Collado V CA GR 107764

3/17/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 390
VOL. 390, OCTOBER 4, 2002 343

Collado vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 107764. October 4, 2002.
EDNA COLLADO, BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO C.

TORRES, JOSE AMO, SERGIO L. MONTEALEGRE,
VICENTE C. TORRES, JOSEPH L. NUÑEZ, GLORIA
SERRANO, DANILO FABREGAS, FERNANDO T.
TORRES, LUZ G. TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD T.
TUTANA, JOSE C. TORRES, JR., IMELDA CAYLALUAD,
ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA ASTORIAS, MYRNA M.
LANCION, NORBERTO CAMILOTE, CECILIA
MACARANAS, PEDRO BRIONES, REMEDIOS
BANTIGUE, DANTE L. MONTEALEGRE, AIDA T.
GADON, ARMANDO T. TORRES and FIDELITO ECO,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, thru the Director of Lands,
respondents, BOCKASANJO ISF AWARDEES
ASSOCIATION, INC., LITA MENDOZA, MORADO
PREFIDIGNO, TERESITA CRUZ and CALOMA MOISES,
respondents/intervernors.
Constitutional Law; Forest; Natural Resources; Land Titles;

The 1987 Constitution readopted the policy—that all lands of the
public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated in the
Philippine Constitution belong to the State.—Section 1, Article
XIII of the 1935 Constitution, on “Conservation and Utilization of
Natural Resources” barred the alienation of all natural resources
except public agricultural lands, which were the only natural
resources the State could alienate. The 1973 Constitution
reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV on the
“National Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation.” The 1987
Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of
Article XII on “National Economy and Patrimony.” Both the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the alienation of all natural
resources except agricultural lands of the public domain. The
1987 Constitution readopted this policy. Indeed, all lands of the
public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated in the
Philippine Constitution belong to the State.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Any watershed or any area of land
adjacent to any surface water or overlying any ground water may
be declared by the Department of Natural Resources as a protected
area.—The term “natural resource” includes “not only timber, gas,
oil, coal, minerals, lakes, and submerged lands, but also, features
which supply a human need and contribute to the health, welfare,
and benefit of a community, and are
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001783d80f47636cb6856003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/35
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
344
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
essential to the well-being thereof and proper enjoyment of

property devoted to park and recreational purposes.” In Sta. Rosa
Realty Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., the Court
had occasion to discourse on watershed areas. The Court resolved
the issue of whether the parcel of land which the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources had assessed to be a
watershed area is exempt from the coverage of R.A. No. 6657 or
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (“CARL” for brevity).
The Court defined watershed as “an area drained by a river and
its tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or divide which
separates it from adjacent watersheds.” However, the Court also
recognized that: “The definition does not exactly depict the
complexities of a watershed. The most important product of a
watershed is water which is one of the most important human
necessit(ies). The protection of watershed ensures an adequate
supply of water for future generations and the control of
flashfloods that not only damage property but also cause loss of
lives. Protection of watersheds is an “intergenerational”
responsibility that needs to be answered now.” Article 67 of the
Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067) provides: “Art. 67. Any
watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or
overlying any ground water may be declared by the Department
of Natural Resources as a protected area. Rules and Regulations
may be promulgated by such Department to prohibit or control
such activities by the owners or occupants thereof within the
protected area which may damage or cause the deterioration of
the surface water or ground water or interfere with the
investigation, use, control, protection, management or
administration of such waters.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The possession of public land,
however long the period may have extended, never confers title
thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with
regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the
occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under
claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a
grant from the State.—The period of occupancy after the issuance
of EO 33 in 1904 could no longer be counted because as a
watershed reservation, the Lot was no longer susceptible of
occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation. Section 48 (b) of
CA 141, as amended, applies exclusively to alienable and
disposable public agricultural land. Forest lands, including
watershed reservations, are excluded. It is axiomatic that the
possession of forest lands or other inalienable public lands cannot
ripen into private ownership. In Municipality of San-tiago,

Isabela vs. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that inalienable
public lands—“x x x cannot be acquired by acquisitive
prescription. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, does
not run against the State. “The possession of public land, however
long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto
upon the possessor because the statute
345
VOL. 390, OCTOBER 4, 2002 345
of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against

the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and
occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required
number of years to constitute a grant from the State.’ ”
Same; Same; Same; Same; No public land can be acquired by
private persons without any grant, express or implied from the
government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of a title
from the state.—Gordula vs. Court of Appeals is in point. In
Gordula, petitioners did not contest the nature of the land. They
admitted that the land lies in the heart of the Caliraya-Lumot
River Forest Reserve, which Proclamation No. 573 classified as
inalienable. The petitioners in Gordula contended, however, that
Proclamation No. 573 itself recognizes private rights of
landowners prior to the reservation. They claim to have
established their private rights to the subject land. The Court
ruled: “We do not agree. No public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or implied from the
from the state. The facts show that petitioner Gordula did not
acquire title to the subject land prior to its reservation under
Proclamation No. 573. He filed his application for free patent only
in January, 1973, more than three (3) years after the issuance of
Proclamation No. 573 in June, 1969. At that time, the land, as
part of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, was no longer
open to private ownership as it has been classified as public forest
reserve for the public good.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Once a parcel of land is included
within a watershed reservation duly established by Executive
Proclamation, as in the instant case, a presumption arises that the
land continues to be part of such Reservation until clear and
convincing evidence of subsequent declassification is shown.—The
evidence of record thus appears unsatisfactory and insufficient to
show clearly and positively that the Lot had been officially
released from the Marikina Watershed Reservation to form part
of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. We
hold that once a parcel of land is included within a watershed
reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, as in the
instant case, a presumption arises that the land continues to be
part of such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of
subsequent declassification is shown.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The right of reversion or

reconveyance to the State of the public properties registered and
which are not capable of private appropriation or private
acquisition does not prescribe.—We also hold that environmental
consequences in this case override concerns over technicalities
and rules of procedure. In Republic vs. De los Angeles, which
346
involved the registration of public lands, specifically parts of the

sea, the Court rejected the principle of res judicata and estoppel to
silence the Republic’s claim over public lands. The Court said: “It
should be noted further that the doctrine of estoppel or laches
does not apply when the Government sues as a sovereign or
asserts governmental rights, nor does estoppel or laches validate
an act that contravenes law or public policy, and that res judicata
is to be disregarded if its application would involve the sacrifice of
justice to technicality.” The Court further held that “the right of
reversion or reconveyance to the State of the public properties
registered and which are not capable of private appropriation or
private acquisition does not prescribe.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Britanico Law Offices for petitioners.
J.P. Villanueva & Associates for private respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
1
This Petition
2
seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated June 22, 1992, in CA-G.R.3 SP No. 25597,
which declared null and void the Decision dated January
30, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal,
Branch 71, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-59179,
confirming the imperfect title of petitioners over a parcel of
land.
The Facts
On April 25, 1985, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the

land registration court an application for registration of a
parcel of land
_______________
1 Filed under both Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court.

2 Thirteenth Division composed of J. Arturo B. Buena (Chairman and
Ponente) and J. Justo P. Torres, Jr. and J. Pacita Canizares-Nye as
members.
3 Penned by Judge Patricio M. Patajo.
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VOL. 390, OCTOBER 4, 2002 347

with an approximate area of 1,200,766 square meters or

120.0766 hectares (“Lot” for brevity). The Lot is situated in
Barangay San Isidro (formerly known as Boso-boso),
Antipolo, Rizal, and covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620.
Attached to the application was the technical description of
the Lot as Lot Psu-162620 signed by Robert C.
Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division,
Bureau of Lands, which stated, “[t]his survey is inside IN-
12 Mariquina Watershed.” On March 24, 1986, petitioner
Edna T. Collado filed an4 Amended Application to include
additional co-applicants. Subsequently, more applicants 5
joined (collectively referred to as “petitioners” for brevity).
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, and the Municipality of Antipolo, through its
Municipal Attorney and the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed
oppositions to petitioners’ application. In due course, the
land registration court issued an order of general default
against the whole world with the exception of the
oppositors.
Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since
time immemorial. Their possession has been open, public,
notorious and in the concept of owners. The Lot was
surveyed in the name of Sesinando Leyva, one of their
predecessors-in-interest, as early as March 22, 1902.
Petitioners declared the Lot for taxation purposes and paid
all the corresponding real estate taxes. According to them,
there are now twenty-five co-owners in pro-indiviso shares
of five hectares each. During the hearings, petitioners
submitted evidence to prove that there have been nine
transfers of rights among them and their predecessors-in-
interest, as follows:
“1. SESINANDO LEYVA was the earliest known

predecessor-in-interest of the Applicants who was
in actual, open, notorious and continu-
_______________
4 Co-petitioners Bernardina Tawas, Joseto C. Torres, Jose Amo, Sergio

L. Montealegre and Vicente C. Torres.
5 Co-petitioners Joseph L. Nuñez, Gloria Serrano, Danilo Fabregas,
Fernando T. Torres, Luz G. Tubungbanua, Caridad T. Tutana, Jose C.
Torres, Jr., Imelda Gaylaluad, Rosalie Tutana, Norma Astorias, Myrna M.
Lancion, Norberto Camilote, Cecilia Macaranas, Pedro Briones, Remedios
Bantigue, Dante L. Montealegre, Aida T. Godon, Armando T. Torres and
Fidelito Eco.
348

ous possession of the property in the concept of

owner. He had the property surveyed in his name on
22 March 1902 (Exhibit “W” and “W-1” testimonies
of J. Torres on 16 December 1987 and Mariano
Leyva on 29 December 1987).
2. DIOSDADO LEYVA, is the son of Sesinando
Leyva, who inherited the property. He had the
property resurveyed in his name on May 21-28, 1928
(Exhibit “X” and “X-1”; testimony of Mariano Leyva,
a son of Diosdado Leyva).
3. GREGORIO CAMANTIQUE bought the property
from Diosdado Leyva before the Japanese
Occupation of the Philippines during World War II.
He owned and possessed the property until 1958.
He declared the property for tax purposes, the
latest of which was under Tax Declaration No. 7182
issued on 3 February 1957 (Exhibit “I” and
testimony of Mariano Leyva, supra).
4. ANGELINA REYNOSO, bought the property from
Gregorio Camantique by virtue of a Deed of Sale on
3 February 1958 (Exhibit “H”). During the
ownership of the property by Angelina Reynoso,
Mariano Leyva the grandson of Sesinando Leyva,
the previous owner, attended to the farm.
(Testimony of Mariano Leyva, supra). Angelina
Reynoso declared the property in her name under
Tax Declaration No. 7189 in 4 February 1958,
under Tax Declaration No. 8775 on 3 August 1965,
under Tax Declaration No. 16945 on 15 December
1975, and under Tax Declaration No. 03-06145 on
25 June 1978.
5. MYRNA TORRES bought the property from
Angelina Reynoso on 16 October 1982 through a
Deed of Sale (Exhibit “G”).
6. EDNA COLLADO bought the property from Myrna
Torres in a Deed of Sale dated 28 April 1984
(Exhibit “P-1” to “P-3”).
7. Additional owners BERNARDINA TAWAS,
JORETO TORRES, JOSE AMO, VICENTE
TORRES and SERGIO MONTEALEGRE who
bought portions of the property from Edna Collado
through a Deed of Sale on 6 November 1985
(Exhibit “Q” to “Q-3”).
8. And more additional Owners JOSEPH NUÑEZ,
DIOSDADO ARENOS, DANILO FABREGAS,
FERNANDO TORRES, LUZ TUBUNGBANUA,
CARIDAD TUTANA, JOSE TORRES, JR.,
RODRIGO TUTANA, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA
ASTORIAS, MYRNA LANCION, CHONA
MARCIANO, CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO

BRIONES, REMEDIOS BANTIQUE, DANTE
MONTEALEGRE, ARMANDO TORRES, AIDA
GADON and AMELIA M. MALAPAD bought
portions of the property in a Deed of Sale on 12 May
1986 (Exhibit “S” to “S-3”).
9. Co-owners DIOSDADO ARENOS, RODRIGO
TUTANA, CHONA MARCIANO and AMELIA
MALAPAD jointly sold their shares to new
349
VOL. 390, OCTOBER 4, 2002 349

OWNERS GLORIA R. SERRANO, IMELDA

CAYLALUAD, NORBERTO CAMILOTE and
FIDELITO ECO through a Deed of6 Sale dated 18
January 1987 (Exhibit “T” to “T-9”).”
During the hearing on January 9, 1991, only the assistant

provincial prosecutor appeared without the Solicitor
General. For failure of the oppositors to present their
evidence, the land registration court issued an order
considering the case submitted for decision based on the
evidence of the petitioners. The court later set aside the
order and reset the hearing to January 14, 1991 for the
presentation of the evidence of the oppositors. On this date,
counsel for oppositors failed to appear again despite due
notice. Hence, the court again issued an order submitting
the case for decision based on the evidence of the
petitioners.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
After appraisal of the evidence submitted by petitioners,

the land registration court held that petitioners had
adduced sufficient evidence to establish their registrable
rights over the Lot. Accordingly, the court rendered a
decision confirming the imperfect title of petitioners. We
quote the pertinent portions of the court’s decision, as
follows:
“From the evidence presented, the Court finds that from the
testimony of the witnesses presented by the Applicants, the
property applied for is in actual, open, public and notorious
possession by the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest
since time immemorial and said possession had been testified to
by witnesses Jimmy Torres, Mariano Leyva, Sergio Montealegre,
Jose Amo and one Chona who were all cross-examined by Counsel
for Oppositor Republic of the Philippines.
Evidence was likewise presented that said property was
declared for taxation purposes in the names of the previous
owners and the corresponding taxes were paid by the Applicants
and the previous owners and said property was planted to fruit
bearing trees; portions to palay and portions used for grazing

purposes.
To the mind of the Court, Applicants have presented sufficient
evidence to establish registrable title over said property applied
for by them.
_______________
6 Consolidated Rejoinder, pp. 39-41; Rollo, pp. 285-287.
350

On the claim that the property applied for is within the Marikina
Watershed, the Court can only add that all Presidential
Proclamations like the Proclamation setting aside the Marikina
Watershed are subject to “private rights.”
In the case of Municipality of Santiago vs. Court of Appeals,
120 SCRA 734, 1983 “private rights” is proof of acquisition
through (sic) among means of acquisition of public lands.
In the case of Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 193-195, by
“private rights” means that applicant should show clear and
convincing evidence that the property in question was acquired by
applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the
Spanish government or by Possessory Information title, or any
other means for the acquisition of public lands x x x” (italics
supplied).
The Court believes that from the evidence presented as above
stated, Applicants have acquired private rights to which the
Presidential Proclamation setting aside the Marikina Watershed
should be subject to such private rights.
At any rate, the Court notes that evidence was presented by
the applicants that as per Certification issued by the Bureau of
Forest Development dated March 18, 1980, the area applied for
was verified to be within the area excluded from the operation of
the Marikina Watershed Lands Executive Order No. 33 dated
July 26, 1904 per Proclamation No. 1283 promulgated on June 21,
1974 which established the Boso-boso Town Site Reservation,
amended by Proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18, 1977 known 7
as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation. (Exhibit “K”).”
In a motion dated April 5, 1991, received by the Solicitor

General on April 6, 1991, petitioners alleged that the
decision dated January 30, 1991 confirming their title had
become final after the Solicitor General received a copy of
the decision on February 18, 1991. Petitioners prayed that
the land registration court order the Land Registration
Authority to issue the necessary decree in their favor over
the Lot.
On April 11, 1991, the Solicitor General inquired from
the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal whether the land
registration court had already rendered a decision and if
so, whether the Provincial Prosecutor would recommend an
appeal. However, the Provincial Prosecutor failed to

answer the query.
_______________
7 Rollo, pp. 80-82.
351
VOL. 390, OCTOBER 4, 2002 351

According to the Solicitor General, he received on April 23,

1991 a copy of the land registration court’s decision dated
January 30, 1991, and not on February 18, 1991 as alleged
by petitioners in their motion.
In the meantime, on May 7, 1991, the land registration
court issued an order directing the Land Regulation
Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration
in favor of the petitioners.
On August 6, 1991, the Solicitor General filed with the
Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment
pursuant to Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129 on the ground that
there had been no clear showing that the Lot had been
previously classified as alienable and disposable making it
subject to private appropriation.
On November 29, 1991, Bockasanjo ISF Awardees
Association, Inc., an association of holders of certificates of
stewardship issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (“DENR” for brevity) under its
Integrated Social Forestry Program (“ISF” for brevity), filed
with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Leave to Intervene
and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention. They likewise
opposed the registration and asserted that the Lot, which is
situated inside the Marikina Watershed Reservation, is
inalienable. They claimed that they are the actual
occupants of the Lot pursuant to the certificates of
stewardship issued by the DENR under the ISF for tree
planting purposes.
The Court of Appeals granted the motion to intervene
verbally during the preliminary conference held on April 6,
1992. During the preliminary conference, all the parties as
represented by their respective counsels agreed that the
only issue for resolution was
8
whether the Lot in question is
part of the public domain.
The Court of Appeals’ Ruling
In a decision dated June 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals

granted the petition and declared null and void the decision
dated January 30, 1991 of the land registration court. The
Court of Appeals explained thus:
_______________
8 Rollo, p. 91.
352

“Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is enshrined in the 1935

(Art. XIII, Sec. 1), 1973 (Art. XIV, Sec. 8), and 1987 Constitution
(Art. XII, Sec. 2), all lands of the public domain belong to the
State. An applicant, like the private respondents herein, for
registration of a parcel of land bears the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of
the public domain (Director of Lands vs. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296).
A positive Act of government is needed to declassify a public
land and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Bacas, 176 SCRA
376).
In the case at bar, the private respondents failed to present
any evidence whatsoever that the land applied for as described in
Psu-162620 has been segregated from the bulk of the public
domain and declared by competent authority to be alienable and
disposable. Worse, the technical description of Psu-162620 signed
by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge, Survey Division,
Bureau of Lands, which was attached to the application of private
respondents, categorically stated that ‘This survey is inside IN-12
Mariquina Watershed.’ ”
That the land in question is within the Marikina Watershed
Reservation is confirmed by the Administrator of the National
Land Titles and Deeds in a Report, dated March 2, 1988,
submitted to the respondent Court in LR Case No. 269-A. These
documents readily and effectively negate the allegation in private
respondent Collado’s application that “said parcel of land known
as Psu-162620 is not covered by any form of title, nor any public
land application and are not within any government reservation
(Par. 8, Application; Emphasis supplied). The respondent court
could not have missed the import of these vital documents which
are binding upon the courts inasmuch as it is the exclusive
prerogative of the Executive Department to classify public lands.
They should have forewarned the respondent judge from
assuming jurisdiction over the case.
“x x x inasmuch as the said properties applied for by petitioners are part

of the public domain, it is the Director of Lands who has jurisdiction in
the disposition of the same (subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Natural Resources and Environment), and not the courts. x x x Even
assuming that petitioners did have the said properties surveyed even
before the same was declared to be part of the Busol Forest Reservation,
the fact remains that it was so converted into a forest reservation, thus it
is with more reason that this action must fail. Forest lands are
inalienable and possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot convert
the same into private property. And courts are without jurisdiction to
adjudicate lands within the forest
353
VOL. 390, OCTOBER 4, 2002 353

zone. (Heirs of Gumangan vs. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 563; Emphasis
supplied).
Needless to say, a final judgment may be annulled on the

ground of lack of jurisdiction, fraud or that it is contrary to law
(Panlilio vs. Garcia, 119 SCRA 387, 391) and a decision rendered
without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck9
down at
any time (Suarez vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 339).”
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioners are restated as follows:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY

ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION
OF THE TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE APPLICATION OF
THE PETITIONERS FOR CONFIRMATION OF TITLE;
II
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR

GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE
COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF
JUDGMENT FILED BY THE REPUBLIC LONG AFTER THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME FINAL;
III
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR

GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE
COURSE TO THE INTERVENORS’ PETITION FOR
INTERVENTION WHICH WAS FILED OUT OF TIME OR
LONG AFTER THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HAD
BECOME FINAL.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
_______________
9 Rollo, pp. 91-92.
354

First Issue: whether petitioners have registrable title

over the Lot.
There is no dispute that Executive

10
Order No. 33 (“EO 33”
for brevity) dated July 26, 1904 established the Marikina
Watershed Reservation (“MWR” for brevity) situated in the
Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioners even concede
that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, is inside the
technical, literal description of the MWR. However, the
main thrust of petitioners’ claim over the Lot is that “all
Presidential proclamations like the proclamation setting
aside the Marikina Watershed Reservation are subject to
private rights.” They point out that EO 33 contains a
saving clause that the reservations are “subject to existing
private rights, if any there be.” Petitioners contend that
their claim of ownership goes all the way back to 1902,
when their known predecessor-in-interest, Sesinando
Leyva, laid claim and ownership over the Lot. They claim
that the presumption of law then prevailing under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926 was
that the land possessed and claimed by individuals as their
own are agricultural lands and therefore alienable and
disposable. They conclude that private rights were vested
on Sesinando Leyva before the issuance of EO 33, thus
excluding the Lot from the Marikina Watershed
Reservation.
Petitioners’ arguments find no basis in law.
The Regalian Doctrine: An Overview

Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private
11
ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. The Spaniards first
introduced the doctrine to the Philippines through the
Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, specifically, Law
14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion
_______________
10 Issued by Governor Luke E. Wright pursuant to the provisions of Act

Numbered Six Hundred and Forty-Eight (Act No. 648), Philippine
Commission, an Act Authorizing the Civil Governor to reserve portions of
the public domain for public uses.
11 Republic vs. Sayo, 191 SCRA 71 (1990).
355
VOL. 390, OCTOBER 4, 2002 355

12
de Leyes de las Indias which laid the foundation that “all
lands that were not acquired from the Government, either 13
by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.”
Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of
all “lands, territories and possessions”

14
in the Philippines
passed to the Spanish Crown.
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley
Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish
Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of
titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The Royal
Decree of 1894 or the “Maura Law” partly amended the
Mortgage Law as well as the Law of the Indies. The Maura
Law was the last Spanish land law promulgated in the
Philippines. It required the “adjustment” or registration of
all agricultural
15
lands, otherwise the lands would revert to
the state.
Four years later, Spain ceded to the government of the
United States all rights, interests and claims over the
national territory of the Philippine Islands through the
Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. In 1903, the United
States colonial government, through the Philippine
Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act,
which was described as follows:
_______________
12 “We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands,
territories, and possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal
predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal crown
and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without proper
and true deeds of grants be restored to us according as they belong to us,
in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys,
audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways,
pastures, and commons in those places which are peopled, taking into
consideration not only their present condition, but also their future and
their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be
necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they now
have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may
remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose as we may wish.”
13 See separate opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz vs. Secretary
of Environment and Natural Resources, 347 SCRA 128 (2000); Chavez vs.
PEA and AMARI, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002, 384 SCRA 152.
14 Ibid., Chavez case.
15 See note 13.
356

“Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance
of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed
the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules
and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of
portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and
prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect
their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the
“issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands,”
for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the
completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or
confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands.” In

short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to
public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the
government; and that the government’s title to public land sprung
from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between
Spain and the United States. The term “public land” referred to
all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the
government and are thrown open to private appropriation and
settlement, and excluded the16 patrimonial property of the
government and the friar lands.”
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under

the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926,
mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the
legal presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.
Act 2874, the second Public Land Act, superseded Act
No. 926 in 1919. After the passage of the 1935
Constitution, Commonwealth Act No. 141 (“CA 141” for
brevity) amended Act 2874 in 1936. CA 141, as amended,
remains to this day as the existing general law governing
the classification and disposition of lands 17of the public
domain other than timber and mineral lands.
In the meantime, in order to establish a system of
registration by which recorded title becomes absolute,
indefeasible and imprescriptible, the legislature passed Act
496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, which
took effect on February 1, 1903. Act 496 placed all
registered
18
lands in the Philippines under the Torrens
system. The Torrens system requires the government to
issue a certificate of title stating that the person named in
the title
_______________
16 Ibid., emphasis supplied.

17 Ibid.
18 Noblejas & Noblejas, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1992 Ed.
357
VOL. 390, OCTOBER 4, 2002 357

is the owner of the property described therein, subject to

liens and encumbrances annotated on the title or reserved
by law. The certificate of title is indefeasible and
imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel
19
of land are
quieted upon issuance of the certificate. PD 1529, known
as the20 Property Registration Decree enacted on June 11,
1978, amended and updated Act 496.
The 1935, 1973, 1987 Philippine Constitutions

The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the
Regalian doctrine substituting, however, the state, in lieu
of the King, as the owner of all lands and waters of the
21
21
public domain. Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his separate
opinion in 22Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources, explained thus:
“One of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935

Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and
conservation of the natural resources of the country. There was an
overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor of the principle
of state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the
Regalian doctrine. State ownership of natural resources was seen
as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the state’s
power to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention very
well knew that the concept of State ownership of land and natural
resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were
not certain whether it was continued and applied by the
Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention approved the
provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine.”
23
Thus, Section 1, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, on
“Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources” barred
the aliena-
_______________
19 Supra, see note 13.

21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Sec. 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines
belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations
358

tion of all natural resources except public agricultural

lands, which were the only natural resources the State
could alienate. The 1973 Constitution reiterated
24
the
Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV on the
“National Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation.” The
1987 Constitution reaffirmed
25
the Regalian doctrine in
Section 2 of Article XII on “National Economy and
Patrimony.”
_______________
or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned

by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession
at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural
land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources

shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, except as to
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other
than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may
be the measure and the limit of the grant.”
24 Sec 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial,
residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural
resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for
the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the
natural resources shall be granted for a period not exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to water
rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than
the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the
measure and the limit of the grant.”
25 “Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources
are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development
and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities
or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and
conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water
359
VOL. 390, OCTOBER 4, 2002 359

Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the

alienation of all natural resources except agricultural lands
of the public domain. The 1987 Constitution readopted this
policy. Indeed, all lands of the public domain as well as all
natural resources enumerated in the Philippine
Constitution belong to the State.
Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource

The term “natural resource” includes “not only timber, gas,
oil, coal, minerals, lakes, and submerged lands, but also,
features which supply a human need and contribute to the
health, welfare, and benefit of a community, and are
essential to the well-being thereof and proper enjoyment
26
of
property devoted to park and recreational purposes.”
In Sta. Rosa27 Realty Development Corp. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., the Court had occasion to discourse on
watershed areas. The Court resolved the issue of whether
the parcel of land which the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources had assessed to be a watershed

area is exempt from the coverage of RA No. 6657 or the
Comprehensive
28
Agrarian Reform Law (“CARL” for
brevity). The Court defined watershed as “an area drained
by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or
divide which separates it from adjacent watersheds.”
However, the Court also recognized that:
“The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a

watershed. The most important product of a watershed is water
which is one of the most important human necessit(ies). The
protection of watershed
_______________
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power,
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant. x x x.”
26 Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., 1990.
27 G.R. No. 112526, October 12, 2001, 367 SCRA 175.
28 R.A. No. 6657 has suspended the authority of the President to reclassify
forest or mineral lands into agricultural lands. Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 6657
(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) states, “No reclassification of
forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the
approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental
and equity considerations, shall have delimited by law, the specific limits of the
public domain.”
360

ensures an adequate supply of water for future generations and

the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but also
cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an
“intergenerational” responsibility that needs to be answered now.”
Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067)

provides:
“Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any

surface water or overlying any ground water may be declared by
the Department of Natural Resources as a protected area. Rules
and Regulations may be promulgated by such Department to
prohibit or control such activities by the owners or occupants
thereof within the protected area which may damage or cause the
deterioration of the surface water or ground water or interfere
with the investigation, use, control, protection, management or
administration of such waters.”
The Court in Sta. Rosa Realty also recognized the need to

protect watershed areas and took note of the report of the
Ecosystems Research and Development Bureau (ERDB), a
research arm of the DENR, regarding the environmental
assessment of the Casile and Kabanga-an river watersheds
involved in that case. That report concluded as follows:
“The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is situated in

the heartland of both watersheds. Considering the barangays
proximity to the Matangtubig waterworks, the activities of the
farmers which are in conflict with proper soil and water
conservation practices jeopardize and endanger the vital
waterworks. Degradation of the land would have double edge
detrimental effects. On the Casile side this would mean direct
siltation of the Mangumit river which drains to the water
impounding reservoir below. On the Kabanga-an side, this would
mean destruction of forest covers which acts as recharged areas of
the Matangtubig springs. Considering that the people have little
if no direct interest in the protection of the Matangtubig
structures they couldn’t care less even if it would be destroyed.
The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be considered a
most vital life support system to thousands of inhabitants directly
and indirectly affected by it. From these watersheds come the
natural God-given precious resource—water. x x x
Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with
sound watershed management. More so, the introduction of earth
disturbing
361
VOL. 390, OCTOBER 4, 2002 361

activities like road building and erection of permanent

infrastructures. Unless the pernicious agricultural activities of
the Casile farmers are immediately stopped, it would not be long
before these watersheds would cease to be of value. The impact of
watershed degradation threatens the livelihood of thousands of
people dependent upon it. Toward this, we hope that an
acceptable comprehensive watershed development policy and
program be immediately formulated and implemented before the
irreversible damage finally happens.”
The Court remanded the case to the Department of

Agriculture and Adjudication Board or DARAB to re-
evaluate and determine the nature of the parcels of land
involved in order to resolve the issue of its coverage by the
CARL.
Sta. Rosa Realty gives us a glimpse of the dangers posed
by the misuse of natural resources such as watershed
reservations which are akin to forest zones. Population
growth and industrialization have taken a heavy toll on the
environment. Environmental degradation from unchecked
human activities could wreak havoc on the lives of present
and future generations. Hence, by constitutional fiat,
natural resources remain to this day inalienable properties
of the State.
Viewed under this legal and factual backdrop, did
petitioners acquire, as they vigorously argue, private rights
over the parcel of land prior to the issuance of EO 33
segregating the same as a watershed reservation?
The answer is in the negative.
First. An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title

bears the burden of proving that he meets the
requirements of Section 48 of CA 141, as amended. He
must overcome the presumption that the land he is
applying for is part of the public domain and that he has an
interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his
name arising from an imperfect title. An imperfect title
may have been derived from old Spanish grants such as a
titulo real or royal grant, a concession especial or special
grant, a composicion con el estado or adjustment
29
title, or a
titulo de compra or title through purchase. Or, that he has
had continuous, open and notorious posses-
_______________
29 Section 48 of CA 141 provides:
362

sion and occupation of agricultural lands of the public

domain under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least
thirty years preceding the filing of his application as
provided by Section 48 (b) CA 141.
Originally, Section 48(b) of CA 141 provided for
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain
since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by RA 1942 which
provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of
occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of an
imperfect title. The same, however, has already been
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on
January 25, 1977, the law prevailing at the time
petitioners’
30
application for registration was filed on April
25, 1985. As amended, Section 48 (b) now reads:
“(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-

interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by
wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and
_______________
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the

public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act,
to wit:
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United
States have applied for the purchase, composition or other form of grant of lands of
the public domain under the laws and royal decrees then in force and have
instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in connection therewith, but have, with
or without default upon their part, or for any other cause, not received title
therefor, and such applicants or grantee and their heirs have occupied and
cultivated said lands continuously since the filing of their applications. See
Director, Lands Management Bureau vs. Court of Appeals, 324 SCRA 757 (2000).
30 Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA 451 (2001).
363
VOL. 390, OCTOBER 4, 2002 363

shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this

chapter.”
Interpreting Section 48 (b) of CA 141, the Court stated that

the Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove
the following:
“(a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period
prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law
are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law,
acquires a right to a grant, a government31 grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued.”
Petitioners do not claim to have documentary title over the

Lot. Their right to register the Lot is predicated mainly
upon continuous possession since 1902.
Clearly, petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and
enforceable right or title because of the failure to complete
the required period of possession, whether under the
original Section 48 (b) of CA 141 prior to the issuance of EO
33, or under the amendment by RA 1942 and PD 1073.
There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33 in
1904, petitioners had acquired ownership or title to the Lot
either by deed or by any other mode of acquisition from the
State, as for instance by acquisitive prescription. As of
1904, Sesinando Leyva had only been in possession for two
years. Verily, petitioners have not possessed the parcel of
land in the manner and for the number of years required
by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, assuming that the Lot was alienable and
disposable land prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, EO
33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since then, the Lot
became non-disposable and inalienable public land. At the
time petitioners filed their application on April 25, 1985,
the Lot has been reserved as a watershed under EO 33 for
81 years prior to the filing of petitioners’ application.
_______________
31 Ibid.
364

The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in 1904

could no longer be counted because as a watershed
reservation, the Lot was no longer susceptible of occupancy,
disposition, conveyance or alienation. Section 48 (b) of CA
141, as amended, applies exclusively to alienable and
disposable public agricultural land. Forest lands, including
watershed reservations, are excluded. It is axiomatic that
the possession of forest lands or other inalienable public
lands cannot ripen into private ownership. In 32Municipality
of Santiago, Isabela vs. Court of Appeals, the Court
declared that inalienable public lands—
“x x x cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. Prescription,

both acquisitive and extinctive, does not run against the State.
“The possession of public land, however long the period may have
extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the
statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against
the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the
same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to
constitute a grant from the State.’ ”
33
Third, Gordula vs. Court of Appeals is in point. In
Gordula, petitioners did not contest the nature of the land.
They admitted that the land lies in the heart of the
Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, which Proclamation
No. 573 classified as inalienable. The petitioners in
Gordula contended, however, that Proclamation No. 573
itself recognizes private rights of landowners prior to the
reservation. They claim to have established their private
rights to the subject land. The Court ruled:
“We do not agree. No public land can be acquired by private

persons without any grant, express or implied from the
from the state. The facts show that petitioner Gordula did not
acquire title to the subject land prior to its reservation under
Proclamation No. 573. He filed his application for free patent only
in January, 1973, more than three (3) years after the issuance of
Proclamation No. 573 in June, 1969. At that time, the land, as
part of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, was no longer
open to private
_______________
32 120 SCRA 734 (1983).

33 284 SCRA 617 (1998).
365
VOL. 390, OCTOBER 4, 2002 365
ownership as it has been classified as public forest reserve for the

public good.
Nonetheless, petitioners insist that the term, “private rights,”
in Proclamation No. 573, should not be interpreted as requiring a
title. They opine that it suffices if the claimant “had occupied and
cultivated the property for so many number of years, declared the
land for taxation purposes, [paid] the corresponding real estate
taxes [which are] accepted by the government, and [his]
occupancy and possession [is] continuous, open and unmolested
and recognized by the government. Prescinding from this premise,
petitioners urge that the 25-year possession by petitioner Gordula
from 1944 to 1969, albeit five (5) years short of the 30-year
possession required under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, as
amended, is enough to vest upon petitioner Gordula the “private
rights” recognized and respected in Proclamation No. 573.
The case law does not support this submission. In Director of
Lands vs. Reyes, we held that a settler claiming the protection of
“private rights” to exclude his land from a military or forest
reservation must show “x x x by clear and convincing evidence
that the property in question was acquired by [any] x x x means
for the acquisition of public lands.”
In fine, one claiming “private rights” must prove that he has
complied with C.A. No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the
Public Land Act, which prescribes the substantive as well as the
procedural requirements for acquisition of public lands. This law
requires at least thirty (30) years of open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and possession of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for free patent.
The rationale for the 30-year period lies in the presumption that
the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants
and/or possessors claim an interest therein only by virtue of their
imperfect title or continuous, open and notorious possession.”
Next, petitioners argue that assuming no private rights

had attached to the Lot prior to EO 33 in 1904, the
President of the Philippines had subsequently segregated
the Lot from the public domain and made the Lot alienable
and disposable when he issued Proclamation No. 1283 on
June 21, 1974. Petitioners contend that Proclamation No.
1283 expressly excluded an area of 3,780 hectares from the
MWR and made the area part of the Boso-boso Townsite
Reservation. Petitioners assert that Lot Psu-162620 is a
small part of this excluded town site area. Petitioners
further con-
366

tend that town sites are considered alienable and

disposable under CA 141.
Proclamation No. 1283 reads thus:
“PROCLAMATION NO. 1283
EXCLUDING FROM THE OPERATION EXECUTIVE ORDER

NO. 33, DATED JULY 26, 1904, AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE
ORDERS NOS. 14 AND 16, BOTH SERIES OF 1915, WHICH
ESTABLISHED THE WATERSHED RESERVATION SITUATED
IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF
RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON, A CERTAIN PORTION OF THE
LAND EMBRACED THEREIN AND RESERVING THE SAME,
TOGETHER WITH THE ADJACENT PARCEL OF LAND OF
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, FOR TOWNSITE PURPOSES UNDER
THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER XI OF THE PUBLIC LAND
ACT.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by
law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines,
do hereby, exclude from the operation of Executive Order No. 33
dated July 26, 1904, as amended by Executive Orders Nos. 14 and
16, both series of 1915, which established the Watershed
Reservation situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of
Rizal, Island of Luzon, certain portions of land embraced therein
and reserve the same, together with the adjacent parcel of land of
the public domain, for townsite purposes under the provisions of
Chapter XI of the Public Land Act, subject to private rights, if any
there be, and to future subdivision survey in accordance with the
development plan to be prepared and approved by the
Department of Local Government and Community Development,
which parcels are more particularly described as follows:
Lot A (Part of Watershed Reservation)
A parcel of land (Lot A of Proposed Poor Man’s Baguio, being a

portion of the Marikina Watershed, IN-2), situated in the
municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon,
beginning at a point marked “1” on sketch plan, being N-74’—30
E, 8480.00 meters more or less, from BLLM 1, Antipolo, Rizal;
thence N 33’ 28 W 1575.00 m. to point 2; thence N 40’ 26 W
1538.50 m. to point 3; thence N 30’ 50W 503.17 m. to point 4;
thence N 75’ 02 W 704.33 m. to point 5; thence N 14’ 18 W 1399.39
m. to point 6; thence N 43’ 25 W 477.04 m. to point 7; thence N 71’
38 W 458.36 m. to point 8; thence N 31’ 05 W 1025.00 m. to point
9; thence Due North 490.38 m. to point 10; thence Due North
1075.00 m. to point 11; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 12;
thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 13;
367
VOL. 390, OCTOBER 4, 2002 367

thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 14; thence Due East 1000.00
m. to point 15; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 16; thence
Due East 1000.00 m. to point 17; thence Due East 1075.00 m. to
point 18; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 19; thence Due
South 1000.00 m. to point 20; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to
South 1000.00 m. to point 23; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to
West 1000.00 m. to point 26; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point
27; thence Due West 636.56 m. to point of beginning. Containing
an area of three thousand seven hundred eighty (3,780) Hectares,
more or less.
Lot B (Alienable and Disposable Land)
A parcel of land (Lot B of Proposed Poor Man’s Baguio, being a

portion of alienable and disposable portion of public domain)
situated in the municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island
of Luzon. Beginning at a point marked “1” on sketch plan being N
74’ 30 E., 8430.00 m., more or less, from BLLM 1. Antipolo, Rizal;
thence Due West 363.44 m. to point 2; thence Due West 1000.00
m. to point 3; thence Due West 100.00 m. to point 4; thence Due
West 1000.00 m. to point 5; thence Due West 1075.00 m. to point
6; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 7; thence Due North
1000.00 m. to point 8; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 9;
thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 10; thence Due North
1000.00 m. to point 11; thence Due North 509.62 m. to point 12;
thence S. 31’ 05 E 1025.00 m. to point 13; thence S 71’ 38 E 458.36
m. to point 14; thence S 43’ 25 E 477.04 m. to point 15; thence S
14’ 18 E 1399.39 m. to point 16; thence S 75’ 02 E 704.33 m. to
point 17; thence S. 30’ 50 E 503.17 m. to point 18; thence S 40’ 26
E 1538.50 m. to point 19; thence s 33’ 23 e 1575.00 m to point of
beginning. Containing an area of one thousand two hundred
twenty five (1,225) Hectares, more or less.
Note: All data are approximate and subject to change based on
future survey.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I Have hereunto set my hand and
caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 21st day of June, in the year of
Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-four.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines”
368

Proclamation No. 1283 has since been amended by

Proclamation No. 1637 issued on April 18, 1977.
Proclamation No. 1637 revised the area and location of the
proposed townsite. According to then DENR Secretary
Victor O. Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637 excluded Lot A (of
which the Lot claimed by petitioners is part)
34
for townsite
purposes and reverted it to MWR coverage. Proclamation
No. 1637 reads:
“PROCLAMATION NO. 1637
AMENDING PROCLAMATION NO. 1283, DATED JUNE 21,

1974, WHICH ESTABLISHED THE TOWNSITE RESERVATION
IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF ANTIPOLO AND SAN MATEO,
PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON BY INCREASING
THE AREA AND REVISING THE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION

OF THE LAND EMBRACED THEREIN, AND REVOKING
PROCLAMATION NO. 765 DATED OCTOBER 26, 1970 THAT
RESERVED PORTIONS OF THE AREA AS RESETTLEMENT
SITE.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Natural Resources
and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I,
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do
hereby amend Proclamation No. 1283, dated June 21, 1974 which
established the townsite reservation in the municipalities of
Antipolo and San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, by
increasing the area and revising the technical descriptions of the
land embraced therein, subject to private rights, if any there be,
which parcel of land is more particularly described as follows:
(Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite)
A PARCEL OF LAND (Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite

Reservation amending the area under SWO-41762 establishing
the Bagong Silangan Townsite Reservation) situated in the
Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo, and Montalban, Province
of Rizal, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the E., along lines 1-2-3-4-5-
6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15-16-17-18-19-20-21-22-23 by the
Marikina Watershed Reservation (IN-12); on the S., along lines
23-24-25 by the portion of Antipolo; on the W., along lines 25-26-
27-28-29-30 by the Municipalities of Montalban, San Mateo; and
on the N., along lines 30-31-32-33-34-35-36-37-38-39-40-41-42-43-
44 by the Angat Watershed Reservation. Beginning at a point
marked “1” on the Topographic Maps with the Scale of 1:50,000
which is the identical corner 38 IN-12, Marikina Watershed
Reservation.
_______________
34 Memorandum of then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos to the President of

the Philippines dated March 29, 1996, Rollo, pp. 439-440.
369
VOL. 390, OCTOBER 4, 2002 369

x x x x x x x x x
NOTE: All data are approximate and subject to change based
on future survey.
Proclamation No. 765 dated October 26, 1970, which covered
areas entirely within the herein Lungsod Silangan Townsite, is
hereby revoked accordingly.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of April, in the year
of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-seven.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President of the Philippines”
A positive act (e.g., an official proclamation) of the

Executive Department is needed to declassify land which
had been earlier classified as a watershed reservation and

to convert it into alienable35 or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes. Unless and until the land
classified as such is released in an official proclamation so
that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain, 36
the rules on confirmation of imperfect
title do not apply.
The principal document presented by petitioners to
prove the private character of the Lot is the Certification of
the Bureau of Forest Development dated March 18, 1986
that the Lot is excluded from the Marikina Watershed
(Exh. “R”). The Certification reads:
“Republic of the Philippines

Ministry of Natural Resources
BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT
REGION IV
EL-AL Building
100 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City
Mar. 18, 1986
VERIFICATION ON THE STATUS OF LAND:
_______________
35 Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 1 (1991).

36 Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69 (1983).
370

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the tract of land situated in Barangay

San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, containing an area of 1,269,766 square
meters, as shown and described on the reverse side hereof,
surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Telesforo Cabading for Angelina
C. Reynoso, is verified to be within the area excluded from the
operation of Marikina Watershed Reservation established under
Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904 per Proclamation No.
1283, promulgated on June 21, 1974, which established the Boso-
Boso Townsite Reservation, amended by proclamation No. 1637
dated April 18, 1977 known as Lungsod Silangan Townsite
Reservation.
Subject area also falls within the bounds of Bagong Lipunan
Site under P.D. 1396 dated June 2, 1978 under the sole
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Human Settlements, to the
exclusion of any other government agencies.
This verification is made upon the request of the Chief, Legal
Staff, R-4 as contained in his internal memorandum dated March
18, 1986.
Verified by:
(Sgd) ROMEO C. PASCUBILLO
Cartographer II
Checked by:
(Sgd) ARMENDO R. CRUZ
Supervising Cartographer
ATTESTED:
(Sgd) LUIS G. DACANAY
Chief, Forest Engineering &
Infrastructure Section”
The above certification on which petitioners rely that a

reclassification had occurred, and that the Lot is covered by
the reclassification, is contradicted by several documents
submitted by the Solicitor General before the land
registration court.
The Solicitor General
37
submitted to the land registration
court a Report dated March 2, 1988, signed by
Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the then National
Land Titles and Deeds Registration
_______________
37 Rollo, p. 197.
371
VOL. 390, OCTOBER 4, 2002 371

Administration, confirming that the Lot described in Psu-

162620 forms part of the MWR. He thus recommended the
dismissal of the application for registration. The Report
states:
“COMES NOW the Administrator of the National Land Titles and

Deeds Registration Commission and to this Honorable Court
respectfully reports that:
1. A parcel of land described in plan Psu-162620 situated in the

Barrio of San Isidro, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal,
is applied for registration of title in the case at bar.
2. After plotting plan Psu-162620 in our Municipal Index Map it
was found that a portion of the SW, described as Lot 3 in plan
Psu-173790 was previously the subject of registration in Land
Reg. Case No. N-9578, LRC Record No. N-55948 and was issued
Decree No. N-191242 on April 4, 1986 in the name of Apolonia
Garcia, et al., pursuant to the Decision and Order for Issuance of
the Decree dated February 8, 1984 and March 6, 1984,
respectively, and the remaining portion of plan Psu-162620 is
inside IN-12, Marikina Watershed. x x x
“WHEREFORE, this matter is respectfully submitted to the Honorable

Court for its information and guidance with the recommendation that the
application in the instant proceedings be dismissed, after due hearing
(Italics supplied).”
38
Likewise, in a letter dated November 11, 1991, the Deputy
Land Inspector, DENR, Region IV, Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office, Antipolo,

Rizal, similarly confirmed that the Lot is within the MWR.
The letter states:
“That the land sought to be registered is situated at San Isidro

(Boso-boso), Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of ONE HUNDRED
TWENTY SIX POINT ZERO SEVEN SIXTY SIX (126.0766)
hectares, more particularly described in Psu-162620, which is
within the Marikina Watershed Reservation under Executive
Order No. 33 dated July 2, 1904 which established the Marikina
Watershed Reservation (IN-12) x x x.
“x x x
“That the land sought to be registered is not a private property
of the Registration Applicant but part of the public domain, not
subjected to
_______________
38 Ibid., p. 198.
372

disposition and is covered by Proclamation No. 585 for Integrated

Social Forestry Program hence, L.R.C. No. 269-A is recommended
for rejection (Italics supplied).” Copy of the letter is attached
herewith as Annex ‘3’ and made an integral part hereof.”
Lastly, the Solicitor General pointed out that attached to

petitioner Edna T. Collado’s [as original 39
applicant]
application is the technical description of the Lot signed
by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey
Division of the Bureau of Lands. This technical description
categorically stated that the Lot “is inside IN-12 Mariquina
Watershed.”
The evidence of record thus appears unsatisfactory and
insufficient to show clearly and positively that the Lot had
been officially released from the Marikina Watershed
Reservation to form part of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain. We hold that once a parcel of
land is included within a watershed reservation duly
established by Executive Proclamation, as in the instant
case, a presumption arises that the land continues to be
part of such Reservation until clear and convincing
evidence of subsequent declassification is shown.
It is obvious, based on the facts on record that neither
petitioners nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the Lot for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title. Even if they submitted sufficient proof that the Lot
had been excluded from the MWR upon the issuance of
Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974, petitioners’
possession as of the filing of their application on April 25,
1985 would have been only eleven years counted from the
issuance of the proclamation in 1974. The result will not

change even if we tack in the two years Sesinando Leyva
allegedly possessed the Lot from 1902 until the issuance of
EO 33 in 1904. Petitioners’ case falters even more because
of the issuance of Proclamation No. 1637 on April 18, 1977.
According to then DENR Secretary Victor Ramos,
Proclamation No. 1637 reverted Lot A or the townsite
reservation, where petitioners’ Lot is supposedly situated,
back to the MWR.
_______________
39 CA Rollo, p. 117.
373
VOL. 390, OCTOBER 4, 2002 373

Finally, it is of no moment if the areas of the MWR are now

fairly populated and vibrant communities as claimed by
petitioners. The following ruling may be applied to this
case by analogy:
“A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does

not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may
have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as
forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops
by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. “Forest lands” do not
have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy
areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms and other trees
growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest
land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status
and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks
like. Unless and until the land classified as “forest” is released in
an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of
the disposable agricultural lands of the public40domain, the rules
on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.”
Second Issue: Whether the petition for annulment of

judgment
should have been given due course.
Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for giving due course

to the Republic’s petition for annulment of judgment which
was filed long after the decision of the land registration
court had allegedly become final and executory. The land
registration court rendered its decision on January 30,
1991 and the Solicitor General41
received a copy of the
decision on April 23, 1991. Petitioners point out that the
Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals the
petition for annulment
42
of judgment invoking Section 9(2) of
B.P. Blg. 129 only on August 6, 1991, after the decision
had supposedly become final and executory. Moreover,
petitioners further point out that
_______________

41 Petitioners claim that the Solicitor General received a copy of the
decision as early as February 18, 1991.
42 Sec. 9. Jurisdiction.—The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
x x x.
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of
Regional Trial Courts;
x x x.
374

the Solicitor General filed the petition for annulment after

the land registration court issued its order of May 6, 1991
directing the Land Registration Authority to issue the
corresponding decree of registration.
The Solicitor General sought the annulment of the
decision on the ground that the land registration court had
no jurisdiction over the case, specifically, over the Lot
which was not alienable and disposable. The Solicitor
General maintained that the decision was null and void.
Petitioners argue that the remedy of annulment of
judgment is no longer available because it is barred by the
principle of res judicata. They insist that the land
registration court had jurisdiction over the case which
involves private land. They also argue that the Republic is
estopped from questioning the land registration court’s
jurisdiction considering that the Republic participated in
the proceedings before the court.
It is now established that the Lot, being a watershed
reservation, is not alienable and disposable public land.
The evidence of the petitioners do not clearly and
convincingly show that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-
162620, ceased to be a portion of the area classified as a
watershed reservation of the public domain. Any title to the
Lot is void ab initio. In view of this, the alleged procedural
infirmities attending the filing of the petition for
annulment of judgment are immaterial since the land
registration court never acquired jurisdiction over the Lot.
All proceedings of the land registration court involving the
Lot are therefore null and void. 43
We apply our ruling in Martinez vs. Court of Appeals,
as follows:
“The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-

registrable properties, such as public navigable rivers which are
parts of the public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the
registration of title in favor of private applicant. Hence, the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga as regards
the Lot No. 2 of certificate of Title No. 15856 in the name of
petitioners may be attacked at any time, either directly or
collaterally, by the State which is not bound by any prescriptive

period provided for by the Statute of Limitations.”
_______________
43 56 SCRA 647 (1974).
375
VOL. 390, OCTOBER 4, 2002 375

We also hold that environmental consequences in this case

override concerns over technicalities and rules of
procedure. 44
In Republic vs. De los Angeles, which involved the
registration of public lands, specifically parts of the sea, the
Court rejected the principle of res judicata and estoppel to
silence the Republic’s claim over public lands. The Court
said:
“It should be noted further that the doctrine of estoppel or laches

does not apply when the Government sues as a sovereign or
asserts governmental rights, nor does estoppel or laches validate
an act that contravenes law or public policy, and that res judicata
is to be disregarded if its application would involve the sacrifice of
justice to technicality.”
The Court further held that “the right of reversion or

reconveyance to the State of the public properties
registered and which are not capable of private
appropriation or private acquisition does not prescribe.”
Third issue: Whether the petition-in-intervention is

proper.
The Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an

association of holders of certificates of stewardship issued
by the DENR under its Integrated Social Forestry
Program, filed with the Court of Appeals on November 29,
1991 a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit
Petition-In-Intervention.
According to intervenors, they are the actual occupants
of the Lot which petitioners sought to register. Aware that
the parcels of land which their forefathers had occupied,
developed and tilled belong to the Government, they filed a
petition with then President Corazon C. Aquino and then
DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, to award the
parcels of land to them.
Secretary Factoran directed the Director of Forest
Management Bureau to take steps for the segregation of
the aforementioned area from the MWR for development
under the DENR’s ISF Programs. Subsequently, then
President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 585 dated June
5, 1990 excluding 1,430 hectares from the op-
_______________
44 159 SCRA 264 (1988).
376

eration of EO 33 and placed the same under the DENR’s

Integrated Social Forestry Program. Proclamation No. 585
reads:
PROCLAMATION NO. 585
AMENDING FURTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED

JULY 26, 1904 WHICH ESTABLISHED THE MARIKINA
WATERSHED RESERVATION (IN-12) AS AMENDED, BY
EXCLUDING CERTAIN PORTIONS OF LANDS EMBRACED
THEREIN SITUATED AT SITIOS BOSOBOSO, KILINGAN,
VETERANS, BARANGAYS SAN JOSEPH AND PAENAAN,
MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL,
ISLAND OF LUZON.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by
law, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do
hereby exclude from the operation of Executive Order No. 33,
which established the Marikina Watershed Reservation, certain
parcel of land of the public domain embraced therein situated in
Sitios Bosoboso, Veterans, Kilingan and Barangay San Joseph
and Paenaan, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal and
place the same under the Integrated Social Forestry Program of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in
accordance with existing laws, rules and regulations, which parcel
of land is more particularly described as follows:
“A PARCEL OF LAND, within the Marikina Watershed Reservation

situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, beginning at
point “1” on plan, being identical to corner 1 of Marikina Watershed
Reservation; thence
x x x x x x x x x
Containing an area of One Thousand Four Hundred Thirty (1,430)
Hectares.
All other lands covered and embraced under Executive Order No. 33
as amended, not otherwise affected by this Proclamation, shall remain in
force and effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and

Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of
Our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
President of the Philippines”
377
VOL. 390, OCTOBER 4, 2002 377
Pursuant to Proclamation No. 585, the chief of the ISF

Unit, acting through the Regional Executive Director of the
DENR (Region IV), issued sometime between the years
1989 to 1991 certificates of stewardship contracts to bona
fide residents of the barangays mentioned in the
proclamation as qualified recipients of the ISF programs.
Among those awarded were intervenors. The certificates of
stewardship are actually contracts of lease granted by the
DENR to actual occupants of parcels of land under its ISF
programs for a period of twenty-five45 (25) years, renewable
for another twenty-five (25) years. The DENR awarded
contracts of stewardship to ISF participants in Barangay
San Isidro (or Boso-boso) and the other barangays based on
the Inventory
46
of Forest Occupants the DENR had
conducted.
According to intervenors, they learned only on July 31,
1991 about the pendency of LRC Case No. 269-A before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. On August 8, 1991,
they filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit
Opposition in Intervention before the land registration
court to assert their rights and to protect their interests.
However, shortly after the filing of their opposition,
intervenors learned that the land registration court had
already rendered a decision on January 30, 1991
confirming petitioners’ imperfect title. Intervenors’ counsel
received a copy of the decision on August 9, 1991.
On August 14, 1991, intervenors filed a motion to vacate
judgment and for new trial before the land registration
court. According to intervenors, the land registration court
could not act on its motions due to the restraining order
issued by the Court of Appeals on August 8, 1991, enjoining
the land registration court from executing its decision, as
prayed for by the Solicitor General in its petition for
annulment of judgment. The intervenors were thus
constrained to file a petition for intervention before the
Court of Appeals which allowed the same.
_______________
45 CA Rollo, p. 119.
46 Ibid., p. 88.
378

47
Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides in
pertinent parts:
Section 1. Who may intervene.—A person who has a legal interest

in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court, or an officer thereof may,

with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The
Court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully
protected in a separate proceeding.
Sec. 2. Time to intervene.—The motion to intervene may be
filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A
copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the
motion and served on the original parties.
As a rule, intervention is allowed “before rendition of

judgment by the trial court,” as Section 2, Rule 19
expressly provides. However, the Court has recognized
exceptions to this rule in the
48
interest of substantial justice.
Mago vs. Court of Appeals reiterated the ruling in Director
of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, where the Court allowed the
motions for intervention even when the case had already
reached this Court. Thus, in Mago the Court held that:
“It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed
by the movants at this stage of the proceedings where trial had
already been concluded x x x and on appeal x x x the same
affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the instant petition for
certiorari to review said judgment is already submitted for
decision by the Supreme Court, are obviously and, manifestly
late, beyond the period prescribed under x x x Section 2, Rule 12
of the rules of Court.
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein
promulgated, is simply a rule of procedure, the whole purpose and
object of which is to make the powers of the Court fully and
completely available for justice. The purpose of procedure is not to
thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of
justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not
to hinder and delay but to facilitate and pro-
_______________
47 Rule 12 under the old Rules of Court.

48 303 SCRA 600 (1999).
379
VOL. 390, OCTOBER 4, 2002 379

mote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing

itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is
designed as the means best adopted to obtain that thing. In other
words, it is a means to an end.”
To be sure, the Court of Appeals, did not pass upon the

actual status of intervenors in relation to the Lot as this
was not in issue. Neither was the validity of the certificates
of stewardship contracts which intervenors allegedly
possessed inquired into considering this too was not in
issue. In fact, intervenors did not specifically seek any
relief apart from a declaration that the Lot in question

remains inalienable land of the public domain. We cannot
fault the Court of Appeals for allowing the intervention, if
only to provide the rival groups a peaceful venue for
ventilating their sides. This case has already claimed at
least five lives due to the raging dispute between the rival
camps of the petitioners on one side and those of the DENR
awardees on the other. It also spawned a number of
criminal cases between the two rival groups including
malicious mischief, robbery and arson. A strict application
of the rules would blur this bigger, far more important
picture.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated June 22, 1992 declaring null
and void the Decision dated January 30, 1991 of Branch 71,
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, in LRC No. 269-A,
LRC Rec. No. N-59179 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug (Actg. Chairman) and Ynares-Santiago, JJ.,

concur.
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), On official leave.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Note.—The possession of forest land, however long,

never confers title upon the possessor because the statute
of limitations with regard to public land does not run
against the State, unless the occupant can prove a grant
from the State. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA
104 [2000])
——o0o——
380
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3/17/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 390

VOL. 390, OCTOBER 4, 2002 343

EDNA COLLADO, BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO C.

Constitutional Law; Forest; Natural Resources; Land Titles;

344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Collado vs. Court of Appeals

essential to the well-being thereof and proper enjoyment of

ripen into private ownership. In Municipality of San-tiago,

VOL. 390, OCTOBER 4, 2002 345

Collado vs. Court of Appeals

of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against

Same; Same; Same; Same; The right of reversion or

346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Collado vs. Court of Appeals

involved the registration of public lands, specifically parts of the

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

On April 25, 1985, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the

1 Filed under both Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court.

VOL. 390, OCTOBER 4, 2002 347

with an approximate area of 1,200,766 square meters or

“1. SESINANDO LEYVA was the earliest known

4 Co-petitioners Bernardina Tawas, Joseto C. Torres, Jose Amo, Sergio

348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ous possession of the property in the concept of

MARCIANO, CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO

VOL. 390, OCTOBER 4, 2002 349

OWNERS GLORIA R. SERRANO, IMELDA

During the hearing on January 9, 1991, only the assistant

The Trial Court’s Ruling

After appraisal of the evidence submitted by petitioners,

bearing trees; portions to palay and portions used for grazing

6 Consolidated Rejoinder, pp. 39-41; Rollo, pp. 285-287.

350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In a motion dated April 5, 1991, received by the Solicitor

appeal. However, the Provincial Prosecutor failed to

7 Rollo, pp. 80-82.

VOL. 390, OCTOBER 4, 2002 351

According to the Solicitor General, he received on April 23,

The Court of Appeals’ Ruling

In a decision dated June 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals

352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is enshrined in the 1935

“x x x inasmuch as the said properties applied for by petitioners are part

VOL. 390, OCTOBER 4, 2002 353

Needless to say, a final judgment may be annulled on the

Hence, the instant petition.

The issues raised by petitioners are restated as follows:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

9 Rollo, pp. 91-92.

354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

First Issue: whether petitioners have registrable title

There is no dispute that Executive