Trademark Search, AI and The Role of Private Sector
Trademark Search, AI and The Role of Private Sector
Trademark Search, AI and The Role of Private Sector
ABSTRACT
Almost every industry today is confronting the potential role that artificial intelligence
and machine learning can play in its future. While there are many, many studies on the role of
AI in marketing to the consumer, there is less discussion of the role of AI in creating and
selecting a trademark that is both distinctive, recognizable, and meaningful to the average
consumer. As we argue, given that the role of AI is rapidly increasing in trademark search and
similarity areas, lawyers and scholars should be apprised of some of the dramatic implications
that AI’s role can produce.
We begin, mainly, by proposing that AI should be of interest to anyone studying
trademarks and the role that they play in economic decision-making. By running a series of
empirical experiments regarding search, we show how comparative work can help us to assess
the efficacy of various trademark search engines, many of which draw on a variety of machine
learning methods. Traditional approaches to trademarks, spearheaded by economic
approaches, have focused almost exclusively on consumer-based, demand-side considerations
regarding search. Yet, as we show in this paper, these approaches are incomplete because they
fail to take into account the substantial costs that are also faced by not just consumers, but
trademark applicants as well. In the end, as we show, machine learning techniques will have a
transformative effect on the application and interpretation of foundational trademark
doctrines, producing significant implications for the trademark ecosystem. In an age where AI
will increasingly govern the process of trademark selection, we argue that the classic division
between consumers and trademark owners is perhaps deserving of an updated, supply-side
framework. As we argue, a new framework is needed—one that reflects that putative
trademark owners, too, are also consumers in the trademark selection ecosystem, and that this
insight has transformative potential for encouraging both innovation and efficiency.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15779/Z380V89H87
© 2020 Sonia K. Katyal & Aniket Kesari.
† Haas Distinguished Chair, University of California, Berkeley; Co-Associate Dean for
Faculty Research and Development.
†† Postdoctoral Scholar, Social Sciences D-Lab, University of California at Berkeley; JD
Candidate, Yale University. Thanks to Bob Cooter, Stacey Dogan, Aaron Edlin, Benoit Fallenius,
Jeanne Fromer, Su Li, Trevor Little, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Frank Partnoy, Justin McCrary,
Steven Davidoff Solomon, Adam Sterling, Jared Elias, James Hicks, Eric Goldman, Amelia Miazad,
Tejas Narechania, Prasad Krishnamurthy, Steven Davidoff Solomon, Robert Bartlett, Tabrez
Ebrahim, Barton Beebe, Simone Ross, and Glynn Lunney for their comments. This paper
benefited from comments received at a conference with the Berkeley Center for Law, Commerce,
and the Economy. We especially thank Jim Dempsey for his helpful insights on the project, the
editors at BTLJ for their work, and Mehtab Khan for helpful research assistance. This research was
supported by a grant from Markify. The authors affirm that they had complete freedom to direct
the study, analysis, results, and reporting, without influence, editorial direction, or censorship.
502 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:501
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................503
I. SEARCH COSTS IN TRADEMARK LAW: A VIEW FROM THE
CONSUMER........................................................................................508
A. SEARCH, EXPERIENCE, AND CREDENCE ATTRIBUTES IN CONSUMER
DECISION-MAKING.........................................................................509
B. TRADEMARK LAW AND CONSUMER SEARCH COSTS ...........................511
II. SEARCH COSTS IN TRADEMARK REGISTRATION: A VIEW
FROM A TRADEMARK APPLICANT .............................................. 514
A. SUPPLEMENTING TRADEMARK SEARCH IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR ..516
B. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ............................................................522
C. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN PRIVATE TRADEMARK SEARCH AND
REGISTRATION .................................................................................527
1. Search, Identification, and Suggestion ....................................................531
2. Registration and Clearance ....................................................................531
3. Comparison and Determining Substantial Similarity .............................532
4. Prediction and Risk Assessment............................................................533
5. Brand Management...............................................................................533
III. A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN
TRADEMARK SEARCH.....................................................................534
A. TRADEMARK SEARCH AND REGISTRATION PROCEDURES .................538
B. A COMPARISON OF TRADEMARK SEARCH ENGINES ...........................542
1. Public Search Engines ...........................................................................542
a) USPTO ...................................................................................542
2. Private Search Engines..........................................................................545
a) Corsearch................................................................................545
b) Markify ....................................................................................547
c) Trademarkia ...........................................................................549
d) TrademarkNow .....................................................................550
3. Our Methodology ..................................................................................551
4. Generating Conflicted Trademarks ........................................................552
5. Scraping Websites .................................................................................554
6. Exploratory Data Analysis ..................................................................555
a) Baseline ...................................................................................556
b) Exploratory Analysis of Private Search Engines ..............561
7. Metrics..................................................................................................567
8. Results ..................................................................................................568
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY ......................................572
A. OUTCOMES AND IMPLICATIONS ..............................................................573
B. FRAMING TRADEMARK REGISTRATION AS AN ADVERSARIAL
2020] TRADEMARK SEARCH AND AI 503
INTRODUCTION
Almost every industry today is confronting the potential role that artificial
intelligence (AI) and machine learning can play in its future. Intellectual
Property (IP) and Information Law are no exception. In areas involving IP,
many entities are studying the potential effect of descriptive and predictive
analytics on its creation, registration, comparison, and litigation. The U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) recently solicited public comments on
the relationship between AI and IP,1 held a conference on the subject, and
even ran a contest for improving patent search with AI.2 More recently, several
prominent studies have focused on the role that machine learning can play at
the USPTO in the process of prosecution.3
In the area of copyright law, scholars and commentators have voiced
significant debate over whether AI-created works can be registered, and the
role of human oversight in the crafting of authorship.4 There are fascinating
1. See Request for Comments on Intellectual Property Protection for Artificial Intelligence Innovation,
FEDERAL REGISTER (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/10
/30/2019-23638/request-for-comments-on-intellectual-property-protection-for-artificial
-intelligence-innovation; see also Neil Wilkof, USPTO Conference on Artificial Intelligence and IP: A
Report, THE IPKAT (Mar. 20, 2019), http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/03/uspto
-conference-on-artificial.html.
2. See USPTO’s Challenge to Improve Patent Search with Artificial Intelligence, GOVTRIBE (last
updated Nov. 7, 2018), https://govtribe.com/opportunity/federal-contract-opportunity
/uspto-s-challenge-to-improve-patent-search-with-artificial-intelligence-rfiusptoaipatent
seach18.
3. See generally Arti K. Rai, Machine Learning at the Patent Office: Lessons for Patents and
Administrative Law, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2617 (2019). In this paper, we draw on Rai’s instructive
description of machine learning, which notes that “a distinctive feature of the genre is that the
learning algorithm does not represent the decision rule; instead, the algorithm “learns” the
decision rules from data known as training data.” Id. (citing David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing
with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
653 (2017) (explaining machine learning processes)); see also Tabrez Y. Ebrahim, Automation &
Predictive Analytics in Patent Prosecution: USPTO Implications & Policy, 35 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 1185
(2019).
4. For a lengthier discussion of this literature and the relevant questions, see generally
Jane C. Ginsburg & Luke Ali Budiardjo, Authors and Machines, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 343
(2019); Shyam Balganesh, Causing Copyright, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2017).
504 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:501
questions about who owns the rights to an AI-generated work. Does the
author of a program, the user, or the AI itself possess the intellectual property
rights over these types of works? Determining the scope of authorship in an
era where machines are increasingly capable of performing human-like tasks is
a fascinating area of IP scholarship.5 Further, it promises to yield rich debates
about the limits of property, personhood, and creativity.
Yet, surprisingly, very little legal scholarship has addressed the potential
role for AI in the context of trademarks.6 For example, in December 2019, the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Secretariat issued a draft
paper on IP and AI, and while it addressed a range of issues involving the
administration of IP and other topics relating to patents, copyright, data,
design, and capacity building, it did not cover trademarks.7 Similarly, while
there are many studies on the role of AI in consumer marketing, there is very
little scholarly research on the potential role of AI in the corresponding
trademark ecosystem.8 This absence is surprising, especially considering that
business owners continue to emphasize that trademarks are the most
important area of IP protection.9 In the United States, IP-related industries
5. For a discussion of the intersection with trademark law and economics, see WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., 2013 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT: BRAND
– REPUTATION AND IMAGE IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE, 81–108 (2013), https://
www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_944_2013-chapter2.pdf.
6. There are very few law-related papers addressing trademarks and AI at the time of
publication. See, e.g., Dev Gangjee, Eye, Robot: Artificial Intelligence and Trade Mark Registers, in
TRANSITION AND COHERENCE IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (N. Bruun, G. Dinwoodie,
M. Levin & A. Ohly eds., forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3467627; Anke Moerland & Conrado Freitas, Artificial Intelligence
and Trade Mark Assessment, in Artificial Intelligence & Intellectual Property (R. Hilty, K-C.
Liu & J-A. Lee eds., forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3683807.
7. See WIPO Conversation on Intellectual Property (IP) and Artificial Intelligence (AI):
Second Session, WIPO, https://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/details.jsp?meeting_id=55309
(last visited Jan. 22, 2021).
8. See, e.g., Thomas Davenport, Abhijit Guha, Dhruv Grewal & Timna Bressgott, How
Artificial Intelligence Will Change the Future of Marketing, J. ACAD. MKTG. SCI. (2019), available for
download at https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/joamsc/v48y2020i1d10.1007_s11747-019-00696
-0.html; Jan Keitzmann, Jeannette Paschen & Emily Treen, Artificial Intelligence in Advertising:
How Marketers Can Leverage Artificial Intelligence Along the Consumer Journey, 58 J. ADVERT. RES.
263 (2018); Mònica Casabayó, Nuria Agell & Juan Carlos Aguado, Using AI Techniques in the
Grocery Industry: Identifying the Customers Most Likely to Defect, 14 INT’L REV. RETAIL DISTRIB. &
CONSUMER RES. 295 (2007); Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 995 (2014) (offering a look into how technology-mediated advertising intersects with
behavioral economics).
9. See Trademarks, Copyright and Patents: Should Business Owners Really Care About IP?,
VARNUM (May 01, 2019), https://www.varnumlaw.com/newsroom-publications-trademarks
-copyrights-and-patents-why-business-owners-should-care-about-ip (“A trademark is one of
2020] TRADEMARK SEARCH AND AI 505
the most important business assets that a company will ever own because it identifies and
distinguishes the company and its products/services in the marketplace from its
competitors.”); see also Darren Heitner, Why Intellectual Property is Important for Your Business and
What You Should be Doing Now to Protect It, INC.COM (May 31, 2018), https://
www.inc.com/darren-heitner/why-intellectual-property-is-important-for-your-business-what
-you-should-be-doing-now-to-protect-it.html (discussing the importance of trademarks).
10. Robert Silvers, Sarah Pearce, Brad Newman, John Phillips, Elena Baca, Tom Brown,
Scott Flicker, Emily Pidot, Carson Sullivan & Edward George, Containing Risk and Seizing
Opportunity: The In-house Lawyer’s Guide to Artificial Intelligence, PAUL HASTINGS LLP (Mar. 26,
2019), https://www.paulhastings.com/publications-items/details/?id=43b9226d-2334-6428
-811c-ff00004cbded.
11. For a good discussion of various issues that have arisen in the recent rise of
trademark applications, see The Pressure of Rising Demand, WORLD TRADEMARK REV. (July 1,
2016), https://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/governmentpolicy/pressure-rising-demand
[hereinafter WTR Report] (noting rise in application filings and describing the role of the
private sector).
506 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:501
16. See generally George Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961);
see also Cathy Roheim Wessells, The Economics of Information: Markets for Seafood Attributes, 17
MARINE RES. ECON. 153, 154–55 (discussing Stigler).
17. Stigler, supra note 16, at 213.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See generally KYLE BAGWELL, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ADVERTISING 6 (2005)
(discussing the informative, persuasive, and complementary view of advertising).
21. Id. at 3.
22. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J. L. & ECON. 265 (1987); Nicholas S. Economides, The Economics of Trademarks,
78 TRADEMARK REP. 523 (1988).
2020] TRADEMARK SEARCH AND AI 509
23. See generally Jie “Jennifer” Zhang, Xiao Fang & Olivia R. Liu Sheng, Online Consumer
Search Depth: Theories and New Findings, 23 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS., 72 (2006) (“Existing economic
theory modeled consumers’ search behavior as a compromise of the anticipated utility gain
through price reduction and the additional search cost. Those models assumed that consumers
are only searching for a single attribute (e.g., price).”).
24. See generally id.
25. Id. at 82–83 (citing George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (l970)); see also Landes & Posner, supra note 22, at 269
(“Rather than investigating the attributes of all goods to determine which one is brand X or is
equivalent to X, the consumer may find it less costly to search by identifying the relevant
trademark and purchasing the corresponding brand.”).
26. See Wessells, supra note 16, at 155 (discussing Nelson); see generally Phillip Nelson,
Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. ECON. 729 (1974) (discussing that there are some qualities
of a product which cannot be successfully conveyed by advertising).
27. Phillip Nelson articulated the distinction between search and experience goods;
Darby and Karni added a third category, credence goods, to the mix. See Phillip Nelson,
Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311, 312 (1970); Michael R. Darby & Edi
Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J. L. & ECON. 67, 68–69 (1973).
510 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:501
pointed out that a more precise term might refer to these categories as
“attributes,” instead of “goods.”28
Each category nevertheless illustrates the importance of trademarks and
advertising in ameliorating the information asymmetry faced by the
consumer.29 Search attributes are qualities that have characteristics which are
observable to the consumer, and the brand or producer matters less because
the product is readily identifiable (like, for example, table salt).30 However, in
the context of experience attributes, quality can only be determined after
consumption of the good, like a newspaper or a law review article that needs
to be read first for a consumer to determine its quality.31 Advertising and
trademarks can improve the market for both search and experience attributes
because they can provide consumers with pre-purchase information about
both price and quality. This, in turn, has the effect of lowering consumers’
search costs in reaching decisions.32
Later, economists added credence attributes as a third category. These
involve goods like pharmaceuticals or automobile repair, where the quality
cannot be determined until long after the good has been purchased and
consumed.33 Compared to search attributes and experience attributes,
credence attributes are often infeasible to judge even right after purchase, and
may take more time to ascertain their quality.34 Thus, labeling and disclosure-
related information can transform a credence attribute into a search attribute
in order to empower a consumer to judge the quality of a good prior to making
28. Ariel Katz, Beyond Search Costs: The Linguistic and Trust Functions of Trademarks, 2010
BYU L. REV. 1555, 1561. We use the terms interchangeably although we note that Katz is
correct that attributes is a more precise formulation.
29. See id. at 1560–61. Later, Nelson separated products into two different types: search
goods and experience goods. See Nelson, Consumer Behavior, supra note 27 (exploring the ways
by which a consumer acquires information about the quality of goods); see also Darby& Karni,
supra note 27, at 68–72 (discussing the importance of credence attributes in assessing the value
of the product); George Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, Q. J. ECON. 488 (l970).
30. Katz, supra note 28, at 1560 (“For most consumers, all salt is equally salty, and as
long as the consumer can reliably identify the white crystals as salt, the identity of the
manufacturer or the exact brand chosen makes very little difference.”).
31. Id.; see Nelson, Consumer Behavior, supra note 27, at 312.
32. Wessells, supra note 16, at 155 (discussing Nelson).
33. Katz, supra note 28, at 1561. As Cathy Wessells pointed out, the markets surrounding
credence goods are deeply imperfect. This is for two reasons: (1) because of the asymmetry of
knowledge between the producer and the consumer and (2) because it is not practical or often
even possible for consumers to assess the quality of the product beforehand (e.g., by
performing laboratory tests, etc.). Wessells, supra note 16, at 155.
34. Darby & Karni, supra note 27, at 69.
2020] TRADEMARK SEARCH AND AI 511
35. Wessells, supra note 16, at 155 (citing Caswell). See Julie A. Caswell, Valuing the Benefits
and Costs of Improved Food Safety and Nutrition, 42 AUSTL. J. AGRIC. & RES. ECON. 409 (1998).
36. Darby & Karni, supra note 27, at 69–70 (outlining credence goods, by taking the
example of repair services, which basically requires a consumer to purchase both information
(about the diagnosis of, say, a malfunctioning machine) and repair (actual performance of the
repair)). If there were no additional costs involved in separating the two then the authors
suggest that the consumer would do so in order to avoid the possibility of fraud. But since it
is often cheaper to provide information and service jointly, then the consumer will purchase
them both from the same source.
37. Wessells, supra note 16, at 155.
38. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the
Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 777–78 (2004).
39. Economides, supra note 22, at 525.
40. See Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 VA. L.
REV. 67, 75–76 (2012) (“The overwhelming majority of scholars use search costs language to
describe trademark law’s purposes, and the Supreme Court has explicitly endorsed the theory
as trademark law’s core theoretical justification.” (internal citation and quotations omitted));
512 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:501
see also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 166–209 (2003); John F. Coverdale, Trademarks and Generic
Words: An Effect-on-Competition Test, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 868, 869–70, 878 (1984); Stacey L.
Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines in Trademark Law, 97
TRADEMARK REP. 1223, 1223 (2007); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark
Law Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1689–90, 1697 (2007); Economides, supra
note 22, at 525–27; Michael Grynberg, The Road Not Taken: Initial Interest Confusion, Consumer
Search Costs, and the Challenge of the Internet, 28 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 97, 97–99 (2004); William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 272
(1988); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J.
1687, 1695–96 (1999); Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1033–34, 1056 (2006);
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 432 (1999); I.P.L. Png & David
Reitman, Why Are Some Products Branded and Others Not?, 38 J.L. & ECON. 207, 208–11 (1995).
41. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (internal citations
omitted).
42. See Landes & Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, supra note 22, at 269–
70.
43. For an excellent account of the multiple roles of search in trademark law, see Barton
Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2020, 2042 (2005).
44. Id. at 2042–43.
45. See Akerlof, supra note 29 (arguing that in situations where sellers and buyers have
asymmetric information about the quality of a good (i.e., with a used car), adverse selection
will occur where high-quality sellers leave the market as consumer willingness-to-pay falls). To
avoid this type of market failure, building credible signals of product quality is crucial, and
advertising can help achieve this goal.
2020] TRADEMARK SEARCH AND AI 513
the promise of these alternative approaches, search cost theory still plays a
seminal role in trademark law, often ensuring the consumer’s centrality to
trademark law, at times even at the expense of a trademark owner.
Multiple doctrines of trademark law—distinctiveness, genericness,
dilution, comparative advertising, and even the theory of trademark use—
implicitly follow the search cost approach in crafting legal entitlements.53 For
example, the goal of limiting search costs has been implicitly extended to
explain the genericness doctrine, in order to avoid the risk that “[c]onsumers
will be misled if what they believe is a generic term is in fact a product sold by
only one company.”54 The search cost rationale has also been extended to
justify Congress’s foray into enacting federal anti-dilution protections, under
the reasoning that uses that blur or tarnish famous marks increase the search
costs faced by the consumer by either weakening the meaning of the mark in
the eyes of the consumer or creating a negative impression of or association
with the mark.55 In sum, trademarks have served as a vehicle to optimize
consumer access to information through reducing search costs, and much of
trademark law has integrated this goal throughout various doctrines.
supra note 40, at 1714; Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Monopolies in the Blue Nowhere, 28 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1091 (2002); Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, supra note 40; Frank I.
Schechter, Fog and Fiction in Trade-Mark Protection, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 60, 65 (1936).
53. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 48, at 786–99.
54. At the same time, however, Lemley and Dogan point out that the genericness
doctrine can actually increase search costs if an ultra-famous mark like “aspirin” or “thermos”
has now become generic, since consumers who might associate the mark with a particular
source may now be confused if the term is used to refer to a class of goods instead. See id. at
793.
55. Id. at 789–90; see also Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and
Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507 (2008) (noting the argument, aided by cognitive science,
that negative trademarks (either ones that weaken or tarnish a mark) can create informational
harms that reduce consumers’ capacity to shop around in a rational manner).
56. Of course, see the seminal paper by Beebe and Fromer, which valuably focused on
the issue of trademark supply. See Barton Beebe & Jeanne C. Fromer, Are We Running Out of
2020] TRADEMARK SEARCH AND AI 515
the search cost approach may be, it can affect the trademark supply if it adds
too much strength to established marks at the cost of others. Too much
empowerment of trademark holders can enable them to exert overbroad
control over uses that may not even be legitimate trademark uses, or to stifle
competitors who are simply describing their own products.57 As Lemley and
Dogan point out, stronger trademark entitlements can also have the effect of
narrowing the scope of available words for others to use.58
Moreover, despite all of the analysis surrounding the consumer, there is
very little recognition of the fact that trademark registrants are also consumers
as well in the marketplace of trademark search and registration. Even aside
from the law’s role in registration, the selection of a trademark is a crucial
moment for a firm because it symbolizes much more than the source of the
product itself. Since the goal of modern marketing and branding is to
essentially create desire among consumers by making irrelevant attributes seem
relevant and valuable,59 the selection of an appropriate trademark is an
emotionally-driven choice as well as an economic one.60 Brands confer market
power. As one author writes, “when trademarks protect brands with significant
image value, the brand in and of itself becomes a product characteristic that
consumers care about but competitors cannot copy.”61
Thus, the same price and non-price variables that might influence a
consumer’s purchasing decision might also influence a trademark registrant’s
decision to select a mark. Even information about the demographics of the
typical and non-typical trademark registrants and their trademark search
processes or sophistication with online search would be enormously helpful in
future research.62 AI-driven tools could play a crucial role in this process at all
levels ranging from trademark selection, to application, and to registration.
Moreover, in a world characterized by more trademarks than ever, it
becomes necessary to explore the costs incurred by firms themselves in the
process of searching for available trademarks. Trademark applicants will
Trademarks? An Empirical Study of Trademark Depletion and Congestion, 131 HARV. L. REV. 945,
947 (2018).
57. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 48, at 788.
58. Id.
59. See McKenna, supra note 40, at 115 (citing Gregory S. Carpenter et al., Meaningful
Brands from Meaningless Differentiation: The Dependence on Irrelevant Attributes, 31 J. MKTG. RES. 339,
339 (1994)).
60. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 5, at 86. See generally Sonia Katyal,
Stealth Marketing and Antibranding: The Love that Dare not Speak its Name, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 58
(2010) (discussing the lure of branding); Sonia Katyal, Trademark Cosmopolitanism, 47 UC DAVIS
L. REV. 875 (2013) (discussing the emergence of brands as global figures of speech).
61. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., supra note 5, at 86.
62. See Zhang et al., supra note 23, at 91(noting the role of similar attributes for a typical
study of consumer search behavior).
516 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:501
expend tremendous effort and incur costs in order to find their optimal
trademark for both economic and non-economic reasons. These kinds of
search costs seem to be underexplored in the relevant trademark literature, but
they are important. Because of the economic benefits of maintaining
trustworthy trademarks, the USPTO will reject trademark applications that risk
trademark infringement or dilution. To avoid this risk, a firm will ideally want
to avoid the costs associated with filing a doomed application, and instead
preemptively search for existing marks and calculate the probability of
infringement or dilution based on those search results. For this reason, AI and
machine learning can play a significant role in improving trademark quality and
registrability, reducing the search costs faced by trademark applicants.63
Below, we outline the theoretical basis for studying how private AI-
powered search tools have emerged to play an important role in supplementing
government determinations and reducing search costs faced by the trademark
applicant. We then turn to the specifics of discussing how AI is used by
government agencies in administering IP and by private entities in the process
of search, registration, and brand management.
A. SUPPLEMENTING TRADEMARK SEARCH IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
In Part I, we discussed the traditional economic underpinnings of
trademarks from the consumer’s point of view. Specifically, we discussed the
need for the USPTO to avoid granting marks that would result in
informational harms to consumers. An erroneously granted trademark creates
harms to consumers by confusing them and eroding their ability to discern
meaningful information about a good or service. In turn, this situation would
harm the original holder of a trademark that relies on the guarantee of quality
that their mark provides in order to sell their products to consumers. But even
before the PTO makes its determination, machine learning can also help to
optimize the search process from an applicant’s perspective, thus providing a
role that essentially supplements the PTO’s eventual determination by
lowering the search costs associated with trademark selection.
While this paper is concerned with the deployment of machine learning in
trademark search and registration, it is important to note that a few scholars
63. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., supra note 5, at 107. Outside of the trademark law
community, there is a robust conversation ongoing about the future uses of AI for both
litigation and transaction-related tasks. See John Markoff, Armies of Expensive Lawyers, Replaced
by Cheaper Software, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/05
/science/05legal.html; see also Timothy J. Carroll & Manny Caixeiro, Pros and Pitfalls of Artificial
Intelligence in IP and the Broader Legal Profession, LANDSLIDE (Jan. 2019), https://
www.dentons.com/en/-/media/fa72a6d5cb304c1194e015eb26123e27.ashx.
2020] TRADEMARK SEARCH AND AI 517
64. See, e.g., David Engstrom, Daniel E. Ho, Catherine M. Sharkey & Mariano-Florentino
Cuéllar, Government by Algorithm: Artificial Intelligence in Federal Administrative Agencies 46–52
(2020), available at https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ACUS
-AI-Report.pdf.
65. Rai, supra note 3, at 2619–21; see generally Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman,
Irrational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 72 VAND. L. REV. 975 (2019) (concluding that each patent
examiner needs more time to assess a patent application to improve patent quality); U.S.
General Accountability Office, Intellectual Property: Patent Office Should Strengthen Search Capabilities
and Better Monitor Examiners’ Work, GAO-16-479 (July 20, 2016), https://
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-479 (recommending steps to improve the prior art search
quality).
66. Ebrahim, supra note 3, 104.
67. Id. at 1196–1201.
68. Id. at 1211–12.
69. Id. at 1191.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1221–23.
518 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:501
patent office because the patent office does not have the tools to discern
between high- and low-quality signals.73 Thus, the patent office will be in a
position where it cannot adequately sift through a market for lemons, thus
creating a supply-side issue where the generators of information can more
successfully play the information game.74 More broadly, AI could also displace
the need for lawyers, as he explains that:
[a]rtificial-intelligence technology could displace or reduce the need
for attorneys in law firms or in-house legal departments and, in doing
so, lessen the job opportunities for law students. The impact of
decreasing the role of legal-service professionals with AI technology
affects the relationship between clients and lawyers and, as a result,
also affects the relationship of the interaction between inventors and
the USPTO.75
We might imagine that similar forces are at play with trademarks. Although
trademark approvals, particularly simple word marks, are likely not as complex
as patent examinations, there is evidence that AI is transforming this area of
IP law as well. The impact of AI on trademark search may be greatest for word
marks or composite marks with literal elements, since more data might be
available, allowing for greater ease of identifying similarities and differences.76
In essence, however, the core search cost problem that Ebrahim and Rai
articulate from the perspective of patent applicants and examiners is the same
problem that we are exploring from the perspective of trademark applicants.
The rise of the private sector in search can have dramatic effects on trademark
quality and supply, just like in the patent context. Primarily, the “likelihood of
confusion” standard in trademarks is similar to the non-obviousness standard
in patents because of the human subjectivity involved in both processes. Each
requires an examiner determining whether to grant an application based on
their best evaluation of the application, with an eye toward minimizing errors
that could result in informational harms to consumers.
Here, we might also note the risk that private vendors’ search tools might
be more sophisticated than those of the government.77 Indeed, the emergence
of a private market for trademark search indicates that there may be a market
failure regarding trademark registration. Although the USPTO operates its
own free search service, there are several private sector alternatives.78 These
private services variously advertise their added value as being powered by AI,
machine learning, statistical models, or other sophisticated techniques.79
Insofar as trademark applicants rely on these private services instead of the
USPTO, it suggests that these services provide real value that the government
service does not.80
Moreover, since the USPTO is not an enforcement agency, and IP rights
owners are responsible for protecting their marks, the government may not
have the right incentives to have the best AI tools available, and can instead
externalize these costs to trademark registrants. This externalization thus
creates a market for the sorts of private AI tools in our study, which function
to supplement the government’s inadequate TESS system. Assuming that the
USPTO relies on its own TESS search engine, and that TESS does not work
as well as these AI-powered private sector alternatives, the emergence of
private search engines suggests that the government’s inadequacy may be
potentially (indirectly) imposing costs on trademark holders and consumers.
An increase in AI-powered search could plausibly reduce the overall
number of applications filed because it would forecast which marks were likely
to face a Section 2(d) refusal.81 Consider: both examiners and applicants want
to avoid the monetary and time costs associated with bad applications. A
trademark can cost about $250 per class it is registered for,82 and it takes a
substantial amount of time.83 While the cost of the mark may be trivial for
larger companies and brands, the time involved and attorney’s fees can be
vendors might result in assertions of trade secrecy and more opacity. Rai, supra note 3, at 2640–
41.
78. For example, see Corsearch, Markify, Trademarkia, and TrademarkNow. We detail
these in a below section.
79. See Nick Potts, Reviews of the 3 Best Trademark Clearance Search Tools for Trademark
Attorneys, TRADEMARKNOW (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.trademarknow.com/blog/reviews
-of-the-3-best-trademark-search-tools-for-trademark-attorneys.
80. Part of this extra value-added may come from the fact that the AI technologies
underlying trademark search are also used for brand protection. We discuss this further in Part
III.
81. See ABA Letter, supra note 76, at 11–12.
82. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Trademark Fee Information, https://www.uspto.gov
/trademark/trademark-fee-information (last visited on Jan. 22, 2021).
83. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Section 1(b) Timeline: Application Based on Intent to
Use your Trademark in Commerce, https://www.uspto.gov/trademark/trademark-timelines
/section-1b-timeline-application-based-intent-use (last visited on Jan. 22, 2021).
520 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:501
84. The examination process involves three steps: first, the mark is classified into a series
of design codes; second, examiners search through existing marks, pending applications, and
abandoned marks for similarity; and third, issue a determination regarding whether the mark
is eligible for registration. See Engstrom et al., supra note 64, at 47.
85. Id.
86. See Section 1(b) Timeline, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/trademark
/trademark-timelines/section-1b-timeline-application-based-intent-use (last visited on Jan.
22, 2021) (Figure 1 below) (showing the timeline for 1(b) applications).
87. See ABA Letter, supra note 76, at 12.
88. See id.
2020] TRADEMARK SEARCH AND AI 521
89. See Meeting of Intellectual Property Offices (IPOS) on ICT Strategies and Artificial Intelligence
(AI) for IP, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (May 23–25, 2018), https://
www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/wipo_ip_itai_ge_18/wipo_ip_itai_ge_18_1.pdf.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 4 (noting developments in Germany, Brazil, and Singapore along these lines).
92. Id. at 5–6 (describing patent search systems).
93. Id. at 6 (describing Tequmine in Finland for patent classification and prior art search).
94. Id. at 12.
95. Isi Caulder & Paul Blizzard, Canada: Artificial Examiner: The Expanding Use of AI and
ML Software at Intellectual Property Offices (IPOs), BERESKIN & PARR LLP (July 26, 2018), https://
www.bereskinparr.com/doc/artificial-examiner-the-expanding-use-of-ai-and-ml-software-at
-intellectual-property-offices-ipos.
2020] TRADEMARK SEARCH AND AI 523
104. Gangjee, supra note 6, at 6 (citing C.J. Fall & C. Giraud-Carrier, Searching Trademark
Databases for Verbal Similarities, 27(2) WORLD PATENT INFO. 135 (2005)).
105. Gangjee, supra note 6, at 6–7 (advances in search technology based on semantic or
conceptual similarity focus more on “lexical relations,” integrating assessments of synonyms,
antonyms, or comparable words in another language) (citing F. Mohd Anuara, R. Setchia &
Y-K Lai, A Conceptual Model of Trademark Retrieval based on Conceptual Similarity, 22 PROCEDIA
COMPUT. SCI. 450, 451 (2013)).
106. Gangjee, supra note 6, at 7 (noting that WIPO and the European Intellectual Property
Office offer users the ability to upload image-based file formats). Currently, WIPO relies upon
a system, the International Classification of the Figurative Elements on Marks, also called the
Vienna Classification system. Trademark examiners, in general, manually index and code
elements of figurative marks, often in reference to the Vienna Classification system, and then
match the Vienna codes of a new application with those already registered. Since not all
trademark registries use the system, and it involves some subjectivity, there is the risk of gaps
in its application. See id. at 7–8 (citing WIPO, Future Development of the Vienna
Classification: Questionnaire Results (April 3, 2019)). According to Gangjee, AI-assisted
processes of content-based image retrieval have been “welcomed,” due to the added value of
accuracy in comparison. Id.
107. Gangjee, supra note 6, at 6–9. As he writes, “[t]he goal is to mimic the assessment of
a human examiner who must synthesize visual, aural, and conceptual similarity to arrive at an
overall conclusion on whether the marks conflict.” Id.
108. Id. at 10 (citing Mosseri I., Rusanovsky M. & Oren G., TradeMarker – Artificial
Intelligence Based Trademarks Similarity Search Engine, in COMMUNICATIONS IN COMPUTER AND
INFORMATION SCIENCE (vol. 1034, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23525-3_13);
Moerland & Freitas, supra note 6, at 2 (noting that only a few trade mark offices apply AI
tools).
109. Moerland & Freitas, supra note 6, at 15; see also Engstrom et al., supra note 64, at 49
(describing the use of a deep learning image classifier and other prototypes).
2020] TRADEMARK SEARCH AND AI 525
110. Engstrom et al., supra note 64, at 49–50 (also describing future ways to deploy AI in
image/text classification).
111. See INTA Comments in Response to Request for Comments on Intellectual Property Protection for
Artificial Intelligence Innovation, USPTO 1, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files
/documents/International%20Trademark%20Association%20(IN_RFC-84-FR-58141.pdf
(noting that out of 9 respondents to its survey, five IP offices are using AI-driven tools in
trademark image search systems).
112. Gangjee, supra note 6, at 9 (citing U.S. Patent Trademark Office, Emerging
Technologies in USPTO Business Solutions (May 25, 2018), https://www.wipo.int/edocs
/mdocs/globalinfra/en/wipo_ip_itai_ge_18/wipo_ip_itai_ge_18_p5.pdf).
113. Gangjee, supra note 6, at 9.
114. Id.
115. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., supra note 89, at 7–8 (describing developments).
116. Id.
117. See Global Brand Database, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., https://
www3.wipo.int/branddb/en/ (last visited July 8, 2020).
118. See How AI Impacts Trademarks, TRADEMARK TIMES 1 (2018), https://
www.managingip.com/pdfsmip/01-TrademarkTimes18Seattle.pdf.
526 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:501
126. See The Future of Trademark Service Providers, WORLD TRADEMARK REV., https://
www.worldtrademarkreview.com/reports/the-future-of-trademark-service-providers (last
visited Jan. 23, 2021) (portions on file with author) [hereinafter “TM Report”]; see also
Interactive Advertising Bureau, Artificial Intelligence in marketing Report, IAB (Dec. 9, 2019),
https://www.iab.com/insights/iab-artificial-intelligence-in-marketing/; Lee Curtis & Rachel
Platts, AI is Coming and It Will Change Trade Mark Law, MANAGINGIP (Dec. 8, 2017), https://
www.hgf.com/media/1173564/09-13-AI.PDF (focusing mostly on trademark law and its
effect on retail, also noting how the law must adapt to AI); Lee Curtis & Rachel Platts,
Trademark Law Playing Catch-up with Artificial Intelligence?, WIPO MAG. (June 2020), https://
www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine_digital/en/2020/article_0001.html (same); Yashvardhan
Rana, Artificial Intelligence and Trademark Law in the Digital Age, INTERNATIONAL JURIST (July 29,
2020), https://www.nationaljurist.com/international-jurist/artificial-intelligence-and
-trademark-law-digital-age#:~:text=Such%20products%20also%20enable%20a,in%20turn
%20saving%20lawyers'%20time (discussing the potential effect of AI on trademark law).
Recommendation systems might also arguably spark trademark liability claims if they offer
competing products to a consumer, stemming from theories of initial interest confusion. Here,
the jurisprudence on keyword searches can be instructive, as well as recent case law
questioning the reach of initial interest confusion, suggesting that such theories of liability are
unlikely to succeed in court. Gangjee, supra note 6, at 1–2. See, e.g., Multi Time Mach., Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 804 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that clear labels by Amazon in making
recommendations precluded a theory of liability); Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123
(2d Cir. 2009) (Google’s use of the Rescuecom trademark was a use in commerce); Rosetta
Stone v. Google, 676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012) (overturning a grant of summary judgment for
Google).
127. See Gangjee, supra note 6.
128. Request for Comments on Intellectual Property Protection for Artificial Intelligence Innovation,
USPTO (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/10/30
/2019-23638/request-for-comments-on-intellectual-property-protection-for-artificial
-intelligence-innovation.
528 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:501
135. See Comments from the Center for Anti-Counterfeiting and Product Protection, USPTO (Dec.
16, 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Jeffrey-Rojek_RFC-84
-FR-58141.pdf.
136. Id. at 2–3.
137. Id. at 3.
138. See Trevor Little, Lower Risk Applications, Increased Refusals and a Boost for Infringers: The
Potential Impact of AI on Trademarks, WORLD TRADEMARK REV. 2 (Mar. 23, 2020), https://
www.worldtrademarkreview.com/anti-counterfeiting/lower-risk-applications-increased
-refusals-and-boost-infringers-the (quoting commentary from the American Intellectual
Property Law Association).
139. See Comments from the App Association, supra note 133, at 5 (noting a desire to avoid
weakening trademark law); see also Computer & Communications Industry Letter, supra note
131, at 10 (noting no impact of AI on trademark law, and no need to change the law at this
time).
140. ABA Letter, supra note 76, at 12 (noting that AI should not be used as a substitute
for subjective judgment); see also Letter from IBM Corporation to Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual
Property & Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO 5 (Jan. 19, 2019),
https://www.uspto.gov/initiatives/artificial-intelligence/notices-artificial-intelligence-non
-patent-related (noting that a trademark examiner will still be required to assess the evidence
collected in the examination and registration process).
141. Letter from Japan Intellectual Property Association to Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual
Property & Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO 2 (Jan. 8, 2020),
https://www.uspto.gov/initiatives/artificial-intelligence/notices-artificial-intelligence-non
-patent-related; see also Intellectual Property Owner’s Association 6, available at https://
www.uspto.gov/initiatives/artificial-intelligence/notices-artificial-intelligence-non-patent
-related.
530 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:501
noting that the subjectivity and complexity of trademark law’s doctrinal tests
would be difficult to replicate with an AI-driven system, since they are
presently unable to reflect the nuances of these tests.142
Yet most commentary noted, as applied specifically to trademarks, AI
carries perhaps the strongest potential in areas of private search and
registration.143 More recent tightening of corporate budgets, coupled with
improvements to AI technology, have streamlined the potential for AI to have
a transformative effect on the process of trademark registration and
litigation.144 Here, AI-powered search takes a form that is much more
predictive in nature, since it is primarily concerned with giving a potential
registrant information about whether a preexisting registration will cause their
application to be rejected. This type of search can range in complexity. At its
most basic, a search engine might check to see if an application exactly matches
an existing registration. More complex implementations might use AI to
determine the likelihood that the USPTO would reject an application by
modeling their own decision-making process. Other techniques might be most
advantageous when they can be used to automate tasks like trademark search
and watch results.145 Since AI provides great improvements in terms of speed
and accuracy, it can dramatically assist brands who aim to be the first to reach
the market.146
While a comprehensive view of all of the implications of AI for trademark
law is beyond the scope of this article, it bears mentioning that we can envision
at least five different ways in which AI-related technologies can radically alter
our existing legal systems, and drive the processes of search and registration to
147. See TM Report, supra note 126, at 4 (page number corresponds to excerpts on file
with author).
148. See Moerland & Freitas, supra note 6, at 4 (describing how machine learning operates
in the trademark context).
149. See TM Report, supra note 126, at 3 (“Areas where AI will dominate include searching
and clearance, prosecution (at least for simple marks), renewals and possibly even
oppositions.”) (page number corresponds to excerpts on file with author).
150. See id. at 4 (page number corresponds to excerpts on file with author).
151. Id. (page number corresponds to excerpts on file with author).
532 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:501
152. Visual similarity involves the question of whether two trademarks are visually similar;
semantic similarity involves whether the trademarks contain the same meaning and semantic
content; and text similarity involves whether the actual text of the trademark is similar. Idan
Mosseri et al., How AI will Revolutionise Trademark Searches, WORLD TRADEMARK REV. (July 2,
2019), https://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/ip-offices/how-ai-will-revolutionise
-trademark-searches.
153. See generally TM Report, supra note 126 (excerpts on file with author).
154. See Ronkainen, supra note 146, at 23–25 (discussing the difficulties in training an AI
program to catch differences between trademarks).
155. Id.
156. Moerland & Freitas, supra note 6, at 20–23.
2020] TRADEMARK SEARCH AND AI 533
157. See TM Report, supra note 126, at 4 (page number corresponds to excerpts on file
with author).
158. See Gangjee, supra note 6, at 13.
159. See generally TM Report, supra note 126 (excerpts on file with author). One example
of this, experts suggest, is having a team of humans who can physically review and correct the
data from national trademark registries to ensure that proprietary trademark databases have
correct examples, deleting, for example, cases where the word mark does not match the image
(errors which are easy for automated systems to overlook). See generally id.
160. See, e.g., Quickly respond to potentially infringing trademark applications with a powerful suite of
watch solutions, COMPUMARK, https://www.compumark.com/solutions/trademark-watching
/watching (discussing CompuMark’s trademark watching services).
534 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:501
161. See infra Section III.B.2 (full descriptions of each search engine).
162. See generally Wessells, supra note 16.
163. See generally id.
164. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PROTECTING YOUR TRADEMARK:
ENHANCING YOUR RIGHTS THROUGH FEDERAL REGISTRATION 3 (2019) (“You, as the mark
owner, are solely responsible for enforcement [of your trademark].”).
165. Rai, supra note 3; Ronkainen, supra note 146.
2020] TRADEMARK SEARCH AND AI 535
and registration. One relatively recent study identified fewer than seventy
articles involving empirical analysis of trademarks.166 While some areas
involved studies of the relationship between trademarks, innovation, and firm
performance, the relevant law review literature is still somewhat thin.167 Other
empirical pieces in trademark law have focused on questions of scarcity,168 the
extent of trademark dilution,169 or the relationship between trademarks and
innovation.170
The problem of firm search costs in trademark search, therefore, lies at the
periphery of these various literatures, but there is very little concrete evaluation
of the issue. For example, we could find only one other study that considers
how different vendors use machine learning techniques in search and
registration (and this one focused mostly on government tools).171 Computer
science literature implicitly recognizes that firms face search costs in finding
potential conflicts and attempts to optimize methods that reduce these costs,172
but it does not delve into the economic consequences of deploying these
methods. Similarly (and conversely), economics literature implies that the
USPTO plays an important gatekeeping function in ensuring adequate search
quality (i.e., that potentially damaging marks are not registered),173 but has
never addressed the question of how private vendors have emerged to respond
to the USPTO’s own search limitations.
Like social science literature, computer science literature is largely
theoretical. Authors are primarily concerned with optimizing search algorithms
and engines, rather than evaluating current implementations. There do not
seem to be meta-studies that comprehensively evaluate either the visual-based
search engines or text-based ones, which suggests that there are avenues for
166. See generally Shukhrat Nasirov, The Use of Trademarks in Empirical Research: Towards an
Integrated Framework (Nov. 20, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3296064.
167. See id.
168. See, e.g., Beebe & Fromer, supra note 56, at 947.
169. Paul J. Heald & Robert Brauneis, The Myth of Buick Aspirin: An Empirical Study of
Trademark Dilution by Product and Trade Names, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2533, 2574–75 (2011).
170. Nasirov, supra note 166.
171. See generally Moerland & Freitas, supra note 6.
172. See Fatahiyah Mohd Anuar, Rossitza Setchi & Yu-Kun Lai, A Conceptual Model of
Trademark Retrieval Based on Conceptual Similarity, 22 PROCEDIA COMPUT. SCI. 450, 451 (2013)
(“[I]n the Internet age, it is even more important to have efficient mechanisms for protecting
trademarks and tools for detecting possible cases of infringement” to motivate the importance
of developing their trademark conceptual similarity model.).
173. See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 42 (framing the economics of trademark law
as being grounded in the economics of property and tort law). They argue that trademark
creates a property right, and trademark litigation is a branch of tort law. Id. Since the USPTO
grants the mark, it effectively is responsible for determining who gets a property right.
536 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:501
174. See generally Anuar, supra note 172; Anil K. Jain & Aditya Vailaya, Shape-Based Retrieval:
A Case Study with Trademark Image Databases, 31 PATTERN RECOGNITION 1369 (1998); Gianluigi
Ciocca & Raimondo Schettini, Similarity Retrieval of Trademark Images, in PROCEEDINGS 10TH
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON IMAGE ANALYSIS AND PROCESSING 915 (Bob Werner
ed., 1999).
175. J. Howard Bryant, USPTO’s Automated Trademark Search System, 9 WORLD PAT. INFO.
5 (1987).
176. Moerland & Freitas, supra note 6, at 6 (discussing methodology). The qualitative semi-
structured survey was sent to fourteen stakeholders, including TrademarkNow and the
USPTO, which we include in our assessment. The search engine tests involved searching
marks related to Apple Inc., using both its logo and the word “apple” to see if each engine
flagged potential issues with the search. Specifically, they measure whether searching “apple”
raises conceptually similar marks across all trademark classes and within specific classes like
“fruits” and “software/hardware.” As we detail below, we conduct similar tests on private
sector trademark search engines using over a hundred search terms.
177. Id. at 7–8.
2020] TRADEMARK SEARCH AND AI 537
common.178 The author ultimately concluded that librarians would still have a
place in helping users navigate these databases, in part because of the huge
volume of applications.179 However, there are no retrospective studies that
indicate how this prediction bore out, or how the growth of patent and
trademark databases have altered applications or research.
In one related study, Lisa Larrimote Ouellette directly tackles the question
of the PTO using search engines in trademark applications. Her main
argument is that Google is an underexplored tool in assessing the
distinctiveness of a trademark, where distinctiveness is “the extent to which
consumers view a mark as identifying a particular source.”180 She argues that
Google, with its complex algorithm and public results, provides an easy way
for the PTO to assess distinctiveness in cases of infringement. To prove her
argument, she conducts an empirical experiment where she used trademarks
that were disputed for trademark infringement and searched them through
Google.
The basic test for whether a trademark was distinctive in this framework
came down to whether it was findable in Google. If a mark was distinctive or
commercially popular, then it would dominate the top ad results. If the mark
was likely to be confused with another mark, there would be overlapping
results between searches for those marks. Essentially, she argues, valuably, that
Google can take a lot of the guesswork out of determining whether consumers
would be able to discern one mark from another, and that this potential role
has been underexplored in infringement cases.
Ouellette’s insightful study foregrounds the role of private companies in
facilitating search and comparison and points out the potentially powerful (and
troubling) role of “algorithmic authority” in trademark law.181 This study
differs from ours primarily in that we are focused on search engines that
specialize in trademark search, prior to registration, and we approach the
problem from the perspective of a trademark applicant, as opposed to a
traditional consumer. Ouellette’s solution is mainly relevant for courts deciding
a trademark infringement case, whereas we are examining trademark
applications well before they would get to that stage of the legal process.182
178. Julia Crawford, Obsolescence or Opportunity? Patent & Trademark Librarians in the Internet
Age, 21 WORLD PAT. INFO. 267 (1999).
179. Id.
180. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, The Google Shortcut to Trademark Law, 102 CALIF. L. REV.
351 (2014).
181. See id. at 368 (citing Clay Shirky’s observations) (citation omitted).
182. Moreover, Google differs from trademark search engines in that Google’s PageRank
algorithm relies on a calculation of how different webpages point to each other. See How
Google’s Algorithm Rules the World, WIRED (Feb. 22, 2010), https://www.wired.com/2010/02
538 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:501
Trademark search engines differ in that they are more akin to querying a
database, modeling good results, and returning those results to the user at a
much earlier stage involving trademark selection and application. Nevertheless,
her observations about the potential role of algorithms in assisting legal
determinations are salient to our study, since many private search engines raise
similar questions about efficacy, impact, and accuracy.
Other than the ones mentioned above, we could find only two other
papers that conducted empirical tests on actual trademark search engines.
Anna Ronkainen conducted a study of thirty thousand trademarks conflicts on
the TrademarkNow platform.183 She specifically models a trademark similarity
algorithm developed by Onomatics, a Finland-based legal technology firm.184
The Onomatics algorithm was used to power TrademarkNow’s Namecheck
product, and she argues it is especially good at incorporating the role of goods
and services in its similarity calculation.185 Her basic results showed that the
algorithmic approach recovered marks with precision of about 80% and recall
of about 94.9%.186 A paper entitled “Trademark Search Tools” put forward by
ipPerformance in 2011 is the only one that directly looks at leading trademark
search vendors and does an apples-to-apples comparison of them.187
A. TRADEMARK SEARCH AND REGISTRATION PROCEDURES
As discussed earlier, potential trademark registrants file their trademarks
by filing an application with the USPTO. The USPTO advises that registrants
should first determine whether a trademark is the appropriate protection
(instead of a patent or copyright), and then details several steps for
registration.188 In particular, it says that registrants should select their mark,
choose a format, identify whether it is a good or service mark, search for
potential conflicts, and choose a filing basis.189
/ff_google_algorithm/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20140412235725/http://www.wired
.com/2010/02/ff_google_algorithm/].
183. Anna Ronkainen, Intelligent Trademark Analysis: Experiments in Large-Scale Evaluation of
Real-World Legal AI, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 14TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 227 (Ass’n for Computing Mach. ed., 2013).
184. Id.
185. The trademark similarity algorithm is derived from the MOSONG prototype, which
is a model of vagueness and uncertainty in legal text. Id. at 2.
186. Id.; see also infra Section III.B.7 (formal descriptions of terms used here).
187. IPPERFORMANCE GRP., TRADEMARK SEARCH TOOLS: ANALYSIS PAPER 7 (2011),
https://www.markify.com/pdf/Trademark_Search_Tools_Analysis_Paper-P2a.pdf.
188. See Trademark Basics, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-getting-started
/trademark-basics.
189. Id. (“Other initial considerations”).
2020] TRADEMARK SEARCH AND AI 539
Once these steps are complete, the registrant fills out an application,
specifying both the mark and the class of goods upon which it will appear, and
then monitors its status for USPTO approval. Crucially, each mark must be
categorized as either a good or service, and the applicant must select the
number of classes.190 Each class costs an additional $225–275 depending on
the specific applicable fee schedule.191 It may be necessary to communicate
with a USPTO examining attorney to talk through any potential issues or
objections before getting an official approval or denial. If approved, the
registrant is still responsible for enforcing the trademark.192
As we well know, in the conventional case, trademark registrants will want
to avoid the costs associated with filing a rejected trademark application. To
avoid incurring these costs, they turn to trademark search engines to identify
potential conflicts in advance and to make appropriate changes prior to filing
a trademark application. The first step is generally to check the USPTO’s
TESS.193 However, while TESS can return existing trademarks that are similar
to the search term, as we have suggested, it is not totally effective. The USPTO
itself recommends consulting an attorney before filing an application as it
cannot guarantee that its results will be exhaustive.194
In the typical use case for a trademark search engine, a potential registrant,
or their attorney, searches a potential mark and then sorts through the returned
results. Firms may employ attorneys to conduct a trademark search, and,
consequently, attorneys turn to trademark search engines to assist with this
process. Attorneys need to be exceptionally careful when advising their clients,
190. See Engstrom et al, supra note 64, at 46–47 (description of the trademark process
before the USPTO).
191. For more details on the trademark application form, see Trademark Initial Application
Form, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-application-process/filing-online/initial
-application-forms#Chart%20Application%20requirements (last visited July 28, 2019). For
details on the fee schedule, see USPTO Fee Schedule, USPTO, https://
www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-schedule#TM
%20Process%20Fee (last visited April 13, 2020).
192. Trademark Process, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-getting-started
/trademark-process#step3 (last visited July 28, 2019).
193. Search Trademark Database, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-application
-process/search-trademark-database (last visited July 16, 2018).
194. Id. Specifically, the website advises:
[D]eciding what to search for and interpreting your results can be
complicated. There are many factors to consider in determining likelihood
of confusion. We can’t advise you on how to do a clearance search for your
mark, do one for you, or interpret your search results. Therefore, we
strongly encourage you to hire a U.S.-licensed attorney who specializes
in trademark law to guide you throughout the application process.
Id. (emphasis added).
540 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:501
and, therefore, trademark search engines are likely optimized in a way to ensure
that attorneys can trust their results as being definitive. Routinely not returning
an accurate result for a potential conflict could cause attorneys to shift business
away from one search engine toward another.
Here, as discussed above, private vendors have emerged to assist attorneys
and applicants with their own search processes. These trademark search
engines all use some form of search algorithm to power their results, although
each of them utilizes different methods of integrating data and machine
learning into their analytical performance. Again, these can vary in complexity
and may be geared toward different audiences. The broad takeaway is that they
each represent a means of helping registrants navigate a complicated search
problem by reducing search costs for marks through recent advancements in
technology. By giving applicants the ability to go beyond what TESS or a
library search can provide, they potentially reduce search costs considerably.
The core type of search that each search engine provides is the “knockout
search.” A knockout search is essentially a trademark search that intends to
return marks that are likely to be cited in a 2(d) “likelihood of confusion”
rejection for a new trademark application.195 This category is what we focus
most of our empirical analysis on because it is the one point of common
ground between all of the search engines in our study. Within the knockout
search, there are still some ways that different search engines distinguish
themselves. Some may simply reference the USPTO’s own TESS search
engine,196 while others combine that data with their own methods.197 Still
others will attach likelihoods for risk scores, which requires a more algorithmic
approach than simply checking against TESS.198
199. For instance, whether a conflicting mark is “live” or “dead” is relevant as a dead
mark cannot be cited as a reason to reject a proposed mark. Searching Marks in USPTO Database,
USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-getting-started/trademark-basics/searching
-marks-uspto-database (last visited July 28, 2019).
200. Trademarkia explicitly talks about a comprehensive search, while others like
Corsearch offer a “trademark screening platform.” See TRADEMARKIA, supra note 196;
Trademark Screening, CORSEARCH, INC., https://www.corsearch.com/our-products/trademark
-screening/ (last visited July 28, 2019).
201. See Possible Grounds for Refusal of a Mark, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/trademark
/additional-guidance-and-resources/possible-grounds-refusal-mark (last visited July 28,
2019).
202. Idan Mosseri, Matan Rusanovsky &Gal Oren, TradeMarker – Artificial Intelligence Based
Trademarks Similarity Search Engine, SPRINGER NATURE SWITZ. 97 (2019), available at https://
www.researchgate.net/publication/334352698_TradeMarker_-_Artificial_Intelligence_Based
_Trademarks_Similarity_Search_Engine/link/5d2865cd458515c11c27b220/download; see
also Tim Lince, How AI will revolutionize trademark searches, WORLD TRADEMARK REV. (July 2,
2019), https://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/ip-offices/how-ai-will-revolutionise
-trademark-searches (highlighting guest analysis provided by TradeMarker that combines
visual, semantic/content, and text similarity).
542 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:501
203. See Mosseri et al., supra note 202 (“This separation enables us to benefit from the
advantages of each aspect, as opposed to combining them into one similarity aspect and
diminishing the significance of each one of them.”).
204. For example, both Markify and Corsearch offer these services; see descriptions of
each search engine below.
205. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 164.
206. See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 42 (discussing the economics of trademark’s
signaling quality to consumers).
207. Search Trademark Database, supra note 193 (see “Trademark Searching” and “Hiring
an Attorney”).
2020] TRADEMARK SEARCH AND AI 543
matches, whereas its more advanced engines use design mark codes and other
information to construct results.
TESS was launched in 2000, making it one of the oldest systems in our
study.208 At the time it was launched, the USPTO explained that TESS used
the same search engine and database that its own examiners use.209 However,
few details are available about the exact search algorithm. One main
disadvantage of TESS is that it seems to have relatively few computational
resources, as only a fixed number of people may search at once and it requests
that users log out to release resources to others in the queue.210 Previously, the
USPTO offered a different free search service since 1998, but TESS ultimately
replaced it.
Importantly, TESS also draws from the U.S. government’s trademarks
dataset.211 The trademark case files dataset212 contains information about over
eight million trademarks and is the authoritative source for existing and
previous trademarks in the United States. The advantage of TESS is that it
draws directly upon this dataset, and consequently uses it to generate its own
search results.
Although its underlying search algorithm and use of AI is unclear, TESS
does have a number of useful features for potential registrants. It provides
serial numbers, registration numbers, and whether a conflicting mark is live or
dead, like shown in Figure 2. Some ordering occurs as exact matches tend to
appear near the top of the search results, but this exact mechanism has not
been verified.
208. Press Release, USPTO Introduces New Trademark Electronic Search System, USPTO (Feb.
29, 2000), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/uspto-introduces-new-trademark
-electronic-search-system.
209. Id.
210. Trademark Search: Beginners Guide to Everything to Know, UPCOUNSEL, INC., https://
www.upcounsel.com/trademark-search (last visited July 28, 2019).
211. Stuart J.H. Graham, Galen Hancokc, Alan C. Marco & Amanda Myers, The USPTO
Trademark Case Files Dataset: Descriptions, Lessons, and Insights, 22 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY
669 (2013); see also Trademark Electronic Search System (TESS), USPTO, http://
tmsearch.uspto.gov/bin/gate.exe?f=tess&state=4806:pvkuk8.1.1 (last visited Jan. 23, 2021)
(“This search engine allows you to search the USPTO's database of registered trademarks and
prior pending applications to find marks that may prevent registration due to a likelihood of
confusion refusal.”).
212. See Trademark Case Files Dataset, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and
-resources/electronic-data-products/trademark-case-files-dataset-0 (last visited July 28, 2019).
544 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:501
b) Markify
Markify was founded in 2009,222 and is exclusively specialized in trademark
searches and brand management. Markify is headquartered in Sweden and
provides global services that allow clients to search and manage trademarks
across numerous jurisdictions.223 In 2017, LegalZoom, an American legal
technology company, partnered with Markify to power its own trademark and
monitoring services.224 LegalZoom specializes in providing legal help to small
businesses and other entities.225 One of these services is trademark registration,
and LegalZoom provides a trademark search as part of its process.226 Because
of LegalZoom’s dominance in the U.S. market, its partnership is a key part of
Markify’s portfolio.227
Markify provides several services as part of its general brand management
offerings.228 These include its Comprehensive Search, ProSearch, trademark
watch, domain name watch, and an API.229 The ProSearch search feature is the
closest equivalent to other search engines in our study, and thus we focus on
this product.230 The trademark watching service actively checks international
trademark databases and provides weekly reports about potential conflicts.231
Similarly, the domain name watch looks for confusingly similar domain
names.232
Markify’s services are powered by its own trademark similarity search
algorithm. The company argues that it distinguishes itself by developing its
algorithm from a statistical perspective, so that users can prioritize search
results more easily.233 This approach quite explicitly leverages artificial
than 8[,]000 actual cases where a government official had ruled that two trademarks were
confusingly similar. The trademark search technology is constantly upgraded and adapted to
new markets.” About Markify, MARKIFY, https://www.markify.com/about.html (last visited
July 28, 2019); see also Big Promises, Big Data, WORLD INTELL. PROP. REV. (May 21, 2019),
https://www.worldipreview.com/contributed-article/big-promises-big-data (noting
Markify’s role in harnessing big data).
234. Id.
235. See Get a real comprehensive trademark watch service, MARKIFY, https://
www.markify.com/services/trademark-watch.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2021) (discussing its
“signal-to-noise ratio”).
236. Note that in addition to the mark name, Markify returns a “risk level” that allows
users to order results from most to least serious threats to their proposed mark. This image
comes from Markify’s “comprehensive reports” while we used its “prosearch” for the
comparisons between firms.
2020] TRADEMARK SEARCH AND AI 549
c) Trademarkia
Trademarkia is a visual trademark search engine that operates as a
subsidiary of LegalForce, an intellectual property law firm.237 Trademarkia
offers a number of trademark services including registration, legal action
against infringing marks, trademark renewal, trademark revival, and trademark
watch.238 Like other firms in this study, Trademarkia offers several services that
can broadly be considered to be “brand management.”
Trademarkia distinguishes between “knockout” and “comprehensive”
searches and offers both. Knockout searches comb the USPTO page for any
similar marks, but these results do not guarantee that the identified marks are
available or meet the standard for registrability.239 Its comprehensive search,
on the other hand, furnishes users with a report that checks the mark against
additional sources and contexts to ensure that the mark is available. It is a little
unclear, but it seems that this process involves human input.
We focus on Trademarkia’s knockout searches, although we note that this
service is free, and thus Trademarkia’s comprehensive search results may be
better. However, the free service most closely resembles the other search
engines in our study because it appears to use an algorithmic approach without
human input.
d) TrademarkNow
TrademarkNow was founded in 2012241 and is explicitly premised on using
AI to revolutionize trademark search. It explains that its search engine,
[a]t its core is a unique artificial intelligence model of trademark law
based on both explicit and intricate domain models of the law.
Created by experts in trademark law and linguistics, our cutting-edge
system also utilizes state-of-the-art machine-learning techniques to
produce models that seamlessly take real-world complexities into
account.242
Essentially, it tries to encode law, legal rules, and intuitions about legal
interpretation of IP into its models in order to furnish users with the most
relevant results.
TrademarkNow offers a few different products.243 ExaMatch is intended
to be a first step for any trademark applicant and promises “instant screening”
240. Note that it provides descriptions and statuses in addition to the mark name.
241. TrademarkNow, CRUNCHBASE, INC., https://www.crunchbase.com/organization
/trademarknow (last visited July 28, 2019).
242. About Us, TRADEMARKNOW, https://www.trademarknow.com/about (last visited
July 28, 2019).
243. See Brand Protection – NameWatchTM, TRADEMARKNOW, https://www.trademarknow
.com/products/namewatch (last visited July 28, 2019).
2020] TRADEMARK SEARCH AND AI 551
results for trademark results.244 The company also offers a “clearance search”
algorithm called NameCheck, which we used for our analysis, that improves
upon knockout searches, and also a brand protection service called
NameWatch that checks to see if anyone tries to register a conflicting mark.
3. Our Methodology
Although there are strong theoretical underpinnings for trademark search,
there is little systematic evidence about how searches occur in practice. The
fact that multiple products exist to assist potential registrants suggests that
there is a real demand for tools that ease the trademark search process. In this
section, we present results from a novel exploration of the efficacy of various
trademark search engines. By comparing and contrasting particular results, we
studied how well these search engines identify potential conflicts under Section
2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d),245 which forbids the
registration of a trademark that is confusingly similar246 to an existing registered
trademark.
As discussed below, answering this broad research question turns on
making choices about particular metrics. Our basic approach involved
searching across each trademark search engine to evaluate how well each one
picks up on potential conflicts. To address this question, we generated a list of
“conflicted marks” that we knew should be flagged as a potential 2(d)
violation. Second, using this list, we ran searches across each engine, and then
measured the returned results. We then compared the results across several
search engines using several relevant metrics.
Moreover, in the interest of reproducible research, we also created an end-
to-end code pipeline. Each step of the process is entirely programmatic and
can be easily reproduced by re-running the same scripts that we ran.247 The
main advantage of taking this approach is that tasks like choosing conflicting
marks involved no subjective judgment. Most importantly, automating
searches allowed us to conduct this study at scale and collect data that would
otherwise take an enormous amount of time and effort to record.248
supra note 6. Our method, we think, provides a way to supplement qualitative studies like that
of Moerland and Freitas.
249. See Brian Farkas, Trademark Classes: Which One Fits the Mark You Are Registering For?,
NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/trademark-classes.html (last visited July
28, 2019).
2020] TRADEMARK SEARCH AND AI 553
250. See Gareth James, Daniela Witten, Trevor Hastie & Robert Tibshirani, AN
INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICAL LEARNING WITH APPLICATIONS IN R 176 (G. Casella, S.
Fienberg & I. Olkin eds., 2017), available at https://statlearning.com/ISLR%20Seventh
%20Printing.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/20210114184648/https://statlearning.com
/ISLR%20Seventh%20Printing.pdf] (explaining this reasoning).
554 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:501
5. Scraping Websites
Once we generated the list of conflicted trademarks, we turned to running
them through each search engine. We wrote Python251 scripts to achieve this
task. Running searches programmatically has several advantages. The primary
benefit is that the searches scale easily; conducting ten, a hundred, or a
thousand searches requires no additional effort on the part of the analyst,
simply more time to run queries. Future studies can therefore use this code as
a template to expand upon, confirm, or adjust our results.
Another advantage is the ability to easily make multiple test runs to
understand which configurations will get the best results. Search engines have
several different search features such as searching for translations, including
dead marks, or looking for different types of matches. Optimizing each search
engine for its typical use case is key, and being able to run multiple tests easily
helps with calibration.
Finally, creating reproducible scripts ensures transparency, which is critical
when we are evaluating various software platforms. By enabling anyone to read
the code, understand it, and replicate it to guarantee the accuracy of the results,
we obviate concerns about mistakes in the research process. These concerns
are further mitigated by drawing on the common tools Selenium and
BeautifulSoup to complete our research.252 Combining these two tools make it
possible to create scripts that consistently and reliably scrape data from each
firm in our study. With relatively simple code, it is possible to generate a rich
dataset that allows us to answer a novel research question. Similar studies that
251. Python is a popular programming language in software engineering, data science, and
other computer programming tasks. It is free to download and use. See PYTHON, https://
www.python.org/ (last visited July 28, 2019).
252. In terms of technical details, the primary tools we used were the Selenium and
BeautifulSoup packages in Python. Selenium is a package that enables automated web
browsing through a variety of common browsers. See SELENIUM, https://selenium.dev/ (last
visited July 28, 2019). Using Selenium, it is possible to automatically navigate to a trademark
search website, login, and run search terms. The basic principle underlying Selenium is that if
it is possible for a human to click or enter text in any part of a website, it is possible to automate
this process with Selenium. The major drawback of Selenium is that if a website’s underlying
source code changes, then it could potentially break a webcrawler. BeautifulSoup is another
common package that can take a webpage and break down its HTML in a convenient format
for humans to read. See Beautiful Soup, CRUMMY, https://www.crummy.com/software
/BeautifulSoup/ (last visited July 28, 2019). The main feature here is that it provides HTML
tags for every element on a webpage. In our case, this feature makes it easy to scrape tabular
or list results for each of our search terms in an automated fashion.
2020] TRADEMARK SEARCH AND AI 555
Figure 7: Pseudocode
253. For more details, see Soundex System, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, https://
www.archives.gov/research/census/soundex.html (last updated May 30, 2007).
2020] TRADEMARK SEARCH AND AI 557
Other search engines might provide even more information than what we
study in our paper. For example, whether a mark is live or dead, high/
medium/low risk for a violation, and owner information might be provided as
well. While this information could be interesting to explore, it is not necessary
to answer the core question of how well trademark search engines flag
potential 2(d) violations.
Our basic measure for efficacy is the “exact match.” An exact match
corresponds to an instance where we search a mark that we know was rejected
under 2(d), and then see if that exact mark is already registered. In the above
example, we looked to see whether the mark “SERIES 1” already exists. An
exact match is the most straightforward and least subjective way that a mark
can conflict with a preexisting one. The one caveat to this statement is that
two marks may share a name if they belong to entirely separate classes, and
therefore are unlikely to degrade the quality of the other. In such instances, an
exact match does not necessarily result in a rejection.
In terms of exact matches, we show results in Figure 8. In this sample, it
is clear that it is fairly uncommon to recover an exact match. About a quarter
of the results are exact matches. What makes this figure interesting is that it
provides some evidence that trademark search is a more complicated process
than simply looking for whether one’s proposed mark already exists. Rather,
most potential conflicts will not match exactly and therefore require some
judgment about likelihood of confusion.
Finally, in Figure 10, we look at the overall number of results returned for
each searched mark. This is an important metric because it contains a few key
pieces of information. A large number of results could imply that a search
engine did a good job exhausting all possible conflicts and returning a lot of
relevant information. On the other hand, a large number of results could also
imply that a search engine produced a lot of noise, perhaps too much for a
human to reasonably sift through. Below, we visualize a random sample of
searched marks and the number of results returned for each mark. Again, this
is a random sample so one should not draw an inference from the shape of
the distribution. However, it does provide a useful baseline for what a
registrant can expect to find when they search TESS.
[Vol. 35:501
Digging deeper, we can also see this difference visualized across different
search terms. Figures 12–16 illustrate the number of search results per mark
for each private search engine in our study. Note for these figures, we sampled
ten marks to visualize the data. In general, each engine that returned a similar
number of relevant results, often between 10 and 20. Certain marks, however,
returned a much larger number of results.
2020] TRADEMARK SEARCH AND AI 563
The major takeaway from these results is that AI truly is transforming the
trademark search landscape. Even on these basic metrics of exact and phonetic
matches, a trademark applicant has little reason to use TESS over a private
competitor, particularly when some of these private search engines offer their
basic search functions for free (and charge for brand management instead),
offering substantial efficiency gains. By returning fewer results in general and
successfully filtering out irrelevant results, they make it easier to find knockout
conflicts. Basically, this algorithmic approach achieves significant noise
reduction at virtually no additional cost to the user.
7. Metrics
For our main results, we focused on whether a search engine successfully
finds the mark that the USPTO cited in its 2(d) rejection (i.e., the “killer
mark”). A killer mark is essentially an existing trademark that justifies rejecting
a new application. If a search engine successfully uncovers such a mark, then
it succeeded in providing the applicant with information about whether their
proposed mark will be accepted. If the search engine fails to find this killer
mark, the probability that an applicant goes ahead with a frivolous application
rises.
568 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:501
To examine whether the search engines in our study successfully find the
killer marks, we used the following metrics. For any given search result, we
checked:
True Positive: The search result matched a killer mark
False Positive: The search result did not correspond to a killer mark
False Negative: There was a killer mark that did not have a match in the
search results.
Conceptually, these metrics are usually presented alongside “True
Negatives.” However, we cannot identify true negatives in this context because
that would correspond to no search results returned and no killer marks
present. That being said, we can still further combine the preceding metrics in
useful ways:
Recall: Ratio of killer marks found to total killer marks, i.e., True Positive/
(True Positive + False Negative)
Precision: Ratio of search results that were actually killer marks, i.e., True
Positive/(True Positives + False Positives).
These metrics are frequently used in machine learning for classification
problems and work well in this context, too, because they can give us a sense
of how each search engine performs, and the tradeoffs among them. For
instance, one search engine may prioritize recall (i.e., finding all of the relevant
killer marks) over precision (i.e., not flagging false positives), or vice versa.
In the results section, we present these metrics in a few different ways.
First, we tweak these definitions slightly to see how well each search engine
does at finding any killer mark (instead of all of the killer marks). We then
show precision and recall for all search results in our overall dataset. Finally,
we show the same metrics for when we limit the number of returned search
results per trademark application. Note that in calculating these numbers, we
only used results from each search engine’s basic search that was the equivalent
of a “knockout” search.
8. Results
Our results suggest that the landscape of trademark search is rich and
interesting, and there is a real potential to further study search costs borne by
trademark registrants. The main takeaway is that private trademark search
engines provide a genuine value-add to a potential trademark registrant. While
not all private search engines provide a meaningful improvement over free,
2020] TRADEMARK SEARCH AND AI 569
“Of all of the killer marks in the dataset, how many was each search engine
able to detect?” Some searched trademarks have multiple killer marks
associated with them, so precision and recall here will capture whether a search
engine uncovered all of the relevant killer marks.
In Table 2, we show results where we derive the precision and recall for
each search engine, without limiting the number of results that each search
engine returns. Results show that every private search engine achieves higher
recall than TESS, and many improve on precision as well.
257. Markify uses “high risk” and “low risk” classifiers, while TrademarkNow shows the
percentage likelihood of riskiness.
258. Faraz Dadgostari, Mauricio Guim, Peter A. Beling, Michael A. Livermore & Daniel
N. Rockmore, Modeling Law Search as Prediction, ARTIFICIAL INTELL. L. (2020), https://
2020] TRADEMARK SEARCH AND AI 573
databases of parking tickets for those who want to contest them.259 Within the
world of IP, we see AI-related techniques throughout the global marketplace,
and more and more countries and companies have turned to the tools of
machine learning to refine their techniques.
These AI-powered techniques are especially important, not just for the
purposes of refining search, but also because of the insights they offer into the
economics of IP. On a scholarly level, as our comparison shows, a new area
emerges for future research on firm search costs within the trademark
registration system through the intersection of AI and trademark search
processes. In this Article, we showed how AI is revolutionizing the economics
of search in the trademark space, raising new questions about the role of AI in
brand management more generally. The main implication of our research is
that search costs and AI will continue to be important to legal decisions, both
within IP and outside of it. As we showed, firm search costs are a dramatically
overlooked area of study and may ultimately hold the key to studying the role
of AI in trademark law.
A. OUTCOMES AND IMPLICATIONS
As we have suggested, when scholars and practitioners explore the
potential role of AI in transforming patent prosecution and litigation, they may
also benefit from looking at trademarks. Trademarks are incredibly valuable
assets, and studying their role in the AI-powered marketplace reveals core
insights into the economics of IP system at large. As we have shown, AI carries
the ability to efficiently compare a proposed trademark against millions of
registered trademarks and to assist in determinations about the proposed
trademark’s worthiness of protection. As with patent and copyright
infringement, effective deployment of AI tools prior to the creation of a
property right in the trademark context could substantially reduce litigation
and other costs when real conflicts arise later on.
At the outset, our legal system places the core responsibility for trademark
search and enforcement on the trademark holder.260 Thus, one interesting
question that may be worth exploring is how the use of AI in the USPTO
context compares to other government contexts. As we have noted
throughout this piece, trademark search engines largely emerged because the
USPTO does not enforce existing trademarks against potential conflicts.
Trademark owners are responsible for discovering and taking legal action
against potentially damaging marks.261
As such, optimizing the search process benefits both the trademark holder
as well as the overall marketplace for trademarks generally, ultimately
benefiting consumers. If the USPTO grants too many confusing trademarks,
then the market would produce weaker trademarks, harming consumers in the
marketplace and leaving more marks vulnerable to enforcement by others.
From a registrant’s perspective, avoiding a potential rejection saves a lot of
time and effort that would otherwise be wasted, conserving the strength of the
mark that is ultimately registered. As we have argued, the crucial moment of
initial search is a key part of the brand-creation and management process,
forming an important threshold of protection.
In this study, we looked at one aspect of the trademarking process—the
search for possible conflicts prior to registration—and the significance of
search in terms of rethinking our approach to trademark law altogether. The
trademark search technologies that we studied here are some examples of how
new computational techniques are attempting to solve this puzzle by modeling
human decision-making. To summarize, AI lowers search costs by doing a lot
of the hard work of making substantive inferences about the relationships
between different trademarks, thus empowering applicants to make informed
decisions about whether to proceed with their trademark applications.
Engstrom et. al. provide an in-depth look at the USPTO’s current experiments
with AI adjudication, specifically in the realm of patent examination.262 They
note that AI has the potential to reduce search costs for the examiners, but
thus far has not been fully implemented as the tools mostly improved the work
of examiners with computer science backgrounds.263 Our study suggests that
the development of private sector alternatives in the trademark space might
make these tools more broadly accessible. Indeed, the UPSTO is currently
exploring implementing deep learning models on image searches.264
Ultimately, as we suggest below, our exploration of trademark search
engines and the choices we made with regards to methodology and metrics
could have interesting lessons for other similar studies in different areas of law.
Our study also revealed some important conclusions about the process of
trademark registration and the important role that search costs can play in the
process.
The first main takeaway from this exploration is that AI is already being
used in this space, and it is capable of reducing search costs through
algorithmically driven information retrieval. Noise reduction and algorithmic
prioritization are two major features that these AI search engines achieve.
Trademark applicants now have access to tools that can process millions of
preexisting trademarks, analyze them, and produce relevant outputs that
human beings can understand.
Second, consistent with the literature that finds that consumers give
significant weight to non-monetary attributes (like brands, reputation, service
quality and pricing quality) in making purchase decisions,265 we found that
trademark registrants, in using AI-powered search, also enlist a variety of non-
monetary variables in their own considerations, such as trademark class and
lexical similarity to existing marks. This means that search engines can
optimize on many more variables than just trademark strength alone. At the
same time, it is reasonable to presume that the addition of non-monetary
elements, such as the ones that we have seen, can play a determinative role in
the trademark registrant’s selection of a search engine. Some of these non-
monetary attributes may turn on the risk of litigation, the magnetism of the
mark, or the mark’s relationship to other identities and marks, among others.
A third takeaway involves optimizing the prediction of the outcomes of
both registration and potentially litigation. Our results provide some basic
validation of the central premise that these types of legal outcomes can be
mathematically modeled. These models can detect lexically and phonetically
similar marks and, importantly, can sift out results that do not meet certain
similarity thresholds. Some attach explicit risk scores, while others implicitly
calculate them and then order results. As expected, these risk determinations
may follow expected patterns both in distributional shapes and over time, but
the patterns may change in the future as adversarial models develop.
None of the trademark search engines we studied model whether a mark
objectively meets or fails to meet the 2(d) standard. Such an objective truth
plainly does not exist. Rather, these search engines attempt to model the ways
that the trademark office, or rather the people in the trademark office, reach
their determinations. Implicitly, by making choices about which marks to
return and ordering them in a specific way, these search engines make the claim
that they can approximate trademark examiners’ decision-making well enough
to guide trademark applicants’ and registrants’ business decisions.
Finally, it bears mentioning that including a selection of a larger number
of AI-driven variables in a trademark selection decision also introduces the
266. For background on adversarial machine learning, see generally Ling Huang, Anthony
D. Joseph, Blaine Nelson, Benjamine I.P. Rubinstein & J. D. Tygar, Adversarial Machine
Learning, AISEC ’11 (Oct. 2011), https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/2046684.2046692.
267. See generally Rai, supra note 3; Ebrahim et al., supra note 3, at 1193–95 (describing the
inventor-examiner interaction).
268. See generally Rai, supra note 3; Ebrahim, supra note 3, at 1195–1211 (discussing the
automation applications in patent prosecution).
269. See generally Huang et al., supra note 264.
270. See generally Ebrahim, supra note 3.
2020] TRADEMARK SEARCH AND AI 577
driving vehicles is that these AI systems can be easily tricked with just a little
additional noise.271 A self-driving vehicle may be trained to recognize a stop
sign with high accuracy, but may suddenly fail if a stop sign has a sticker on it.
Although a human being would still recognize the stop sign as such, the AI
can be easily fooled because it has never seen this sort of example before.
To address this problem, an analyst may try to present the AI with
“adversarial” examples in the training phase so that it can learn from these
examples. In the self-driving vehicle example, this process could involve
perturbing pixels in an image or providing examples of stop signs with stickers
and other idiosyncratic markings. Thus, the AI can learn to improve its
predictions, even when there is noise present.
Extending this concept into the trademark space, we can conceptualize the
general problem articulated by authors such as Rai and Ebrahim in these terms.
Consider the following theoretical model: Assume there was a universe of
trademark applications prior to the advent of private trademark search engines.
Once AI trademark search tools were built based on historical PTO decision
data, the recommendations produced by these tools likely influence the names
and types of marks in applications to the PTO, thus changing the underlying
distribution of trademark applications.272 The PTO, in response to this change,
adjusts its own algorithms and procedures. The search engines retrain their
models based on new PTO decisions, and, once again, influence the sorts of
trademark applications that are eventually filed. And the PTO again must
update its decision-making. This interplay between the PTO and trademark
search engines (and trademark applicants) thus evolves dynamically over time.
By framing trademark registration as an adversarial machine learning
problem, it becomes clear that the introduction of AI into the process of
trademark registration also changes the substance of trademarks. When the
PTO makes a series of decisions that search engines must retrain their models
on, this represents the PTO adding new noise into their systems. Similarly,
when trademark applicants file new applications that are optimized by advice
provided by search engines, they add noise to the PTO’s decision-making. This
dynamic game implies that, over time, the substance of applied for and
registered trademarks may keep changing.
271. Solving the problem of malicious signage in particular is an active area of research in
computer science. See generally Chawin Sitawarin, Arjun Nitin Bhagoji, Arsalan Mosenia, Mung
Chiang & Prateek Mittal, DARTS: Deceiving Autonomous Cars with Toxic Signs, ARXIV.ORG (May
31, 2018), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.06430.pdf.
272. Indeed, we mention these selection effects as a hurdle for studying the causal effect
of trademark searches in our methodology section.
578 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:501
Previous scholars have advocated for the use of machine learning in patent
examinations as a response to increasing sophistication in the private sector.
Adversarial machine learning makes clear why this call is important. The term
“adversarial” may imply that the contest between the PTO and private sector
search firms is damaging, but it should instead be thought of as a framework
that improves the quality of trademarks and administrative decision-making.
Here, the outputs of the PTO’s decisions become the inputs of the search
engines’ algorithms, and vice versa. By dynamically responding to each other,
the substance of trademark applications will change over time, and, ideally, in
a way that gradually eliminates “easy” cases. Moerland and Freitas argue that
so far, government search engines have not developed a level of sophistication
that can replace human examiners. Future work might explore whether this
argument holds true for such “easy” cases, or whether it is more applicable to
“hard” cases involving novel or ambiguous marks.
Using adversarial machine learning as a model, we can open up new areas
of inquiry in addressing situations where a public agency needs to make
decisions based on information provided by a private actor. Adversarial
machine learning provides a framework for thinking of dynamic government
decision-making systems as responding to added noise. Just like adding
random pixels to an image stress tests the AI system that powers a self-driving
vehicle, policymakers can think about ways to utilize stress tests provided by
private actors to better calibrate law, policy, and administrative decision-
making. Thus, administrative agencies investing in machine learning tools and,
more importantly, adopting theoretical frameworks about dynamic decision-
making can empower them to improve over time.
C. RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE TRADEMARK ECOSYSTEM
Our study suggests that a supply-side study of trademarks should engage
further with the search costs associated with post-registration enforcement, as
well as the search costs inherent in the entire brand management process.
Getting a trademark registered is important, but the post-registration
landscape of enforcement is perhaps is even more important. The largest
question, perhaps for a future round of research, concerns the impact of AI
on the overall trademark litigation ecosystem, i.e., whether or not search costs
may have a similar effect on the trademark system like the patent system, where
patent trolling and patent pooling have detrimentally affected the marketplace
of patent acquisition and enforcement. With millions of existing trademarks
spread across a variety of industries, it is simply infeasible to manually look for
potential conflicts and deal with them as they arise. Instead, AI-powered tools
can consume this tremendous amount of brand-related data, process it, and
present it to the brand owner in a way that filters out noise while giving
2020] TRADEMARK SEARCH AND AI 579
and policy literatures, discussions on the use of risk assessment in public policy
primarily focus on the implications of AI tools on values like fairness,
accountability, and transparency.276 Risk assessment has been the subject of
debate in criminal justice, especially, with applications to sentencing,277 parole
decisions,278 and bail reform.279 Scholars have also recently focused attention
on critical issues like housing and employment, thus extending discussions on
fairness in machine learning to include anti-discrimination and equal
protection law.280 These discussions largely center around the legal problems
and implications stemming from the use of “black-box” algorithms in
decisions.281 In particular, the scholarly community is deeply engaged with the
possibility that algorithms can learn and reinforce human biases in a way that
creates inequitable outcomes for marginalized communities.
Our results suggest that a ripe area for future research could be the use of
risk assessments in IP law. Arti Rai describes the theoretical potential for the
use of machine learning models in patent applications, and critically notes that
many of the equity and justice concerns inherent in areas like crime and
housing may not apply to IP contexts in the same way.282 Given that the stakes
are quite different, IP may be a good subject to explore and experiment with
risk assessments in legal decision-making. This is especially because the
government does not bear the same set of enforcement responsibilities in
trademark law.
Engstrom et. al. have explored the idea of surveying the use of AI across
government administration.283 They created a typology of different AI use
cases in government such as enforcement, regulatory research, and
adjudication.284 Through the exercise, they defined adjudication specifically as,
“[t]asks that support formal or informal agency adjudication of benefits or
rights,” and note that patent and trademark office applications as an
276. See Solon Barocas, Moritz Hardt & Arvind Narayanan, FAIRNESS AND MACHINE
LEARNING, https://fairmlbook.org/ (last updated Dec. 6, 2019, 3:49 PM).
277. See John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Assessment in Criminal Sentencing, 12
ANN. REV. OF CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 489 (2016).
278. See Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L. REV. 303, 304
(2019).
279. See generally Jon Kleinberg, Himabindu Lakkaraju, Jure Leskovec, Jens Ludwig &
Sendhil Mullainathan, Human Decisions and Machine Predictions, 133 Q.J. ECON. 237 (2018).
280. See generally Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF.
L. REV. 671 (2016).
281. See generally Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable
Machines, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 1085 (2018).
282. See Rai, supra note 3.
283. See generally Engstrom et al., supra note 64.
284. See generally id.
2020] TRADEMARK SEARCH AND AI 581
example.285 Our study suggests a general approach and method for assessing
the interplay between the government’s adjudication system and the private
sector, and this general framework could also be applied to other areas of law
as well. Zoning, licensure, and social security benefits claims are all examples
of the government adjudicating the benefits and rights of private parties, and
the ability to assess how AI-driven systems work in these spaces will likely be
a rich, new research area.
With respect to trademark law, our work suggests that greater employment
of risk assessments can play a central role in brand management after
registration. For example, one core question in studying risk assessments in
the law is whether legal decisions can be effectively mapped onto mathematical
relationships. However, the process by which human decision-makers give
effect to legal rules is inherently a black box. The 2(d) “likelihood of
confusion” test reflects the way that law typically creates somewhat nebulous
rules. These rules only become effective because human beings (judges,
bureaucrats, etc.) interpret them and create standards for how they should be
applied. Giving explicit written reasons for decisions is one way that decision-
makers can communicate how they arrived at decision.286
Importantly, we echo Rai’s central point that transparency and explicability
are not necessarily the same thing in the intellectual property context.287
Explicability is an elusive goal in these sorts of agency decisions because
human decision-making is inherently a black box. Similarly, machine learning
models may also suffer from this lack of explicability.288 In the context of a
2(d) denial of a trademark application, it may be impossible to truly explain
how either a trademark officer or a machine learning models making
determinations about likelihood of confusion.
However, as we show, not all hope is lost because one need not understand
precisely why a potential mark will be rejected as a 2(d) violation in order to
make decisions. Simple diagnostic tools can provide insights into how
decisions are being made. In our case, we evaluate trademark search engines
that deploy AI to power their results and find that they in general reduce search
costs for potential users. In doing so, we demonstrate that one way forward in
studying risk assessments in the law is to evaluate the outputs of AI models.
We specifically focus on search results in trademark search engines, but this
general framework could be applied broadly across various domains.
289. Both TrademarkNow and Markify provides these assessments. See, e.g., Unlimited
Trademark Screening & Analysis with ProSearch™, MARKIFY, https://
www.markify.com/services/prosearch-temp.html (last visisted Jan. 23, 2021) (discussing its
metrics for “statistical risk analysis”). TrademarkNow’s product description says that its
services allow a user to “a clear picture of risk across all regions of interest in seconds and
review your clearance search results ranked and analyzed in order of threat.” Clearance Search –
NameCheck™, TRADEMARKNOW, https://www.trademarknow.com/products/namecheck
(last visited Jan. 23, 2021).
290. This image is taken from TrademarkNow’s demo page: https://
www.trademarknow.com/name-check-video.
291. These are drawn from Markify’s Comprehensive Reports rather than the knockout
searches we used earlier.
2020] TRADEMARK SEARCH AND AI 583
to cause problems anyway, the user would save a potentially enormous amount
of time and costs associated with hiring a trademark attorney.
Another way we see the various ways by which underlying AI may work is
by looking at how each search engine deals with similarity. Again, we do not
know the exact mechanics of how each search engine defines similarity or the
thresholds that each chooses when optimizing information retrieval. However,
we do have the outputs and can diagnose how well those outputs fit our
predefined metrics. In particular, we can use Levenshtein distance292 to analyze
the results produced by each search engine. A Levenshtein distance is
calculated between two text strings by looking at the number of edits—
additions, subtractions, substitutions, and deletions—that it takes to get from
one string to another. Figure 24 shows the distribution of Levenshtein
distances across some of our search engines. A quick look at each search
engine’s distributions shows how their underlying algorithms may prioritize
different kinds of results. For instance, Corsearch returns relatively few
extremely close matches, likely because its algorithm is more focused on
phonetic matching. Trademarkia returns a relatively large number of exact or
close matches, indicating that it is more concerned with finding obvious
candidates.
Delving deeper, we can see this relationship even more clearly. Figure 24
shows the median Levenshtein Distance for results, separated by search
engine. TESS, Markify, Trademarkia, and TrademarkNow all tend to return
results that are fairly close to the searched mark. Corsearch is a clear outlier
here, again, because its algorithm is likely prioritizing different kinds of results.
Using these simply defined metrics and plots, we can see how these
relatively straightforward tools can be used to understand and diagnose AI
systems. In particular, by focusing our attention on the outputs of these search
engines, we can perform apples-to-apples comparisons among them to make
inferences about how their underlying algorithms work. These inferences can
586 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:501
then enrich our general theory of search costs in the trademark spaces because
they suggest that firms look for a variety of attributes within their initial search
for a trademark. These attributes are likely directly related to the outputs that
we uncovered in this study, giving us insight into how users make decisions
about which AI tools to use in their searches and brand management efforts.
Here, it is important to note that given the sheer power of predictive
analytics coupled with massive amounts of data storage and retrieval, there is
at least some potential for AI to surpass human judgment and performance
when it comes to analyzing and integrating a much wider array of variables in
its assessments.293 But this may not always be a good thing, particularly where
subjective judgment (or survey evidence) is relied upon in court. In some cases,
risk assessments can result in a mechanistic, formalistic prediction of liability.
Where AI lacks the human ability to consider context, it may result in a higher,
expanded prediction of likelihood of confusion.294 This outcome suggests at
first that a greater reliance on AI at the front end in the registration process
may actually reduce the incidence of infringement and confusion at the back
end (after the mark has entered the market).295 But this may leave out the
consumer in the process of determining actual confusion on the back end. In
fact, Dev Gangjee has observed, “[t]he reactions of a real-world consumer, so
often alluded to in trademark doctrine, may be muted even further as a
result.”296
There are other concerns raised by an overreliance on AI in risk assessment
strategies. Given the large number of marks that are not in use, but which
remain registered or may be unregistered, there is also a risk that assessments
may not reflect the reality of the existing marketplace. Here, AI-driven tools
may not be able to distinguish between marks that are actually in use from
those that are just claimed for use (but not actually in use yet), thereby creating
a greater risk of false positives for likelihood of confusion.297 The converse of
this is also created by the limited ability of AI to accurately assess other risks
beyond infringement. For example, the risk of dilution through blurring or
tarnishment or inclusion of common law trademarks in assessments present
other risks that produce more false negatives and enable potential free-riding
activity.298
299. On this point, see generally Glynn Lunney, Two-Tiered Trademarks, 56 HOUS. L. REV.
295 (2018).
588 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:501
and 2(d) denial rates among different types of registrants could be interesting.
For instance, examining the difference between repeat registrants and first-
time registrants, companies in different industries, and various other factors
could further enrich our understanding of how trademark search engines work.
Finally, we raise questions about the interplay between AI-powered
trademark searches and USPTO trademark-granting activity. This area has
been explored theoretically in patent literature already, and we expand this
discussion to trademarks. While we provide some preliminary evidence about
how trademark search engines work, more work should be done to study the
interplay directly and how trademarks evolve over time, if at all.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we outlined a framework for understanding the economics
of trademarks from the perspective of trademark holders, and we examined
how AI is rapidly changing the search costs involved with trademark
registration and acquisition. We then conducted a novel empirical study that
explores how AI is used by trademark search engines, comparing the results
from various AI-related private vendors. Our research suggests a greater need
for trademark scholars to consider a foundational transformation attributable
to AI, where the trademark holder essentially becomes a consumer of
trademarks. Such a transformation necessitates a greater attention to the
supply of, rather than the demand for, trademarks. Finally, we discussed the
implications our findings have for IP law, and the role of AI and search in legal
contexts. Going forward, we hope this paper opens up an exploration of the
impact that AI will have on trademarks, search costs, and legal administration
more broadly.