Melo Versus People - 85 PHIL. 766

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. Melo v. People - 85 PHIL.

766

Parties:
CONRADO MELO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, Respondents-Appellees.

Facts:
 Petitioner was charged in the Court of First Instance (CFI) with frustrated homicide, for
having allegedly inflicted upon victim with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill,
several serious wounds on different parts of the body, requiring medical attendance for a
period of more than 30 days, and incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor
for the same period of time. 
 On December 29, 1949, at eight o’clock in the morning, the accused pleaded not guilty to
the offense charged, and at 10:15 in the evening of the same day Benjamin Obillo died
from his wounds. 
 Evidence of death was available to the prosecution only on January 3, 1950, and on the
following day, January 4, 1950, an amended information was filed charging the accused
with consummated homicide. 
 The accused filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging double jeopardy,
which was denied by the respondent court; 
 Hence, the instant petition for prohibition to enjoin the respondent court from further
entertaining the amended information.

Issue:
Whether the amendment of the information charged against the accused constitutes Double
Jeopardy.

Ruling: NO

"Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible,
which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time,
constitute a new and distinct offense," the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if
indicated for the new offense.

It must be noticed that the protection of the Constitution inhibition is against a second jeopardy
for the same offense, the only exception being, as stated in the same Constitution, that “if an act
is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar
to another prosecution for the same act.” The phrase same offense, under the general rule, has
always been construed to mean not only the second offense charged is exactly the same as the
one alleged in the first information, but also that the two offenses are identical. 
 There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for
one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other. This so called
“same-evidence test” which was found to be vague and deficient, was restated by the
Rules of Court in a clearer and more accurate form. 
 Under said Rules there is identity between two offenses not only when the second offense
is exactly the same as the first, but also when the second offense is an attempt to commit
the first or a frustration thereof, or when it necessary includes or is necessarily included
in the offense charged in the first information. 
 In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of
the essential ingredients of the former as alleged in the information constitute the latter.
And vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when all the
ingredients of the former constitute a part of the elements constituting the latter. 
 In other words, one who has been charged with an offense cannot be again charged with
the same or identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the former. 
 “As the Government cannot be with the highest, and then go down step to step, bringing
the man into jeopardy for every dereliction included therein, neither can it begin with the
lowest and ascend to the highest with precisely the same result.”

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1950marchdecisions.php?id=78 

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