Ancient thinkers on Population:

Since time immemorial, scholars and thinkers have concerned themselves with the population

and development question. Of course the points of view have differed, specially as they related

to the size and growth of human populations.

A large and rapidly growing population has sometimes been considered to be desirable as a

source of the nation’s strength and wealth and as an essentially useful factor underlying

technological development.

At the other extreme, it has been viewed as a contributory factor in poverty and such

catastrophes as wars, famines and epidemics. The size and growth of population has thus been

viewed as an important factor underlying the development of any country.

In ancient times, several statesmen and thinkers applied their minds to the question of the

desirable size of population and the need for either encouraging or discouraging population

growth.

The basis for such concern was mainly practical, covering military, political, social and

economic issues, and usually led to the formulation of a specific public policy. Such thinking,

however, cannot be designated as any statement of a consistent population theory.

In the true sense of the term, a population theory can be considered to have emerged only in the

eighteen century when the well-known work of Thomas Malthus was published, though some

thought was given to population issues in earlier periods.

Since Malthus, impressive contributions have been made to the population theory. In this chapter

it is, therefore, proposed to discuss the various theories as they relate, first, to the early periods

and then to the pre-Malthusian, Malthusian and post-Malthusian periods.

Confucius and other Chinese Thinkers

The traces of some ideas, which have gained prominence in recent theoretical writings on

population such as the effects of excessive population growth on the levels of living, internal

peace, and productivity per worker may be noticed in the writings of some ancient thinkers and

philosophers.

It appears that the great Chinese philosopher, Confucius, and those belonging to his school of

thought, as well as a few other Chinese thinkers, had given some thought to the concept of

optimum population as it related to agricultural land.

They had also considered population growth in relation to the availability of resources and the

possible checks on this growth.

It must, however, be pointed out that the doctrines of Confucius on marriage, family and

procreation were generally in favour of population increase.

Greek Thinkers

The population theories and policies of the Greeks and the Romans may best be understood with

reference to their ideals. In the Greek scheme of political life, the individual was only a part of

the state and had to play a subordinate role to it.

This viewpoint was reflected in their thinking on various social institutions. For instance, in

ancient Sparta, marriage was considered as an institution created by the legal and political

system, to provide the state with inhabitants and citizens.

The real purpose of marriage was, therefore, emphasised as being the procreation of children.

Continual wars, which decreased the population size, demanded a constant supply of men.
All Spartans were therefore, compelled to get married. Celibacy was punishable by law and

denounced in public. The state required that all marriages should be good, in the sense that

children, sound in body and mind, should be born of such marriages.

Fathers, who had sired three or four sons, were publicly rewarded in Sparta. The Spartans,

however, were also very much concerned about the quality of their population and disfavoured

the overburdening of the state with useless inhabitants. As a result, deformed babies were

invariably eliminated.

In Athens, the rules concerning procreation were somewhat less rigid, though Athenian customs

and laws also encouraged frequent child bearing.

It is remarkable that policies relating to population growth underwent changes to suit changing

situations.

During times of peace, when population increased rapidly, the usual recourse was to an

expansionist policy of colonization, while, in order to avoid over-population, the Greeks even

encouraged abortions and exposure of the new-born babies, leading to infanticide.

It must, however, be remembered that, like the Spartans, the Athenians were also interested in

maintaining and improving the quality of the population.

From this, it is obvious that the Greeks were concerned about the size of the population more

from the points of view of defense, security and government than from that of economic

resources.

Plato (427-347 B.C.) was more specific on this point when he stated that if the “highest good”

was to be achieved, the city-state should have 5,040 citizens and land, houses and property

should be equally divided among them.

It may be noted that Plato referred only to citizens, and did not include women, children and

slaves in this ideal number of 5,040. The total population of such an ideal city- state was about

50,000.

The possibility that demographic trends may not follow the ideals laid down by him was not

overlooked by Plato.

To tackle the problem of over-population, he recommended infanticide, exposure and

abandonment of deformed infants on grounds of eugenics, and even advocated colonisation, if

necessary.

If the population decreased, Plato’s remedy was immigration. His ponytails measures included

rewards, advice and scolding to young persons failing in their duty to achieve a certain family

size.

According to Plato, the purpose of marriage was to bring forth children. He recommended that

women should get married between the ages of 16 to 20, and even went so far as they say that

marriage should be made compulsory for girls between these ages.

The figure of 5,040 citizens, which Plato mentioned as ideal for a city-state, appears to be a little

intriguing. It is obvious that Plato attached some importance to this figure, for it is mentioned at

least four times in The Laws.

He has not offered much of an explanation for recommending this figure, beyond the one that the

number 5,040 can be divided by all the numbers from one to twelve, except eleven.

Even after dividing this figure by eleven the correction required would only be marginal, and by

deducting two families from this figure, the defect would be taken care of.
Jowett is of the view that there was some element of Numerology in the choice of this particular

number. This, however, does not explain the choice of the particular number 5,040, for a half of

this number of its double would have served that same numerological purpose.

Hutchinson says that the purpose of this choice of figure in Plato’s planned state was ‘simply to

aid in maintaining an equal division of property.”

Another plausible explanation is that Plato wanted the city- state to be large enough to ensure

economic self-sufficiency and military defence, but small enough to permit a constitutional
government, with considerable contact among citizens and scope for their direct participation.

Plato’s views on population, as expressed in his Laws, were based upon his ideal of the city-state

rather than upon a broad view of human society.

Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) was of the opinion that an excessive number of people would give rise

to poverty and other social ills, since it was not possible to increase land and property as rapidly

as the size of the population.

As preventive checks, he suggested abortion and exposure of babies. In order to control the size

of the city-state, Aristotle even proposed a limit on the number of children each couple should

have.

To sum up, the Greeks were interested in maintaining population size which was appropriate for

a city-state. They also emphasised the quality of the population. They were interested in what

may be called political, rather than economic, questions, and their politics were the politics of

small city-states.

Indian Thinkers:
Kautilya, a contemporary of Plato, had written in his Arthashastra that ‘a large population is a
source of political, economic and military strength of a nation’. Kautilya authored
the Arthashastra – a Sanskrit literary classic on statecraft – in the 3rd century BCE.
The Arthashastra defines the vulnerable segments of the population to include “minors, the
aged, the sick, the disabled, the insane, Brahmins and ascetics.” The vulnerable “are to enjoy
priority of audience before the king, maintenance at state expense, free travel on ferries and
given special consideration by judges. women had the right to inherit and transfer property.
The Arthashastra also states that the ‘third gender’/homosexuals should be maintained by their
families as they lack children and therefore do not inherit property. It forbids the vilification of
the ‘third gender’.
Classical Philosophy

Classical philosophy on population and development is related with population increase, increase
in food demand and imbalance of food with population increase based on Malthusian theory of
population Neo-Malthusian approaches. Population increase is always harmful to a country as
production of food does not increase as it has to be. Consequently, country faces many
difficulties, especially with insufficient of food availability. This results to natural calamities,
famine, various kinds of diseases etc. This is very miserable to any one living in the country.
Thus, it would be wise to reduce fertility rate using preventive ways such as late marriage,
abstinence from sex and other such preventive ways.

European Thinkers

Until about 1650 population was growing gradually but after that the growth was very sharp. An
European English scholar, Thomas Malthus, was one of the first to examine the relationship
between food supply and population growth as a theory. In 1798, in the first edition of his essay
on Population; he showed that food supply can only increase arithmetically while population was
increasing by geometric progression. He concluded that at some point in time, the increasing
population will be counterbalanced by the increase in death rate due to disease and starvation
resulted from over population. He suggested following preventive checks (moral restraint, late
marriage etc.) to lessen human miseries from stopping overpopulation. If people do not follow
preventive checks, there are inevitably positive checks by nature through natural calamities and
famine including manmade war if food is not enough for people.
In contrast to Malthusian theory of population, some European thinkers expressed their views on
population and development that increasing population size is not problem, rather it is problem
of unequal distribution of wealth. Among them, Karl Marx is one of thinkers who gave his view
on population is that major problem of population is not excessive population, rather it is a
capital mode of production. In the other words, rich people invest money into industrial sectors
for better benefits. They do not give an appropriate wage for labourers as it has to be. Thus, they
accumulate a big capital by exploiting wages of labourers. Then, they again invest the big capital
into the big industrial sectors for more and more earnings. Ultimately, they are able to replace
labourers with machines and poor people face a critical situation because of unemployment and
underemployment. Thus, there are different views on population and development among
European thinkers.

American Thinkers

American thinkers do not have much different views on population and development with the
European thinkers. The difference between the American and European thinkers is that the
American thinkers addressed their views on holistic approach of the world population. They
stressed to introduce family planning programme to reduce fertility rates and population growth
rates in the developing countries. They also provided various funds through various international
organizations such as UNFPA and UNDP to the developing countries. Such activities helped in
reducing fertility and population growth rates in the developing countries in a greater extent. In
the American country context, they paid attention towards bringing high skilled persons from
many countries, including diversity visa and immigration processes, that helped them in making
their country better off by higher productivity by using high skilled persons inside and outside
the country.

Nepalese Thinkers

Nepalese thinkers addressed on population issues, high fertility and high population growth rates
by suggesting that anti-natalist population policy is must for the country. Since 1965 (third
development plan), Nepal introduced family planning programme in the country from
government sides though the programme had already started establishing family planning
association of Nepal (FPAN) in 1959. In every succeeding development plan, the country
introduced family planning programme effectively reviewing previous programmes related to the
family planning programme. With introduction of multy-party democracy in the country,
Nepalese thinkers on population and development addressed emigration policies by sending
youths abroad to reduce unemployment rate in the country as well as to bring remittances in the
country. Consequently, Nepal has been third country of the world in bringing the remittances
from abroad.

Modernism

With introduction of modernism in a country, it is believed that fertility and mortality start
declining from their high stages to the low stages. As socio-economic status of people increases,
their fertility and mortality rates start declining, the stage is called demographic transition. This
stage is attributed to modernism. Indeed, increasing living standard of people means increasing
demands of various things that people use in their daily life, which makes people compel
reducing their fertility rate, even adopting family planning services. Consequently, modernism
may help in developing the country by reducing fertility and mortality rates.

Post-modernism

In post-modernism, what people thought of population and development in the beginning of

modernism that reducing fertility and population growth is positive indication for economic
development. That may not be true in that case as there are many elderly people in their society
and there is a scarcity of labour force. When people start thinking of themselves in a greater
extent rather than others (including their children as well), fertility reduces to a lesser than
replacement level. There is a development of individualistic society in which people think
themselves individually. With a high standard of living, their mortality rate declines sharply, and
life expectancy at birth becomes a very high. Consequently, there is a growing concern of
increasing fertility rate by providing government incentives such as giving delivery allowance,
priority for government job etc.

Gandhism

Gandhian economic position, that is from the perspective of Gandhian economic philosophy. So
it becomes necessary to state what constitute the Gandhian economic position. Gandhian
economics and development model are based on ethics and directed towards spirituality. It has
been pointed out that Gandhi did not recognise the separation of economics from ethics. On the
contrary, he wanted to achieve an ethical ordering of the economic life of society. He wrote: "I
must confess that I do not draw a sharp or any distinction between economics and ethics.
Economics that hurts moral well-being of' any individual or nation is immoral and therefore
Gandhi rejected 'economism', which believed in the creation of a paradise of material plenty, in
raising the standard of living understood as maximising consumption and optimising the pattern
of production. He considered the craze for material affluence created by the industrial
development paradigm unrealistic, unnecessary, and undesirable. It is a society that ensures the
welfare and well- being of all its members. Its emphasis is on all the three components of well-
being material, mental and moral-spiritual. In such a conceptualisation wealth is defined as
relational rather than as material. Relational wealth is largely independent of material scarcity or
abundance and potentially exists at all levels of human experience. It is true that human beings
have needs and wants and that all of them are not of the same importance.

Fertility Transition:
Simply, fertility transition is a changing process in the Birth Rate of the society. Fertility
transition is often called “quiet revolution” as it is a dramatic global social process which
generated new demographic dynamism in the history of mankind. 

Near zero or negative population growth rates

• Rapid population aging
Decreasing Fertility Rate in Nepal and the beginning of Fertility Transition in Nepal:
Fertility levels persisted at a high level of 6.3 children per woman up to 1981. A decline in fertility levels
has been noted only in 1991. Since then it has started to decline by 0.5 children per woman per decade,
except during the period 2001 to 2006, when it dropped from 4.1 children per woman in 2001 to 3.1
children per woman in 2006, a drop of one child per woman during a five year period.

The fertility transition leads to population decline, which could be bad for the
economy. Since, low population means low working people or labor force.
Rapid contraction of the labor force could have a negative impact on an
economy, on growth, consumption and on the ability of current generations to
pay for entitlements for dependent population. However, Gradually declining
population sizes might be ideal for the environment and stability because less
population means less demand and less demand means low production which
ultimately releases the environmental pressure.
The impact of fertility transition in development will be:

 Less workers: As birth rates fall, working-age populations eventually fall as well.  This
leads to labor shortages in countries where the working-age populations are in decline,
something that is already evident in major economies such as Japan and Germany.  This
slows growth in many key industries and reduces a country’s economic competitiveness.

 Less consumers: Lower birth rates and falling working-age populations also mean that
there are fewer consumers. This reduces the opportunities to generate growth on the
 domestic market, leaving those countries with low birth rates more exposed to external
shocks.  This has already played a key role in the economic struggles in Europe and
parts of Latin America over the past decade.

Older populations: Falling birth rates, coupled with rising life expectances, also mean that the
average age of a country’s population continues to rise.  Unless older segments of the
population are allowed and able to be economically-productive, they are burdens on the
economy.  With shrinking working-age populations, these burdens become unsustainable, a key
threat to many of leading economies. As of 2019, over 2 million people living in Nepal are
aged over 60 which is almost 9% of the country’s total population. The proportion of
older people is expected to double to 18.6% in 2050 with 36 million people aged over
60. As an increase in longer lifespans increases, working populations increase their savings to
prepare for retirement. However, when the population falls out of replacement, savings tend to
drop.
As three university professors from Thailand pointed out in their 2014 study, savings drop
because the “high ratio of dependents leads to lower aggregate saving.”
For example, Japan in 1990, had the highest savings rate in the world being at 15 percent after
taxes. Today, 40 percent of Japan’s single population and 30 percent of families are at or below
a zero savings rate which is leading them into debt. Japan’s savings crisis is expected to become
worse because the current TFR of Japan is 1.44 children per couple as of 2016.
In addition, according to a 2018 report by the International Monetary Fund, if current population
trends in Japan remain the same, their debt to GDP ratio will reach above 245 percent above its
overall GDP by 2030.

 Wealthy markets in decline: Most of the world’s lowest birth rates today are found in
what are generally wealthier countries.  In these countries, this is leading to a greater
concentration of wealth in the hands of small segments of their populations as
opportunities for growth become more concentrated.  Meanwhile, export opportunities
for poorer economies are reduced as growth in rich markets slows.

 The push for automation: As labor shortages worsen and the pool of labor shrinks, the
need for automation will rise accordingly.  Already, many industrial and service sectors
are investing heavily in automation, anticipating this need.  In fact, as population growth
continues to slow, productivity will have to increase enough to offset the impact of
slower population growth in order to maintain economic growth.

In their 2009 study, researchers from Harvard University analyzed the relationship between birth
rates and income per-capita in Europe.
The study finds “lower fertility will increase income per capita in the short run, but decrease it in
the long run.”
Fertility transition will lead in improved health outcomes for children because smaller
family sizes and longer intervals between births may allow for additional health
investments in children, which, in turn, can contribute to physical and cognitive
development and can lead to increases in human capital and improved worker
productivity.

More allocation of budget in the field of social security program.

Population Policy in China: China has been the world’s most populous nation for centuries. After
the Communist takeover in 1949, Chinese leaders led by Mao Zedong took a broadly pronatalist
stance, believing that a communist society could solve any population problems and that a larger
population would mean a more powerful country. Mao (whom China’s leaders still call ―60%
right‖ about policy) went so far as to send advocates of population control to jail. However, in the
face of famine in the late 1950s, these policies moderated. In 1980, China initiated a tough new
drive to deter births with a goal of lowering the annual birth rate to 1% during the decade.
Stringent and often draconian measures to achieve that goal were introduced in 1982 and 1983 as
the Chinese government adopted a policy of one child per family. Social and political pressures
to limit family size to one child included requiring women to appeal to the neighborhood
committee or council for formal permission to become pregnant. Although first births were
routinely approved, second births were usually approved only if the first child had a serious birth
defect or if the woman had remarried. Economic incentives included giving priority to one-child
families in housing, medical care, and education. Mothers of two or more children were often
denied promotions, and steep fines, sometimes in excess of ten times China’s per capita income,
were levied for second and third children. Although a growing number of exceptions have been
introduced in recent years, the policy remains probably the most restrictive in the world. Given
such rigid national policies and a strong cultural preference for boys, it is not surprising that
there have been many reports of girls receiving less medical attention, of selective abortion of
female fetuses, and even female infanticide. Male-to-female ratios are higher than the normal
level in many Asian countries, and gender bias is at least partly to blame. Amartya Sen’s
pioneering 1992 research estimated that 44 to 50 million women were already ―missing‖ in
China, depending on whether the comparison is to Western countries or to Africa. The most
recent data confirm that these trends have continued. It is estimated that in 2010, there were 106
males for every 100 females in China overall; and in a trend pointing to a worsening of the
problem, close to 119 boys were born for every 100 girls. Of course, these current cultural
preferences may change with further economic development. The full impact of China’s
population control programs is uncertain. Only time will tell whether the benefits of reduced
population growth achieved through severe social and economic pressures for one-child families
will be worth the cost of a harsh break with traditional family norms and perceptions regarding
the value of children. Resistance in rural areas, where well over 60% of the population still
resides, was apparently so widespread that in August 1988, when the Chinese government
discovered to its surprise that the population had already passed the 1 billion mark, it decided to
increase its enforcement of the one-child norm in rural as well as urban areas. However, popular
opposition again caused it to relax its stringent controls slightly and to focus more on elevating
the status of women and providing greater old-age security. By the mid-1990s, China’s fertility
rate reached 1.9 births per woman, and it fell further to 1.6 by 2009. This rate is below
replacement level and consistent with a slow long-term decline in population growth. Because of
population momentum, China’s population has continued to grow as larger, younger cohorts
replace smaller, older ones. However, the country’s largest cohorts are now passing out of their
childbearing years. The population growth rate has slowed dramatically, and the population is
not expected to exceed 1.4 billion at its peak before starting to fall. In practice, many families
have two children rather than one, and others in rural areas, including ethnic minorities exempted
from the one-child policy, have more than two children. But fertility rates are extremely low in
the urban areas to which an increasing share of the rural population is moving. Typical estimates
suggest that upward of 250 million fewer people were born in China than would have been born
without the one-child policy—an enormous impact. There are now concerns that China will have
to reevaluate the policy to prevent too high a dependency ratio of retired to working adults. The
apparent success of China’s tough fertility policies have led some observers to see advantages of
dictatorship rather than democracy in spurring development. But in fact there are several ways in
which the lack of a free press in particular and democracy more generally has held back China’s
development. In Mao’s ―Great Leap Forward,‖ at least 30 million people died due to poor
government decisions and incentives for bureaucrats to send overly optimistic reports from the
field. Democratic India, by contrast, has not had a famine since independence in 1947. Amartya
Sen attributes China’s lead in economic growth to its massive investments in health and
education, which India has lacked. Dictatorship can be good or bad for fertility programs or any
other aspects of development. But the risks of a very bad outcome are probably much lower with
democracy. Successful population control in China comes with its own risks and unintended
consequences as well as substantial rewards. By 2050, China will have almost twice as many
people above age 50 as below age 20. In addition, while fertility has fallen, preference for boys
over girls has actually intensified. Many Chinese families seem to feel that if they are to have
only one child, it should be a boy, to carry on the family name and help support the parents in
their old age. A2007 report from China’s State Population and Family Planning Commission
concluded that the country may have about 30 million more men than women of marriageable
age by 2020 and warned that the result could be social instability. A 2009 study by economists
Shang-Jin Wei and Xiaobo Zhiang provided robust evidence that China’s recent new surge in
savings is caused in large part by competitive investments in housing and other wealth
accumulation by families seeking to attract brides for their sons. Such a savings surge even has
potential implications for global imbalances (see Chapters 12 and 13). In sum although rapid
economic growth and coercion and incentives in family planning account for part of China’s
drop in fertility, other factors include female literacy, improved child health, and greater
economic opportunities for women. These have also been factors in the strong success in fertility
reduction in the Indian state of Kerala. Population Policy in India In 1949, India became the first
country to implement a national family-planning program. It has proved to be relatively
ineffective and has proceeded in fits and starts. By the early 1970s, observers were becoming
increasingly alarmed by the very high rate of population growth in India. When Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi tried to implement drastic population control in 1975–1977, a period during which
she seized dictatorial powers, it was a failure. Reports of forced sterilizations, sometimes in mass
―sterilization camps,‖ and other coercive measures ended up giving family planning a bad
reputation in many areas of the country. Indeed, public revulsion toward these coercive fertility
policies helped bring the ―emergency‖ period to an end more quickly, and when elections were
held in 1977, Gandhi was voted out of office. Her return to power in the elections of 1980 was
made possible in part by her commitment not to reintroduce coercive birth control policies.
Years later, villagers in some parts of India avoided health workers out of fear of forced
sterilization. However, family planning did become more widely practiced. Some of the
acceptance of limits on family size reflected rising income among the more than 200 million
middle-class Indians and somewhat improved conditions among a significant fraction of the
poor. Some of it reflected modest moves back to policy incentives to encourage smaller families.
There have been variations from state to state. In Madhya Pradesh, individuals who had a third or
subsequent child after January 2001 were banned from running for election to village council
posts, spurring considerable controversy. In 2004, an uproar over reported higher fertility among
Muslims than among Hindus—reports that turned out to be greatly exaggerated—revealed the
continuing political sensitivity of the issue. As fertility has fallen, a preference for boys over girls
has developed, particularly in the ―Hindi belt‖ in northern India. The result is a ―missing
women‖ problem parallel to China’s. Stronger male bias is actually found in the better-off states
of India, and researchers Jean Drèze, Anne-Catherine Guio, and Mamta Murthi found that
―female disadvantage in child survival is significantly lower in districts with higher poverty
levels.‖ P. N. Mari Bhat and A. J. Francis Zavier analyzed data from the National Family Health
Survey and estimated that ―in northern India, girls currently constitute about 60% of the
unwanted births and that the elimination of unwanted fertility has the potential to raise the sex
ratio at birth to 130 boys per 100 girls.‖ Such a dramatic imbalance seems likely to lead to future
social stress. As of 2010, the ratio of males to females in India as a whole had reached 108 to
100, one of the highest in the world. Kerala, a state on India’s southwest coast that has
emphasized poverty reduction and human development, is an important case in point. By the
mid-1990s, Kerala’s fertility rate had fallen to just 1.7 births per woman and has remained low,
implying a slowly falling population over time (in the absence of in-migration). Thus Kerala’s
fertility rate was until recently less than that of China, but unlike China, the dramatic reductions
in fertility in Kerala were achieved without coercion, let alone China’s huge direct economic
incentives for lowered fertility. Norms of behavior can be highly influential, and multiple
equilibria resulting from different expected norms of behavior are possible, as explored in
Chapter 4 and applied to population norms in this chapter in section 6.4. Amartya Sen has
observed that there is much evidence that the sharp decline in fertility rates that has taken place
in the more literate states in India has been much influenced by public discussion of the bad
effects of high fertility rates, especially on the lives of young women and also on the community
at large. If the view has emerged in, say, Kerala or Tamil Nadu that a happy family in the
modern age is a small family, much discussion and debate have gone into the formation of these
perspectives. In addition, and especially more recently, greater awareness on the part of rural
women of urban norms of women’s empowerment, facilitated by village television and Internet,
may have made a big impact, proving that cultural awareness can be powerful. Robert Jensen
and Emily Oster provide some evidence on the power of TV in India. While television, billboard,
and other advertising in India has promoted family planning, and there is some evidence that
these campaigns can have some positive impact on their own, such efforts have been far more
successful when the social climate has changed enough to be receptive to the message. This
helps explain why nongovernmental organizations working for comprehensive rural
development have often apparently had more success than many government programs. In
Kerala, if the official campaigns supporting small families have seemed more effective than
elsewhere, it is largely because both social and economic conditions on the ground changed
previously or simultaneously. More than 85% of women in Kerala are literate, which means they
have more power in the household and opportunities in the workforce as well as the ability to
read print materials about fertility and family planning. Some of Kerala’s success is due to the
traditionally higher status of women in the local culture. But there is no reason that Kerala’s
success cannot be duplicated elsewhere in India if there is the political and social will. Sen
concluded that Kerala’s impressive results in fertility reduction were achieved ―mainly through
the emergence of new values—a process in which political and social dialogues have played a
major part. The high level of literacy of the Kerala population, especially female literacy, which
is higher than that of every province of China, has greatly contributed to making such social and
political dialogues possible.‖ The success of Kerala suggests that fertility reduction may depend
not on rapid economic growth or even, in its absence, on draconian governmental policies but
rather on grassroots human development emphasizing women’s empowerment, in which civil
society plays a leading role.

Fertility Transition:
Fertility transition is often called “quiet revolution” as it is a dramatic global social process
which generated new demographic dynamism in the history of mankind. However, the less
developed economies in the late twentieth century (“latecomers”) have not been following the
exact same path of fertility transition that developed economies in Europe before WWI
(“pioneers”) experienced and consequently, the speed and nature of fertility decline have varied
among the pioneers and latecomers. Arguably, though mortality decline have been the
prerequisite for fertility decline everywhere, there have been significant similarities and
disparities between the paths of fertility transitions of the pioneers and latecomers. The causality
of fertility decline is more complicated than mortality decline and it has been a much debated
topic to determine how to weight the various causes of the transition by demographers,
economists and historians based on their researches since the late 1940’s till today. Since the
demographic transition is a global process, it is highly possible for latecomers to embark on the
post-transition population namely aging population in more rapid dynamism than pioneers did
earlier. Therefore, it is important to examine the drivers for fertility decline of pioneers and
latecomers in order to understand the universal mechanism of demographic transition.

Before discussing the drivers for fertility decline, it is useful to review the demographic
transition theory as it is a systematic effort to analyze the historical pattern of the quiet
revolution. The theory was extracted from the European and North American historical
demographic experience in the mid-twentieth century by Notestein and it has been the central
concept of demographic study for decades. The theory suggests that there are three stages of the
demographic transition: 1) pre-transition stage characterized by high fertility and mortality, 2)
transition stage characterized by declining mortality and after a lag, declining fertility with
experiencing rapid population growth, and 3) post-transition stage characterized by low mortality
and fertility and the life expectancy tends to be longer with the process of transition. By the late
twentieth century, the rest of the world has been following the basic framework of the
demographic transition theory, distilled from the European experience and fertility transition has
become a global process. It is universally confirmed that mortality decline was prerequisite for
fertility decline [1] or in other words, fertility decline occurs in response to mortality decline.

There have been many efforts in search of identifying the causality of fertility decline based on
the European experience. The most orthodox approach is socio-economic approach which
emphasizes urbanization, growth in individualism and secularism, and changes in the
economy [2] . This approach was originally suggested by Notestein and later elaborated in
subsequent literatures. From anthropological approach, Caldwell (1976 and 1982) argued
intergenerational wealth flow by stressing the westernization and mass education which have
popularized the idea of “child-centered” families [3] and the predominance of the nuclear family
that shifted the direction and magnitude of intergenerational wealth flows [4] . Lesthaeghe
(1983) suggested more cultural and ideational approach stressing the emergence of value such as
secularism, materialism, individualism, and self-fulfilment as the fertility decline proceeded in
parallel with cultural-ideational changes in Europe [5] . From micro-economical perspective,
there was Chicago School approach which applied micro-economic theory to rationalize fertility
decline which emphasized the changing cost and demand for children with little attention to
cultural context [6] . In the nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe, there were also other
factors that contributed the fertility declines of pioneers such as improvement in birth control
methodology and increase in migration to extra-Europe. While it is quite true that socio-
economic factors played the significant role in fertility decline, “it is impossible to be precise
about the various causal factors behind the fertility transition” [7] , as Notestein correctly
mentioned. There are no two countries which have followed identical paths to transition as there
are too many possible combinations of socio-economic, economic, cultural, ideational, and other
probable causalities [8] .

The demographic transition theory is able to predict that the demographic transition will occur in
every society which is experiencing modernization, but it is still unable to forecast the exact
outset required for fertility decline [9] apart from mortality decline being the universal
prerequisite. Between the pioneers and latecomers, there are major differences in the process of
demographic transition. In order to identify the drivers for fertility decline of each case, it is
important to examine the divergences in the process which characterize respective patterns of
transitions.

Firstly, there is a significant difference in fertility level in pre-transitional stage. In Europe, it was
generally around 30 to 45 per thousand whereas it was almost 50 per thousand in Africa, 40 per
thousand in Asia and 40 to 45 per thousand in Latin America. From historical and cultural
perspective, Chesnais (1992) argued that these were the results from “the system of nuptiality or,
more precisely, from the average age at which sexual relations commence” [10] and “a model of
early and universal marriage characterizes less developed countries, whilst in many parts of
historical Europe, an inverse pattern of late and selective nuptiality prevailed” [11] .

Secondly, there is a difference in the pace of mortality decline which is the prerequisite for the
fertility decline as discussed. While the driver for the fertility decline is a combination of many
factors, mortality decline is usually explainable in modernization of society which brings
material wellbeing, major improvement in medicine, disease control and other public health
measures. Therefore, as modernization and technology advances, it is relatively easier to decline
the mortality. As a result of being latecomers in modernization, according to Kirk (1996), “a
mortality transition that took 75-100 years in Northern Europe to complete was achieved within
20-25 years in Eastern Europe and within even shorter periods in the less developed countries
which came on the scene much later” [12] . However, the rapid improvement in mortality caused
wider time lag between the mortality and fertility declines during the process of transition among
the latecomers. According to Reher (2004), it was far shorter among the pioneers (5-10 years)
than it was for the latecomers (30-40 years) and as a result, natural population growth rates
hardly increased among the pioneers (8-12 per thousand) whereas latecomers experienced
population explosion (25-29 per thousand) [13] , which means that transition multiplier was
higher among the latecomers. In many cases, it became a huge obstacle for the economic
development since the population growth far exceeded the capacity of economic growth. But
once decline was set in the latecomers, the pace of fertility transition was far faster than the
pioneers [14] .

These findings suggest that there were major divergences between the pioneers and latecomers in
the timing and pace of fertility whereas they share the basic framework of the demographic
transition theory. As it is arguably confirmed that demographic transition is a part of
modernization, it is certain that socio-economic factors such as urbanization, growth in
individualism and secularism, and changes in the economy were the common drivers for the
fertility decline. On the other hand, factors that govern the timing and pace of fertility transition
such as culture, ideology, and value system would be the divergent in fertility transitions
between the pioneers and latecomers.
In the diffusion of fertility decline, cultural context played important role as an agent in the
pioneers. There was massive quantitative research by Princeton European Fertility Project from
1963 organized by Coale. While they discovered the fertility decline under the wide variety of
socio-economic condition, they registered the importance of cultural context such as religion,
language, region, and pattern of marriage to diffuse the fertility decline [15] . As Hirschman
summarizes, “the patterns and pace of fertility decline appeared to be more associated with
regions that shared common languages and culture than with regions sharing common socio-
economic features” [16] .

Contrary in the latecomers, state intervention played the role of agent in order to speed up the
fertility decline, instead of cultural context of the pioneers. Due to their economic vulnerability,
policy makers in 1960s to 70s in latecomers, many of which were newly independent countries,
considered that high fertility was rational response to poverty and initiated family planning
program as a key public policy in order to decline the fertility, decelerate the population growth,
establish stable and modern society and develop the economy. As a result, the latecomers have
experienced more rapid and synthetic fertility transition whereas the pioneers have experienced
more gradual and natural transition.

There were two levels of rationales behind the adoption and implementation of family planning
programs in latecomers. One is macro-level rationale that has elements of Malthusianism and the
other is micro-level rationale that has elements of global feminism movement in 1950s [17] .
Instruments of family planning programs were mainly aiming to challenge the marital pattern
and increase the level of birth control. Its implementation and success hugely depended upon
availability of medical and health service, progress of economic development, and social change
such as change in value, freedom of woman, and secularization of behaviour. Demeny (1993)
summarized that four factors which were particularly important in determining the successful
fertility transition in relation to the family planning program: a) the direct cost parents must incur
in raising and educating their children, b) the opportunity costs of children to parents, c) the
contribution that children’s labor makes to the income of the family, and d) the contribution of
children to parents’ economic security in old age relative to other forms of security [18] .
Therefore, instruments of family planning policies should have good balance of bearing part of
the cost of education and health (especially of women), encouraging women to enter the labor
force in order to delay the age of marriage and achieve economical independence, compulsory
education of children and make child labor illegal, and increase access to contraception, reduce
its cost, and compress resource to abortion [19] . However, there were serious oppositions
against state-driven family planning programs as they required social changes and state became
an agent to shape the new culture. Nationalist considered the birth control program as an attack
on the numerical strengthening of country and it was subtle form of capitalism from rich
countries and the religious fundamentalists opposed on moral ground. Some of them labeled the
family planning program “neo colonialism” and “cultural imperialism” and their serious
opposition made the family planning program unsuccessful eventually in some economies.

There are some assessments on family planning programs from development perspectives. A
study done by Bongaarts (1993) classified 88 poor countries according to the average fertility
decline with development index and index of family planning program effort. It shows that
development without appropriate programs slows down the process of fertility decline, while the
combined action of these two factors accelerated the process. Conversely, fertility remained high
in countries where development was low and programs were weak or nonexistent [20] .
Although the assessment from social change perspective is more difficult to measure as each
country has different cultural environment, Rosero-Bixby and Casterline (1993) presented
unique simulation of fertility transition with three sets of factors in fertility decline which was
diffusion, supply of birth control methods, and demand for such methods. According to their
study, family planning programs initiated by state could be the key factor in opening up taboo
areas, or creating a critical mass, which makes possible the diffusion process [21] .

In conclusion, by and large, the latecomers have been following the trace of the pioneers in the
frame of demographic transition theory. Although it is unquestionable that mortality decline is
universally prerequisite for fertility decline and socio-economic factors have been the important
drivers for the fertility decline, there was a noticeable difference among two groups in timing and
pace of fertility transition which shaped the characteristics of respective demographic transitions.
In pioneers, cultural context played important role for setting the lower fertility level in pre-
transitional stage and the pace of fertility transition in response to the gradual mortality decline.
On the other hand, in latecomers where the pre-transitional fertility level was relatively higher
and the pace of mortality decline was rapid and often incurred population explosion outpacing
the economic development, the state intervention played important role to drive the fertility
decline by forming series of family planning programs. Generally the development without
appropriate programs decelerated the process of fertility decline, while the combined action of
these two factors accelerated the process. Some programs were not successful as they were not
accepted in the indigenous cultural context due to the inflexibility to accept social change.
Although it is difficult to evaluate such cultural factors in conventional quantitative analysis in
both pioneers and latecomers cases, arguably they were the important driver in diffusing the
fertility decline. This is to say that the cultural factors and flexibility to accept the social change
have played huge role in declining fertility while it is also true that there is a strong link between
decline of fertility and socio-economic development. As the demographic transition has been the
global process, these various case studies of fertility decline can possibly help to form the future
public policy on population of post-transition stage.

Relationship between Population and Environment:

The main relationship between population and environment lies between the size of population
and change in environment. Generally, we can refer to this as the relationship between
demographic factors population size, composition, and distribution, and the change in
environment.
It is no more breaking news that the population of the world is increasing day after day, and it
has a way of affecting the environment, either directly or indirectly. Global resources that are
available in our environment seem to be on a limited level as the populace that are utilizing the
resources are on an increasing level.
These global resources include forests, wild animals, arable crops, fish, and portable water. As
the population increases, more landmass is being covered. This landmass was probably in use for
agriculture purposes. However, when this landmass is being occupied, the amount of food
production would reduce.
The composition of a population can affects the surrounding environment. Currently, the global
population has both the largest proportion of young people under 24 and the largest percentage
of older adults in the world's history.
There are a lot of studies that are done about the relationship between population and the
environment. One obvious relationship is that the higher the population, the higher the depletion
of the natural resources that are available in the area.
The more that the global population continues to grow, the higher the possibility that a lot of the
natural resources will become affected. There might not be enough water that will go around that
people need in order to drink. There might not be enough food too in the future. There are also a
lot of animals that tend to become endangered or extinct because of the habits of people who
inhabit different areas.
At present there are two school of thought for the theories on population growth. The first is the
pessimistic view developed by Reverend Robert Malthus, a British scholar who believed that the
resources available will not be sufficient for human beings if human population is not controlled.
The other theory is the optimistic view developed by Julian Simon who believed that humans can
manage the issue of population because of their knowledge and skills. 
Neo-Malthusian or pessimistic views on population growth

Malthusian theories or pessimistic theories on population growth was derived from the ideas of
Reverend Thomas Robert Malthus, a British scholar who wrote series of essays on the principles
of population. There were six editions of his An Essay on the Principle of Population (published
from 1798 to 1826) in which he said that if the human population growth is left unchecked the
food supply will not be sufficient to meet the needs of humans. He proposed the idea that while
human population grew exponentially, the food resources grew only arithmetically. He also
believed that population will be controlled naturally by disease, famine and mortality. This was
called as the pessimistic model of population growth. Malthus believed in using preventive
checks such as abstinence, delayed marriage and restricting marriages in order to control
population growth. According to Malthus (1798), the population of the world increases at a rate
which is much more fast than the increase in the resources which are meant to help maintain life.
As a result, when there are no measures taken for controlling the population growth, the
available resources will have to be shared among a larger population bunch.

Some people criticized Malthuss theory based on the fact that there has been an enhanced
agricultural production and reduced human fertility over the past few decades since the
publication of his theories. However, many still believe in his theory that if left unchecked,
population growth can pose serious problems for resource availability (Cristina, 2010).

Neo-Malthusianism

These are groups who also believe in the theories of Malthus and encourage population control
programs for the present and future benefit of human beings. The Neo-Malthusians view
however differ from Malthus in their belief on the use of contraceptive techniques for the birth
control measures. The neo-Malthusians or the pessimistic view had more concerns about the
effect that population growth would have on environmental degradation. While they supported
the theories put forward by Malthus, this group of people strongly supported the idea of actively
controlling population growth in order to prevent adverse impact on the environment. This
pessimistic group are concerned about the effect overpopulation may have on resource depletion
and environmental degradation. There has been a general revival in neo-Malthusian ideologies
from the 1950s onwards especially after the publication of series of books by some Malthusian
supporters such as Fairfield Osborn (Our Plundered Planet), William Vogt (Road to Survival)
and Paul Ehrlich (The Population Bomb). Although many critics of neo-Malthusianism criticize
the revival of this theory based on fact that the green revolution has led to sufficient food
production, Pessimists such as Paul Ehrlich believe that unchecked population will ultimately
lead to serious problems in the future (Ehrlich, 2009). Neo-Malthusian or the pessimistic view is
more about the positive checks but Malthusian said that there is balance between both positive
and negative checks.

Technological or Optimistic views on population growth.

The optimistic model of population growth was proposed by Julian Simon who in his book The
Ultimate Resource (1981) argued that as resources become scarce the price goes up which in turn
creates incentives for people to discover new source or find alternatives for the resource. Simon
also claims in his book that the natural resources are infinite based on the justification that
innovative methods can be used to make natural resources available. Increasing population
growth and reduced resources make people to create innovations and inventions to produce more
food and all basic needs. The optimistic view said that science and technology can overcome
scarcity problems. Esther Boserup (1910-1999)-Danish economist said necessity is the mother of
invention. So, humanity will always find a way to overcome their problems. The optimistic view
also said that more people means more alternatives to find new materials and discover ways to
do things.

Impact of Higher Population Growth on Environment:

Although it may be difficult to measure the carrying capacity for humans on earth (Cohen, 1995)
scientists have estimated the carrying capacity at around 7.7 billion people (Van Den Bergh and
Rietveld, 2004). It is now estimated that the world population will be around 9.1 billion by the
year 2050. The very high population growth has raised concerns that the planet may not be able
to sustain such population in the long run. Increasing population will mean increased demand for
food, water, and other resources such as fossil fuel. The impact of population growth can be seen
by everyone who care for the world that we live in. Over the last few decades there has been
large scale destruction of the tropical forests mainly to make land available for agriculture and
for urbanization. In order to produce enough food to meet the demand of growing population,
forests have been cleared to undertake farming. Due to increased industrialization and
urbanization, there has been great increase in the pollution of air, water and the environment of
the planet. Growing population will result in the depletion of natural resources such as water,
fossil fuels (Hubert, 1982); deforestation and loss of ecosystems; and emergence of new
diseases. It will also lead to more starvation, hunger and unhygienic living conditions in poor
countries.

Deforestation for agriculture

If the human population growth is left unchecked, a day might come when the earths resources
will not be able to sustain the requirements of human beings. As overpopulation will demand
increasing food, energy, and other resources, humans will engage in activities that will directly
affect our environment and ecosystem. For instance, about 160,000 square kilometers per of
tropical rainforests are cleared for agricultural use thus resulting in loss of habitat for the
biodiversity (Laurance, 1999). Such loss of forests will contribute to global warming and other
negative effects on environment.

Urbanization/industrialization

In order to meet the growing demand of increasing population, humans have been using
technologies such as industrialization for enhanced production of food and other needs.
Increased industrialization and urbanization results in air pollution, noise pollution, and water
pollution which are all detrimental to our environment.

Increased urbanization will also mean clearance of forests for construction of roads, buildings
etc. which further adds to pollution.

Depletion of non-renewable natural resources and emission of green house gases

Uncontrolled growth of population will lead to rapid depletion of non-renewable natural

resources such as fossil fuels which are used as source of energy. The burning of fossil fuel i.e.
carbon based fuels, mainly wood, coal, oil and natural gas produces significant amount of CO2
which is one of the main green house gases that contributes to global warming (International
Energy Outlook, 2000). The green house effect maintains the earth at comfortable temperature
range but if there is excessive release of CO2 and other harmful gases from the industries and
factories, the green house gases gets easily out of control and will lead to so many problems like
continental drift, climate change, natural disasters and variations of suns out put.

Loss of biodiversity and habitat

Due to growing population, especially in the rural areas of developing countries, people
practising shifting cultivation undertake slash-and-burn techniques which results in the extinction
of native flora and fauna. It has been reported that nearly 140,000 species are lost every year due
to deforestation activities (Pimm, Russell, Gittleman and Brooks, 1995). Therefore, if population
growth is not controlled, increasing human activities will further result in destruction of the
habitat and loss of biodiversity. In Bhutan, human-wildlife especially human-elephant conflict is
increasing and this is mainly due to the loss of habitat for the elephants due to increasing human
population and activities (Kuensel, 19 May 2012).

According to recent United Nations estimates, global population is increasing by approximately

80 million — the size of Germany — each year. Even in areas where fertility rates have declined
to near replacement levels (2.1 children per couple), population continues to grow because of
"population momentum," which occurs when a high proportion of the population is young. The
dynamic relationship of population and environment can be further studied under the mentioned
population variables:
Population Size

No simple relationship exists between population size and environmental change. However, as
global population continues to grow, limits on such global resources as arable land, potable
water, forests, and fisheries have come into sharper focus. In the second half of the twentieth
century, decreasing farmland contributed to growing concern of the limits to global food
production. Assuming constant rates of production, per capita land requirements for food
production will near the limits of arable land over the course of the twenty-first century.
Likewise, continued population growth occurs in the context of an accelerating demand for
water: Global water consumption rose sixfold between 1900 and 1995, more than double the rate
of population growth.

Population Distribution

The ways in which populations are distributed across the globe also affect the environment.
Continued high fertility in many developing regions, coupled with low fertility in more-
developed regions, means that 80 percent of the global population now lives in less-developed
nations. Furthermore, human migration is at an all-time high: the net flow of international
migrants is approximately 2 million to 4 million per year and, in 1996, 125 million people lived
outside their country of birth. Much of this migration follows a rural-to-urban pattern, and, as a
result, the Earth's population is also increasingly urbanized. As recently as 1960, only one-third
of the world's population lived in cities. By 1999, the percentage had increased to nearly half (47
percent). This trend is expected to continue well into the twenty-first century.

The distribution of people around the globe has three main implications for the environment.
First, as less-developed regions cope with a growing share of population, pressures intensify on
already dwindling resources within these areas. Second, migration shifts relative pressures
exerted on local environments, easing the strain in some areas and increasing it in others. Finally,
urbanization, particularly in less-developed regions, frequently outpaces the development of
infrastructure and environmental regulations, often resulting in high levels of pollution.

Population Composition

Composition can also have an effect on the environment because different population subgroups
behave differently. For example, the global population has both the largest cohort of young
people (age 24 and under) and the largest proportion of elderly in history. Migration propensities
vary by age. Young people are more likely than their older counterparts to migrate, primarily as
they leave the parental home in search of new opportunities. As a result, given the relatively
large younger generation, we might anticipate increasing levels of migration and urbanization,
and therefore, intensified urban environmental concerns.

Other aspects of population composition are also important: Income is especially relevant to
environmental conditions. Across countries, the relationship between economic development and
environmental pressure resembles an inverted U-shaped curve; nations with economies in the
middle-development range are most likely to exert powerful pressures on the natural
environment, mostly in the form of intensified resource consumption and the production of
wastes. By contrast, the least-developed nations, because of low levels of industrial activity, are
likely to exert relatively lower levels of environmental pressure. At highly advanced
development stages, environmental pressures may subside because of improved technologies and
energy efficiency.

Within countries and across households, however, the relationship between income and
environmental pressure is different. Environmental pressures can be greatest at the lowest and
highest income levels. Poverty can contribute to unsustainable levels of resource use as a means
of meeting short-term subsistence needs. Furthermore, higher levels of income tend to correlate
with disproportionate consumption of energy and production of waste.