Medieval Semiotics

To speak of medieval semiotics is not to speak of a precisely defined discipline

besides, and distinct from, other medieval arts and sciences; it is rather to speak of
a complex field of more or less — mostly more — elaborate reflections on the
concept of sign, its nature, function, and classification. In order to understand the
enormous extent to which such theories grew during the Middle Ages some basic
formal features of the scholastic organization of knowledge has to be kept in mind.

There are various areas within the scholastic system of arts and sciences where a
rich tradition of semiotic questions and answers accumulated over the centuries.
Most important are those places located in the realm of the so-called trivium (i.e.,
grammar, rhetoric and logic), especially in logic where already the determination
of its primary subject as well as the discussion of the basic logical notions (like
‘term’ or ‘signification’) gave rise to explicit remarks on the concept of sign.

In his incomplete early work, De Dialectica, Augustine massively draws on the

terminology of the Stoic philosophy of language. Augustine is favoring a reifying
concept of sign. A sign, as he defines it in line with the descriptions given by
Cicero and the Latin tradition of rhetoric, is “something that shows itself to the
senses and something other than itself to the mind”

The concept of sign, thus defined in terms of a triadic relation (a sign is always a
sign of something to some mind), provides the general basis for Augustine's theory
of language: “To speak is to give a sign in articulate voice” (Loqui est articulata
voce signum dare) (Augustine De dial. 1975, 86). Speech, in further contrast to
Stoic semantics, is essentially characterized by its communicative function. A
word, by definition, is a “sign of something, which can be understood by the
hearer when pronounced by the speaker”.

In his dialogue De Magistro (On the Teacher), however, written shortly after De
Dialectica, Augustine denies that words or signs have the power of ‘showing’
anything in the sense of making something present to the understanding.
For this reason, still influenced by the tenets of the skeptical tradition at that time,
Augustine was limiting the capacity of the sign to its admonitory or
commemorative function.
But in De Doctrina Christiana, after abandoning the skeptical position, Augustine
redefines the sign accordingly, claiming that “a sign is something which, offering
itself to the senses, conveys something other to the intellect.
In contrast to his former view, he is now attributing a fundamental epistemic
function to the sign, claiming that “all instruction is either about things or about
signs; but things are learnt by means of signs”
Augustine divides the sign into the two main classes of natural signs (signa
naturalia) and given signs (signa data). “Natural signs are those which, apart from
any intention or desire of using them as signs, do yet lead to the knowledge of
something else”, as, for example, smoke when it indicates fire, the footprint of an
animal passing by, or the countenance of an angry or sorrowful man.
“Conventional signs, on the other hand, are those which living beings mutually
exchange in order to show, as well as they can, the feelings of their minds, or their
perceptions, or their thoughts.” Whether and to what extent such an “intention to
signify” (voluntas significandi) can be assumed in cases of animal sign
communication Augustine leaves open.

Despite all the internal ruptures and inconsistencies, Augustine's doctrine of sign
is based on a definition of the sign that, for the first time, intends to embrace both
the natural indexical sign and the conventional linguistic sign as species of an all-
embracing generic notion of sign, thus marking a turning point in the history of
semiotics.

Even though Boethius, in line with the Aristotelian writings he commented on,
focuses on the concept of linguistic signification and hardly ever explicitly speaks
of signs (notae) in general he is, besides Augustine, the main source for medieval
theories of signs. The medieval philosophers viewed Aristotle's logic at first
through the eyes of Boethius, who has made some influential decisions concerning
semantic terminology , as well as the interpretation of the Aristotelian text. What
they learned through his writings were inter alia the insight into the conventional
character of language, the view that meaning is established by an act of
‘imposition’, i.e., name-giving or reference-setting, and the influential idea that to
signify (significare) is to “establish an understanding” (intellectum constituere).

Especially in his more elaborate second commentary on Peri Hermeneias,

Boethius discusses at length the interrelations between the four elements of
linguistic semeiosis mentioned by Aristotle, i.e.,
- between external objects or things (res),
- mental concepts or representations (passiones, intellectus),
- spoken words (voces), and
written words (scripta).

These elements are arranged so that they build up what Boethius calls the “order
of speaking” (ordo orandi) which is characterized by the fact that among the
elements mentioned the former in each case ontologically precedes the latter.
Thus, without the existence of things there would be no concepts, without
concepts no spoken words, and without spoken words no written ones.
Ps.-Robert Kilwardby
The unknown author, now commonly named Ps.-Robert Kilwardby, opens his
commentary on Priscianus maior (written somewhere between 1250 and 1280) by
modifying Augustine's prominent dictum that “all instruction is either about
things or about signs” into the stronger and more ‘semiotic-minded’ thesis that
“every science is about signs or things signified”.

This statement he takes as starting point of a detailed discussion of the questions of

whether there can be a (special) science of signs . Kilwardby points out that there
are several ‘sciences of signs’ (diversae sunt scientiae de signis) according to the
various kinds of signs. In case of natural signs (signa naturalia) as well as “moral
signs” (signa moralia), as e.g., actions in relation to the good or bad will, the theory
of signs cannot be separated from the theory of things signified; therefore, these
signs fall under natural and moral science, respectively (Ps.-Robert Kilwardby:
Comment. on “Prisc. Maior”, 1975, 6). The linguistic signs, however, produced by
the human understanding for the purpose of communicating its ideas, are the
subject-matter of a rational science (scientia rationalis), the science of signs.

Roger Bacon (ca. 1214-ca. 1293)

Roger Bacon is probably the most important medieval theorist of sign — at least
he is the author of the most extensive medieval tract on signs known so far.
According to Bacon, the concept of sign belongs to the category of relation.

Bacon develops both in De signis (ca. 1267) and in his Compendium studii
theologiae (1292) a general conception of signification as well as a detailed theory
of the linguistic sign, so that here, as in Augustine, semantics is integrated into a
broader theory of sign. In general Bacon lay stress on the ‘pragmatic’ relation to
the sign-interpreter, for the notion of sign is, as he claims, “essentially predicated
with respect to someone to whom it signifies. … For if no one could conceive
something through the sign, it would be void and vain, nay, it wouldn't be a sign.”

There are other important points in which Bacon deviates from the common
opinion: He defines the sign as “that which upon being offered to the sense or
intellect designates something to the intellect itself”, and emphasizes that,
contrary to what the common description says, there are signs which are offered
only to the intellect.

Bacon presents a detailed classification of signs by taking up, combining, and

modifying elements of several prior sign typologies. The division of the two main
classes of natural and given signs is taken from Augustine, the distinction between
necessary and probable signs is borrowed from Aristotle , and their subdivision
according to their temporal reference is a traditional element in the theories of the
sacramental sign.
1. NATURAL SIGNS
1.1 signifying by inference, concomitance, consequence
1.1.1 signifying necessarily
1.1.1.1 signifying something present (large extremeties → strength)
1.1.1.2 signifying something past (lactation → birth of a child)
1.1.1.3 signifying something future (dawn → imminent sunrise)

1.1.2 signifying with probability

1.1.2.1 signifying sth. present (to be a mother → love)
1.1.2.2 signifying sth. past (wet ground → previous rain)
1.1.2.3 signifying sth. future (red sky in the morning → rain)

1.2 signifying by configuration and likeness (images, pictures, species of colour)

1.3 signifying by causality (tracks → animal)

2. SIGNS GIVEN AND DIRECTED BY A SOUL

2.1 signifying instinctively without deliberation (sigh → pain; laughter → joy)
2.2 signifying with deliberation (words)
2.3 interjections

The general class of natural signs signifying unintentionally by their essence (1) is
divided according to the relation between a sign and its significate into the three
subclasses of (1.1) inferential signs based on a more or less constant concomitance
of sign and significate, (1.2) iconic signs, based on similarity in appearance, and
(1.3) signs based on a causal relation between the sign and the signified thing. The
signs of inference (illatio) are subdivided into (1.1.1) necessary and (1.1.2)
probable signs, both of which are further differentiated according to the three
possible directions of temporal reference (present, past, future).

The general class of signs given and directed by a soul (2) is divided according to
whether the living being brings forth the sign (2.1) together with a deliberation by
reason and choice of will , or (2.2) by a natural instinct or impulse . The reason for
distinguishing two modes of natural signifying, as they appear in (1) and (2.1), is,
on the one hand, an equivocation of the concept of nature, meaning “substance or
essence of something” , as well as “force acting without deliberation” (De signis,
1978, 85f.) and, on the other hand, the insight that, contrary to what holds for the
natural signs in the first sense, in the case of the latter there is always a sign-giver,
not only someone taking something as a sign. Interjections (2.3) are considered as
a hybrid of the two other sorts of given signs.

Bacon gives to understand that he takes inferential and iconic signs to be signs
more properly than the members of third class, i.e., signs based on a causal relation
(later in the Compendium studii theologiae he will drop this class entirely). He
justifies this by pointing to the fundamental difference between sign relations and
causal relation: whereas sign relations are necessarily constituted by an
interpreter, causal relations exist independently of any such one alone by reason of
the order of nature.

The general class of signs given and directed by a soul (2) is divided according to
whether the living being brings forth the sign (2.1) together with a deliberation by
reason and choice of will, or (2.2) by a natural instinct or impulse. The reason for
distinguishing two modes of natural signifying, as they appear in (1) and (2.1), is,
on the one hand, an equivocation of the concept of nature, meaning “substance or
essence of something” , as well as “force acting without deliberation” (De signis,
1978, 85f.) and, on the other hand, the insight that, contrary to what holds for the
natural signs in the first sense, in the case of the latter there is always a sign-giver,
not only someone taking something as a sign. Interjections (2.3) are considered as
a hybrid of the two other sorts of given signs.

The primary intention of Bacon's semiotic analyses is, as it was already with
Augustine, to provide the foundations for the semantics of spoken language.
According to Bacon, an adequate and complete account of the “difficult issue”
(difficilis dubitatio) of what the significate of a vocal expression is has to consider
three different aspects: 1) the signification of vocal expressions apart from
impositio, i.e., apart from their being endowed with (conventional) meaning by
‘imposition’, 2) their signification according to imposition, and 3) their
signification over and above imposition.

1) Each vocal expression may serve independently from its imposition as a natural
sign (De signis, 1978, 86f.) Words indicate for instance the speaker being close,
and they may ‘tell’ something about him in the same way as an artwork is
indicating the skills of the artist. Furthermore, the spoken word is a natural sign
implying that the speaker possesses the concept of the object meant by the word
according to its regular meaning.
2. In his account of signification of words regarding their ‘impositio’ Bacon
accentuates the arbitrariness of meaning. But even though the first ‘impositor’
(name-giver) is free to impose a word or sign on anything whatsoever, he does
perform the act of imposition according to the paradigm of baptism: “all names
which we impose on things we impose inasmuch as they are present to us, as in
the case of names of people in Baptism”.
3) Even if impositio in the described sense is of pivotal importance for the
constitution of linguistic meaning, the signification of words is by no means
limited to it: “a vocal expression signifies many things for which it is not imposed,
as it signifies all those things that bear an essential relation to the thing for which
the word is imposed.” In this way, Bacon claims, words signify, as it were,
infinitely many things.