Mijares v. Ranada, G.R. No.

139325, April 12, 2005 Case Digest

FACTS:
The petitioners in this case are a group of ten Filipino victims that suffered under the Martial
Law Regime of Ferdinand Marcos. They filed a complaint against the Estate of Ferdinand
Marcos for human rights abuse. The Alien Tort Act was invoked as basis for the US District
Court's jurisdiction over the complaint, as it involved a suit by aliens for tortious violations of
international law.
In the end, the US Court decided in favor of the ten Filipinos in final judgement, awarding them
roughly 1.9 Billion U.S. Dollars in compensatory and exemplary damages.
The ten Filipinos then went to the Philippines and filed a complaint to the RTC to enforce the
foreign judgement pursuant to Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court then in force.
The Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-payment of the
correct filing fees.  It alleged that petitioners had only paid Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) as
docket and filing fees, notwithstanding the fact that they sought to enforce a monetary amount of
damages in the amount of over Two and a Quarter Billion US Dollars (US$2.25 Billion). 
The Marcos Estate cited Supreme Court Circular No. 7, pertaining to the proper computation and
payment of docket fees.  In response, the petitioners claimed that an action for the enforcement
of a foreign judgment is not capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, a filing fee of only Four
Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) was proper, pursuant to Section 7(c) of Rule 141.
RTC Judge decided in favor of the Marcos Estate and dismissed the complaint. Respondent
judge opined that contrary to the petitioners' submission, the subject matter of the complaint was
indeed capable of pecuniary estimation, as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court
ordering the payment of definite sums of money, allowing for easy determination of the value of
the foreign judgment.
On that score, Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure would find application,
and the RTC estimated the proper amount of filing fees was approximately Four Hundred
Seventy Two Million Pesos, which obviously had not been paid.
Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary estimation as the subject matter of
the suit is the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and not an action for the collection of a sum of
money or recovery of damages. 
ISSUES:
Whether or not the payment of filing fee of 410 pesos was proper.
HELD:
YES. It is proper.
In dismissing the complaint, the respondent judge relied on Section 7(a), Rule 141 as basis for
the computation of the filing fee of over P472 Million.  The provision states:
SEC. 7. Clerk of Regional Trial Court.-
(a) For filing an action or a permissive counterclaim or money claim against an estate
not based on judgment, or for filing with leave of court a third-party, fourth-party, etc.,
complaint, or a complaint in intervention, and for all clerical services in the same time, if
the total sum claimed, exclusive of interest, or the started value of the property in
litigation…
Obviously, the above-quoted provision covers, on one hand, ordinary actions, permissive
counterclaims, third-party, etc. complaints and complaints-in-interventions, and on the other,
money claims against estates which are not based on judgment.  Thus, the relevant question for
purposes of the present petition is whether the action filed with the lower court is a "money
claim against an estate not based on judgment."
Petitioners' complaint may have been lodged against an estate, but it is clearly based on a
judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court. The provision does not make any
distinction between a local judgment and a foreign judgment, and where the law does not
distinguish, we shall not distinguish.
A reading of Section 7 in its entirety reveals several instances wherein the filing fee is computed
on the basis of the amount of the relief sought, or on the value of the property in litigation. The
filing fee for requests for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage is based on the amount of
indebtedness or the mortgagee's claim. In special proceedings involving properties such as for
the allowance of wills, the filing fee is again based on the value of the property. The aforecited
rules evidently have no application to petitioners' complaint.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders are NULLIFIED and SET
ASIDE, and a new order REINSTATING Civil Case No. 97-1052 is hereby issued. No costs.

DOCTRINE/LESSON RELEVANT TO THE TOPIC OF FOREIGN JUDGEMENT IN THIS

CASE
A proper understanding is required on the nature and effects of a foreign judgment in this
jurisdiction.
The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized
states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally
respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different
countries. This principle was prominently affirmed in the leading American case of Hilton v.
Guyot and expressly recognized in our jurisprudence beginning with Ingenholl v. Walter E.
Olsen & Co. The conditions required by the Philippines for recognition and enforcement of a
foreign judgment were originally contained in Section 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
was taken from the California Code of Civil Procedure which, in turn, was derived from the
California Act of March 11, 1872. Remarkably, the procedural rule now outlined in Section 48,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure has remained unchanged down to the last word in nearly
a century. Section 48 states:
SEC. 48.          Effect of foreign judgments. — The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon
the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence
of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent
title;
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in
personam. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to
the thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not
conclusive, of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent
title.
However, in both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts
on the grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact. Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend against the
enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is essential that there should be an
opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to
properly determine its efficacy.
It is clear then that it is usually necessary for an action to be filed in order to enforce a foreign
judgment, even if such judgment has conclusive effect as in the case of in rem actions, if only for
the purpose of allowing the losing party an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, and in
order for the court to properly determine its efficacy. Consequently, the party attacking a foreign
judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.
The rules are silent as to what initiatory procedure must be undertaken in order to enforce a
foreign judgment in the Philippines. But there is no question that the filing of a civil complaint is
an appropriate measure for such purpose. A civil action is one by which a party sues another for
the enforcement or protection of a right, and clearly an action to enforce a foreign judgment is in
essence a vindication of a right prescinding either from a "conclusive judgment upon title" or the
"presumptive evidence of a right." Absent perhaps a statutory grant of jurisdiction to a quasi-
judicial body, the claim for enforcement of judgment must be brought before the regular courts.
There are distinctions, nuanced but discernible, between the cause of action arising from
the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and that arising from the facts or allegations that
occasioned the foreign judgment.  They may pertain to the same set of facts, but there is an
essential difference in the right-duty correlatives that are sought to be vindicated. For
example, in a complaint for damages against a tortfeasor, the cause of action emanates from the
violation of the right of the complainant through the act or omission of the respondent. On the
other hand, in a complaint for the enforcement of a foreign judgment awarding damages from the
same tortfeasor, for the violation of the same right through the same manner of action, the cause
of action derives not from the tortious act but from the foreign judgment itself.
More importantly, the matters for proof are different. Using the above example, the complainant
will have to establish before the court the tortious act or omission committed by the tortfeasor,
who in turn is allowed to rebut these factual allegations or prove extenuating circumstances. 
Extensive litigation is thus conducted on the facts, and from there the right to and amount of
damages are assessed. On the other hand, in an action to enforce a foreign judgment, the matter
left for proof is the foreign judgment itself, and not the facts from which it prescinds.
As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally restricted to a review of
jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of personal notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of
fact or law.  The limitations on review is in consonance with a strong and pervasive policy in all
legal systems to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues. Otherwise known as the policy of
preclusion, it seeks to protect party expectations resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard
against the harassment of defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be increased by never-
ending litigation of the same disputes, and – in a larger sense – to promote what Lord Coke in
the Ferrer's Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law: "rest and quietness." If every judgment
of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her
original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation.