Nhom5 Case Study
Nhom5 Case Study
Nhom5 Case Study
CASE STUDY:
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
Tên giảng viên : Nguyễn Anh Duy
Mã môn : ECO1103E
Năm học : 2020-2021 Học kỳ: 2A
Nhóm 5 – Tên thành viên :
- Nguyễn Minh Thư : 195081720
- Trần Thị Kim Trang : 195080945
- Trần Khả Vy : 195080704
- Trần Hoài Phát : 195081739
- Nguyễn Phạm Minh Anh : 195082463
- Nguyễn Bích Trâm : 195080788
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under ASEAN, accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2007
and signing the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) in 2015
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Figure 2. Current account balance of VietNam in percent of GDP
Figure 3 shows the development of gross foreign debt of Vietnam in US-dollar.
Foreign debt after 2005 sharply increased, however deceased after 2012
somewhat. With an actual foreign debt level of 45.2% of GDP in early 2016
(IMF 2016) Vietnamese foreign debt is high. In case of a strong depreciation of
the dong the foreign debt can become a high burden. Most of the debt is public
debt. Public debt to GDP in 2015 was 58.3% with an increasing trend; end of
2014 public debt in foreign currency was 39.9% of GDP. While official loans to
Vietnam are shrinking, Vietnam might gradually seek ways to get more risky
commercial loans with floating interest rates. Therefore, the risk of changing
interest rates and exchange rates might substantially increase. Vietnam should
avoid such a dangerous development of foreign debt which exposes the country
to the danger of currency crises and makes it economically and politically
dependent on foreign creditors and donors.
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Figure 5. VietNam's export structure
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Looking at the structure of international trade and services in Vietnam the
Smith- Ricardo model is largely confirmed. A large proportion of Vietnam’s
exports originate from absolute advantages. This is the case for natural resource
exports like crude oil and minerals; and it also the case for most of the
agricultural exports whose competitiveness largely depends on the climate in
Vietnam. In the industrial sector Vietnam exports low-tech-labour-intensive
products. If imports of intermediate goods for inputs in global value chains are
neglected imports are mainly final consumptions goods and investment goods.
This is exactly what the Smith-Ricardo model predicts. Unfortunately this
means also that all the fears in the tradition of Friedrich List are of key
importance for Vietnam. Vietnam finds itself in a structure of international trade
which without comprehensive government interventions reproduces
underdevelopment and prevents catching-up.
The high percentage of natural resource exports leads to an overvaluation of the
exchange rate – at least if the industrial sector is taken as a reference. Taking
this Dutch-Disease effect it becomes clear that the industrial sector in Vietnam
has been suffering from an exchange rate which is destroying its
competitiveness. Vietnam also suffers from the volatility of natural resource
prices. At the same time the high percentage of exports of unprocessed
agricultural products involves the risk stressed by the Prebisch-Singer
hypothesis that these products have to be sold for a very low price and lead to
bad term of trade for Vietnam.
For international trade FDI inflows are of most importance for Vietnam. Figure
9 shows the structure of the stock of FDI in Vietnam in 2015. FDI projects
mainly focused on the industrial sector contributing significantly to the process
of economic restructuring towards industrialization. A study conducted by
Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM) in 2006 showed while FDI
in the 1990s mainly focused on the mining industries and import substitution,
since 2000 FDI in the processing industries and export-oriented fields has been
increasing significantly contributing to a surge in total export but also imports of
Vietnam in recent years. With around 30% the stock of FDI in the real estate
sector is relatively high in Vietnam. FDI in this area added to the real estate
bubble in Vietnam was not very helpful in industrial upgrading.
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implemented, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership (CPTPP) is the first new generation FTA that Vietnam has joined,
followed by the Agreement. concentration. Commercial design. freedom from
Vietnam - European Union (EVFTA).
NO. FTA STATUS PARTIES
1 AFTA Effective since 1993 ASEAN
2 ACFTA Effective since 2003 ASEAN, China
3 AKFTA Effective since 2007 ASEAN,South Korea
4 AJCEP Effective since 2008 ASEAN,Japan
5 VJEPA Effective since 2009 Vietnam,Japan
6 AIFTA Effective since 2010 ASEAN, India
7 AANZFTA Effective since 2010 ASEAN,Australia, New
Zealand
8 VCFTA Effective since 2014 Vietnam,Chile
9 VKFTA Effective since 2015 Vietnam,South Korea
10 VN-EAEU FTA Effective since 2016 Vietnam,Russia,Belarus,
Amenia,Kazakhstan,Kyrg
yzstan
11 CPTPP Effective since 30/12/2018, Vietnam,Canada,Mexico,
came into effect in Vietnam Peru,Chile,New
since 14/01/2019 Zealand,Australia,Japan,
Singapore,Brunei,
Malaysia
12 AHKFTA Effective in Hong ASEAN,Hongkong
Kong,Laos,Myamar,Thailands,Si (China)
ngapore ang VietNam since
14/01/2019
13 EVFTA Effective since August 01,2020 Vietnam,EU
14 RCEP Effective since November ASEAN, China,
25,2020 Korea,Japan,Australia,
New Zealand
15 UKVFTA Effective since May 1,2021 Vietnam, The UK
16 Vietnam-EFTA Negotiations commenced in May Vietnam, EFTA
FTA 2012
17 Vietnam –Israel Negotiations commenced in Vietnam, Israel
FTA December 2015
Previously, in trade relations, about 60-70% of Vietnam did business with East Asia,
but the results were often at a loss, with great losses. Typically, in 2017, Vietnam's
trade balance with East Asia had a deficit of nearly 70 billion USD, of which the
ASEAN region alone accounted for 65 billion USD. The participation in negotiation
and signing of many new-generation free trade agreements helps Vietnam to re-
balance the trade balance and create impetus for reform.
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The participation in the FTAs has created more motivation and brought many positive
impacts to the Vietnamese economy, Minister Tuan Anh said: "The import and export
market is expanding and diversifying; the market for translation The financial
department is more developed with the participation of many foreign investors; the
institutional and policy system has been gradually improved to meet the requirements
of integration and implementation of commitments in FTAs, etc. Since 2007, the
implementation of FTAs has contributed to boosting Vietnam's GDP by more than
300%, and its import-export turnover by 350%. "
Participation in FTAs has helped increase Vietnam's exports of goods. Evidence is, in
1995, exports reached only 5.4 billion USD, in 2000 it was 14 billion USD. By 2007,
Vietnam exported over 48 billion USD and recently in 2017, this figure has reached
over 213 billion USD.
In 2019, in the context of slowing global trade and economic growth due to global
trade tensions and competition among major economies, Vietnam continues to
maintain import and export growth in at a high level, the total import-export turnover
in 2019 exceeded USD 500 billion; of which export turnover reached $ 263.45 billion,
up 8.1% over 2018; Import turnover in 2019 reached 253.51 billion USD, an increase
of 7% compared to 2018.
Figure 8. VietNam's import and export turnover, Balance of Trade in period of 2012 to 2019
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Officially taking effect for Vietnam from January 14, 2019, the CPTPP Agreement has
initially brought about positive effects. According to the report of the Ministry of
Industry and Trade, in 2019, trade exchange turnover between Vietnam and 10 CPTPP
member countries reached more than 77 billion USD, up nearly 4% compared to 2018.
Export turnover of Vietnam to 10 countries is nearly 40 billion USD, an increase of
more than 7% compared to 2018. If in 2018, Vietnam had a trade deficit of 0.9 billion
USD from CPTPP countries, in 2019, Vietnam had a trade surplus with these
countries. 1.6 billion USD.
Particularly for the EVFTA Agreement, after nearly three months of entry into force
(from August 1, 2020), many Vietnamese exports to the EU have enjoyed preferential
treatment from this agreement. Some products have increased sharply in both turnover
and price. In addition, in the context of the COVID-19 epidemic which is seriously
affecting the world economy as well as Vietnam, the implementation of EVFTA also
plays an important role in helping to offset the economic slowdown.
In the first eight months of 2020, the complicated developments of the COVID-19
epidemic in the world, especially in Vietnam's leading trading partner countries, have
affected import and export turnover of many aspects. goods: the total value of goods
import and export of the country reached 337.23 billion USD, equivalent to the same
period last year. In which, export value was 175.36 billion USD, up by 2.3% and
import was 161.87 billion USD, down by 2.4%. This achievement is a testament to
the right leadership of the Party on international economic integration, including
the participation in FTAs and the timely direction of the Government in enhancing
implementation and exploitation. Effective free trade agreements have taken effect
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towards promoting international economic integration in the direction of effectiveness
and efficiency.
After Vietnam signed and joined a series of free trade agreements (FTAs), it became a
large open economy. After more than 30 years of opening, integrating and reforming
the business environment, Vietnam has become an attractive destination for foreign
investors. FDI inflows into Vietnam have increased sharply, registered capital and
implemented capital have improved over the same period of years. The data to attract
FDI investment in the first quarter of 2019 is a concrete proof. Accordingly, the total
registered capital in the first 3 months of 2019 reached 10.8 billion USD, up 86.2%
over the same period in the first quarter of 2018. Of which, 785 newly registered
projects totaled US $ 3.8 billion (up 80%); capital contribution, share purchase reached
nearly 5.7 billion USD (up over 200%); FDI disbursement reached 4.12 billion USD
(up 6.2%) over the same period in 2018.
In addition, FTAs also bring many other benefits, notably ensuring equal access.
Among the FTAs, especially the new generation one, pays great attention to equality.
This requires the State to create equality at home, between state enterprises and private
enterprises, ... thereby helping private enterprises to access more equal resources.
FTAs also help Vietnam to improve.
Besides, the FTA helps Vietnam to restructure and balance the import-export market,
avoid relying too heavily on certain markets, helping enterprises (enterprises) have a
medium-term advantage over competitors in the region. penetrating into some
important markets such as the US, EU, etc. In addition, the new FTAs are also an
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important driving force to help Vietnam improve the market economy institutions,
innovate the growth model.
2. Explain the Rise of Non-tariff measures in recent years? What are the main
motives of these tools. Give some examples.
During the past two decades, applied tariffs in the Asia-Pacific region have halved. At
the same time, the number of non-tariff measures (NTMs), including sanitary and
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phytosanitary (SPS) measures and technical barriers to trade (TBTs), has risen
significantly (figure 1). Both in relative and absolute terms, the impact of NTMs vis-à-
vis tariffs as an impediment to trade has increased. While the higher tariffs imposed by
the United States and China during the past two years have made headline news, the
rising importance of NTMs as barriers to trade at the regional and global levels is
expected to continue.1 In fact, a key concern is that trade tensions evolve from existing
relatively transparent tariff wars to discriminatory implementation of NTMs, the
impact of which is much more difficult to assess and predict.
“NTMs are not inherently good or bad – they add to trade costs, but can be important
instruments in achieving SDGs, and can even promote trade.” NTMs are policy
measures other than ordinary customs tariffs that can potentially have an economic
effect on international trade in goods, changing quantities traded, or prices or both.”
First, the number of notified regulatory barriers has been increasing since the mid-
1990s ( Figure 2a) Second, over the same period, the number of specific trade
concerns raised by WTO members in the Technical Barriers to Trade Committee has
also been trending upwards.1 Evidence from disputes, however, is inconclusive.
Looking at the cross section, there is clear evidence of the predominance of regulatory
measures over other non-tariff measures. This is reflected both in new data collected
from official sources by the UN Conference on Trade and Development and in the
evidence from business surveys conducted by the International Trade Centre.
According to this latter source, about half of the non-tariff measures considered to be
burdensome by firms in the 11 developing and least developed countries where
surveys have been conducted, are TBT/SPS measures. Business surveys also show
that, for exporters, more than 70% of burdensome non-tariff measures raise a
procedural obstacle. Evidence from business surveys also reveals that TBT/SPS are a
major concern for EU exporters, representing more than half (52%) of all problems
they report. The equivalent share for US exporters is much lower, at 22%, although the
two figures cannot be compared due to different methodologies.
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Figure 12. SPS notifications, 1995-2010 (number of notified measures and notifying
countries per year)
Figure 13. TBT notifications, 1995-2010 (number of notified measures and notifying
countries per year)
The main motives of these tools:
Non-tariff measures, and in particular technical barriers to trade and sanitary and
phytosanitary measures, are often the first-best instruments to achieve public policy
objectives. They can be used to correct market failures arising from information
asymmetries or imperfect competition, and to pursue non-economic objectives, such as
the protection of public health. At the same time, however, non-tariff measures can
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also be used by political incumbents to protect domestic producers. A recent report by
the WTO discusses how the fragmentation of supply chains and growing attention by
consumers to quality and safety of food products have contributed to an increase in
both governmental and private measures related to food safety and quality (WTO
2012). It also illustrates the intertwining of public policy goals and domestic producer
interests in the context of climate change mitigation policies.
Some recent examples of non-tariff barriers:
• Until recently China ruled that all avocados coming from countries such as
Kenya had to be frozen to -30°C and peeled before shipping!
• Trucks of fruit coming from North Macedonia to Serbia are subject to customs
and sanitary checks, and long wait times at the border. Fresh fruit deteriorates the
longer trucks have to wait at the border!
• Within the African Continental Free Trade Area, businesses have to contend
with 55 separate national standards, 55 test certificates and 55 national inspection
procedures. This slows the speed at which trade takes place.
3. What are the main arguments of the authors ? Do you agree with them?
What are the impact on developing countries if the Great Decoupling process
happens ? Give some examples
The main arguments of the authors talk about the current economic divide that is
intensely occurring between the world's two largest economies, China and the United
States. Furthermore, they talked about the history of the 1930s separating the US and
Japan, thereby talking about future predictions.
From the perspective of experts in many fields to consider the possible consequences
of the pandemic on the future link between China and the US. With an already slowing
economy affected by this year's pandemic, China will likely do what it can to alleviate
economic tensions with the United States - like trying to appease Trump by adhering
to goal of phase one. Many problems that Washington will face is that China is the
second largest creditor of the US, holding more than 1 trillion USD of US debt.
Now that the Trump administration is using the coronavirus epidemic to further push
its economic decoupling agenda, the big question is what will happen to US-China
relations. The US supply chain is related to and dependent on China. Or it could be
shifting the supply chain to countries with more political ties to the United States to
reduce trade with China.
Overall, the current split is the result of two decades of steadily growing Chinese
economic might, which many, like Trump, see as the cause of the emptiness of
industries as important as Western production.
In my view, I completely agree with the points made by the authors. The Chinese
economy is growing stronger and able to compete with the United States. Taking
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advantage of the Corona epidemic, the United States could divide China. But it is very
difficult because the economy of the United States in particular and the world in
general have a very high mutual relationship (Beata Javorcik, chief economist of the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, said: “One China's province was
shut down and all of a sudden factories around the world were out of supply. "That
fosters the notion of how dependent we are on China and we have less redundancy.
how "has built up in the global supply chain.). America can separate from China if it
has the right policies and the right time. As a result, it could boost the US economy
and defeat China.
The impact on developing countries if the Great Decoupling process happens depends
on the individual company and its strategic goals, and must be rated according to
standards that the U.S. and Chinese governments may allow. These ties will be costly
and disruptive to transform, even in a gradual and phased manner.
For the more hawkish members of the Trump administration, undoing 40 years of
ever-closer economic relations with China and rolling back U.S. reliance on Chinese
factories, firms, and investment was always the end game of the endless trade war—
even before the coronavirus pandemic turbocharged Washington’s desire to
disentangle itself from what many view as a dangerous economic bear hug. Now,
lawmakers and administration officials are mulling a raft of measures to cleave parts
of the two largest economies in the world: Bans on a wide variety of sensitive exports,
additional tariffs on Chinese goods, forced reshoring of U.S. companies, even pulling
out of the World Trade Organization altogether, which is seen by some as facilitating
China’s so-called economic imperialism.
It’s not just economic ties between China and the United States that are in danger.
Europe, too, is increasingly talking of rolling back the deep trade and investment ties it
has developed with Beijing in recent decades (even as it is cutting trade ties with itself,
as the United Kingdom leaves the European Union). Other countries are also pulling
up the drawbridges—all leery that today’s unprecedented level of economic
integration has gone too far, bringing more pain and less gain.
The threat of a great decoupling is a potentially historic break, an interruption perhaps
only comparable to the sudden sundering of the first huge wave of globalization in
1914, when deeply intertwined economies such as Britain and Germany, and later the
United States, threw themselves into a barrage of self-destruction and economic
nationalism that didn’t stop for 30 years. This time, though, decoupling is driven not
by war but by peacetime populist urges, exacerbated by a global corona virus
pandemic that has shaken decades of faith in the wisdom of international supply chains
and the virtues of a global economy.
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the concept traces back, ironically, to Chinese policymakers in the 1990s who were
themselves worried about over dependence on the U.S. dollar and high-end American
technology.
Trump has long contended that China has exploited the U.S. economy for its own
enrichment at the expense of the American worker, and there is some economic data to
back that up. As a result, since taking office, the Trump administration has sought to
partially decouple economically from China, first by reducing U.S. imports through
higher tariffs, later by more restrictive screening of Chinese investment in critical
sectors.
More recently, the administration has expanded controls on exports to China of
potentially sensitive technologies, and this week it banned a federal retirement fund
from investing in Chinese stocks. Administration officials even briefly flirted with the
idea of defaulting on government debt held by China. These days, efforts to tear up
and rebuild supply chains are gaining momentum, whether in semiconductors, rare-
earthelements, or medicines and personal protective equipment needed to deal with the
ravages of the coronavirus pandemic.
“What the pandemic has done is expose our very significant dependence on Chinese
production, and overseas production generally, but particularly in key areas on
Chinese manufacturing production and Chinese supply chains,” said Sen. Josh
Hawley, a Missouri Republican, who is leading the legislative charge to repatriate U.S.
supply chains and withdraw from the WTO. “I’d like to see as much production
brought back to our shores as we can.”
Other U.S. allies around the world are eyeing ways to follow suit. Australia, bristling
at Chinese trade threats, is also looking to diversify its own export markets and supply
chains away from China. Europeans are having second thoughts about ever-closer
trade and investment ties with Beijing. Some European policymakers in recent years
have been spooked by an aggressive wave of Chinese takeovers of critical
infrastructure from ports to power grids, fearing it could give Beijing undue leverage
over their countries. Chinese diplomats have taken on an aggressive stance against
some Western countries, including the Netherlands, with vague threats of sanctions or
other forms of coercion as relations sour amid the pandemic.
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