Tim B
Tim B
Tim B
Johnson
JSGS 806
12/06/2020
have, to varying degrees, started acquiring, using, and developing algorithmic policing methods
(Kenyon 2020). The report also acknowledged that the true extent to which predictive policing methods
are used is unknown (Kenyon 2020). Considering the rise in predictive algorithmic policing across
many countries (Kaufman, Egbert and Leese 2019, 674), it seems reasonable to conclude that Canada is
following suit. Accordingly, this paper accepts that predictive policing is becoming commonplace in
I juxtapose the adoption of data-driven predictive methods against calls for police reform in the
name of human rights, i.e. those voiced in the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement. The analysis of
If society sincerely wants to address police reform, an examination of the impacts of predictive
policing on key demands for reform is required. Thus, this paper asks the fundamental question of
whether or not calls for transparency, accountability, and a reallocation of police resources are
Through exploratory research of peer-reviewed and grey literature, I situate this paper within
the context of pre-existing critical and descriptive discourse. In doing so, I echo the need for safeguards
issued by the Citizen Lab, but aim to provide specificity to where predictive policing methods conflict
with the aforementioned three demands. A few broad-stroke recommendations for mitigation strategies
are made, though the focus resides predominantly on identifying problems where policy intervention
implications of predictive policing upon each. To conclude, I deduce that increased adoption of
predictive policing demands safeguards to ensure not just ‘human-in-the-loop’ decision-making but
Predictive policing: What it is, its aims, and what data it uses:
First, predictive policing refers to police use of algorithmic risk assessment to calculate the
likelihood of future criminal behaviour (Peeters and Schuilenburg 2018, 276). It is also understandable
as a form of stochastic governance through control (Sanders and Sheptycki 2017). This section uses
the following two facets to describe predictive policing and how it works:
There are many aims or targets of predictive policing. For clarity, this paper classifies these
aims into four subsets. Algorithms are used to project patterns (Kaufman, Egbert and Leese 2019), that
2. offenders who are deemed high risk for committing future crimes;
This is by no means an exhaustive account, for example, the flag-hypothesis forecasts crime
risk based on an object's vulnerability to theft (Kaufman, Egbert and Leese 2019, 682). However, the
where and whom seem to be the most common forms of decision-making for predictive analytics.
Deterrence via targeted deployment to 'hot spot' areas during high risk times seems to be the most
common intervention motivated by predictive algorithms. The higher the projected risk, the more need
for surveillance and patrol (Peeters and Schuilenburg 2018, 276). Such preemptive deterrence is
believed to bear the potential to effectively and efficiently lower crime rates.
The foundational assumption is that the future will resemble the past (Bennett Moses and Chan
2018, 810). So, predictive analytics are based on historical data sets. The data can be drawn from
closed police data sets or open data, i.e. big data. There is also a trend in big data usage toward
“platformization” in police work, which is, “an organizational process in which manifold data sets and
databanks, especially from police-external sources, are cross linked” (Egbert 2019, 84). This trend
correlates with the use of machine learning in algorithms. A necessary final point is that software
packages used by police are often privately owned. So, how algorithms work is often subject to
Accountability is concerned with controlling the power of police and requiring police explain
their conduct (Bennett Moses and Chan 2018, 817). Thus, accountability has two components, that
police explain their conduct and face suitable consequences for their actions (power control).
1.1 Peeters and Schuilenburg describe the use of computer generated scores to prevent crime as
very similar to how 'consumer scores' get used by credit card companies. (Peeters and Schuilenburg
2018, 268) They refer to predictive policing as 'administrative law' (Peeters and Schuilenburg 2018,
classification based on the algorithms that are designed into risk assessment tools.” (Peeters and
Schuilenburg 2018, 268) Understanding predictive policing as a logical extension of bureaucratic
classification creates a conflict regarding the need for police to explain their conduct. Peeters and
Shuilenberg argue that bureaucratic practice “shows a tendency toward a self-imposed reduction of
professional discretion.” (Peeters and Schuilenburg 2018, 275) The authors contend that “the outcomes
of an algorithm are more determined by its input and design than by the individual assessment of a
case. What is more, bureaucratic structures are highly disciplining for the behaviour of those subjected
Thus, bureaucratic structures reduce the extent to which individuals exert discretion over their
own decisions. And, algorithms only add new rules to discipline behaviour. Police may claim that
predictive scores are only a tool to assist in their decision-making, but Peeters and Shuilenberg suggest
human tendency to have more faith in numerical data over other forms of evidence, regardless of
validity (Israni 2017), adds to accountability issues of bureaucratic decision-making. When asked to
explain decisions, officers can now blame software. Algorithms offer a means of outsourcing decision
1.2 Feedback loops refer to self-perpetuating, self-affirming biases through the use of historic
crime data (Bennett Moses and Chan 2018, 810). One example being the fact of officially reporting a
crime and how it gets classified are subject to bias. Then, that biased data is used to justify intervening,
thereby creating more crime data to be used for future predictions. Through feedback loops,
discrimination becomes entrenched into police methods. Automation bias refers to a computer
program's suggested answers being over trusted (Freeman 2016, 99). In machine learning, automation
bias can also refer to confirmation bias, or feedback loops within an algorithm that uses machine
learning. Feedback loops are an accountability issue because algorithms can “mathwash” (Mok 2017)
Body cameras as a technological tool claimed to improve police accountability. A 2016 study found
that 92.6% of prosecutions involving the use of body-cam evidence were against private citizens, just
over 8% against law enforcement (Merola et al. 2016, 16). So, even when police adopt technologies to
These three issues imply that increased adoption of predictive policing technologies raises
issues of accountability. This points to a need for safeguards that establish where legal liability resides
Transparency can be understood as the ability to “dig deeper” (Bennett Moses and Chan 2018,
818). In this paper, it is the ability to access answers with respect to how an algorithm works, i.e. its
variables and/or how they are weighted. Transparency is thus in one sense more rudimentary than
accountability, because in order for police to provide answers they must first be able to provide
The first is the issue of proprietary black boxes, the second being algorithmic black boxes.
2.1 The issue of proprietary black boxes respecting predictive software ought to instill a sense
of ethical urgency for policy intervention. Proprietary black boxes occur when policing software is
“subject to commercial-in-confidence provisions and licensing contracts” (Bennett Moses and Chan
2018, 818). In the recent Wisconsin Supreme Court case of State v. Loomis, the ethical importance of
algorithmic transparency was centerstage. In Loomis, a sentence was issued based on an algorithm
generated recidivism risk assessment from a program called COMPAS (Israni 2017). On appeal, the
defendant-appellant claimed that: “[h]e knew what information COMPAS was using, his criminal
history and a pre-sentencing questionnaire he had filled out, but had no idea how it was using said
information to predict his recidivism.” (Israni 2017)
This case creates a precedent for programmers to deny access to algorithmic analysis to outside
parties. This is extremely problematic, even if we think that a computer might be less biased than a
judge or a police officer. In Loomis, the defendant was denied information regarding how variables
were weighted in a calculation that determined his prison sentence. Not requiring the disclosure of how
variables get weighted allows for biases like racial discrimination to remain unchecked, even when
racial indicators are not explicitly included in an algorithm's calculation. This is because proxy
indicators can be used for racial factors, i.e. one's postal code (Turner Lee, Resnick and Barton 2019).
Thus, how a postal code gets weighted could disproportionately influence the risk score that an
algorithm generates Saskatoon's Police Service development of their own in-house software to avoid
proprietary opacity (Kenyon 2020) further suggests that some form of policy intervention is warranted
to ensure transparency measures are being met with respect to proprietary algorithms.
2.2 The second problem can occur even if proprietary transparency measures seem satisfactory.
Simply put, how an algorithm produces a risk assessment can be too complicated to understand, even
for the programmers themselves.This is especially the case when algorithms incorporate machine
learning- which always carries an element of opacity (Oswald et al. 2018). Take for example, a specific
risk assessment known as the HART model that “contains over 4.2 million decision points, all of which
are highly interdependent on the ones that precede them” (Oswald et al. 2018, 234). Algorithms can
themselves be black boxes, given the relative human capacity to understand how they work even with
These two problems call for, at the very least, intensive deliberation and discussions involving
lawmakers, policy analysts, policymakers, police representatives and software providers about the need
for transparency within predictive policing. Requiring that police have basic algorithmic literacy in
order to reflect on their decisions is a bare minimum. That the public at large has access to the 'what'
and 'how' of a proprietary algorithm must be considered, perhaps in the form of mandatory disclosure
measures. Lastly, it might be of value to ask if the benefits of using inherently opaque algorithms
reliant upon machine learning is really higher than the cost of never having total comprehensibility.
I argue that a contradiction exists within how predictive policing defines the problem of crime
that carries implications for resource reallocation. Deborah Stone's typology of causal stories can help
to extrapolate this contradiction. Predictive policing operates upon paradoxical reasoning that logically
Deborah Stone argues that how we understand occurrences, that is, intentions of actions and
their consequences is crucial “in the struggle over problem definition” (Stone 1989, 284). Actions can
either be unguided or purposeful, with intended or unintended consequences (Stone 1989, 285). She
clarifies that this taxonomy is not complete upon acknowledging the existence of 'complex' historical
or structural causal explanations (Stone 1989, 288). I suggest that predictive policing relies on
structural causal explanations while operating as though crime (its problem definition), were a simple
Certain algorithms incorporate census data to identify communities at risk of higher crime rates.
One police officer in a 2019 study, stated they had relied on variables like “socio-economic status,
residential stability, linguistic isolation, and race and ethnicity” (Kaufman, Egbert and Leese 2019,
and crime. And still, policing 'criminal behaviour' through patrol and deterrence relies on an
oversimplified attribution of intent. As Stone puts it, “predictable stochastic outcomes have been
transformed[...]into conscious intent“ (Stone 1989, 291). Thus, the use of software that includes
variables related to socio-economic status and ethnicity is at odds with a problem definition that begets
intervention through deterrence in the immediacy of spatiotemporal predictions.
Calls for reallocation of police resources to other social and health services implicitly reject the
simple definition of 'crime' as simply purposeful action with intended consequences. As Stone would
see it, predictive policing “assumes that the effects of an action are its purposes [which] is to commit
the teleological fallacy.” (Stone 1989, 290) In acknowledging structural causes of crime, predictive
oversimplified definition that justifies channelling resources toward strategies of intervening via police
presence.
Predictive policing could therefore be its own strongest case against itself with the questions of
resource reallocation. Given the increasing emphasis placed on preventing crime from taking place, and
that police also acknowledge socio-economic indicators in algorithmic predictions, the logic supports
reallocating resources to other public services. Meaning that, intervening earlier, i.e. to address socio-
economical causes of crime is the next logical step for predictive policing.
In Sum:
To conclude, this paper has identified problems that predictive policing presents for reform
demands of accountability, transparency, and reallocating resources. I deduce that the increased
adoption of predictive policing urgently demands policy intervention to ensure not just human-in-the-
loop decision-making but rather humans-in-the-loop decision-making. Full disclosure and transparency
of how algorithms make their calculations must not be confined to police or software proprietors, but a
concern for the federal government, lawmakers, policymakers, the public, and law enforcement
agencies alike. For now, I will channel the above analysis into a demand for algorithmic transparency
in the form of regulatory safeguards that ensure decision-making incorporates humans-in-the-loop from
diverse perspectives.
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