Falcis v. Civil Registrar General G.R. No. 217910, September 03, 2019 Case Digest

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JESUS NICARDO M. FALCIS, III, PETITIONER, v.

CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL,


RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 217910, September 03, 2019
LEONEN, J.
Case Doctrine:
Intervention is not an independent action but is ancillary and supplemental to existing litigation.
A petition-in-intervention cannot create an actual case or controversy when the main petition
has none.
FACTS:
Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III (Falcis) petition the SC to "declare Articles 1 and 2 of the Family
Code as unconstitutional and, as a consequence, nullify Articles 46(4) and 55(6) of the Family
Code."
Falcis claims that a resort to Rule 65 was appropriate, citing separate opinions of various cases
saying that this Court should follow a "'fresh' approach to this Court's judicial power" and find
that his Petition pertains to a constitutional case attended by grave abuse of discretion. He also
asserts that the mere passage of the Family Code, with its Articles 1 and 2, was a prima
facie case of grave abuse of discretion,11 and that the issues he raised were of such transcendental
importance as to warrant the setting aside of procedural niceties.
The Civil Registrar General prays that this Court deny due course to or dismiss the Petition. It
notes that the Petition was not in the nature of a class suit, but was instead personal only to
Falcis. Because of this, it claims that Falcis failed to show injury-in-fact and an actual case or
controversy, but was rather seeking an advisory opinion that this Court cannot issue.
On April 7, 2016, LGBTS Christian Church, Inc. (LGBTS Church), Reverend Crescencio
"Ceejay" Agbayani, Jr. (Reverend Agbayani), Marlon Felipe (Felipe), and Maria Arlyn "Sugar"
Ibañez (Ibañez)—collectively, petitioners-intervenors—whose counsel was Falcis himself, filed
a Motion for Leave to Intervene and Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention. They ask this
Court to allow them to intervene in the proceedings, claiming that: (1) they offer further
procedural and substantive arguments; (2) their rights will not be protected in a separate
proceeding; and (3) they have an interest in the outcome of this case. They adopt by reference the
arguments raised by Falcis in his Petition.
Subsequently, they filed their Petition-in-Intervention, which is a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the same reliefs as those in Falcis' Petition, namely: (1)
the declaration of unconstitutionality of Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code; and (2) the
invalidation of Articles 46(4) and 55(6) of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
WON the Petition and/or the Petition-in-Intervention are properly the subject of the exercise of
our power of judicial review.
HELD:
NO.
Petitioner has no actual facts that present a real conflict between the parties of this case. The
Petition presents no actual case or controversy. In fact, petitioner has no legal standing to file his
Petition.
Legal standing is a party's "personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." Interest in the case "means
a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest
in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest."
Petitioner's desire "to find and enter into long-term monogamous same-sex relationships" and "to
settle down and have a companion for life in his beloved country" does not constitute legally
demandable rights that require judicial enforcement. This Court will not witlessly indulge
petitioner in blaming the Family Code for his admitted inability to find a partner.
The Petition-in-Intervention was also authored by petitioner. He only filed it after the Office of
the Solicitor General had filed a Comment (Ad Cautelam) pointing out the procedural flaws in
his original Petition. Still, the Petition-in-Intervention suffers from the same procedural
infirmities as the original Petition. Likewise, it cannot cure the plethora of the original Petition's
defects. Thus, it must also be dismissed.
Interventions are allowed under Rule 19, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
SECTION 1. Who may intervene. — A person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in
the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to
intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and
whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Intervention is not an independent action but is ancillary and supplemental to existing litigation.
Intervention requires: (1) a movant's legal interest in the matter being litigated; (2) a showing
that the intervention will not delay the proceedings; and (3) a claim by the intervenor that is
incapable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding. Here, while petitioners-intervenors
have legal interest in the issues, their claims are more adequately decided in a separate
proceeding, seeking relief independently from the Petition.
The Petition-in-Intervention suffers from confusion as to its real purpose. A discerning reading
of it reveals that the ultimate remedy to what petitioners-intervenors have averred is a directive
that marriage licenses be issued to them. Yet, it does not actually ask for this: its prayer does not
seek this, and it does not identify itself as a petition for mandamus (or an action for mandatory
injunction). Rather, it couches itself as a petition of the same nature and seeking the same relief
as the original Petition. It takes pains to make itself appear inextricable from the original
Petition, at the expense of specifying what would make it viable.
Given these, this Court can only arrive at the conclusion that the Petition-in-Intervention was a
veiled vehicle by which petitioner sought to cure the glaring procedural defects of his original
Petition. It was not a bona fide plea for relief, but a sly, tardy stratagem. It was not a genuine
effort by an independent party to have its cause litigated in the same proceeding, but more of an
ill-conceived attempt to prop up a thin and underdeveloped Petition.
Petitioner, as both party and counsel to petitioners-intervenors, miserably failed in his pretenses.
A petition-in-intervention cannot create an actual case or controversy when the main
petition has none.
Petitioner's choice of remedy further emphasizes his ignorance of basic legal procedure.
Rule 65 petitions are not per se remedies to address constitutional issues. Petitions for certiorari
are filed to address the jurisdictional excesses of officers or bodies exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions. Petitions for prohibition are filed to address the jurisdictional excesses of
officers or bodies exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions.
Contrary to the basic requirement under Rule 65, petitioner failed to show that respondent Civil
Registrar General exercised any judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial function. From this, no
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction can be appreciated.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition require the proper allegation not only of a breach of a
constitutional provision, but more important, of an actual case or controversy.

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