In collaboration

with Deloitte

Transitioning to a
Quantum-Secure Economy
WHITE PAPER
SEPTEMBER 2022
Images: Getty, Unsplash

Contents
Foreword 3

Executive summary 4

Introduction 5

1 Why prioritize quantum security? 8

1.1 What are quantum computers? 9

1.2 When will the quantum-threat become mainstream? 9

1.3 What is the potential impact of the quantum threat? 10

2 How to begin the quantum-safe transition? 12

2.1 What are the steps to consider? 12

2.2 What can organizations start to do? 13

2.3 What are the deployment scenarios? 14

3 How to adopt a quantum risk management approach? 16

3.1 The Quantum-Secure Transition Framework 17

4 What is required from different stakeholders? 21

4.1 Recommendations for corporate leaders and boards 21

4.2 Recommendations for cyber leaders 22

4.3 Recommendations for policy-makers 22

4.4 Quantum across the extended enterprise ecosystem 23

5 What technologies are available to address the quantum threat? 24

5.1 Post-quantum cryptography 25

5.2 Quantum key distribution 25

5.3 Quantum random number generation 26

6 What are the focus areas for future attention? 27

6.1 Quantum technology predictions 27

6.2 Pathways and focus areas for future attention and innovation 28

Conclusion 30

Contributors 31

Glossary 33

Endnotes 34

Disclaimer
This document is published by the World Economic Forum © 2022 World Economic Forum.
as a contribution to a project, insight area or interaction. The All rights reserved. No part of this
findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed herein are publication may be reproduced or
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Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 2

September 2022 Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy

Foreword

Jeremy Jurgens Isaac Kohn Colin Soutar

Managing Director, Partner, Deloitte, Managing Director,
World Economic Forum Switzerland Deloitte, USA

Quantum technologies continue to fascinate and Building an understanding among senior leaders of
their applications have the potential to transform the risks and immediate steps required to ensure a
our lives. The quantum computing age is growing secure quantum transition is therefore a critical priority
ever closer and it could render obsolete some identified by both the World Economic Forum’s Global
of the encryption on which most enterprises, Future Council on Cybersecurity and the community
digital infrastructures and economies currently engaged in the Future Series: Cyber 2025 initiative.
rely. Addressing this issue requires prompt action at
the national and global levels. Over the past year the Forum, in collaboration with
Deloitte, has worked with a community of senior
Unlike Y2K, the impact of a corresponding “Y2Q” executives and experts from business, academia,
(year to quantum) is fairly well known, but the government and non-profit organizations to develop
timeline is unpredictable. Further, there is a belief a deeper understanding of the emerging risks and
that data is being harvested now for decryption to provide insights and guidance to ensure a secure
later once quantum computers are available. The transition to the quantum economy. We hope this
uncertainty surrounding when quantum will be report will help drive individual and collective action
mainstream makes it hard to discern the right time globally to address the key security challenges
to take action and tends to lead to de-prioritization while realizing the transformative potential of
in favour of more immediate issues. quantum technologies.

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 3

Executive summary
To harness the potential opportunities
opened by quantum computing,
organizations need to act now on the
quantum threat.

Quantum computing promises transformative – Build awareness around the quantum threat,
simulation and modelling capabilities across by educating senior leaders on the systemic
a diverse range of industries. However, these impact. The quantum threat feels far away and
advances in computational power will also introduce largely abstract for many organizations. To combat
significant risks via the potential threat of disruption this, organizations will need to face what is known,
to some widely used encryption standards. While but also accept there are implications that are still
definitive timelines for both quantum computing unknown. Conducting initial quantum readiness
applications and the associated quantum assessments will help leaders determine the
cybersecurity threats have not yet fully materialized, specific threats their organizations face. Executive
organizations must act now to evaluate their buy-in is key to ensure the quantum transition
readiness to adapt to the quantum threat. attracts appropriate investment and prioritization.

The quantum threat is expected to have a large and – Plan and prepare by adopting a quantum-safe
disruptive impact on the current digitally dependent strategy and transition roadmap. Addressing
economy. An orderly response is highly desirable the quantum threat requires organizations to plan
over a reactive one. It is a business imperative that and create a timeline that sequences immediate,
organizations start to think about what a secure near-term (3-5 years) and longer-term actions.
quantum transition could look like and understand Organizations should consider adopting a
their cryptographic and data exposure to avoid “crypto-agile” posture, enabling them to readily
disruption of business operations. The unknown transition cryptographic capability. This will help
timeline of this quantum risk – which could lead to a them prioritize a transition to quantum security as
“not me, not now” response – may impose a more technology advancements and threat knowledge
significant impact than is necessary. continue to evolve.

This white paper arises from in-depth discussions – Initiate the transition, leveraging hybrid
between senior leaders and quantum experts solutions. Organizations adopting quantum-
from the quantum security working group, part resistant security will more than likely leverage
of the quantum computing network of the World hybrid solutions that integrate both classical
Economic Forum. The paper provides guidance for and quantum-ready approaches. This will give
a secure quantum transition, which organizations organizations some assurance that existing
need to embrace now to avoid playing catch-up security remains intact, while overlaying that
with the technology. To achieve this transition, security with relatively new post-quantum
organizations need to: cryptography algorithms.

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 4

 Introduction
The establishment of governance
principles is key to building trust in
quantum and to pre-empt possible risks
before the technology is commercialized.

Quantum computing has the potential to drive Some of the applications being considered include
transformational changes across industry and quantum machine learning, simulation of complex
society. The growing interest and investment systems and modelling of material science.
in developing quantum computing by major However, the arrival of quantum computing and its
technology corporations, national governments ability to speed up certain complex mathematical
and venture capitalists highlight its importance. computations could render obsolete the current
In 2021, the quantum computing market earned encryption on which most enterprises, digital
$490 million, with estimates of public funding infrastructures and economies rely. Quantum
surpassing $24 billion.1 Private investments in technologies therefore represent a significant and
quantum start-ups have skyrocketed to more tangible risk to digital economies, with potential
than $1 billion.2 The race to unlock the potential global impact. If this risk materializes, it could
of quantum computing has the potential to drive overshadow the great benefits that quantum
trillions of dollars of value across the global economy technologies could offer mankind. It has even
during the coming years, with cybersecurity market recently been referred to as the “Encryptogeddon”.4
spending forecast to grow $3 billion per year to
reach $30 billion by 2030.3 These investments The timeline associated with the maturity of
will likely drive further developments around quantum computing is still uncertain, but recent
diverse quantum security solutions, such as advancements in the field have amplified the need
post-quantum cryptography, quantum random to take near-term actions to prepare a secure
number generation, quantum key distribution transition to the quantum era. For example, the
The significant
and quantum communication technologies. Canadian company Xanadu Quantum Technologies
risk to digital reported in June 2022 that Borealis, their quantum
economies posed The quantum computing age unlocks multiple computer in the cloud, can perform a single task
by quantum optimization and simulation opportunities across 50 million times faster than a classical computer,
computing has led industries, through its ability to solve specific improving on the early results demonstrated by
it to be dubbed mathematical problems in a significantly faster and China’s quantum computer in June 2021 and
“Encryptogeddon”. more efficient manner than was previously possible. Google in 2019.5 6 7

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 5

 While the quantum risk is understood by some within (see Figure 1).10 The proactive establishment of
the technical community and defensive solutions are governance principles is key to building trust in the
being developed, further clarification of the significant technology and to pre-empt possible risks before
challenges and impacts needs to be developed in a the technology is commercialized. Cybersecurity
way that is digestible by senior leadership. Diverse is one of the key principles for ensuring a safe
global stakeholders, including governments, experts transition while harnessing the transformative
and larger communities of interest, have called for capabilities of quantum computing.
urgent action. In May 2022, US President Biden
announced an executive order and memorandum Developing a coherent approach for transitioning
to address the quantum threat by 2035.8 9 In to a quantum-secure economy requires a broad,
July, the US’s National Institute of Standards and collaborative and critical approach from a diverse
Technology (NIST) announced a list of four quantum- and global community of business and cybersecurity
resistant cryptographic algorithms, after thorough leaders. This white paper has been informed by a
evaluation by the expert community. Yet while some wide-ranging group of participants from across the
organizations have already started the transition Forum’s quantum security community and Global
journey, others are still questioning the real benefits Future Council for Cybersecurity.11
and challenges brought by the technology.
This paper seeks to help senior leaders, policy-
To ensure the responsible development and use makers, regulators, business executives and
of quantum computing, the governance working decision-makers in cybersecurity, strategy,
group of the World Economic Forum’s quantum innovation and risk management to understand the
computing network has developed a set of potential impact of quantum cyber risks and to take
governance principles, themes and core values the necessary steps to ensure a secure transition.

FIGURE 1 Quantum computing governance principles, themes and core values

Sustainability Transformative
capabilities

ntability Acc
ccou es
A sib Access to
d il hardware
Standardization
ity
o

infrastructure
go

Tra
on

Core
Comm

nspar
ency

values
In clu s

Open
nce

Privacy
iv e

innovation
ce
ne

s
al
efi
s

Eq n- m
u it a b il
it y No

Creating
Cybersecurity awareness

Workforce development
and capability-building

Source: World Economic Forum

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 6

This white paper will: This white paper will not:

– Provide clarification on the impacts of the – Explore general quantum computing

quantum threat applications

– Present steps and a consensus-based framework – Focus on systemic risks that are not created or
to help guide organizations throughout the amplified by the quantum threat and quantum
transition towards a quantum-safe environment security solutions

– Develop guidance for senior business leaders, – Provide detailed sectoral or geographical
cyber leaders and policy-makers to manage the perspectives in relation to the exploration or
risks and secure the quantum transition mitigation of identified systemic risks

– Clearly articulate the characteristics of three – Deliver in-depth technical explanations of

emerging technologies that can help mitigate quantum computing technologies or the
the quantum threat: post-quantum cryptography cybersecurity dimensions of use cases
(PQC), quantum key distribution (QKD) and
quantum random number generation (QRNG) – Highlight specific products or solutions that
can be used – instead we will use generic
– Determine emerging focus areas for research use-case descriptions
and investment and enhance cybersecurity
capabilities to counter future systemic risks

How to read this report

This report comprises six chapters that discuss the Chapter 4: What is required from different
potential impact of quantum on security, as well stakeholders? Offers guidance for various
as actions to take to ensure a secure transition audiences to initiate the post-quantum transition.
towards a quantum economy:
Chapter 5: What technologies are available to
Chapter 1: Why prioritize quantum security? address the quantum threat? Defines the current
Introduces quantum computing, the threats, technology landscape and differentiates
opportunities and timeline. key technology approaches.

Chapter 2: How to begin the quantum-safe Chapter 6: What are the focus areas for future
transition? Discusses some of the independent attention? Identifies future research, investment
timelines for key drivers and identifies actions that and governance needs and opportunities.
can be taken now.

Chapter 3: How to adopt a quantum risk

management approach? Provides a global
consensus-based framework to ensure action in
the short-, medium- and long-term.

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 7

 1 Why prioritize
quantum security?
Quantum computing will enable
great innovations in the future but
will be accompanied by great risk.

Emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence most notably, it enabled the invention of the
(AI) and cloud computing consistently promise semiconductor transistor, which is the cornerstone of
to address our most pressing problems, giving the computer industry and is considered the highlight
many a sense of both inspiration and scepticism. of the first quantum revolution.
Quantum technologies are no exception. For
many, the word “quantum” is more likely to More recently, a second quantum revolution has
conjure thoughts of science-fiction than one of been underway, garnering attention for advanced
today’s news headlines. Yet, what are quantum applications such as quantum computing,
computers? When will the quantum threat become quantum sensing and quantum communications.
mainstream? And most importantly, what is the As opposed to the first quantum revolution where
potential impact of the quantum threat? quantum properties were used to manufacture
superior devices (lasers, transistors, etc.), the
Quantum
Quantum mechanics, first conceived at the beginning second quantum revolution refers to the storage
mechanics enabled of the 20th century, explains foundational concepts and processing of information in quantum devices.
the invention of of how basic matter exists, changes and interacts This emerging field of quantum information science
the semiconductor over time. Those initial discoveries fascinated will have the capacity to drive high-impact use
transistor, the scientists for the next several decades and inspired cases in the future. However, its transformative
cornerstone of the ground-breaking innovations such as lasers and power is still limited due to the infancy of today’s
computing industry. magnetic resonance imaging systems. Perhaps quantum hardware.

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 8

 1.1 What are quantum computers?
Quantum computers are a new type of computing processing information. These new building blocks
device capable of performing specific calculations, are used to construct quantum algorithms that, in
some of which are intractable with classical computers. some cases, significantly accelerate the ability to
solve computational problems (see Figure 2).
In classical computing, all information is represented
in bits (as 0s and 1s). Quantum computers use There are already multiple quantum algorithms that
qubits that combine 0s and 1s at the same time show potential to achieve significant speed-up
(called “superposition”). Leveraging the principles of compared to classical algorithms. These include
superposition and entanglement (the ability of remote algorithms for solving combinatorial problems,
qubits to be correlated to each other), quantum simulation of physical systems, accelerating
computing enables a new way of storing and machine learning algorithms and more.

FIGURE 2 Classical vs. Quantum computer

Classical bit Quantum qubit

1 0
z

or

x y

0 1
Can be only in one state Can be in a superposition state,
at the same time, 0 or 1 by being in one of multiple states
of 0 and 1 at the same time

1.2 When will the quantum-threat become mainstream?

Experts forecast The field of quantum computing is still in its infancy Regardless of this timeline, organizations need to
the quantum threat and the machines we have today are still far from take a risk management approach and understand
will materialize in being mainstream and threatening cybersecurity. that the timeline is accelerating towards the
Leading experts in the field forecast the quantum “shelf-life” and “danger zone” (see Figure 3).
10 years – but it
threat will materialize in about 10 years.12 This With migrations of previous algorithms taking
could be sooner,
timeline, although uncertain, could arguably be approximately 10 years, it is vital for organizations
given the secrecy even shorter – especially given the asymmetry of to pioneer the shift to quantum-safe cryptography
of certain nations information and secrecy across the globe regarding to thrive and stay protected from cyberattacks.
looking for strategic the advancements in quantum computing by
advantage. certain nations looking for strategic advantage.

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 9

 The precise threat timeline you should focus on depends on your risk
tolerance. For very critical systems and assets, the likelihood of quantum
attacks in five years is becoming material and for most critical systems and
assets I believe the 10-year likelihood needs to be addressed assertively.

Michele Mosca, University of Waterloo, Canada

FIGURE 3 Quantum threat timeline

Migration time Shelf-life time

The number of years needed to properly The number of years the
and safely migrate the system to a information must be protected by
quantum-safe solution the cyber-system

2020 2025 2030 2035

Threat timeline Danger zone

The number of years before the relevant
threat actors will be able to break the
quantum-vulnerable systems

Source: Michele Mosca, University of Waterloo, Canada13

1.3 What is the potential impact of the quantum threat?

The quantum cyber threat is likely to materialize within the lifecycles
of many IT/OT systems being deployed today; the cyber risk,
however, particularly for long-lived data, is clear and present today.

Vikram Sharma, Founder & CEO, QuintessenceLabs

When quantum computing gains traction, it will used to break the factorization problem in a matter
break some of the current cryptographic algorithms. of hours or even minutes,14 rendering public-key
A great deal of the security of our digital society cryptographic algorithms useless.15 Grover’s algorithm
relies on these cryptographic algorithms to can be used to speed up the search for the secret
guarantee the confidentiality (data privacy) and key used by symmetric cryptography to guarantee
integrity (data accuracy) of our message exchanges, the confidentiality of most of our data exchanges and
online banking operations and stored data in the storages, as well as the search for the passwords we
cloud. Most of these algorithms’ security builds use to secure our personal accounts.16
on mathematical problems that are considered
intractable on classical computers but that become The impact of the quantum threat does not stop
solvable with quantum computers. This threatens with cryptographic algorithms, as its cascading
the security of the cryptographic algorithms that are effects can be potentially large. With infrastructure
a fundamental part of our digital lives. breakdowns being one of the main concerns for
cyber leaders, this places it among the highest
There are currently two algorithms – Shor and challenges business organizations face in the
Grover – that quantum computers can use to break future.17 The examples below illustrate some of
the hard mathematical problems that underpin some the systemic risks around how the quantum threat
of our existing cryptography. Shor’s algorithm can be could affect our daily lives:

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 10

 – Increasing data breaches of sensitive health replaced by digital versions, this need becomes
and financial personal data. Data breaches supremely important. Attacks using quantum

$4.35m are already one of the largest cyber challenges

for organizations, with average costs per data
computers could be used to challenge and
forge the digital versions of information,
Average cost breach reaching $4.35 million. Imagine if all identities and sensitive data.
per data breach your private and sensitive communications and
information become public? Most information – Breaking cryptocurrencies.
exchanges between organizations, individual As cryptocurrencies become more mainstream,
citizens, and financial and governmental they are increasingly a target for cyber attacks.
institutions are fully digital and rely on This is because they are built with blockchain
cryptographic systems to ensure they are kept technology that relies heavily on cryptography
private. Quantum computers provide the ability algorithms for data integrity, transaction
to intercept and decrypt this data. This will lead processing, proof of ownership and more.
to large reputational impacts for organizations Quantum computing could pose a systemic
as well as impacts on the privacy of individuals, risk to cryptocurrencies by breaking their
who could find their private sensitive information underlying cryptography. Recent research has
in the public domain. demonstrated that about 25% of bitcoins and
65% of ether coins could be vulnerable to a
– Threatening internet and message quantum attack. At current rates, this could
exchanges. In today’s digital world, internet represent more than $40 billion of value at risk.18
traffic and instant messaging are a fundamental
part of our daily lives, with private and sensitive – Risk of “harvest now, decrypt later” attacks.
personal exchanges. These exchanges are For certain types of data (e.g. confidential and
protected by a secure communication channel sensitive) that have both high data value and
that uses public-key encryption algorithms long shelf-life characteristics, the quantum
to exchange a unique key to secure the threat might already be materializing today in
communication. Quantum computers could the form of an attack known as “harvest now,
About 25% be used to break this secure channel and decrypt later”. Certain attackers may currently
of bitcoins and eavesdrop on practically every encrypted be intercepting encrypted data transmissions
exchange. This makes all private and secret and storing them on a hard disk drive for later
65% of ether
communications transparent to malicious users. use. Although the encrypted data may not be
coins could be of any value today, it could still be of interest 10
vulnerable to a – Challenging the integrity of digital or 15 years from now when the attacker has
quantum attack, documents. In our increasingly digital society, access to a cryptographically relevant quantum
putting more there is a growing need to ensure the integrity computer. This is of particular concern for
than $40 billion and authenticity of data and information. regulated industries that are required to keep
of value at risk. As paper documents and identities become sensitive customer data for long periods of time.

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 11

 2 How to begin the
quantum-safe transition
Regardless of unpredictable timelines,
organizations should think about their
transition to quantum-safe cryptography
now, as the process will take time.

20 billion digital The World Economic Forum’s Global Future Council machines, TV set-top boxes, point-of-sale systems,
devices will need on Quantum Computing estimates that 20 billion smartphones and a host of other devices and
to be upgraded digital devices will need to be upgraded or replaced systems. As a result, algorithm replacement can be
or replaced with with post-quantum cryptography in the next 20 extremely disruptive and take years to complete;
post-quantum years.19 This upgrade is not a simple switch-out or typically, it requires upgrading or replacing
patch, because cryptography is entrenched across components of the cryptographic infrastructure.
cryptography in
enterprises, often in physically remote systems. For This is one of the reasons organizations must start
the next 20 years.
example, migrating to post-quantum cryptography now to consider what their migration plan should be
will affect the performance requirements of and assume a posture of crypto-agility that would
microprocessors that are embedded in ATM allow them to quickly update.

2.1 What are the steps to consider?

Not all data Build awareness of the quantum threat, by Take a fresh look at cryptographic governance.
generated today understanding the risk that quantum computing Preparing cryptographic systems for the quantum
will still be relevant poses to existing cryptographic and encryption computing era is a major technological challenge.
when the quantum systems, as well as the macro impact to the In the same way that agile software delivery
threat materializes. organization’s business model. This awareness practices helped create more adaptable technology
will help to educate senior leaders from the public organizations, so a more agile approach to
and private sectors, including boards, C-suites, cryptographic governance can create more flexible
government heads, policy-makers and operational- businesses and infrastructure that will quickly pivot
level executives, to gain broad support for investments and reprioritize in response to evolving security
in a quantum-safe cryptography infrastructure. challenges and requirements.

Plan and prepare for the quantum threat, by Assess readiness for and work towards greater
assessing the different areas of the digital and crypto-agility. A more crypto-agile organization
infrastructure environment to devise a prioritized is one that can efficiently update cryptographic
action plan. algorithms, parameters, processes and technologies
to better respond to new protocols, standards and
Understand the lifetime of data. As it is expected security threats, including those leveraging quantum
to take some years before quantum computers computing methods. To assess organizational
can break cryptography, not all data generated readiness for crypto-agility, consider the following:
today will still be relevant when the quantum threat
materializes. It is therefore important to classify – Data and cryptographic assets. To help respond
the longevity of data in order to assess whether to systemic changes, such as new algorithms,
protection against the quantum threat is needed in organizations should provide an account of their
the short term. For example, state secrets must be data assets to understand how they are currently
kept secret for a long time (even indefinitely), while cryptographically protected. This means
the digital signature for a one-year contract is not inventorying and prioritizing cryptographically
likely to be relevant after the contract expires. protected data, transactions and other assets

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 12

 to understand their retention requirements and methods, which in turn could require
locations (e.g. are they on-premises or in the infrastructure upgrades. As NIST standards
cloud). It is important to note that inventorying develop, it will be important to understand
cryptographic assets is initially a time-intensive how they affect system infrastructure, identify
process and requires updating as new potential future infrastructure shortcomings and
technology and services are adopted. develop a plan for addressing them.

– Cryptographic keys. To identify and prioritize Initiate the transition, leveraging hybrid solutions.
future vulnerabilities, business leaders should Organizations adopting quantum-resistant security
review the types of cryptographic keys being technologies will more than likely leverage hybrid
used, their characteristics and their locations approaches that integrate both classical and
in existing computer and communications quantum-ready solutions. This will give organizations
hardware, operating systems, application reassurance that existing security remains intact,
programs, communications protocols, key while overlaying that security with relatively
infrastructures and access control mechanisms. new post-quantum cryptography algorithms.
Organizations should set their short-, mid- and
– Infrastructure limitations. Quantum-safe long-term goals, review the different deployment
cryptography may use substantially more scenarios, opportunities and challenges they may
processing power than current cryptographic face, and fashion strategies that are fit for purpose.

BOX 1 Understanding the steps to take on quantum: Salesforce

Like several organizations, Salesforce is currently NIST and collaborating with potential partners to
making the quantum-secure transition. To build internal tools to address and mitigate the
understand the potential impact and to define an quantum threat. These steps allow Salesforce
action plan, the first step involves a comprehensive to experiment with different potential public-key
audit of all cryptographic assets. At the same time, standards and determine their impact on the
Salesforce is tracking public-key standards from environment, while implementing new tools.

2.2 What can organizations start to do?

Organizations can start assessing the impacts that quantum risk might have on their operations
before the quantum threat actually reaches them. They can set short-, medium- and long-term
goals today to manage the risk and ensure a smooth quantum transition (see Figure 4).

FIGURE 4 Goals to manage quantum risk and ensure a smooth transition

Short-term Mid-term Long-term

– Get familiar with the impact of – Conduct larger-scale experiments – Transition to quantum-secure
quantum computing with quantum applications ecosystem
– Conduct quantum readiness and – Invest in proofs of concept (e.g. – Adopt fully agile cryptography
quantum risk assessments risk prediction) management
– Create a quantum roadmap – Implement quantum solutions
– Trial small-scale proofs of concept where they provide added value
(e.g. crypto-agility)
– Inventory cryptography assets
(very time-intensive)
– Assess quantum opportunities
and their value to the organization

Source: World Economic Forum

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 13

 BOX 2 Partnering on developing quantum proof of concepts: Quantinuum and Fujitsu

As part of their vision to be ready for quantum encrypt network traffic. Over time, this integration
risks to network security, Fujitsu partnered with will incorporate post-quantum algorithms, as these
Quantinuum on a software-defined wide area become approved by NIST and standardized.
network (SD-WAN) proof of concept (PoC) which
incorporated cryptographic keys that would remain The combination of new, approved algorithms
secure and unpredictable, even as powerful and the PoC approach for their configuration,
quantum computers are developed in the future. integration and security benefits on cloud
will provide enhanced SD-WAN security and
The project focused on integrating Quantinuum’s
benefits for cloud-hosted application solutions.
key generation platform into Fujitsu’s SD-WAN
PoC infrastructure. The key generation platform The technical goal of deploying the solution is
uses quantum computers to generate probably a reduction in the potential for data breaches,
near-perfect cryptographic keys using a verified should the quantum risks to cryptography be
and patented quantum process. Keys are delivered realized, thanks to the strong guarantee of
securely to the SD-WAN nodes and used to cryptographic key strength.

2.3 What are the deployment scenarios?

There is often a debate on when is the right time National cybersecurity institutions – such as the
to deploy emerging technologies – is it best to be US’s National Security Agency (NSA), the US’s
an early adopter of proprietary technology, to wait Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
for consensus standards to evolve, to rely upon the (CISA), the Agence nationale de la sécurité
use of frameworks that provide guidance on how des systèmes d’information (ANSSI – France’s
to leverage standards, or to wait until regulators computer security service), the Bundesamt
force change? für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI
– Germany’s Federal Office for Information
In the case of quantum, underlying standards Security), Canada’s Communications Security
Hybrid and/ have been under development by NIST since Establishment (CSE), and the UK’s National Cyber
or phased 2017. NIST announced the initial “winners” in July Security Centre (NCSC) – have started to issue
approaches to 2022,16 which will now be developed into Federal implementation guidance and help organizations
Information Processing Standards (FIPS). Some make decisions on relevant activities.
the quantum
organizations will rely upon this directly, much as
transition offer the they do with FIPS 140-2 and related examples of Nevertheless, some organizations may wait (either
best balance for this type of document. Other organizations may deliberately or inadvertently) until they are obliged
most companies seek to wait until NIST has offered up the material to act, either by regulation or in response to an
between potential for an international standard under the International actual reported attack on encryption by a quantum
impacts and Organization for Standardization (ISO) or the computer. Figure 5 presents four potential
opportunities. Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). scenarios for adoption.

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 14

 FIGURE 5 Four potential deployment scenarios to address quantum risk

Scenario Rationale Potential impacts Potential opportunities

Do nothing Organizations that believe – No protection from quantum; – No upfront financial outlay
quantum computing is still at full impact on the digital
an early stage and the benefits infrastructure
of investing and embarking on
– Disruption of business
the quantum transition are yet
operations and processes
to be defined.
– High risk of requiring a
reactive, direct changeover
when the threat materializes

Adopt a hybrid As standards are created, it – Vulnerability of classical – Provides legacy support
approach is possible to have classical, solutions to old solutions
quantum and post-quantum
– Low to medium financial – Allows agility and flexibility
cryptography solutions in a
impact to adapt quickly to new
hybrid mode. The security of
solutions
the complete solution is as
good as the strongest element. – Provides classical
protection while PQC
algorithms being further
stress tested

Follow a phased Phase investment to adopt – Vulnerability of classical – Prioritization of solutions

approach quantum security solutions to solutions based on inventory
replace impacted solutions.
– Low to medium financial – Phase-based
impact improvement learnings
– Phased budget spending
following quantum’s
evolution

Direct changeover Make a replacement of all – High financial impact – large – Direct enhancement of
impacted solutions, replacing migrations can have higher security against quantum
them with quantum and post- costs risks for smaller, novel
quantum cryptography. and less complicated
– Large disruption of business
environments
operations and processes

Each organization will have to assess its own cost versus impact of
quantum risk activities, relative to other priority strategic cyber initiatives,
determine which scenario is best and budget accordingly.

BOX 3 Running a phased approach at a healthcare provider: QuSecure

Healthcare data remains relevant for years – and 1) overlay legacy network infrastructure, 2) support
often decades. This puts the healthcare industry at expected network performance and 3) maintain
risk of “harvest now, decrypt later” attacks. After communication with non-upgraded equipment.
learning about the quantum threat, the leadership
at a large healthcare provider sought help to start To begin the phased approach, a combination
a phased approach to adopting post-quantum of quantum random number generator, post-
cryptographic standards. quantum cryptosystems, protocols and traffic
monitoring software was deployed in a single
A network of clinics within the company has pilot clinic to demonstrate quantum-resilient
transmitted patient records between physical data transmission. After successful testing, the
locations continuously for the past two decades. healthcare provider is now rolling out the solution
Given the mix of legacy and modern equipment, to a broader number of clinics to ensure a phased
any proposed solution should: and complete transition.

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 15

 3 How to adopt
a quantum risk
management approach?
First define your quantum security vision. Identify
drivers for change. Then plan and execute your
roadmap, while enabling critical success factors.

The World Economic Forum’s Quantum-Secure The framework consists of four layers – Define,
Transition Framework provides guidance for Identify, Plan and Execute – that help organizations
organizations in defining their quantum security structure their goals and objectives for a secure
transition, by identifying the quantum risks and quantum transition (see Figure 6).
their timelines against each organization’s unique
technology environment and digital ecosystem. It is
a consensus-based framework developed by the
Forum’s quantum security community.

One way of anticipating the quantum threat timeline could be

by considering now which systems need to be left behind
Brian LaMacchia, Distinguished Engineer, Microsoft Research

FIGURE 6 Quantum-Secure Transition Framework

1 Quantum security vision (see Fig. 7)

Define Enable organizations to transition to quantum-secure ecosystems and mitigate quantum threats

2 Quantum threat
Drivers for change (see Fig. 8)
Cryptography
Identify 1 materialization 2 Regulatory pressures 3 Market dynamics 4 management needs

3 Quantum security roadmap

Plan Talent & education (see Fig. 9) Governance & processes (see Fig. 10) Technology & infrastructure (see Fig. 11)

Post-quantum Quantum key Random

Knowledge pool Executive support cryptography distribution number
generation

Culture & socialization Vision & roadmap Product security

Training & awareness Cryptography champions Enterprise security

Policies & standards Third-party security

4 Key factors for success (see Fig. 12)

Sustainable business &
Execute Standards and certifications Ecosystem cooperation Technological innovation & research
long-term investments

Source: Deloitte, World Economic Forum

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 16

 3.1 Quantum-Secure Transition Framework
1. Define a quantum security vision strategy, cybersecurity and IT plans, and the
Organizations can define a quantum security market they operate in. Organizations can use their
vision based on contextual factors, (see Figure organizational context to create objectives for their
7) including but not limited to organizational quantum transition.

FIGURE 7 Contextual factors

Organizational plans Cybersecurity and IT External sources

Business strategy Cybersecurity and IT strategy Market drivers

Strategic Investment plans Cybersecurity and IT politics Regulatory influences

2. Identify drivers for change cryptography. The drivers presented in Figure 8

There are different drivers that could motivate an are representative and non-exhaustive. They are
organization to kickstart its quantum transition independent but possibly interlinked. However, it is
(see Figure 8). These can be threat-driven, but still unclear when the impacts of some drivers will
there are also more business-driven reasons for materialize, how they will influence each other and
an organization to explore new ways of managing how they will influence organizations to change.

FIGURE 8 Drivers for change

1 Driver: Quantum threat materialization enabling attacks on traditional crytography

Either the reaction to an actual compromise or the understanding that it is imminent

Driver: Regulatory pressures to adopt standards

2 The anticipation of national or international regulations will likely require action

long before quantum computers become mature

3 Driver: Market dynamics, driven by early adopters who influence others to become quantum-secure
After early adopters implement quantum-safe solutions, the rest of the market is likely to follow

Driver: Cryptography management needs, driven by non-quantum security threats

4 Cyber risk management initiatives that are not driven by quantum but by other current or
emerging threats and operational challenges

Starting points for identifying

key actions

Source: Deloitte, World Economic Forum

3. Plan a quantum security roadmap transition. We have identified three workstreams:

Based on the strategy and drivers, organizations Talent & Education, Governance & Processes
can start defining what actions and approaches and Technology & Infrastructure, detailed further
need to be prioritized for their own quantum in Figures 9, 10 and 11.

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 17

 FIGURE 9 Quantum security roadmap: talent & education

Knowledge pool
While the materialization of the quantum threat is still several years away, organizations can start equipping their
talent with the right knowledge on quantum security. This includes addressing the talent gap.

Culture & socialization

Quantum computers can change the threat landscape for organizations. Socializing this impact can aid the
quantum-secure transition.

Training & awareness

Early education and training on quantum and how quantum security impacts the organization provides teams
with the ability to be ready when the quantum impact materializes and aids understanding of the threat.

Talent & education: approaches

– Create a realistic timeline now that showcases the time and – Lack of understanding around the quantum timeline
effort it will take to transition, in order to educate leaders can be mitigated by demystifying quantum and framing
who may believe the threat is too far away to act now it in relation to the corporate business model

Source: Deloitte, World Economic Forum

FIGURE 10 Quantum security roadmap: governance & processes

Executive support
Projects and transitions revolve around getting proper support from senior leadership to
enable appropriate sponsorship, resources and mandate for change.

Vision & roadmap

As becoming quantum-secure becomes a higher priority, initiatives should be
bundled and supported with a quantum security roadmap.

Cryptographic champions
Cryptographic champions can look beyond separate functions and amplify the quantum
security message at the team level and coordinate adaptation across the organization.

Policies & standards

Successful implementation of policies and standards brings organizations up to speed with
regard to new ways of working and reducing the impact of quantum threats.

Governance & processes: approaches

– Integrate the risk of quantum into your general risk management framework
to understand the level and likelihood of impact across your ecosystem

Source: Deloitte, World Economic Forum

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 18

 FIGURE 11 Quantum security roadmap: technology & infrastructure

Post-quantum cryptography Quantum key distribution Random number generation

Development and implementation Deployment of cryptographic Generating true random numbers
of quantum-safe algorithms that protocols for distribution of symmetric based on the laws of quantum
are secure against quantum keys, in order to avoid vulnerable key mechanics, as opposed to the
computer-supported attacks. exchange mechanisms. pseudo-random numbers generated
by traditional techniques.

Product security
Relates to the security of software development or other product design. When conducting product security assessments,
teams must take into account the security of the cryptographic protocols in use for their organization’s products.

Enterprise security
Helps organizations understand whether they are secure and implementing sufficient measures to safeguard
their business and people. Within enterprise security, organizations need to prioritize quantum risk.

Third-party security
Protects an organization against cybersecurity threats that originate from the supply chain, vendors or customers.
Assessments may be needed to gain insights into how the quantum threat changes the threat landscape.

Technology & infrastructure: approaches

– To overcome a heavy dependency on vendors and their – To tackle budgetary restrictions, piloting use cases
solutions, organizations can begin to have conversations with can demonstrate the opportunities that quantum
vendors about the quantum threat to gain realistic expectations can bring to your business

Source: Deloitte, World Economic Forum

BOX 4 Experimenting with specific applications: Banco Santander

Financial institutions deal with very sensitive data, 2. Identify and assess use cases for random
including customer data and information regarding number generation within the bank’s services
transactions and contracts. Regulators often and the benefits of having a quantum-based
require sensitive data to be stored for long periods, random number generator solution, such as
making security a key requirement. The advent of verifiability and improved performance. These
quantum threats could therefore have implications use cases aim to explore novel approaches
on the security of financial institutions. To prepare to improve the overall quality of the bank’s
its enterprise against quantum threats, Banco random number generation in key areas,
Santander has been experimenting with a number including cryptography, financial simulations
of strategic research projects, outlined below. and machine learning.
1. Understand the current risks of critical 3. Initiate implementation of cryptographic
functions handling sensitive information, by agility by developing “cryptography-as-a-
mapping the potential threats, and develop service” to provide the bank with the ability
a quantum readiness framework for a to move services over to post-quantum
prioritized transition. This framework helps build cryptography, as well as the opportunity to
a roadmap to developing an understanding of make modern cryptographic automation
the organization’s confidential cloud and digital more widely and easily available within the
signature resilience. organization.

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 19

 4. Execute ensuring key factors for success the quantum threat. Organizations will face challenges
With an initial roadmap in mind, it is crucial to strategizing which solution is right for them and their
strategize who should get involved in kickstarting the specific application, and encounter implementation
transition, identifying the key stakeholders and best issues along the way. There are four key factors that
candidates to get the ball rolling. There are no silver will help ensure the successful and robust execution
bullets while executing a strategy and plan to address of a quantum security roadmap (see Figure 12).

FIGURE 12 Key factors for success in executing a quantum security roadmap

Standards and certifications

Use of standards and certifications will enhance quantum security solutions

Ecosystem cooperation
Cooperation between ecosystem parties will help resolve or mitigate systemic risks

Technological innovation and research

Research leading to innovative solutions and new approaches mitigating quantum risk

Sustainable business and long-term investments

Long-term investments and responsible business strategies aiding implementation of quantum-secure solutions

BOX 5 Developing playbooks for change: EvolutionQ

The financial services industry is one of the most be harvested today and decrypted tomorrow by
heavily regulated and relies on trust relationships malicious actors using quantum computers.
between customers and financial companies for
its survival. The quantum threat puts at risk the We then looked at the benefits of implementing
backbone of today’s financial infrastructure and a quantum key distribution (QKD) solution by
worldwide economy in the coming years. developing a multi-phase playbook to define
requirements for the potential roll-out. This allowed
To educate multinational investment management us to establish a two-phase approach that defines
and financial services companies on the risk profile a QKD simulator enabling the bank to assess the
and how to ensure a quantum-safe transition, security and performance potential, followed by the
we have conducted detailed analysis on how project definition that will replace the simulator with
the risk profile is changing. Risks are increasing actual QKD hardware.
with larger and more complex infrastructure, and
these risks will only grow with the massive rise The solution increases the bank’s layered
in cloud platforms, sophisticated mobile stacks cybersecurity defences by providing the “vault” to
and the advent of edge computing. With that in lock down the bank’s most important assets and
mind, we have reviewed the key data that could prevent the potential risks arising from code-breaking.

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 20

 4 What is required from
different stakeholders?
All organizations will feel the impact of quantum.
The transition must begin with leaders setting
the right level of support and direction.

Like many other emerging and disruptive This chapter offers some recommendations
technologies, the quantum threat will affect for priority activities to the following actors:
almost everyone. Developing and implementing
– Corporate leaders and boards
a successful quantum readiness plan requires
coordination across many different industry – Cyber leaders
sectors, governments and global stakeholders. All – Policy-makers
organizations will feel the impact of the quantum – Leaders navigating the extended enterprise
threat, regardless of their size, type and revenue – ecosystem
including quantum technology vendors themselves.
The quantum-secure transition must begin with Smaller organizations or those without a dedicated
leadership to set the appropriate level of support cyber security office or function could still appoint
an officer responsible for quantum reporting to
and direction required to carry out such an effort.
management to ensure the quantum threat receives
the right focus and prioritization.

4.1 Recommendations for corporate leaders and boards

Corporate leaders and boards represent the CEO and legal responsibilities and that various drivers
other C-suite leaders who establish the overall direction (regulatory, financial, security etc.) can influence
and priorities of organizations, including initiatives the need for and speed of adoption.
pertaining to quantum computing technologies.
– Invest in updating IT systems and technical
What you should know infrastructure, and prioritize crypto-agility
to avoid lock-in and costly future changes.
– Understand the capabilities and challenges of Consider conducting thorough risk and impact
adopting quantum technology and the business assessments on which solutions (PQC, QKD,
impact of quantum computing advances. QRNG etc.) might suit your organization best.

– Grasp the individual and industry-wide legal and – Invest in the hiring and training of
regulatory implications. knowledgeable and skilled staff that
understand the technology and the threats.
– Learn how to navigate the hype and complexity During our interviews and working sessions,
of quantum risk solutions – and properly most organizations noted that this is the key
evaluate the impact on your organization. challenge for the coming years.
The Quantum-Secure Transition Framework
presented in Chapter 3 of this white paper can – Coordinate quantum security efforts internally,
help organizations define their vision, objectives in cooperation with other C-suite stakeholders
and key steps in line with their risk appetite and and risk management functions, to build
business drivers. awareness and integration with supporting
The key
and affected corporate functions. Externally,
challenge in the What you should do today establish third-party risk management functions
coming years will to include quantum risk preparedness. These
be hiring staff – Adopt a holistic approach that balances the third-party stakeholders include key vendors
skilled enough to potential opportunities of quantum computing and service providers, channel partners,
understand the against the risks. Understand that taking risks infrastructure providers, product vendors and
quantum threat. may be necessary to fulfil various regulatory and other ecosystem partners.

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 21

 4.2 Recommendations for cyber leaders
Cyber leaders represent the chief information What you should do today
security officer (CISO) of the organization, or
whoever is the senior-most individual in the – Champion quantum computing concerns
organization specifically tasked with protecting its within your organization and educate corporate
information and technology assets. leaders and business stakeholders. Some
organizations have successfully created the right
What you should know level of urgency by linking the quantum threat to
operational resilience and business strategies,
– Understand the organizations, individuals and and tailoring the impact of the quantum threat to
entities driving the regulatory and standards the organizational context.
conversations (NIST, ENISA, etc.). Chapter 2
of this white paper sheds light on regulatory – Launch initiatives to assess quantum computing
developments and links these to various risks and exposures. Establish or modify
scenarios for adopting quantum technologies processes to account for quantum computing
now and in the future. capabilities. Understand that cross-functional
collaboration between security, operational and
– Keep informed of entities advancing in quantum, business functions might be critical.
both security applications and quantum
computing threats, through liaising with – Build a crypto “inventory” that includes data
ecosystem partners, supply chains and other assets to determine which ones need to be re-
organizations. encrypted with quantum-resistant cryptographic
algorithms. A complete inventory will provide
– Monitor quantum developments in your a clear overview of vulnerabilities and which
organization by working with responsible systems might need to be prioritized in the
individuals, such as the owners of crypto secure quantum transition.
infrastructure and cybersecurity, as well as
privacy policy teams, data owners and the data
protection officer.

4.3 Recommendations for policy-makers

Imagine Policy-makers represent national and international What you should do today
the future of leadership, along with standards organizations
quantum – it is that are ultimately responsible for guiding the – Support the development of international
an ever-evolving governance of quantum technologies and efforts quantum cybersecurity and risk management
technology with to mitigate their potential risk. standards for quantum computing. A starting
point for this can be our Quantum-Secure
some exciting
What you should know Transition Framework presented in Chapter 3
opportunities.
of this report.
– Understand the commercial and national
security implications of quantum computing. – Promote enhanced quantum awareness among
both public and private sector leaders. Many
– Discern the relationships between different organizations stress the need for education,
standards to make a timely start in transitioning especially at a senior level.
to quantum-safe standards. We are starting to
see guidance from NSA, ANSSI, BSI and others, – Accelerate development of a cyber-secure
so keeping track of regulatory movements could global ecosystem by including quantum
be useful in determining what is needed for cybersecurity technology as an area of focus.
organizations in your jurisdictions.
– Consider incorporating advances in quantum
– Manage the balance between regulating the cybersecurity into existing standards originally
technology too early (stifling innovation) and written during the classical era.
regulating the technology too late. The debate
on the right moment to deploy quantum-safe – Imagine the future of quantum – it is an
solutions is still ongoing and organizations are ever-evolving technology with some exciting
looking towards policy-makers and regulators to opportunities.
see when they need to act.

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 22

 4.4 Quantum across the extended
enterprise ecosystem

Our modern digital economy is becoming more – Clarify which enterprise technologies and
granular and dispersed, while at the same time services are the responsibility of the organization
increasingly systemic and interdependent. itself to make quantum-safe as opposed to those
Organizations rely heavily on connected that are the obligation of third parties to address.
technologies – both custom-developed and off-the-
shelf – to execute and maintain their extended and – Establish vendor relationships to understand the
connected supply chains. While organizations may timelines and expectations around addressing
be responsible for legacy, home-grown applications quantum threats in the products and services
and databases, and their own IoT, mobile devices those vendors provide.
and internal networks, third-party vendors will most
likely manage support technologies, such as public Third-party vendors should be continuously aware
telecommunications, cloud services and common of how quantum threats will impact their products
business applications. and take action to develop enhancements to those
products and services. Third-parties should therefore:
When it comes to the quantum transition,
organizations should: – Understand the risk and impact of the quantum
threat to their products and services
– Understand their exposure to potential quantum
threats through the lens of their digital supply – Develop a plan to address quantum risks in their
chain and full partner ecosystem. This includes product and/or service roadmap
knowing about core technology solutions and
the status of the encryption capabilities within – Communicate their action plan to customers
those products. and stakeholders to build awareness and
promote action

BOX 6 Creating awareness across the regulatory environment:

the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)

To better understand the potential impacts of Council (EPSRC), the National Cyber Security Centre
quantum information technologies (QIT) on (NCSC), the National Quantum Computing Centre
financial services, the FCA has carried out several (NQCC) and internal stakeholders. The aim of the
activities in collaboration with the UK Quantum workshop was to raise awareness of QIT, educate
Computing & Simulation Hub. This is a valuable relevant stakeholders in its key potential impacts and
example of how regulators can collaborate more identify areas of focus for financial regulators. 
closely with academia to understand complex
technological topics. The findings from the FCA workshop provided
valuable insights around future policy implications
In addition to an expert talk and a joint internal and potential regulatory challenges in the areas of
report, the FCA co-organized a virtual workshop security and competition. Similarly, it supported
with more than 25 different stakeholders, including conversations with other international regulators
the Bank of England, six leading UK universities, and prompted the sharing of insights across
the UK Quantum Communications Hub (QCH), jurisdictions, while gathering novel information
the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research about relevant developments.

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 23

5 What technologies are
available to address
the quantum threat?
Quantum computing’s threat to public-key
encryption has generated a market for quantum
risk technologies with varying levels of maturity
and relevance to organizations.

In today’s nascent quantum cybersecurity market, – Quantum key distribution (QKD) develops
several efforts are ongoing to develop technologies physics-based quantum techniques to generate
to mitigate the quantum threat. These technologies secure communication channels which can
do not represent a silver bullet, but they can be used be used to distribute encryption keys. QKD
individually or in combination for certain applications. can complement the use of PQC and other
There are three technologies to mitigate the risk cryptographic algorithms by providing a secure
posed by quantum to public-key cryptography that key distribution method.
have been garnering the majority of attention:
– Quantum random number generation (QRNG)
– Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) uses new leverages fundamental quantum properties to
mathematics-based public-key cryptography generate random numbers with high entropy.
algorithms that are designed to be impervious Randomness is a key part of cryptography.
to attacks by Shor’s algorithm. PQC will QRNG produces better validated entropic
fundamentally update what will become sources than conventional processes, which
insecure cryptographic algorithms. may enhance security under certain conditions.

In the quantum-secure solutions market there is a large information asymmetry

between buyers and sellers. Buyers don’t always know how to pick the right
technical solutions that will mitigate the specific threats their organization faces
and sellers are incentivized to sell inferior products based on factors other than
solely their technical qualifications. This leads to an adverse selection problem
which is a concern for the entire quantum security ecosystem.

Jaya Baloo, Chief Information Security Officer, AVAST

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 24

5.1 Post-quantum cryptograpy

Post-quantum cryptographic algorithms are Added benefits

based on hard mathematical problems, which – Considered to be secure against (currently
are very difficult to solve efficiently, even for known) quantum attacks
quantum computers. There are various options
– Software-based solutions can be implemented
and approaches to develop these algorithms with
within existing infrastructure
different security levels and use cases. To provide
general guidance to where and how to use these Current limitations
algorithms, in late 2017 NIST initiated a process – All known PQC schemes (from the NIST
to solicit, evaluate and standardize quantum- standardization process) have performance
resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms. drawbacks, such as requiring long keys and
In July 2022, NIST announced a list of four long processing times compared to currently
quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms and is used algorithms (e.g. RSA, ECC), which makes
currently developing standards for post-quantum them unsuitable as a direct drop-in replacement
cryptography to protect information exchanges in – Developments in classical and quantum attacks
the quantum era.20 (cryptoanalysis) might impact the security of
these schemes in the future

5.2 Quantum key distribution

Current limitations
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the most well-
known class of quantum protocols to establish a – Significant financial investment as it requires
secure communication channel in a way that stealth specialized hardware
eavesdropping is not possible. The protocol uses – Distance limitations until quantum repeaters and/
the principle of “superposition” to ensure that an or satellite QKD infrastructure are developed
eavesdropper cannot listen in to the communication and commercially available; secured and trusted
unnoticed. This protocol is designed to exchange repeaters are needed in the meantime
secret keys that are afterwards used to encrypt the – Requires a separate authentication channel,
communication using quantum-secure symmetric which adds additional complexity to the solution,
key algorithms, e.g. AES256. in contrast with current classical methods where
authentication is part of the protocol
Added benefits
– Information theoretic security, which means that
no algorithms can be developed to access the
exchanged keys
– Increased protection against harvest-now,
decrypt-later attacks, as the key-exchange
protocol is not vulnerable to quantum attacks.
– Can be used in combination with other schemes
to add a new layer of security

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 25

 5.3 Quantum random number generation

Quantum phenomena are inherently random in nature and so can be used to generate pure random
numbers. The generation of random numbers plays a crucial role in cryptography, for both the
generation of cryptographic keys as well as within some algorithms.

Added benefits Current limitations

– While classical random number generators (RNGs) – Some applications require repeatability, which
are derived from some source of entropy (e.g. is not possible for QRNGs
thermal noise), QRNGs are inherently random
– Difficult to quantify the improvement in security
– The possibility of proof of randomness (certifiable
randomness) for some implementations

BOX 7 Developing a quantum entropy service for a major global bank: QuintessenceLabs

A major global bank, with an extensive virtual automatically replenished entropy pools before
machine deployment hosting a range of starvation with quantum random numbers retrieved
banking services, was experiencing delays and from the appliances.
the potential for duplicate keys used by the
cryptographic processes for securing data and Previously, during busy periods, login and
communication. A quantum random number cryptographically intensive operations had
generation (QRNG) solution was explored response delays of several tens of seconds. After
to ensure the timely delivery of high-quality the deployment of the QRNG solution, response
randomness consumed by the cryptographic times improved by up to one hundred times. And
processes running in the virtual machines. while prior to deployment of QRNG, 2.5% of virtual
machine instances experienced duplicate keys
The QRNG network appliances were deployed after start-up, after deployment, no duplicate keys
in all of the bank’s data centres around the were generated. The solution gave the client clear
world, delivering entropy-as-a-service. The visibility of demand for randomness across the
appliance monitored entropy levels and whole organization.

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 26

 6 What are the focus areas
for future attention?
Quantum computing offers great potential to
solve critical problems – but it also presents
challenges that will require new technologies
and partnerships to tackle.

Quantum computing – still in its early stages with happen in the future and explores the challenges
near-term gains in some niche industry use cases – that organizations committed to mitigating the
offers great potential to help solve a range of critical quantum threat might face around technology,
problems. This chapter looks ahead to what might partnerships and other themes.

The protection of the data-centric internet world needs a crypto-agile

approach to keep pace with constant innovations starting with the
quantum threat and continuing for more flexibility for the future.

Taher Elgamal, Chief Technology Officer, Salesforce

6.1 Quantum technology predictions

The current state of quantum technology is still nascent, but short- and long-term predictions suggest great
potential for a technology that could open new opportunities in the cybersecurity area (see Figure 13).

FIGURE 13 Quantum technology predictions

Short-term Long-term
Current state prediction prediction

– Quantum supremacy – proof that a – Noisy, intermediate-scale quantum – Quantum computing hardware
quantum computer can solve some (NISQ) hardware begins to advances to the point where
problems better than a classical demonstrate instances of genuine decoherence (a process that causes
computer – was demonstrated in quantum advantage in certain quantum information to be lost,
2019 by a team at Google21 areas of financial services (e.g. a significant barrier to today’s
– In 2021, the largest publicly capital markets) quantum computers) can be
available quantum computer had – The public and private sectors controlled via quantum error
127 qubits, but hardware firms are begin formally rallying behind correction and meaningful quantum
actively working to increase this quantum cryptography, to align on advantage is solidified
number and enable additional uses standards and improve encryption – Modern encryption techniques (e.g.
of the technology22 techniques RSA) become easily decrypted by
– Initial proofs of concept are being – The use of quantum computing quantum computers; however, most
conducted with success in financial (e.g. quantum machine learning) governments, businesses and other
services, largely using hybrid begins to become a unique large organizations (e.g. those that
systems of quantum and classical differentiator for large institutions; govern the encryption of the internet)
computers that split different parts most large cloud providers have a have moved on to quantum-secure
of an algorithm across the two market-ready“quantum-as-a- forms of encryption (e.g.lattice-
architectures to optimize performance service” tool based methods)

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 27

6.2 Pathways and focus areas for
future attention and innovation

Quantum computing brings great potential for businesses and governments to harness, whether
to enhance their cyber capabilities or to explore new opportunities. There are four focus areas
that require the attention of public and private sector actors:

− Establishing new partnerships

− Innovating through the adoption of emerging technologies

− Preparing for areas of disruption

− Exploring new research opportunities: experimentation as a starting point for growth

Establishing new partnerships

– Kick-start your post-quantum transition today – Understand the emerging risks from the
by starting to evaluate your infrastructure and interdependencies across organizations’ value
systems using a quantum readiness framework and supply chains, such as telecommunications,
or index that consists of benchmarks across cloud environments, etc. There may be
industries, plus guardrails and guidance challenges, for example, with the transition from
for exploring the current encryption and smart technologies (e.g. IoT, OT) to quantum-
algorithm ecosystem. This approach can help safe algorithms and unclear timelines around
organizations identify challenges and bottlenecks when the quantum threat to those technologies
associated with specific quantum security risks might become tangible.
and risks with post-quantum adoption.
– Develop a secure supply chain strategy inclusive
– Create an overarching framework to establish of software and hardware, so that you can
a common language for calibrating risks across prepare to substitute tech due to any crypto
business, governments, policy-makers and breakthrough, quantum or classical. Plan and
standard-setters. start talking to your vendors to ask what their
responses are to quantum and begin hardware
– Establish a platform to foster collaboration and software transitions as needed.
across industries to partner and align on
quantum-secure capabilities and solutions. – Develop guidelines to create awareness and to
provide clear action points to decision-makers
for managing a secure quantum transition.

Innovating through the adoption of emerging technologies

– The quantum threat provides an opportunity – There is a clear desire among participants in the
to proactively review and solve generic and Forum’s quantum security community to start
legacy challenges encountered in cryptography experimenting with quantum security solutions.
management (e.g. certificate management, bad
seeds etc.). – Given that the quantum transition might include
hybrid solutions (systems with both classical
– Many organizations see quantum random cryptographic and quantum-based encryption
number generators as key to ensuring sufficient components), organizations should enhance
entropy in a post-quantum era. their crypto-agility to build ongoing capabilities
to evolve cryptographic standards and
– At the same time, opinion is divided on whether solutions. This crypto-agile approach requires
quantum key distribution would be a requirement taking a fresh look at cryptographic governance
for secure communications in future. and exploring novel ways to deploy crypto-agile
software frameworks and architectures.
– Organizations are not sure whether post-
quantum cryptography will mitigate the quantum
threat on its own.

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 28

 Preparing for areas of disruption
– Market-based and public investment into attacks are something they should worry
quantum security solutions testify to the about today.
importance of and growing interest in moving – Decentralized systems running on blockchain
towards a post-quantum world, setting the require a broad consensus before change can
stage for a “first-mover advantage race” be implemented. This could present a significant
between countries. challenge in the transition of cryptocurrencies,
– Some organizations have expressed doubt decentralized finance (DeFi) platforms and Web3
around whether harvest-now, decrypt-later to quantum secure solutions (see Box 8).

BOX 8 Reviewing the quantum risk to blockchain: Deloitte

Blockchain technology is disrupting many aspects transactions depends heavily on the performance
of our lives, including the use of cryptocurrencies. of the underlying cryptography. Replacing the
This technology is enabled by using sophisticated current algorithms with ones of lower performance
cryptography protocols to replace a central could have a detrimental effect on the adoption
authority with a decentralized governance system. of blockchain applications. Furthermore, the
The use of cryptography within blockchain decentralized nature of blockchain technology
technology makes it very powerful, but also requires a broad consensus before change can be
exposes it to a threat from quantum computers. adopted. This could result in a very long transition
Recent research23 shows that a significant period to post-quantum cryptography – time that
portion of cryptocurrencies could be stolen by a we may not have.
malicious actor with a cryptographically relevant It is therefore imperative to start preparing the
quantum computer. transition as soon as possible. Not just the
The quantum risk to blockchain presents a number selection of new cryptographic algorithms, but
of unique challenges that need to be addressed. also creating the consensus process needed to
For example, the performance of blockchain successfully undergo this transition.

Exploring new research opportunities:

experimentation as a starting point for growth

– Organizations require more clarity on how to overcome stances shaped by backgrounds

overcome the information asymmetry between rather than organizational risk profiles.
buyers and sellers to make informed decisions – Organizations are encouraged to conduct
on which quantum security solutions fit their ongoing assessments to monitor developments
organization best. in quantum computing, as they relate to both
– Opinions and viewpoints are strongly shaped opportunities and threats.
by roles and background (e.g. the “physicists – Organizations should address the talent gap by
versus mathematicians and cybersecurity focusing on training and upskilling the current
specialists” problem). There is a need for workforce while working with universities to
collaboration and interdisciplinary research to educate and skill new professionals.

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 29

 Conclusion
Quantum computing will take time to mature,
but that is no excuse to delay preparations.
Take prudent action now to start your
transition to a quantum-safe future.

It is difficult to As the quantum era continues to evolve and The field of quantum computing is still in its infancy
accurately predict timelines for technological advancements become and the quantum machines we have today are still
how long it will clearer, it is important to understand how quantum far from being able to threaten cybersecurity. It is
take before this computers will impact cybersecurity, how they may therefore difficult to accurately predict how long it
threat materializes. affect your organization specifically and when the will take before this threat materializes. However, this
threat could potentially materialize based on your does not mean that organizations should wait before
However, this
individual enterprise risk profile. taking action. Established businesses, start-ups
does not mean
and researchers are all working on solutions, the
that organizations The quantum transition process will be lengthy. most common being post-quantum cryptography
should wait before Regardless of when we think the threat will (PQC), quantum key distribution (QKD) and quantum
taking action. materialize, you need to consider what steps need random number generation (QRNG).
to be taken now and what your organization can do
to prepare. Consider creating a transition roadmap Each of these solutions helps mitigate different
to help you define your quantum security vision. aspects of the quantum threat and each has its
To get ready for a secure transition to a quantum- own benefits and limitations. Innovation will bring
safe economy, organizations should identify key new opportunities and advances in quantum,
stakeholders, including corporate leaders, board which can in turn open doors to new partnerships,
members, cyber leaders, policy-makers and technologies and research opportunities that can
vendors, and assign responsibility accordingly. be used to expand current operations.

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 30

Contributors
Lead authors Steering committee

Filipe Beato Jaya Baloo

Lead, Centre for Cybersecurity, Chief Information Security Officer, Avast Software,
World Economic Forum Czech Republic

Anne Ardon Taher Elgamal

Junior Manager, Deloitte, Netherlands Chief Technology Officer, Security, Salesforce, USA

Itan Barmes, Isaac Kohn

Specialist Leader, Deloitte, Netherlands Partner, Deloitte, Switzerland

Chris Knackstedt Brian LaMacchia

Senior Manager, Deloitte, USA Distinguished Engineer, Microsoft Research, Microsoft,
USA

Michele Mosca
Professor, University of Waterloo, Canada

Vikram Sharma
Founder and Chief Executive Officer,
QuintessenceLabs, Australia

Colin Soutar
Managing Director, Deloitte, USA

Acknowledgements
This white paper was co-created by many experts George Miao
and diverse stakeholders in the World Economic Credit Suisse, Switzerland
Forum’s project community on quantum security,
as part of the quantum computing network that Jason Lau, Jacques Francoeur
shared insights and lessons learned, through Crypto.com, Hong Kong SAR
interviews, design workshops and consultation
sessions. The World Economic Forum would like Soon Chia Lim, Jong Chin, Roddy Kok
to thank the following individuals for their insightful Cyber Security Agency of Singapore, Singapore
reviews and feedback.
Michael Daniel
Andrew Fursman Cyber Threat Alliance, USA
1QB Information Technologies, Canada
Ken Durazzo
Dimitri van Esch Dell Technologies, USA
ABN Amro, Netherlands
Christian Cruces Mujica
Sigmund Kristiansen Deloitte, USA
Aker BP, Norway
Marc Verdonk
Antia Lamas-Linares Deloitte, Netherlands
Amazon Web Services, USA
Bushra AlBlooshi
Daniel Cuthbert, Mark Carney Dubai Electronic Security Center, United Arab
Banco Santander SA, Spain Emirates

Dimi Stratakis Andrew Ward

Bank of New York Mellon, USA Emirates Integrated Telecommunications
Company PJSC (Du), United Arab Emirates

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 31

Pavle Avramović John Stewart, Kevin Hanley
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), UK NatWest Group, UK

Haimera Workie Hoda Al Khzaimi

Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), New York University Abu Dhabi, UAE
USA
Bryan Ware
Gabriel de Alba LookingGlass Cyber Solutions, USA
Frontera Energy, Canada
Mohammed Zumla
Terril Frantz Ofgem, UK
Harrisburg University, USA
Ali El Kaafarani
Bruce Schneier PQShield, UK
Harvard Kennedy School of Government, USA
Rebecca Krauthamer
Naveen Kumar Malik Quantum Thought, USA
HCL Technologies, UK
Stacey Jeffery
Kirk Bresniker QuSoft, Netherlands
Hewlett Packard Enterprise, USA
Ibrahim Almosallam, Sara Alghunaim
Duncan Jones, Nidhi Sharma Saudi Information Technology Company,
Honeywell, UK Saudi Arabia

Anand Autar Mike Wilkes

ING Group, Netherlands SecurityScorecard, USA

James Cemmell Ana Predojevic

Inmarsat Global, UK Stockholm University, Sweden

Reena Dayal Maya Bundt

Institute of Electrical and SwissRe, Switzerland
Electronics Engineers (IEEE), India
Bob Blakley
William Dixon Team8, USA
Istari Globalm, UK
Rainer Muller
Roger A. Grimes Technische Universität Braunschweig, Germany
KnowBe4, USA
Salvador Venegas-Andraca
Tommaso Gagliardoni Tecnologico de Monterrey, Mexico
Kudelski Security, Switzerland
Marcos Allende Lopez
Hanna Helin The Inter-American Development Bank, Japan
London Stock Exchange Group, UK
Jacob Sherson
John Beric, Paul Trueman University of Aarhus, Denmark
Mastercard, UK
Gabrijela Dreo Rodosek
Juhani Eronen University of the German Federal
Ministry of Transport and Armed Forces (Bundeswehr München), Germany
Communications of Finland, Finland
Mark Barwinski
Damien Pang UBS, Switzerland
Monetary Authority of Singapore, Singapore
Arunima Sarkar, Grigory Shutko
Roland Fejfar World Economic Forum
Morgan Stanley & Co, USA
The Forum also wishes to acknowledge
Carl J. Williams contributions from Alexey Bocharnikov and
National Institute of Standards Piers Clinton-Tarestad from EY, as well as Scott
and Technology (NIST), USA Alexander and David Shiu from Arqit.

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 32

 Glossary
The table below provides definitions of the most-used terms throughout this document for reference.

The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) specifies a FIPS-approved cryptographic algorithm that can
be used to protect electronic data. The AES algorithm is a symmetric block cipher that can encrypt
AES
(encipher) and decrypt (decipher) information. AES256 represents the 256-bit version, while AES128
the 128-bit version.

Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d’information – the government agency responsible
ANSSI
for cybersecurity issues in France.

Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) – the German Federal Office
BSI
for Information Security

The ability of a system to be able to rapidly switch between cryptographic algorithms, cryptographic
Crypto-agile primitives and other encryption mechanisms without the rest of the system’s infrastructure being
significantly affected by these changes.

Cryptographically
Quantum computers that are capable of actually attacking real-world cryptographic systems that
relevant quantum
would be unfeasible to attack with a normal computer.
computer

CSE Communications Security Establishment – Canada’s national cryptology agency.

ENISA The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity – an agency of the EU.

A quantum mechanical phenomenon in which the quantum states of two or more objects have to be
Entanglement
described with reference to each other, even though the individual objects may be spatially separated.

Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) documents define rules, regulations and standards for
FIPS many aspects of the handling of information by computers and people. They apply to all United States
government employees and personnel, including members of the armed forces.

Information theoretic A cryptosystem is considered to have information-theoretic security if the system is secure
security against adversaries with unlimited computing resources and time.­

NCSC The National Cyber Security Centre of the United Kingdom.

The National Security Agency is a national-level intelligence agency of the United States Department
NSA
of Defense, under the authority of the Director of National Intelligence.

The demonstration of a quantum computer that can carry out tasks that are not possible or practical
Quantum supremacy
with a traditional (classical) computer.

A public-key algorithm that is used for key establishment and the generation and verification of
RSA
digital signatures.

Superposition The ability of a quantum system to be in multiple states at the same time until it is measured.

Y2Q Year to Quantum, the moment when quantum computers can mount attacks on current cryptography.

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 33

 Endnotes
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https://qureca.com/overview-on-quantum-initiatives-worldwide-update-mid-2021/.
2. Temkin, Marina, “Investors bet on the technologically unproven field of quantum computing”, PitchBook, 13 September
2021, https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/quantum-computing-venture-capital-funding.
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4. Tett, Gillian, “Encryptogeddon is coming for us all”, FT Magazine, 1 June 2022,
https://www.ft.com/content/a8204a7d-2922-4944-bdff-5449a8f3aee9.
5. Arute, Frank et al., “Quantum supremacy using a programmable superconducting processor”, Nature, 23 October 2019,
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-019-1666-5.
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May 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/05/04/executive-order-on-enhancing-the-
national-quantum-initiative-advisory-committee/.
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Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems”, The White House, US Government, 4 May 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/statements-releases/2022/05/04/national-security-memorandum-on-promoting-united-states-leadership-in-quantum-
computing-while-mitigating-risks-to-vulnerable-cryptographic-systems/.
10. World Economic Forum, Quantum Computing Governance Principles, January 2022,
https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Quantum_Computing_2022.pdf.
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https://www.weforum.org/communities/gfc-on-cybersecurity.
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https://globalriskinstitute.org/publications/2021-quantum-threat-timeline-report/.
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no. 5, pp. 38-41, September/October 2018, doi: 10.1109/MSP.2018.3761723.
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AVS Quantum Science, 25 January 2022, https://avs.scitation.org/doi/10.1116/5.0073075.
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cryptography-standardization/evaluation-criteria/security-(evaluation-criteria).
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https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Cybersecurity_Outlook_2022.pdf.
18. “Quantum computers and the Bitcoin blockchain”, Deloitte, https://www2.deloitte.com/nl/nl/pages/innovatie/artikelen/
quantum-computers-and-the-bitcoin-blockchain.html.
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https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Future_Council_on_Quantum_Computing.pdf.
20. “NIST Announces First Four Quantum-Resistant Cryptographic Algorithms”, NIST, 5 July 2022,
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21. Arute, Frank et al., “Quantum supremacy using a programmable superconducting processor”, Nature, 23 October 2019,
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quantum-computers-and-the-bitcoin-blockchain.html.

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy 34

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