A Foundation of Good Management Practice in Government: Management by Objectives

Author(s): Robert Rodgers and John E. Hunter

Source: Public Administration Review, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 1992), pp. 27-39
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public Administration
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 Management by objectives (MBO) is a management sys-
tem that incorporates the features of three processes
that are known to constitute good management prac-
tice in government: participation in decision making,
goal setting, and objective feedback. A compelling
A Foundation of Good base of theory underpins each process (Drucker, 1954).

First, goal setting in MBO programs involves the con-

Management Pracdce in tinuous review and revision of objectives. "Decisions
are made, goals are identified, priorities and posteriori-

Government: Management by ties are set, and organization structure designed for the
specific purposes of the institution" (Drucker, 1976, p.
19). Second, participative management is used to pro-
Objectives
mote understanding throughout the organization
(Ingraham and Rosenbloom, 1989) by "bringing out the
basic views, the basic dissents, the different approaches
Robert Rodgers, University of Kentucky to the same task and the same problem within the orga-
nization" (Drucker, 1976, p. 18). Third, objective feed-
John E. Hunter, Michigan State University
back is given by managers to subordinates on progress
toward achieving their objective.

How effective has management by objectives (MBO) Extensive empirical support exists for each of the
been in the public sector, and why? Robert Rodgers and three component processes. This evidence shows that,

John Hunter offer the results of a meta-analysis of 70 when used independently, each component process of

studies of MBO adoptions in both the public and private

MBO contributes to gains in productivity (Rodgers and
Hunter, 1991). Because all of the component processes
sectors, and theirfindings indicate that MBO has had a
increase productivity, MBO should increase organiza-
positive impact on productivity in all the public sector
tion-wide productivity as well.
agencies studied. These studies indicate that the greatest
gains were generated in agencies where top manage- The general literature on use of MBO in government

ment was highly committed to the approach. Their is reviewed in this article, and results of surveys that
examine the extent of usage are summarized.
analysis also shows that MBO has been as effective in
Conclusions and observations from authors who have
the public sector and it has been in the private sector.
studied the implementation of MBO systems are report-
ed. Taken together, this literature reports that MBO has
been institutionalized throughout all levels of govern-
ment and usage has become more widespread over
time. In contrast, start-up problems and issues of prop-
er implementation are found in some cases, and there
are reports of some programs that have been aban-
doned.

Organizational processes are sometimes difficult to

install (Downs and Larkey, 1986). A management pro-
gram may be ineffective because it is not fully imple-
mented rather than because the organizational process
behind the program is faulty. The key consideration in
program implementation is the extent of top-manage-
ment involvement in the MBO program.

Public Administration Review # January/Febnrary 1992, Vol. 52, No. 1 27

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 Commitment and participation of top management should, They address issues of process rather than outcome noting
in theory, be no less important in government than in busi- that some programs generate excessive paper work, goals in
ness. This study makes that test explicit. Using the study government are sometimes difficult to specify (Sherwood and
results reported in Rodgers and Hunter (1991), studies done Page, 1983), and commitment to MBO is sometimes absent
in public sector organization were separated out from the pri- (Swiss, 1991).
vate sector studies. Results of MBO programs in public sector
Negative comments about MBO are typically associated
organizations were then compared against results in private
with problems that emerge from half-hearted or piecemeal
sector organizations.
implementation of the process. Hollmann (1976, p. 29), for
example, notes that: "Managers often view MBO as just
another fad or gimmick pushed on them by an overzealous
The MBO Literature personnel manager who is trying to 'make [a] mark' on the
What does the research evidence show about the impact company. Naturally, this type of managerial reaction is usual-
of MBO on organizational productivity in public sector orga- ly accompanied by a fairly high degree of resistance to the
nizations? Although articles on MBO theory and implementa- new MBO program."
tion in government proliferated the journals during the 1970s Negative reports led some administrators to form the opin-
and 1980s, no systematic review of empirical evidence exists. ion that MBO was a fad of the 1970s that had faded by the
Reviews do exist that survey study results for both private 1980s. The attention MBO has received in scholarly journals
and public sector organizations (Carroll, 1986; Kondrasuk, has seen a dramatic demise. Extensive discussion of the sub-
1981; Kopelman, 1986; McConkie, 1979). Such reports, how- ject could be found in any public administration outlet during
ever, do not separate the results of studies of MBO programs the 1970s; articles were rarely published during the 1980s.
in public organizations from those in private organizations. Why would such a theoretically sound management system
Kondrasuk (1981) suspected MBO might be better suited to that had received such high marks from surveys and long-
private sector contexts than the public sector milieu but pre- standing support from social science theory have been "pro-
sented no evidence to support his view. Thus, public admin- nounced still-born" (Newland, 1976, p. 20)?
istrators have had no way of knowing what the empirical evi- The expository literature indicates considerable variation
dence has to say about MBO in government. in the type of MBO systems that have been installed. Many
National surveys exist that give subjective evaluations of succeed; some are abandoned. Some programs are imple-
the impacts of MBO. Greiner et al. (1981) compare MBO mented with low commitment and little (or no) participation
experience across 25 governmental units and find that MBO of top management. Others are implemented with high com-
usage is widespread. When administrators are asked to eval- mitment and full participation by top management (Hillmar,
uate MBO in surveys, they consistently report productivity 1981).
improvement when MBO programs are installed (Moore and A form of program implementation also exists where top
Staton, 1981; Poister and McGowan, 1984; Poister and Streib,public administrators have high commitment to the MBO sys-
1989; Ruth and Brooks, 1982; Varney, 1978). tem but do not (for whatever reason) personally participate in
goal setting. These systems are bottom-up in the sense that
Some surveys have gathered information at different points
top managers hope that the positive effects will trickle up the
in time. When survey results are compared across successive
organization as a result of the involvement and participation
time periods, MBO usage is shown to have become even
of lower-level employees.
more widespread over time. In 1976, 41 percent of the 404
cities surveyed had MBO systems; in 1982, 59 percent of 460 The theory behind effective implementation of MBO pro-
cities surveyed had MBO systems (Poister and McGowan, grams indicates that the reason why some programs show
1984); and in 1987, 62 percent of 451 cities surveyed used dramatic productivity improvement and others show meager
MBO (Poister and Streib, 1989). This trend represents a 50 effects is due to the presence (or absence) of top-manage-
percent increase in national usage over a 10-year period. ment support and participation (Howell, 1967).
Thus, agreement exists between the public administrators
who report on their experience with MBO in their own orga-
nizations and management surveys of organization experi- Top-Management Commitment and
ence with MBO. Both suggest that MBO is a successful and
widely applied management system.
Intervention Success

High Top-Management Commitment

Expository Evidence Alpin and Schoderbek (1976) surveyed 198 administrators
Although many articles by public administrators and books from a large state agency that had a successful MBO program.
written by consultants report positive experience with MBO They found that MBO is more successful if all three of its
in many different types of governmental units (Mali, 1986; components-participation in decision making, goal setting,
Odiorne, 1981), negative reports also appear in the literature. and objective feedback-are fully introduced throughout the
These articles discuss various problems and obstacles that organization, from top to bottom. They concluded that MBO
have confronted administrators who have been involved with success is influenced by (a) the amount of subordinate influ-
implementing the MBO management process (Swiss, 1991). ence in the goal-setting process (i.e., participation in decision

28 Public Administration Review *January/Febniary 1992, Vol. 52, No. 1

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making) (b) relevancy of feedback and (c) top-level goal set- managers the autonomy of action promised them so they may
ting and support for the MBO program. reach the measurable objectives to which they commit them-
selves in MBO contracts with their superiors' (Hummel, 1977,
An essential component of MBO is the active participation
p. 90). Use of the program's component processes withers
of top management (Report to the Congress, 1978; Brady,
away.
1973; Jun, 1976; Sherwin, 1976; Swiss, 1991). Discussions
about organization-wide objectives are initiated among top The positive benefits of MBO should not be entirely lost.
administrative officers and, if appropriate, members of the Modifications to the work process that resulted from bottom-
agency's governing body. Top management subsequently up and top-down discussion should not be undone. New
involves senior staff in objective-setting discussions that, in objectives resulting from goal setting should not be changed.
tum, result in the development of senior staff objectives. ByThus, a positive change in productivity should still occur.
example, top management demonstrates to senior administra- Programs with low top-management commitment would be
tors the give-and-take character of the objective-setting pro-expected to have more limited use of all three components of
cess. Senior managers, in tum, engage in objective-setting MBO. Productivity gain should, therefore, be smaller in low-
discussions with their subordinates. Communications thus commitment organizations where practice of the component
trickle from the top down, throughout the entire organization processes is less prevalent.
(Swiss, 1991). The MBO program is eventually institutional-
ized as an ongoing, day-to-day, communications system. Moderate Top-Management Commitment
Alternatively, consider a management system that empha-
Low Top-Management Commitment
sizes the active support of top management in setting goals
Programs that are implemented piecemeal are problematicbut asks for no lower-level comment, evaluation, or participa-
and often show meager effects (Odiorne, 1976). What does tion. It has been suggested that this type of management sys-
piecemeal implementation look like? Top management has tem can be helpful to top management. A "slap on the wrist"
little interest in personally participating in the MBO process can be administered when necessary (Lorch, 1978, p. 259).
but believes that MBO contains features of good management This is not a full-fledged MBO system, however. Even though
practice. Without personal involvement, top management top management supports the MBO program, it does not par-
would have difficulty knowing whether subordinates and ticipate in setting goals with the next level down.
managers actively participate in goal setting or whether man-
agers give objective feedback to subordinates. These are
Top-Management Commitment as a Moderator
ongoing processes that cannot be monitored on a day-to-day
basis without personal participation and involvement. Even if Rodgers and Hunter (1991) derived the hypothesis from
subordinate managers believed in the value of these process-their review of MBO theory that productivity should increase,
es, they would have little way of learning how they workedbut considerable variation was expected in productivity gain.
without having the advantage of learning by example fromSome studies were expected to show huge effects; others,
the chief administrative officer. tiny effects. Results confirmed both hypothesis.

The lack of personal involvement by top management has They also hypothesize that the impact of MBO programs
been identified as a critical reason for a system's abandon-on productivity should increase as top-management commit-
ment. "The most important single reason for failure of MBO ment went from low to moderate to high. As predicted, the
in government is the tendency to treat it as a paperwork sys- results showed that productivity increased from 6 percent to
tem, rather than a face-to-face management system" 33 percent to 56 percent as the level of top-management
(Odiorne, 1976, p. 30). commitment increased from low to moderate to high.
Considerable variation in productivity existed, however, even
Poister and Streib's (1989) survey of 451 U.S. cities affirms
after the studies were broken down by the level of top-man-
the importance of organization-wide participation. City
agement commitment.
administrators and mayors reported that the introduction of
MBO city-wide was much more effective than implementation The theory behind MBO component processes holds for
of MBO in a selected group of targeted departments of city government as well as for business. The large variation in
administration. Of the MBO programs that were implemented productivity gain should be explained by the level of commit-
in some departments but not others, 18 percent were report- ment from top public administrators to the MBO program.
ed by respondents to be very effective. In contrast, 57 per- Exactly the same results should be found: productivity gain
cent of the MBO systems introduced city-wide were reported should be positive, but the variation in gain should also be
to be very effective. Similar results were found in a 1982 sur- large.
vey (Poister and McGowan, 1984). MBO systems introduced
Does MBO work in government as well as it works in
throughout a public jurisdiction were found to be four times
as effective as programs introduced in only selected depart- business? Nothing contained in the process theory behind
ments or divisions of a city government. MBO would sugget that MBO programs in business. Thus, we
would expect that its effect on productivity should be at least
In a system that lacks the active involvement of top man- as large in public sector organizations as in private setor orga-
agement, middle managers have difficulty sorting out the nizations. This hypothesis is also tested here by juxtaposing
goals that are important from those that are not. "It is espe- Rodgers and Hunter's findings for private sector organiza-
cially difficult to cut through the morass of regulations to give tions.

A Foundation of Good Management Practice in Government 29

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 The current meta-analysis used two common metrics: a cent prductivity metric and a performance metric. Some
studies reported productivity results in the form of ratio-scal data Wtsuhtdis, a percent productivity effect esti-
mate (PRO) was calculated from the pretest period to the posttest period where

PRO 100 x (Productivity- - Productivitya)

Productivitypre
Signs were adjusted (when necessary) so that the direction of change was always positive for improvement and nega-
tive for productivity decline; A percent effect estimate of 50.0 percent always means that productivity improved 50 per-
cent over the level that existed before MBO was introduced.
Other studies had data on worker performance that were reported as ordinal numbers; these were typically supervisor
ratings.

Consider a hypothetical example. Suppose mean performance of a work force was rated equal to 4.0 or excellent"
before the MBO program and 5.0 or "superior" one year after the program was installed. The one-point increase does not
mean that performance increased by 25.0 percent, i.e., (5-4)/4 = .25. The degree of improvement is unknown because the
performance scale is ordinal.
The results of studies with performance-rating data were converted to a second common metric and analyzed separate-
ly. This metric, known in meta-analysis as the "d" statistic, estimates the magnitude of the impact of the management pro-
gram on performance in standard deviation units.

d = Mean Performance Rating&,, - Mean Performance Ratingp

Mean of Performance Rating Standard Deviations

A d statistic equal to +.50 means that the management system increased performance by 50 percent of one standard
deviation unit. If the data needed to calculate the d statistic were not reported in the study, the d statistic was derived
using the data that were reported from a statistical conversion formula (Hunter et al., 1982, p. 98; Glass, McGaw, and
Smith, 1981, pp. 149-150).
Multiple indicators of productivity were available in many of the studies. The best estimate of organization-wide pro-
ductivity is the average of all of its component indicators. Multiple measures of productivity with percent productivity esti-
mates were thus averaged. For example, Dempsey and Hamm (1981a, 1981b) report data for two measures of productivi-
ty: 12.0 percent productivity gain for the pilot area accident rate and 17.7 percent productivity gain for the percent of
drivers exceeding 60 miles per hour. The average productivity estimate (PROD) for this study was thus 14.9 percent (the
mean of 12.0 and 17.7). For each study with multiple productivity measures, we derived an averaged indicator for produc-
tivity with equal weighting awarded to each measure.
Some studies with ordinal data also had multiple performance measures for the same organization. After d was com-
puted for each measure, the d values were averaged to generate one estimate for that organization. For example, in
McCotter's (1983) study of New York City maintenance, Manhattan productivity was 73 percent of one standard deviation
(d .73), and Outer Borough productivity was 21 percent of one standard deviation (d - +.21), so mean productivity was
47 percent of one standard deviation (d - 0.47 - (0.73 + 0.21)/21.
Some of the MBO studies reported qualitative evaluations of productivity change. The direction of the estimate in
qualitative studies with multiple assessments was determined by counting and averaging the count of productivity and
performance assessments with positive and negative effects. If the averaged count was positive, the study was coded as
positive. If the number of measures with negative effects outnumbered those with positive effects, the study effect was
coded as negative.

organizations, the researcher cannot be sure if the finding is a

Meta-Analysis
fluke or a valid result. The result from a single organization
Researchers in public administration have a rich tradition can not be generalized to other organizational contexts.
in formulating the tenets of good management practice in
The present study (see grey box above) employs a form of
government (DiIulio, 1989). However, the techniques and
analysis that is new to public administration called meta-anal-
methods used to test these theories typically rely on the
ysis (Perry and Kraemer, 1986). With meta-analysis it is pos-
experience of only one administrative unit. Data are collect-
sible to analyze the cumulative findings from evaluation stud-
ed on the productivity of the organization before the manage-
ies conducted in many different settings by many different
ment program is started. The program is installed and given
researchers. For each management program, there are typi-
time to take effect. Then, its effect is evaluated by considering
cally many evaluation studies. Some are published in aca-
the magnitude of pre-post change in productivity gain.
demic journals or in books or book chapters. Some are pre-
Widespread criticism has been directed at evaluation stud- sented at professional meetings. Others appear as
ies of single organizations. Without data on the experience unpublished dissertations or masters theses. All such studies
with the same management program across many different constitute the database for a meta-analysis.

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Table 1
Studies with Ratio Scale Data on Productivity

Study Measures PRO PROD Study Measures PRO PROD

Bryant (1981) 61.5 Number of inspection findings 20.3

Cases pending investigation 62.0 Number of warehouse refusals
Time from filing to issuance 61.0 for wrong location 100.0
Burkhalter & Coffman (1974) 29.0 Percent cleared off R36 11.0
Average crew size 20.0 Priority 2 iss (min) 84.4
Annual budget 38.0 Priority 3 iss (min) 86.6
Butler (1976) 148.6 Priority 4 iss (hrs) 41.7
Hours taught per semester 148.6 Number of repeat findings -100.0
Dempsey & Hamm (1981a,1981b) 14.9 Number of delinquent turn-ins 100.0
Pilot area accident rate 12.0 Priority 2 iss (min) 57.2
Percent drivers exceeding 60 m-p-h. 17.7 Priority 2 Rec (min) 66.3
Douds & Collingwood (1978) 3.1 Priority 3 (min) 53.1
Recidivism rate -2.1 Priority 4 (hrs) 39.4
Juvenile court hearings 8.2 Vehicle inspection score 0.8
Mali (1978) 66.7 Number of reportable accidents 0.0
Truck breakdown rate 66.7 Number of nonreportable accidents 33.3
Murray (1978) 21.6 Number of incoming items left 65.1
Intervention cases closed 44.7 Number of dated items left 66.7
Supervision cases closed 21.2 Number of unidentified items left 87.5
Foster care placement 17.2 Number of aircraft parts left 86.4
Recidivism rate 3.5 Number of functional checks left 83.3
Pritchard, Jones, Roth, Stumbing, Number of suspect items left 80.0
& Ekeberg (1987, June) 55.7 Number of late monthly inspections 100.0
Percent bounces 54.2 Number of returns from Data 100.0
Percent QA inspections passed -2.1 Processing
Number of units awaiting maintenance 49.4 Percent TCTOs checked 0.0
Number of units awaiting parts 26.5 Number of RODS from other bases 13.8
Percent demand met 6.1 Number of off-base shipments left 83.3
Number of STS tasks completed 33.3 Number of delinquent documents 80.4
Percent qualifying tasks (communications) 17.6 Taylor & Tao (1980) 94.3
Percent qualifying tasks (navigation) 37.5 Case closures per person 68.0
Number of scheduled Trn. overdue 100.0 Processing time 83.5
Number of mobility eq. overdue 100.0 Cases that result in remedies 194.1
Number of PMEL overdue 100.0 Charges resolved 30.0
Number of 349 errors 85.2 Cases resolved 96.0
Number of missed appointments 0.0 Terpstra, Olson & Lockeman (1982) 29.4
In checking errors/100 100.0 Number of activities 15.8
Priority 2 rec (min) 86.3 Number of service activities 61.3
Priority 4 rec (hrs) 72.2 Management development programs 11.1
Number of warehouse refusals Thompson, Luthans & Terpening (1981) 113.5
in receiving 100.0 Actions taken by counselor 113.5
Number of delinquent rejects 98.6

Grand study means (percent) 58.0

Standard deviations (percent) 43.2
Number of studies 11
PRO = percent productivity effect estimate; PROD = average percent productivity estimate; st

If there is more than one study, meta-analysis can be used

metric or statistic must be identified (see
to cumulate the results across studies quantitatively. Findingsmetric is identified
30). Once the common
are thus based on the cumulative experience of all the
be converted orga-
to that metric using standard
nizations that have been subjects of evaluation
conversion studies. If the(Hunter, Schmidt,
procedures
theory suggests the program should work (as in
Hunter andthe case with
Schmidt, 1989).
MBO), the hypothesis is derived that positive effects are
Data on productivity (or performance) bef
expected. If analysis of all studies shows productivity gain,
MBO program was started are needed for
the researcher has high confidence that it is not a fluke.
included in the meta-analysis. There is ex
In most research domains, results are reported
that reports inonmany
experience with ongoin
different forms. Some studies have qualitative reports;
When a study report otherscontains only postt
have quantitative evaluations. To be inMBOa position
impacts,to it
cumu-
is not possible to evaluate
late results across studies with quantitative data, a common
pretest-posttest change resulting from the

A Foundation of Good Management Practice in Government 31

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 For each question asked, authors had the option of indicating that they did not know or did not remember. We
checked information about top-management commitment in the original study report against the author's answers to our
survey and found no inconsistencies. Two of the twelve authors were unable to provide complete answers to our ques-
tions that were necessary to identify the level of top-management commitment and involvement.

We were also able to use the information from the study reports to code the degree of top-management commitment
and involvement for 3 (Bryant, 1981; Dempsey and Hamm, 1981a, b; Murray, 1978) of the 5 studies where we had no sur-
vey information from the authors. Altogether, information on the degree of top-management commitment and involve-
ment was missing in only 4 out of the 17 studies.

The measure of top-management commitment used in the analysis was derived from answers to two questions First,
authors characterized top-management support of MBO to reflect high, moderate, or low commitment. Second, authors
indicated whether or not top management personally participated in setting goals. Commitment of top management to
MBO was considered to be high if support was high and members of the top-management team formulated their own
personal objectives. In several studies, top management was said to have high or moderate commitment but did not par-
ticipate in goal setting. These organizations were considered to have bottom-up expectations and were coded as organi-
zations with moderate top-management commitment. If support was low and there was no participation in goal setting,
top-management commitment was considered to be low. Not surprisingly, no study had top management with low com-
mitnent who participated in goal setting.

Study Moderators
Study organization Commitment Support Particpation
Bryant (1981) National 1abor Relations Board High High Yes
Burkhalter and Coffman (1974) City sanitation department Moderate High No
Butler (1976) Department of Environmental Resources Do not know High Do not know
Dempsey and Hamm (1981a, 1981b) Colorado State Patrol High High Yes
Douds and Collingwood (1978) Police department Low Low No
Mali (1978) Garbage collection Do not know Moderate Do not know
Murray (1978) Division of Family Services, Utah Low Low No
Pritchard et al, (1987) Air Force maintenance and supply units Moderate Moderate No
Taylor and Tao (1980) EEOC District offices Do not know, High Do not know
Terpstra, Olson, & Lockenan (1982) University of Idaho Business School Do not know Do not know No
Thompson, Luthans, & Terpening (1981) State vocational agency High High Yes
Dyer, Monson, and Cope (1975) Veterans administration hospitals Low Low No
McCotter (1983) Cleaning and maintenance Moderate Moderate Yes
Merrow and Holton (1986) Naval Ocean Systems Center Moderate High No
Shetty and Carlisle (1974) Public university High High Yes
Tirmm et al. (1977) YMCA High High Yes
Vanzandt (19'76) Maine school district Moderate Moderate No

Top-Management Commitment was coded as ,high" if suppoNr was h

was coded as "moderate" if support was moderate or high and top management did not participate in goal setting. Top-management
commitment was coded as "low" if support was low and top management did not participate in goal setting. Coding for top-man-
agement commitment in McCotter (1983) was sugested by the Study author.

Take for example the highly visible MBO program intro- descriptions of the nature and extent of top-management
duced in the federal government during the Nixon administra- commitment and involvement were not even reported. For
tion. Many articles were written about agency-wide or gov- such studies, we could not tell the degree or nature of com-
ernment-wide outcomes after the MBO program was installed mitment from the study report itself. We, therefore, gathered
(e.g.: Brady, 1973; McCaffery, 1976; Newland, 1976, Rose, information on top-management commitment and involve-
1977; Sherwood and Page, 1983). Of the many articles pub- ment by surveying the study authors. Responses were
lished about the Nixon MBO program effort, none reported obtained from 12 of the 17 authors (or coauthors) of studies
information (or data) on agency-wide productivity or perfor- with quantitative data (71 percent). Authors of qualitative
mance before MBO was introduced. Without pretest assess- studies were not surveyed. Authors either returned informa-
ments, no evaluation of the pre-post change in productivity is tion to us on a written questionnaire or answered our ques-
possible. Findings from hundreds of expository reports on tions by phone (see grey box on page 32).
MBO program effectiveness could not be included in the
Detailed discussion of the procedures used to locate stud-
study database for the meta-analysis because such studies did
ies, the criteria used for including and excluding studies for
not contain the pretest data necessary for formal evaluation.
analysis, the methods used to convert the results of each
MBO studies sometimes reported sketchy descriptions of study with quantitative data to each of the two common met-
the MBO process that was implemented. In a few studies, rics, and the treatment of pre-post studies with qualitative

32 Public Administration Review . January/February 1992, Vol. 52, No. 1

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Table 2 Table 3
Studies with Ordinal Scale Data Studies with Qualitative
on Performance Ratings Assessments of MBO Programs

Study Measures d PR Sample Study Organiztion Measures Direcon Average

Dyer, Monson & Cope (1975) 0.19 325 of Estmate Estimate
Psychosocial patient care .24 Elam (1978) University public relations Positive
Physical patient care .15 Work completions Positive
Latona (1978) Juvenile justice center Positive
General patient care .19
Job involvement Positive
Patient communications .48
Work goal attainment Positive
Professionalism .19 Sense of achievement Positive
Nursing care safety .14 Mali (1986) New York Transit Authority Positive
Nursing care environment .06 Performance Positive
Special therapy .03 Problem solving Positive
Nursing notes .15 Phoenix Positive
Nursing care plan .31 Service Positive
McCotter (1983) 0.47 82 Per-capita performance Positive
Manhattan productivity .73 Mali (1978) Garbage collection Positive
Productivity audit Positive
Outer borough productivity .21
Memorial hospital Positive
Merrow & Holton (1986) 0.38 1,319 Productivity audit Positive
Turnover of high performers .53 McConkey (1976) Management institute Positive
Turnover of low performers .44 Product quality Positive
Encouragement of innovative work .39 Program reputation Positive
Group work output .15 Ottawa hospital Positive
Shetty & Carlisle (1974) 0.45 109 Project completions Positive
Performance (productivity) .45 City of Sapporo, Japan Positive
Timm, Strauss, Sorensen & Babcock (1977) 0.52 36 Tax collection efficiency Positive
Feeling of self-fulfillment .68 Pascoe (1970) Navy supply and transport Positive
Management performance Positive
Feeling of accomplishment .35 Pies &
Vanzandt (1976) 0.26 250 Thompson (1979) State agency Positive
Hampden guidance service -.11 Placements Positive
Newburgh guidance service .53 Raia (1974) California school district Positive
Weatherbee guidance service .72 Use of time Positive
Winterport guidance service -.10 Reddin (1971) Electric utility Positive
Labor costs Positive
Weighted mean performance rating 0.35
Standard deviation .08 ductivity outcomes, all 13 were positive
Total sample 2,121 out of 30 studies had positive results. Th
the public sector studies reported produ
mance gain
d = d statistics; PR = averaged d statistics forafter the introduction
performance of MBO.
ratings.
Sample = sample size of the study; study data are taken from
Rodgers and Hunter (1991). Percent Productivity Gain
Among the 11 public sector studies with
evaluations are described in mates,
detail the
inmean gain in and
Rodgers productivity
Hunter wa
(1991). The study data on thestandard deviation
experience withwasMBO
43.2 percent,
in pub- sugg
lic sector contexts that were dicted,
analyzed
a fewin the would
studies current
have meta-
found lit
analysis were drawn directly from ity gain. Rodgers and Hunter (1991)
and appear in Tables 1, 2, and 3.
The theory behind implementing MBO in government sug-
gests that the mean productivity gain should be different
when one takes into consideration the commitment of top
Results management in implementing the MBO program. Recall that
it was found that private sector organizations with high com-
Qualitative Results mitment had greater productivity gain than those with moder-
Results for the 30 public sector studies broke down as fol- ate commitment, while moderate-commitment organizations
lows: 11 had data on productivity, 6 had data on performance had greater productivity gain than low-commitment organiza-
outcomes, and 13 reported qualitative evaluations. Among tions (Rodgers and Hunter, 1991). Standard deviations for
the 11 studies with ratio data, all 11 had average productivity each of the subgroups were also smaller than the standard
estimates that were positive (Table 1). Among the 6 studies deviation for the combined group.
with ordinal data, all 6 were positive (Table 2). Among the Productivity-effect estimates for public sector organizations
13 organizations which had qualitative assessments of pro- were grouped into three subsets: three had high commitment,

A Foundation of Good Management Practice in Government 33

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 1651, sd = 4 percent), and in the one low-commitment orga-
Table 4
nization, productivity gain was 19 percent of one standard
Percent Productivity Effects and Performance
deviation (n = 325).
Ratings Broken Down by Sector and Top-
Management Commitment Performance ratings showed the same pattern that was
seen with percent gain: high-commitment organizations
Top-Management Commitment showed a larger gain than moderate-commitment organiza-
High Moderate Low tions; moderate-commitment organizations showed a larger
gain than the low-commitment organization. Standard devia-
Percent Productivity Gain
tions for the high-commitment (sd = 3 percent) and moder-
Public sector
ate-commitment organizations (sd = 4 percent) were also
Orgs 3 2 2
Mean 63.3% 42.4% 12.3% considerably smaller than the standard deviation for the com-
SD 40.3% 13.4% 9.2% bined set of six organizations (sd = 8 percent).
Private sector
We also predicted that productivity gain in public sector
Orgs 10 2 4
Mean 54.4% 23.5% 3.0% organizations should be just as large as in private sector orga-
SD 25.6% 6.5% 5.3% nizations. Data in Table 4 show that for all levels of top-man-
Performance Gain agement commitment, percent productivity gain in the public
Public sector sector is greater than the private sector, although these differ-
Orgs 2 3 1
ences were not significant.
Mean 47% 37% 190/0
SD 3% 4% - Now consider the private sector-public sector differences
Private sector for performance ratings. Studies where top management had
Orgs 4 0 2
high commitment had slightly less performance gain in public
Mean 67% - 8%
SD 43% - 6% organizations than in private (47 percent of one standard
deviation versus 67 percent of one standard deviation)
The percent gain inthough, again, this difference was not significant.
performance ratings
dard deviation. Comparison of the difference for low-commitment organiza-
SD = standard deviation. tions showed the same pattern found for the studies with
Orgs = number of organizations.
data on productivity gain: the public sector organizations had
more productivity gain than the private.
two had moderate commitment and two had low commit-
ment from top management (Table 4). In the organizations
with high commitment, the average gain was 63.3 percent
with a standard deviation of 40.3 percent. In the organiza-
Discussion
tions with moderate commitment, the average gain was 42.4
percent with a standard deviation of 13.4 percent. In the The Massive Discard of Research Evidence
organizations with low commitment, the average gain was
Results show that, when there is high commitment from
12.3 percent with a standard deviation of 9.2 percent. The
top management, MBO programs result in large productivity
standard deviation for each subgroup was smaller than the
gain. In stark contrast to the results reported here and in our
standard deviation for the combined group. The difference
earlier work (Rodgers and Hunter, 1991), prior reviewers
between 63.3 percent in the high commitment organizations
were hesitant to draw definite conclusions regarding the
and 12.3 percent in the low-commitment organizations is a effectiveness of MBO programs (Milgiore, 1977, p. 20). For
also a dramatic difference.
example, Guzzo and Bondy (1983, p. 22) concluded that
"productivity improvement is a likely, though not certain, out-
Performance Ratings come (of MBO)." Kirchhoff (1975, p. 351) asserted that
The mean performance rating gain across all six studies "researchers have failed to confirm that MBO concretely con-
was 35 percent of one standard deviation (Table 2) The stan- tributes to manager performance." In the most widely cited
dard deviation was also relatively large, 8 percent. In view ofreview of research on MBO, Kondrasuk (1981, p. 419) con-
the predictions of MBO theory and the corroborative findingscluded that the evidence "leaned toward finding MBO to be
for percent gain, this estimate was expected to be the average ineffective."
of results for organizations with different levels of top-man- How could the results of this meta-analysis diverge so rad-
agement commitment. ically from the findings reported in prior review studies? Prior
Table 4 groups studies with performance ratings into three reviewers rejected most of the research evidence for one or
subsets: two public sector organizations had high commit- another methodological reason and wound up basing their
ment from top management, three had moderate commit- analysis on a handful of studies. Consider the findings
ment, and one had low commitment. In the two high-com- reported in three reviews of MBO research. Kondrasuk
mitment organizations, mean productivity gain was 47 (1981) reviewed 185 reports about MBO program effective-
percent of one standard deviation (n = 145, sd = 3 percent). ness. Of these, only 45 had pretest-posttest data on produc-
In the three moderate-commitment organizations, mean pro- tivity. He discarded 40 of these 45 studies and, in the end,
ductivity gain was 37 percent of one standard deviation (n = considered the results of only 5. Thus, Kondrasuk rejected 89

34 Public Administration Review *January/Febniary 1992, Vol. 52, No. 1

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percent of the studies with formal evaluations of MBO pro- Studies by Authors who Implemented MBO. Reviewers also
grams. Kopelman (1986) reviewed only 8 studies and wound worried that study authors who were involved in implement-
up rejecting 3 of those. His conclusions were also based on ing the MBO program might be more disposed to report posi-
only 5 studies. Guzzo, Jette, and Katzell (1985) analyzed data tive effects and bury negative effects. Because an author has
from only 4 organizations. taken an active role in implementing MBO, the author would
Why were so many studies rejected? Reviewers did not have reason to repress negative effects. External evaluators,
see themselves as rejecting worthwhile studies. Rather, they in contrast, are presumed to be less likely to bury assess-
thought they were rejecting "unsophisticated" studies which ments of MBO effectiveness since they are "not emotionally
they believed were "flawed methodologically" for one reason attached to its success and can be more objective"
or another. They thus made a conscious decision to review (Ivancevich et al., 1978, p. 78). If authors who are actively
only the results of the tiny tip of studies that they believed involved in implementing MBO programs do suppress evi-
had more "rigorous" study designs. dence of program failure, their studies should have larger
effects than studies by authors who are not involved.
As a general rule, narrative reviews are seldom systematic
or comprehensive (Jackson, 1980). It was found that review- Empirical Tests of Methodological Hypotheses. Do studies
ers in ten different research domains threw out as much as 90 that are authored by managers or by persons who imple-
percent of the research evidence for one reason or another mented the MBO program show larger outcomes? We tested
(Hunter and Rodgers, 1989, 1991). Conclusions of reviewers each question empirically
are often based on a highly selected subset of studies. While
First, we coded each study for the presence or absence of
the reviewer believes that the studies that are kept are superi-
each study characteristic, respectively. Of the 11 studies with
or to the discarded studies, other reviewers, with different
ratio data on productivity, 6 were authored by managers
biases, would not agree. Discarding the majority of studies
(Bryant, 1981; Burkhalter and Coffman, 1974; Butler, 1976;
requires an act of faith-an assumption that the discard rule
Dempsey and Hamm, 1981a, 1981b; Douds and Collingwood,
did not produce a biased sample of studies. With meta-anal-
1978; Taylor and Tao, 1980); 5 were authored by nonman-
ysis, no studies are rejected at the outset. Thus no act of faith
is necessary in assessing the conclusions. agers (Mali, 1978; Murray, 1978; Pritchard et al., 1987;
Terpstra, Olson, and Lockeman, 1982; Thompson, Luthans,
and Terpening, 1981); 8 were authored by individuals who
Methodological Moderator Variables
were involved in implementing the MBO program (Burkhalter
Prior reviewers never proved or even attempted to prove and Coffman, 1974; Butler, 1976; Dempsey and Hamm,
that the rejected studies were flawed. They simply accepted 1981a, 1981b; Douds and Collingwood, 1978; Mali, 1978;
their own beliefs uncritically and did not notice that their Murray, 1978; Pritchard et al., 1987; Thompson et al., 1981);
beliefs were actually untested hypotheses-hypotheses which and three authors were uninvolved (Bryant, 1981; Taylor and
they simply assumed to be true. The massive discard of stud- Tao, 1980; Terpstra et al., 1982).
ies was more an act of morality than an act of science
(Hunter and Schmidt, 1989; Hunter et al., 1982; Jackson, 1980; Second, we tested to see whether study outcomes were
Schmidt et al., 1985). related to each study characteristic, respectively. Are man-
agers more likely to author studies with larger productivity
Reviewers pointed to many different study characteristics outcomes? Mean productivity in the six studies authored by
that they believed affected study outcomes, including such managers was 58.7 percent. Mean productivity in the five
considerations as whether the study was published or unpub-
studies authored by nonmanagers was 57.4 percent.
lished, had data that were collected retrospectively, or were
Productivity outcomes in studies authored by managers are
authored by a consultant. Reviewers speculated that such
thus essentially no different from the productivity outcomes
study characteristics moderated the outcomes that were
in studies authored by nonmanagers.
reported. That is, they believed studies would show larger
productivity gains if they were published, if a retrospective Did studies by authors who were involved in implement-
data collection method was used, or if the study was ing MBO programs report larger productivity outcomes than
authored by a consultant. studies by authors who were not involved? Mean productivi-
Do such study characteristics moderate study outcomes? ty in the eight studies by authors involved in implementing
We treated each allegation as an unproven, hypothetical the MBO program was 56.6 percent (standard deviation =
assertion and subjected each to an empirical test. Consider 47.9 percent). Mean productivity in studies authored by
for example results for just two such factors. uninvolved authors was 61.7 percent. (standard deviation =
26.5 percent). Contrary to reviewer expectations, authors
Studies Authored by Managers. Some MBO study authors
involved in implementing MBO programs reported slightly
were managers who did studies on the effectiveness of MBO
smaller productivity outcomes than uninvolved authors.
for their own organizations. Guzzo and Bondy (1983, p. 36)
speculated that managers might be reluctant to publish evi- In addition to an examination of the two hypotheses that
dence of their own organization's failures. If managers do concern author affiliation and involvement, we tested all of
suppress negative findings, then studies authored by man- the many methodological hypotheses that are sprinkled
agers should show larger effects than studies authored by throughout the literature about MBO. Results indicated no
nonmanagers. support for any of them (Rodgers and Hunter, 1989).

A Foundation of Good Management Practice in Government 35

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Extraneous Factor Threats trast to the initial, massive discard of studies by prior MBO
reviewers, we found no justification for the discard of even
If an extraneous factor threat is real, it is usually known. If
one study.
known, a researcher can almost always count on the fact that
some studies will have that particular study characteristic and
others will not. This means that the full set of studies can be Cumulating Study Results for Organizations
sorted into two groups: one subset of studies that have that This meta-analysis considered the findings of 30 studies
particular study characteristic and a second subset of studies from 30 different organizations. Each single, isolated study
that do not. A test then can be done to see whether out- reported data on only one organization's experience with
comes in the two subsets differ. This means that a researcherMBO. In each study, data on the experience of many indi-
is almost always in a position to test for the effects of factors viduals from many units of the organization were reported.
that could potentially affect study outcomes. Therefore, the formal evaluation of MBO impacts in any one
study was based on data from large numbers of individuals.
A possibility exists that an extraneous factor might be pre-
sent in all studies and thus cannot be treated as a potential In our meta-analysis, data from a study on the productivity
moderator variable. Perhaps productivity gains in the MBO of many persons from different departments and units were
studies are explained by Hawthorne effects: MBO organiza- used as a basis for estimating a single number-that of orga-
tions knew they were being studied and were more produc- nizational productivity. The whole organization was used as
tive because of the extra attention they received. If this were the appropriate unit of analysis because the theory behind
true, outcomes would be similar in the organizations with MBO suggests it is most effective when installed throughout
low, moderate, and high commitment from top management. the entire organization. An analysis that considers the experi-
Instead, results showed that there were large differences in ence with MBO of 30 different organizations is 30 times more
productivity outcomes across the three levels of commitment. powerful than the single, isolated study that considers the
Thus, Hawthorne effects do not account for the large differ- experience of many persons from just one organization.
ences found across levels of top-management commitment.
Studies that report on the experience of only one organi-
An extraneous factor that is unknown to the researcher zation have become a rich tradition in public administration
could potentially bias study outcomes. If an extraneous fac- research. What is the conventional criticism of the single, iso-
tor threat is unknown (or cannot be measured), it cannot be lated study that reports on experience with a management
treated in the analysis as a potential moderator variable. program in only one organization? Such studies are said to
Consider one example suggested by one of the reviewers of report findings that can not be generalized to other situational
contexts. More "rigorous" research is recommended.
this article. Perhaps the large effects found in the MBO stud-
ies are due to "...a new top management team coming in and Criticism that the study of only one organization's experi-
pressing for a turnaround.... An MBO initiative might be one ence lacks rigor holds up only as long as the skeptical critic
pellet in a shotgun blast of new initiatives and changes." thinks about the results of each study, one by one. When the
There is no information reported in most of the studies about results of each single, isolated study are cumulated and ana-
management initiatives running side-by-side MBO. lyzed comprehensively as in the current meta-analysis, find-
Therefore, the possible presence of turnaround initiatives in are drawn from many different situational contexts. The
ings
the organizations that were studied is not known. massive body of study evidence of the experience of single
governmental units are a rich database that has been need-
The cumulative effect of extraneous factors can be estimat-
ed using a new meta-analytic method (Hunter and Rodgers, lessly discarded.
1989). Using this method, the magnitude of effects was esti-
mated for unknown extraneous factors in the case of the
MBO studies (Hunter and Rodgers, 1991). This analysis Summary of Findings
shows that the mean productivity gain due to extraneous fac-The hypothesis of success for MBO programs in govern-
tors is 1.4 percent. Study outcomes that are due to the effects
ment was derived from an examination of the theory underly-
of unknown extraneous factors are thus quite small and doing the MBO process. MBO is made up of three constituent
not change any of the substantive findings reported here. processes: participative decision making, goal setting, and

The mean estimate of extraneous factor threats is smallobjective

in feedback. Thus the process theory of MBO predicts
success for any management system which combines those
large part because of the presence of different extraneous fac-
tors that have the potential to affect productivity outcomes.processes. Results confirmed our prediction: all 30 studies
Some of the extraneous factor threats magnify productivity (100 percent) reported productivity gain.
outcomes. Others diminish outcomes. When the effects of Our review of the literature on MBO generated the
extraneous factors that have both positive and negative hypothesis that some studies would show large gains while
effects are cumulated across studies, it is not surprising to others would not. The literature on MBO implementations
find that, when averaged, their combined effect is quite small. suggested that the main reason for failure of MBO in govern-

In summary, we used study results from the full set of allment is the same reason for its failure in the private sector:
studies with pre-post quantitative assessments of MBO the absence of a fully committed and involved top manage-
impacts to test the various methodological hypotheses and to ment. The MBO process spreads from the top down. If top
estimate the effects of extraneous factor effects. In stark con-management does not personally participate in the process,

36 Public Administation Review .January/Febniary 1992, Vol. 52, No. 1

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then the system is half-hearted and ultimately should not suc- tions implied by theory were developed. Third, studies that
ceed. As predicted, there was considerable variation in pro- evaluate program impacts using pretest-posttest designs were
ductivity and performance outcomes with the introduction of identified and results converted to one (or more) common
MBO. metric(s). Fourth, theoretical expectations were tested
through cumulative meta-analysis of the study results.
Consideration of the theory behind and experience with
program implementation suggested this variation could be In the typical evaluation of management programs found
explained by the level of top-management commitment to the in public sector organizations, productivity impacts are evalu-
program. Studies with a high level of top-management com- ated on the basis of the experience of just one organization.
mitment were predicted to have greater productivity gain Suppose a researcher selects for analysis an organization that
than studies with moderate commitment, and studies with has low commitment to MBO. Our results indicate that pro-
moderate commitment were expected to show greater gain ductivity improvement of only 12 percent on average would
than studies with low commitment. be found. The effect is positive but disappointing, especially
Results again confirmed expectations. In studies with ratio in light of the predictions tendered by MBO theory. The
scale measurements of productivity, productivity gains researcher would probably be inclined to conclude that pro-
dropped from 63.3 percent to 42.4 percent to 12.3 percent as gram effects were "disappointing."
commitment from top management dropped from high to A researcher must thus have comparative data on the
moderate to low. In studies with ordinal data on perfor- experience of MBO in organizations with high top-manage-
mance, performance ratings dropped from 47 percent to 37 ment commitment to see that the program results in a large
percent to 19 percent of one standard deviation as commit- increase in productivity only when it is fully implemented.
ment dropped from high to moderate to low. Selection of one organization's experience as the basis for
Finally, theory suggested that the MBO should be no less evaluation has the potential for massive error in the conclu-
effective in the public sector than in the private sector. sions that can be drawn about a program's effectiveness.
Comparison of results of studies done in both sectors con- A popular criticism heard of public administration research
firms the expectation that MBO in the public sector works is that more studies of high quality are needed. Results
just as well (or perhaps even better) than in the private sec- reported here for studies that evaluated MBO programs sug-
tor.
gest that more studies are not necessarily needed. A strong
base of theory already exists. A critical mass of studies
already exists. With the two in place, it would be a shame
Conclusions not to take advantage of a method of analysis other disci-
Public administrators will continue to embrace new man- plines have found so useful.
agement programs that offer the promise of significant pro-
ductivity gain. When the many programs of the last 50 years
are laid out side by side, they contain many or all of the com-Robert Rodgers is associate professor of public adminis-
ponents of properly implemented MBO programs. Take the at the University of Kentucky. His research interests
tration
management fad of the 1990s-Total Quality Management include the study of administrative systems that enhance
(TQM)-where feedback is essential, goal setting is critical,organizational and individual productivity.
and participation in decision making is expected. The pro-
John E. Hunter is a fellow of the Society of Industrial and
gram label is new, but the program process itself is based on
Organizational Psychology, the American Psychological
the same three components used in the design of MBO. That
Society, and the American Psychological Association. His
is, while the label "MBO" is less often used for current pro-
current research in personnel focuses on the determinants of
grams, the content is MBO in fact.
job performance: learning as represented by job knowledge
This study presented a method for evaluating management
gained from training and experience, specific cognitive skills
program impacts. First, the various components of the pro-
used in day-to-day performance, social skills used in manage-
gram were identified and considered from the perspectives of and the extent to which these determinants are reflect-
ment,
administrative theory and practice. Second, a set of expecta-
ed in various methods of job analysis.

A Foundation of Good Management Practice in Government 37

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