1. IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q.

GUTIERREZ
AM. No. L-363             July 31, 1962
FACTS:
Diosdado Q. Gutierrez, respondents, is a member of the Philippine Bar who
was admitted on October 5, 1945.
In criminal case No. R-793 of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro
he was convicted of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of
Calapan, and together with his co-conspirators was sentenced to the penalty of
death.
However, upon review by this Court the judgment of conviction was affirmed,
but the penalty was changed to reclusión perpetua. 
After serving a portion of the sentence respondent was granted a conditional
pardon by the President on August 19, 1958. The unexecuted portion of the prison
term was remitted "on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws
of the Philippines."
Subsequently, the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the
murder case, filed a verified complaint before this Court praying that respondent be
removed from the roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, section 5.
Section 5 of Rule 127 provides that a member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such a
crime. The term "moral turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty or good morals.
Respondent presented his answer in due time, admitting the facts alleged by
complainant regarding his previous conviction but pleading the conditional pardon in
defense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conditional pardon extended to respondent places him
beyond the scope of the rule on disbarment.
RULING:
Pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the crime for
which respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered
disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of lawyers.
The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional, and
merely remitted the unexecuted portion of his term. The rule that pardon operates to
wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the
attorney after the pardon has been granted applies only where the pardon is
absolute, but not where, as in this case, the pardon granted is conditional and merely
remitted the unexecuted portion of the penalty. In such a case, the attorney must be
judged upon the fact of his conviction for the crime he has committed.
It is to be taken into consideration also that, respondent Gutierrez must be
judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the pardon he
invokes in defense. The nature of the crime committed by the respondent is a crime
involving moral turpitude which is a ground for an attorney’s disbarment (Section 5 of
Rule 127).
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to
certain rigid standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate
to the bar the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of academic preparation but
require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These standards are
neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission; the lawyer must continue to
adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal.
2. ZALDIVAR VS GONZALES
GR No 80578
07 October 1988

Facts:
Petitioner Enrique Zaldivar is one of several defendants in a criminal case pending
before the Sandiganbayan. The Office of the Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary
investigation and filed the criminal informations in those cases. Petitioner filed with
this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus naming as
respondents both the Sandiganbayan and Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez. Petitioner alleged
that respondent Gonzalez, as Tanodbayan and under the provisions of the 1987
Constitution, was no longer vested with power and authority independently to
investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and corruption against public
officials and employees, and hence the criminal case against the petitioner were all
null and void. The Court further resolved to ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER, effective immediately, ordering respondent Sandiganbayan to CEASE and
DESIST from hearing and trying the criminal cases againts the petitoner Zalvidar.
Petitioner Zaldivar filed with this Court a second Petition for certiorari and Prohibition
initially naming only Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez as respondent for recommending that
additional criminal charges for graft and corruption be filed against petitioner Zaldivar
and five (5) other individuals. Once again, petitioner raised the argument of the
Tanodbayan’s lack of authority under the 1987 Constitution to file such criminal
cases and to investigate the same.
The Court again: (1) required respondent Gonzalez to submit a comment thereon:
and (2) issued a temporary restraining order ordering respondent Gonzalez to
CEASE and DESIST from further acting in the pending cases from filing the criminal
information consequent thereof and from conducting preliminary investigation
therein.
Petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to Cite in Contempt 11 directed at
respondent Gonzalez. The Motion cited the acts of respondent Gonzalez in: (1)
having caused the filing of the additional information against petitioner in criminal
cases before the Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous
statements to the media in relation to the proceedings.
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by respondent Gonzalez in which he alleged
interference in due process by sitting judges of the court. Respondent Gonzalez also
continued to make statements to the media regarding the subjudice case repeatedly
alleging bias in the judiciary against him.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Gonzalez is in contempt of court?
Ruling:
Guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer
of the court and member of the Bar.
The Supreme Court, as regulator and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary
disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from
the Court’s constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which
includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of law. Apart from this
constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over
members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration of
justice and essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the
furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers
and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the Court. The
power to punish for contempt is “necessary for its own protection against an
improper interference with the due administration of justice,” “(it) is not dependent
upon the complaint of any of the parties litigant.
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like
that before us here; the Court’s inherent power to discipline attorneys and the
contempt power. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is
broader than the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be committee
both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where the
contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes professional
misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court.
Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme Court’s disciplinary
authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not the misconduct with which
the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish
for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the
Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar
is but corollary to the Court’s exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is
not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called
upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving
disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or
impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes both professional
misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him, and
contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.
3. ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN
GR. No. 148560
November 19, 2001

G.R. Nos. 159486-88

November 25, 2003
Doctrines:
Court will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our people’s
faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been privileged by it to
practice law in the Philippines.—The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will
not denounce criticism made by anyone against the Court for, if well-founded can
truly have constructive effects in the task of the Court, but it will not countenance any
wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our people’s faith in the judicial system, let
alone, by those who have been privileged by it to practice law in the Philippines.

A lawyer should observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial
officers and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others.—Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist
on similar conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and
questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the Court, Atty.
Paguia has only succeeded seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the
dispensation of justice.
FACTS:
1. Atty. Allan Paguia the legal counsel for the deposed president Joseph Ejercito
Estrada filed a Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Seeking the following
relief:
***“1.That Chief Justice Davide and the rest of the members of the
Honorable Court disqualify themselves from hearing and deciding this
petition;
“2.That the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be vacated and set
aside; and
“3.That Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905 pending
before the Sandiganbayan be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
2. Atty. Paguia further asserts that members of the Supreme Court should inhibit in
deciding on the case as justices are prohibited in any partisan political activity as
some have participated in the EDSA 2 rally, which is a violation of Rule 5.10 of Code
of Judicial Conduct.
3. Several Resolution had been filed by the legal counsel which is in the disguise of
forum shopping, to which the court issued a resolution on July 08, 2003 with a
warning to Atty. Allan Paguia it states, “ on pain of disciplinary sanction, to desist
from further making, directly or indirectly, similar submissions to this Court or to its
Members.”
4. Atty. Paguia even after the court’s warning persist on filing cases after cases, to
which the Supreme Court rendered its decision dismissing the certiorari and
demanding the petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estradato show cause and provide a valid
reason on why the Supreme Court should not suspend the legal counsel for conduct
unbecoming a lawyer and officer of the court.
5. Atty. Allan Paguia submitted a response with a continuous claim of political
partisan ship of some of the member of the court, and quoting Canon 5.10 to attack
the member of the the court. Canon 5(10) “A judge is entitled to entertain personal
views on political questions. But to avoid suspicion of political partisanship, a judge
shall not make political speeches, contribute to party funds, publicly endorse
candidates for political office or participate in other partisan political activities”
6. The court responded on the allegations of Atty. Paguia, citing Section 79(b) of the
Omnibus Election Code defines the term “partisan political activities;” the law states:
“The term ‘election campaign’ or ‘partisan political activity’ refers to an act
designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to
a public office which shall include:
“(1)Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of
persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or
against a candidate;
“(2)Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other
similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any
campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate.
“(3)Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or
against the election of any candidate for public office;
“(4)Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or
oppose the election of any candidate; or
“(5)Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a
candidate.” Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, 416 SCRA 465, G.R. Nos. 159486-88
November 25, 2003
7. The court then flagged Atty. Paguia on possible nonobservance of, Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should
insist on similar conduct by others.
8. The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been called to the mandate of Rule 13.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Regrettably, Atty. Paguia has persisted in
ignoring the Court’s well-meant admonition.
On the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune, Atty. Paguia wrote to say—

“What is the legal effect of that violation of President Estrada’s

right to due process of law? It renders the decision in Estrada vs.
Arroyo unconstitutional and void. The rudiments of fair play were not
observed. There was no fair play since it appears that when President
Estrada filed his petition, Chief Justice Davide and his fellow justices
had already committed to the other party—GMA—with a judgment
already made and waiting to be formalized after the litigants shall have
undergone the charade of a formal hearing. After the justices had
authorized the proclamation of GMA as president, can they be
expected to voluntarily admit the unconstitutionality of their own act?”
Issue:
Whether Atty. Paguia violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Ruling:
Yes, Atty. Paguia had been warned repeatedly on the conduct that should be
observed along with the privilege of a practicing law.

In Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility it mandates that the lawyer

should observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and,
indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others. While Rule 13.02 of Code of
Professional Responsibility states that, “A lawyer shall not make public statements in
the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a
party.”

In this case the Atty. Paguia was repeatedly warned, however feeling passionate
about the case, he failed to observe the etiquette that is expected from a lawyer
when he repeatedly filed several cases which are already a forum shopping in
nature, responded with an unfounded claim that some justices violated of the Code
of Judicial Conduct, when the law is clear on the definition of partisan political
activity, and going out to the media stating again his unfounded claim, when the
Code of Professional Responsibility is clear on the limitation on issuance of
statements on a pending case which will arouse public opinion that may affect the
people’s trust and confidence on the legal and judicial system.
Wherefore, for the violation of Rule 11 and 13.2 the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Mr. Allan Paguia is indefinitely suspended of practice of law, inside
and outside of the Halls of Justice. Let the copy of this resolution be furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bat of the Philippines, and Office of the
Court Administrator.

4.BRION V BRILLANTES
“Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and legal processes”
FACTS

The complainant Marciano Brion, Jr., charges the respondent, Atty. Francisco
Brillantes, Jr., of having willfully violated a lawful order of this Court in a case entitled
“Lupo Almodiel Atienza v. Judge Francisco F. Brillantes Jr.”, wherein the respondent
is dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and
with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the
government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. This decision
is immediately executory.

Petitioner averred that respondent violated our decree of perpetual

disqualification imposed upon him when he accepted a legal consultancy post at the
Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), from 1998 to 2000. Said consultancy
included an appointment by LWUA as 6th member of the Board of Directors of the
Urdaneta (Pangasinan) Water District. Upon expiration of the legal consultancy
agreement, this was subsequently renewed as a Special Consultancy Agreement.

Petitioner contends that while both consultancy agreements contained a

provision to the effect that nothing therein should be construed as establishing an
employer-employee relationship between LWUA and respondent, the inclusion of
this proviso was only a ploy to circumvent our order barring respondent from
appointment to a government agency. Petitioner points out in reality, respondent
enjoys the same rights and privileges as a regular employee.

ISSUE

W/N respondent be suspended in the practice of law.

RULING

Yes. The lawyer’s primary duty as enunciated in the Attorney’s Oath is to

uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and
legal processes. That duty in its irreducible minimum entails obedience to the legal
orders of the courts. Respondent’s disobedience to this Court’s order prohibiting his
reappointment to any branch, instrumentality, or agency of government, including
government owned and controlled corporations, cannot be camouflaged by a legal
consultancy or a special consultancy contract. By performing duties and functions of
a contractual employee of LWUA, by way of a consultancy, and receiving
compensation and perquisites as such, he displayed acts of open defiance of the
Court’s authority, and a deliberate rejection of his oath as an officer of the court.
Such insolence not only erodes respect for the court but also destroys the public’s
confidence in the rule of law.
5. BAUTISTA VS GONZALES
ADM Case no 1625 Feb 12 1990
FACTS

On July 15, 1976, complainant submitted an amended complaint for disbarment,

alleging that respondent committed the following acts: 

1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro Fortunado,
Nestor Fortunado and Editha Fortunado [hereinafter referred to as the Fortunados]
to pay all expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of
the value of the property in litigation.

2. Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in Civil Case No. Q-15143, wherein Eusebio
Lopez, Jr. is one of the defendants and, without said case being terminated, acting
as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490; 

3. Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the Fortunados, which

properties are the subject of the litigation in Civil Case No. Q-15143, while the case
was still pending; 

4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract with him
on August 30, 1971 for the development into a residential subdivision of the land
involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143, covered by TCT No. T-1929, claiming that he
acquired fifty percent (50%) interest thereof as attorney's fees from the Fortunados,
while knowing fully well that the said property was already sold at a public auction on
June 30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and registered with the
Register of Deeds of Iligan City; 

5. Submitting to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City falsified documents

purporting to be true copies of "Addendum to the Land Development Agreement
dated August 30, 1971" and submitting the same document to the Fiscal's Office of
Quezon City, in connection with the complaint for estafa filed by respondent against
complainant designated as I.S. No. 7512936; 

6. Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant who was his client; 

7. Harassing the complainant by filing several complaints without legal basis before
the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City; 

8. Deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office by
making false assertion of facts in his pleadings; 

9. Filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so) that while he does not intentionally tell a he,
he does not tell the truth either."
Respondent filed an answer on September 29, 1976 and an amended answer on
November 18, 1976, denying the accusations against him. Complainant filed a reply
to respondent's answer on December 29, 1976 and on March 24, 1977 respondent
filed a rejoinder.
ISSUE/S

Whether or not respondent committed the acts of misconduct alleged by complainant

Bautista

RULING
WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Attorney Ramon A. Gonzales committed
serious misconduct, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice
of law for SIX (6) months effective from the date of his receipt of this Resolution. Let
copies of this Resolution be circulated to all courts of the country for their information
and guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty. Gonzales.
6.PIAT V ANORDO
“Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct”

FACTS

On February 19, 1932, Perfecto Abordo, a member of the Philippine Bar,

accepted the offer of two individuals to sell him a quantity of opium, a prohibited
drug, and agreed to pay P1.50 per tin for the opium. A can was later on disclosed to
Abordo as containing opium, for which he paid Php600.

In returning to Manila an automobile overtook them and the parties riding

therein, pretending to be constabulary soldiers, told Abordo to stop. Instead Abordo
drew his revolver and commanding the driver of the car to turn into Calle Vito Cruz
was able to evade his pursuers.

Having been found out that the opium is fake, Abordo reported to the Luneta
Police Station of Manila that he had been robbed of P600. Two individuals were later
arrested, charged with the crime of estafa, and convicted.

Abordo contended that "there being no evidence in the record establishing the
relationship of attorney and client between the respondent and the malefactors", and
"the act complained of not having been committed in the exercise of his profession of
attorney-at-law", the acts he committed could not affect his status as attorney-at-law
and could not, therefore, constitute a ground for disciplinary action.

ISSUE

W/N the acts Abordo committed could serve as a ground for disciplinary
action.
RULING

Yes. Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure enumerates the grounds for
the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer. Nevertheless, it is well settled that a
member of the bar may be suspended or removed from his office as lawyer for other
than statutory grounds. However, as a general rule, a court will not assume
jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to be committed in
his private capacity. The exception to the rule is that an attorney will be removed not
only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct
not connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office
and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.

7. SOBERANO VS VILLANUEVA
116 PHIL 1206
FACTS:
On March 12, 1955, complainant Mercedes H. Soberano filed with this Court
a petition alleging that after inducing her to take part, in December 1951, in a fake
wedding under the belief, on her part, that it was a genuine and valid one,
respondent Eugenio V. Villanueva cohabited with her and later lived with her as
husband and wife, as a consequence of which she bore him two children, and that,
subsequently, he abandoned her and their children, and praying therefore that he be
disbarred.
In his answer respondent denied the main allegations of the petition,
particularly those referring to the allegedly simulated marriage and to his having lived
with complainant as husband and wife, although he admitted having been intimate
with her. Upon investigation, the Solicitor General, to whom the matter was referred,
filed the corresponding complaint for disbarment, which is a substantial reproduction
of complainant’s petition for disbarment. Respondents reiterated the denials and
allegations contained in his answer to said petition and in addition thereto, he set up
“special defenses” as well as expressed the wish to present further evidence, which
he was authorized to introduce and did introduce before the officer of this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the extra- marital relations between the parties, before respondent’s
administration to the Bar, warrant disciplinary actions against him.
RULING:
An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct committed before
his admission to the Bar, and this notwithstanding that his certificate to practice was
issued after the Board of Law examiners, as required by law passed its judgement
upon his moral character and standing. In order to justify disbarment for breach of
good faith committed before admission, the transaction or act must be so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree.
 Intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married, especially in the
light of the circumstances attending this case, is neither so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act nor so unprincipled as to warrant disbarment or disciplinary action
against the man as a member of the Bar.

8. UI VS. BONIFACIO, 333 SCRA 38 , JUNE 08, 2000

LESLIEUI, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.
Facts:
On January 24, 1971, complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos Ui and begot 4
children. Sometime in December 1987, complainant found out that her husband,
Carlos, was carrying an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with
whom he begot a daughter in 1986. Respondent who is a graduate of the College of
Law of the University of the Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.
Carlos admitted to Leslie his relationship with Atty. Bonifacio and the latter
likewise admitted that she had a child to Carlos and alleged, however, that
everything was over between her and Carlos. However, complainant again
discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent
continued, and that in December 1988, respondent and her husband , Carlos Ui, had
a second child. Complainant pleaded to the respondent to discontinue her illicit
relationship with Carlos but to no avail.
A complaint for disbarment as then filed on August 11, 189 by the Leslie Ui
against Atty. Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines on the ground of immorality more particularly, for carrying on
an illicit relationship with Carlos Ui.
Atty. Bonifacio insisted that by the time she got married with Carlos Ui, what
she only know is that he is a bachelor, a single man that is why she agreed to marry
him in Hawaii. But as soon as she discovered his first marriage, she distant herself
from him and she even went to other country.
When Atty. Bonifacio answered the allegations, she attached a copy of her
marriage certificate with Carlos Ui which was indicated there that their marriage took
place in year 1987. But again, Leslie Ui contested it as it was believed to be falsified
because the date of their marriage was in year 1987. It was answered by Bonifacio,
insisting that it is not her intention to falsify as she only have a photocopy and the
original ones is in the possession of Carlos Ui.
Issue:
Whether or not the Atty. Iris Bonifacio has conducted herself in an immoral
manner for which she deserves to e barred from the practice of law.
Ruling:
 No. The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right
to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations.
It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a
lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. If good moral character is a
sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of good moral
character is also requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession.
Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have
good moral character. A lawyer may be disbarred for “grossly immoral conduct or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.” A member of the bar
should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
Circumstances existed which should have aroused Atty. Bonifacio’s suspicion
that something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui and moved her to ask
probing questions. Respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs.
However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with
what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered as an
immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral
norms of society and to opinion of good and respectable member of the community.
Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be
grossly immoral, that is it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
The Court held that “a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not
only required to refrain from adulterous relationships . . . but must also so
behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that
he is flouting those moral standards.” Atty. Bonifacio’s act of immediately
distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that
the alleged moral indifference and proves she had no intention of flaunting the law
and the high moral standard of the legal profession. The Court noted that
complainant filed to establish clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence.
On the matter of falsified Marriage Certificate attached by Atty. Bonifacio to
her answer, the Court fins it improbable to believe averment of respondent that she
relied on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos
Ui. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can
forget that year when she got married. It is contrary to human experience and highly
improbable. The defense of good faith of respondent cannot stand for attaching such
Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest
standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from its members nothing less.
Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds
and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court
demand no less than the highest degree of morality.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty.

Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED. However,
respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy
of her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a
STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any
repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.

9.FIGUEROA VS. BARRANCO, JR., 276 SCRA 445 , JULY 31, 1997
PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant, vs. SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent.
Facts:
Patricia and Simeon were both from the same town, and they became
sweethearts when they were in their teens. Because of their intimacy, together they
had a child. According to Patricia, after the child was born, Simeon first promised to
marry her after he passes the Bar Examinations. The two continued their relationship
and it was alleged that he had given her 20 or 30 promises of marriage throughout
their relationship. But, her trust in him and their relationship ended when she found
out that he had married another woman.
In 1970, after a few years and four attempts at passing the Bar Examinations
Simeon finally nailed it. However before Simeon could ever take his oath as a
lawyer, Patricia filed a case against him in 1971 preventing him from his admission
to the legal profession. Three years later, on February 18 th 1974, Simeon submitted
a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case saying that Patricia failed to respond
on the motion. To which Patricia then replied that she was still interested in the
resolution of the present case. So on June 18, 1974, the Court denied Simeon’s
motion to dismiss the case.
A few years have passed and Simeon became a politician. In 1988, he again
requested to dismiss the case citing that his public service, active participation in
civic organizations, and good standing in the community, as well as the length of
time this case has been pending are reasons enough to allow him to take his oath as
a lawyer.
On September 29, 1988, the Court decided to dismiss the case for Patricia’s
failure to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time, and to allow
Simeon to take the lawyer's oath upon payment of the required fees. Simeon’s hopes
were once again crushed on November 17, 1988 when the Court, in response to
Patricia's opposition, decided to cancel his scheduled oath-taking.
On June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines recommended the dismissal of the charge of gross immorality made by
Patricia and that Simeon be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
Issue:
Whether or not Barranco can be prevented from taking the lawyer's oath in
1971 because of the charges of gross immorality made by complainant. 
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court agreed and took the recommendation of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, citing that these facts do not constitute gross immorality
warranting the permanent exclusion of Simeon from the legal profession.
His engaging in premarital sexual relations with Patricia and promises to marry
suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not constitute
grossly immoral conduct.
The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act
complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral
act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.It is a
willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of respectable members of the community
The Supreme Court find the ruling in Arciga vs. Maniwang quite relevant
because mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no
impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of
respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of
disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of such relationship a child was
born out of wedlock.
The Supreme Court cited that Patricia and Simeon’s relationship was
voluntary. Patricia was not forced to have sexual relations with Simeon since she
even continued to be his girlfriend even after she gave birth to their son. She was an
adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship and there was no
deception given by Simeon. The Supreme Court added that it was neither corrupt
nor unprincipled of Simeon to be given disciplinary sanction against him, even if their
relationship resulted with a child out of wedlock.
It was just unfortunate that Simeon chose to marry and settle permanently
with another woman. The Supreme Court emphasized; “We cannot castigate a
man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and
perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love, not for any
other reason.”
The Supreme Court therefor concluded that Patricia was simply acting as a
scorned woman seeking revenge to make Simeon’s personal and professional life
suffer, bitter and unforgiving to the end. And that, the 26 years that Simeon has been
prevented from being a lawyer was already punishment enough for whatever wrong
he had made. And so, the Court Dismissed the case filed against him, and the 62
year old was finally allowed to take his lawyers oath.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent
Simeon Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment
of the proper fees.
10. AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL VS ATTY. ANTONIO M. LLORENTE
339 SCRA 154(2000)
FACTS:
This is a complaint for disbarment against respondents Antonio M. Llorente
and Ligaya P. Salayon for gross misconduct, serious breach of trust, and violation of
the lawyer’s oath in connection with the discharge of their duties as members of the
Pasig City Board of Canvassers in the May 8, 1995 elections.
Complainant alleges that, in violations of R.A. No. 6646, respondents
tampered with the votes received by him, with the result that, as shown in the
Statements of Votes and Certificate of Caanvass pertaining to 1,263 precincts of
Pasig City.
Respondents denied the allegations against them. They alleged that the
preparation of the Statements of Votes was made by the 12 canvassing committees
which the board had constituted to assist in the canvassing. They claimed that the
errors pointed out by complainant could be attributed to honest mistake, oversight,
and/or fatigue.
Complainant’s counters that respondents should be held responsible for the
illegal padding of votes considering the nature and extent of the irregularities and the
fact that the canvassing of the election returns was done under their control and
supervision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent held liable for illegal padding.
RULING:
The court ruled respondents guilty of misconduct.
Respondent’s participation in the irregularities herein reflects on the legal
profession, in general, and on lawyers in government in particular. Such conduct in
performance of their official duties, involving no less than the ascertainment of the
popular will as expressed through the ballot, would have merited for them
suspension was it not for the fact that this is their first administrative transgression.
The Court finds respondents guilty of misconduct and imposes on each of
them a fine in the amount of P10,000.00 with warning that the commission of similar
acts will be dealt with more severly.
11. CORDOVA VS CORDOVA
M. No. 3249 November 29, 1989
SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA, respondent.
FACTS:
 Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and out
of this marriage, two (2) children were born. In 1985, the couple lived somewhere in
Quirino Province.
In the same year, respondent Cordova left his family as well as his job as
Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino Province,
and went to Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur with one Fely G. Holgado. Fely G.
Holgado was herself married and left her own husband and children to stay with
respondent.
Respondent Cordova and Fely G. Holgado lived together in Bislig as
husband and wife, with respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his
wife, and Fely Holgado using the name Fely Cordova. Respondent Cordova gave
Fely Holgado funds with which to establish a sari-sari store in the public market at
Bislig, while at the same time failing to support his legitimate family.
On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an
apparent reconciliation. Respondent promised that he would separate from Fely
Holgado.
He the brought his legitimate family to Bislig, but frequently came home drunk
and failed to support his family.
On February 1987, Salvacion upon returning home from a trip to Manila
necessitated by hospitalization of her daughter, Salvacion discovers that Laurence
had left their home for another mistress, Luisita Magallanes, and had taken their
other daughter, Melanie with him.
Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie from the complinant,
compelling complainant to go to court and to take back her daughter by habeas
corpus. The Regional Trial Court, Bislig, gave her custody of their children.
In an unsworn letter-complaint dated 14 April 1988 addressed to then Mr.
Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, complainant Salvacion Delizo charged her
husband, Atty. Laurence D. Cordova, with immorality and acts unbecoming a
member of the Bar. The letter-complaint was forwarded by the Court to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline ("Commission"), for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The Commission, before acting on the complaint, required complainant to
submit a verified complaint within 10 days from notice. Complainant complied and
submitted to the Commission a revised and verified version of her long and detailed
complaint against her husband charging him with immorality and acts unbecoming a
member of the Bar.
And in an Order, respondent was declared in default for failure to file an
answer to the complaint within 15 days from notice and the same Order required
complainant to submit before the Commission her evidence ex parte.
A hearing was then set, however complainant requested for a resetting of the
schedules of hearing. However, the hearings never took place as complainant failed
to appear. Respondent Cordova never moved to set aside the order of default, even
though notices of the hearings scheduled were sent to him.
In a telegraphic message, complainant informed the Commission that she and
her husband had already "reconciled".
Subsequently, an Order was issued requiring the parties to appear before it
for confirmation and explanation of the telegraphic message and required them to file
a formal motion to dismiss the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice. Neither
party responded and nothing was heard from either party since then.
Complainant having failed to submit her evidence ex parte before the
Commission, the IBP Board of Governors submitted to this Court its report
reprimanding respondent for his acts, admonishing him that any further acts of
immorality in the future will be dealt with more severely, and ordering him to support
his legitimate family as a responsible parent should.
ISSUE:
Whether or not reconciliation between complainant and respondent, excuses
and wipe away the misconduct and immoral behavior of the respondent carried out
in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar and
upon the Philippine Bar itself.
RULING:
This Court helds that the reconciliation between complainant and respondent,
assuming the same to be real, does not excuse and wipe away the misconduct and
immoral behavior of the respondent carried out in public, and necessarily adversely
reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself.
An applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required to show that
he is possessed of good moral character. That requirement is not exhausted and
dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. On the contrary, that
requirement persists as a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good
standing.
Respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2) years an adulterous
relationship with a married woman not his wife, in full view of the general public, to
the humiliation and detriment of his legitimate family which he, rubbing salt on the
wound, failed or refused to support. After a brief period of "reform" respondent took
up again with another woman not his wife, cohabiting with her and bringing along his
young daughter to live with them. Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the
fundamental institution of marriage and its elementary obligations before his own
daughter and the community at large.
Therefore, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of
law indefinitely and until farther orders from this Court. The Court will consider lifting
his suspension when respondent Cordova submits proof satisfactory to the
Commission and this Court that he has and continues to provide for the support of
his legitimate family and that he has given up the immoral course of conduct that he
has clung to.
12.VENTURA V SAMSON
FACTS:
Complainant Maria Victoria B. Ventura filed on July 29, 2004 a Complaint for
Disbarment or Suspension before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline against respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson for
"grossly immoral conduct."

Ventura alleged that Samson raped her several times when she was only 13 years
old.

Respondent admitted that sexual intercourse indeed transpired between the herein
Complainant and himself but respondent alleged that act of respondent in having sex
with complainant was done with mutual agreement after respondent gave money to
complainant. Respondent respectfully submits that his act of having sex with
complainant once does not constitute grossly immoral conduct.

Respondent also alleged that the complainant was of loose morals and that
complaint was only concocted so that the complainant can extort money from him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty Samson should be disbarred?

RULING:
Yes.  Respondent’s act of engaging in sex with a young lass, the daughter of his
former employee, constitutes gross immoral conduct that warrants sanction.
Respondent not only admitted he had sexual intercourse with complainant but also
showed no remorse whatsoever when he asserted that he did nothing wrong
because she allegedly agreed and he even gave her money. Indeed, his act of
having carnal knowledge of a woman other than his wife manifests his disrespect for
the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. Moreover,
the fact that he procured the act by enticing a very young woman with money
showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the dignity of the human
person and the ethics of his profession.

Respondent has violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by complainant,
then a 13-year-old minor, who for a time was under respondent’s care. Whether the
sexual encounter between the respondent and complainant was or was not with the
latter’s consent is of no moment. Respondent clearly committed a disgraceful,
grossly immoral and highly reprehensible act. Such conduct is a transgression of the
standards of morality required of the legal profession and should be disciplined
accordingly.

Respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby DISBARRED for Gross Immoral

Conduct, Violation of his oath of office, and Violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
13. MACARRUBO VS MACARRUBO
A.C. No. 6148
February 27, 2004
Facts

For resolution is the Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) filed by respondent Edmundo
L. Macarubbo (respondent) who seeks to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.

Records show that in the Decision dated February 27, 2004, the Court disbarred
respondent from the practice of law for having contracted a bigamous marriage with
complainant Florence Teves and a third marriage with one Josephine Constantino
while his first marriage to Helen Esparza was still subsisting, which acts constituted
gross immoral conduct in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7.  Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. 

Canon 1 Rule 1.01 “ A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest or deceitful
conduct”

Canon 7 Rule 7.03 “ A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall be, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to discredit of the legal profession.

In 2004, respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo was found guilty of gross immorality

and was DISBARRED from the practice of law. He is likewise ORDERED to show
satisfactory evidence to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline and to this Court that
he is supporting or has made provisions for the regular support of his two children by
complainant. The respondent’s name was also stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

He filed for a motion for reconsideration in 2004 but was denied. In 2012, the
respondent filed the instant Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) 5 seeking judicial
clemency and reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys. 

Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency,
to wit:

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but
should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or
chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges
associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity
and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the
same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-
reformation.

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to
ensure a period of reform.
 3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has
productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a
chance to redeem himself.

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning

or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of
the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as
potential for public service.

5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify
clemency.9 (Citations omitted)

Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the applicant must, like any other
candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good
moral character.10

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the petitioner should be granted judicial clemency and be reinstated
to the roll of attorneys

RULING:

Petition granted. Court ruled in favor of the petitioner and ordered to be reinstated to
the roll of attorneys

Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his indiscretion in
the legal profession and in his personal life. He has asked forgiveness from his
children by complainant Teves and maintained a cordial relationship with them as
shown by the herein attached pictures. Records also show that after his disbarment,
respondent returned to his hometown in Enrile, Cagayan and devoted his time
tending an orchard and taking care of his ailing mother until her death in 2008. In
2009, he was appointed as Private Secretary to the Mayor of Enrile, Cagayan and
thereafter, assumed the position of Local Assessment Operations Officer II/ Office-
In-Charge in the Assessor’s Office, which office he continues to serve to date.
Moreover, he is a part-time instructor at the University of Cagayan Valley and F.L.
Vargas College during the School Year 2011-2012. Respondent likewise took an
active part in socio-civic activities by helping his neighbors and friends who are in
dire need.

14.TOLEDO V ABALOS
FACTS:
This is a case of a lawyer who borrowed money without paying it back.

Atty. Abalos obtained a loan from Priscila Toledo, payable within six months from
date, plus interest per month. To guarantee the payment of said obligation,
respondent executed a Promissory Note.
After six months, and despite repeated demands, respondent failed to pay her
obligation. Afraid that she will not recover her money, Ms.Toledo sought the help of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), which referred the matter to the
Commission on Bar Discipline.

The Commission issued an order directing Atty. Abalos to file her Answer to the
letter-complaint of Ms. Toledo. Despite receipt of said order, respondent did not
answer the complaint.

The Commission passed a resolution recommending the suspension from the

practice of law of respondent for a period of six months for her flouting resistance to
lawful orders of the Court and illustrating her despiciency of her oath of office as a
lawyer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not IBP has jurisdiction to suspend Atty. Abalos.

RULING:

Yes. The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the
court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him, for misconduct in his
non-professional or private capacity.

The recommendation to suspend respondent from the practice of law for six months
to be grossly disproportionate to the act complained of, i.e., her failure to appear
before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP. The IBP does not ignore the
fact that by virtue of one’s membership in the IBP, a lawyer thus submits himself to
the disciplinary authority of the organization.

It was still necessary for respondent to acknowledge the orders of the Commission in
deference to its authority over her as a member of the IBP. Her wanton disregard of
its lawful orders subjects her to disciplinary sanction. Thus, her suspension from the
practice of law for one month is warranted.
SIGNIFICANT NOTES
Chapter 1. THE LAWYER AND SOCIETY
Canon 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the Land and promote
respect for law of and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 – A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the judicial system.
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man's cause.
Rule 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will
admit of a fair settlement.
Rule 138, Section 21- Authority of attorney to appear. — an attorney is presumed to be
properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of
attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge
may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any
attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under
which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person
who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorneys
wilfully appear in court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of the court,
may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official
transactions.
Rule 138, Section 27 - Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds.
— A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a
wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
UI VS. BONIFACIO, 333 SCRA 38 , JUNE 08, 2000
Requisites for admission to the practice of law.—The practice of law is a privilege. A bar
candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by
passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of
due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for
admission to the practice of law are:
(a) he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
(b) a resident thereof;
(c) at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
(d) a person of good moral character;
(e) he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending
in court;
(f) possess the required educational qualifications; and
(g) pass the bar examinations.
Possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment
of the privilege of law practice.—Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior
to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. More
importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the
enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the
revocation of such privilege.
Lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social
responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. - Simple as
the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not only far
from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal
practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from
what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public
faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their
personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps
respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising situation had she exercised
prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Ui’s personal background
prior to her intimate involvement with him.
To warrant disciplinary action, conduct must be “grossly immoral,” that is, it must be so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to
a high degree.—All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent
was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her
relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid
marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows
indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members
of the community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must
be “grossly immoral,” that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
A member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from
adulterous relationships x x x but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the
public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.—We have held that
“a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships x x x but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.” Respondent’s act of immediately
distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged
moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high
moral standard of the legal profession. Complainant’s bare assertions to the contrary deserve
no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will
exercise its disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence. This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.
Figueroa vs. Barranco, Jr., 276 SCRA 445 , July 31, 1997
Gross Immorality; Words and Phrases; A person’s engaging in premarital sexual relations
with another, making promises to marry, suggests a doubtful moral character but the same
does not constitute grossly immoral conduct; A grossly immoral act is one that is so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree.—Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer’s oath in
1971 because of the charges of gross immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate,
respondent bore an illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims
that he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations. We find
that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of
respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with
complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the
same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify
suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly
immoral. “A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal
act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.” It is a willful,
flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable
members of the community.
Mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to
marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of the former, is neither
so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction
against him, even if as a result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.—We
find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang quite relevant because mere intimacy between a man
and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and
devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to
warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of such
relationship a child was born out of wedlock.

The Supreme Court cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for
marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love, not
for any other reason.—Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual
relations were evidently consensual. We do not find complainant’s assertions that she had
been forced into sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be respondent’s
girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of
amicable and intimate relations refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual
congress with him. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their
relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could be easily led astray.
Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle permanently with another woman. We
cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and
perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love, not for any other reason.

Even assuming that a person’s indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that he has
been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor.—We cannot
help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and
unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely and it seems,
perpetually, sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be admitted into. Even
assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that respondent has been
prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor. During this time
there appears to be no other indiscretion attributed to him. Respondent, who is now sixty-two
years of age, should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyer’s oath.