REYES, JR., J.:
MANUEL MORALES, JOSE ROÑO, TROADIO T.
QUIAZON, RUBEN ANCHETA, FERNANDO
MARAMAG, JR., GERONIMO VELASCO, Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under
EDGARDO L. TORDESILLAS, JAIME C. LAYA, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The
GERARDO P. SICAT, ARTURO R. TANCO, JR., petition seeks to nullify and set aside the
PLACIDO L. MAPA, JR., PANFILO DOMINGO, Resolution dated June 23, 2006 of the Office of
VICTORINO L. OJEDA, TEODORO DE VERA, the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-05-0153-D,
ALEJANDRO LUKBAN, JR., ROMEO TAN, LUIS dismissing the complaint filed against Renato D.
RECATO, BENITO S. DYCHIAO, ELPIDIO M. BORJA, Tayag, Ismael Reinoso, Juan Trivino, Juan Ponce
Respondents. Enrile (Enrile), Mario Ortiz, Generoso Tanseco,
Faustino Sy Changco, Vicente Abad Santos,
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS Eusebio Villatuya, Manuel Morales, Jose Roño,
Troadio T. Quiazon, Ruben Ancheta, Fernando was approved under PNB Resolution No. 157-D
Maramag, Jr., Geronimo Velasco, Edgardo L. dated October 27, 1971. Allegedly, at this time,
Tordesillas, Jaime C. Laya, Gerardo P. Sicat, BISUDECO had no sufficient capital and
Arturo R. Tanco, Jr., Placido L. Mapa, Jr. (Mapa), collateral, and had assets amounting to only
Gilberto Teodoro, Panfilo Domingo, Victorino L. P510,000.00 as reflected in its Balance Sheet
Ojeda (Ojeda), Teodoro De Vera (De Vera), dated December 31, 1971.
Alejandro Lukban, Jr. (Lukban), Romeo Tan (Tan),
Luis Recato (Recato), Benito S. Dychiao
(Dychiao), Elpidio M. Borja (Borja) (collectively When BISUDECO failed to comply with the
referred to as the private respondents), and the conditions imposed on the grant of loan, that it
Order3 dated January 7, 2009 which denied must have sufficient capital and collateral, it
petitioner Presidential Commission on Good requested for modifications in the guarantee
Government's (PCGG) Motion for conditions, viz.:
Reconsideration.

WHEREAS, the above corporation (BISUDECO)

The Facts has requested for the following:

Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation I. That the aforequoted condition be amended so

(BISUDECO) is a domestic corporation engaged as to allow them to deposit only P500,000 before
in the business of sugarcane milling. It was L/C opening, the balance of P15.1 million to be
incorporated on September 30, 1970, with an put up during the construction period as the
initial authorized capital stock worth need arises; and
P10,000,000.00 of which P2,010,000.00 worth of
shares were subscribed and P510,000.00 worth
were paid up. Its incorporators were private II. That the bank accept as collateral for the
respondents Ojeda, de Vera, Lukban, Tan, accommodations their plant site, sugar mill
Recato, Dychiao, Borja, and Edmund Cea (Cea) machinery and equipment, farm equipment and
(Deceased). implements and other assets to be acquired; and
assignment of proceeds of their share in their
sugar and molasses produced.
On August 12, 1972, BISUDECO's authorized
capital stock was increased to P36,300,000.00, of
which P5,260,000.00 worth of shares were PNB approved the requested modifications
subscribed and P1,315,000.00 worth were paid under Resolution No. 141-C.8 Despite the
up. amendments made, BISUDECO still failed to
submit and comply with the guarantee
conditions. Nonetheless, PNB further
In 1971, BISUDECO filed a loan request with accommodated BISUDECO and passed PNB
Philippine National Bank (PNB) for the issuance Resolution No. 137-C9 approving modifications
of a stand-by letter of credit. The loan request in in the terms and conditions and facilitating the
the total amount of P172,583,125.00 was implementation and opening of the letter of
recommended to the PNB Board of Directors and credit, viz.:
 6. That BISUDECO shall make an immediate
payment of the encumbrance annotated at the
RESOLVED, that in order to avoid further delay
back of the title of the property in favor of the
and to take advantage of the beneficial terms
[PNB].
and conditions of the contract which they have
entered into with its supplier, further
amendment of the aforesaid resolution be
All the terms and conditions of Res. No. 141-C of
approved as requested by BISUDECO:
December 15, 1971 referred to above, not in
conflict herewith, to remain in full force and
effect.
1. To grant BISUDECO a period of 30 days from
opening of the letter of credit within which to
increase its authorized capital of P36.3 Million;
PCGG claims that despite continuously incurring
losses in its milling operations resulting to capital
deficiency, BISUDECO was extended by PNB
2. To delete the requirement for the joint and
undue and unwarranted accommodations from
several signatures of BISUDECO's principal
1977 to 1985 by way of grant of the following
officers and stockholders, provided that
loans:
BISUDECO will guarantee that it will pay its
obligations to the bank to the extent of its
interest in BISUDECO;
Resolution under which loan

was granted
3. To grant BISUDECO a period of 30 days from
Date
opening of the letter of credit within which to
deposit with the [PNB] the sum of P500,000.00, Amount of Loan
provided that they will execute a Deed of
Undertaking that they are holding the Resolution #337
aforementioned sum in trust for the Bank with November 9, 1997
the written conformity of depository bank and
will turn over the money within said period; P6,047,500.00

Resolution #449

4. That BISUDECO shall execute a Deed of March 19, 1979

Undertaking to mortgage to the Bank the P7,750.000.00
aforesaid 111.3165 Has. of land in Himaao, Pili,
Camarines Sur, free from all liens and (not indicated)
encumbrances;
1979

P26,100,000.00
5. That BISUDECO shall submit to the Bank a copy
Resolution #538
of the Deed of Sale with assumption of mortgage
covering the aforementioned property; and September 28, 1981

P5,610,000.00
(not indicated) PNB's Board of Directors and Officers of
BISUDECO) for violation of Sections 3(e) and (g)
1982
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft
P1,240,000.00 and Corrupt Practices Act.

(not indicated)

1983 In its Resolution14 dated June 23, 2006, the

Ombudsman dismissed the Complaint on the
P4,824,000.00 grounds of lack of probable cause and
Resolution #155 prescription. The pertinent portions of the
assailed resolution read as follows:
January 9, 1984

P18,470,000.00
Before the passage of Batas Pambansa Bilang
Resolution #375 195 on 16 March 1982, the prescription of
March 26, 1984 offenses punishable under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act was ten (10) years. The
P4,590,000.00 Supreme Court in the case of "People vs. The
Hon. Sandiganbayan and Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr."
Resolution #517
in ruling that the new prescriptive period cannot
July 23, 1984 be given retroactive effect succinctly stated that
Batas Pambansa Bilang 195 which was approved
P15,040,000.00
on March 16, 1982 amending Section 11 of RA
Resolution #46 3019 by increasing from ten (10) to fifteen (15)
years the period for the prescription or
January 21, 1985 extinguishment of a violation of the Anti-Graft
P21,840,000.00 and Corrupt Practices Act, may not be given
retroactive application to the crime which was
On February 27, 1987, PNB's rights, titles and committed by Paredes in January 1976 yet, for it
interests were transferred to the Philippine would be prejudicial to the accused. It would
Government through a Deed of Transfer, deprive him of the substantive benefit of the
including the account of BISUDECO. In 1994, shorter (10 years) prescriptive period under
after study and investigation, the Presidential Ad Section 11 of RA 3019 which was an essential
Hoc Fact Finding Committee (Committee), in element of the crime at the time he committed
reference to Memorandum No. 61, found that it.
the loan accounts of BISUDECO were behest
loans due to the following characteristics: a) the
accounts were under collateralized; and b) the xxxx
borrower corporation was undercapitalized.

Therefore, applying the two rulings of the

Thus, on January 28, 2005, PCGG filed with the Supreme Court mentioned earlier, the loans
Ombudsman a complaint against private granted by the PNB to BISUDECO from 1971 to
respondents (in their capacities as members of 1981 are already barred by prescription with
respect to the criminal liability of the
respondents.
At the outset, it should be stressed that R.A. No.
3019, Section 1117 provides that all offenses
punishable under said law shall prescribe in ten
As to the other loans/ accommodations
(10) years. This period was later increased to
extended by PNB to BISUDECO, the complaint
fifteen (15) years with the passage of Batas
and its supporting papers do not show the
Pambansa (BP) Bilang 195, which took effect on
individual or collective participation of the
March 16, 1982.
respondents in the acts complained of.

When the subject transactions took place, the

xxxx
period of prescription for all offenses punishable
under R.A. No. 3019 was ten (10) years. As to
which of the two periods should apply, the Court
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, it is in People v. Pacificador19 explained that in the
respectfully recommended that the Complaint prescription of crimes, the period which appears
for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019 more favorable to the accused is to be adopted,
filed against all respondents be dismissed. viz.:

SO RESOLVED. It can be gleaned from the Information that the

respondent Pacificador allegedly committed the
crime charged on or about during the period
PCGG filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the from December 6, 1975 to January 6, 1976.
same was denied by the Ombudsman in an Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by B.P.
Order16 dated January 7, 2009. Blg. 195, provides that the offenses committed
under the said statute shall prescribe in fifteen
(15) years. It appears however, that prior to the
Hence, the instant Petition. amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by
B.P. Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16,
1982, the prescriptive period for offenses
The Issue punishable under the said statute was only ten
(10) years. The longer prescriptive period of
fifteen (15) years, as provided in Section 11 of
For resolution is the issue on whether the R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, does
Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of not apply in this case for the reason that the
discretion amounting to lack or excess of amendment, not being favorable to the accused
jurisdiction in dismissing PCGG's Complaint on (herein private respondent), cannot be given
the ground of (a) prescription and (b) lack of retroactive effect. Hence, the crime prescribed
probable cause. on January 6, 1986 or ten (10) years from January
6, 1976.20

Ruling of the Court

The loan transactions subject of this case were
granted by the PNB to BISUDECO from 1977-
Generally, the prescriptive period shall
1985. Applying this Court's pronouncement in
commence to run on the day the crime is
Pacificador, the period of prescription for
committed. That an aggrieved person "entitled
offenses committed prior to the passage of B.P.
to an action has no knowledge of his right to sue
Blg. 195 is ten (10) years. The new 15-year period
or of the facts out of which his right arises," does
cannot be applied to acts done prior to its
not prevent the running of the prescriptive
effectivity in 1982 because to do so would violate
period. An exception to this rule is the
the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
"blameless ignorance" doctrine, incorporated in
Transactions entered into and consummated
Section 2 of Act No. 3326. Under this doctrine,
prior to the effectivity of B.P. Blg. 195 on March
"the statute of limitations runs only upon
16, 1982 are exempt from its amendments. The
discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right
new 15-year period shall only be applied to acts
which will support a cause of action. In other
done after its effectivity.
words, the courts would decline to apply the
statute of limitations where the plaintiff does not
know or has no reasonable means of knowing
When does the 10-year period begin to run?
the existence of a cause of action." It was in this
accord that the Court confronted the question
on the running of the prescriptive period in
While R.A. No. 3019 is silent as to when the People v. Duque which became the cornerstone
period of prescription begins to run, R.A. No. of our 1999 Decision in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
3326,21 specifically Section 2 thereof fills the Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto
gap. Section 2 provides in part: (G.R. No. 130149), and the subsequent cases
which Ombudsman Desierto dismissed,
emphatically, on the ground of prescription too.
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the Thus, we held in a catena of cases, that if the
day of the commission of the violation of the law, violation of the special law was not known at the
and if the same be not known at the time, from time of its commission, the prescription begins
the discovery thereof and the institution of to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e.,
judicial proceeding for its investigation and discovery of the unlawful nature of the
punishment. x x x constitutive act or acts.

In the 199922 and 201123 cases of Presidential In Disini v. Sandiganbayan, the Court reiterated
Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, that the prescriptive period commenced to run
et al. v. Hon. Desierto, et al., the Court ruled that not on the date of commission of the crime or
the prescriptive period began to ran from the offense, rather, from the discovery thereof, i.e.
date of discovery of the subject transactions and date of discovery of the violation after the
not from the time the behest loans were PCGG's exhaustive investigation.
transacted. In the 2011 Desierto case, the Court
ruled that the "blameless ignorance" doctrine
applies considering that the plaintiff at that time In the more recent case of PCGG v. The
had no reasonable means of knowing the Ombudsman, et al.26 likewise involving behest
existence of a cause of action, viz.: loans, the Court applied the same rule in
determining whether or not prescription had
already set in, viz.:
It bears stressing, however, that the crux of the
present petition is the propriety of the
Ombudsman's dismissal of PCGG's complaint on
In the case at bar, involving as it does the grant
the ground that there was no probable cause to
of behest loans which We have recognized as a
indict respondents for alleged violation of R.A.
violation that, by their nature, could be
No. 3019.
concealed from the public eye by the simple
expedient of suppressing their documentation,
the second mode applies. We, therefore, count
As a general rule, courts do not interfere with the
the running of the prescriptive period from the
discretion of the Ombudsman to determine
date of discovery thereof on January 4, 1993,
whether there exists reasonable ground to
when the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
believe that a crime has been committed and
Committee reported to the President its findings
that the accused is probably guilty thereof and,
and conclusions anent RHC's loans. This being
thereafter, to file the corresponding information
the case, the filing by the PCGG of its Affidavit-
with the appropriate courts.
Complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman
on January 6, 2003, a little over ten (10) years
from the date of the discovery of the crimes, is
clearly belated. Undoubtedly, the ten-year When the Ombudsman dismissed the case for
period within which to institute the action has lack of probable cause, it explained that the
already lapsed, making it proper for the Complaint and its supporting papers failed to
Ombudsman to dismiss petitioner's complaint establish probable cause both as to the
on the ground of prescription. commission of the crime and the guilt of the
private respondents, to wit:

Applying this to the present case, the date of

discovery was April 4, 1994, the date of the As to the other loans/accommodations extended
Terminal Report that was submitted to President by PNB to BISUDECO, the complaint and its
Fidel V. Ramos. The Terminal Report classified supporting papers do not show the individual or
the subject BISUDECO loans as behest loans. collective participation of the respondents in the
Records show that the PCGG filed its affidavit- acts complained of. As a matter of fact, they do
complaint before the Ombudsman only on not show the names of the members of the PNB
January 28, 2005 or a little more than 10 years Board who approved said loans/
from the date of discovery. Clearly, the crimes accommodations in favor of BISUDECO.
imputed to private respondents for loans Paragraph "16" of the complaint merely
transacted in the years 1971 to 1981 have provided the names of the members of the PNB
already prescribed. As to the loans covered by Board at the time of the application and approval
the years 1982 to 1985, the 15-year prescriptive of the loans, and its Annex "K" listed the names
period shall apply since B.P. Blg. 195 was then of the PNB Board from 1964 to 1986. Moreover,
already in effect. Thus, insofar as the 1982 to there is no copy of the PNB Board Resolution in
1985 loan transactions are concerned, the the record. The Board Resolutions referred to by
complaint was filed on time and without a doubt, the complainant in the complaint are actually
within the prescriptive period. excerpts of the Minute of the Board Meetings
during which the Resolutions were approved. To justify an indictment under Section 3(e), the
Thus, we cannot make a presumption that all the following elements must concur: (1) the accused
members of the PNB Board from 1964 to 1986 is a public officer or a private person charged in
unanimously approved the loan in favor of conspiracy with the former; (2) he or she causes
BISUDECO. any undue injury to any party, whether the
government or a private party; (3) the said public
officer commits the prohibited acts during the
To recapitulate, the private respondents were performance of his or her official duties or in
charged with violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of relation to his or her public positions; (4) such
R.A. No. 3019 which provides: undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference to such
parties; and (5) the public officer has acted with
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
addition to acts or omissions of public officers inexcusable negligence.
already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: On the other hand, Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019
lists the following elements: (1) the accused is a
public officer; (2) he or she enters into a contract
xxxx or transaction, on behalf of the Government; (3)
such contract or transaction is manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the Government,
e. Causing undue injury to any party, including regardless of whether or not the public officer
the Government or giving any private party any profited therefrom.
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, Private respondents Mapa and Enrile, in their
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable respective Comments, maintain that the
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers complaint failed to state the particular acts for
and employees of offices or government which they are individually or collectively liable
corporations charged with the grant of licenses as Directors of PNB. PCGG, however, insists that
or permits or other concessions. there is probable cause to hold the private
respondents liable and that it was capricious for
the Ombudsman to require that they indicate
xxxx the participation of every private respondent in
the commission of the offense- preliminary
investigation not being the occasion for the full
and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence.
g. Entering, on behalf of the Government, into
any contract or transaction manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or
not the public officer profited or will profit In the case of Buchanan v. Viuda De Esteban,32
thereby.30 probable cause has been defined as the
existence of such facts and circumstances as
would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the studied and favorably endorsed the loan to the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty Banks Board for approval.
of the crime for which he was prosecuted.

As a general rule, a corporation has a separate

A careful perusal of the records reveals that the and distinct personality from those who
only basis of PCGG for imputing liability on represent it. Its officers are solidarily liable only
private respondents is the fact that the latter when exceptional circumstances exist, such as
were members of PNB's Board of Directors at the cases enumerated in Section 31 of the
time the loan transactions were entered into. Corporation Code. The liability of the officers
While it is true that a finding of probable cause must be proven by evidence sufficient to
does not require a finding of guilt nor absolute overcome the burden of proof borne by the
certainty, PCGG cannot merely rely on the plaintiff.
private respondents' membership in the Board
to hold the latter liable for the acts complained
of. Section 31 of the Corporation Code states:

In the case of Kara-an v. Office of the Sec. 31. Liability of Directors, Trustees or
Ombudsman, the Court ruled that approval of a Officers.- Directors or trustees who willfully and
loan during incumbency as director does not knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful
automatically establish probable cause absent a acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross
showing of personal participation in any negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of
irregularity as regards approval of the loan, viz.: the corporation or acquire any personal or
pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as
such directors or trustees shall be liable jointly
The Court cannot likewise sustain petitioner's and severally for all damages resulting therefrom
contention that the Ombudsman gravely abused suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or
his discretion in dismissing the charge against members and other persons.
Farouk A. Carpizo (Carpizo). The Ombudsman
explained his reasons for finding that there was
no sufficient ground to engender a well-founded From the foregoing it can be deduced that
belief that Carpizo is liable under RA 3019. True, personal liability will only attach to a director or
Carpizo, who was appointed in March 1981, was officer if they are guilty of any of the following:
already a director when the Islamic Bank (1) willfully or knowingly vote or assent to
approved the CAMEC loan in 1986. However, the patently unlawful acts of the corporation; (2)
fact that the Islamic Bank processed and gross negligence; or (3) bad faith.
approved the CAMEC loan during his
incumbency as director does not automatically
establish probable cause against him absent a PCGG failed to allege in the complaint and in the
showing that he personally participated in any present petition the particular acts of private
irregularity in the processing and approval of the respondents which constitutes a violation of
loan. As the Ombudsman stated in the assailed Sections 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019. It is not
Order, there were subordinate officials who sufficient for PCGG to merely provide a list of
names of the PNB Board members for the years officer involved herein with violation of Section
covering the subject loans absent proof of the 3(e) and (g), private respondents who acted in
latter's individual participation in the approval their capacities as Officers of BISUDECO are
thereof. likewise cleared of any criminal liability.

In its Resolution37 dated June 23, 2006, the Although the Court has ruled in previous cases
Ombudsman likewise observed that the affiant that a preliminary investigation is not the
seemed to have no personal knowledge of the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
allegations in the complaint. The relevant prosecution's evidence, the particular act or
portion of the resolution reads as follows: omission constituting the offense charged must
still be alleged in the complaint otherwise it
would amount to nothing more than a fishing
Finally, it appears that the Affiant has no expedition. Simply put, the evidence adduced by
personal knowledge of the allegations in the PCGG was not sufficient to establish probable
complaint as its penultimate paragraph states cause.
that "The foregoing may be attested to by,
among others, PCGG Legal Counsel Orlando L.
Salvador and/or PCGG Director Danilo R. Daniel, In Dichaves v. Office of the Ombudsman, the
PCGG members of the TWG that examined the Court reiterated the rule on non-interference
foregoing accounts." None of the above- with the Ombudsman's determination of
mentioned personalities executed an Affidavit to probable cause absent a showing of grave abuse
attest to the allegations in the complaint. of discretion committed by the latter, viz.:

Insofar as criminal liability of the BISUDECO As a general rule, this Court does not interfere
officers is concerned, the Court likewise rules in with the Office of the Ombudsman's exercise of
the negative. Private respondents Ojeda, De its constitutional mandate. Both the Constitution
Vera, Lukban, Tan, Recato, Dychiao, Borja and and Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act
Cea (deceased) are not criminally liable under of 1989) give the Ombudsman wide latitude to
Section 3(g) and (e). act on criminal complaints against public officials
and government employees. The rule on non-
interference is based on the "respect for the
The relevant provisions of R.A. No. 3019 and the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted
Court's ruling in the cases of Singian, Jr. v. by the Constitution to the Office of the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) and Domingo v. Ombudsman[.]"
Sandiganbayan, clarified that private persons
who conspire with public officers may be
indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for An independent constitutional body, the Office
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. In the of the Ombudsman is "beholden to no one, acts
case at bench, no violation was proven because as the champion of the people[,] and [is] the
there was no probable cause to charge the preserver of the integrity of the public service."
private respondents in the first place. Thus, there Thus, it has the sole power to determine
being no probable cause to charge the public whether there is probable cause to warrant the
filing of a criminal case against an accused. This Resolution dated June 23, 2006 and Order dated
function is executive in nature. January 7, 2009 in OMB-C-C-05-0153-D are
hereby AFFIRMED.

The executive determination of probable cause

is a highly factual matter. It requires probing into SO ORDERED.
the "existence of such facts and circumstances as
would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty
of the crime for which he [or she] was
prosecuted."

The Office of the Ombudsman is armed with the

power to investigate. It is, therefore, in a better
position to assess the strengths or weaknesses of
the evidence on hand needed to make a finding
of probable cause. As this Court is not a trier of
facts, we defer to the sound judgment of the
Ombudsman.42 (Citations omitted)

It is not sound practice to depart from the policy

of non-interference in the Ombudsman's
exercise of discretion to determine whether or
not to file information against an accused. As
cited in a long line of cases, the Court has
pronounced that it cannot pass upon the
sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence to
determine the existence of probable cause. The
rule is based not only upon respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted
by the Constitution to the Ombudsman, but
upon practicality as well. If it were otherwise, the
Court will be clogged with an innumerable list of
cases assailing investigatory proceedings
conducted by the Ombudsman with regard to
complaints filed before it, to determine if there
is probable cause.43

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is

DISMISSED. The Office of the Ombudsman's