Aziz Nasafi (Lloyd Ridgeon)

'AZĪZ NASAFĪ
CURZON SUFI SERIES

Series editor: Ian Richard Netton
Professor of Arabic and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Leeds
The Curzon Sufi Series attempts to provide short introductions to a variety

of facets of the subject, which are
accessible both to the general reader and
the student and scholar in the field. Each book wil be either a
synthesis of
existing knowledge or a distinct contributor to, and extension of, knowledge
of the particular
topic. The two majoi under-lying principles of the Series
are sound scholarship anc readability.
BEYOND FAITH AND INFIDELITY
The Sufi Poetry and Teachings of Mahmud Shabistari
Leonard Lewisohn
AL-HALLAJ
Herbert W. Mason
RUZBIHAN BAQLI
Mysticism and the Rhetoric of Sainthood in Persian Sufism
Carl W. Ernst
ABDULLAH ANSARI OF HERAT
An Early Sufi Master
A.G. Ravan Farhadi

PERSIAN SUFI POETRY
An Introduction to the Mysticaql Use of Classical Persian Poetry
J.T.P. de Bruijn
THE CONCEPT OF SAINTHOOD IN EARLY ISLAMIC MYSTICISM
Bernd Radtke and John O'Kane

SUHRAWARDI AND THE SCHOOL OF ILLUMINATION
Mehdi Amin Razavi

‘AZĪZ NASAFĪ
Lloyd V. J.
Ridgeon
First Published in 1998
by Curzon Press
15 The Quadrant, Richmond
Surrey, TW9 1BP
© 1998 Lloyd V. J. Ridgeon
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or

reproduced or utilised in any form or by any
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ISBN 0-7007-1013-2 (Hbk)
ISBN 0-7007-1014-0 (Pbk)

For Evie, Barbara and Fiona
I am as My servant imagines Me. I am with him when he thinks of Me. If he thinks of Me
inwardly, I think of him
inwardly; if he mentions Me in company, I mention him in a superior
company. If a man approaches Me by a foot,
I shall approach him by a yard; if he approaches Me
by a yard, I shall approach him by a furlong. If he comes
to Me walking, I shall go to him
running.
Hadīth, see W. Graham, Divine Word and Prophetic Word in Early Islam (The Hague: Mouton,
1977), p. 130.
Contents
Introduction
1 Life, Times and Works of 'Azīz
Nasafī
I. The Life and Times of 'Azīz Nasafī

II. Nasafī's Works
2 Ontology
I. 'Azīz Nasafī's Six Ontological Faces

II. Nasafī and Imagination
III. Nasafī and Neoplatonic Ontology
3 Epistemology
I. Attaining Knowledge
II. The Convergence of Hellenistic and Islamic
Epistemological
Thought
III. Mystical Knowledge
4 The Sufi Journey
I. Felicity, the Goal of Sufism

II. The Sufi Path
5 Visionary Experience and Unity with

God
I. Types of Vision and Mystical Experience

II. The Vision of God
III. Spiritual Perfection and Creation
6 The Perfection of Man
I. The Spiritual Ascent

II. The Superiority of Friendship Over Prophecy
III. The Superiority of Prophecy Over Friendship
IV. The Friends as Heirs of the Prophets
V. Perfection and its Political Significance
Conclusion
Appendix
Bibliography
Koranic and Ḥadīth Index
Subject Index
Cover
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication Page
Contents
Introduction
1 Life, Times and Works of 'Azīz
Nasafī
I. The Life and Times of 'Azīz

Nasafī
II. Nasafī's Works
2 Ontology
I. 'Azīz Nasafī's Six Ontological

Faces
II. Nasafī and Imagination
III. Nasafī and Neoplatonic
Ontology
3 Epistemology
I. Attaining Knowledge
II. The Convergence of
Hellenistic and Islamic
Epistemological
Thought
III. Mystical Knowledge
4 The Sufi Journey
I. Felicity, the Goal of Sufism

II. The Sufi Path
5 Visionary Experience and

Unity with God
I. Types of Vision and Mystical

Experience
II. The Vision of God
III. Spiritual Perfection and
Creation
6 The Perfection of Man
I. The Spiritual Ascent

II. The Superiority of Friendship
Over Prophecy
III. The Superiority of Prophecy
Over Friendship
IV. The Friends as Heirs of the
Prophets
V. Perfection and its Political
Significance
Conclusion
Appendix
Bibliography
Subject Index
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Guide
Cover
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication Page
Contents
Introduction
Start of Content
Appendix
Bibliography
Subject Index
Introduction
If Sufism in its beginnings had been an "outspoken elitist form of
religion,"1 then it had matured by the middle of the
twelfth century by
means of the establishment of orders in to a mass movement which had
penetrated all sections
of society in the Middle East and North Africa and
had made great inroads into Central Asia and India. The
thirteenth century
was indeed a vibrant age for Sufism and one cannot speak of a uniform
version of Islamic
mysticism because its manifestations differed in terms of
form and understanding. The myriad forms were
exemplified in the
voluminous speculative thought of Ibn 'Arabī (1165-1240), the poetic
subtleties of Jalāl
al-Dīn Rumī (d. 1273) and the manuals interpreting
visions of light by Najm al-Dīn Kubrā (d. 1221). With regard
to the
understanding of "reality", one need only look at the various interpretations
of existence
offered by 'Azīz Nasafī (see chapter two).2 Despite the
diversity in form and
understanding, these manifestations of Sufism shared
the fundamental goal of seeking God through devotion and
service which
could lead to an intimate and private relationship with the Absolute based
on love. One mystic of
this period was 'Azīz Nasafī, who was born in
Central Asia and gathered a circle of followers in Bukhārā and
various
locations in Iran. His works are of great interest because they contain
descriptions of the different
Islamic world views of the age and by a careful
analysis of their contents it is possible to piece together
Nasafī's own
particular mystical perspective which has a striking resemblence to those of
Ibn 'Arabī and
Najm al-Dīn Kubrī.
There have been many scholarly works on individual Sufis of the
medieval era, however, Nasafī has attracted very
little attention among
contemporary researchers. This is quite surprising since Nasafī was one of
the greatest
Sufi masters of his time and composed several major works that
are distinctive for their clarity and simplicity
in explaining the Sufi path.
Although Nasafī has been over looked in the modern day and
age, he was
the subject of academic interest in the West in earlier centuries. In 1665, a
Turkish version of
Nasafī's Maqṣad-i aqṣā along with a Latin translation
was published3 and this was followed in 1821 by F. Tholuck
who discussed
Nasafī in his handbook entitled "The Pantheistic Theosophy of the
Persians."4 The first English work on Nasafī
appeared in 1867 when Palmer
paraphrased the Maqṣad-i aqṣa under the title Oriental
Mysticism5 and this
book has been reprinted several times since then. In the middle of the
twentieth century there were several
excellent studies related to Nasafī.
Fritz Meier's German articles were the first to concentrate upon
Nasafī's
ideas and writings6 while M. Molé edited two of Nasafī's treatises entitled
"The
Perfect Man" (al-Insān alkāmil) and "The Waystations of the
Travellers" (Manāzil
al-sā'īrīn).7 Molé also included a fifty-seven page
introduction in French in which he discussed some of
the themes in Nasafī's
theosophy as well as continuing Meier's investigation into manuscripts of
Nasafī's works.
Since Molé's studies in the early 1960s, western scholars have only made
brief references to Nasafī as an
interpreter of Ibn 'Arabī8 and this does not
do justice to one of the greatest shaykhs of
thirteenth century Central Asia
and Iran. Recently, several articles about Nasafī's thought and life have
been
published. Of particular interest is Landolt's study which offers an
alternative focus on Nasafī from
that presented in this work.9 During the
course of my own research on Nasafī, several articles have
been published
which have been adapted and included within this work.10
One point that will become clear to the reader is that this book includes
many translations, some lengthy, from
Nasafī's books. The reason for this is
that it is best to let the original author speak for himself rather
than present
watered-down paraphrases which sometimes omit significant details. In
addition, the literal approach
to translating Nasafī's works has been adopted
here in an attempt to avoid the pitfalls of
"reader-friendly" interpretations
which not only overlook the nuances and technical terminology of the
original texts but also becomes lost in a fog of poetic language which may
not reflect the intention of the
original author.
This book is a result of several years of research undertaken at various
universities in England, the United
States of America and Japan while I was
Ph.D. student. During this period, I was lucky to receive assistance from
numerous scholars whose recommendations and comments shaped the
course of my studies, and this work would
not have been completed without
their help. Firstly, I should express my gratitude to
Professor A. Matsumoto
of Eichi University in Japan, who not only read through Nasafī's al-lnsān
al-kāmil with me while I was studying at the International University of
Japan for my M.A., but has continued
to take an interest in my research in
this field. My study of Nasafī's texts lead me to the State University
of New
York at Stony Brook from October 1994 to May 1995, where Prof. W.
Chittick kindly read through
Nasafī's Kitāb-i tanzīl with me (in manuscript
form). In addition, Prof. Chittick consented to review
an early draft of the
first section of chapter two, and he unstintingly
drew my attention to many
of the facets of the wujūdī interpretation of Sufism which would otherwise
have
been omitted.
In England, my understanding of Nasafī's theosophy was nurtured under
the guidance of Dr. L. Lewisohn who
clarified numerous problems related
to Sufi terminology and belief. Always unselfish with his time, Dr.
Lewisohn
looked at several pieces of this work and suggested various ways
to improve it. Another great debt is to Prof.
Netton who listened patiently to
my ideas and plans for three years. Not only did he provide numerous
contacts
and give me adequate academic freedom to pursue my studies on
Nasafī, but he also was an infinite source of
motivation.
I would also like to express my gratitude to all the members of the
Imanari family in Muikarnachi in Japan where
I enjoyed their hospitality
for several lengthy periods of time during which I continued my studies on
Nasafī in
a comfortable and tranquil environment. I would also like to
mention my good friend, Vargu Shankar Ajay whose
sense of humour,
support and insights on a variety of topics contributed to the development
of my research.
This piece of research would never have materialised had it not been for
the considerable financial assistance
that I received from the British
Academy and the British Institute of Persian Studies.
Finally I would like to express my thanks to my parents who have
encouraged my research from the very start. They
have never lacked in
understanding or sympathy and their presence has always been the
necessary support behind
all others.
Notes
1 A. Schimmel, "Sufism and the Islamic
Tradition," Mysticism and Religious Traditions, edited
S. Katz (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1983), p. 137.
2 For different kinds of Sufism,
see H. Landolt, "Two Types of Mystical Thought in Muslim
Iran," Muslim World, Vol. 68 (1978).
3n A. Mueller, Excerpta Manuscript! Cujusdam
Turcici (Coloniae Brandenburgicae: 1665).
4 F.A.G. Tholuck, Ssufismus Sive Tbeosophia Persarum
Pantheistic;/ (Berlin: 1821).
5 E.H. Palmer, Oriental Mysticism: a Treatise on
Sufiistic and Unitarian Theosophy of the
Persians (London: 1867; second edition, 1938).
6 See "Das Problem der Natur im Esoterischen Monismus
des Islams," Eranos-Jahrbucb 14
(1946), and "Die Schriften des 'Azīz-i Nasafī,"
Wiener Zeitscbrift für die Kunde des
Morganlandes 52 (1953). The first of these has been translated into
English, see "The
Problem of Nature in the Esoteric Monism of Islam," Spirit and Nature: Papers
from the
Eranos Yearbook, ed. J. Campbell ( New York: 1954).
7 Nasafī, Kitāb al-Insān al-kāmil, ed. M. Molé
(Tehran-Paris: Institut Franco-Iranien, 1962).
This work also includes Nasafī's Manāzil
alsā'īrīn. Nasafī's al-Insān al-kāmil has
subsequently been translated into European
languages several times. The first of these was
Isabelle de Gastines's French rendition entitled Le
Livre de I'Homme Parfait (Paris: Fayard,
1984). My own English version was called The Perfect
Man (Niigata, Japan: The Institute of
Middle Eastern Studies, 1992). There also exists an unpublished
translation by W. Thackston,
which I saw during a research trip to the United States in 1995. Both S.H. Nasr
and W.
Chittick showed Thackston's work to me.
8 For example, James Morris, "Ibn 'Arabī and his
interpreters," Journal of the American Oriental
Society 106 (1986), pp. 745-51. Also W. Chittick,
"Rūmī and wahdat al-wujūd," The Heritage
of Rūmī, eds A. Banani and G. Sabagh (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994). See
also S. Murata's passages on Nasafī in her Tao of Islam: A
Sourcebook on Gender
Relationships in Islamic Thought (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992). L. Lewisohn has also
focused
upon Nasafī, although not merely as an interpreter of Ibn 'Arabī, see Beyond Faith and
Infidelity (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1995), pp 219-228.
9 H. Landolt, "Le Paradoxe De La "Face De
Dieu": 'Azīz-e Nasafī (VIIe XIIIe) Et La
"Monisme
Ésoterique" De L'Islam," Studia Iranica, 25, 1996, pp. 163-192.
10 L. Ridgeon, "The Life and Times of 'Azīz
Nasafī," Sufi: A Journal of Sufism. XXII (1994): 31-
35. '"Azīz Nasafī and Visionary
Experience," Sufi: A Journal of Sufism. XXIV, (1995): 22-28.
"The Felicitous Life in
Sufism," Sufi: A' Journal of Sufism., XXVIII, (1996): 30-35. '"Azīz
Nasafī's Six Ontological Faces," Iran, 1996, pp. 85-99.
1
The Life, Times and Works of ‘Azīz

Nasafī
I. The Life and Times

of ‘Azīz Nasafī
'Azīz ibn Muhammad al-Nasafī was born m the beginning of the thirteenth
century in Nasaf, a town that was
situated some four days travelling
distance from Bukhārā.1 This was the era for seeking knowledge, and the
city of Bukhārā was the centre of
learning for it had achieved the reputation
of being one of the great cities not only of the region, but of the
Islamic
world. Juwaynī, a contemporary historian, described Bukhārā as ". . . the
cupola of Islam and is in
those regions like unto the City of Peace. Its
environs are adorned with the brightness of the light of doctors
and jurists
and its surroundings embellished with the rarest of high attainments. Since
ancient times it has in
every age been the place of assembly of the great
savants of every religion. Now the derivation of Bukhārā is
from 'bukhar'
which in the language of the Magians signifies centre of learning."2
Whether Nasafī was in Nasaf or Bukhārā
or even in Khwarazm among the
circle of Najm al-Dīn Kubrā in 1220 when the Mongols appeared is not
known, but since his date of birth probably occurred around 1200,3 he
would certainly have been old enough
and aware of the events that were to
follow.
In 1220, the security and civilised environment of Central Asia and Iran
was shattered. One contemporary
historian commented: "Who would find it
easy to describe the ruin of Islam and the Muslims? If anyone were
to say
that at no time since the creation of man by the great God had the world
experienced anything like it, he
would only be telling the truth."4 In
February 1220, the Mongol hordes descended upon Bukhārā, and from the
pulpit
of the Friday mosque, Chingiz Khān declared: "O people! Know that
you have committed great sins and that
great ones among you have
committed these sins. If you ask me what proof I have for these
words, I say
it is because I am the punishment of God. If you had not committed great
sins God would not have
sent a punishment like me upon you."5 One
survivor of the destruction described what had happened: "They came,
they
sapped, they burned, they slew, they plundered, they departed."6 Juwaynī
believed that Bukhārā had escaped lightly, Chingiz Khān
being satisfied
with slaughter and looting only once, but not going to the extreme of a
general
massacre.7
Having captured the major cities of Transoxania, Chingiz Khān rested
during the summer just outside of Nasafī's birthplace on the plains of Nasaf.
His forces then proceeded to conquer all the major
cities including
Khwarazm which was taken in 1221. Najm al-Dīn Kubrā refused to flee the
advancing Mongol armies
and was killed in the vain defence of the city.
Those cities that surrendered escaped with little damage, but
those which
resisted suffered a terrible retribution. The case of Nishapur is perhaps the
most
horrific, for the command was given to destroy the town completely
and kill all life including cats and
dogs.8 A daughter of Chingiz
Khān had
lost her husband during a preliminary skirmish at Nishapur, and once she
entered the town with her
escort, she had all the survivors slain (save four
hundred artisans who were valued for their crafts, and who
were carried off
to Turkestan). They severed the heads from the slain and proceeded to
construct three huge
mountains of skulls; one for men, another for women,
and one for the children.9 It was estimated that 1,747,000 people were
killed in
the massacre at Nishapur,10 and
although this is an exaggeration, at
least one can begin to see the proportion of the destruction and terror that
the Mongol invasion left in its wake.
Chingiz Khān's hordes were diverted by other issues and departed from
the Middle East, however, the Mongols
returned to Transoxania in 1254
under Hulegu. Hulegu Khān was the younger brother of Kubilai Khān and
he entered
Central Asia and Iran to crush the Ismā'īlīs. Having achieved
this, he advanced to Baghdād, the capital of
the decaying Abbasid
Caliphate. The city was sacked and looted and the Caliph was taken
prisoner but his
ambassadors warned Hulegu that should the deputy of
God's messenger be killed, ". . . the whole world
will be disorganised, the
Sun will hide its face, the rain will cease to fall and the plants will no longer
grow." In addition, they predicted that ". . . if Hulegu spills the blood of the
Caliph on the ground,
he and his infidel Mongols will be swallowed up by
the earth." Describing the Mongols' predicament, the
Muslims said "the
accursed Hulegu feared that if he let the Caliph live, the Muslims
would
rise up in revolt, and that if he slew him and his blood was spilled on the
ground, there would be an
earthquake."11 Hulegu
settled the matter by
having the Caliph rolled up in a carpet and trampled to death.
The second Mongol invasion in fact turned into an occupation, Hulegu
being the first of the Il-Khān dynasty. Of
course this had important
consequences for Muslims since Chingiz Khān and the Mongols had no
special respect for
Islam (indeed, during the sacking of Bukhārā, the
Mongols had used Koranic stands in the Friday Mosque as mangers
for
their horses, and worse still for devout Muslims was that leaves of the
Koran were trodden underfoot). Yet
the Mongols were generally tolerant of
all religions, and Chingiz Khān had decreed the freedom of religion:
"Kubilai pursued the traditional Mongol policy of toleration for all creeds,
whose priests, imams and bonzes
continued to be exempt from taxation, and
he allowed but two partial exceptions, by suppressing the literature of
Taoists and banning the propaganda of the Muslims,"12 and this policy was
generally followed by subsequent rulers. However, the
establishment of all
religions on a level par with Islam, coupled with the murder of the Caliph,
must have thrown
Muslims into paroxysms of fear that the end of the world
was drawing nigh. It was the first time that Muslims
were to suffer the
indignity of sharing the same status as Christians and Jews which also
meant that non-Muslims
were no longer obliged to pay the jizya tax.
Moreover, Muslims must have felt greater
indignation and humiliation since
their religion was reduced by the Mongols to the same degree as
"idol-
worshipping" Buddhism and Shamanism. The Mongol rulers
themselves
embraced a mixture of Buddhism and Shamanism, for example, at Hulegu's
death, several beautiful
young women were chosen as "his bed fellows" for
the journey to the next world which may have been an
old Mongol religious
custom.13
Abaqa (Hulegu's son and second Il-Khān) "followed the path of
the
Buddhists"14 and at the
same time remained attached to native Mongol
beliefs, as he is known to have enjoyed the company of a magician
named
Baraq.15
Shaman influence remained under the fourth Il-Khān, Arghun
(1284-91), who practised an exorcism of purification
by fire which involved
walking by two fires while those around him recited incantations and
sprinkled
water.16 It was also suggested
by some Mongol advisors to the Il-
Khān Oljeitu (1304-1316) that he undertake this ceremony
(although it is
not known if it was performed). In fact Arghun combined Shamanism with
his
interest in Buddhism, for it is known that he had priests brought from
India to conduct Buddhist ceremonies. An
interesting account by the famed
Kubrāwī Sufi, 'Alā' al-Dawla Simnānī (d. 1336) reveals the nature of
religious interaction during Arghun's reign. Simnānī was a member of the
Mongol court but had a vision which
made him embrace Sufism. After
attempting an escape from the court, he was captured and brought back by
the
Mongols to the city of Sultaniyya. "There, he [Arghun] had assembled
Buddhist priests from India, Kashmir,
Tibet and Ighur, along with the
ascetics and the religious leaders of the idolaters around him, to engage in
disputation with me. So I discussed and disputed with them. But God
Almighty lent me strength, and I was able to
refute all of them, and to
disgrace and humiliate them."17 Arghun was delighted and begged Simnānī
to stay with him, permitting him to
remain in his dervish clothing.
Nevertheless, the true extent of Buddhist influence cannot be evaluated,
although
as Bausani has commented, "Iran must have been full of Buddhist
temples – we hear of them only when they
were destroyed in 1295-6."18
One interesting point concerning religion under the Mongols is their
favourable attitude towards Nestorian
Christians. This position may well
have been a result of the political dynamics of the time, for Hulegu suffered
a defeat at the hands of the Mamluks at 'Ayn Jalut in 1260, and
subsequently the Il-Khāns
found themselves facing enemies on several
fronts; the Mamluks to the west, the Golden Horde in
the north and the
Chagatai Mongols in the east. Therefore the well-disposed attitude towards
Christianity on the
half of the Il-Khāns may have been directed at the
Byzantine Emperor who was a rival of the Mamluks in the
Mediterranean.
The extent to which Christianity had penetrated into the Il-Khān court is
illustrated by the fact
that both Hulegu and his son Aqaba had Christian
wives (Aqaba's wife being none less than the daughter of the
Byzantine
Emperor). Indeed, a Christian named Rabban Sauma19 was Aqaba's envoy
to Rome and at the Vatican he claimed that many Mongols
had converted to
Christianity. Rabban Sauma's disciple, named Mark, became the supreme
head of all Nestorians
in Asia (under the protection of Abaqa) and later he
was to baptise Arghun's son as Nicholas (in honour of
Pope Nicholas IV). It
is also during this period that the Gospels were translated in to Persian,
but
the extent to which the Sufis and Muslims were aware of Christian doctrine
is unclear. Although some mystics
including Nasafī quoted passages which
bear striking resemblance to those in the Gospels,20 these may have
been
little more than idioms that were popular at the time.
The displacement of Islam as the official religion of Iran and central Asia
lasted until the reign of the Il-Khān
Teguder, (1282— 1284) who converted
to Islam and adopted the name Ahmad. Although his reign was
brief and
this changing of religion did little to affect the lot of the Muslim, it is
perhaps indicative of the
influence that Islam, the belief of the populace,
was having upon the Il-Khān court. Islam finally regained its
predominant
position in the region when the Il-Khān Ghazan (1295-1304) accepted
Islam. His conversion is of
particular interest because the ceremony was
performed by Ṣadr al-Dīn Ibrāhīm Ḥammūya (1246-1322) who was the son
of Sa'd al-Dīn Ḥammūya (Nasafī's Sufi master). In addition, it appears that
Ghazan was initiated into
Sufism in this ceremony.21
Ironically, the religious policy of the early Il-Khāns may have contributed
to the strengthening of Islam, in
particular of Sufism, in the whole region of
Central Asia and Iran. Fear of the Mongols and the difficulties of
life
subsequent to the Mongol invasions may have directed people towards hope
in the next world and not in this
world. Such a perspective is so pervasive in
Nasafī's works:
Oh dervish! Know for sure that we are travellers and certainly we
pass the time hour by hour. If there is wealth
it will pass, and if there is
affliction it will pass. If you have wealth do not put your trust in it
because it
is unclear what will happen in the next hour. If you have
affliction, do not be excessively sad because it is not
clear what will
occur in the next hour. You should try not to cause harm to anyone and
as far as possible you
should try to bring comfort.22
Sufism provided a relief for the general Islamic populace, and in all
probability, many individuals found solace
in meetings at the khānaqāh,
and in dhikr and samā' gatherings. Whole
communities were affiliated to
particular Sufi shaykhs: "At the beginning of the thirties of the thirteenth
century, the majority of the population in Balkh were murids (followers) of
Shaykh
Bahā' al-Dīn Walad."23
This factor, aided by the Mongol tolerance
of religion may help explain why Sufism flourished during the Il-Khān
period, to which the mystical works of 'Azīz Nasafī, Sa'd al-Dīn Ḥammūya
(d. 1252), Najm al-Dīn Rāzī (d.
1256), Sayf al-Dīn Bākharzī (d. 1261), 'Alā'
al-Dawla Simnānī and Awḥād al-Dīn Balyānī (d. 1288) all
testify.
Moreover, the region of Central Asia and Iran under the Il-Khān's was still
free and open enough to
receive the intellectual and spiritual inheritance of
great mystics such as Ibn
'Arabī24 and Jalāl al-Dīn
Rūmī who lived outside
of the Mongol regions.
Aside from the religious policies of the Mongols, life in Central Asia and
Iran was affected in a whole number of
ways. Mongol influence was felt
predominantly in the north, for Abaqa had fixed the capital at
Tabrīz.25
Concerning the
influence of the Mongols in the north, one scholar
commented "under the system set up by Hulegu and his
immediate
successors, Mongol rule was direct only in Khurasan and elsewhere in
northern Iran, except in Gīlān and
in parts of Iraq. Fārs, Kirmān and
Shabankara, with Hurmūz and Qais on the Persian Gulf in the south,
Luristān in
the west and Hirāt in the east, [were] all contained within the
Mongol framework under the native ruling
families, who suffered little
interference and in some cases outlasted the Il-Khāns."26 By all accounts,
the Mongols in the
north were rapacious in extorting and appropriating
everything and anything from the native peoples who had
survived. Finding
any source of income must have been difficult enough, and as a result of the
destruction of two
invasions it was estimated that in 1295, five out of every
ten houses in the sacked cities of Iran were
uninhabited.27 Tax collecting
was arbitrary and the Mongols imposed new, more severe taxes upon the
native population. For example, the
"tamgha" was a tax of 10% of the value
of each commercial transaction which
replaced the Muslim zakat of 2.5%.28
The jizya tax was abolished for non-Muslims early in the
II-Khān period (to
be re-established by Ghazan) and was replaced with a general poll tax. In
Transoxania, the
highest rate for this tax was fifteen dinars and in 1253
when Arghun was in control of that region, he began to
levy seventy dinars
from every ten men, turning the maximum into an average.29 "By extracting
taxes greater than the people could pay, and
having them reduced to
poverty, they began to torment and afflict them. Those who tried to hide
were caught and
put to death. From those who could not pay they took
away their children."30
The Iranian economy suffered tremendous losses during the early Il-
Khān period. It has been estimated that in
their desire for wealth and to
finance their campaigns, the Mongols levied taxes twenty to thirty times
each
year: "the Mongol grandees were the principle culprits; a conquered
territory in their opinion existed only
to be mulcted, and the terror of their
name unlawfully exacted vast sums from the peasants, artisans and
merchants."31 This
resulted in the peasants abandoning their land, and nine
tenths of cultivable land went to waste.32 It has been shown that in one
region of
Fārs, 700,000 ass-loads of grain were yielded annually between
949-983, and in the
aftermath of the Mongol invasion and its consequences,
this total was reduced to 300,000 ass-loads in
1260.33
To say that Nasafī lived during the best of times and the worst of times
may not be too much of an exaggeration.
The thirteenth century was a
century of extremes; on the one hand it developed a tradition of knowledge
whose
legacy is still regarded as a treasure by millions not only in the
Middle East but all around the world, and on
the other hand it suffered the
devastation and dread of the Mongol invasions and occupation. Nasafī's life
spans the whole course of this era, for he was born in Nasaf around the very
beginning of the thirteenth century
and died towards its end. This is clear
because in Maqṣad-i aqṣā, Nasafī commented that he was eighty
years of
age, and this work was compiled some time before 1281.34
Of his youth and early adulthood nothing at all is known, indeed, only
fragments of information concerning his
life emerge from his works. The
first of these is his association with an affiliate of the Kubrāwī order,
Shaykh
Sa'd al-Dīn Ḥammūya, who Nasafī served in Khurāsān.35 Nasafī
also received guidance from an un-named shaykh in Bukhārā36, and if this
shaykh was Ḥammūya, then
Nasafī's association with him must have
occurred some time during the 1240s and before 1252 when Ḥammūya
died. (Prior to this period, Ḥammūya was seeking knowledge further west
in the Islamic world).37 One famous Sufi writer, the great
Persian poet and
theosopher Jāmī (1414-1492) believed this un-nmaed shaykh was indeed
Ḥammūya.38 A recent work, however, has suggested
that this un-named
shaykh (referred to by Nasafī as "Our shaykh") could have been Sayf al-Dīn
Bākharzī.39
That Nasafī enjoyed companionship with Ḥammūya during the 1240s
means that we are still left with a huge gap of
perhaps forty years, from
Nasafī's birth until his meeting with Ḥammūya. A portion of this may have
been
taken up with Nasafī's study of medicine, which lasted several years,40
and although it is not clear when he commenced this study, one can
speculate that it was before he encountered Ḥammūya, for Nasafī was
probably too old in the 1240s to commence
such a difficult field of learning.
A knowledge of medicine was one that was, however, fairly typical of the
Sufis of the Kubrāwī order for Najm al-Dīn Kubrā and his associates Farīd
al-Dīn 'Aṭṭār (d. 1220) and Majd
al-Dīn Baghdādī (d. 1219) all spent some
time in this occupation.41
Aside from enjoying the companionship of Sa'd al-Dīn Ḥammūya, Nasafī
may have been spiritually inspired by a
son of one of the commanders of
Sultan Jalāl al-Dīn of Bukhārā.42 In a sixteenth century text, Nasafī
is called
a lover ('āshiq) and intoxicated (mast) with reference to this youth. This
was a
relatively common phenomena in medieval Persian Sufism, for one
finds similar accounts of Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī who
witnessed beauty in the
character traits of Shams-i Tabrīzī (d. 1248), Salāḥ al-Dīn Zarkūb (d. 1258)
and Ḥusām
al-Dīn Chalābī (d. 1284).43
By 1260, Nasafī had acquired his own circle of novices who wished to
learn from him. His first work appears to be
Kitāb-i tanzīl which was
composed at the request of his followers. The first six chapters were written
in
Nasaf. By 1261 Nasafī had moved back to Bukhārā44 where he continued
his work on Kitāb-i tanzīl. From this period until
1273 nothing is known,
perhaps Nasafī continued to teach his theosophy to his circle of dervishes.
However his
life style was to change dramatically following the events of
22 January 1273:
In that year the infidel armies came to Transoxania and they
destroyed the province, and at that time this
helpless one was in the city
of Bukhārā with the community of dervishes. At dawn on Friday, at the
beginning of
the month of Rajab, we left the city – or should I say, that
they forced us to make an exit – and we passed the
waters of Khurāsān
and arrived at the cities of Khurāsān. From that time onwards, each day
we were in one
location and each night at another, having no security
anywhere.45
The infidel armies belonged to the Il-Khān Abaqa, whose rivalry and
dispute with the Chagatai
Mongols was a result of the division of Chingiz
Khān's empire, Bukhārā was situated on the border between the
Il-Khān and
Chagatai areas, and friction between the two sides frequently lead to
demonstrations of force. The
attack of 1273 was brutal and Nasafī was most
likely very lucky to escape with his life. The religious schools
and books
were burned and as many as 50, 000 people were killed. It was said that no
living creature appeared in
Bukhārā for seven years after the massacre.46
It was impossible for Nasafī to return to Bukhārā so he made his way
westwards into northern Iran to visit the
tomb of his shaykh, Sa'd al-Dīn
Ḥammūya, which was situated in Bahrabād, near Juwayn.47 Perhaps the Il-
Khān control here was
strong, because Nasafī moved southwards, and he
composed works at Kirmān,48 Shirāz,49 Isfahān50 and Abarqūh.51 The date
of Nasafī's death is not known, but M. Molé has mentioned one of
Nasafī's
manuscripts which bears the date of 1291. However, his death could have
happened anytime between
1281 and 1300. It was on the night of 27 August
1281 that Nasafī was in Abarqūh and had a
dream in which the Prophet
Muḥammad told him not to reveal the remaining chapters of Kashf al-
ḥaqā'iq
until seven hundred years had elapsed since the hegira (i.e. 1300
A.D.). Nasafī had already composed the first
seven of ten chapters for the
dervishes, and in all remaining manuscripts of this work, only these seven
chapters
appear. This suggests that Nasafī passed away before the deadline
in the year 1300.
Thus, very little is known about Nasafī's personal life, which perhaps is
not so surprising since his works
were of a didactic nature. In his treatises,
the advice to seek knowledge is predominant, and perhaps Nasafī was
speaking of himself when he commented:
The People of Gnosis . . . have spent many years in the service of Shaykhs in religious effort
and spiritual
discipline, and they have actualised knowledge of form and knowledge of meaning,
and they supposed that they
had reached and recognised God. Then after seventy years they
understood that they knew nothing, and everything
which they had understood was all
imagination and fancy; and they saw themselves as ignorant, incapable and
helpless.52
The People of Gnosis . . . have spent periods among the 'Ulamā', periods among the
Philosophers, periods among the Transmigrationists, periods among the Sufis and
periods among
the People of Unity. Each group said, "The truth is with us and falsity is
with the others." The
People of Gnosis thought to themselves that if each one opposes the others then they
cannot all be
true because the truth is only one. So they knew for sure that the truth was not with any of
them.53
One last factor which appears in Nasafī's works is fear and the danger in
expressing the esoteric dimension
of Islam. This aspect of Nasafī's life is
evident in his dream in which the Prophet warned him not to reveal
the
remaining chapters of Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq:
Know that in 1281 I was in the province of Fārs in the city of
Abarqūh. It was midnight on the 27 August and this
helpless one had sat
down and placed a lamp nearby and was writing something. Then sleep
overcame me and I saw my
father enter by the door. I stood up and
greeted him, and he returned the greeting and said, "The Prophet
Muḥammad is sitting with Shaykh Abu 'Abdullah Khafīf and Shaykh
Sa'd al-Dīn Ḥammūya in the Friday Mosque
of Abarqūh and they are
waiting for you." I went with my father to the mosque. I saw the
Prophet sitting
with them and I greeted them all and they returned the
greeting and each one of them embraced me. I sat down and
the Prophet
said, "Today Shaykh Sa'd al-Dīn Ḥammūya has spoken much about you
and he is worried and
concerned about your circumstances. He said that
all the meanings that he assembled in four hundred books
'Azīz has
assembled in ten chapters and although he attempted to write them in an
obscure and secretive fashion, 'Azīz has attempted to explain clearly and
he fears that some bad fortune or
harm comes to you."54
Another indication of the conditions that prevailed when Nasafī was

compiling his works is found in Maqṣad-i
aqṣā:
Now I myself do not give my own opinions so that I cannot be
accused of infidelity; I report and I say that the
People of Unity explain
in this way and the Sufis say in that way. O dervish, accept the
discourse of this
helpless one and recognise yourself so that you can
recognise God. Understand all of these discourses which I
have set out,
and know for sure where the Truth lies.55
Nasafī's reluctance to reveal his own views is not surprising given the
turbulent times in which he lived. In
the generation after Nasafī, the mere
possession of Ibn 'Arabī's works was prohibited in Egypt, and such works
were confiscated and burnt if found. Moreover, the 'Ulamā'
confirmed that
any person advocating the ideas of Ibn 'Arabī would be executed.56
II. NASAFĪ'S
WORKS57
There are many features in Nasafī's treatises which enable scholars to
identify his works (although one
cannot exclude the possibility of someone
else using his name and copying his style and content). The first
distinctive
aspect in Nasafī's works is the simple but lucid, non-verbose Persian style.
His predominant aim
is that the reader understands his message and in order
to achieve this Nasafī presents each topic from several
perspectives, adding
at the end of each explanation "I know you have not fully understood so I
will explain
in another way." This non-condescending style, his direct
manner of calling the reader "Dervish"
or "Dear Friend," the sections of
"advice" at the end of each chapter (in some of his works)
in which he
offers comfort and encouragement to the Sufi novice and his humility and
self rebuking nature endear
Nasafī to the reader and one is soon drawn into
a warm, intimate relationship with him. The fact that Nasafī used
Persian
(except for Arabic quotations from the Koran, ḥadīth and other sayings) is
also of some importance
because he can be regarded as among the first of
Ibn 'Arabī's commentators who wrote in Persian, thus
spreading the
message among the non-Arabic speaking populations of Central Asia and
Iran.
Secondly, Nasafī's commentaries are both forthright and simple in
revealing the non-manifest (bāṭin)
dimension of Islam. He speaks directly
to his readers, advising them to pass over from the
formal dimension of
Islam to the esoteric, and indicative of this is Nasafī's dream in
which Sa'd
al-Dīn Ḥammūya states that he had written over four hundred treatises in an
obscure and secretive
fashion, whereas Nasafī has revealed all of these non-
manifest secrets in just ten chapters.
One of the most striking of all of the features in Nasafī's works is the way
in which he presents the
arguments of each group, that is, he lets each group
speak for itself. His chapters frequently begin by "The
People of the Holy
Law say that . . ." or "The Philosophers say . . ." or "The People of
Unity
say. . ." If not employing such labels, Nasafī refers to the People of the Holy
Law as the
"People of Imitation"58 and the Philosophers are called the
"People of definite proof and certain
demonstration,"59 and the
People of
Unity are the "People of Unveiling."60 The reason that Nasafl does not
reveal his own opinions are firstly that he may
have been afraid and so he
hid his own beliefs under the shelter of other groups and secondly, he was
attempting
to describe the beliefs of all the major interpretations of Islam in
an impartial manner. While it is true that
Nasafī was not the first to
undertake such a project, he was most likely the first to record the various
beliefs
in a non-partisan way. In fact his own dervishes had requested that
Nasafī compose his treatises conveying the
varying Islamic beliefs "without
prejudice and without dissimulation and without making them great and
without belittling them."61 Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) had studied all
the different Islamic beliefs in
his attempt to realise the Truth and the results
of his intellectual and spiritual investigations are set out in
his books in a
systematic fashion, describing the beliefs of the 'Ulamā Philosophers and
Sufis.
However, his preference for the Sufi interpretation of Islam caused
him to disparage those beliefs which were at
variance with his own, and he
describes the Philosophers as "heretics and irreligious men."62 Nasafī's own
portrayal of the
different Islamic beliefs did not include such derogatory
remarks, and Meier's comment that Nasafī may be
considered as a
"forerunner of modern comparative religion"63 captures the essence of
Nasafī's spirit. The reality is that while
Nasafī was more sympathetic
towards the Sufis, he attempted to discover the reality and truth behind
other
beliefs. This is neatly expressed by Nasafī in his explanation of
similar, but different ḥadīth.
In one ḥadīth it is stated that "the first thing God created was intelligence," and in
another, "the
first thing God created was the Pen," and in
another, "the first thing God created was the Throne,"
and there are others like
these.64
In the Koran and ḥadīth there are many references to the First Intelligence. Know that this first
intelligence has been referred to through different attributions and viewpoints.
Oh dervish! If one thing has been named in a hundred ways, in truth there is no multiplicity in
that one thing,
despite its one hundred names.65
Yet Nasafī's method of ascribing certain beliefs to particular groups does

have the disadvantage in that one
is never quite sure when that discourse
comes to an end, or whether the beliefs of the same group are carried
over
into the following discourse (which may not be attributed to any particular
group). Moreover, the difficulty
in identifying Nasafī's own beliefs has lead
to several contemporary scholars66 seeing Nasafī's own beliefs within those
which
are attributed to other groups (such as the Transmigrationists). It is
more likely that Nasafī believed that the
explanations of other groups
revealed an aspect of the truth, depending upon which station the wayfarer
had
reached.
Another distinctive point in Nasafī's works is the similarity in content,
and this reaches the extent that
there are passages which appear in different
books virtually word for word, or else the imagery is exactly the
same. One
reason for this is that Nasafī's works were all composed during the latter
part of his life, and by
that time his theosophy had matured to such a degree
that he was able to present his teachings in a systematic,
coherent manner.
There is no development from one work to the next (with the exception of
Kashf-i ṣirāt,
which presents several problems that will be highlighted
later), only the same message is presented, that is, the
unity of being and the
perfectibility of man through ascetic discipline and religious effort. So if
Nasafī had
one fundamental message, the question that must be asked is
why did he not write one large book which contained
the whole package of
his theosophy instead of writing several works which involved a lot of
repetition. The
reason may be due to Nasafī's teaching in several areas and
having different groups of followers. Thus,
Nasafī may have composed
Kitāb-i Tanzīl in Nasaf and Bukhārā at the request of the dervishes, and then
he
composed al-Insān al-kāmil on the Iranian plateau for another group of
dervishes, adding new expressions
which he thought would be understood
easily. This is not to say that his books are completely the same, because
this is not the case. For example, Manāzil al-sā'īrīn contains discussions
which are not found in
Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq or Maqṣad-i aqṣā.
Notes
1 V. Minorsky, art. "Nakhshab," Encyclopedia of Islam (Leiden, E,J. Brill), Vol VII, p. 925.
2 'Ala al-Din 'Ata al-Malik Juvaini, The History of the
World Conqueror, trans, J.A. Boyle
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958), Vol. I, p. 97-98.
3 The problems surrounding the dating of Nasafī's birth will
be discussed later in this section.
4 Ibn al-Athir, cited by C. Irving, Cross-roads of
Civilisation (London: Weidenfeld and
Nicholson, 1979), p. 123.
5 Juvaini, trans. Boyle, p. 105.
6 Ibid, p. 107.
7 Ibid, p. 96-97.
8 Ibid, p. 177.
9 Ibid, p. 178.
10 Saifi, Tarikh-nama-yi Harat, cited LP. Petroshevsky
"The Socio-Economic Conditions of Iran
under the Il-Khans," Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. V
(Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1968), p. 485.
11 A. Bausani, "Religion Under the Mongols,"
Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. V. p. 539.
12 J.J. Saunders, The History of the Mongol Conquests
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971),
p.137.
13 See J.A. Boyle, The Mongol World Empire (London:
Valorium Reprints, 1977), XXII, p. 8.
14 J.J. Sauders, op. cit., p. 130.
15 Bausani, op. cit., p. 540.
16 J.A. Boyle, "Turkish and Mongol Shamanism in the Middle
Ages," The Mongol World Empire,
p. 184.
17 See. L. Lewisohn, Beyond Faith and Infidelity, pp. 63-4.
18 A. Bausani, op. cit., p. 541.
19 Rabban Sauma is said to have given communion to King Edward I
in Bordeaux, see T. Ware,
The Orthodox Church (London: Penguin, 1987), p. 12.
20 Maqṣad-i aqṣā, in Jāmī's Ashi"at
al-lama'āt, ed. H. Rabbānī (Tehran: Kitabkhāna-yi 'Ilmīyya-
yi Hāmidī, 1973), p. 238, "One
cannot enter (lā yaliju) the Kingdom of the Heavens and earth
unless one is born again," reflects
John 3:3, "Truly, truly, I say to you, unless one is born
anew, he cannot see the Kingdom of God.
21 See C. Melville, "Padshah-i Islam: The Conversion of
Sultan Mahmud Ghazan," in C. Melville
(ed). Pembroke Papers I: Persian and Islamic Studies in Honour of
Peter Avery (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990).
22 Maqṣad-i aqṣā, p. 228-229.
23 Petrushevsky, "The Socio-Economic Conditions of Iran under
the Il-Khans," p. 509.
24 This influence can be witnessed in the works of Nasafī and
Balyānī in particular. One of
Balyānī's works was for many years attributed to Ibn 'Arabi and was published under the title
of "Whoso Knoweth Himself" (London:
Beshara Publications, 1976), although Chodkiewizc
has shown this is not a work by Ibn 'Arabī.
25 D. Morgan, The Mongols (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), p.
163.
26 D.E. Philips, The Mongols (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1969), p. 118.
27 Rashid al-Dīn, Jāmī' al-tawārīkh, cited by Boyle, p.
506.
28 Petrushevsky, op. cit., p. 506.
29 W. Barthold, Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion
(London: Luzac, 1928), p. 482.
30 Ibid, p. 482, cited from Kirakos.
31 J.J. Saunders, op. cit., p. 133.
32 D. Morgan, op. cit., p. 165.
33 Petrushevsky, op. cit., p. 490-91.
34 Maqṣad-i aqṣā, p. 255.
35 Manāzil al-sā'īrīn, p. 316. Sa'd al-Dīn Ḥammūya
came from a very distinguished religious
family. His great-grandfather, Muḥammad Ḥammūya, was a tutor of
'Ayn al-Quḍāt
Hamadānī, see Nāmahā-yi 'Ayn al-Quḍāt Hamadānī, Vol. I, edited 'Afīf
'Ussayrāan (Tehran:
Intishārāt-i zawār, 1362/1983), pp. 62-63. 'Ayn al-Quḍāt also cites a quatrain
composed by his
tutor, see Tamhīdāt, edited 'Afīf 'Ussayrān (Tehran: Kitābkhāna-yi Manūchihrī,
1373/1994), p.
258. Sa'd al-Dīn's grand-uncle also attained a position of fame since he was appointed
the
inspector of all the Syrain khānaqāhs. See J. S. Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam
(Oxford
University Press, 1971), p. 261.
36 Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq, p. 107.
37 Sa'd al-Din Ḥammūya (1198-1252) served under Najm al-Dīn
Kubrā in Khwarazm until 1220.
At this point he fled the invading Mongols and journeyed to Egypt, Palestine and
Syria where
he became acquainted with the school surrounding Ibn 'Arabī. During the 1240's he returned
to Iran and Central Asia.
38 In his Nafaḥāt al-uns, edited M. 'Abidī (Tehran:
Mū'assasa-yi iṭilā'āt, 1370/1991), p. 431, Jāmī
cites an episode (probably taken from one of
Nasafī's treatises) in which he describes
Ḥammūya's spirit making an ascent lasting thirteen days.
During this period, Ḥammūya's
body was like that of dead person. Nasafī offered the very same description
about "the
shaykh" in Zubdat al-ḥaqā'iq, p. 58 and about "our shaykh" in
al-Insān al-kāmil," p. 108.
39 H. Landolt, "Le Paradoxe De La "Face De Dieu":
'Azīz-e Nasafī (VIIe/ XIIIe Siecle) Et Le
"Monisme
Ésoterique" De L'Islam," Studia Iranica, 25, 1996, p. 168.
40 Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq, ed. Aḥmad Mahdawī Dāmghānī
(Tehran: Bungāh-i tarjurna wa nashr-i kitāb,
1965), p. 125.
41 A.H. Zarrīnkūb, justuj, dar taṣawwuf-i Irān (Tehran:
Amir Kabir, 1983), p. 160.
42 See the Majālis al-'ushshāq of Kamāl al-Dīn Ḥusayn
Kāzargāhī, (Bodleian Library, MS
Ouseley, Add. 24, f. 76b).
43 W. Chittick, "Rūmī and the Mawlawiyyah," Islamic
Spirituality II, edited S. H. Nasr, p. 110-
111.
44 Kitāb-i tanzīl, John Rylands
Library, Manchester University Library, C112, fol. 71b, lines 12-
13, and al-lnsān al-kāmil, p, 80.
46 Rashid al-Dīn Faḍl-Allah, Jāmī' al-tawarīkh, cited
by Haqq-wardī Nāṣirī in his introduction to
Nasafī's Zubdat al-ḥaqā'iq, p. 7.
47 Kitāb-i tanzīl, fol. 82b, line 1, and al-lnsān
al-kāmil, p. 80.
48 al-lnsān al-kāmil, p. 80.
49 Ibid, p. 80.
50 Ibid, p. 153.
51 Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq, p. 4-5.
52 Manāzil al-sā'īrīn, p. 436.
53 Ibid, p. 437.
56 Lewisohn, op. cit., p. 116.
57 Several western scholars have paid considerable attention to
Nasafī's manuscripts without
commenting upon their content. However, their efforts have made the task of
contemporary
researchers that much easier in terms of access to these manuscripts. In particular, the efforts
of M. Mole should be mentioned for he gathered microfilms of manuscripts from libraries in
Iran and Turkey.
These are now stored in Paris in the Centre National de la Recherche
Scientifique: Institut de Recherche et
d'Histoire des Textes, Section Arabe.
On Nasafī's works see Molé, "Die Schriften des 'Azīz Nasafī," Wiener 7eitschrift für die
Kunde
des Morgenlandes 52 (1953), and his introduction to Nasafī's al-lnsān al-kāmil, pp. 28-57.
See also F. Coslovi, "Liste des manuscits Arabe et Persans microfilms (Fond Mole) de
L'Insitut de
Recherche et d'Histoire des Textes," Studia Iranica, 7 (1978), pp. 117-155, and
"Second
Liste de Microfilms des Manuscrits Arabes et Persans du Fond Molé," Studia
Iranica 14/2 (1985), pp.
245-254. See also Jürgen Paul, "A Propos de Quelques Microfilms
du 'Fond Molé." Studia
Iranica, 18 (1989), pp. 243-245.
59 Ibid, p. 249.
60 Ibid, p. 250.
62 W.M. Watt, The Faith and Practice of al-Ghazālī,
"al-munqidh min al-ḍalāl," (London: G.
Allen and Unwin, 1953), p. 32.
63 F. Meier, "The Problem of Nature in the Esoteric Monism of
Islam," p. 150.
65 Ibid, p. 225.
66 See Meier, "The Problem of Nature in the Esoteric Monism
of Islam," p. 182, and J. Morris,
"Ibn 'Arabī and His Interpreters part II: Influences and
Interpretations," p. 749.
2
Ontology
I. ‘AZĪZ NASAFĪ'S
SIX ONTOLOGICAL FACES
(Wherever you turn there is the face of God)1
Abū Hāmid Ghazālīs acceptance of Sufism as a genuine expression of

Islamic belief and his composition of
treatises in the field of speculative
Sufism2 ('irfān-i naẓarī) in the language of the Koran and philosophers may
be
regarded as something of a watershed in the history of Sufism. After
Ghazālī, numerous Sufi texts were composed
in a similar style by affiliates
of Sufi orders that had established roots in the Muslim world stretching from
Andalusia to Central Asia. The movement of explaining Sufism in the lingua
franca of the
"intelligentsia" of the day perhaps reached a pinnacle in the
profound and voluminous theosophy of Ibn
'Arabī, whose writings required
and deserved much study and meditation by learned scholars. For the
majority
of the Islamic populace, his message was delivered in a more
simplified and summarised form by interpreters. Some
scholars have seen
'Azīz Nasafī's treatises as "popularising the teachings of Ibn
'Arabī"3 and
thus the
Greatest Shaykh's message penetrated into areas such as Iran and
Central Asia. This section is an attempt to
summarise Nasafī's ontological
teachings and in so doing, show the similarities between his ideas and Ibn
'Arabī's vast corpus of teachings. Nasafī's audience were Persian speakers
and were probably
beginners 011 the Sufi path, so his treatises provided his
dervishes with plenty to contemplate and served as a
basis from which they
could advance to the texts of the Greatest Shaykh (Ibn 'Arabī) himself.
In this section, Nasafī's ontology is discussed by focusing upon one
chapter from the treatise Kitāb-i
tanzīl (the Book of the Descent). It is hoped
that this method covers all the main points on the one hand,
and also that the
reader will catch something of the flow, directness and simplicity of
the
original text (which are distinctive characteristics of Nasafī's works).
INCOMPARABILITY AND SIMILARITY
There has been a tendency by scholars to explain Ibn 'Arabī's theosophy in

the simple term "unity of
existence" (wahdat al-wujūd) and to label the
world view of the wujūdī school pantheistic or
monist.4 A more suitable way
to
characterise this theosophy is not unity of existence (a term which Ibn
'Arabī did not use)5 but He / not He. This axiom neatly
encapsulates the
Islamic teaching of God's incomparability (tanzīh) and similarity (tashbīb).
'Azīz Nasafīs works should also be considered in the same light. The idea of
incomparability is expressed in
the Koran that "Nothing is like Him,"6 and in
the ḥadīth that "none knows God but
God,"7 and "reflect upon all things but
reflect not upon God's essence."8 Similarity is also found in the Islamic
tradition,
perhaps the best example being the famous ḥadīth that "God made
Adam in His own
form."9 Adam is of course
the archetypal human being, so
each person's essence in fact is a mirror of God's essence.
Sufism tended to emphasise the tashbīh relationship between God and
man, although this should always be
considered in the light of tanzīh. The
first chapter of Nasafī's Kitāb-i tanzīl is quite
instructive in this respect
because the beginning of the work stresses the tanzīh position while the
remaining sections reflect the tashbīh dimension of existence.
From a tanzīh perspective, Nasafl comments upon a ḥadīth frequently
discussed by Sufis that says
"He who knows himself knows his Lord."
O dear friend! The pure essence and Holy Face of the Truth is so great
that an individual's intelligence
cannot encompass Him; rather, His
exalted self is too high for another person to discover Him as He really
is.
Each one of the Prophets and Friends became aware of God Most
High in accordance with their own preparedness and
station, and each
one of them told the people in accordance with the preparedness and
station of the listeners.
What they knew compared to what they did not
know is a drop in the ocean, and what they said compared to what
they
understood is also a drop in the ocean. No-one understands his self in the
way it is, and he cannot
understand. The extremity of man's knowledge
is that point where he knows that he cannot know God as God
really is.
So according to the knowledge one has of one's soul, one also has
knowledge of God.10
Nasafī then proceeds to say that even the most intelligent of philosophers,
and even the Prophets and Friends, cannot understand God, each believing
their own
knowledge to be the ultimate vision of God. It is impossible to
reach God's essence, which is infinite and
beyond man's sense perception
and intelligence ('aql):
Just as the seekers and the students who are counted among the People of Thought and
Reasoning do not like or
accept the discourse which their intelligence does not attain to, and just as
they judge it correct to deny one
another's discourse, because there are ranks (darajāt) of
intelligence and because the wisdom
(ḥikmat) in each thing is infinite, so also the wayfarers and
spiritual warriors who are accounted as
the People of Unveiling and Contemplation do not like or
accept the spiritual station (maqām) which
their view does not reach. They judge it correct to deny
one another's station, because there are ranks in
unveiling and [God's] self-disclosure (tajallī) is
infinite. So in whatever station a man is, it is
necessary that he makes this prayer his litany: "My
Lord! Increase me in knowledge,"11 because if man could live for a
thousand years, and in this
thousand years he is [busy] in searching and advancing (taraqqī), he would
discover and
understand something every day which he had not discovered or understood the day before. . .
O dear friend! If someone fancies that he has understood whatever can be understood and has
discovered whatever
can be found, this fancy is his idol and this wretched person is an idol
worshipper. The reality of an idol is
that it keeps a person busy with itself and it becomes an
obstacle in his searching and advance.12
Yet it is necessary to make an attempt to understand oneself (and in so doing,

God's existence) for "He
who knows himself knows his Lord." This is a
difficult task to undertake and understand as Nasafī himself
comments:
A person may ask, "How can God's essence which is non-delimited
and infinite be considered as together
with jabarūt, Malakūt and
Mulk?"13 The Sufis have asked many questions about this and the
answer to these
questions is extremely difficult and hard. But it is
necessary to give an answer. If you want to know that it is
difficult, I will
give an indication: Understanding the existence of non-delimitation and
infinity, and
understanding the existence of something else with that such
that the non-delimited and infinite possess limits
and boundaries,
direction, division, separation, breaking apart and coming together is
extremely difficult and
hard.14
The meaning behind such remarks by Nasafī is that man should reach the
essence of God as far as it is possible,
that is, he should reach the essence of
God as seen through tashbīh. Thus whenever Nasafī speaks of reaching
God's essence, one should read with two eyes (to borrow an analogy from
Ibn
'Arabī),15 that is, with
one eye of tashbīh and with one eye of tanzīh.
Having given a tanzīh warning in the opening pages of Kitāb-i tanzīl,
Nasafī then devotes the rest
of the chapter to the tashbīh dimension. It is
typical that the tashbīh section takes up about
ninety percent of the whole
chapter, for Sufism emphasises the love between God and man, that is, the
dimension
which can be known. As 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib is reported to have said,
"I only worship a Lord I
see."16 This
tashbīh position is explained by Nasafī
from six different points of view, that is, six ontological
perspectives, all of
which are the spiritual stations (maqām) of the Friends (awliyā), who are
those closest to God.
NASAFĪ'S SIX FACES
In the Sufi tradition, a spiritual station (maqām) describes a relationship

between the wayfarer and God.
This station is acquired (kasbī), based upon
the wayfarer's own spiritual effort, and the knowledge
that he actualises in a
particular station remains with him even if he progresses on to another
station.
Spiritual stations are often discussed in the Sufi manuals along with
ḥāl, or a spiritual state, which is
a bestowal by God upon the wayfarer which
takes place in a particular station. Nasafī does not employ the term
ḥāl in
Kitāb-i tanzīl, but uses waqt. (present moment) a technical word
discussed
by Sufis prior to Nasafī, including Hujwīrī17 and al-Ghazālī.18 The latter two
classified the mystical experience into three stages; the first
stage is waqt,
the second is ḥāl and the third is stability (tamkīn). It is not possible to
investigate the differences between these three here, suffice to say that the
waqt is the lowest stage and
stability is the highest stage.
Acquisition of the station by the wayfarer and God's bestowal of the waqt
is referred to by Nasafī at
the beginning of each of the stations:
O dear friend! There is a station for the wayfarer, and in that station
there is a waqt. When he reaches
that station and enters into it, and when
that waqt reaches him . . .19
The waqt is based upon the ḥadītb which states: "I have a waqt with God
when no angel
brought nigh or Prophet sent embraces me."20 This waqt has
been interpreted by some as Muhammad's ascent,
referred to in the Koran:
"Glory be to Him, who carried His servant by night from the
Holy Mosque
to the Farthest Mosque."21 According to Islamic tradition, Muḥammad rose
from his bed and journeyed with
Gabriel from Arabia to Jerusalem, and then
upwards through all the heavens until he reached the final boundary of
the
heavens. At this point, Muḥammad had to proceed alone to witness God, for
Gabriel said that if he went
further towards God he would be burnt.
The waqt is not permanent (unlike the station and the knowledge
associated with it); it can last less than
one hour and may last for longer than
ten days.22 In another work, Nasafī mentions moments experienced by
various Sufis:
Our shaykh stated, "My spirit spent thirteen days in the heavens and
then returned to my body. And during
those thirteen days my body was
like that of a dead man and had no concern for anything. Others who
were present
said that my body had been in such a way for thirteen
days." And another dear one stated, "My spirit
remained there for twenty
days and then came back to the body." And another good companion
said, "My
spirit spent forty days and then returned to the body." He
remembered everything that he saw in those forty
days.23
Although the identity of the Friends within these six stations is unclear in
the majority of cases, by comparing
the contents of these stations with the
discourses that appear in other works by Nasafī, one can conclude that
the
beliefs of the 'Ulamā', Philosophers, Transmigrationists
and the People of
Unity are all mentioned. This shows Nasafī at his best, prepared to endorse
the beliefs of groups other than the Sufis if he sees truth in them. Yet,
typically, he does not claim that any
one group represents his own beliefs.
The person with real knowledge witnesses the truth (through experience) in
all of the stations:
At the end of journeying, each wayfarer is in one of these stations, and
one of these stations has become his aim
and he remains there. There are
few wayfarers who are informed of all six stations, and until the
wayfarer
discovers the information of all six stations and sees the
correctness (ṣalāḥ) and corruption of each one
(not through imitation
(taqlīd) and supposition (gumān) but through unveiling and
contemplation) he
will neither reach the end point of the journey nor be
informed of the extremity of the journey nor discern the
truth from the
false nor recognise God.24
This idea that the wayfarer has to recognise the truth in all expressions of
belief is perhaps the fundamental
element in Nasafī's theosophy, for it
reveals the reality of "no repetition in God's
selfdisclosure" (lā takrār fī 'l-
tajallī) which is the basis of the allembracing nature of Sufism. This idea is
discussed in detail within one of the six stations, and so
it is not necessary to
develop it any further at this point.
The First Station
The first station is the shortest of all the stations, perhaps an indication that
Nasafī did not regard it as a
profound ontologicai explanation of the
relationship between God and man. God is explained as the essential
existent
(mawjūd li-dhātihi) and He is also termed the Jabarūt. This stands in
opposition to the
world ('ālam) which is an existent through other than itself
(mawjūd li-ghayrihi) and comprises
Mulk and Malakūt. Mulk is the world of
sensory existents (mawjūdāt-i
ḥissī) and Malakūt is the world of intelligible
existents (mawjūdāt-i 'aqlī). God, or
Jabarūt, is real and eternal existence,
whereas the world (Mulk and Malakūt) have
metaphorical and created
existence. The world is created by God from non-existence through His
attributes, that
is, through His knowledge, desire and power. These three
attributes of knowledge, desire and power were commonly
discussed by the
theologians in the process of creation; in order to create something, God
must have knowledge of
it; then He must have the desire to create that thing;
thirdly, He must have the power to bring it in to
existence. Nasafī then
follows the standard explanation of the theologians that there are seven
attributes of
essence (ṣifāt-i dhāt); the seven are life, knowledge, desire,
power, speaking, hearing and seeing. Of
course, God's attributes are infinite,
but apart from the foregoing seven, they are all attributes of acts.
In this station, creation is seen as a process whereby God makes
something existent from non-existence, in other
words, it is an interpretation
reflecting the idea of creatio ex nihilo. This is the
meaning behind making
something exist (hast gardānīd) from nonexistence (nīstī) and this position
is
reflected in a small sentence "God was and nothing else was,"25 which is in
fact a
ḥadīth.26 Creation from
nothing is typically taken by Nasafī as the
belief of the People of the Holy Law (ahl-i sharī'at),
(who are called the
'Ulamā' in other works):
Know that the wise men have had differences of opinion about the possibility of non-existence
becoming
existence, and existence becoming non-existence. The 'Ulamā' and Fuqahā' believe that
it is possible for non-existence to become existence and for existence to become nonexistence.
This is because
the world was non-existent and God Most High made the world existent and will
make it
non-existent when He desires.
The Philosophers and People of Unity believe that it is not possible for
existence to become
non-existence and it is not possible for nonexistence to become existence.27
The distinction made between God and the world (that is, between Jabarūt
on the one hand, and Mulk
and Malakūt on the other) represents a tanzīh
position. This is counter-balanced by a
tashbīh explanation that God is with
everything, for "it is not possible for a leaf to move on a tree
without His
knowledge, desire and power."28
God's tanzīh-tashbīb relationship with the world is described in the
following way:
The God of the world is not inside nor outside of the world, nor
contiguous (muttaṣil) with or
discontiguous (munfaṣil) from the world,
and not in any direction of the directions of the world or in
time or place
because these are attributes of bodies, and the God of the world is not a
body or
bodily.29
Although this is the simplest explanation of all the six stations (in terms of
an ontological explanation of
existence), Nasafī comments that the wayfarer
in this station is able to experience the waqt with God:
In this station, when the wayfarer shows perseverance and persistence
in the task and does not cease in ascetic
discipline and spiritual effort,
then Mulk and Malakūt (which are God's creation) become
concealed
and forgotten all at once when this ivaqt predominates over him. This is
called the station of
annihilation (maqām-ī fanā'). When the existence of
the wayfarer also becomes concealed from and
forgotten by the wayfarer
and he does not see or know anything else except God, this station is
called
annihilation of annihilation (fanā'-i fanā').30
The Second Station
The first station takes up only twenty-nine lines, whereas the second station
comprises a hundred and
thirty-four; in fact, it is longer than any other of the
stations. Obviously, in this station there are
discussions which must have
been important to Nasafī.
Whereas in the first station God's essence and attributes are Jabarūt and
other than God is
Mulk and Malakūt, in the second station God is other than
all three worlds. Mulk and
Malakūt are explained in the same way as the
preceding station, but Jabarūt
is an expression for the first substance
(jaw/har-i awwal), yet God is with all three worlds through His
essence and
His attributes. The "withness" (ma'iyyat) of God with the three worlds is
described in terms of the human spirit in the human body. The word ma'iyyat
is an allusion to the
Koranic verse, "God is with you wherever you are."31
Thus although man is separated from God by the first substance, the
tashbīb
position is maintained through God's "withness."
One of the major discussions in this station is the nature of Jabarūt (or
first substance), and here the
relationship between the first and second
stations becomes clear. The first station states a position of
creatio ex nihilo,
whereas the second station suggests a kind of eternity for
Jabarūt:
The first substance came from the world of potentiality ('ālam-i
quwwat) to the world of actuality
('ālam-i fi'l) through one command in
the blink of an eye, "And Our command is but one, as
the twinkling of an
eye."32,33
This eternal potentiality is attributed likewise to Mulk and Malakūt, for the
first substance is like a seed and all the substances of Mulk and Malakūt are
existent in the first
substance. To use Nasafī's words, everything that "was, is
and will be, was potentially existent"
in the first substance. However, while
these substances are existent in the first substance, they are not
distinct
(mumtāz) from one another; and for this reason, the first substance is also
called the
undifferentiated world ('ālam-i ijmāl). In this state, the potential
existents of Mulk and
Malakūt are called non-existent things (ashyā'-i
ma'dūm) since they have the possibility of
existence in contrast to God's real
existence.
Both the content and language that Nasafī uses in this discussion reflect an
intermingling of Koranic terminology
with the kind of philosophical
concepts that were discussed by the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā (Brethren of Purity) and
Ibn
Sīnā (known to the west as Avicenna) among others. Indeed, in this
discussion on Jabarūt, one finds
numerous parallels with Ibn 'Arabī's
theosophy, and in other works Nasafī explicitly refers to the
similarity of his
position with Ibn 'Arabī's, the only difference being one of terminology:
All potential existents are things, and they are all the objects of God's
knowledge (ma'lūm-i
khudā). Possible non-existence is one thing and
impossible non-existence is another. Possible non-existence
is a thing,
but impossible non-existence is not a thing. And Ibn 'Arabī calls these
things the immutable
entities (a'yān-i thābita); Shaykh Sa'd al-Dīn
Ḥammūya calls these things
the immutable things (ashyā'-i thābitā)-, and
this helpless one [i.e. Nasafī] calls them the immutable
realities (ḥaqā'iq-
i thābita). They are called immutable (thābit) because they never change
their own state, and they never will.34
These possible non-existent things plead with God to have existence

bestowed upon them, they say to God "in
the tongue of [their] state," (bā
zabān-i ḥāl) "We have such a preparedness
(isti'dād) and such a task can be
performed through us."35 The similarity of this passage with chapter sixty-
six of Ibn
'Arabī's al-Futuḥāt al-makkiyya is unmistakable,36 and the tongue
of their own state is a Persian translation of Ibn
'Arabl's Arabic expression
lisān al-ḥāl.37
If God bestows existence upon these non-existent things by the command
"Be!" then they are manifested
in the differentiated world ('ālam-ī tafṣīl)
(which is Mulk and Malakūt) in exactly the
way in which they spoke with
God. They do whatever they said they would, and this introduces the second
major
point in the second spiritual station.
God bestows existence upon the non-existent things, but He is not the
creator of their actions:
Everything and everyone has whatever he has from himself and has
brought it with himself, nobody has placed it
there. This is because only
the command to become existent is from God Most High. Everything
and everyone became
existent in such a way that they were in the world
of potentiality. So God Most High is All-Knowing
('ālim} and AllAware
(khabīr), and his knowledge and awareness follow its object ('ilm
tābi'
ma'lūm).38
This last phrase, again, leads back to Ibn 'Arabī,39 and the significance of
God's knowledge following its object is that God
does not make the existents
act, which "justifies" His rewarding and punishing of creatures. As Nasafī
reminds us, "His command, when He desires a thing, is to say Be! and it is,"
40 He does not say to the non-existent thing, "Be a
wrong doer!" or "Be God-
fearing!"
God Most High commanded the recital of prayers. Recital of prayers
is the action of the one who recites the
prayer, and the one who recites
the prayer brings into existence (mūjid) his own actions. If this were not
so, why would the performer of good actions deserve reward and praise
and the performer of bad actions deserve
punishment and blame?
Potential existents are the ones who bring into existence their own
actions and everything
and everyone came to the world of actuality
through the command of God and from its own action, just as it was in
the world of potentiality, and the good ones brought goodness with them
and the wretched
ones brought wretchedness with them. "A happy man
is he who is happy in his mother's womb and a wretched
man is he who
was wretched in his mother's womb."41'42
Although God does not create the acts of the things directly, He knows what
they will do once they have existence
bestowed upon them. For God not to
know this would mean there is a deficiency in Him. Therefore, Nasafī
explains
God's knowledge as the third main component in the second station.
He divides it into two kinds since He is
All-Knowing and All-Aware.43
The
All-Knowing refers to God's existentiating command, for He knows the
universal condition of each thing:
When a farmer wants to plant, he takes the seed of the fruit he wants
to pick. When he looks at the seed, he
"knows" of the existence of the
crop before its existence and he recognises the result of the crop. He
knows that the barley seed will in fact produce barley and the wheat seed
will in fact produce wheat if the earth
is wholesome and the air is
compatible and there is water on appropriate occasions and no calamity
befalls. This
knowledge of the farmer is absolute (muṭlaq) but it is not
complete. Although the farmer knows this, he
does not know how many
of the wheat seeds that he sowed will rise from the earth and how many
will not rise. He
does not know how many will reach their full term
(ajal-i musammā) and how many will become non-existent
before the
full term through the term of the divine decree (ajal-i qaḍā'). He does not
know the cause
of the non-existence of that which becomes non-existent
through the decreed term of life, perhaps because of
warmth or cold, too
little water or too much water, being eaten by animals or intrusion by
people and so on. But
when he scatters the seed on the ground, and some
rise and others do not, some reach perfection and a calamity
befalls
others before perfection, then all of this becomes known by the farmer,
and this is the farmer's
experiential knowledge ('ilm-i dhawq).44
As Nasafī comments, this is another way of saying that knowledge follows

its object. In the first case, the
All-Knowing follows the known because the
seeds tell the farmer that they have such a preparedness for
manifesting what
is particular to them. In the second, the AllAware follows the known,
because it is only after
the development of the plant that he knows what
happens to it. As Nasafī says, this relates to the knowledge of
universals and
particulars:
So the farmer is "knowing" and "aware." He is "knowing" of the crop before its
existence and he
is "aware" of the existence of the crop after its existence.
He is "knowing" of the universals
(kulliyyāt) before the existence of the
universals and he is "aware" of the particulars after the
existence of the
particulars.
In the same way, God Most High is knowing and aware. He is knowing of the existence of
Mulk, Malakūt and Jabarūt before their existence and He is aware of the existence of
Mulk,
Malakūt and Jabarūt after their existence. He is knowing of the universals before their
existence
and He is aware of the particulars after their existence.45
Nasafī then returns to the statement made in the beginning of the passage
that God's essence and attributes
are with everything. This begs the question
that if God's attribute of awareness is with everything, then why
is He aware
of a thing only after it has performed the action? If He is aware of it only
after the action, then
His awareness appears to be defective, which
contradicts the idea that his attributes are perfect. Nasafī
recognises this
problem and he comments that the example of the farmer is only an
approximation46 to help us understand the real
situation. Although he does
not make the point in this work, in al-Insān al-kāmil Nasafī says that time is
not a consideration for God but only for humans.47 There is no dimension of
time in God's world, so He is All-Aware of
everything all at once, even
"before" something takes place.
God's attributes of All-Knowing and All-Awareness are identical to His
essence, because there is nothing in
true existence except His essence.
However, the essence has been called different names by people from
various
perspectives. Nasafī returns to the seven main attributes which are
discussed in the first station:
So God Most High is All-Knowing in essence, a desirer in essence,
powerful in essence, a hearer in essence, a
seer in essence, speaker in
essence and command in essence.48
These attributes of essence are then divided into two groups which are the
basis of the second station. There are
God's existentiating command and His
knowledge:
His desire, power and speaking are expressions for His command; and
His hearing, sight and life are expressions
for His knowledge. So there
are not more than two attributes, and there are not more than three things
from
God's side and there are also three things from the side of potential
existents.49
From God's side there is the essence (which is infinite and encompasses
everything) and two attributes
(command and knowledge); from the side of
the potential existents there is
"thingness" (shay'iyyat), acceptance (qabūl)
and action (fi'l).50 "Thingness" is the essence of
the thing, acceptance is the
receptivity of the thing of God's command to be, and action is what the thing
does when existence is bestowed upon it. Nasafī's portrayal of such a dual
triplicity is very reminiscent of
that found in Ibn 'Arabī's Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikām. Ibn
'Arabī described God's triplicity in terms
of Essence, Desire and Speaking
(reflecting the main components necessary for creation).51 The triplicity of
the created thing is its own
thingness, its hearing of God's command to be
and its obedience to the command, Be!
Having described die theory behind this station, Nasafī then explains how
the wayfarer perceives the relationship
of man and God. This is done with
reference to the ḥadīth qudsī, servant draws near to Me through nothing
I
love more than that which I have made obligatory for him. My servant never
ceases drawing near to Me through
supererogatory works until I love him.
Then, when I love him, I am his hearing through which he hears, his sight
through which he sees, his hand through which he grasps, and his foot
through which he walks."52 From this ḥadīth, Muslims
distinguish two kinds
of acts of worship; the first is the obligatory acts which include
praying,
fasting and the pilgrimage to Mecca, and the second is the supererogatory
which are acts of worship in
excess of obligatory worship.
Nasafī's interpretation resembles that of Ibn 'Arabī;53 Ibn 'Arabī says that
the servant is the hearing and seeing of God in
obligatory acts of worship
and Nasafī expresses this in terms of everything at the level of self of self,
hearing
of hearing and sight of sight as being God's discourse.54 It is God's
discourse because He looks at the cosmos through man. If He were
to look at
the cosmos without an intermediary then the cosmos would be "burnt away
by the glories of His
face." Since the obligatory acts are commanded by
God, they are regarded by Ibn 'Arabī as more eminent
than supererogatory
acts of worship in which the servant has a choice concerning their
performance. (Of course, this does not mean that one should not perform the
supererogatory acts. The obligatory
acts are sufficient for the majority of
believers but the supererogatory acts draw each individual even closer to
God.) Concerning the supererogatory acts, Ibn 'Arabī states that God is the
servant's hearing and seeing
and therefore says "I,"55 and Nasafī comments
that everything at the level of self, hearing and sight is
the discourse of God's
messenger (rasūl-i khudā).56 The distinction between the two sets of
acts is
very intricate and complex. One way to contemplate the obligatory and
supererogatory acts is through the
relationship between annihilation (fanā')
and subsistence (baqā'). Through the obligatory
acts, man annihilates his
"self," and therefore it is God performing the acts through man. From this
point, the annihilated man subsists in God and so he is able to perform the
supererogatory acts. Another way to
view the relationship is through tanzīh
and tashbīh. Tanzīb stresses God's mastery over His
servants through tanzīb
names, including the majestic (jalāl) and the compeller (jabbār),
and the
obligatory acts establish God's majesty and compulsion over his servant for
the latter has no free
will in the performance of such acts. Tashbīh
emphasises the similarity between man and God through
tasbbīh names,
including beauty (jamāl) and gentleness (luṭf). God and the supererogatory
acts draw the servant closer to God since he assimilates God's attributes in
the performance of those very
acts. Nasafī summarises the obligatory and
supererogatory acts of worship in the following way:
When the wayfarer shows perseverance and persistence in the task in this station and does not
cease from
ascetic discipline and spiritual effort, then the self of the self, the hearing of hearing,
the sight of sight
sees, listens and speaks in him. In whomever the self of the self, hearing of
hearing, and sight of sight sees,
listens and speaks, that person has reached God and the day of
resurrection has arrived for him. The dead
become living and rise from the graves. Although in
form such a person is in the world, in meaning he is in the
next world. Outwardly he is with the
creatures but inwardly he is with God, since the resurrection of the
spirit is different from the
resurrection of the body.57
So until this point, the wayfarer was alive through himself, heard through himself, saw through
himself and
spoke through himself. Now he is alive through God, he hears through God, sees
through God and speaks through
God, "I am his hearing, his sight and his speaking." Moreover, he
reaches a point where God hears,
God sees, God speaks and God does everything he does. "So you
did not slay them, but it was Allah Who slew
them, and you did not throw when you threw, but it
was Allah who threw."58 There is much difference between the station where
one listens through
God, sees through God and speaks through God and the station where God listens, God sees,
and
God speaks. So everything which the People of Perfection perform is all good. Although some of
their
actions appear in the form of disobedience (ma'ṣiyat), in the actual situation it is not
disobedience, rather it is identical to obedience (ṭā'at).59
The Third Station
The next station described by Nasafī draws on the Sufi tradition of regarding
everything other than God as
imagination. The imagination has been the
focus of many studies by twentieth-century scholars because it is one
of the
primary ways in which Ibn 'Arabī explains his theosophy.60 In the ninth
chapter of his Fusus al-ḥikām, Ibn 'Arabī discusses
two kinds of
imagination.61 The
first is the cosmos and the second is the individual. It is
likely that Nasafī based his third station on Ibn
'Arabī's Fuṣūs since he
follows the same two-fold classification, and not only does he reach the
same conclusion that Prophets and Friends are required to interpret the
meanings behind imagination, but he also
quotes the Fuṣūs.
The first kind of imagination is the world (which comprises Mulk,
Malakūt and
Jabarūt). The world has imaginary existence which stands in
contrast to God's real
existence:
Real existence (wujūd-i ḥaqīqī) which is the existence of God is
existence (hastī) that appears
non-existent (nīst numā). Imaginary
existence (wujūd-i khayālī) which is the existence of the
world, is
nonexistence that appears existent.62
Although the world is imagination and unreal, it can still tell us something
about the reality of God because
. . . there is not one particle of all the particles of the world which God is not with, for
imagination cannot
exist without reality, and a shadow cannot exist without essence. This
discourse will only be clear for you
through an example (mithāl).
Know that according to the philosophers (ḥukamā'), air is existence that appears
non-existent
while a mirage is non-existence that appears existent. The existence of the mirage is through the
air and the manifestation of the air is through the mirage. Air is the reality of the mirage and the
mirage is
the form of the air. You should understand God's withness with the world in the same
way as the withness of
the air with the mirage. Hence, it has been said, "All the world is
imagination in imagination and a dream
in a dream."63 This is
the meaning of "People are asleep
and when they die they wake up."64'65
In this station, when man looks at anything, he perceives the forms of the
world that are the manifest dimension
of meanings66 (as Ibn
'Arabī so often
states, this situation reflects the Koranic verse "We will show them Our signs
upon the
horizons and in themselves"67). These signs within the self
introduce the second classification of imagination, which is the faculty of
imagination within each person. Although
Nasafī does not discuss this
faculty in any detail in this chapter, he does refer to it in a later chapter
where
he explains the imagination and its functions (and his analysis leans
heavily upon the teachings of Ibn
Sīnā).68 One of man's
sources of
intelligence is the five senses which gather in the sensus communis and these
forms are then
stored in the imagination.69
The store of forms is crucial for
man to make sense of God's self-disclosure because the majority of Sufis
(including Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī) held that God's self-disclosure takes a form:
"the heart is the
antechamber of the eye: For certain everything that reaches
the heart will enter into the eye and become a
form."70 Nasafī himself
says
that God's selfdisclosure without a form is impossible (although he makes
this comment in the fifth
station).71
Since everything is imagination, or a form, it is necessary to understand
the reality behind the form:
Everything people see in a dream is all imagination. Everything
people see is imagination, so they are all in a
dream. Although they see
everything in a dream as imagination, that imagination is a denotation
(dalāla)
of reality and [people] will not reach the reality of that
imagination as long as they have not "crossed
over" ('ubūr] from it. An
interpreter (mu'abbir) is called an "interpreter"
on the basis of this, and
because of this his words are called interpretation (ta'bīr). The Friends
(awlīyā) and the Prophets are all interpreters and they interpret peoples'
dreams so that the people
can pass from supposed and imaginary
existents (mawjūdāt-i mutawahham wa mutakhayāl) and reach real
existents (mawjūdāt-i ḥaqīqī).72
Even the interpreters of dreams and their interpretations may be considered

as imagination. The difference
between them and other people is that they
have woken up from the dream and they know that everything is
imagination
(or a dream), while those who are sleeping think that their dreams are reality
since they undergo all
kinds of "sensory" and "emotional" experience as long
as they witness dreams.73 Those people who are in a dream but
think that it
is real may not wake up at all. Only at death do they awaken and by then it
may be too late. This
death is the natural death (murdan-i ṭabī'ī) whereas
those who have woken up and realised that all is
imagination die the
voluntary death (murdan-i irādī)
It is necessary to die the voluntary death before natural death in order
to awaken from sleep. This is the
meaning of "Die before you die."74'75
The Fourth Station

The whole tone of the fourth station is very much of a tashbīh nature, for
God is recognised as the whole
world, whether it is imagination or reality:76
In this station, the wayfarer knows and sees the "world," which is an
expression for Mulk, Malakūt and Jabarūt, all at once as the existence of
God
and he sees or knows no existence other than Mulk, Malakūt and
Jabarūt which are the levels of the
world.77
Existence is one. However, it is described by many attributes, since it is

manifested in many forms. Therefore
the reality of existence is its unity,
even though it has been called by many names. As Nasafī says, it may be
called God, the world,78
creature or spirit. In fact, it is best to call this
existence by the name which is closer to one's
understanding.79
Another way to express existence is through the terms substance (jawhar)
and accident
('araḍ). Substance is common for everything, for it is the
fundamental reality, however, the
distinction between things is through
accident:
. . . there is not more than one substance but there are many accidents
for this one substance; growing and not
growing, sensory and non-
sensory, rational (nāṭiq) and non-rational, Philosopher (ḥakīm) and other
than Philosopher, Prophet and other than Prophet, Friend and other than
Friend and others like these have all one
substance, and the substance of
them all is one. The distinction between them all is through accident.80
From this perspective, one can say that everything is God (kull khudā ast),81
an expression that is very reminiscent of the
"everything is He" (hama ūst),
which was employed by Sufis including Farīd al-Din
'Aṭṭār82 and Anṣārī (d.
1089).83 This phrase has also
been spoken of in the same breath as the unity
of existence (waḥdat al-wujūd) which is the doctrine
typically attributed to
Ibn 'Arabī.84
In this fourth station, the unity of God's existence is divided into two
forms; the form of essence and
attribute (dhāt wa ṣifāt) and the form of face
and name (ivajh wa ism). The form
of essence and attribute may also be
called the undifferentiated world ('ālam-i 'ijmāl) and the
level of readiness
(martaba-yi ṣalāḥiyyat). This is because in origin the substance of
everything is in
potentiality, as described in the second station, and it is
ready to perform its actions. When existence is
bestowed upon a thing,
substances and accidents may be spoken of as the face and name,
because
the things are differentiated (tafṣīl) and dispersed (tafraqa) from one another
and also
since they are at the actualised level (martaba-yi ḥāṣiliyyat). The
two forms which describe this one
substance, or God's existence, are
summarised in the three levels. Each form is one level and the two
combined
forms make the third level. So the first level is God's essence, the second
level is His face and
the combined forms are His breath (nafas).85
M. Molé has read this third level as nafs, rather than nafas. Nafs has a
variety of meanings
ranging from the self, soul, mode and aspect and Molé
preferred the word "hecceité,"86 whereas nafas means breath.
Nafas is
etymologically related to nafs since both come from the same Arabic root.
Thus both of
them appear exactly the same way when written because the
vowel signs (which would distinguish between
nafs and nafas) are not
usually written in Persian. This distinction between the two words is
important because the discussion of n.f.s. as nafas (breath) concerns the
Divine breath, which is a
major element in the Sufism of Ibn 'Arabī.87
The reason for reading n.f.s. as nafas in this particular passage appears in
another of
Nasafī's works. In Bayān-i tanzīl, Nasafī comments:
O dervish! If the essence is called the ink-pot, and if the face is called the book, then the breath
(n.f.s) which is the intermediary (wāsiṭa) must be called the pen. If the essence is called the
undifferentiated world and if the face is called the differentiated world, the breath is the world of
love.
. . .the sigh (āh) of the n.f.s. comes from the essence and the face comes from the breath
(nafas).
The face is the self-disclosure of the breath and the breath is the self-disclosure of the
essence.88
Given that Nasafī uses "sigh," it appears more likely that n.f.s. is nafas
(breath)
rather than nafs (hecceité). The sound of a sigh is heard when one
breathes out or exhales air or blows.
(This image calls to mind God's
blowing of His spirit into Adam.) The visual image of the
breath as an
intermediary also makes sense because one cannot see the breath in the
undifferentiated world, but
when God sighs or exhales, then a "cloud" of
breath becomes visible.89
In this station there are two questions that may be asked about the nature
of this unity
of existence. The first concerns the reason for the existence of
incompatible (nā-muwāfiq) forms and the
infinite differences among their
attributes, such as one who confesses and one who denies, a powerful person
and
an incapable person, a just person and a wrongdoer. The answer is that
existence
... is described by every attribute which has the possibility to be. Each
attribute is perfect in its own level,
and this perfection is its greatness.
And [existence] is manifested in every form which has the possibility to
be
and each form is perfect in its own level.90
This leads to the next problem, for if all the attributes and forms are
manifested perfectly, then is wrongdoing
a perfect attribute and is the
wrongdoer a perfect form?91 The reply to this question is linked to God's
attributes of power
(qudrat) and desire (irādat) which are perfect attributes.
The forms (i.e. the creatures) also have
these attributes within them and so
they are able to create their own actions, or in other words, they are the
cause of their own actions. (This is another way of expressing the point
made in the second station that
knowledge follows its object ('ilm tābi'
ma'lūm) and God is not responsible for peoples'
actions, He only bestows
existence upon them.) So if a form employs power at the right time, it is
called just
('ādil) and if it uses power on an inappropriate occasion, it is
called wrongdoer (ẓālim).
Nasafī repeats that if the situation were not this
way, then there would be no point in the call of the Prophets
and the
instruction of the Friends.92
The divine attributes are always manifested in the world, for although the
form may differ due to time and place,
the substance of the form is always
the same. From this perspective
... it is correct if it is said that it is we that existed, it is we that exist
and it is we that will exist. And
it is also correct if it is said that it is not
we that existed and it is not we that exist and it is not we that
will exist.
You should understand all things in the same way. If, according to you,
Moses was
the son of 'Imrān and came from Egypt and spoke Hebrew,
then Muhammad was not Moses because Muhammad was the
son of
'Abdullāh and came from Mecca and spoke Arabic. But if Moses was the
Perfect Man
according to you, then Muhammad was Moses because
Muhammad was the Perfect Man.93
Here an important term is introduced, that is, the Perfect Man.94 He is God's
deputy on earth because he is able to manifest the divine
attributes at their
appropriate time and place. Such a concept guides each individual
towards
their own perfection, but whether or not this perfection is actualised depends
to a great extent on
one's own effort. Since God's attributes always exist, it
necessarily follows that the Perfect Man who
manifests perfection is always
in the world:
If there was a time when there was Moses and Pharaoh and there was
discussion and dispute between them, then
there is always Moses and
Pharaoh and there is always discussion and dispute between them. The
difference is to
the extent that one may speak of a time for Adam and
Satan, a time for Abraham and Nimrūd, a time for Moses and Pharaoh, a
time for Muhammad and Abu Jahl, a time for Ḥusayn
and Yazīd, and a
time for Jesus and Dajjāl. If it never was the case that Moses and
Pharaoh
were, then there would never be Moses and Pharaoh, because
nothing comes to the world which was not and
everything that was, is
and will be; and everything that was not, is not and will not be.'0
The Fifth Station
There are two interrelated points in the fifth station; God's new creation ("No
indeed, but they are in uncertainty as to the new creation")96 and the non-
repetition of this new creation. Many Muslims held that this
Koranic verse
referred to the resurrection, but Ibn 'Arabī and Nasafī take it as an
indication
of the renewal of creation at every instant.
God's new creation was accepted by Ash'arī theologians and both Ibn
'Arabī and Nasafī quote the
Ash'arī axiom that "the accident does not remain
for two moments."97 However they disagree with the
Ash'arī idea that only
accidents disappear. Rather, they maintain that both substance and accident
are
continually destroyed and created again by God. In the quotation below,
Nasafī speaks of "accidents" to
refer to both substance and accidents. These
are both annihilated, while only the real substance, or the One
Entity
remains:
This wayfarer in this station says that one Entity ('ayn) is the Entity of
the world and this One
Entity ('ayn-i wāḥid), that is the Entity of the
world, is described with the attribute of unity. In
other words, it is one
thing that is the reality of the world and this one thing is described with
the attribute
of unity. All the forms of the world are the forms of the One
Entity. This One Entity, which is the Entity of the
world, always was and
always is and whatever is existent of all the forms and accidents of the
world, which are
the forms and accidents of the One Entity, becomes
non-existent in each moment and a similar (mithl) thing
becomes
existent.98
Humans cannot perceive this new creation because of both the extreme
speed of the process99 and also because the thing made
nonexistent is similar
to that which takes its place. One way of explaining how Nasafī
perceived
this idea is to say that each person is continually changing, whether in his
personality, his thoughts,
or even his physical appearance. Therefore God's
"new creation" is always unique; in other words,
His self-disclosure never
repeats itself:
It is one light which has disclosed itself in the whole world. In other
words, it is God who has been manifested
in all these forms. Whatever is
existent becomes non-existent in each moment and something similar to
that
becomes existent. If He wills, that which becomes existent in the
east in a fixed time will become existent in
the west, not in the east, and
if He wills, that which becomes existent in the west in a fixed time will
be
manifested in the east, not in the west, since it is God that becomes
manifested in the east and west. The sea
produces waves in the east,
west, south and north and the sea is one, and the waves are the forms of
the sea, or
rather they are the same as the sea. just as the sea is constantly
billowing, the light of God Most High is
continually disclosing itself.100
Nasafī offers this self-disclosure which can take place in the east and in
the next moment in the west as the
explanation for miracles (mu'jizāt),
charismatic powers (karāmāt) and the manifestation of
angels such as
Gabriel, and the story of the Queen of Sheba's throne being transported in
an
instant to Solomon's court,101 the appearance of Khiḍr and also of the
Invisible Shaykh.102 So miracles and charismatic powers
should be regarded
as the breaking of enduring habits (kharq-i 'ādat-i mustamirr) rather than the
changing of reality (qalb-i ḥaqīqat).103
God as substance never changes, but the forms or accidents of the One
Entity, that is, its self-disclosure is
always changing. In this station, Nasafī
again refers to the three levels of God to explain existence, that is,
the levels
of essence, face and breath:
God's essence, face and breath are not synonymous words (alfāẓ-i
mutarādif), for they are distinct
words (alfāẓ-i mubāyin). Considering
contradictory words is difficult since the light of God cannot be
partitioned or divided and cannot alter or change. So one's vision (naẓar)
must be extremely piercing
(tīzbīn) and far-sighted (dūrbīn) in order to
discover these meanings. Know that the wayfarer says
that the People of
Unveiling and Contemplation have three visions (naẓar) in existents: one
is towards the
existence of that thing, and one is towards the generality
('umūm) and specificity (khuṣūṣ) of
that thing; and one is towards the
whole (majmū) of that thing.104
Nasafī offers the example of water: the vision of the existence of water
reveals the essence of water; and the
existence of water in all plants reveals
the generality of water, and the plant is thus
the face of God. Water as
essence and water as face make up the breath of water. In other words, God's
light as essence, and God's light in its forms make up God's breath. So
wherever one looks,
one sees God; everything is God (kull khudā ast);
everything is He (hama ūst):
The existence of light is an expression for the essence of God because
He is independent (ghanī) of the
world, "God is independent of the
worlds."105 The generality of God's light for all things and the withness
of God's
light with each one of the world's forms is an expression for
God's face and the whole is an expression
for God's breath. For each
form to which you turn, you have turned to God's face, "wherever you
turn
there is the face of God,"106 and each one of the forms of the world
is perishing except God's face,
"everything is perishing except His
face."107
Everything man sees is a face of God, thus all beliefs express God's self-
disclosure. For this reason Sufis
witness truth in all beliefs; however, they
stress that one has to recognise the truth in all faces and not
become fixed to
only one of the faces or forms:
Whoever reaches God's face (wajh) and has not reached the essence
has become an associator of others
with God (mushrik), and whoever has
not passed on from God's face and does not reach the essence is an
associator of others with God. Whoever passes on from God's face and
reaches the essence is a Unitarian
(muwaḥḥid). So whoever worships
something worships nothing except God, and whoever turns to
something
turns to nothing except God, "wherever you turn, there is the
face of God."108 Although all the associators of others with God have
turned to God's face and worship God, they were limited (muqayyad) to
one face and turned their back
towards the other faces. Consenting to
some and denying others is not acceptable, so the Prophets called them
from the limited God to the non-delimited God and they said, "God is
one. Whatever you have turned towards,
it is all one God that you have
worshipped." The associators of others with God were surprised at this
and
they denied the words of the Prophets, but they marvelled: "What,
has he made the gods One God? This is
indeed a marvellous
thing!"109,110
From this point on, Nasafī describes the waqt of this station, the
explanation of which
differs from the other awqāt since it contains the
ecstatic utterances (shaṭḥiyyāt) of several
celebrated mystics:
When he [the wayfarer] becomes completely clean of reproachable descriptions and unpleasant
character traits
and becomes completely described and characterised with praiseworthy
descriptions and pleasant character
traits, and when he becomes translucent (shaffāf), reflective
('aks
pazīr) and glass-like (zujāji) through extreme subtleness, then the real light, which is the
essence
of God, becomes like one thing with the existence of this wayfarer, who is reflective and
glass-like. It is
like a goblet made of glass which is extremely translucent and reflective, and has
wine poured into it, a wine
which is extremely pure and fine. One cannot distinguish the goblet
from the wine or the wine from the
goblet,111 because the two
things are like one. Hence the
Prophets said, "Our spirits are our bodies and our bodies
are our spirits."112
Each cry (awāzī)
which comes from the wayfarer like "There is nothing in my cloak
except God,"113 and
"I am the
Truth,"114 is in this station.115
In truth, this station requires this, because the body of the wayfarer becomes very glass-like,
extremely
translucent and reflective through ascetic discipline and spiritual effort. It is in such a
way that the
wayfarer sees himself as light, and he cannot distinguish the light from the glass or
the glass from the light.
Whether he desires or not, a cry such as 'There is nothing in my cloak
except God" and "I am the
Truth" comes from him involuntarily That is, at the beginning of this
station, the wayfarer is still aware
of himself and he sees himself and also sees the light from
himself. This cry comes from him, "There is
nothing in my cloak except God," and "There is
nothing in existence except
God." People have called this station the station of incarnation
(maqām-i ḥulūl). At the end of
this station, the wayfarer is not aware of himself and he does not
recognise himself because he sees everything
as light and this cry comes from him, "I am the
Truth," and "Glory to Me, how great is My
majesty!" People have called this station the station of
union (maqām-ittiḥād).116
The Sixth Station
Whereas the fifth station describes the creatures as the loci of manifestation
of God, the sixth station explains
the creatures as the loci of manifestation of
God's light (maẓāhir-ī nūr-ī khudā). Nasafī is able to
use this last station to
portray existence in terms of the relationship between God, the macrocosm
(big man) (insān-i kabīr) and the microcosm (small man)
(insān-i ṣaghīr).
The world is again portrayed as a mirror, but not in the sense that it has an
imaginary
existence. God's world is a mirror in which He can witness His
beautiful names.117 It is like a soulless body or an unpolished mirror,
and
when God breathes of His spirit into the world it becomes the locus of
manifestation of His light. This
discussion is based upon the Koranic verse
in which God is speaking to the angels concerning his creation of
Adam,
"When I have fashioned him and breathed of My spirit into him, prostrate
yourselves
before him." Nasafī's explanation of this Koranic verse seems to
be based upon the first chapter of Ibn 'Arabī's Fusus al-ḥikām, for in another
work he mentions that
Ibn 'Arabī uses the word tasiwiya in this very sense:
In Ibn 'Arabī's Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikām, in the first bezel, which is the bezel of
Adam, he says that
fashioning (taswiya) is an expression for
preparedness and breathing the spirit is an expression for
receiving the
spirit.118
So He is the spirit of the world and the world is His body. The spirit ascends
in levels, and in each level it is
perfect. When the spirit reaches man, the
ascent is complete for man contains all the levels within himself. At
this
juncture, one can understand the purpose of "creation" which is referred to in
the Prophet
David's prayer, "O God! Why did you create the creatures?" He
said, "I was a
hidden treasure and I loved to be known."119
In this station, the first thing that God creates is compared to a seed, and
the body and spirit of the world are
enclosed in this seed and are not
distinguishable (mumtāz) from one another. In their own time, they are
manifested and become differentiated. This portrayal of creation is an
alternative to the Neoplatonic hierarchy
of creation which some modern
scholars have attributed to Sufism.120 In the first place, Nasafī says that two
things come from the seed (that
is, body and spirit) whereas the
Neoplatonists speak of three things emanating from the first substance (an
intelligence, a soul and a heaven). Moreover, in this station, only Koranic
imagery is employed in portraying the
seed as the first substance which
manifests Mulk and Malakūt: "Do not those
who disbelieve see that the
heavens and earth were closed up (ratq) but We have opened
them up
(fatq)."121
Nasafī describes this process in another way which again reflects
a Koranic rather than Neoplatonic basis:
As long as the spirit and body were mixed in one another and were not
distinguishable from one another, they were
like an ink-pot. When they
split and become distinguishable from one another, they became like
pens. This is the meaning of: "Nun, and the pen and what they are
writing."122 "Nun" is an oath by
the state of closing (ratq) and "the pen"
is an oath by the state of opening (fatq) and
"what they are writing" is an
oath by the four pens.123
This alternative perspective to Neoplatonism is also apparent in Nasafī's

other
works124 where he claims that
the Philosophers say the first thing that
God creates is intelligence ('aql) and the
last thing is the earth (khāk). The
People of Unity (who are the elect among the Sufis)
maintain that the first
thing God creates is earth and the last thing is intelligence,
which is
manifested only in man. In this way, man is accorded the greatest place in
creation. The meaning of man
here is the small man (i.e. the microcosm) and
not the big man (i.e. the macrocosm), as Nasafī explains:
Although each individual thing (fard) of the world is God's mirror, it is
the Perfect Man (insān-i kāmil) who is the perfect mirror for "I loved to
be known," and
some have read it as "I loved to know." Both are correct
because the microcosm is both knower and
known, both observer (nāẓir)
and observed (manẓūr), both mirror and the possessor of
beauty.125
Man is superior to the macrocosm because the macrocosm does what it
does through its specific characteristics and
properties, so it is impossible for
it not to do the task which God commands. However, man does what he does
through his specific characteristics and through activity (fi'l) which means he
also has the choice in
some things.126 He can choose
to manifest God's
beautiful names in the appropriate situation, and thereby hope for the reward
of Paradise.
The macrocosm does not possess free will or desire to the same
extent that man has. Thus man is closer to God and
he can reach a point
where God is the seer, hearer and speaker. For this reason, man is both
knower and known,
observer and observed, mirror and possessor of beauty.
Of course, this refers to the ḥadīth that Nasafī
discusses in the second
station.
In this station, human bodies are compared to windows (darīcha) and
man's spirit, which is God's
light, shines out of all these windows.
Sometimes the light shines from many windows, and
sometimes it shines
from fewer windows. When the windows are fewer in number (if there is a
plague, or natural
disaster) the light is stronger in the remaining windows,
and this helps the spirit of one person reach the
extremity in knowledge.
Such a person becomes the leader of people; he may be a Prophet, Friend,
commander or
sultan.127
Although the light is the same for each person, its manifestation in the
world is different and so people are not
aware of the knowledge others have
had or have. The reason for this difference in manifestation is explained as
follows:
Know that the self-disclosures of God's light are not repeated. Any occasion that He discloses
Himself is
not identical with the previous self-disclosure; it is similar (mithl) to the first. If it were
in such
a way that the second was identical with the first, then you would be aware of the first
form (qālib)
and would recognise and remember whatever you had seen in that form. But it is not
so. If a water jug is dipped
into the sea a thousand times, and a thousand times it is filled from that
sea, the
water of the first time is not the same as the water of the second time, even though the jug
is filled with sea
water each time. Hence, it is said that His self-disclosures have no end point.
In addition, know that when the water jug is filled with sea water, in fact the water takes on
several
attributes from the adjacency (mujāwarat) of the jug, and the jug takes on several attributes
from the
adjacency of the water. When the jug is smashed, the water goes to water and the earth
goes
to earth. Each one goes to its own state and takes on the attributes of the whole (ṣifāt-i
kull).128
Nasafī closes the first chapter of Kitāb-i tanzīl by relating the famous
story of the blind men and the
elephant. The story goes that there was a city
of blind people who had heard of elephants but could not imagine
what they
were like. When a caravan (in which there was an elephant) passed their city,
some blind men went out
to the caravan and each of the blind men touched
the elephant. One felt its trunk, another its leg, another its
ear, and so each
one discovered something about the elephant, about which the others had no
knowledge. When they
told each other about the "reality" of the elephant,
each one said something which did not accord with
the experiences of the
others.129 All of them were correct from one perspective but not one of them
could grasp
the whole picture.
This of course is the reality of the tashbīb-tanzīh nature of God. Each one
of the six stations reflects
an element of truth, and the task of the wayfarer is
to realise that his own station is not the only one which
reveals God's
similarity. However, as Nasafī remarks, even if one person comprehends this
fact, the majority
(even philosophers and Sufis) do not accept this truth:
This is the state of the People of Thought and Reasoning concerning
the objects of intelligence because
intelligence has degrees, and the
wisdom of things is immeasurable and innumerable. And this is the state
of the
People of Unveiling and Contemplation concerning the objects of
unveiling, because unveiling has degrees and
divine selfdisclosure is
immeasurable and innumerable. Among a hundred thousand people who
set out on this road,
one reaches the end and is aware of the ultimate goal
of the task. The rest remain in way stations
(manāzil) and they consider
the station is their aim.130
Each of the six stations represents a way of considering the relationship
between God and man, in other words,
the tashbīhtanzīh relationship. In the
first station, creatio ex nihilo expresses
man's contingent nature and is on the
whole more representative of tanzīh. The
second station stands in contrast to
the first where man is also eternal in potentiality and the tashbīh
nature is
portrayed through the concept of knowledge following the known and also
through the ḥadīth of
supererogatory acts. The third station acts as a kind of
isthmus between the previous two, for although the world
is imagination and
thus tanzīh, it does at least reveal something of reality and from this
perspective it
is tashbīh. The fourth station also reflects the tashbīh-tanzīh
relationship. Tashbīh is
evident through the idea of "everything is He," and
God's existence being a single entity which has
three levels; essence, face
and breath. Tanzīh is clear when Nasafī comments that individuals are
responsible for their own acts and thus liable to God's wrath if they are
disobedient. In the fifth station,
creation at every instant and non-repetition
in self-disclosure also manifest the tanzīh-tasbbīh nature.
Although things
are annihilated each moment by God (tanzīh), his mercy bestows existence
upon something
similar to the annihilated thing (tashbīh). The non-repetition
of self-disclosure also expresses the
tanzīh-tashbīh nature, for although
everything is a self-disclosure of God (tashbīh), it is only a
"face" and not
existence as it really is (tanzīh). The nonrepetition of God's
self-disclosure is
a theme continued in the sixth station, but Nasafī also focuses upon the
important concept of
the Perfect Man. The Perfect Man is crucial for an
understanding of Prophecy and Friendship. He
is the goal of creation
because he acts as a link between God and His creation; he is the mirror by
which God sees Himself and he is the form in which the creatures can see
God's perfect
creation. Thus the Perfect Man fuses tanzīh and tashbīh
together and he realises these two aspects
of the God-man relationship in
their appropriate places.
All issues considered in the first chapter of Kitāb-i tanzīl are among the
major points which concerned
Ibn 'Arabī and his interpreters. The discussion
of these issues combined with Nasafī's style of fusing
Koranic imagery and
the language of the kalām with the use of the Greek-inspired terminology of
Philosophers such as al-Farābī and Ibn Sīnā, reflects the wujūdī world view
of Ibn 'Arabī. Yet the
significance of Nasafī's work goes far beyond a shared
vision with Ibn 'Arabī. Nasafī's works give a
certain simplicity and clarity to
Ibn 'Arabī's idea of He/not He, which Sufi novices may have found
difficult
to find in the Greatest Shaykh's voluminous treatises. In addition, Nasafī's
explanation of the
six stations which describe the various ontological
perspectives of his time, reveals his interpretation of
Sufism as allembracing.
The beliefs of the Ulamā', the philosophers and the different Sufi schools all
represent some aspect of truth and are therefore genuine expressions of
Islamic belief.
II. NASAFĪ AND

IMAGINATION
In the previous section, it was shown that Nasafī described existence through
the worlds of Mulk, Malakūt
and Jabarūt. Of the six spiritual stations, the
most sophisticated is the second where God is other than
the worlds of Mulk,
Malakūt and Jabarūt. Similar discussions to this second spiritual station
occur
in most of Nasafī's other works and therefore it is likely that he
preferred such a position to any others.
This ontological ordering is neatly
encapsulated in Manāzil al-sā'īrīn:
Know that Mulk is the world of testimony and Malakūt is the invisible world ('ālam-i
ghayb)
and Jabarūt is the invisible, invisible world ('ālam-i ghayb-i
ghayb) and God Most High is the
invisible, invisible, invisible world ('ālam-i
ghayb-i ghayb-i ghayb).
O dervish! Jabarūt, which is the invisible, invisible world, is the world of potentiality, and the
world
of potentiality is above Mulk and Malakūt. This is because existents are actual in Mulk
and
Malakūt and they are potential in Jabarūt and potential existents are prior to actual
existents. First
is readiness (ṣalāḥiyyat) and then is special quality (khāṣṣiyyat). In addition,
potential existents
have no beginning and actual existents have a beginning.131
Nasafī's interpretation of Jabarūt is in fact the same as Ibn 'Arabī's

immutable entities.
This appellation of the immutable entities as Jabarūt is
somewhat idiosyncratic, for most Sufis, and not
only those of the wujūdī
school, described Jabarūt in an altogether different fashion. To
demonstrate
the specific nature of Nasafī's Jabarūt, it is necessary to see how the term
was used by
his predecessors and contemporaries.
Imagination and the Divine Presences
Mulk and Malakūt are Koranic terms. The term Jabarūt does not appear in
the Koran although
one finds it in a ḥadīth which states: "Glory to He of the
Jabarūt and Malakūt and
Majesty (al-kubriyā) and Greatness (al-'aẓma)."132
Thus, the use of the term Jabarūt enters the Islamic
vocabulary at an early
stage, but its meaning as a technical term in not entirely clear. Some scholars
have not
been able to see a difference between Malakūt and Jabarūt in the
works of early Islamic
philosophers such as al-Farābī and Ibn Sīnā.135
However, it has suggested that Ibn Sīnā's system differentiates
between
Malakūt and Jabarūt, the former being the realm of intellectual realities (or
disembodied
intellects) and the latter being the realm of symbols that affect
the imagination, which is the realm in which
Ibn Sīnā locates the celestial
souls.134
A contemporary of Ibn Sīnā was Abu Ṭālib al-Makkī (d. 998) who also
makes a clear distinction between Mulk,
Malakūt and Jabarūt in his work
entitled Qūt al-qulūb. Mulk is witnessed by intellectual light;
Malakūt which
is the next world, is witnessed by the light of faith; the Majesty (al-'izza)
which is the (divine) attributes, is witnessed by the light of certainty; and
Jabarūt, which is the Unity
(al-wāḥidāniyya) is witnessed by the light of
gnosis.135
Abu Ḥāmid Ghazālī was familiar with the works of both Ibn Sīnā and
Makkī. Within his works there are many
references to Jabarūt which is
portrayed in two main ways. The first is found in his Durra in which
the
lowest world is Mulk, then Malakūt and the highest world is Jabarūt. Mulk
pertains to
"Adam and his posterity," Malakūt pertains to the classes of
angels and jinn, while Jabarūt pertains to the elect among the
angels. The
elect of the angels are the Cherubs, the bearers of God's Throne and the
chamberlains of the
godhead.136
This ranking appears in treatises of other Sufis, such as the author of
Tabṣirat al-mubtadi', who is
thought to be Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī.137 Nasafī
copied several passages from this work in his Maqṣad-i aqṣā, some
of which
are discussions related to the existents of Malakūt (mawjūdāt-i malakūtī).
Nasafī describes
various kinds of existents. The first are those who pay no
attention to the world of the creatures, and these are
the "Enraptured
Angels." Another kind who also are not concerned with the world of bodies
and who
continually contemplate God are the door-keepers of the Divinity
(ḥijāb bārgāh-i ulūhiyya) and they are
also known as the Folk of Jabarūt. A
second kind of spiritual existent are those who order, govern and
pertain to
this world and they are called "spirituals" (rūḥaniyyān). Among these are the
Folk of
Higher Malakūt, who have free disposal in the heavens, and the Folk
of Lower Malakūt who are the
guardians over minerals, plants and animals.
The jinn and Satan are included among the Folk of Lower
Malakūt.138 This
particular ordering by Nasafī resembles Ghazālī's hierarchy found in the
Durra, but this system is not
repeated in any of Nasafī's other works. The
first chapter of Kilāb-i tanzīl is much more
representative of his discussions
of Mulk, Malakūt and Jabarūt.
Returning to Ghazālī, his second way of portraying Jabarūt owes more
perhaps to the systems of Ibn Sīnā
and Makkī that were described
previously. In this second ordering of the three worlds,
Jabarūt is a unity of
Mulk and Malakūt within man but it is not the origin of Mulk
and Malakūt as
in Nasafī's system. Ghazālī's Jabarūt in fact prefigures the discussions of
the
imagination that became one of the predominant features in many of the Sufi
works of the wujūdī
school.139 For Ghazālī,
Mulk is the world of sense
perception and Malakūt is the invisible world. "The realm of the
world of
Jabarūt lies between the two worlds; partly it may become visible in the
world of Mulk,
partly it is related to the eternal Power and belongs to the
world of Malakūt.140
In other words, Malakūt is a realm which cannot be witnessed by the
physical eye, however, that which
pertains to Malakūt, such as spirits and
angels, takes a form within the imagination. In this way
Malakūt and Mulk
combine, resulting in Jabarūt. Ghazālī explains: "Now the world of
Jabarūt
141 between that
of Mulk and Malakūt, resembles a ship which is moving
between the beach and the water; it has
neither the utter fluxity of the water
not the utter stability and fixidness of the beach. Everyone who walks on
the
earth walks in the world of Mulk and of sensual apperception. And when he
has sufficient power to sail
on a ship, he is as one who walks in the world of
Jabarūt. And when he has reached such a stage that he
can walk on the
water without a ship, he walks in the Malakūt without sinking."142
This is the imaginal world which was described and developed in the
course of Sufism. Ghazālī's ranking of
Jabarüt as the realm where one can
understand spiritual realities through a mental form was also explained
by
'Ayn al-Quḍāt Hamadānī (d. 1132). For "Ayn al-Quḍāt, it is intelligence
which acts as a broker
between the brain and the heart, enabling spiritual
realities to become embodied.
Now know that my brain (damāgh) would not understand the
discourses of my heart if my intelligence
('aql) were not between the
two. The brain pertains to the realm of Mulk, the heart pertains to
the
realm of Malakūt and intelligence pertains to the realm of Jabarūt. Know
that intelligence is
the interpreter that understands both the tongue of the
Malakūtī heart and also the tongue of the
Mulkī brain.143
Another Sufi who had much to say about this imaginal world was Shaykh
Shihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā Suhrawardī (d. 1191).
According to his Oriental
Theosophy (ḥikmat al-ishrāq), there are several worlds, the highest of which
is
the Light of Lights. From this emanates one Victoral Light (qāhir) which
is referred to
under the Mazdean name "Bahman."144 From Bahman,
innumerable lights, independent of material bodies are emanated,
and this,
according to Corbin, is the world of Jabarūt.145 Then from this world of
Jabarūt, two groups
of substances of light are emanated which may be
perceived by man. The first are luminous suspended forms
(al-ṣuwar al-
mu'allaqa al-mustanīra) and is also known as the imaginal world ('ālam
alkhayāl).146 The second
are dark suspended forms (al-ṣuwar almu'allaqa
al-ẓulmāniyya) which include evil spirits and
satans.147 Corbin calls these
last two categories together the world of Malakụt.148
Nasafī's portrayal of Jabarūt is much closer to Suhrawardī's interpretation
than those of Ibn
Sīnā, Ghazālī or 'Ayn al-Quḍāt, since they understood it as
the imaginal world. The reality of the imaginal
world was discussed in more
detail from the thirteenth century onwards by Sufis of the wujūdī school. In
many ways Nasafī was influenced by this school as was shown in the
previous section, however his works do not
discuss the imaginal world in the
same manner or detail as Ibn 'Arabī or Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī. Nasafī's
most
detailed ontological hierarchy posits four levels which are God, Jabarūt,
Malakūt and Mulk,
omitting the world of imagination from his order. This is
not the case with the leading members of the
wujūdī school who include the
imaginal world within their ontological hierarchy which contains five (and
sometimes six) levels of existence.149 These five levels were formulated by
members of the wujūdī school into
the "Five Divine Presences," (al-ḥaḍarāt
al-ilāhiyya al-khams). With a lack of a detailed
discussion about the
imaginal world in Nasafī's theosophy, it is perhaps inevitable that his works
are not as
sophisticated as those by Sufis such as Ibn 'Arabī, Ṣadr al-Dīn
Qūnawī, Sa'īd al-Dīn Farghānī (d.c.
1300), Mu'ayyid al-Dīn al-Jandī (d.c.
1300), Kamāl al-Dīn 'Abd al-Razzāq Kāshānī (d. 1329) and Sharaf
al-Dīn
Dāwūd al-Qayṣarī (d. 1350).
In order to elucidate Nasafī's position vis-a-vis the wujūdī school, it is
useful to compare
his "four seas" from his Maqṣad-i aqṣā with the
interpretation of the Five
Divine Presences by Sa'īd al-Dīn Farghānī. The
reason for looking at Farghānī's exegesis rather than any
other interpreter is
because the former's works probably exercised a more widespread influence
on the Islamic
world.150 Before focusing upon
Farghānī's Divine Presences,
Nasafī's "four seas" will be briefly analysed (it is not necessary
to examine
them in detail because the four levels of existence have already been
discussed).
In the final two chapters of Maqṣad-i aqṣd, the topic of discussion is "the
four seas," which
are "the invisible, invisible, invisible world," Jabarūt,
Malakūt and Mulk.151 The first of these is God's
essence which is an infinite,
non-delimited light and is a sea without
end and without shore.152 This
essence is explained with reference to the ḥadīth, "I was a hidden treasure
and I desired to be
know." Since it desired to be known, the first essence
made itself a mirror and this is the second sea
(which is the mirror in
potentiality).153 The second sea acts as an intermediary between the tanzīh
first sea and
the third and fourth seas. This second sea is the world of
Jabarūt and is called by other names including
the Attributed Spirit (rūḥ-i
iḍāfī),154 the Muhammadan Spirit, the Greatest Light and the Muhammadan
Light,155 and it is also an infinite and
non-delimited light and a sea without
end and without shore.
It encompasses the world, and there is not one particle in the world
which the Attributed Spirit is not with and
which it does not encompass
and about which it is not aware. It is the life of the world and of the
creatures of
the world, and it is the governor of the world and of the
creatures, it is the master (mutaṣarrif) in its
world and it governs the
world. Its task is existentiating (ījād), annihilation (ī'dām),
reviving
(iḥyā), putting to death (imātat), honouring (i'zāz) and holding in
contempt
(idhlāl).156
The reason that Nasafī gives the name Jabarūt to this particular level may be
found in the etymology of
the word. Jabarūt is not found in the Koran
although the derived name al-Jabbār (the All-Compeller)
appears in 59: 23.
So the things in Jabarūt are those which are fixed and which cannot change
their nature
or quality. In other words, they are determined or compelled
(jabr) in their state from eternity.
Nasafī describes the Attributed Spirit (or Jabarūt) as a seed, which
contains Mulk and
Malakūt (the third and fourth seas). A seed has the
potential to existentiate a plant and it also has a
set limit for a plant's life, for
a seed contains everything which has the potential to be manifested, from
the
stalk, to the leaves and petals. The second sea is also described as a pen:
"The ink-pot (nūn), by the pen and what they are writing."157 Nun is
an expression for the first sea because "I was
a hidden treasure and I
desired to be known,"158 and the pen is an expression for the second sea
because "the first thing
God created was intelligence,"159 and "what they
are writing," is an expression for the third and
fourth seas, and they are
continually writing and the three kinds of children160 were and are
created from their writing, and the
three kinds of children are words and
they are not repeated, rather, there is no end as the Most High said
"Say:
if the sea were ink for the words of my Lord, sooner would the sea be
exhausted than would the words
of my Lord, even if we added another
sea like it for its aid."161
The words are existent in the pen in an undifferentiated mode, and when
the
pen splits them into the third and fourth seas, it is able to compose them in a
differentiated mode.
Aside from Nasafī's four seas, there is a discussion in Maqṣad-i aqṣā of
another level of existence
which other Sufis of the wujūdī school consider a
Divine presence. This is the Perfect
Man. Nasafī frequently refers to the
aforementioned ḥadīth that "I was a hidden treasure and I
desired to be
known." He explains how Mulk and Malakūt are combined together in man,
for ail
existents are compounds of light and darkness. Each compound has its
nature (its spiritual
dimension) and its body (its sensory dimension). These
two are mixed together and need to be separated, a process
which is started
through eating pure food. The process leads from the stomach through the
liver
and to the brain where the attributes of light can be manifested.
According to Nasafī, animals and men are
constantly performing this
"alchemy," but the Perfect Man takes this alchemy to the limit. The Perfect
Man is God's perfect mirror:
The answer that the Truth Most High gave to David (peace be upon
him) that "I was a hidden treasure and I
loved to be known," becomes
apparent and recognised here. He sees His own glory and He witnesses
His own
attributes, names, works and wisdom.162
So within one chapter of Maqṣad-i aqṣā, Nasafī discusses the ontological

hierarchy of the four seas and
the Perfect Man who comprehends them all.
Turning now to Sa'īd al-Dīn Farghānī's Divine Presences, the first thing to
note is that he speaks of six
levels rather than five levels. His first level is
that of God in His tanzīh nature, which is called
aḥadiyya or Exclusive
Unity. This is the level beyond man's conception, and it is Nasafī's
"invisible, invisible, invisible world." The second level is that of Inclusive
Oneness (wāḥidiyya) which is another expression for God as Creator, the
source of all things, Who has
knowledge of all things and can bestow
existence upon them. This is the world of immutable entities, or in
Nasafī's
terminology, it is Jabarūt. Once God bestows existence upon His
knowledge, there are three
modes or levels in which they are the loci of
manifestation. The first is the spiritual world, or the level of
intelligible
things; the second is the sensory world, or level of sense perception; third is
the level of
imagination where spirits are corporealised and bodies are
spiritualised. The last level is that of the
all-encompassing Perfect Man, who
comprehends all the prior levels.
Nasafī does not use the terminology of the divine presences although the
predominant theme
in his theosophy is the hierarchical nature of existence.
His four main levels and the Perfect Man accord with
Farghānī's aḥadiyya,
wāḥidiyya, spiritual and sensory worlds and Perfect Man. That Nasafī did
not
include detailed discussions in his works of the central concept of the
imaginal world is quite surprising given
the fact that he explains the other
main aspects of wujūdī theosophy (albeit in a summarised manner). The
significance of this omission becomes clear when Nasafī's explanation of
what happens to the soul after death
is compared with the descriptions given
by Ibn 'Arabï and other Sufis of the wujūdī school.
Imagination and the Return to God (Ma‘ād)
The unity of God, Muhammad being God's last prophet and the return of
each individual to God to be judged are
the three fundamental principles of
Islam. As one would expect, each one is discussed in all of Nasafī's
works.
With respect to the return, the Sufis of the wujūdī school discussed three
worlds: this world
(dunyā), the grave, and the next world (ākhira). Nasafī
discusses this world in
detail and his references to the next world are many
but he hardly mentions the grave. In the whole of Kitāb-i
tanzīl there is only
one paragraph which refers to the grave:
Know that the Prophets and Friends were informed of the states after
death, like the questioning in the grave,
the tortures of the graves,
becoming alive and rising from the grave, reading the letter of one's
works, the
reckoning (ḥisāb) of each person, the scales (tarāzū), the
straight path (ṣirāṭ
al-mustaqīm), hell and the various tortures in hell,
paradise (bihisht) and the numerous comforts in
paradise, and all the
others are the truth. It is necessary for each person to have faith in each
one of them
even if he does not know the manner (kayfiyyat) of these
things. If a person does not have faith in some
of them then he is not a
believer. There is no damage to faith if a person discusses the manner of
these things
and makes an explanation (sharḥī) even if he is mistaken on
some of them, because he is searching. But it
is better if he does not say
anything and does not become busy in giving explanations.163
Yet there can be little doubt that Nasafī was aware of the wujūdī discussion
of the grave because this
topic is included within Tabṣirat al-mubtadi'164 a
text with which he was familiar and passages of which he copied in
Maqṣad-
i aqṣā. Nasafī in fact does deal with concepts that are similar to the
discussions of the
wujūdī school but there are fundamental differences.
Before reflecting on Nasafī's explanations, it is necessary to summarise the
position of the wujūdī school on the return
to God.
As stated earlier, the wujūdī school discusses three worlds: this world, the
grave and the next world. The
grave is understood as an isthmus (barzakh)
between this world and the next world and its nature is
different for each
individual soul. This is because the experiences in the grave are dependent
upon the
attributes that were predominant in the individual soul while it was
in this world.
Since realities in this world are veiled by corporeal bodies, it is difficult to
understand the motivations and
intentions of people. Their outward
dimension or appearance remains relatively fixed while their inward states,
moods and thoughts are constantly fluctuating and changing, so most people
can only witness the outward
appearance and not the inward state. This is
not the case in the grave where there are no corporeal bodies to
veil realities.
Each soul takes an "imaginal" form appropriate to its state which is
determined by the
attributes or character traits that were predominant over it
in this world. This is clarified by the author of
Tabṣirat al-mubtadi', who
says, "If for example, love of position dominated, the person will
appear in
the form of a leopard. If the faculty of appetite dominated over the other
attributes, he will appear
as a dog."165
The inner reality of each individual, that is, in terms of attributes, in the
grave is fixed. However the
manifestations of these attributes at the outward
dimension are constantly changing in the forms of their works
during this
world. The grave then is this world inside out where the intentions and
motivations of the soul are
apparent in form. If the intentions and
motivations are worthy then the form will be pleasant and if they are
blameworthy then the form will be hellish. So the grave gives a foretaste of
the next world, which may be
paradise or hell. Corporeal bodies of this
world are dense whereas imaginal bodies are relatively subtle,
therefore the
experiences of the soul in the grave, be they felicitous or wretched, are more
intense than those
in this world. The next world is even more real "because it
lies closer to the spiritual side of things and
is therefore subtle and more
luminous."166
As stated earlier, Nasafī does not discuss the grave. His explanation of the
return to God is connected with the
idea of the spirit rising through several
levels until it perfects itself. Of his portrayal of the beliefs of the
People of
the Holy Law, the Philosophers, the Transmigrationists and the
People of
Unity, it is the discourses of the Transmigrationists that appear similar to
those of
the wujūdī school concerning the grave. However, it will be shown
that there are
fundamental differences between the two.
(i) Imagination and the Return According to the

Transmigrationists
Nasafī's discussions of the return to God are similar to those of the wujūdī
school in his
explanations of the People of Transmigration (ahl-i tanāsukh).
These occur in several of his works which
indicates that he held them to be
quite significant.167 The identity of this group is somewhat unclear. In Kashf
al-ḥaqā'iq,
Nasafī states that they may be accounted among the Philosophers
(ahl-i ḥikmat), while in Mazāzil al-sā'īrīn, he comments that they have
existed for
several thousand years and four parts out of six (chahār dāng-i
'ālam) in the world follow the beliefs
of the Transmigrationists169
which
indicates a pre-Islamic, possibly Indian belief.
According to the People of Transmigration, all souls are existent in the
higher world ('ālam-i
'ulwī) and they come to the lower world ('ālam-i suflī)
to actualise their perfection
because this can only be achieved with a body. If
this perfection is achieved then the soul returns to the
celestial world.170 The
individual soul at first has the form of a plant, then an animal and then a
human. Nasafī explains that this
ascent is known as "progressive
transmigration" (naskh). The lowest plant form is moss
(ṭuḥlubj and the
highest form of plant are trees such as the mandrake (dirakht-i
lūffāh) and
dhāq dhāq trees whose fruit are similar to animals. The ascent continues to
the lowest
form of animal which is the worm, until the non-rational animals
(ḥaywān-i ghayr-i nāṭiq) appear such as
the elephant, ape and rtasnās.171
From here, the human form appears, the lowest of which is the negro and it
rises in levels until it reaches the Philosopher where it is called the Rational
Soul, then it reaches the degree
of the Friends where it is named the Holy
Soul, and finally it reaches the form of the Prophets where it is
called the
Soul at rest.172
Nasafī also gives the Transmigrationists account of the ascent of the spirit
from plant to human form within one
lifetime. Some trees bear fruits whose
outward appearance is like that of humans. If these trees grow in areas
where
the air is moderate in regions beneath the equator, such as Sri Lanka, their
fruit will
gradually become rational and speak. The tradition that Adam
came to earth first in Sri Lanka
is used to illustrate this belief.173
Progressive transmigration is when the individual soul appears in a form
higher than the one that it had
previously and regressive transmigration
works in the opposite direction. Once the spirit
has reached the human level
it has the ability to reach its ultimate perfection. According to the
Transmigrationists, the spirit below the level of Philosopher is in hell. The
rank of Philosopher reaches heaven,
the rank of the Friend passes on from
the heavens and reaches the universal intelligence and the spirit of the
Prophet reaches God.174 If the
spirit reaches its perfection in this world, then
at the time of death when the spirit separates from the body
(mufāriqat), it
returns to the world of intelligences and souls. The individual soul connects
to the soul
of a sphere with which the knowledge and piety that it acquired in
this world accords. If it does not reach its
perfection in this world then after
separation from the body, the soul cannot return to the world of
intelligences
and souls but remains beneath the firmament of the moon (i.e. this world of
creation and
corruption, which is hell).175
In this case, the spirit is
resurrected (ḥasbr) in another body until it reaches its perfection. Some of
the Transmigrationists held that it was impossible for the human spirit to be
resurrected in anything other than
a human body,176 while others
have said
that the spirit may regress below the world of animals and become
resurrected in the kingdom of
plants.177 in regressive
transmigration the
spirit suffers in proportion with its sins and then it has the chance to rise
again through
the various forms until it reaches its perfection. If it does not
reach its perfection again, then the process is
repeated. The spirit is always
resurrected in a form which is suitable to it, in other words, it is raised in the
form of the attribute that was dominant over it when it was alive in this
world.178
This is the point where the beliefs of the Transmigrationists appear similar
to those of the wujūdī
school. It was shown that the Sufis of the wujūdī
tradition held that in the grave, individuals have
"imaginal" bodies which
accord with the works of the individual while they were in this world.
However,
the Transmigrationists believed that if the individual soul did not
actualise its perfection, then it was
resurrected in this world in the form
appropriate to its acts. This superficial similarity was pointed out by
Ṣadr al-
Dīn Qūnawī:
In the barzakh - or rather, a short time before the Mustering - some people appear in the form of
lions,
wolves and birds, as the Shariah has mentioned, and as unveiling and divine instruction have
given witness.
But this does not happen by means of metempsychosis (maskh) or transmigration (tanāsukh)
that is
denied, for people who believe in such things hold that it occurs in this world. But what we
are speaking about
occurs in the barzakh after death.179
Generally speaking, Sufis view the ascent of man's spirit as passing through
several
stages before reaching its perfection, but the form always remains the
same in this world, only the non-manifest
dimension changes. Rūmī captures
the essence of this concept in a well known passage from the Mathnawī:
I died from the mineral kingdom and became a plant; I died to vegetive nature and attained to
animality.
I died to animality and became a man. So why should I fear? When did I ever become less
through dying?
Next time I will die to human nature, so that I may spread my wings and lift up my head among
the angels.
Once again, I will be sacrificed from angelic nature and become that which enters not the
imagination.180
In the grave the manifest dimension, that is, the imaginal body changes to
reflect the
attribute of the spirit. This was a theory that was developed prior
to Ibn 'Arabī and the wujūdī
school by Sufis including 'Ayn al-Quḍāt:
The structures of the existence of the Next World are through imaginalisation, and
recognising
[the reality] of imaginalisation is not an easy task.181
The first thing that becomes clear for the wayfarer concerning the Next World is the [different]
states of the
grave. The first imaginalisation that he witnesses, such as snakes, scorpions, dogs,
fire, which have all been
promised to the people who are to be punished, appears to him in the
grave through imaginalisation. All of
these things are in man's inner dimension since they are
[imaginalised] through him, in fact they are
continually with him.182
(ii) Imagination in the Return According to the People of Unity
One might expect Nasafī to explain the beliefs of the Sufis or People of
Unity regarding the forms of souls in
the grave in the same manner as Ibn
'Arabī and Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī. However within the sections of the People
of Unity where the discussion is related to the return to God, there is no
mention of the imagination in the same
sense in which the wujūdī school
employ the term. For example, in two chapters of Kashf
al-ḥaqā'iq entitled
"Unity" and "the Resurrection of Man," Nasafī presents the
discourses of
four different groups among the People of Unity. The first two are called the
Advocates of Fire
(aṣḥāb-i nār). The first of these explains that man's body
is the creation of God and his spirit is
the God of creation. At death, there is
no more existence for the body but the spirit continues to exist
because it is
eternal. People in this particular station, according to Nasafī, have
included
Shaykh Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī (attributed by modern scholars to be the
Shaykh al-Ishrāq183) and Shaykh 'Abdallāh Anṣārī of
Herat.184 The second
party
among the Advocates of Fire hold that both man's spirit and body are
unreal, for they are opposites and there
are no contraries in God's world.
This is the station of Shaykh Ibn Sab'īn.185
The second two groups are called the Advocates of Light (aṣḥāh-i nūr).
The first of
these says that the spirit and body are with each other and cannot
be separated. They rise together in levels and
reach their ultimate perfection
in man. Then they return to their origin which is earth. Bodies
return to the
element of earth and spirits return to the nature of earth, and the process of
seeking perfection
commences again. There is no distinction in the element
of earth for each person or in the spirit of each person:
the differences among
individuals arise due to the movements of the spheres.186 The second group
say that man's body and spirit form a
temporary union and after perfection is
reached they separate, in other words, the body returns to its world and
the
spirit returns to its world. However there is no distinction or differences in
the body when it returns to
its own world and the same applies to the
spirit.187
These discussions by Nasafī are short and limited and there is no mention
of the grave or the resurrection.
Therefore it is difficult to make any
comments about them. However, if the beliefs of Advocates of Light
concerning the return of the spirit and body refer to the resurrection, then
there are several issues which need
to be raised. This is because there
appears to be a lack of individuation after death which runs contrary to the
Koranic belief in reward and punishment for each individual based upon his
or her works in this world. Moreover,
the Koran also states that man will be
resurrected in both body and spirit, which the second group of Advocates
of
Light seems to deny.
The beliefs of the Advocates of Fire also present some interesting
problems, especially the group that is
representative of Shihāb al-Dīn
Suhrawardī (and which also is similar to the theories of Ibn Sīnā). The
difficulty lies in the fact that this group sees man's spirit as eternal and that
the body is not necessary
in the next world, which as already mentioned,
contradicts the Koran. Ibn Sīnā regarded the resurrection of the
body as an
"imaginal" body (and in this respect he is a forerunner of the wujūdī school)
for the
disembodied spirits enjoy pleasure and suffer torture by virtue of the
application of their imaginations.188
According to one contemporary scholar,
Ibn Rushd (1126-1198) could not accept this idea of
imaginal bodies because
the imagination pertains to sense perception.189 The imagination is a faculty
of the soul and the soul cannot exist
without a body. When the body dies, so
too the soul (and therefore the imagination) ceases to function.
Therefore,
the resurrection takes place for each individual in both his soul and also in a
physical body (created
by God) similar to the one that was united with the
soul in this world. In this respect Ibn Rushd defends the
Koranic doctrine of
the resurrection of man's body and spirit and at the same time rejects the idea
that man
conquers death through the intrinsic nature of his soul. The process
is God's second creation.190
The wujūdī school did not interpret the soul as pertaining to the body in
the same way as Ibn Rushd. The
soul had a somewhat undetermined position
between matter and the spiritual, or between darkness and light. Therefore it
shares the qualities of the two. Moreover, it is able to experience things in
the
grave because God creates barzakh bodies for the soul.191
Nasafī's explanation of the Return to God for the People of Unity leaves
many questions
unanswered. There is no detailed discussion of the nature of
the grave or of the next world and there is no
mention of the imagination,
which as demonstrated in this section, is the key to how many Sufis
explained several
aspects of the Return to God. Given Nasafī's limited
explanation of the imagination in his portrayal of the
ontological hierarchy, it
is not really surprising that there is no discussion of the grave and "imaginal
bodies" in his works.
Despite the above shortcomings, one should not under-estimate Nasafī's
major contribution to the ontological
discussions of the thirteenth century.
His portrayal of the hierarchical levels of existence (Mulk, Malakūt and
Jabarūt) continued the tradition of providing even more specific and
precise
explanations of the existential levels. After Nasafī, this trend was developed
further by 'Alā'
al-Dawla al-Simnānī192 and the
mystics of the wujūdī
tradition.
III. NASAFĪ AND

NEOPLATONIC ONTOLOGY
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, several eminent scholars of
Sufism believed that Neoplatonic
thought was one of the major influences
upon Sufism. For example, R.A. Nicholson commented that "we are
drawn
irresistibly to the conclusion . . . that Neoplatonism poured in to Islam a
large
tincture of the same mystical element in which Christianity was
already
steeped."195 This train of
thought was also adopted by A.J. Arberry
(Nicholson's student) who held Neoplatonism on the one hand and the
"transcendental theism of the Koran" on the other, as the "twain
fountainheads of Sufi
theosophy."194 In more
recent years, the Neoplatonic
influence has been identified by P. Morewedge in the works of 'Azīz Nasafī,
who
described "... a Neoplatonic system of 'emanation and return' as a
mystical
depiction of the world."195 Indeed, one can find many passages in
Nasafī's works which one might
classify as being of a Neoplatonic
persuasion. This is especially the case when he portrays the descent and
return which is suggestive of the Neoplatonic idea of emanation through the
intelligences until the individual
things of the earth are created, and then a
return to the One through the compounds.196
The influence of Neoplatonism upon Sufism has been questioned by other
scholars, such as W. Chittick, who
believes the world view of mystics such
as Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī was in fact founded upon both spiritual unveiling
and
the contemplation of Koranic images. However, the extent to which
Neoplatonism affected Sufism is still open
to debate and much research is
required to provide a clearer picture. Nasafī's position in this respect is
interesting because scholars have emphasised different elements in his world
view; while P. Morewedge seems to
witness Neoplatonic tendencies in
Nasafī's thought, Chittick has indicated that he was primarily in the
wujūdī
tradition of Ibn 'Arabī and Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī.197 Before concentrating
upon the similarities or differences of Nasafī's
theosophy with that of the
Neoplatonists, a brief description shall be given of the points where Islam
and
Neoplatonic thought meet.
Similarities Between Islam and Classical Neoplatonism
By 840 A.D. the so-called "Theology of Aristotle" had been translated into
Arabic and
was soon utilised by Islamic philosophers such as al-Farābī198 in
their world views. The "Theology of Aristotle" was in fact, a
resume of
books IV, V and VI of Plotinus's "Enneads."
The fundamental tenets of
Plotinus's visionary theosophy are fivefold; God is one: He is eternal: there
is a
perpetual emanation from the One: the Universal Intellect then acts as a
means between the One and the emanations
that result from the Universal
Intellect: these emanations finally return to the One.199 These five
fundaments of Neoplatonism bear strong
similarities to certain verses and
meanings which can be found in the Koran. This will be
illustrated in the
next few paragraphs.
(i) The first tenet, which is that of God's unity is described by Plotinus in
the following manner:
"Think of the One as Mind or God, you think too
meanly; use all the resources of understanding to conceive
this Unity and,
again it is more authentically one than God, even though you reach for God's
unity beyond the
unity the most perfect you can conceive. This self
sufficiency is the essence of its unity. Something there must
be supremely
adequate, autonomous, all transcending, most utterly without need."200
Unity is of course the backbone of Islam and it is the basis of the
testimony of faith, "There is no god but
God." The Koran is littered with
references to God's unity, for example: "Invoke no other God with
Allah.
There is no god but Him. All things perish except His face,"201 "Why, were
there gods in earth and heaven other than God
they would surely go to
ruin,"202 "Say: He is God, the One."203
(ii) The eternity of God, the second tenet of Neoplatonism, was defined by
Plotinus in the following manner:
"This principle, at rest within the One, is
Eternity; possessing this stable quality, being itself at once
the absolute self
identical and none the less the active manifestation of an unchanging Life set
towards the
Divine and dwelling within It untrue, therefore neither on the
side of being nor on the side of Life - this will
be eternity."204
The eternity of God is taken for granted in the Islamic tradition for it is the
very nature of God that He is
eternal. In many verses, the Koran contrasts
the eternal God with His temporal, created world. "All that
dwells upon the
earth is perishing, yet still abides the face of thy Lord, majestic and
splendid,"205 "God,
there is no god but He, the Living, the Everlasting
(qayyūm)."206 In addition one of the ninetynine names of God is
baqā' the
meaning of which is permanent, or eternal.
(iii) The third principle of Neoplatonic thought is perpetual emanation.
Creation was expressed by Plotinus in
terms of generation or emanation, for
example: "If the First is perfect, utterly perfect above all, it must
be the most
powerful of all that is, and all other powers must act in partial imitation of it.
Now other things
coming to perfection are observed to generate . . . How
then could the most perfect remain self set - the First
Good, the Power
towards all, how could it grudge or be powerless to give of itself? If things
other than itself
are to exist, things dependent upon it for their reality, it must
produce since there is
no other source."207
Plotinus also commented, . . all
that is fully achieved engenders: therefore the eternally achieved engenders
eternally an eternal being. At the same time, the offspring is always minor:
what then are we to think of the All
Perfect but that it can produce nothing
less than the very greatest that is later than itself? This greatest must
be the
Divine Mind, and it must be the second of all existence . . . (it) is the loftiest
being in the universe,
all else following upon it - the Soul for example, being
an utterance and act of the Intellectual
Principle."208
If one replaces the Neoplatonic word of generation or emanation with the
Koranic term of "creation," it
is possible to find references that can be
interpreted in a way which imply eternal creation. For example,
"No indeed,
but they are in uncertainty as to the new creation,"209 "Each day He is upon
some
labour,"210 "To God
belongs the Command before and after."211
(iv) The universal intellect of Plotinus acts as an intermediate between the
One and many and this preserves the
One in transcendence, beyond the
limits of rational human understanding and also guards the One from
multiplicity
which is incompatible with Unity. The One engenders the
Intellectual Principle, and the latter's vision of
the One's overflowing and
exuberance causes the Intellectual Principle to imitate this. In such a way,
the
Intellectual Principle generates the Soul. These then are Plotinus's three
initial hypostases.212 The One generates the Intellectual
Principle which in
turn generates the Soul which generates the entire universe and the return to
the One follows
the same linear route (but in the reverse order).
In the Koran, it is difficult to find such a doctrine of God creating one
thing from which the whole universe was
created. However, such an idea
became one of the linchpins of Sufism, and numerous mystics quoted the
ḥadīth "the first thing God created was the intellect," to demonstrate this.
Sufis including
Nasafī frequently quoted the above ḥadīth213 and also one
Koranic verse (which attested to the universe appearing from one
thing):
"Do not those who disbelieve see that the heavens and earth were closed up
but we have opened
them."214 Nasafī
interpreted this verse in such a way
that the heavens and earth were closed up together as if they were in a
seed.
(v) Having descended from the One down to the Intellect, the Soul and the
universe, the ascent back to the One
commences. Plotinus describes the
return to the One in this famous passage: "Many times it has happened:
lifted
out of the body into myself; becoming external to all other things and self
encentred; beholding a marvellous beauty; then more than ever, assured of
community with the loftiest order;
enacting the noblest life, acquiring
identity with the divine."215 "But what must we do? How lies the Path? How
come to vision of the
inaccessible Beauty, dwelling as if in consecrated
precincts, apart from the common ways where all may see, even
the profane?
He that has strength, let him arise and withdraw into himself, foregoing all
that is known by the
eyes, turning away from the material beauty that once
made his joy."216
The return to God is stressed innumerable times in the Koran, for the
meeting with God at the end of time is one
of the fundamental purposes of
life. Those who have lead a good life in conformity with the Shari'a
are
rewarded with eternity in heaven, and those who have not are sent to Hell:
"Are they not in doubt touching the encounter with their Lord?"217 "He
originates creation, then He
brings it back again that He may recompense
those who believe and do deeds of righteousness, justly. And those
who
disbelieve - for them awaits a draught of boiling water, and a painful
chastisement, for their
disbelieving,"218 "O
soul at peace! return unto thy
Lord, well pleased, well pleasing! Enter thou among my servants! Enter thou
My
Paradise."219
On the basis of the above five tenets, it is possible to find a degree of

compatibility between Neoplatonism and Islam. However, several of the five
key Neoplatonic pillars are integral to Islam,
and it seems highly unlikely
that Muhammad was influenced by Neoplatonic ideas. It is advisable to bear
in mind
Nicholson's adage that "the identity of two beliefs does not prove
that one is generated by the
other."220 In fact, when
both sets of thought are
scrutinised more carefully, it becomes apparent that Classical Neoplatonism
is very
different from the "Neoplatonism" of the Islamic Philosophers and
also from the world
view of the Sufis.
Yet Neoplatonism did seep in to the Islamic world, indeed, once the
"Theology of
Aristotle" had been translated into Arabic, Islamic
philosophers structured their world views around the
emanationist
framework, using Arabic equivalents for Neoplatonic terminology (such as
fayḍ for emanation
and 'aql-i kull for universal intellect). This does not mean
that such philosophers embraced
everything in the Neoplatonic system, for
despite the similarities between the two positions, modern scholars
have
noted many differences between Classical Neoplatonic thought and that of
the Islamic Philosophers such as Ibn Sīnā. Morewedge has commented that
it is incorrect to call Ibn Sīnā an advocate of
Islamic Neoplatonism, rather,
his mystical philosophy "contains development of Neopiatonic themes," and
at the same time it is a "development of themes found in Islamic
philosophy."221 He summarises his standpoint by stating that . .
there is no
doubt that Islamic intellectual thought grew through the rich nourishment it
received from the
Neopiatonic spirit in the same sense that Aristotle's
philosophy flourished on a Platonic
basis; in both cases, however, the
similarity does not warrant a total reductionism."222 And furthermore, in the
same way that
there are major distinctions between Classical Neoplatonism
and Islamic Neoplatonism, there are also fundamental
differences between
Islamic Neoplatonism and Sufism.
Differences Between Classical Neoplatonism and Sufism
(i) One of the major differences was that Plotinus had described three
hypostases (the One, the Intellect
Principle and the Soul) and then followed
the universe. Al-Farābī and Ibn Sīnā developed this to the extent that
there
were ten intelligences before existents appeared on the earth. Nasafī
described the beliefs of the Islamic
Philosophers in the following manner:
Know that the Philosophers say that not more than one substance was
emanated (ṣādir shud) from the essence
of God Most High and the name
of this substance was the First Intelligence. The First Intelligence is a
simple
substance and it cannot be divided or separated. Therefore real
oneness was emanated from God Most High - Who is
Real Oneness -
and that is the First Intelligence. From the First Intelligence, the
remaining mothers and fathers
were emanated, because in this First
Intelligence there is real oneness and there is multiplicity from different
viewpoints and relations, that is, regarding the essence of intelligence
and regarding the cause of intelligence
and regarding the relationship
between the cause and effect. So from these relations of the First
Intelligence,
three view points came to be and something was emanated
from each relation of the First Intelligence. That is, an
intelligence, a
soul and a heaven. In such a way, an intelligence, a soul and a heaven
emanated from the First
Intelligence until nine intelligences, nine souls
and nine heavens came to be from the First Intelligence. And
then the
element and nature of fire were produced under the firmament of the
moon. Then the element and nature of
air were produced, and then the
element and nature of water were produced and then the element and
nature of
earth were produced and the fathers and mothers were
completed and descent was finished. Fourteen levels
descended and there
will be an ascent in fourteen levels in the opposite way to the
descent;
therefore there are fourteen levels of ascent so that the circle can be
completed.223
The first point to note is that in Plotinus's system, only one thing emanates
from the First Intelligence
(i.e. the Soul), whereas for Nasafī's Philosophers,
three things emanate from each
intelligence. Nasafī describes the views of
the People of Unity which differ from both the
Classical Neoplatonists and
also the Philosophers:
The Prophets posited this First Intelligence as the greatest level and they praised it very much.
They called
it many names and did not see anything wiser than it, and they said nothing else was
nearer to God. Mankind is
cherished and is the noblest of existents and exists through intelligence.
Sermons are by means of intelligence
and punishments are by means of intelligence. The
Philosophers also posited this First Intelligence as the
greatest level and praised it very much. The
Philosophers said that not more than one substance (jawhar) emanated (ṣādir shud) from the
essence of God Most High and Holy, and that
substance was the First Intelligence. The rest,
including creatures and the objects of intelligence and
perception (ma'qūlāt wa maḥsūsāt)
emanated from the First Intelligence.
O dervish! The Friends say it better. They say that the objects of intelligence were manifested
from the First
Intelligence and the objects of perception were manifested from the First Sphere
(falak-i awwal). The
First Intelligence and the First Sphere were manifested from Jabarūt and
became existent. These two
substances arrived at the shore together from the sea of Jabarūt.
Since you have understood this introduction, now know that some say that a divine command
came to this First
Intelligence which is the Pen of God: 'Write upon the First Sphere which is the
writing
tablet (law?) of God.' The Pen said: 'O God! What shall I write?' There came a divine
command: 'Write whatever was, is and will be until the day of resurrection.' The Pen wrote all of
this
and became dry, but according to this helpless one [i.e. Nasafī] a divine command came to the
First
Intelligence which is the Pen of God: 'Write upon yourself and the First Sphere!' It wrote in
the blink
of an eye, so that the intelligences, souls and natures appeared (paydā amadand) from the
first
intelligence and the spheres, stars and elements appeared from the First Sphere.224
Thus there is a major difference here, for the First Intelligence of the
Philosophers corresponds to Nasafī's
Jabarūt, which contains both the First
Intelligence and the First Sphere. These two things which emanate
from
Jabarūt, are explained further in the following manner:
Know that Jabarūt is one world, but this world is called different names. The
quiddities of
perceivable and intelligible things, and individual and composite things, and substances and
accidents are all in Jabarūt but they are all concealed and undifferentiated. In addition, they are
not
separate from one another. It is because of this that Jabarūt is called the ink-pot.225
Since you have understood this introduction, now know that a divine command came to the ink-
pot of the universe
to 'Split!' In a wink of an eye it split and there were two parts. One part was the
First Intelligence
which is the Pen of God and the other part was the First Heaven which is the
Throne of
God.226
The fact that two things emanate from Jabarūt reflects imagery from the
Koran, for Nasafī frequently
quotes the verse "Do not those who disbelieve
see that the heavens and earth are closed
up."227 In addition Nasafī uses the
image of the Pen for the First Intelligence
because of the verse, "By the Ink-
pot (Nun), the Pen and what they are writing."228
(ii) Another difference between Nasafī's vision of creation and that of the
Islamic Philosophers is that for
Plotinus and the Islamic Philosophers, the
First Intelligence is a spiritual intelligence which
has no contact with matter,
and the universe appears as a result of the chain of emanation which starts at
the One and continues through the First Intelligence (down through the nine
other intelligences in Ibn Sīnā's case). Nasafī portrays the system of one of
the groups of the People of
Unity which contrasts considerably with the
above.
According to the People of Unity, the first substance (jawhar-i awwal)
is the earth (khāk) and then
the rest of the things appear by means of the
earth until intelligence is reached. And according to the
Philosophers, the
first substance is intelligence and then other things appear until earth is
reached.229
Thus on the basis of this comment, the People of Unity dispense with the
whole chain of Neoplatonic emanation.
Again, such a belief reflects the
Koran, "His command, when He desires a thing, is to say 'Be!' and
it is."230
Although Sufis
including Nasafī did use the terminology of Neoplatonic
emanation (e.g. fayḍ), it conveyed a totally
different meaning to that of the
Islamic Neoplatonists. This point has been elaborated upon by Izutsu,
discussing
the wujūdī school, which had a very strong influence upon
Nasafī's thought: "It is to be
remembered that Ibn 'Arabī uses the Plotinian
term 'emanation' (fayḍ)
as a synonym for tajallī (self-disclosure). But
'emanation' does not mean as it does in the world
view of Plotinus, one thing
overflowing from the Absolute One, then another from that first thing, etc.,
in the
form of a chain. 'Emanation' for Ibn 'Arabī, simply means that the
Absolute itself appears in
different, more or less concrete forms, with a
different self determination in each case. It means that one and
the same
Reality variously articulates and determines itself and appears immediately
in the forms of different
things."231
Thus the wujūaī interpretation of emanation as described by Izutsu is
rather far removed from that of
Nicholson who commented, "the idea of
emanation, or rather the particular form of it exhibited in Sufism
proceeded,
if we are not mistaken, from the Neoplatonicmint."232
In the system of the People of Unity, God exists in His unknowable aspect
and secondly there is Jabarūt
(which is God's knowledge, otherwise known
as the immutable entities). When God bestows existence upon His
knowledge it comes immediately into the world. Nasafī comments that the
first thing is earth; earth is the First
Intelligence and the First Sphere closed
up together as the Koran states. In other words, the nature of earth is
the
spiritual or intelligible aspect (or "amr" in Koranic terminology) and the
element of earth
is the material or perceptible aspect (or "khalq.")
By placing earth first and intelligence last, the People of Unity have stood
the Philosophers on their heads. So
far, this interpretation accords
completely with the Koranic portrayal of creation. Moreover, it remains
faithful
to the Koran by placing intelligence last in the scheme, as will
become clear in the following point.
(iii) In Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq, earth (khāk), according to the People of Unity, is

the first thing
created from Jabarūt. Nasafī proceeds to explain how
everything is manifested in the universe from earth
until intelligence is
finally reached. This manifestation is also the way in which earth attains its
perfection.
In fact there are two ways in which this is done, that is, there are
two ways in which existence becomes
completely manifested.
The first way to perfection leads from earth to the sphere of spheres:
Know that the select (zubdat) and quintessence (khalāṣa) of a body
(jism) is earth, and it
becomes water, and the sclect and quintessence of
water becomes air, and the select and quintessence of air
becomes fire,
and the select and quintessence of fire becomes the body of the
firmament of the moon.223
This order then proceeds in the same manner through Mercury, Venus, the
Sun, Jupiter,
Saturn, the Fixed Stars and the Great Firmament. Nasafī
continues:
Whatever is the (select and quintessence) of the Sphere of Spheres
returns to the body of earth and the children
from the horizon by means
of the light of the Fixed Stars and Wandering stars.234
This idea that in ontological terms, the earth is the first substance and not
intelligence, is reconfirmed in
another chapter of Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq:
Know that according to the People of Unity, heaven (samā') is an expression for a
thing which is
higher ('ulwī) and the giver of emanation (mufīḍ) to the level which is lower
than itself, and the
giver of emanation may be from the world of bodies and may be from the world of spirits.
And the earth (arḍ) is an expression for a thing which is relatively lower (suflī) and is a
seeker
of emanation (mustafīḍ) from the level which is above it, and this seeker of emanation may be
from the world of bodies or the world of spirits. So the one thing may be earth and may be heaven
and for this
reason the heaven and earth are called Adam and Eve.
Know that although the heaven is the giver of emanation and the earth is a seeker of emanation,
the level of
earth is prior to the level of heaven, so Eve is prior to Adam. Although there never was
a time when there was
no earth and heaven (because there has always been heaven and earth), the
level of earth is prior to the level
of heaven and for this reason the nun is mentioned first and then
the pen (qalam), in
such a way as it is said, "Nun, by the pen and what they are writing." (68:1).235
The second way of perfection from the earth leads to man:

Know that the levels of children are threefold; mineral, plant and
animal. Matter is earth
which rises in levels and in each level it has a
name. It rises from the elements to plant, and from plant to
animal, and
one of the types of animal is man, and man is the final type. Whatever is
existent in all individual
things is existent in man. The body of earth
attains its perfection when man is reached. It will return to the
earth and
rise again in levels until it reaches man. When man is reached it will
return again to the earth, once,
twice, three times, eternally and this is the
meaning of, "Out of the earth We created you; and We shall
restore you
into it."236
That is, the perfection of the earth is reached when it reaches
the body of man and the perfection of nature is
when it reaches
intelligence. And everything which attains perfection will return to its
origin and this is the
meaning of "Everything returns to its origin, once,
twice, thrice, maybe
indefinitely."237'238
This description in Kashf-al-ḥaqā'iq of two ways to the perfection of earth
becomes clearer with Nasafī's remarks in al-Insān al-kāmil:
Know that Abū Turāb Nasafī,239
who is one of the People of Unity
says that intelligence and knowledge are not included in anything other
than
mankind. The purpose of Abū Turāb in this discourse is to negate
the discourses of the 'Ulamā' and
Philosophers. The 'Ulamā' and
Philosophers say that spheres and stars have
intelligence and knowledge,
desire and power, that is, each sphere has an intelligence, and there are
nine
spheres and the nine intelligences. They are constantly acquiring
knowledge and extracting lights and their
movements are voluntary. The
'Ulamā' say that the angels have knowledge, but it
is not increased. That
which each one knows is its inherent knowledge. Abū Turāb does not
accept either of these
discourses and he says that the spheres and stars
and angels do not have intelligence and knowledge, for
intelligence and
knowledge are particular to mankind. The spheres, stars and angels are
continually occupied,
each one has an action and they can not refrain
from it or perform another one; so that action came in to
existence from
themselves without their knowledge or desire, and the spheres and stars
and angels are compelled
in their actions. The spheres, stars and angels
are the loci of manifestation for action and mankind is the locus
of
manifestation for knowledge.240
Thus the first route to perfection through to the Sphere of Spheres is inferior
to that which leads to
intelligence in man. Initially, earth is the first thing to
be created and intelligence comes last. Once created
however, the heavens
and stars have an important role to play upon the states and circumstances
and the make up
of each thing. For this reason, it sometimes occurs in
Nasafī's works that the heavens are placed in a
position which is prior to the
earth. However, the heavens and stars can only exercise their influences
upon that
which has already been created (that is, upon something which is
prior to them).241 This creation is constantly occurring because God
creates
the world anew every moment, thus the whole process of earth being created
first commences again and
again).
The reason that the philosophers are stood on their heads by placing earth
first and intelligence last is because
intelligence in found only in man. Man
is the centre of the universe. This point was of course stressed by other
Sufis
prior to Nasafī, for example, Rūmī expressed the superiority of man over the
universe by saying: "We
have honoured the children of Adam (17:70), God
did not say, 'We have honoured the heavens and earth.' So
man is able to
perform that task which neither the heavens nor the earth nor the mountains
can perform. When he
performs that task, he will no longer be sinful, very
foolish."242 The honour that Rūmī refers to is the
gift of knowledge, the
knowledge by which man is able to acquire more knowledge. Not even the
angels (who are
merely messengers) possess this kind of knowledge. Indeed,
in the Koran, the angels are required to bow down
before man, a verse which
Nasafī quoted: When I have breathed of My spirit into him, you [the angels]
should bow
down before him all together.243 Rūmī also quotes the ḥadīth,
"But for thee I would not have created
the heavenly spheres," which also
emphasises man's superior position to any other created thing. Such an
idea,
that the universe was created for man's benefit and to serve him, is
commonplace in Nasafī's works:
O dervish! It is man and whatever he needs that is existent. Nothing
else is existent other than this. If man
could exist without the spheres,
stars, elements, natures, plants and animals, then he would live without
them.
But he cannot exist without them and he cannot live without them,
so the aim of all of them is man, and the
existence of all other things is
for man's sake.244
This relationship is described in another way by Nasafī as man being the

fruit of a tree, with
all other existents being part of the tree, serving the fruit:
Know that according to the People of Unity all of the existents are one tree; the first sphere
(which is the
sphere of spheres and is simple and not illuminated) is the ground (zamīn) of this
tree. And the ground
of the second sphere (which is the fixed sphere) is the root of this tree. The
seven heavens (haft
āsmān) are the trunk of this tree, Saturn in the first heaven and the moon in the
seventh heaven. Saturn,
which is further from us, is in the first heaven; and you should understand
the rest in the same way. Each one
which is nearer to us is higher up. And the fourfold elements
and natures are the branches of this tree while
the minerals, plants and animals are the leaves,
flowers and fruit of the tree. Since you have understood the
levels of the tree, now know that the
fruit is the end of the tree; it is the select and quintessence of the
tree and is more noble and subtle
than the tree. Whatever is nearer to the fruit in the tree is higher and more
subtle and noble.245
O dervish! The People of Unity say that the levels of this tree were always complete and are
always complete.
But some of the levels of this tree exist in such a way that they cannot release the
form which they have and
they cannot take another form. This is the lower world ('ālam-ī suflī)
which is the spheres and
stars that are the roots and trunk of this tree. It must be in this way
because the roots and trunk of the tree
have a form which they do not release and they do not take
another form. But some [of the levels of the tree]
exist in such a way that they release the form
which they have and take another form, and this is the higher
world ('ālam-i 'ulwī), which is the
minerals, plants and animals and they
are the leaves, flowers and fruit of this tree. And it must be
this way because the leaves, flowers and fruit
are not always in one state, sometimes the flowers
drop off, and the fruit of some falls when it is not ripe
and some falls when it is ripe. Moreover, the
leaves, flowers and fruit appear; they themselves grow, they
themselves are born, they themselves
exist and they themselves die. However, this tree rises up in levels and
becomes more subtle and
more delicate (nāzuktar), and for this reason it may suffer a calamity and move
from place to place
contrary to the roots, trunk and branches.246
Know that the People of Unity say that there is no sense perception, voluntary movement or
desire in all the
levels of existents except for animals. Sense perception, voluntary movement and
desire is particular to
animals. And there is no intelligence ('aql) or knowledge ('ilm) in existents
except in
man; intelligence and knowledge is particular for man. The spheres, stars, angels,
elements and natures do not
have sense perception, voluntary movement, intelligence or
knowledge. They are continually working and each one
has a task; each one is engaged in
performing that task and it can not perform a task other than that [which it
is performing]. So that
task without knowledge, and without thought and without their desire, comes in to
existence
through them. That is, sense perception, voluntary movement, desire, intelligence and knowledge
is
particular for the fruit of this tree, but there is no sense perception, voluntary movement, desire,
intelligence and knowledge in the other levels of this tree.247
In Rūmī's words, "The outward form of the branch is the origin of the fruit;
but inwardly, the branch
came into existence for the fruit's sake."
The significance of the microcosm being regarded as superior to the
macrocosm
can also be seen in the light of the wujūdī interpretation of the
divine names Raḥmān and
Raḥīm, which Nasafī appears to make. He
comments:
One name of the names of the spirit of the sphere of spheres is the
Compassionate (al-Raḥmān) and the body
of the sphere of spheres is the
Throne, and the Compassionate is seated upon the Throne:
"The
Compassionate is firmly established upon the Throne,"248 and one name
of the names of the spirit of the Perfected Man is the
Merciful (al-
Raḥīm): He is gentle to believers, merciful,249 and the body of the
Perfected Man is the Throne and the Merciful is firmly
established upon
the Throne. The Compassionate and Merciful (who are the select and
quintessence of the macrocosm
and microcosm and the last of existents
and extremity of levels) are God's Throne and God is firmly
established
upon the Throne.250
Nasafī's interpretation of Raḥman and Raḥīm was discussed by Meier, who
visualised the relationship in the diagram below.
Meier has seen in this a kind of Islamic trinity in which "Nasafī's

conception is . . . that man, by
mystical growth into the knowledge of the All
(i.e. the macrocosm - or Raḥman) ultimately arrives at a kind of
coincidence
with the All, and with God. All and Man the Perfecter are two all-embracing
loci: the All in that it
is nature, man in that he reflects this nature. And God
is exalted above these two only to the extent that he is
symbol and concept
of their unity, wherein all antagonisms are resolved."251 Meier's explanation
is illuminating, but we can
advance one step further by recognising the
fundamental distinctions between Raḥman and Raḥīm of
the wujūdī school
which emphasises a uniqueness enjoyed by Raḥīm.
Ibn 'Arabī regards Raḥman as an inclusive mercy which is bestowed upon
the macrocosm and the
microcosm. Raḥman is the existence which is blown
upon the immutable entities which then immediately
appear in this world as
Nasafī states: "Raḥman is a name for Him, for that face where existence is
distributed to the possible things."252 Raḥīm, however, is particular to man,
for it is an obligatory mercy in
the sense that God rewards those who are
worthy of it, and He is wrathful upon those who are not. So man in fact
receives Raḥman (i.e. existence) and has the potential to receive Raḥīm
(God's reward).
Raḥīm is bestowed on those individuals who employ their
knowledge, desire and power in a way that is
appropriate in serving God.
Since the macrocosm has no knowledge, it cannot be a recipient of Raḥīm.
(iv) Aside from this major difference between Nasafī's theosophy and that
of the Islamic Philosophers and Classical Neoplatonism, there are several
other factors which make
Classical Neoplatonism distinct from the beliefs of
Nasafī and the Islamic
Philosophers.253 The first of
these concerns the
concept of being. For Plotinus, the One is completely transcendent, to the
extent that in some passages of the "Enneads," it appears that the One is not
even conscious of itself.254
Moreover, in some passages, the One is beyond
being: "What is this which does not exist? But the existence
of That, in the
sense which we say it exists, is known from the things that come after it."255
It appears that there were some
Islamic Philosophers who followed this line,
for in Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq, Nasafī comments:
. . . and the Philosophers have different opinions regarding the
existence of God Most High and Holy. Some have
said that God has
quiddity and also existence, since existence is impossible without
quiddity.
Some have said that God has quiddity but not existence, in
order that "manyness" (kathrat) and
plurality (ijzā') is not necessary [for
God]. Some have said that God's quiddity is the same
('ayn) as God's
existence and is not prior to God's existence in order that
"manyness"
and plurality is not necessary [for God].256
For Nasafī, God's quiddity is His existence; one of Nasafī's favourite

phrases, which occurs numerable
times in all of his works, is "existence is
not more than one and that is the existence of God Most High and
Holy."257
(v) There is quite a distinction between Nasafī and Neoplatonic thought in
the stance taken towards matter. Plotinus regards matter as intrinsically evil,
while later Neoplatonists such as Proclus modify this idea and come to
regard it in a more positive light.258 For Nasafī, it is unthinkable that
matter
can be evil because it is one of the modes in which God manifests Himself.
It has already been seen that
Nasafī views the world as divided into two
parts, that is, the sensual and spiritual. Matter belongs to the
sensual world
but it co-exists with the spiritual world and is not separate from it. Nasafī
repeatedly uses the
Koranic concepts of non-manifest (bāṭin) and manifest
(ẓāhir) to describe how these two should be
regarded as one:
Existence is not more than one and that is the existence of God, and other than God nothing else
has existence.
But there is a 'ẓāhir' and a 'bāṭin' for this one existence. Its
'ẓāhir' is creation (khalq)
which is an expression for the world of bodies, and its
'bāṭin' is called 'command' (amr) which is
an expression for the world of
spirits.259
Know that the call of the Prophets and the instruction of the Friends are for the sake that people
adhere with
good words, good actions and character traits so that their 'ẓāhir' becomes correct. If
the
'ẓāhir' is not correct then the 'bāṭin' is not correct, because the
'bāṭin' is like a thing which is
poured into the body. So if the body is
erect, the thing that is poured into the body will also be
erect, but if it is bent, that thing poured into the
body will also be bent.
(vi) The last difference involves the practical manner of Sufism and
Neoplatonism, in particular, the role of an
intermediary between the
individual and the One/God. Modern commentators have seen different
mediator figures in
the "Enneads" ranging from an "ascetic sage" to love,
and it has also been speculated
that there is no intermediary at all.261 This
stands in contrast to Sufism and Nasafī's theosophy where the role of
the
intermediary figure plays a crucial role. The identity of this figure is not the
same in all cases. One
possibility is the Sufi Shaykh or wise man (dānā):
Without the association of a wise man it is not possible that someone
can reach his target. The fruit of the
desert which grows by itself is never
equal with the fruit of the orchard which the gardener has nurtured. In
the
same way, each wayfarer who has not found association with a wise
man will never be equal to a wayfarer who has
found association with a
wise man.262
Another possible intermediary is the so-called "invisible shaykh" (shaykh al-

ghayb) who may
appear before the wayfarer following the ascetic disciplines
and spiritual exercises that are performed under the
supervision of the Sufi
shaykh. The invisible shaykh is an important element in the theosophy of
Najm al-Din
Kubrā for the former is no other than the realisation of the
perfected self, or the "theophanical
ego."263
The last possible mediator described by Nasafī is God's love. Nasafī
portrays God's love in a discourse
on dhikr in such a way that it is regarded
as a gift from God:
The glory of the Beloved empties the heart of the lover of everything
but Himself, everything is taken out of the
heart ... at that time the lover
does not see himself and he sees everything as the Beloved.264
The possibility that God draws one of his servants towards him on the basis
of His love was a common belief in
Sufi circles. Indeed, Nasafī describes
how Shaykh Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī portrayed four types of Sufis, one of
which he called "majdhūb" (or divinely attracted) who are involuntarily
drawn by God's
divine attraction (jadhb) and they arrive at the level of love
in the love of
God.265
Conclusion
Several eminent scholars, in particular P. Morewedge, have highlighted the
distinctions between Neoplatonic
thought and that of the Islamic
Philosophers such as Ibn Sīnā. This has provided a basis to
re-investigate the
relationship between Sufism and Neoplatonism (and Islamic
Neoplatonism/Philosophy). It is not
an easy task to research Nasafī's position
in regard to Sufism and Neoplatonism because it is not always
clear which
particular Islamic interpretation he is discussing. However, the system
portrayed in Kashf
al-ḥaqā'iq posits earth as the first thing created by God,
and everything else,
including the heavens and man reach perfection from
earth. This is the belief of one of the groups of the People
of Unity, and
therefore it would seem likely that Nasafī had more sympathy with this
group than
with the ideas of the Philosophers. One can speculate that
Nasafī's portrayal of the "Philosophers"
was based upon his familiarity of
works such as the "Theology of Aristotle" and the
eclectic mixes of al-Farābī
and Ibn Sīnā whereas the explanation of the People of Unity way well have
been a
result of spiritual unveiling and contemplation of the Koran.
Labelling Nasafī's works as "a Neoplatonic
system of 'emanation and return'
as a mystical depiction of the world,"266 does not do justice to the many
levels
of interpretation that are contained within them. It is equally as valid
to remark that his works depict the
Koranic belief of creation and return.
Notes
1 Koran, 2: 115.
2 For example, Mishkāt al-anwār, translated W.H.T. Gairdner
(London: Royal Asiatic Society,
1915; repr. Lahore: SH Muhammad Ashraf, 1952).
3 S. Murata, The Tao of Islam, p. 331.
4 A.E. Affifi comments that Ibn 'Arabī is a
"thoroughgoing pantheist who tried his best to
reconcile his pantheistic doctrine with Islam." See
"Ibn 'Arabī," A History of Muslim
Philosophy, ed. M.M. Sharif (Wiesbaden: Otto
Harrassowitz, 1963), Vol I, p. 420. See also I.R.
Netton's relevant comments in Allah Transcendent
(London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 272274. F.
Meier's article on Nasafī, "The nature of monism in
Islam," refers to his theosophy as monist
countless times.
5 W. Chittick, "Rūmī and waḥdat al-wujūd," p. 72.
6 Koran, 42: 11,
7 Ḥadīth frequently quoted by Sufis.
8 Ḥadīth, See al-Suyūṭī, al-Jāmi' al-ṣaghīr (Fayd
al-qadīr fī sharḥ al-Jāmi' al-ṣaghīr), (Beirut:
Dār al-Ma'rifa, 1972), Vol. III, pp. 262-63.
9 Ḥaditb, ed. B. Furūzānfar,
Aḥādīth mathnawī (Tehran: 1955), no. 346.
10 Kttāb-i tanzīl, fol. 38a, lines 9-13.
11 Koran, 20: 114.
12 Kitāb-i tanzīl, fol. 39a, lines 5-11.
13 These three terms, Mulk, Malakūt and
Jabarūt are crucial in Nasafi's theosophy. The first two
appear in the Koran, (for Mulk see
for example 2: 101, 3: 186, 5: 20, 21, 44, 120. For Malakūt
see 23: 90, 36: 83). Jabarūt does not
appear in the Koran, but it is derived from the divine
name al-Jabbār, or All-compeller (59: 23).
Scholars have translated Mulk as "kingdom" and
Malakūt as "dominion" and
Jabarūt as "invincibility" (see Chittick, The Sufi Path of
Knowledge, p. 282). However,
I have refrained from translating these terms in this way
because such translations do not reflect the meaning
that Nasafī generally gives to them. Mulk
is connected with the world of sense perception and
Malakūt is connected to the world of
spirits, and Jabarūt stands higher than both of them in this
hierarchy.
15 See Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, chapter 20.
16 A saying frequently quoted by Sufis, for example see Chittick,
Faith and Practice, p. 14.
17 Kashf al-mahjūb, Hujwīrī, trans. R.A. Nicholson (London:
Luzac, 1911), pp. 367-370.
18 See Margaret Smith, al-Ghazālī the Mystic (London:
Luzac, 1944; repr. Lahore: Hijra
International Publications, 1983), pp. 130-131.
19 Kitāb-i tanzīl, fol. 39b, lines 3-4.
20 Hadītb, Furūzānfar, no. 100. See S. Murata, op. cit., p.
265.
21 Koran, 17: 1.
25 Ibid, fol. 39b, lines 16-17.
26 This ḥadītb is often quoted by Sufis but given various
interpretations. For example, see Ibn
'Arabī's usage in Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, p.
88.
28 Kitāb-i tanzīl, fol. 39b, line 10. (This alludes to the
Koran 6: 59, "Not a leaf falls but He knows
it.")
30 Ibid, fol. 40a, lines 1-4.
31 Koran, 57: 4.
32 Koran, 54: 50
36 For an English translation of this chapter, see Chittick,
Imaginal Worlds, p. 129-136.
37 See Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, p. 387, n. 14.
39 See Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, p. 298.
40 Kitāh-i tanzīl, fol. 41b, lines
5-6. (Koran, 36: 82).
41 A ḥadīth reported by Bukhārī, Muslim and Ibn Ḥanbal,
frequently quoted by Sufis; see Najm al-
Dīn Rāzī, Mirṣad al-'ibād min al-mabdā ilā'l-ma'ād,
translated H. Algar, The Path of God's
Bondsmen from Origin to Return (New York: Caravan Books,
1982), p. 162.
43 Ibid, fol. 42a, line 1. This discussion of God being
All-Knowing and AllAware is based on two
of God's Ninety-Nine Names. The All-Knowing occurs in the Koran in
verses 32: 1, 35: 2, 27:
1, 37: 1, and the All-Aware is found in verses 6: 18 and 34: 1. God's names were
the topic of
many Sufi works, such as Ghazālī's Maqṣad al-asnā, translated R.C. Stade, "The
Ninety-Nine
Names of God in Islam" (Ibadan, Nigeria: Caystar Press, 1970).
44 Kitāb-t tanzīl, fol. 42a, lines 2-12.
45 Ibid, fol. 42a, line 17 - fol. 42b, line 1.
46 Ibid, fol. 42b, line 2.
47 al-Insān al-kāmil, p. 242.
49 Ibid, fol. 43a, line 2-3.
51 Ibn 'Arabī comments "For God says, 'Our only word
to a thing, when We desire it is to say to it
'Be!' and it is.' (16: 40). Here we have an Essence,
a desire and a word," cited by S. Murata, op.
cit., p. 151. See also R. Austin, Ibn al-'Arabī: The
Bezels of Wisdom (New York: Paulist Press,
1980) chapter 11.
52 This ḥadīth in this form is found in Bukhārī,
Riqāq, 38.
53 See Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, pp. 325-31.
54 Kitāb-i tanzīl, fol. 43a, line 18.
55 Ibn 'Arabī, translated by Chittick, The Sufi Path of
Knowledge, p. 329.
58 Koran, 8: 17.
60 For example, see Henri Corbin, Creative Imagination in the
Sufism of Ibn 'Arabi (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1969) and Chittick Imaginal Worlds.
Ibn 'Arabī defines three types
of imagination, "Nondelimited imagination" is the widest sense of
the concept for it includes
existents in potentiality and in actuality; "discontiguous imagination"
refers to the intermediate
world of the macrocosm; "contiguous imagination" is used to describe both
the soul and also
one of the faculties of the soul called imagination in each individual.
61 Austin, op. cit., pp. 120-127.
63 A quotation from Ibn 'Arabī's Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikām.
". . .whole earthly life was after this fashion,
being a dream within a dream," and several
paragraphs later, "all existence is an imagination
within an imagination." See Austin, op. cit., p.
121, p. 125.
64 Ḥadīth, Furūzānfar, no. 222.
66 Ibid, fol. 44a, line L
67 Koran 41: 53. For Ibn 'Arabī's use of this verse see
Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knoivledge, p. xv.
68 See F. Rahman's Avicenna's Psychology (London:
Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 30-38.
69 Kitāb-i tanzīl, fol. 59b, line 4 - fol. 60 a line
2.
70 Rūmī, quoted by Chittick, The Sufi Path of Love, p. 279.
71 Kitāb-i tanzīl, fol. 48a, lines 16-17,
73 Ibid, fol. 44a, lines 11-14,
74 Hadīth, Furūzānfar, no. 352.
79 Ibid, fol. 45a, line 9.
82 See A. Schimmel, As Through a Veil (New York: Columbia
83 See W.M. Thackston's translation of Ansārī's
Munājāt, Intimate Conversations (New York:
Paulist Press, 1978), p. 215.
84 A. Schimmel, As Through a Veil, p. 61.
86 See M. Molé's introduction to al-Insān al-kāmil, p.
13. Heccéité is the French form of haecceity,
an obsolete English word meaning a quality or mode of being in
virtue of which a thing is or
becomes a definite individual.
87 See H. Corbin's Creative Imagination in the Sufism of
Ibn 'Arabī, and Chittick, The Sufi Path of
Knowledge, pp. 127-30.
88 Bayān-i tanzīl, fol. 9, lines 9-13.
89 See Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge concerning the
Divine Breath and the Cloud, p. 126.
94 The Perfect Man is a major element in Ibn 'Arabī's
theosophy and his commentators discussed
this issue at length. Indeed, Nasafī himself composed a book entitled
the Perfect Man.
95 Kitāb-i tanzīl, fol. 46a, line 18 - fol. 46b, line 3.
96 Koran, 50: 15, quoted by Nasafī, Kitāb-i tanzīl, fol.
46b, line 19.
97 Kitāb-i tanzīl, fol. .46b, line 6. For Ibn 'Arabī
see Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, p. 97.
100 Ibid, fol. 47a, line 6 - fol. 47b, line 3.
101 See the Koran, 27: 40 and also Austin, op. cit., pp. 188-189.
105 Koran, 3: 97. Kitāb-i tanzīl, fol. 48a, line 4.
108 Koran, 2: 115.
109 Koran, 38: 5.
111 Such a description is found in Ghazālī's Mishkāt
al-anwār, translated Gairdner, p. 108.
112 I have not been able to trace the origin of this statement.
113 The shaṭḥ of Abū Sa'id b. Abi'l Khayr.
114 The shaṭḥ of Hallāj Ibn Mansūr.
117 A reference to the Koran, (7: 180), "To God belong the
most beautiful names."
118 Maqsad-i aqṣā, p. 264.
119 Kitāb-i tanzīl, fol. 49a, line 13. This is a Ḥadīth
qudsī, Furūzānfar, no. 70.
120 See below, Section III, Nasafī and Neoplatonic Ontology.
121 Kitāb-i tanzīl, fol. 50a, line 7. Koran 21: 30.
122 Koran, 68: 1.
123 Kitāb-i tanzīl, fol. 50a, lines 5-8. The four pens are
the four primal elements (earth, water, air
and fire) of the world. They mix together to form the composite
things, which are the three
kingdoms of mineral, plant and animal.
124 See Kasbf al-ḥaqā'iq, pp. 57-58.
127 Ibid, fol. 51a, lines 12-16. Compare with Ibn 'Arabī's
ideas on this point in Austin, op. cit,, p.
251-252.
128 Kitāb-i tanzīl, fol. 50b, lines 5-11. The imagery of
the jug in this passage resembles Junayd's
axiom that the water takes the colour of the cup.
129 Kitāb-i tanzīl, The story of the elephant extends from
fol. 51a, line 17 to fol. 51b, line 17. F.
Meier has commented on the origin of this story, suggesting a
Buddhist origin before it was
picked up by Sufis such as Sanā'ī, Ghazālī, Rūmī and Nasafī. See F. Meier,
"The Nature of
Monism in Islam."
130 Kitāb-tanzīl, fol. 52a, lines 7-11.
132 Nasā'ī, Taṭbīq, bāb 12, 25, 73, 86; Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, vi.
24. Cited by A. J. Wensinck, "On the
Relation Between Ghazālī's Cosmology and His Mysticism,"
Mededeelingen der Koninklijke
Akademie wan Wetenschappen (Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche
Uitgevers-Maatschappij,
1933).
133 A. J. Wensinck, op. cit., p. 188-190.
134 L.E. Goodman, Avicenna (London: Routledge, 1992), p.
89-90.
135 A. J. Wensinck, op. cit., pp. 191-92.
136 Ibid, p. 193.
137 See Chittick, Faith and Practice, p. 263.
138 Maqṣad-i aqṣā, pp. 238-240.
139 See Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, p. 408, n.8.
140 Translated by Wensinck, op. cit., p. 195.
141 Wensinck's translation reads Malakūt, but this must
be an error. To make sense of the passage,
one should read Jabarūt.
142 A. J. Wensinck, op. cit., p. 194-195. For another account of
Ghazālī's interpretation of Jabarūt,
see K. Nakamura, "Imam Ghazali's Cosmology
Reconsidered with Special Reference to the
Concept of Jabarut," Muslim World, 1994, pp. 29-46.
143 'Ayn al-Quḍāt, Nāmahā-yi 'Ayn al-Quḍāt, ed.
'Afīf 'Ussayrān, Vol. 1 (Tehran: Intisharāt-i Zawār,
1362), p. 277.
144 Shaykh Shihāb al-Dīn Yahyā Suhrawardī, Ḥikmat
al-Ishrāq, translated into Persian by Sayyid
Ja'far Sajjādī (Tehran: Tehran University, 1978), p. 230.
145 H. Corbin, Spiritual Body and Celestial Earth,
translated from the French by N. Pearson
(Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 55.
146 H. Ziai, "The Source and Nature of Authority: A Study of
alSuhrawardī's Illuminationist
Political Doctrine," in The Political Aspects of Islamic
Philosophy, ed. C. Butterworth
(Harvard Middle Eastern Monographs, Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 319,
n.40.
147 H. Ziai, ibid.
148 H. Corbin, Spiritual Body and Celestial Earth, p. 55.
149 For an account of the wujūdī school's
interpretation of the different levels of existence see
Chittick's article, "The Five Divine
Presences," Muslim World, pp.107-28.
150 Ibid, p. 119.
151 Maqṣad-i aqṣā, pp. 275-285.
152 Ibid.'p. 279."
153 Ibid, p. 281.
154 So called because the spirit is attributed to both God and
man. The Koran says that God blew of
His spirit into Adam.
156 Ibid,'p- 280."
157 Koran, 68: 1.
158 Ḥadīth, in Furūzānfar, no.70.
159 Ḥadīth, in Furūzānfar, no. 342.
160 The children are the kingdoms of mineral, plant and animal.
161 Koran, 18: 109. Maqṣad-i aqṣā, p. 258.
163 Kitāb-i tanzīl, fol. 67b lines 8-14.
164 Tabṣirsat al-mubtadi', trans. Chittick, Faith
and Practice, pp. 99-100.
165 Tabṣirsat al-mubtadi', trans. Chittick, Faith
and Practice., p. 99.
166 Chittick, Imaginal Worlds, p. 103.
167 See Manāzil al-sā'īrīn, p. 408-420, also Kashf
al-ḥaqā'iq, p. 17-19. In Kitāb-i tanzīl, the
Transmigrationists are not named although the
discussions are the same as those attributed to
the Transmigrationists in other works, see fol. 68 a, line 2 -
fol. 71 b line 13.
169 Manāzil al-sā'īrīn, p. 408
170 Ibid, p. 410.
171 For an explanation of the nasnās, see Algar, The
Path of God's Bondsmen from Origin to
Return, p. 82, n. 18.
172 Kitāb-i tanzīl, fol. 68 b line 1 - 68 b line 17.
173 Ibid, fol. 69 aline 13.
174 Ibid, fol. 68 b line 15-68 b line 17.
177 Ibid, p. 189.
178 Ibid, p. 188.
179 See Chittick, Faith and Practice, p. 227-228.
180 Translated Chittick, The Sufi Path of Love, p. 79.
181 'Ayn al-Quḍāt, Tamhīdāt, ed. 'Afīf
'Ussayrān (Tehran: Intishātāt Manuchihr, 1373/1994), para.
385.
182 'Ayn al-Quḍāt, Tamhīdāt, para. 376.
183 See Sajjādī's introduction to his Persian edition of
Ḥikmat al-ishrāq (Tehran University Press,
1978), pp. 16-18.
185 Ibid, p. 158.
186 Ibid, p. 192.
187 Ibid, p. 192.
188 O. Leaman, An Introduction to Medieval Islamic
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1985), p. 94.
189 Mohammed, O.N. Averroes Doctrine of Immortality
(Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press,
1984). See Chapter III, pp 84-114.
190 Ibid, p. 112-113.
191 Chittick, bnaginal Worlds, p. 99.
192 For Simnānīs discussion of the ontological levels see J.j.
Elias, The Throne Carrier of God
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), pp. 154-157.
193 R.A. Nicholson, The Mystics of Islam (London: G. Bell
& Sons, 1914), p. 13.
194 A.J. Arberry, Fifty Poems of Hdfiz (London: Cambridge
195 P. Morewedge, "Sufism, Neoplatonism, and Zaehner's
Theistic Theory of Mysticism," in P.
Morewedge (ed). Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism (Albany: SUNY
Press, 1981), p. 225.
196 See for example, al-Insān al-kāmil, p. 190.
197 Chittick, Imagmal Worlds, p. 179, n. 1.
198 Concerning the influence of Neoplatonism upon al-Farabi, see
I.R. Netton's Al-Farabi and His
School (London: Routledge, 1992).
199 D. Martin, "The Return to the One in the Philosophy of
Najm al-Din Kubra," in P. Morewedge
(ed), Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism, p. 212.
200 Plotinus, Enneads, trans. Stephen MacKenna, VI.9.6
(London: Penguin, 1991), p. 542.
201 Koran, 28: 88.
202 Koran, 21: 22.
203 Koran, 112: 1.
204 Plotinus, Enneads, III.7.6, p. 219.
205 Koran, 55: 26.
206 Koran, 2: 255.
207 Plotinus, Enneads, V.4.1, p. 388.
208 Ibid, V.1.6, p. 354.
209 Koran, 50: 15.
210 Koran, 55: 29.
211 Koran, 30:4.
212 Plotinus, Enneads, V.2.1, p. 361.
213 Nasafī also quoted variations of this ḥadīth, for
example, "the first thing God created was
intelligence," "the first thing God created was
spirit," "the first thing God created was the Pen."
Kashf
al-ḥaqā'iq, p. 47.
214 Koran, 21: 30.
215 Plotinus, Enneads, IV.8.1, p. 334.
216 Plotinus, Enneads, 1.6.8. p. 53.
217 Koran, 41: 54.
218 Koran, 10: 4.
219 Koran, 89: 27.
220 R.A. Nicholson, Introduction to Selected Poems from the
Diwan-i Shams Tabrizi (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1898; repr. Richmond: Curzon Press, 1994), p.
xxx.
221 P. Morewedge, Introduction to Neoplatonism and Islamic
Thought, (Albany, SUNY Press,
1992), p. 4.
222 P. Morewedge, "Sufism, Neoplatonism, and Zaehner's
Theistic Theory of Mysticism," p. 231.
224 Ibid, p. 189.
225 Ibid, p.186.
226 Ibid, p. 186-187. Til See for example, Kitāb-i
tanzīl, fol. 50a, line.3.
228 Koran, 68: 1.
229 Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq, p. 57. See also, Kitāb-i
tanzīl, fol. 52a, lines 5-16.
230 Koran, 36: 82.
231 T. Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1984)
p. 154. Corbin was perhaps the first to remark on the distinctions
between the emanationist
position compared with that of the wujūdī school. He remarked, "This
cosmogony is neither an
emanation in the Neoplatonic sense of the word nor, still less, a creatio ex nihilo. It
is rather a
succession of manifestations of being, brought about by an increasing light, within the
originally
undifferentiated God; it is a succession of tajalliyat of theophanies." Creative
Imagination in the
Sufism of Ibn 'Arabī, translated R. Manheim (Princeton: Princeton
232 R.A. Nicholson, Selected Poems from the Diwan-i Shams
Tabrizi, p. xxx-xxxi.
234 Ibid, p. 57.
235 Ibid, p. 225.
236 Koran, 20: 57.
237 Ḥadīth, (source not given).
238 Kasbf al-ḥaqā'iq, p. 58.
239 Abū Turāb Nasafī was a Sufi from Transoxania who emphasised
trust in God (tawakkul). He
met an unfortunate end in 859 A.D for he was eaten by lions in the desert.
241 In this system, emanation still has an important role to play,
because the emanations from the
spheres determine the fortune of each child's life, and there are four times when these
emanations take place: . . there are two kinds of preparedness
(isti'dād); one is actualised at the
origin without the free will and acquisition of the child, and
this is the preparedness of the
effects of the qualities of time and place; and the other is actualised after
the origin through
free will and acquisition and this preparedness is through effort and endeavour."
"O dear
friend! There are strong effects and complete qualities on the preparedness and states
(aḥwāl)
of the child for when the sperm falls in to the womb, the time when the form of the child
appears, the time when the spirit appears in the form and the time when the child leaves the
mother's
womb." (Kitāb-i tanzīl, fol. 60b lines 11-17). The states of each person are different
because the
emanations each day (and thus the four times of each person) are different: "The
spheres and stars are the
managers of the lower world and they have no free will and their
function is to continually spread torment and
comfort in this world and spread felicity and
wretchedness in a universal way, not in a particular way."
(al-Insān al-kāmil, p. 197).
242 Quoted from Chittick, The Sufi Path of Love, p. 63.
243 Kasbf al-ḥaqā'iq, p. 85, Koran 15: 29.
244 Maqṣad-i aqṣā, p. 266
245 Manāzil al-sā'īrīn, p. 430-1.
246 Ibid, p. 431-432.
247 Ibid, p. 433.
248 Koran, 20: 5.
249 Koran, 9: 129.
251 F. Meier, "The Problem of Nature in the Monism of
Islam," p. 187.
252 Nasafī, Maqṣad- Aqṣā, p. 237.
253 See P. Morewedge, "Sufism, Neoplatonism, and
Zaehner's Theistic Theory of Mysticism," p.
228-229.
254 Plotinus, Enneads, VI.9.9.
255 Ibid.
257 It is interesting that Ibn 'Arabi also uses the expression
"There is no existent but God," and
"there is no existent other than He." See Chittick,
"Rumi and waḥdat al-wujūd," p. 108, n. 52.
258 See I.R. Netton, Muslim Neoplatonists (London: Allen
and Unwin, 1982), p. 34.
261 For this discussion see P. Morewedge,
Neoplatonism and Islamic Thought, p. 70.
263 T. Izutsu, "The Theophanical Ego in Sufism,"
Sophia Perennis, Bulletin of the Imperial Iranian
Academy of Philosophy, Vol. IV, No. 1 (Tehran, 1978).
266 P. Morewedge, "Sufism, Neoplatonism and Zaehner's
Theistic Theory of Mysticism," p. 225.
3
Epistemology
I. ATTAINING
KNOWLEDGE
'Ayn al-Quḍāt Hamadānī (d. 1131) claimed the idea of the equidistance of
all things from their ultimate
ontological Source in terms of knowledge (or
ma'iyyat, "withness") to be his own.1 This understanding of God's
proximity
reflects the Koranic verse which states that God is with man wherever he
is2, but the practical reality is that man is negligent
and he forgets this
"withness," so he must strive to acquire such knowledge and once attained,
keep it
in mind constantly. By Nasafī's era, the idea of "withness" expressed
in terms of knowledge had
become common in Sufi circles, and is
explained in Nasafī's own works:
O Dervish! God is very close, just as the Most High said: "We are
nearer to him than the jugular
vein,"3 and there are many
examples like
this in the Koran and ḥadīth, but what is the use if the people have
fallen far, far behind
and remain without any share or portion in the
gnosis of God and God's proximity. Every day they boast and
say that
we are searching for God, but they do not know that God is present and
there is no need to search. O
dervish! God is neither far from some nor
close to others. He is with everyone. All the existents are equal in
proximity with Him. The highest of the high and the lowest of the low
are the same in proximity with Him. We have
spoken of proximity in
terms of knowledge (ilm) and ignorance, that is, whoever is more
knowledgeable is
nearer.4
The knowledge of the various groups that Nasafī portrayed agreed upon the
general principles of Islam, such as
the unity of God and how He could be
described. For example:
Know that the Sufis say that all the Prophets and Friends have said that
there is a creator for the world. After
the Prophets and Friends, all the
'Ulamā' and Philosophers have also said that
there is a creator for the world
and in order to prove this they have given many reasons
and they have
written and continue to write books, so it is not necessary for me to give
any proof for the
[existence of a] creator of the world.
Since you have understood that there is a creator for the world, now know that the Sufis say
that there is one
creator and He is eternal, and has no beginning or end, no like or partner, and He
cannot change or alter, and
He cannot be non-existent or annihilated, and He has no place
(makān), time or direction. He is endowed
with the appropriate attributes and He is free from
inappropriate attributes. The 'Ulamā' and
Philosophers agree on this point with the Sufis.
The Sufis say in addition to this that the essence of God is unlimited and infinite. O dervish!
The
'Ulamā' and Philosophers also say that the essence of God Most High is infinite, and they say
that this infinity of God has no beginning or end, above or under, before or after, that is, it has no
direction. It is a light, unlimited and infinite. It is an ocean without shore or end. The totality of
the
universe is a drop in the ocean considered in relation to the greatness of God's essence,
perhaps less than
a drop. There is not one existent particle which God is not with, or which God
does not encompass and of which
He is not aware.5
Thus the beliefs of both the 'Ulamā' and Philosophers are regarded as
Islamic and worthy in their
own right, however, their knowledge of things
does not match that of the Sufis or People of Unity. In fact,
Nasafī makes a
distinction between the groups which reflects the well-known ḥadīth of
Gabriel, in which Muḥammad divides Islam in to three stages. The first
stage is submission
(islām), the second is faith (īmān), and the third is
excellence (iḥsān). According to this
ḥadīth, submission is performing the
five pillars of Islam: bearing witness that there is no god but God
and
Muḥammad is His messenger, reciting the ritual prayer (ṣalāt), paying the
alms tax, fasting during
Ramadan and making the pilgrimage to Mecca.
Faith is having faith in God, His angels, His books, His messengers,
the
Last Day and the measuring out (qadar). Excellence means worshipping
God as if you see Him, for even
if you do not see Him, He sees you.6
Submission pertains merely to practice, and is the lowest in the hierarchy
because people may practice Islam even if they do not want to. There are
many reasons for performing actions,
ranging from the economic to social,
so even a hypocrite (munāfiq) can submit to God and the five pillars
of
Islam. Faith is a stage above practice because the person with faith
undertakes submission through sincerity.
The relationship between practice
and faith can be described in Koranic terms as the manifest (ẓāhir) and
the
non-manifest (bāṭin). Above faith is excellence, and this is the highest
degree
in the ḥadīth of Gabriel because excellence involves a degree of
insight or gnosis which faith does not
encompass. For Nasafī, the 'Ulamā'
have submission,7 the Philosophers have faith,8 and the People of Unity
have excellence (iḥsān).9
The differences between submission, faith and excellence may also be
clarified through another ḥadīth
which Nasafī quotes on numerous
occasions: "The Holy Law (sharī'at) is my words, the Path
(ṭarīqat) is my
works and the Reality (ḥaqīqat) is my states."10 Nasafī reworks this ḥadīth
and states that the
Perfect Man has four things: good words, good works,
noble character traits (akhlāq) and gnosis
(ma'rifat).11 Good
words and
works pertain to the Holy Law, the character traits pertain to the Path, and
gnosis pertains to the
Reality. Gnosis is the ability to see things as they are,
to see the essences (as far as it is possible) of
oneself and God, whereas
having the appropriate character traits or being sincere does not necessarily
mean that
one can see things as they are.
(i) The Knowledge of the ‘Ulamā’
Tradition plays a very important role in the Islamic community and this
tradition is based upon memorising the
Koran and ḥadīth and also by
following the Sunna of Muḥammad. The importance of this tradition is
demonstrated by the fact that Najm al-Dīn Kubrā (the founder of the Sufi
order to which Nasafī was probably
affiliated) had spent long periods in the
study of ḥadīth and he also commenced a commentary on the Koran
(which
was eventually completed by 'Alā' al-Dawla Simnānī)12. This kind of
knowledge is fundamental for all Muslims, and Nasafī
recognises that the
'Ulamā' provide a crucial role in society by acting as guardians of this
knowledge. They act as propagators of the exoteric message of the Koran,
ḥadīth and Sunna, and
education (reading and writing) is entrusted to them.
Nasafī expresses the importance of the
'Ulamā' in society:
O dervish! Whoever puts himself up as a director of creatures, calls himself a shaykh or an
ascetic. Know for
sure that [such an indiviual] has found no trace of God's fragrance. It was
necessary for the Prophets to
be the directors of creatures whether they wanted to be or not. It is
also necessary for the
'Ulamā'.13
O dervish! Whoever possesses one field of knowledge has a narrow range of thought and his
enemy is the
'Ulamā' who possess [several] fields of knowledge. Whoever possesses [several]
fields of
knowledge has a wide range of thought and he is a friend of the 'Ulamā'.14
However, the knowledge of tradition is founded upon memory and

represents only the first
step towards the realisation of things. It is not
sufficient to be able to recite the Koran and ḥadīth and
act in the way of
Muḥammad, for one also has to understand the message of the Koran and
ḥadīth and realise
why Muḥammad behaved in any given manner:
"God Most High sent down the Koran in ten meanings."15 The
grammarians, philologists, jurists, commentators
of the ḥadīth and
expounders (mufassirūn) are all at the first stage and are not aware of
the
second stage.16
Nasafī calls the 'Ulamā' the "People of Imitation" (ahl-ī taqlīd) and their
belief is based upon the sense of hearing:
They have heard and accepted, that is, their acceptance is not by
reason and demonstration, and not by unveiling
and spiritual
contemplation. This belief is worthy although it is through the sense of
hearing, and this group is
included among the People of Submission
(ahl-ī islām). At this level, effort and endeavour are dominant
over the
wayfarer and satisfaction and submission are subdued. There is much
difficult asceticism and spiritual
discipline and much obedience and
worship in this level. They perform very much of everything which
pertains to
the manifest dimension, and they perform little of anything
that pertains to the non-manifest dimension. This is
because this group
(in this level) believe in existence and oneness, and although they
believe that God is
Knowing, Desiring and Powerful, they have not seen
that His knowledge, desire and power are through the light of
reason
and demonstration and through the light of spiritual unveiling and
contemplation for all secondary causes
(asbāb) and caused things
(musababāt). They have not witnessed that all the secondary causes are
incapable and over-powered, like all the caused things. So effort and
endeavour is valid according to them and
everything is increased by
secondary causes, effort and endeavour. This group see by means of
secondary causes,
effort and endeavour, because such people are still in
the level of sense perception and they cannot advance
forth.17
This belief is merely a preliminary stage, but it provides the foundation

upon which to build other forms of
knowledge. Nasafī contrasts the results
obtained through the religious institution of the 'Ulamā'
(the madrasa) with
those of the house of Sufis (khānaqāh):
There is one way which leads to perfection of the path. At the beginning is education and
repetition and at the
end it is religious effort and remembrance of God (dhikr). One must first go
to the madrasa and
then one must go to the khānaqāh from the madrasa.
Whoever does not go to the madrasa but goes to the khānaqāh may profit and
have some
reward and may reach God through the journey to God, but will not profit or have any reward
through
the journey in God.18
Nasafī is referring to the Sufi concept of annihilation (fanā'), a state when

all human attributes
which form a veil between man and God are removed.
According to Nasafī, it is possible to reach this stage even
if one does not
learn the knowledge offered through the madrasa, that is, belief through
sense perception.
However, the higher stage of baqā', or subsistence in God,
can only be reached by first attending the
madrasa and then going onto the
khānaqāh.
(ii) The Knowledge of the Philosophers
Some of the discussions in Nasafī's treatises concerning the Philosophers

and their methods of acquiring
knowledge are explained with great clarity.
However, there are also passages which are quite confusing. To begin
with,
let us examine those points which are set out in a manifest manner, and on
the basis of this we can then
investigate those issues which are problematic.
When considering the knowledge of the Philosophers, it is important to
remember that their knowledge is a stage
above that of the 'Ulamā':
This group [the Philosophers] are among the People of Faith.
Satisfaction and submission are dominant in this
level and effort and
endeavour are subdued. This is because this group has recognised God
through definite proofs
and certain demonstration, and they have seen
His knowledge, desire and power encompassing all existents. They
have
witnessed secondary causes as incapable and overpowered in the same
way as caused things. That is, in the
same way that until now they saw a
thing as incapable and overpowered, they also see secondary causes as
incapable and overpowered. In other words, they reached the Causer of
secondary causes and saw the Causer of
secondary causes as
encompassing everything and powerful over everything and they
became satisfied and submitted.
They do not place their faith upon
anything, neither effort nor endeavour, and neither material wealth nor
reputation, neither obedience nor worship.19
However, above the knowledge acquired by the Philosophers stands that of

two other groups, namely the Prophets
and the Friends. Nasafī comments
that a Philosopher knows the nature of things; a Prophet understands the
nature
of things and the qualities of things; but the Friend recognises the
nature of things, the
qualities of things and the reality of things.20 The
reason that the Philosophers are limited in knowledge is
that their
knowledge is dependent upon definite proof (dalā'il qaṭ'ī) and certain
demonstration,
that is to say, upon reason and intellectual argument. The
knowledge of the Prophets is through revelation from
God and that of the
Friends is through gnosis and inspiration from God. This knowledge of the
Philosophers is
acquired by intelligence ('aql), the tool of rational
demonstration, but this method is considered
deficient by the Sufis because
it cannot yield gnosis. Moreover, having a rational mind does not
necessarily mean
that one acts on the basis of reason. A Philosopher may
understand that the Sufi path of ascetic discipline and
religious effort may
purify the body and prepare the heart for any unveiling that may reach it
from the spiritual
world, but that same Philosopher may not act on the basis
of this knowledge because of the difficulties and
hardships of undertaking
the Sufi practices. Another limitation in the Philosophers' path is found in
the
etymology of the word 'aql itself. The root meaning of 'aql is tying,
binding and
constricting. In other words, 'aql likes to order things into
individual units which means that it
cannot accommodate God's tanzīh
nature on the one hand, and His tashbīh nature on the other
hand. 'Aql can
only work with one or the other but not with opposites. The inadequacy of
the
Philosopher's methods compared to those used by Sufis (ascetic
discipline and religious effort) is described
with reference to the story made
famous by Niẓāmī and Rūmī about the Greek and Chinese painters:
O dervish! Some wayfarers say, "We learn the skills of painting so that we can illustrate the
tablet of
our hearts with all knowledge by the pencil of education and the pen of repetition, so all
knowledge will be
written in our hearts, and everything which is written in our hearts will
become the well preserved tablet
(lawḥ-ī maḥfūẓ)."
Other wayfarers say, "We learn the skills of polishing so that we make the mirror of our heart
clean and
pure by the tool of polishing which is asceticism and by the oil of dhikr. In this way
our
heart becomes capable of transparency and reflecting, thus the reflection of every knowledge
which exists
in the invisible world can be manifested in our hearts."
Reflection is more reliable and correct than a book because mistakes and error are possible in
writing, but not
in reflection. The story of the Chinese painters and the Emperor is famous.21 In
addition, much knowledge exists for man and
there are many different kinds of knowledge. But
life is short and it is not possible to fulfil life by making
the heart the well preserved tablet by
education and repetition, but it is possible to fulfil life by making
the heart the cosmos reflecting
mirror by the path of asceticism and dhikr.22
Several other weaknesses which the Sufis saw in the epistemology of the
Philosophers have
already been noted (see chapter two, section iii), so here
we shall
remind ourselves of just two fundamental faults. The first, the
Neoplatonic idea of emanation,
as advocated by Nasafī's Philosophers, does
not explain the complete picture of God in His
tanzīh/tashbīh nature. With
the hierarchy of ten intelligences, God remains too remote from His
creation.
Secondly, the Philosophers (according to Nasafī) believe that the
celestial intelligences acquire knowledge,
desire and power, and they are
the origin of the intelligences and souls of man.23 This idea, as we have
seen, is denied by the People
of Unity, since intelligence is found only in
man.
Up to this point, Nasafī's discourses concerning the Philosophers present
the reader with no problems.
Difficulties arise however, when one reads
passages relating to the Philosophers in which 'aql is
praised very highly.
The trouble is that Nasafī sometimes speaks of more than one kind of 'aql,
and it
is not always clear which 'aql is associated with the Philosophers.
The quotation below from
Maqṣad-i aqṣā discusses two kinds of 'aql:
. . . man is a partner with other animals, that is, in having three spirits: the plant spirit, the
animal
spirit and the soul spirit. This is because all men and all animals have three spirits and
man also has other
things which animals do not have.
The first is speech (nuṭq), and through this man is superior to other animals. At first he is
superior
through this spirit of speech which is also called intelligence ('aql). Yet this intelligence
has no
share or part in the gnosis of God. [However], it is the king on earth, makes the waters
flow on the earth,
prepares the fields, creates gardens, makes boats move on the water, carries
merchandise (rakht) from
east to west and carries merchandise from west to east, and there are
many examples like this. I have discussed
this intelligence for livelihood ('aql-ī mu'āsh) in the
seventh station of Manāzil
al-sā'īrīn, and [the wayfarer] can study it there.
That intelligence about which the Prophet Muḥammad said "Intelligence is a light in the
heart
distinguishing between the truth and the false"24 is different. This light rules the heart and soul
whereas the intelligence for
livelihood rules water and clay. As long as man has not yielded the
human spirit (rūḥ-ī insānī), he has
not reached the intelligence about which the Prophet spoke.
The human spirit is called the Attributed Spirit
(rūḥ-ī iḍāfī) because God Most High attributed the
human spirit to Himself and said: "And when I
have fashioned him and breathed of My spirit into
him."25 Several times it has been said that the Attributed Spirit has many names:
the First
Intelligence, the Greatest Pen, the Supreme Spirit, the Muḥammadan Spirit and
others like
these.26
Is the 'aql of the Philosophers the intelligence for livelihood or the

Attributed Spirit? The answer is not clear. However, the 'aql of the
Philosophers is able to offer
highly esoteric interpretations of the Koran.
The following example comes from the fifth chapter of Kashf
al-ḥaqāiq in a
section explaining the resurrection of man according to the Philosophers:
The following example makes it clear that the heaven which is promised after death for the
pious ones is commanded by God Most High: "This is the similitude of Paradise which the god-
fearing have
been promised; therein are rivers of water unstalling, rivers of milk unchanging in
flavour and rivers of wine
– a delight to the drinkers, rivers, too, of honey purified; and therein
for them is every fruit, and
forgiveness from their Lord – Are they as he who dwells forever in
the Fire, such as are given to drink boiling
water, that tears their bowels asunder?" 27 Know that
water causes life and its benefit is common for everything in all
times, and the reality of these
rivers of water in heaven is that they are the waters of life for all the
People of Heaven who enjoy
all of them.
The cause which nurtures children is milk which is more particular than water, since the
benefit of milk is
common for all but only at a certain time. The reality of these rivers of milk in
heaven is that they are
rivers of common sense which is the basis and exoteric aspect of wisdom,
and the common pleasure in heaven is
derived from these rivers.
The cause of healing sickness and suffering is honey which is more particular than milk since
the benefit of
honey is particular for some people. The reality of these rivers of honey in heaven
is that they are the rivers
of wisdom for the special ones and the pleasure of the special ones in
heaven is derived from these rivers.
The cause which removes grief and sadness is wine which is more particular than honey since
wine is unlawful
and impure for all the People of the World but it is lawful and pure for the
People of Heaven. The purification
and reality of these rivers of wine in heaven is that they are
the wisdom and pleasure of the special ones
among the special ones in heaven and their pleasure
is derived from these rivers.
In addition, know that in Hell there are four rivers for the inhabitants of Hell, which correspond
to the
rivers in Heaven: these are hot water, stagnant water, stagnant water mixed with matter
flowing from the bodies
of the damned, tar and pus: "And these similitudes – We strike them for
the people, but none understands
them save those who know."28'29
Does rational demonstration, the epistemological tool of the Philosophers,

permit such an esoteric interpretation
of the levels of Heaven? The answer
must be affirmative although it is important to remember that this
interpretation of the Philosophers' is based upon reason and not on gnosis,
which may
provide a completely different vision of the levels of Heaven.
Another problem encountered in determining
Nasafī's attitude towards 'aql
is that the term is used not only in the discourses of the
Philosophers but
also in those of the People of Unity. This is highlighted in Nasafī's
discussion of the
covenant between God and man before existence was
bestowed upon man. The Koran states that God assembled mankind
and
asked all of them, "Am I not your Lord?" and they answered "Yes."30
Nasafī describes the result of this
event:
That trust (amānat) which was presented to all existents, and was
denied and not accepted by any of them,
was accepted by man, and he
reached his perfection through it. That trust was 'aql.31
Two chapters later, continuing the discourses of the People of Unity,
Nasafī explains the same covenant and
replaces 'aql with passionate love
('ishq).32 With regard to his explanation of the Sufis, Nasafī is explicitly
clear
that when he uses the word 'aql, it refers to something which has been
remembered under a variety of
names including the Attributed Spirit, the
Muḥammadan Light, the First Intelligence, the Greatest Pen and the
Supreme Spirit. Despite the problems of determining the true nature of 'aql
as
used by the Philosophers, it is apparent that Nasafī sees the Sufi method,
founded upon love and worship, of
ascetic discipline and religious effort as
superior to reasoning and intellectual demonstration. The methods of
the
Philosophers are better than the blind imitation of the 'Ulamā', for reasoning
enables man to
intellectually comprehend some aspect of God's nature.
(iii) The Knowledge of the People of Unity
Nasafī explains that the knowledge of the People of Unity (also referred to
as the People of Unveiling) is
superior to that of the 'Ulamā' and the
Philosophers:
O dear friend! What is heard (masmū'), the object of knowledge
(ma'lūm) and spiritual
station (maqām) are all different from each other.
It is a long way from what is heard to what is known
and there are
uncountable difficult passes from what is known to the spiritual station.
So whoever has read or
heard these chapters should not suppose that he
has understood (ma'lūm kard) the intention and purpose
of the author.
Whoever has understood the intent and purpose of the author does not
suppose that this has become
his spiritual station. This is because
whoever hears that there is a thing in the world
called sugar is never
equal with the person who knows there is a plant called sugar cane
which is extremely
sweet, and that when that plant is cut and beaten and
the water is taken from it and made thick, sugar and
cane-products are
made. Whoever knows how sugar is made is never equal to the person
who sees how it is made and
places sugar in his mouth. First is the level
of hearing (sam') concerning the experiential knowledge
(ma'rifa) of
sugar, second is the level of knowledge ('ilm), and third is the station of
tasting (dhawq). When knowledge is completed, it becomes complete
through tasting and
reaches its: perfection through tasting. First in the
experiential knowledge of sugar is general knowledge
('ilm-i ijmālī),
and second is the differentiated knowledge ('ilm-ī tafṣīlī) and third is
knowledge of tasting ('ilm-ī dhawqī). First, sugar is heard of, second it
is known and third it is
seen and tasted. You should understand all
things in this way.33
This experiential knowledge transcends sense perception and 'aql because it

is based upon unveiling
bestowed upon wayfarers by God. Although the
wayfarer cannot guarantee that God will ever rip away the veils that
conceal
Him, the wayfarers among the People of Unity believe that unveiling is
more likely if
they love God intensely and engage in ascetic discipline and
spiritual effort.
Know that the People of Unveiling confirm with their tongue and testify with their hearts the
existence and
unity of God and this confirmation and testimony of theirs is by way of unveiling
and contemplation. O dervish,
these are groups that see and know everything as God since they
have passed all the veils and have come close
to God's face and have seen and known the
knowledge of certainty ('ilm al-yaqīn) and the eye of
certainty ('ayn al-yaqīn) and they have
understood that existence is for God alone, and for this
reason they are called the People of Unity,
for they do not see or understand anything other than God.
Know that at this level, nothing is predominant for the Unitarian, neither effort nor endeavour,
neither
satisfaction nor submission, because the Unitarian says that everything in the beginning is
good, and
everything that exists must be as it is, and if it were not so then it would not be itself.
But everything must
exist in such a way that it is in the right place and in the right amount, since
everything is called bad which
is not in the right place, or else is in its right place but not in the
right amount. So effort and endeavour
are good in the right place and amount, and satisfaction
and submission are good in the right place and in the
right amount, and the words of the doctors
are good in the right place and the right amount, and everything
which exists is good in the right
amount.34
It was mentioned in the first chapter that Nasafī was requested to

compose his treatises without prejudice and
without belittlement, and in to a
remarkable extent, he is consistent in maintaining this,
however, there can
be no doubt that he preferred his path of ascetic discipline and religious
effort to
'aql and sense perception. He slips in a slight criticism of the other
groups:
The People of Unveiling (ahl-ī kashf) attained to the truth of things
and they saw and understood things
as they are. The rest are in a sleep
and are dreaming and they tell stories to one another in their
dreams.35
II. THE CONVERGENCE

OF HELLENISTIC
AND ISLAMIC EPISTEMOLOGICAL
THOUGHT
The integration of Greek knowledge into the Islamic world resulted in
Muslim philosophers
discussing ontological and epistemological issues. As
some Muslim philosophers were also attracted to Sufi
explanations of
existence and knowledge, the mystical and the rational philosophical
traditions converged, to
which some of Ibn Sīnā's works testify. By Nasafī's
era and in the tradition of which he was a part, many
Sufi works included
discussions that on the one hand preserved the basic Koranic doctrines and
also employed
Islamic terminology and on the other hand borrowed certain
rational philosophical structures and occasionally
used the language that
would have been familiar to students of Classical Greek thought.
This confluence of the Islamic and Hellenistic is apparent in many
sections of Nasafī's works. For example,
the ontological levels of the soul
(nafs) reflect the Greek classification of the three kingdoms (mineral,
plant
and animal) and also the Koranic terminology of the soul commanding to
evil (al-nafs al-ammāra bi'l
sū') the blaming soul (al-nafs al-lawwāma) and
the soul at peace (al-nafs
al-muṭma'inna). In a discussion of the
Transmigrationists in Manāzil
al-sā'īrīn, there is a description of the ascent
of the soul which reflects the Greek-Islamic heritage.
At the lowest level,
the soul is called nature (ṭabī'at), then it develops into the plant soul
(nafs-i
nabātī) which progresses into the animal soul (nafs-i ḥaywānī) and then
comes the human
soul (nafs-i insānī) which is also called the rational soul
(nafs-i nāṭiqa) and the commanding
soul. The ascent continues and the soul
of the Philosopher is called the blaming soul, the soul of the Friend is
the
holy soul (nafs-i qudsī) and the soul of the Prophet is the soul at peace.36 In
other works, Nasafī also says there is one spirit
which is described by
praiseworthy and blameworthy attributes, such as the predatory spirit,
satanic spirit, the
commanding soul, the blaming soul and the soul at
peace.37 He then compares the levels of the spirit to the
Light verse of the
Koran:38
The body (qālib) is like a niche, the plant spirit is like a glass lamp,
the animal spirit is like a wick,
the soui spirit is like oil, the human spirit
is like light, the prophetic spirit is like light upon light and
the holy
spirit is like light upon light upon light.39
A similar ontological hierarchy is utilised in other works in Nasafī's

discussions of the other Islamic
beliefs to portray how man can know God.
The basic epistemological structures are grounded in both the frameworks
provided by Ibn Sīnā, who adopted them from Galen40 and also in the
doctrines found in the Koran. Yet there is a crucial
distinction between
Nasafī's beliefs and those of philosophers such as al-Farābī concerning the
knowledge
that man can actualise. In order to show this difference it is
necessary to portray Nasafī's epistemological
order.
The Outer and Inner Faculties of Perception
The faculties of perception (idrāk) are of two kinds, outer and inner; and
there are five outer senses and
five inner senses. The outer senses are
seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and touching. The inner senses are the
sensus communis (ḥiss-i mushtarak), imagination (khayāl), sensory intuition
(wahm), the memory and the cognitive faculty (mutaṣarrafa). The sensus
communis is the
perceiver of the objects of sense perception (maḥsūsāt) and
these are stored as forms in the imagination.
Thus the sensus communis
discovers those things which pertain to the world of testimony such as the
colour, flavour, scent, sound and coldness of water. Sensory intuition is the
perceiver of the meaning
(ma'nā) of the objects of sense perception and
these are stored in the memory. So sensory intuition
pertains to the
invisible, such as the meaning of friendship in friend.41 These faculties are
governed by the cognitive faculty for it
orders (taṣarruf) the perceptions
which are stored in the imagination through composition (tarkīb)
and
distinguishing (tafṣīl), for example it composes a man with no head. It is
also implied in
Nasafī's works that the cognitive faculty also needs to order
and control sensory intuition.
Nasafī observes that the physicians say that there are no more than three
inner senses; the imaginative
(takhayyul), sensory intuition (tawahhum) and
recollection (tadhakkur) because the sensus
communis and imagination are
one and are located at the front of the brain, sensory intuition and the
cognitive are one and are located at the middle of the brain and memory and
recollection
are one and are located at the back of the brain.42 Such
discussions are also found in Ibn Sīnā's works43 and also those of Ibn
Rushd.44
Although at first it may appear that all knowledge that man can obtain is
sensory, this is not the case. This is
because the cognitive should also be
considered as man's 'aql which the Philosophers employ in their quest for
truth, and which enables the Sufis to make sense of any
unveilings which
occur in their hearts. According to Nasafī, God's self-disclosure (or
unveiling in the
heart) is impossible without a form,45 so the unveiling takes
an imaginal form, of which 'aql can make
sense. Thus, only the form of
knowledge (which originates in the heart) is sensory, for the form is based
upon
sensory images that are understood by 'aql.
Nasafī outlines several problems related to the operations of the faculties
of imagination and sensory intuition
which pertain to sense perception.
These include the manifestation of images when they are not sought which
may
occur during sleep or during wakefulness (in the latter case Nasafī
comments that one says such a thing or such a
person just came in to the
mind)46, and the slowness in presenting images that are sought which is
called
forgetfulness.47 Imagination
and sensory intuition can have such a
strong effect upon individuals that they can present images that effect the
state of that individual. Nasafī describes imagination's power in an example
of a person asleep who witnesses
a cup of water. He drinks the water and
something of the pleasure in satisfying that thirst remains when that
person
wakes up. Likewise, sensory intuition has similar power, and people may
even become sick and die through
its effects. For this reason, 'aql has to
become the master over imagination and sensory
intuition.48
The superiority of 'aql to the other faculties is portrayed by Nasafī with
reference to man as the
microcosm:
Know that just as Adam, Eve and the Devil (Iblīs)
are in the macrocosm, so too are they in the
microcosm, and just as predatory animals,
beasts, satans and angels are in the macrocosm, so too
are they in the microcosm.
O dervish! Man is the microcosm and Adam is the 'aql, and Eve is the body, sensory intuition
is the
Devil, appetite is the peacock, anger is the snake of this world and good
character traits is
heaven and bad character traits is hell, and the faculties of 'aql and the
faculties of spirit and body
are angels.49
Nasafī proceeds to describe how it is the task of man (otherwise known as

Adam, Solomon or
Jesus) to make his satan (who has the attribute of
disobedience), his
Devil (who has the attributes of pride, self satisfaction,
envy and disobedience) and his angel (who has the
attributes of obedience
and heeding commands) subservient to him:
The task of God's deputy is to make all these attributes subjected and subservient to himself
and put each
one of them in its correct place. Without his command, not one of them can do
anything and God's deputy is
Solomon and all of them work for Solomon.
O dervish! The angel and the Devil are a single faculty and as long as this faculty is not
obedient to Solomon,
it is called the Devil and Solomon puts it in chains. When it obeys Solomon
it is called an angel and then he
puts it to work. Some build, some dive.50
So Solomon's task is to change attributes, not to make them non-existent, since this is
impossible. He
makes the disobedient obedient. He teaches courtesy (adab) to the discourteous
and he makes the blind
see and he makes the deaf hear and he brings the dead to life. So 'aql,
which is God's deputy is
Adam, Solomon and Jesus.51
When the 'aql is employed in the appropriate manner, man is then open
to understand the reality behind
any unveilings that appear in his heart. The
store of sensory images in the faculty of
imagination provides him with the
ability to imaginalise the disembodied realities of the spiritual world. Since
each person's store of sensory images are based upon their own unique
experiences, it follows that the
imagination is particular to each person.
This means that God's self-disclosure is different for each person.
The
manner in which this imaginalisation occurs, that is, the embodiment of
disembodied objects
is a mystery that is not explained by the Sufis. Such a
secret could be not be discovered even by Ibn 'Arabī:
. . . the gnostic knows who is disclosing Himself and Why He is
disclosing Himself. But only the Real knows how
(kayf) He discloses
Himself. No one in the cosmos, no one other than God, knows that,
neither angel nor
prophet. For that is one of the specific characteristics
of the Real, since the Essence is unknown at root. Hence
the knowledge
of how He discloses Himself in the loci of manifestation cannot be
acquired or perceived by any of
God's creatures.52
Although this is a mystery, the Sufis explained the self-disclosure in man's

heart in purely Koranic imagery,
for the Greek heritage was unable to
provide any assistance. The Koran and ḥadīth literature hold
man's heart as
the locus of greatest proximity between man and God: "My heavens and
earth embrace Me not, but the heart of My believing servant does embrace
Me;"53 "The hearts of the children of
Adam are like a single heart between
the two fingers of the Allmerciful."54 Nasafī also provides many similar
examples, such as, "Intelligence is a Sight in the heart distinguishing
between the truth and the
false."55 The actual
process of how the heart can
"perceive" God remains a mystery as Ibn 'Arabī comments, however, the
Koran hints that the heart can be considered in the same way as a mirror:
"No indeed, but
what they were earning has rusted upon their hearts."56
Mirrors were made of polished metal in Arabia during the seventh century
and
they rusted if they were not cleaned. In addition, the verse: "We lay
coverings upon their
hearts"57 occurs several
times in the Koran and one
cannot see a reflection in a veiled mirror. Moreover the ḥadīth Nasafi cites
that "Knowledge is a light in the heart," suggests a mirror imagery because
there can be no reflection
in a mirror without light.
The polished heart (also called the non-manifest) has to master the body
(the manifest) because if the body
predominates over the heart then
knowledge from the world of spirits cannot be actualised:
That side which is the invisible world is always clean and pure and
there is no vexation (zaḥmat) or
darkness (zulmat) or turbidity (kadūrat)
in the non-manifest dimension. As for that side which is
the body, it is a
slave to greed and anger and it is gloomy and dark, and the non-
manifest becomes gloomy and
dark as long as one is tied to one's
appetites. For this reason, the non-manifest is not able to acquire
knowledge and lights from the invisible world – which is the world of
angels and pure spirits. When the body
becomes clean and pure, the
non-manifest is made clean between two worlds. Whatever is in the
invisible world –
which is the world of angels and pure spirits – is also
manifested in the non-manifest dimension of the wayfarer
just as two
clean mirrors when they are placed opposite one another; whatever is
found in one mirror will also be
found in the other mirror and vice
versa.58
When man's heart is polished and dominates his senses, he can become
informed of past, present and future
events59 because there is no
dimension
of time in the spiritual world. This knowledge passes into a form in most
cases while man is asleep
(when his sensory faculties are dulled and thus do
not present any images which would obstruct the creation of
forms for the
knowledge from the disembodied world). This is known as veridical
dreaming (khwāb-i rāst).
However, some people are also able to actualise
this knowledge even while they are awake. Such cases are rare and
Nasafī
says that the isolation, ascetic discipline and spiritual effort of the wayfarer
are so that his body has
the same state in wakefulness that it has while he is
asleep.
Yet isolation, ascetic discipline and spiritual effort are not the only ways
that
contribute to actualising a polished heart. Some people have a
constitution (mizāj) which is innately
perfect and such individuals include
Prophets, Friends and the elite among the 'Ulamā'. They have
praiseworthy
attributes, pleasant character traits and good qualities and they can acquire
lights and knowledge from the spiritual world without much ascetic
discipline or spiritual
effort.60 Other people do not
have such a constitution
and they have nothing but blameworthy attributes and bad character traits
which cannot
be improved through ascetic discipline and spiritual effort.
Between these two are those people whose attributes
and character traits are
not determined in essence but can be improved through the Sufi practices or
may
deteriorate if the body dominates over the spirit. Each person's fate is
decided by the "four times," in other words, by the movements of the stars
and planets during the period of the
child's conception and its birth into this
world.61 According to Nasafī, these three kinds of humans are referred to in
the Koran:
"People of the right hand, o how fortunate shall be the people of
the right hand! And the people of the left
hand, o how unfortunate shall be
the people of the left hand! And the foremost shall still be the
foremost,"62
and:
"Now someone among them is being unjust to his own self, and
someone is following a middle course and
someone is excelling in good
deeds by God's leave."63
Since the actualisation of a polished heart is in some cases determined by
the "four times" it is not
surprising that Nasafī states that such a quality
does not pertain solely to Islam, Acquiring knowledge from the
spiritual
world upon the heart may be found in non-believers. This significance of
this point will be discussed
in more detail chapter five.
The important point to note concerning Nasafī's portrayal of how man
actualises knowledge is that it is not
intellectual or rational. The Sufi makes
an effort to polish his heart, but having done this, it is God that
places a
certain knowledge in the heart. For the Philosophers, knowledge is acquired
through
finding the "middle term" rationally which does not involve God.
God's action of bestowing
knowledge upon the wayfarer is described by
Nasafī as love:
O dervish! Love is a fire which falls into the wayfarer's heart. It annihilates the external
secondary
causes and inner thoughts of the wayfarer – which are all idols of the soul and veils in
the path of the
wayfarer – in order that he becomes qibla-less and idol-less and he becomes clean,
pure and disengaged
(mujarrad).
O dervish! Love is the staff of Moses and this world is the magician
which plays tricks every
day. In other words, everyday it makes illusions (khayālbāzī) and the people
are deceived by
these worldly illusions. Love opens its mouth and swallows this world and everything in this
world in one go and it makes the wayfarer clean, pure and disengaged in one go. Now the
wayfarer is called
"ṣāfī,"(pure) for up to this point he was not a Sufi because he was not ṣāfī. He
becomes a Sufi when he becomes ṣāfī'.64
O dervish! 'Aql is the staff of the wayfarer as long as he has not reached the level of love and it
prepares his worldly structures and tasks because it is engaged with the edifice of this world
which has no
soul (jān): "He replied, 'It is my staff: Upon it I lean and with it I beat down the
leaves for
my flock. It has other uses besides,'"65 The soul of 'aql is love. 'Aql without love is
"soul-less" and dead. Hence that dear one said:
If there is no heart, where does love build its home?
And if there is no love what would the heart do?
O dervish! A command came to the wayfarer, "Cast aside 'aql for 'aql has turned
towards this
world and there is a danger that it will lead you to destruction (halāk). Turn it around so
that it
faces Me." The wayfarer cannot cast aside 'aql at first because it is love that casts
it aside. When
the wayfarer reaches the level of love, he casts aside 'aql and regards it as a
serpent, and he is
afraid that it may even kill him.66
The knowledge of the Philosophers such as al-Farābī and Ibn Rushd is

purely scientific, however
gradually philosophers of the Greek tradition
combined Islamic doctrines of revelation or unveiling. For example,
Ibn
Sīnā "recognises the possibility of man's attaining instantaneous scientific
knowledge without
following scientific procedures."67 Nasafī's
epistemology bears many resemblences to that of Ibn Sīnā, including
the
explanation of man's inner senses and also the possibility of actualising
intelligible thoughts and
foreknowledge of the future from the world of
spirits in dreams and in wakefulness.68 Moreover, Nasafī and Ibn Sīnā
appear to
be saying similar things concerning the knowledge actualised by
the Prophets:
. . . there might be a man whose soul has such an intense purity and is
so firmly linked to rational principles
that he blazes with intuition, i.e.
with the receptivity of inspiration coming from the Active Intelligence
concerning everything. So the forms of all things contained in the
Active Intelligence are imprinted on his soul
either all at once or nearly
so, not that he accepts them merely on authority but on account of their
logical
order which encompasses all the middle terms . . . This is a kind
of prophetic inspiration, indeed its highest
form and the one most fitted
to be called a Divine Power; and it is the highest human faculty.69
Yet Ibn Sīnā's hierarchy of ten intellects between God and man with the
Active
Intellect acting as the link between man and the higher intellects
seems to emphasise God's tanzīh
nature, Sufis such as Nasafī stress God's
immediate self-disclosure, reflecting the tanzīh/tashbīh
balance of
witnessing God through His signs and through gnosis of Malakūt and
Jabarūt.
III. MYSTICAL
KNOWLEDGE
Although reason and logical argument are insufficient to grasp the true
reality of Ultimate Existence, Nasafī
portrays a systematic hierarchy of
mystical perception which leads the wayfarer from the very start of the path
where multiplicity is witnessed in all things to the termination of the
journey where the unity of existence, or
unity in multiplicity is
apprehended. There are four levels in this hierarchy; the first is
"remembrance" (dhikr), the second is "reflection" (fikr), the third is
"inspiration" (ilhām) and the fourth is
"contemplation" ('iyān). Nasafī
himself comments that no one can comprehend the
wayfarer's experiences
of the fourth level unless they have also reached this station70 and this is
just as valid for the other
three levels too. Nevertheless, Nasafī's didactic
works provided a guide of these levels for the wayfarers,
perhaps as a
foretaste of what one could expect should the path be followed. Even if one
did not have the
preparedness to reach any one of the four levels of mystical
knowledge at least one would be able to comprehend
the theoretical
explanation that Nasafī provides.
(i) Dhikr (Remembrance)71

It has been stated that one of the distinguishing features of Sufism around
Nasafī's era was the practice of
dhikr.72 The verbal form
of this term
appears in the Koran several times where Muslims are commanded to
remember God: "O you who
believe! Remember God with much
remembrance," 73 "And remember your Lord within yourself humbly and
with awe and under your
breath by morning and evening."74 One of the
most common forms of dhikr was the repetition of the Islamic
testament,
"There is no god but God." By uttering this simple phrase in "mantra-style,"
whether verbally or silently, the Muslim was able to focus his concentration
upon God alone and the distractions
of this world ceased to be a veil
between him and God. Nasafl describes the dhikr as the first step
towards
reaching God:
Know that for the wayfarer, the dhikr is just like milk for a child. .75
Just as it is impossible for the body
to grow strong and reach its
perfection without milk, so too is it impossible for the heart to
be
nurtured and reach its perfection without the dhikr.76
Nasafī describes four levels of dhikr. The first of these is that of the novice,
whose dhikr is
verbal but whose heart is negligent. This dhikr reciter says
the dhikr but only in form for his
thoughts are elsewhere, perhaps buying
and selling goods in the bazaar. The effects of this dhikr are weak
but still
beneficial, for at least the journey has commenced. The second level of
dhikr is when the
reciter performs the dhikr with his tongue and heart, and
although the heart is present (ḥāḍir) in
a formal manner (bi-takalluf) the
pure ones are aware of their own disobedience to God. The third level of
dhikr is when it is performed in such a way that it is both verbal and at the
heart. Here the dhikr
is dominant over the heart which becomes calm and
stable. Even though the dhikr prevails over the heart,
the reciter is able to
perform other tasks which pertain to this world in a formal manner. The
inner sign of this
third level is that one is always aware of one's own
obedience (ṭa'at) to God. The final level of
dhikr is when the "object of
remembrance" (madhkūr), or God, becomes dominant over the
heart. In fact
this final level of dhikr is also referred to by Nasafī as the beginning of fikr
or
reflection. At this point the novice reaches the start of the Sufi path.77
(ii) Fikr (Reflection)
Several major Sufis of Nasafī's era, including Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī and Ibn
'Arabī,78 considered reflection as pertaining to human
intellectual and
rational faculties. For this reason they held reflection as an inferior method
of obtaining
knowledge when compared with dhikr (which was a means of
obtaining knowledge of a higher dimension).
However, there was no real
consensus among the Sufis. One of the greatest of mystics of Nasafī's era
was
Shabastarī (d. 1320) and he portrayed "thinking" (tafakkur) in the sense
of unveiling
(kashf), in other words, as an intuitive grasp of Reality: "It is to
see the absolute All in every
individual thing."79 Abū
Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī
believed fikr to be superior to dhikr and he defined five stages in obtaining
non-rational knowledge:
What we have said thus far will show you how excellent a thing is
meditation (tafakkur) and how it
surpasses invocation (dhikr) and
remembrance (tadhakkur) . . . First:
remembrance or invocation
(tadhakkur), which consists in bringing to mind two cognitions. Second:
meditation or reflection (tafakkur), which is the search for the cognition
which one seeks to obtain from
the two concepts already in the mind.
Third: obtaining the desired cognition, and the heart's illumination by
it.
Fourth: a change in the heart from its former state, by virtue of the
illumination attained. Fifth: service
performed for the heart by the
bodily members in conformity with the new state prevailing within it.80
Like Ghazālī, Nasafī posits fikr as more eminent than dhikr:

Just as you have understood the effects and qualities of the dhikr for the illumination of the
wayfarer's heart, know that the effects and qualities of fikr are a hundred times greater, maybe
more.81
The journey is searching and searching is an attribute of the heart. There is a time when this
searching is
strong and dominates the heart in such a way that the search is transmitted to the
outside which then becomes
engaged in the same task as the inside. The inner and outer searching
turn to the object of desire and they
both engage in that task. The inner task is the resolution of
purity and great effort: the outer task is bodily
asceticism and constraint of the soul. The inner
task is fikr and the outer task is
dhikr.82
Nasafī's understanding of fikr becomes clearer when he explains how it has
been known under different
names by various individuals:
Every person gives fikr a name; some call it "reflection" (fikr), some
call it
"state" (ḥāl), some call it "I have a time with God," and some call
it
"absence" (ghaybat).83
Thus in Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq, Nasafī's explanation of fikr is a non-rational and

non-intellectual process.84
The meaning of all of them [that is fikr, ḥāl, etc.] is that there is a time
for a person when his inside
(andarūn) becomes so absorbed and
engaged in something that his external senses cease from their activity
and in that state his inside pays complete attention to that thing. Such a
state lasts for one hour for some
people, and for one day for other
people, or two or three days for still others, and it is possible for it to
last for up to ten days.85
Nasafī gives examples of how fikr or ḥāl can befall a person when he or she
is in the middle of any
task:
It is related that one day, a dear one was climbing up a ladder [to reach a place where] he could
perform his
ritual ablutions. A servant had taken a water jug and was following him when that
dear
one experienced this [mystical] state while still on the ladder. That state remained with him
for forty days
while he was on the ladder and the servant stood in assistance, still holding the
water jug. When the Shaykh
came out of the state and climbed to the top of the ladder, the servant
followed him to the top and the Shaykh
took the water jug and made his ablutions.
The servant said, "It has been forty days since we have prayed."
The Shaykh replied, "You must go and pray the equivalent of forty days prayers since you have
been aware
of this for forty days."86
Other examples of fikr befalling people while engaged in day to day

activities are given, such as during
prayer or even while eating food, and
this mystical state may last for one or two days.87 Despite this, Nasafī's
portrayal of fikr
is somewhat vague and many questions are left
unanswered. We may assume quite safely, however, that when Nasafī
speaks of the wayfarer's inside being engaged in something, he is referring
to the wayfarer meditating on
God. Once the external senses are blocked
from their functions, the wayfarer's heart is then prepared to
receive, or
rather "perceive" anything that God bestows upon it. In the Sufi tradition
the ḥāl
(or fikr to use Nasafī's term) is "something that descends from God
into man's heart."
88 Nasafī does not explicitly
say this, since his definition
of fikr refers only to the external senses being blocked, however, there is
an
implicit understanding in this that the heart is ready to receive something
from God. According to Sufis, the
ḥāl (or fikr) that descend upon the heart
are not all the same, as Schimmel states: "The
states that come over [the
wayfarer] will vary according to the station in which he is presently living;
thus the
qabḍ, 'contraction,' of someone in the station of poverty is different
from the qabḍ of
someone in the station of longing."89
(iii) Inspiration (ilhām)
The third level of mystical perception which is called "inspiration" is

different in nature from
fikr. The fikr is when the wayfarer abides in a
particular spiritual station and pays complete
attention to God and he
experiences a mystical state which reflects the knowledge of that station.
The scope of
inspiration differs because it is a time when the heart is
illuminated with knowledge concerning a past or future
event without prior
meditation or hearing it from some other person. Again Nasafl comments
that inspiration has
been known by different names including "heralding"
(adhina) and "a
passing thought" (khāṭir). Inspiration is very similar to the
concept of revelation (waḥī),
however revelation is limited to prophets
which came to an end with the sealing of Prophecy.
Nasafī also describes how the experiences of fikr-ḥāl and inspiration may
be manifested externally in the
wayfarer. He does this by listing the various
degrees of insight. The first is called "finding"
(wajd) of a thing in the heart
which has come from the invisible world. When the "finding"
becomes
more manifest, it is called "unveiling" (kashf), and when this becomes more
manifest it
is called "gnostic knowledge" (ma'rifat) which is then called
"witnessing"
(mushāhada) when it becomes more manifest. When all the
veils have been cast aside, the wayfarer reaches
the station of contemplation
(mu'āyana). Having given this introduction, Nasafī compares the heart to
a
hearth and gnostic knowledge is like a coal in the hearth, love (maḥabbat)
is like fire in the coal, and
passionate love ('ishq) is like the flames of the
fire. The states and mystical occurrences
(wārid) and inspiration and
mystical audition (samā') are like a breeze which blows on the
fire.
Thus the wayfarer must first have the preparedness, love and passionate
love for God and then God may release a
breeze of fikr-ḥāl or inspiration
upon him. There is nothing rational or intellectual in this process.
When the fire of love – which is in the heart – flares up in flames as a
result of the breeze of mystical
audition, the wayfarer cries in tears if it
expresses itself through his eyes. He shouts out loud if it expresses
itself
through his mouth. He waves his hands if it expresses itself through his
hands and he rises up and dances
if it expresses itself through his legs.
States like these are called "finding" because if the fire of
love was in
the heart but could not be manifested, it resembles a thing that has been
lost. When the breeze of
mystical audition or mystical occurrences
cause this fire to burst forth in flames, it resembles a lost thing
which
has been found. So these states are called "finding."90
(iv) Contemplation (‘iyān)
In the previous section it was shown that Nasafī lists a hierarchy of spiritual
experience. This starts with
"finding" and progresses to the final level of
"contemplation." Unfortunately, in
Nasafī's works there is no precise
definition of these technical terms so it is difficult to understand how
he
distinguishes between them (this problem is not solved by referring to the
works of other Sufis because there
is no consensus among them regarding
these technical terms).91 One clue to Nasafī's understanding of
"contemplation" is contained in the following portrayal of God as light:
The Shaykh of this helpless one said, "I reached and saw this light. It was an infinite and
limitless
light, it was an ocean, endless and shoreless that had no above, under, left, right, before
or after. I
remained bewildered in that light. Concerns for sleep, eating and problems of livelihood
departed from me and I
could not engage in any of them. I said to a dear friend that my condition
(ḥāl) was in this way and he
said that I should go and take a handful of straw from someone's
harvest store without God's
permission. I went and I took [the handful of straw] and I no longer
saw the light."
This helpless one said to the Shaykh, "O Shaykh, in my opinion, one cannot see this light with
the eyes of
the head, but one can see it with the eyes of the inner heart (sirr) because this
light is
not the object of sense perception (maḥsūs)."
The Shaykh said, "O 'Azīz, in my opinion, one can see this light with both the eyes of the head
and
also with the eyes of the inner heart."
I said, "O Shaykh, the indication of whoever has reached this sea of light is that he drowns in it
and he
will never see himself afterwards. He sees everything as this sea of light."
The Shaykh said, "One should not witness (mushāhada) continually."
I said, "O Shaykh, witnessing is one thing and contemplation (mu'āyana) is another."
He said, "One should not witness continually but one should contemplate continually."92
The above is an account of Nasafī's Shaykh's experience of "witnessing"

which occurs within the
heart. This "inner witnessing" of God has been
described by one of the foremost scholars of Sufism as
"the realisation of
one's own nothingness"93 through witnessing God in the heart, which
encapsulates Nasafī's
Shaykh's loss of self in the sea of light. "Witnessing"
is contrasted with the experience of
"contemplation" which is when the
mystic sees God with the eyes of the head. This would seem to be
heretical,
but the Sufis meant the seeing of God through His signs in this world. One
realises that although
everything, including oneself, has no real existence,
the things of this world reveal some aspect of God's
existence.
For Nasafī, "contemplation" is a superior level of mystical experience
compared to
"witnessing" because the mystic has already passed through
the stage of "witnessing" and has
returned to this world and can now
contemplate God in a sober manner and see and understand the things as
they
are. Moreover, from this elevated stand-point, one can do anything one
pleases, such as engage in the dhikr, fikr or inspiration.
As long as the wayfarer is engaged in dhikr and it is dominant over him, he is
in the world of
body and physical sensation. When he ceases the dhikr and fikr presents itself
and it becomes
dominant over him, he passes from the world of body and reaches the world of spirit. When he
ceases fikr and inspiration presents itself and it becomes dominant over him, he passes from the
world
of intelligence and reaches the world of love. When he ceases from inspiration,
contemplation presents itself
and he passes from the world of love and reaches the station of
stability (tamkīn), and in [the station
of] stability he may choose whatever attribute he desires and
he will be attributed with it.
So at first the dhikr is dominant for the wayfarer, then fikr is dominant, then inspiration and
then contemplation. And then he reaches the station of stability and he becomes free from any
variegation. In
other words, at first the attributes of the wayfarer are dominant over his existence
and each day, perhaps each
hour, an attribute is dominant over him. But when he passes the
station of variegation (talwīn) and
reaches the station of stability, his existence becomes dominant
over his attributes. The indication of the
station of stability is that the wayfarer can obtain
whatever station or attribute he desires, that is to say,
he can choose and all the attributes are his
property. If he desires he can recite the dhikr, and if he
wants he can engage in fikr, and if he does
not desire then he will not recite the dhikr or
engage in fikr. He has made himself prepared for
inspiration so that he can become informed of past and
future events. In other words, the mirror
of his heart has been cleaned from the tarnishing of both worlds, so
that the reflection of whatever
occurs or will occur in this world will become apparent upon his heart. If he
desires, he can
renounce the past and future and enjoy his present time.94
The Two Varieties of Mystical Wayfarer95
The superiority that Nasafī sees in fikr over dhikr is highlighted in his
comparison of the
terrestrial and celestial wayfarer. The terrestrial wayfarer
journeys on land and his means of transport is a
mount (markab) which is in
fact, the dhikr. The celestial wayfarer journeys through the heavens and
his
mount which is called Burāq (the name of the horse of the Prophet
Muḥammad, by which, according to Sufi
tradition, he rode on his night
ascent through the heavens) is in reality, fikr.
There are four conditions (sharṭ) for the terrestrial wayfarer without
which the spiritual journey is
impossible. These four are association with a
wise man, complying with the orders of this wise man, continual
dhikr and
lastly being God-fearing (taqwā) and abstinent (parhizgar).
There are also four "wings" (par) for the Buraq of the celestial wayfarer,
without which it
cannot fly in to the heavens of mystical experience. These
four wings are firstly
spiritual hearing, or hearing and understanding the
reality and meaning behind things; second is spiritual seeing
which is the
ability to see things as they are. These two wings are called manifest
revelation (waḥy-i
jahr). The third wing is fikr and the fourth is inspiration,
and these two wings are called revelation
of the spiritual heart (waḥy-i sirr).
According to a recent work, this classification of terrestrial and celestial
wayfarers is unique and found in no
other author preceding or following
Nasafī.96 With the practice of dhikr, the terrestrial wayfarer can also become
a
celestial wayfarer:
Know that it is necessary for the terrestrial wayfarer to travel on the
mount of religious effort and to be
engaged in continual dhikr until he
acquires the Buraq of contemplation. And when he acquires the Burāq
of
contemplation, he ceases from the dhikr, the sign is that the wayfarer
has passed from the earth and
heavens, and the earth and heavens are
one.97
Conclusion
For those who have not had any kind of mystical experience, it may be
difficult to comprehend Nasafī's
epistemological discussion of mystical
experience because it transcends the logical and rational processes of
acquiring knowledge which are based on sense perception and the intellect.
It is perhaps obvious to state that
"a full understanding of mystical
phenomena requires more than a study of mystical
literature."98 In other
words, one has to have had a mystical experience oneself in order to
appreciate what is really happening when
mystics such as Nasafī are
discussing the inner senses and losing themselves in the sea of light.
This ineffability of the mystical experience and the transcendence of
logic and reason is the essence of what
distinguishes the epistemology of
the Sufis from that of the Philosophers. The Sufis of Nasafī's era held
that
mystical experience occurred through the "inner senses" and by this term
they were not referring
to the intellectual faculties. Nasafī does not
elaborate on these "inner senses" but his
contemporaries, such as 'Alā' al-
Dawla al-Simnānī constructed a hierarchical framework of inner senses
which he called "Subtle Substances" (laṭa'īf). These are the essential reality
of the human
being. Of course reason and intelligence have a role to play in
how man acquires knowledge for it is through the
imagination that
knowledge from Malakūt and Jabarūt takes a form. It is also vital to note
that the pinnacle of Nasafī's epistemology, namely "contemplation" is when
one
"returns" to this world and is able to understand and see everything as it
is and in its right place.
Thus Nasafī's Sufism should not be regarded as
"otherworldly," or as a form of mystical escapism.
Rather, Nasafī provides a
path to perfection which leads one away from oneself to God. Thereafter,
one remains
with God but enjoys a felicitous life in this world. Just how one
can achieve this life is the subject of the
next chapter.
Notes
1 See T. Izutsu, Creation and the Timeless Order of Things
(Oregon: White Cloud Press, 1994),
p. 112.
2 Koran, 57: 4, "He is with you wherever you are."
3 Koran, 50: 16.
5 Ibid, p. 229.
6 For a discussion of the implications of this ḥadīth. see
Murata and Chittick, The "Vision of
Islam (New York: Paragon House, 1994).
8 Ibid, p. 249.
9 Ibid, p. 212.
10 For example, Maqṣad-i aqṣā, p. 213.
12 This commentary was called Bahr al-ḥaqā'iq, see J.J.
Elias, The Throne Carrier of God
(Albamy: SUNY Press, 1995), pp. 204-205.
14 Ibid, p. 81.
15 Ḥadīth, I have not been able to trace this.
18 al-lnsān al-kāmil, p. 54-55.
20 Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq, p. 58. This issue will be
explained in more detail in chapter six.
21 See Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, Mathnawī, I, 3467. Also Niẓāmī,
Sikandar-nāma, Vol II, pp. 197-200
(Dehli, 1316). For a translation of this story in Niẓāmī, see Sir
Thomas W. Arnold, Painting
in Islam (New York: Dover Publications, 1965), pp. 67-68.
24 Ḥadīth. This is a ḥadīth which was quoted by
Sufis prior to Nasafī. For example see al-Sarrāj
(d. 989) Kitāb al-luma' fi'l-taṣawwuf, ed. R.
A. Nicholson (Leiden and London, E.J. Brill,
1914), 548.
25 Koran, 15: 29.
27 Koran, 47: 15.
28 Koran, 29: 43.
30 Koran, 7: 172, 33: 72.
32 Ibid, p. 299.
33 Kitāb-i tanzīl, fol. 68b, l.15 – fol. 69a, 1.6.
38 Koran 24: 35, "God is the light of the heavens and earth.
The parable of His light is as if there
were a niche and within it a lamp enclosed in a glass, the glass as it
were a shining star,
kindled from a blessed tree, an olive tree neither of the east nor the west. Its oil would
almost
shine even if no fire touched it. Light upon light. God guides to His light whom He will."
39 Kitāb-i tanzīl, fol. 58b lines 16-18.
40 See S.H. Nasr, Three Muslim Sages ( New York: Caravan
Books, 1964), p. 39.
41 As S. Murata has commented, there is no scholarly consensus on
how to translate the word
wahm. See The Tao of Islam, p. 351, n. 77.
43 S.H. Nasr, Three Muslim Sages, p. 39.
44 See O.N. Mohammed, Averroes Doctrine of Immortality
(Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University
Press, 1984), p. 102.
47 Ibid, p. 243.
48 Ibid, p. 240-241.
49 Ibid, p. 149.
50 An allusion to Solomon's power over the satans mentioned in
the Koran, 38: 37: "And the
satans, every builder and diver, and others also, coupled in fetters."
51 Ibid, p. 150.
52 Ibn 'Arabī, al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya (II 597.4, 35)
translated Chittick, The Sufi Path of
Knowledge, p. 342.
53 Ḥadīth, Muslim, Qadar, 17.
54 According to Chittick, this ḥadīth is frequently quoted
in Sufi texts as well as by Ghazālī in
Iḥyā' 'ulūm al-dīn, but it is not acknowledged as
authentic by most of the exoteric scholars.
See The Sufi Path of Knowledge, p. 396, n. 20.
55 Maqṣad-i aqṣā, p. 263. See note 19.
56 Koran, 83: 14.
57 Koran, 6: 25, 17: 46, 18: 57.
59 Ibid, p. 242.
62 Koran, 61: 7-12.
63 Koran, 35: 31.
65 Koran, 20: 19.
66 al-Insān al-kāmil, pp. 297-298.
67 H. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on
Intellect (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1992), p. 123.
68 Ibid, p. 119.
69 Avicenna, Avicenna's Psychology, translated F.
Rahman, p. 37.
71 For an alternative discussion on dhikr, see J.J. Elias, The Throne Carrier of God, p. 119-146.
72 M. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam (Chicago: University of
Chicago, 1974-77), p. 211.
73 Koran, 33: 41.
74 Koran, 7: 205. See also 76: 25, 73: 8, 3: 41, 4: 103, 18: 24.
76 Ibid, p. 164.
77 For these four levels of dhikr, see Kashf
al-ḥaqā'iq, pp. 165-166. Nasafī's discussion of the
different levels of the dhikr are very
similar to those of earlier Sufis such as Maybudī (d.
1126). See M.I. Waley, "Contemplative Disciplines in
Early Persian Sufism," in Classical
Persian Sufism: from its Origins to Rumi, edited L. Lewisohn
(London: Khaniqahi
Nimatullahi Publications, 1993), p. 531-32.
78 For Ibn 'Arabī on fikr, see
Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, p. 159. For Rūmī on fikr, see
Lewisohn, Beyond Faith and
Infidelity, p. 222-225.
79 Shabastarī, Gulshān-i Rāz, v. 72, reproduced in
Lāhījī's Mafātīh al-i'jāz fī sharḥ-i gulshān-i
rāz, edited Kayvān Samī'ī (Tehran, 1965).
Cited by T. Izutsu in Creation and the Timeless
Order of Things, op.cit, p. 59.
80 Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā', Bāb al-tafakkur (vol 4,
pp. 412), translated M.I. Waley, cited in
Lewisohn, Beyond Faith and Infidelity, p. 219.
82 Ibid, p. 165.
83 Ibid, p. 149.
84 In Kitāb-i tanzīl, Nasafī explains fikr in a way
which may be interpreted as a rational and
intellectual process. He describes the appearance of light within the wayfarer, which at the
beginning may have the strength of a star in [the
wayfarer's inside]. According to the times of
the day, [the light] has the strength of the moon, and with
the passing of time that moon
becomes just like the sun through ascetic discipline and dhikr, until a
point when reflection
(fikr) and thought (andīsha) are no longer required for [the wayfarer].
Everything becomes
the object of contemplation (mu'āyana) for him. (Kitāb-i tanzīl, fol. 74b,
lines 12-14).
86 Ibid, p. 166.
87 Ibid, p. 139-140.
88 Hujwīrī, Kashf al-maḥjūb, p. 181.
89 "The states that come over [the wayfarer] will vary
according to the station in which he is
presently living; thus the qabḍ, 'contraction,' of
someone in the station of poverty is different
from the qabḍ of someone in the
station of longing." See A. Schimmei, Mystical Dimensions
of Islam (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1975), p. 99.
91 For example, see Hujwīrī: "Therefore the life of
contemplatives is the time during which they
enjoy mushādhadat: the time spent in seeing occurlarly
(mu'āyanat) they do not reckon as
life, for that to them is really death." Kashf
al-maḥjūb, op. cit., p. 331. Nasafī spiritualises the
meaning of mu'āyanat, as is shown in this
section.
93 C.W. Ernst, Words of Ecstacy in Sufism (Albany: SUNY
Press, 1985), p. 35.
95 See Lewisohn's discussion on Nasafī and the celestial
wayfarer, Beyond Faith and Infidelity, p.
220-222.
96 Ibid, p. 220. However, one can point to similar classifications
such as a work by Najm al-Dīn
Kubrā, Risāla ādāb al-sulūk, edited and translated into Persian by Husayn
Muḥyī al-Dīn
Qumsha'ī, in Kīmiyā, ed. Aḥmad Bihishtī Shīrāzī (Tehran, 1366), pp. 4-13. In this work,
Najm
al-Dīn Kubrā divides the journey (safar) into one of spiritual meaning (ma'nā) and the
other
is a bodily (jismānī) journey.
98 N. Pike, Mystic Union (London: Cornell University Press,
1992), p. xii.
4
The Sufi Journey

foot
Surely God's friends - no fear shall be on them, neither shall they sorrow. Those who believe and
are god
fearing - for them is good tidings in the present life and in the world to come.1
I.
FELICITY, THE GOAL OF SUFISM
The origin of the word "Sufism" has been studied in depth by both Muslim
and non-Muslim scholars but as
yet, there is no consensus concerning its
etymology.2 However, the reality of Sufism is clear, for its paramount aim is
felicity
(sa'āda) which is determined by the knowledge or proximity one has
to God. For Sufis, knowledge about
God is both "theoretical" and
"experiential", the former being worthless unless it is used to
bring man
close to God. Having discussed many of the issues relating to theoretical
knowledge of God in the
preceding two chapters, it is now necessary to
examine the practical side of Sufism, that is, the methods and
disciplines
particular to Sufism that distinguishes it from other forms of Islamic
worship.
Nasafī's version of felicity is attractive because it reveals the simple and
complex nature of the
"shahāda" or testimony of Islam. The public and
voluntary utterance of the shahāda,
"There is no god but God,"3 is the
foundation of Islam and by this statement, consenting adults become
Muslims. At the manifest level, the shahāda is an affirmation of the unity of
God and negates any
multiplicity of deities. The non-manifest dimension of
the shahāda is more intricate and Nasafī's
explanation of this is the means by
which the wayfarer can enjoy the felicitous life in Sufism. To understand the
non-manifest dimension of the shahāda, it is necessary to know the Sufi
meaning of felicity.
Felicity and Heaven
Finding real existence, which is the existence of God, is the cause of felicity.
This search is the Sufi path in
which there are many stages and the closer
one comes to real existence, the more one's felicity increases.
Nasafī
portrays three basic degrees of felicity by revealing the esoteric meaning of
the word
"ajr," or reward. In Persian, this word is spelt with three letters;
alif, jim and
ra:
Alif is an expression for return to God (i'ādat), and jim is an
expression for paradise
(janna) and ra is an expression for vision of God
(rū'yat). In other words, those who
have faith and have performed good
works will return to God and their return is to God's essence. There is no
doubt that they reach God's essence when they ascend, and they are in
paradise and encounter God.4
The distinction in felicity between Paradise and witnessing God is a typical

Sufi theme and dates back to the
time of Rābi'a (d. 801),5 a
female mystic
from Basra who stressed the importance of avoiding any ulterior motive in
worshipping God.
'Aṭṭār (d. 1221) cites one of Rābi'a's prayers:
O my Lord, if I worship Thee from fear of Hell, burn me in Hell, and
if I worship Thee from
hope of Paradise, exclude me thence, but if I
worship Thee for Thine own sake then withhold not from me Thine
Eternal Beauty.6
The vision of God as the ultimate degree of felicity is not confined to the
next world. Through following the
Sufi path of ascetic discipline and
spiritual effort under the guidance of a shaykh or master, many mystics
claim
that it is possible to witness God through his signs in this world.
Nasafī gives an indication of such Sufis and
the subsequent felicity that they
experience:
Know that some of the élite of the élite among the People of the Holy Law say that it is possible
that through
ascetic discipline and spiritual effort, the wayfarer's body can reach a point that in
terms of attributes
and subtlety it becomes extremely translucent, reflective, and luminous. The
light and the place of
manifestation become like one thing just like a glass goblet which is
extremely translucent and reflective in
which there is an extremely pure and fine (laṭīf) wine. One
cannot distinguish the goblet from the wine
or the wine from the goblet since the two are like one
thing.7 Hence the Prophets said: "Our spirits are our
bodies and our bodies are our spirits." Each
cry that comes from the wayfarers, like "Glory be to Me,
how great is My majesty,"8 and "I am the
Truth,"9 is in this station. In fact this station requires this because when the wayfarer's body
becomes glass-like (zujājī), extremely translucent
and reflective through ascetic discipline and
spiritual effort, he sees things that others cannot see, he hears
things that others do not hear, he
knows things that others do not know and he does things that others do not
do. When it occurs in
this way, the wayfarer sees the whole of his self as light and he cannot distinguish the
light from
the glass or the glass from the light. Even if he does not wish, a cry such as "Glory be to Me
how
great is My majesty," comes from him involuntarily.
O dervish! At the beginning of this station a cry comes from the wayfarers, like "There
is
nothing in my cloak except God,"10 and "There is nothing in the two worlds except
Me."11 In the
middle of
this station, in fact the cry "I am the Truth," and "Glory be to Me how great is My
majesty," comes from the wayfarers. At the end of this station, such a silence and quietness prevail
over
the wayfarer that he does not speak with anyone at any time unless it is necessary, and such
an incapacity
('ajzj and ignorance (nā-dānā'ī) prevail over him that he knows for sure that nobody
knows or will know God's essence and attributes just as God's essence and attributes are, and such
a
tranquillity (farāghat) and peace of mind (jam'iyat) prevail over him that he renounces
everything all at once, and such an entrustment (tafwīẓ) and surrender (taslīm) prevail over him
that nothing remains as a sorrow for him and he recognises God as knowing and powerful over the
servants.12
Although the ultimate goal is the contemplation of God, in Nasafī's works

there are frequent references to
the wayfarer being in either heaven (bibisht)
or hell (dūzakh). In Sufi terms, being in hell is a
state of remoteness from
God where it is not possible to witness Him. However, heaven is a place
where the
wayfarer is able to contemplate Him.13 As Nasafī indicates, some
Sufis claim that it is possible to behold God in this
world, therefore there is a
heaven and hell in this world as well as a heaven and hell in the next world.
In this
world,
Hell is love of fortune and fame, greed and avarice, associating others
with God (shirk) and not
recognising God. Heaven is the hatred of
fortune and fame, renunciation of seeking them, contentment,
satisfaction, unity and recognition of God.14
This worldly heaven and hell appear in Nasafī's discourses of both the Sufis
and the Philosophers. For
example, according to the Philosophers
the real Heaven is harmony and the real Hell is antagonism, and the truth of felicity is obtaining
[one's]
desire and the truth of non-felicity is not obtaining [one's] desire . . . Since
you have
understood the truth of Heaven and Hell, now know that Heaven and Hell have many gates. All
pleasant
words and actions and praiseworthy character traits are the gates of Heaven. All
unpleasant words and actions
and reproachable character traits are the gates of Hell. This is
because each torment and unhappiness that
befalls man is through unpleasant words and actions
and reproachable character traits. Each comfort and
felicity that befalls man is through pleasant
words and actions and praiseworthy character traits.
Know that some people say that Hell has seven gates and Heaven has eight gates. This is correct
because man has
eight senses, that is, man has eight perceptions; five external senses, imagination
(khayāl), sensory
intuition (wahm) and intelligence ('aql). Everything that man perceives and
discovers is
through these eight gates. Each time that intelligence does not accompany the other
seven, or when they operate
without the order of intelligence but operate through the order of
nature, these seven are the gates of Hell.
And when intelligence is manifested and becomes the
master of these seven and when they operate on the command
of intelligence, the eight become the
gates of Heaven. Therefore all of mankind will pass through Hell and then
arrive at Heaven. Some
remain in Hell and cannot proceed from there, and others pass Hell and arrive at
Heaven.15
Nasafī's statement that everyone passes the gates of Hell is based upon a
verse in the Koran which states
"Not one of you there is, but he shall go
down to it [Hell]."16 In fact, the whole of Nasafī's works reflect a deep
knowledge
of the Koran and in outlining his thought and that of others, he
draws many allusions from it. The following
example (which again comes
from a discourse of the Philosophers) stresses the immediacy of
Heaven and
Hell in the present world and portrays the tree in Heaven and the tree in
Hell.17
Know that the Tubba' tree is a tree which has a branch in each pavilion and in all the levels of
Heaven. Each comfort and repose for each individual of the People of Heaven comes from a
branch of the
Tubba' tree, since it is in their pavilion. That tree is wisdom, since there is wisdom in
every
branch. Each person thinks about the final cause of each action he performs and he does not
regret any action.
And the Zaqqūm tree is a tree which has a branch in each house and in each of the Hells of Hell.
Every
torment and vexation that afflicts the People of Hell comes from the Zaqqūm tree. That tree
is nature
since there is nature in each branch of this tree. Each person does not think about the final
cause of each
action that he performs, and this lack of reflection and thought is created by him and
he regrets his own
action. The sign of the ignorant is that they regret [their] words and actions.
Know that reward and punishment are the fruits of the Tubba' and the
Zaqqūm trees. The fruit of
their branches will be produced for you since there is a branch of both in
your house.
Since you have understood that reward and punishment are the fruits of your tree, now know
that the nurturing
of these trees is through your own planting and rearing. This is because each
action which you perform is
through the management and thought of intelligence and the
prevention of the soul's caprice is in that
action.18
Although the two previous quotations are from the discourses of the
Philosophers, they also reflect the esoteric
dimension of Nasafī's brand of
Sufism. The only difference that Nasafī has with the Philosophers is that
there is another stage beyond intelligence which enables the wayfarer to
contemplate God from Heaven. This stage
is the love for God where one
actualizes gnosis (ma'rifa).
O dervish! Ignorance is a Hell before [attaining] gnosis. Ignorance
after gnosis is Heaven. Before attaining
gnosis, ignorance is the cause of
greed and avarice, and after gnosis it is the cause of satisfaction and
surrender.19
The Path of Felicity
Sufism is more than a theoretical interpretation of the esoteric dimension of

Islam for there is no benefit to
the wayfarer in comprehending the theory of
felicity without performing those tasks which draw him towards the
felicitous life:
Whoever hears there is a thing in this world called sugar is never equal
with the person who knows there is a
plant called sugar cane which is
extremely sweet and when that plant is cut and beaten and the water is
taken
from it and made thick, sugar and cane by products are made.
Whoever knows how sugar is made is never equal to
the person who sees
how it is made and places sugar in his mouth. First is the level of hearing
(sam')
concerning the experiential knowledge of sugar, second is the
level of knowledge ('ilm) and third is
the level of tasting (dhawq).20
In other words, the first level pertains to those members of the 'Ulamā' or
religious scholars who
stress the exoteric dimension of Islam, and the second
level is that of the Philosophers who emphasise the use of
rational
knowledge in explaining the world. The third level belongs to the Sufis
whose practices enable them to
understand the reality of things as they really
are. In Maqṣad-i aqṣā, Nasafī classifies these practices
into two sections,
which if perfected together, can lead to the felicitous life. The
first factor is
renunciation (tark) and the second is gnosis of God.
(i) Renunciation
Nasafī lived through the two Mongol invasions of Central Asia and Iran
between 1220 and 1258. The subsequent
occupation of that area by the
Mongols clarified to the local inhabitants the insecurity and
impermanence
of their lives and circumstances. The horrors perpetrated by the Mongols are
infamous and need not
be repeated here.21 It may well
be a result of his
experiences under Mongol domination that Nasafī was so adamant that
"there is no
happiness (khūshī) in this world (dunyā)."22 The instability of
this world and its circumstances (aḥwāl) are compared
by Nasafī to a wave
of the sea:
O dervish! You must not put your trust in this world or this world's
comforts, and you should not put your
trust in the life or veracity of
fortune and fame. Everything under the sphere of the moon and the stars
does not
keep its original state. It will certainly change, in other words,
the state of this world does not stay in one
condition, but is always
changing. Each moment it takes a new form and each hour a plan is
created, but the first
form has still not been completed or found stability
when another form comes and annuls the first form. It
resembles a wave
of the sea, and the wise man never builds his house upon a wave of the
sea and he never intends
to live there.23
As a result of this impermanence, people are always seeking more.

Nobody is satisfied with his own station. If there is an ignorant person,
he seeks something and if there is a
wise person, he also seeks
something, perhaps more; and if there is a poor person, he seeks
something and if
there is a wealthy person, he seeks something, perhaps
more; and if there is a subject and if there is a king,
they are both
desirers. This conflict and discord are due to desire and seeking; so there
are conflict and
discord wherever one desires and seeks. There is no
difference between the wise and the ignorant person, the
wealthy and the
poor person, the subject and the king. But the wise person, the wealthy
person and the king have
more suffering because their desires and
seeking are greater.24
The only cure for conflict is the renunciation of whatever one is seeking.
Know that renunciation is the severing of connections; the severing of
connections in its non-manifest dimension
is when love of this world is
expelled from one's heart, and in its manifest
dimension it is when a
worldly person renounces everything he has and gives it to the poor
people.25
Desire is not limited to worldly matters, for according to Nasafī, attachment

to religion and the next world is
undesirable in certain respects. This is
particularly the case if the exoteric dimension of a religion
predominates in
the believer.
O dervish, everything which becomes a veil in the path of the
wayfarer obstructs his path. He must renounce it,
whether it belongs to
this world or to the next world. That is, just as fortune and fame obstruct
the path of the wayfarer, there is also a time when too much prayer and
fasting
obstruct the path. One is a murky veil and the other is a luminous
veil.25
Nasafī relates an enlightening story which highlights the extent of

renunciation when attachment to religion
(even Sufism) can become a veil.
The story involves two famous Sufis, Ibrāhīm Adham (d. 790) and Shaqīq
al-Balkhī
(d. 809).
It is said that Shaqīq came to Ibrāhīm and Ibrāhīm asked Shaqīq
"O Shaqīq! How do the dervishes of your city behave?"
"In the best spiritual state," Shaqīq replied.
"How is that spiritual state?" Ibrāhīm asked.
"If they find something they give thanks, and if they do not find anything, they wait," Shaqīq
replied.
"The dogs of our city act in the same way; if they find something they eat it, and if they don't
find
anything, they wait," Ibrāhīm said
"So how should the dervishes live?" asked Shaqīq.
"If they don't find anything, they give thanks, and if they find something, they give it up (īthār
kunand)," he replied.27
The "murky" and "luminous veils" are also called idols (but) which come in
all forms:
Old clothes may be an idol for one person and new clothes may be an
idol of another. The free person is he who
sees both in the same way. The
purpose of clothing is the repelling of cold and obtaining warmth, and
one should
desire whichever serves this purpose. If neither do, then one
should desire whichever serves the purpose in an
easier way. O dervish,
the person who says, "I want new clothes and I do not want old clothes,"
is in
chains. And the person who says "I want old clothes and I do not
want new clothes," is also in chains.
As long as they are in chains, there
is no difference between them. Whether gold or iron, both are chains.
The
free person is one who has no chains of any type in any way,
because chains are idols.28
Generally, Nasafī describes the root of all idols in the following way:
O dervish, there is one big idol and the rest of the idols are small.
These small idols derive from the big idol.
For some people the big idol
is fortune and for others it is fame while for still others it is being
accepted by
other people. Being accepted by other people is the biggest
of all idols, and fame is bigger than
fortune.29
Nasafī does not advocate the complete renunciation of everything; rather the
renunciation of idols means becoming
non-attached to everything to such an
extent that makes life possible. One has to be practical in renunciation:
Renunciation is the renunciation of trifling matters, not the
renunciation of what is required. This is because
too much fortune is
unpleasant and obstructs the path. The renunciation of what is necessary
is also unpleasant
and also obstructs the path because man needs
nourishment, clothing and a place to live to a degree that is
necessary. If
man renounces everything, he needs others and he becomes hungry and
hunger is the mother of
meanness. In the same way that too much fortune
causes much corruption, so too does the renunciation of whatever
is
necessary. Whatever is necessary is a great blessing and whatever is not
necessary is a great affliction. The
amount of whatever is necessary is a
blessing, but it becomes an affliction when that amount is
exceeded.30
Renunciation is not an easy task, since one has to determine what is the
necessary amount. This is one reason why
Nasafī holds it advisable to
practice renunciation with the help of someone who is spiritually more
mature and
advanced, that is, the Sufi shaykh.
. . . renunciation must have the permission of the shaykh. You must
renounce whatever he says, whether it
pertains to this world or the next
world, for nobody recognises his own idol and nobody sees himself as an
idol
worshipper. Everyone believes himself to be released and free and
recognises himself as a Unitarian and
idol-smasher.31
Renunciation and idol-smashing have results in two ways: that one may
enter Heaven after the
Day of Judgement and that one may enjoy a felicitous
life in this world in close proximity to God.
(ii) Gnosis of God
Renunciation is a concept that is common in the esoteric dimension of all

major religions, but the gnosis of God
is perhaps a more particularised
aspect in each belief. For Sufis, gnosis of God means seeing God in
everything, for His creation reveals something about Him - if one has the
ability to
see correctly. His creation is ali good, for it is impossible that God
should create something evil. Nasafī explains:
No attribute is bad, but some of these are used on an improper
occasion, and it is said that the attribute is
bad. There is nothing bad in
the world. Everything in its right place is good, but the name of some
things
becomes bad when they are not in the right place. Therefore God
Most High does not create anything bad, He has
created everything as
good.32
To take a specific example, force may be a good attribute if one needs to

exercise physical strength to break a
piece of wood, however, the same force
of physical strength should be regarded in a negative light when it is
used in
robbery. The individual who manifests the right character trait at the right
time has the gnosis of God,
but the problem of course, is how one knows
which character trait to reveal at any given moment.
(a) The simplest way to obtain gnosis of God is to realise that Heaven and
Hell exist within
the self and to act appropriately, for God is witnessed in
Heaven.
Know that someone asked a wise man, "Each person has a way and that way is called the way of
salvation,
and each person denies the way of the others. I am confused and I do not know where
my salvation lies or what
way will make me sorrowful." The wise man said, "Go and be a man of
good conduct, since no evil
befalls a man of good conduct in this world or the next world and the
man of good conduct never regrets his
actions." He asked the wise man, "What is good conduct?"
The wise man said, "Don't do
anything evil against anyone and do good with everyone, and do not
wish evil against anyone but wish well for
everyone, since the quality of a well-wisher and a good
soul is that at first his own state and affairs prosper
and the quality of a bad soul and an evil-wisher
is that at first his own state and affairs deteriorate. So
whoever does evil and wishes evil upon
people, in truth does it against his own soul."
O dervish! The bad-souled, evil wishing person has a state right now in Hell and burns in Hell
and his heart is
tormented. His fire and torture become more severe on the basis of other peoples'
states and to the extent
that other peoples' states improve.33
Thus the person who steals for no good reason, steals from himself, and the
person who torments other people or
even animals without purpose, in fact
torments himself: "whatever evil visits you is from
yourself."34 The
manifestation of such character traits at the improper time leads straight to
Hell: "For them is
chastisement in the present life; and the chastisement of
the world to come is yet more
grievous."35
(b) The second way is by following the laws that God has sent down to
His community. The
laws of Islam (the Sharī'a) are quite specific, ranging
from issues on inheritance to those on
marriage. However, Nasafī is aware
that in some cases, the Sharī'a needs to be understood in an
esoteric manner:
The Unitarian says that recognising good and bad, and obedience (ṭā'at) and disobedience
(ma'ṣiyat) is a great task and nobody understands them except the wise man and perfect ones.
O dervish! All the religions and Islamic schools have agreed that telling lies is a great
disobedience, and
they have seen and spoken the truth, but there is a time when speaking the truth
is a great disobedience and
there is a time when lying is a great act of worship, so it is clear that
understanding good and bad is a
difficult task.
O dervish! Actions according to intent may be good and they may be bad, so recognising the
intent is a great task.36
So it is incumbent upon each individual to make an attempt to recognise the

intent behind each person's
action, but this does not mean that everyone can
ignore the laws of the Sharī'a on the basis of their
own esoteric
interpretations of the Koran (however much the intent may be in the spirit of
the
Sharī'a). Indeed, having composed treatises on the esoteric nature of
Islam, Nasafī concludes
both Maqṣad-i aqṣā and Manāzil al-sā'īrīn with
warnings that the ultimate recourse of the
Muslim must be to the Sharī'a:
O dervish! In whatever station you are in, do not trust in your own intelligence and knowledge,
and do not see
or name yourself "Verifier of the Truth." Neither make a special way (ṭarīqī) for
yourself nor
establish a religious school (madhhab) through your own thought. In other words, you
must be an imitator
of your prophet (payghambar) in the knowledge and gnosis of any station that
you are in, and do not
neglect his Sharī'a . . .37
Don't let your caution slip, in other words, don't neglect the Sharī'a because anyone who
neglects it will certainly be sorrowful since "renunciation of caution and discretion is poor
opinion."38
Know that the wise men have said that man's expediency is to respect the claims of the Verifier
of the
Truth and not to step outside the bounds of imitation (ḥadd-i taqlīd) and admit one's own
incapacity
and ignorance and know for sure that one cannot know in reality God, as God really is,
and one cannot recognise
in reality things as they really are. When this was understood, the Sharī'a
was, and is respected.
The Sharī'a includes conforming to commands, abstaining from prohibited
things, being abstinent, not
neglecting one point in observing the Sharī'a, speaking truthfully and
behaving correctly.
Once the Sharī'a is respected, the wayfarer knows that the perfection of man
is that he reaches
the human level and becomes completely clean of blameworthy qualities and unpleasant
character
traits and he becomes adorned with laudable qualities and pleasant character traits.39
Esoteric interpretations of the Sharī'a are limited to those who have a great
degree of spiritual
understanding, such as the Sufi shaykh, which introduces
the third step for attaining gnosis
of God.
(c) The way of the scholars of Islam (through the study of the Koran and
the ḥadīth) and the way of the
Philosophers (through reason and
intelligence) are regarded as a preliminary stage by the
Sufis. They hold that
there is a superior way to know God, which is surrendering to Him and
building faith
through performing acts of worship and devotion such as
prayer, renunciation and other Sufi practices including
the dhik, chilla (a
period of forty day isolation for spiritual contemplation) and the recital of
litanies. All of these activities must be performed under the guidance of the
Sufi shaykh, if they are not, then
they have no value because only the Sufi
shaykh can recognise the significance of the effects and spiritual
visions that
may result from such practices.
The aim of these activities is to recognise the self, for man is the purpose
of God's creation, since all of
God's attributes and character traits can be
witnessed through man. If he perfects himself and manifests the
appropriate
attribute at the right time, he is like a mirror for God. This is why many Sufis
quoted the
ḥadīth, "I [God] was a hidden treasure and I desired to be
known," and "God created Adam in His own form." Adam, is of course, the
archetype of all humans and
therefore each person is made in God's image,
having the potential to manifest all the character traits in
the correct manner.
From this perspective, one can understand why Nasafī states:
O dervish, there is a sign for understanding the magnificence and
greatness of man, and if you find that sign in
yourself it is clear that you
have understood what a man is. That sign is that hereafter you must
search in
yourself for whatever you are searching. If you are searching
for God's essence and attributes, then search
in yourself. If you are
searching for the First Intelligence and the First Spirit (which is the
Attributed
Spirit) then search in yourself. If you are searching for Satan
and the Devil, then search in
yourself. If you are searching for the
Resurrection and the Reckoning and the Straight Path
then search in
yourself. And if you are searching for the water of life then search in
yourself - pass the darkness of nature until you arrive at the water of life,
O dervish! I say all
of this and I know for sure that you do not
understand what I am saying.
I travelled in search of Jamshid's world reflecting chalice
I did not rest during the day and I did not sleep at night.
I listened to the description of Jamshid's chalice from a wise man.
I was the world reflecting chalice!40
The path to felicity, which is composed of renunciation and gnosis of God, is

encapsulated by
Nasafī to reflect a simple formula known to millions of
Muslims: "There is no god, but God."
O dervish! Renunciation and gnosis of God is the testimony of Islam.
The testimony of Islam is negation and
affirmation. Negation is the
renunciation of idols and affirmation is the gnosis of God. Fortune and
fame are two great idols and they have lead astray and they lead
astray
many people. They are the deities of creatures and many creatures
worship fortune and fame. You must have
no doubt about the reality of
this situation described in this discourse. Whoever has renounced fortune
and fame
and has cast aside love of this world from his heart has
completed the negation and whoever has obtained the
gnosis of God has
completed the affirmation. This is the reality of "There is no god but
God."41
The testimony of Islam has been the source of inspiration for Sufis
throughout history. For Ibn 'Arabī, the
testament of Islam could be
formulated in the idea of "He/not He," which reflects the negation (there
is
no god) and affirmation (but God). In other words, everything in the world
possesses existence, but this
existence is limited in comparison to that of
God. For example, man is limited in terms of the duration of his
life and also
in the talent he possesses, whereas God is eternal and knowing and powerful
over everything. Thus,
in some respects, man resembles God in that he can
manifest the appropriate character traits but in other
respects he cannot be
compared with God, Whose essence is unknowable, that is He/ not He, or
"there is no
god, but God."
The public utterance of the testimony of Islam makes an adult a Muslim,
but for Nasafī, however, being a real
Muslim is not so easy:
Whoever has not carried out renunciation and does not have gnosis of
God has never said the testimony of
Islam.42
Nasafī own views are reflected in the discourses of the People of Unity:
O dervish! The People of Unity say this in a better, more pleasant
way.
They say that the meaning of the testimony of Islam is negation and
affirmation but the negation is not
seeing the self and the affirmation is
seeing God.43
In fact, this is a similar way of expressing Ibn 'Arabī's "He/not He." The
incomparability
(tanzīh) of the self with God is contrasted with the similarity
(tashbīh) of the self with God.
Real Muslims are able to witness the unity in
these opposites and the reward of undertaking renunciation and having
gnosis of God is the felicitous life, which for Sufis is a life here and now
and
also in the next world.
The testimony of Islam, prayer, fasting have a form and a reality, and
you have been uninformed of these
realities and you have been content
in the form. It is a great shame if you do not reach these realities.
Renunciation and gnosis of God are like a tree, for the gnosis of God is
the root of this tree
and renunciation is the trunk. All the good attributes
and pleasant character traits are the fruit of this tree.
The root of this tree
is the heart and the trunk is manifested from the heart. However much
the root becomes
stronger, the trunk also becomes stronger, until
renunciation reaches a point where this world, the next world
and the
existence of the wayfarer are obliterated and God alone remains. O
dervish! God alone always existed and
God alone always exists, but the
wayfarer was blind but he sees at the hour when he reaches the reality of
the
testimony of Islam.44
II. THE SUFI

PATH
(i) The Order (ṭarīqa)
By the thirteenth century, Sufism developed within a range of different

orders (ṭarīqa) which were
brotherhoods of Sufis having a common spiritual
"family tree." This spiritual ancestry (silsila) was traced back through
various shaykhs to the Prophet Muḥammad. According to Sufi
tradition, at
Muḥammad's death, the spiritual virtue (baraka) was passed on to his
successors (many orders cite 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib as the first link in the silsila).
With the
growth in the number of shaykhs possessing baraka, the silsilas
often became complex and in
addition, the growth in the numbers of shaykhs
who initiated disciples into Sufism resulted in a differentiation
among the
orders in ascetic disciplines and spiritual practices by which one could come
close to God (such as the
silent dhikr and the vocal dhikr).
The extent to which Nasafī was affiliated to a Sufi order is unclear.
Although he claims
in his works that he served under Sa'd al-Dīn Ḥammūya,
there is no letter of ijāza45 which would indicate that Ḥammūya was
indeed
Nasafī's shaykh. In fact, Nasafī's "formal" connections to a Sufi
order has
been questioned to the extent that he has been called a "free-thinker."46
Although it is clear that Sa'd
al-Dīn Ḥammūya was initiated into Najm al-
Dīn Kubrā's circle of Sufis which came to be known as the
Kubrāwiyya
order, in his later life it seems that Ḥammūya was "poorly received" by other
Kubrāwī Sufis,
which may have been a result of his "heterodox" Sufism and
his close association with Ibn 'Arabī
and his Damascene circle.47 If
Ḥammūya was not completely integrated into the Kubrāwiyya circle then It
is possible that Nasafī may also have
been on the fringe of this order. From
this perspective, the passages in Nasafī's texts which are severely
critical of
Sufism make more sense.48 So the real situation concerning Nasafī's
affiliation with the Kubrāwiyya is
not clear, but presented on the next two
pages are two possible silsilas49 which link Nasafī with Muḥammad.
One reason which supports the belief that Nasafī was affiliated with the
Kubrāwiyya order is the fact there are
many similarities in the basic beliefs
held by both Nasafī and also the order as a whole. This order was greatly
inspired by the teachings of Junayd of Baghdad (d. 910), and there are
several references
within Najm al-Dīn Kubrā's Fawā'iḥ al-jamāl wa fawātiḥ
al-jalāl to Junayd.50 Junayd listed eight principles which he
considered
essential in the Sufi path. These were purity, silence of the tongue, seclusion
and avoidance of
people, fasting, continual dhikr, negation of thoughts,
inclination for the association of pure people
(such as the shaykh), and
finally contentment with God's command. Najm al-Dīn Kubrā offered the
same eight
principles adding two of his own: the renunciation of sleep and
observing the Sufi rules concerning consumption
of food and drink.51 Nasafī
also lists ten actions of the "People of the Path," which
reflect the influence
of Junayd and Najm al-Dīn Kubrā. The ten are: the search for God, the
search for a wise man
(shaykh), desire for the shaykh, obeying the
commands of the shaykh, renunciation, God-fearingness, speaking
little,
sleeping little, eating little and seclusion.52
Distinctions have been made by Sufis themselves and also western
scholars between the "sober" and
"drunken" forms of Sufism. This is
particularly the case with reference to Junayd's form of
Sufism,53 since he is
known to
have been critical of Bāyazīd Basṭāmī's descriptions of mystical
experience. Nasafī
also regarded the "sober" form of Sufism as a higher
stage than the drunken form. The latter, which is
characterised by the
ecstatic comments such as "I am the Truth," or "Glory be to Me how great is
My majesty," is necessary although it does not represent the ultimate degree
of spirituality:
When they return from the ascent, some wayfarers are sober and some are drunk because they
have tasted from
cups full to the brim of pure wine and their wine bearer was their God. For this
reason, those who are weaker
do not look after their manifest dimension and they behave
drunkenly and they neglect the manifest dimension of
the Holy Law.54
And whoever has become a lover and manifests his love remains dirty and does not become
clean because that fire
which entered by means of his eyes has left by means of his tongue, and the
heart remains
only half burnt. Thereafter, the heart can do nothing, neither a task of this world nor
a task of the next
world nor a task of the Lord.55
In Bayān-i tanzīl, Nasafī remarks that drunkenness is at the beginning and
middle of the station of unity
with God, and the wayfarer cannot but make
such ecstatic utterances. However, sobriety is at the very end of the
station
and is the more mature relation between man and God.56 When Nasafī
makes critical remarks about Sufism, he is not complaining about
those Sufis
who are drunk, for they cannot help their state, rather he is condemning
those who use Sufism and
make claims to advance themselves.
Aside from being a "sober" order, the Kubrāwiyya also became known for
its
psycho-analysis of light colour in mystical visions. The details of such
phenomena were described by Najm al-Dīn
Kubrā and also by 'Alā' al-
Dawla Simnānī.57 In Nasafī's works, there is no such exegesis of colours,
indeed, one is
struck by the dryness of Nasafī's treatises when compared
with the poetic and imaginal nature of Najm al-Dīn
Kubrā's Fawā'iḥ. (Of
course, one has to remember that the objectives of the two were different;
Nasafī was concerned with explaining the beliefs of the 'Ulamā',
Philosophers,
Transmigrationists and Sufis, while Kubrā was detailing his
own visionary experiences).
Nasafī's links with "institutionalised" Sufism certainly go as far as
believing in the necessity of
the shaykh and performing the Sufi devotional
practices under his guidance. Spiritual wayfaring is impossible
without these
two, and therefore the remainder of this chapter will investigate in more
detail Nasafī's
explanation of the shaykh and devotional practices.
(ii) The Sufi Shaykh
The importance of the Sufi shaykh in actualising gnosis of God is paramount

in Nasafī's theosophy. The
difference between the shaykh and the wayfarer is
that the former has already completed the spiritual wayfaring
and thus
possesses the spiritual blessing (baraka)58 from his own shaykh. Baraka is
the blessing bestowed by God
upon the individual, and since Muḥammad is
thought to have received God's blessing, so too others believed
that
Muḥammad passed on this baraka to those around him who were worthy of
it. The initiation into Sufism
and the transmission of baraka was not
bestowed upon everyone because the gnosis of Sufism could not be
understood by all members of the community, and the beliefs and ecstatic
utterances (shaṭḥiyyāt) could
easily be mis-interpreted by the common
people and also the 'Ulamā'. Therefore, the novices were
bound to the
commands of the shaykh by an oath of loyalty (bay'a), and they were not
supposed to
divulge these secrets to the uninitiated or unsympathetic.
The tradition of the beloved ones [i.e. the shaykhs] was that the
community which enjoyed association with them
saw its protection in
whoever had preparedness, did not divulge secrets and preserved dignity.
They surrendered
to him [the shaykh] for protection and declared that
they would not betray this protection but keep it secret
from those who
were not of the community.59
In addition, if the Sufi shaykh was accused of deviating from Islam,

he was
able to defend the "orthodoxy" of his beliefs and practices by referring to his
baraka
and the silsila as the ultimate authority (since it had been passed
down to him from
Muḥammad via his own shaykh). To repeat, it is through
baraka that one comes close to God. In some cases,
the baraka was received
not from the living shaykh of a particular order, but from the spirit of an
Islamic mystic who had died many years previously. This was the case of a
Khwājagānī Shaykh, 'Abd al-Khāliq
Ghujdawānī (d. 1220), who was
initiated into Sufism by the spirit of Abū Ya'qūb Yūsuf Hamadānī (d. 1140).
The shaykh possessing baraka was one of the most important components
in Nasafī's theosophy. In a
typical comment, Nasafī explains:
Know that association has strong effects and great qualities, in evil and good. The reason that
any wayfarer
arrives at the destination and achieves his aim is because he has association with a
wise man. The reason that
the wayfarer does not arrive at the destination and does not achieve his
aim is because he has not had such
association. The task [of Sufism] requires association with a
wise man. All the ascetic discipline and
spiritual effort and the rules of courtesy and conditions
which have been set in the Sufi path (rāh-i
taṣawwuf) are so that the wayfarer becomes worthy of
the association with a wise man. When the wayfarer
becomes worthy of association with a wise
man his task is complete.60
O dervish, if a wayfarer has association with a wise man for one day, even one hour, and he is
prepared
(musta'ad) and worthy of this association, this is better than being engaged in a hundred
years or a
thousand years of ascetic discipline and spiritual effort.61
Finding a suitable Sufi shaykh was not an easy task because by the thirteenth
century, Sufism had become so
popular in the Islamic world that there were
many "shaykhs," and some of them had reached this
spiritual position in
society without truly deserving it. Nasafī refers to this several times:
People must have great caution at the beginning and not become the disciple of any person even
if they are good
and sound, since shaykh-hood and leadership and the taking of disciples is a
different task. I myself do not
speak the discourses of those people who are the People of Idle Talk.
O dervish, I have seen many who have
claimed such things for themselves and they make claims
of shaykh-hood and they have made shaykh-hood a trap of
fortune and fame. God preserve
everyone from the association of such people.62
O dervish, my intention of this wise man or searcher of the Truth is not these inactive religious
scholars
('Ulamā') and not these impure shaykhs. These religious scholars and
shaykhs are a
thousand times more imitating, lost and further from God Most High than you are. Despite this
remoteness from God, they regard themselves as near to Him, and as a result of extreme ignorance
and darkness,
they regard themselves as wise men, and they see themselves as existing with light.
Each time they read the
verse: "It is like the depths of darkness in a vast deep ocean, overwhelmed
with billow, topped by dark
clouds, depths of darkness, one above the other,"63 they apply these
words to the Chinese and Indians but never to
themselves.64
Nasafī describes the difficulty of finding a suitable shaykh:

O dervish, you will not find this wise man or this Verifier of the Truth
in mosques, preaching from the
minbar or reciting dhikr. You will not
find him in the religious schools giving
lessons, and you will not find
him among the people of high office among the bookish people or
among the idol
worshippers. You will not find him in the Sufi Khānaqāh
prostrating himself with the People of Imagination
and self-worshippers.
Out of these three places for worshipping God, there may be one person
out of a thousand
working for the sake of God. O dervish, the wise man
and Verifier of the Truth and the men of God are hidden and
this
hiddenness is their guardian, their club, their fortress, their weapon. [This
hiddenness] is the reason why
they are clean and pure. He that is not
hidden is a plot and a trick of Satan. O dervish, their exterior is like
the
exterior of the common people and their interior is like the interior of the
elite. They do not give access
to any leader or chief and they have no
claim to be leader or leaders. Each one is busy with something or
someone
according to his need and they earn their own living through
their own business, fleeing from the wealth of kings
and tyrants. They do
not seek anything in excess and if something falls to them without effort
or exertion which
they do not need, they give it away. They spend most
of their time in retreat and seclusion, and they do not
enjoy interaction
with this world, and they are opposed to company with the lords of high
position. If it is
useful, they spend their time in association with the dear
ones and the dervishes.65
The kind of wise man that Nasafī would have approved of can be ascertained
by the references that he makes to
other mystics in his works. These include
Ibn 'Arabī, Ṣadr al Dīn Qūnawī, Shaykh Shihāb al-Dīn 'Umār
Suhrawardī,66
Abū Ḥāmid
Ghazālī67 and 'Ayn al-Quḍāt
Hamadānī.68 Presumably the
shaykhs of the Kubrāwiyya order were also held in high esteem, such as
Najm al-Dīn Kubrā, Najm al-Dīn Rāzī and
Sa'd al-Dīn Ḥammūya.
Nasafī describes the ideal shaykh with reference to the views of Shaykh
Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī:
. . . know that when one man is overtaken by the Truth's divine attraction
(jadhb) and that
person arrives at the level of love in the love of God, it is more
likely that he will not return from
that level but will live and die there. Such a person is called the object
of divine attraction
(majdhūb). There are some people who return and they are aware of themselves and
they are called
the divinely attracted wayfarers (majdhūb sālik) if they engage in wayfaring and
complete the
wayfaring. If a person performs the spiritual wayfaring first of all and completes it and then the
divine attraction of the Truth overcomes him, such a person is called a wayfarer of divine
attraction. If a
person performs the spiritual wayfaring and completes it, but the divine attraction
does not overtake him, then
such a person is called a wayfarer (sālik). So there are four kinds; the
divinely attracted one, the
divinely attracted wayfarer, the wayfarer of divine attraction and the
wayfarer.
Shaykh Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī said in his 'Awārif al-ma'ārif that there
should be one group
of shaykhs and leaders among these four and they are the divinely attracted wayfarers, and
the
others should not be shaykhs or leaders.69
The reason that the majdhūb is not considered as a suitable shaykh is

because he cannot be held
responsible for his words or actions in the state of
being overtaken by divine attraction. Such ecstatic
utterances not only
aroused the opposition of the 'Ulamā' but also could not be understood by
novices who wished to follow the Sufi path. Thus it is necessary that the
shaykh is someone who has both
traversed the path and can recognise the
different stations and states and understand all the pitfalls and
dangers, and
has also received divine grace.
It has already been mentioned that it was not easy for novices to identify
"legitimate" Sufi shaykhs
and therefore Nasafī describes four qualities that
are found in a genuine shaykh.
The first is that they [the Shaykhs] are pious and forbear and they keep the customs and
traditions and ways,
and they are very careful in nourishment, clothes and place of living. They
keep their distance from dubious
property, bequests and taxes, the property of kings, the property
of the followers of titles and tyrants . . .
Accepting what is legal and having caution in nourishment
and clothing and places to live has many good
qualities which people do not know except for the
Perfect Ones. And accepting what is illegal and not having
caution in nourishment and clothing
and places to live has many bad qualities which people do not know except
for the Perfect Ones.
The second is that they flee from fortune and fame; they do not like
these two since they are the
cause of all sin. The indication of the person who has renounced fortune is that
he has none, and he
does not accept it even if it is given to him. He is not arrogant with anyone, but is
humble and he
does not associate or sit with the People of Titles and the People of
this World.
The third is that they never speak of their soul's purification or make claims of themselves. That
is, they
do not speak about their own obedience to God and their own purity. They do not describe
their own sacrifices
and munificence, but they talk about their own faults and deficiencies, and the
perfection and states of
others. They speak of injustices that they themselves have caused and of
the justices caused by others.
The fourth is that they do not speak too much, and they do not speak of that matter which is not
asked of them.
They give brief answers to questions. If in truth they do not know that matter then
they say, "I do not
know," and they do not answer in a dubious and inexact way.
So every person who trains people should have these four internal indications in him and many
people will
benefit from association with him. It is unlawful for the person who does not have
these four indications to
train people since association with him will harm them, and he may cause
innumerable faults in them.70
Once the appropriate shaykh has been found, it is incumbent upon the novice
to persuade the shaykh of his genuine
desire to follow the Sufi path.
When you have found one [a shaykh], pay attention and serve him and
regard him dearly, and see association with
him as the cause of all your
blessings and surrender to him. You should empty your existence of your
ego and your
opinion, and you should fill your non-manifest dimension
with him and his will and his love, even if he distances
you from himself
and drives you away. He cannot endure social interaction and association
with everyone. Be
inseparable from him and try to be in such a way that
he cannot refuse you. When you have been accepted, you have
found the
correct path and you have become one of the Saved People (ahl-i
najāt).71
Having been accepted by the shaykh, the Sufi novice commences a

commitment to wayfaring (sulūk). There are
six essential conditions for
wayfaring,72 all of which are connected with the relationship between the
novice and the
shaykh. These conditions are as follows:
i. The novice must find a shaykh.
ii. During the course of his life he must not love anyone as much as he
loves the shaykh.
iii. The novice must obey all of the shaykh's commands.
iv. All the thoughts and opinions that the novice has must be rejected.
v. On the basis of the two previous points, the novice must never
complain or deny the
shaykh. This is because the novice cannot
recognise what is good or bad or what is obedience or disobedience.
Therefore the simplest policy for the wayfarer is to carry out all the
shaykh's commands without complaint or
denial. This is the case even
if it means doing certain things which appear to contradict the
Sharī'a:
. . . [the wayfarer should not] act on the basis of his own opinion or
idea, even if it is the obligatory prayer
(namāz-ī farẓ), [and he should not
act] without the command of the guide (hādī) since whatever the
wayfarer does on the basis of his own opinion is the cause of his
remoteness, and whatever he does according to
the command of the
guide is the cause of his nearness.73
Not all Sufis would have agreed on this point, that is, that the shaykh may
cause the wayfarer to temporarily
refrain from following the Sharī'a (as in
not performing the obligatory prayers). However, the genuine
shaykh always
has a valid reason for doing this, and he himself continually follows the
manifest (and
non-manifest) dimensions of the Sharī'a, for the first quality
of the genuine shaykh is that he
"keeps the customs and traditions and
ways."
vi The novice must remain constant upon the path.
This commitment and surrender by the wayfarer to the shaykh has two
conditions:
The first condition is that the disciple, in the association of his shaykh,
is just like the community in the
association of its prophet74;
and the
second condition is that the shaykh speaks with the disciple in
accordance with his station.75
The ideal period to commence this commitment to the shaykh is at the age of
twenty. Nasafī comments that the
first twenty years of man's life is the
period when his body becomes mature, and in the next twenty years his
spirit
becomes mature.76 This
ascetic discipline and spiritual effort under the
shaykh continues for twenty years:
In these twenty years, [the wayfarer] must never be relaxed and without religious effort for an
instant . . . O
dervish! A person who is accounted as one of the People of the Holy Law does not
waste his life if he serves a
perfect teacher for twenty years which is the time for wayfaring. [If he
does this] then there will be no
knowledge pertaining to the manifest dimension that is unknown to
him. [Likewise] a person who is accounted as
one of the People of the Way does not waste his life
if he has the association of a
perfect shaykh for twenty years which is the time for wayfaring. If he
does this, no knowledge of the real
knowledge will remain unknown to him.
The unfortunate person and dweller of Hell is he who is accounted as one of the People of
the
Holy Law and has been busy in these twenty years - which is the time for wayfaring - in the
position of
judgement or teaching. The appropriate way for a person to be engaged in the position
of judgement or teaching
is to remain in the service of a perfect shaykh for twenty years. It is also
appropriate if such a person then
becomes engaged in shaykh-hood or being a preacher. If he
renounces all of this after forty years despite these
titles, he is perfect.77
Although the period of religious effort and spiritual discipline is limited to

twenty years, the association with
a wise man lasts for a life time:
The dervishes must never be without religious effort and ascetic
discipline until they are forty years of age,
and when the fortieth year has
passed they must not perform religious effort and ascetic discipline in an
excessive way, but they must not be without it until they become sixty
years old. When the sixtieth year passes,
they must not perform much
religious effort and ascetic discipline. After the sixtieth year they must
continue
with association, the People of the Heart cannot live without
association.78
(iii) Devotional Practices
From this point, Nasafī proceeds to describe the customs (adab) of

wayfaring, the striking feature of
which is the predominance of prayer in the
everyday life of the wayfarer:
Know that the first custom of wayfaring is continually being ceremonially pure, and each time
that ablutions
are made, two cycles of prayer of thanks are performed. After the first cycle, after
the opening chapter of the
Koran, [the wayfarer] must read, "If one does a sinful thing or wrongs
himself in any way and afterwards
implores Allah's forgiveness, he will find God Forgiving and
Compassionate."79 At the second cycle, [the wayfarer] must read:
"Those who commit an
indecency or wrong themselves but remember God and pray forgiveness for their sins -
and who
shall forgive sins but God? - and do not persevere in the things they did and that wittingly, their
recompense is forgiveness from their Lord."80
The second custom is to divide the times of day and night. That is, [the wayfarer] should
establish a fixed
litany (wird) for each particular time of day so that his life is not wasted; a litany
for worship, a
litany for food and a litany for sleep.
The third custom is the prayer repeated during the night (namāz-i tahajjud).
That is, in the
second half of the night, [the wayfarer] must perform twelve cycles of the
"witr" prayers
(voluntary prayers). Some, after reading the opening verse of the Koran at the
end of the namāz-i
tahajjud recite this verse: "And as for the night, keep vigil a part of it, as a
work of supererogation
for thee; it may be that thy Lord will raise thee up to a laudable
station."81 Others, at
the end of the
namāz-i tahajjud, after the opening verse of the Koran, recite the sura "We
have sent down,"82 and
some read from "By the sky and the nightly-visitant,"83 to the end of the Koran in the namāz-i
tahajjud.
The fourth custom is the mid morning prayer (namāz-i chāsht). That is, each day at sun rise, [the
wayfarer] must perform two cycles for the sunrise prayers (namāz-i ishrāq) and at mid morning he
must
perform twelve cycles for the namāz-i chāshtgāh.
The fifth custom is the prayer of the penitents (namāz-i awwābīn). That is, [the wayfarer] must
perform
twelve cycles between the evening prayer and the prayers before sleeping.
The sixth custom is continual dhikr.
The seventh custom is recognising thoughts (khāṭir). That is, there are four kinds of thought;
merciful
(raḥmānī), angelic (malakī), egoistic (nafsānī), and satanic (skayṭānī) and there
is an
indication for each one.84
The eighth custom is reading something from the discourses of the shaykh.
The ninth custom is accepting service in the khānaqāh.
The tenth custom is sitting everyday for a period in the association of dervishes and listening to
their
discourses.
The eleventh custom is the declaration of incidents (mājarā). That is, if a dervish tells a
discourse or
does something that vexes another dervish, the vexed dervish must not keep it in his
heart but explain the
incident in a kind way before all the dervishes and the dervish who has
caused the incident.
The twelfth custom is religious effort and ascetic discipline.85
Thus the Sufi's wayfaring is based upon devotion to God and not a moment
passes when he is engaged in a task
which does not involve him thinking
about God. Half of the above customs (if one considers dhikr as a form
of
prayer) are established upon prayer, the frequency of which conditions the
wayfarer's life towards
complete devotion. Indeed, prayer is portrayed as
consisting of half of wayfaring (sulūk) in another work:
O dear friend! the reality of wayfaring is two steps; proceeding from
veils and reaching stations. A veil is
whatever [the wayfarer] has to
remove from himself and a station is whatever he has to actualise for
himself. So
whoever has been completely cleansed of blameworthy
attributes and unpleasant character traits has passed all the
veils; and
whoever becomes completely described by praiseworthy attributes and
pleasant
character traits has reached all the stations. Whoever has passed
the veils has produced purity and whoever has
reached all the levels has
performed prayers, since the reality of purity is distinction (faṣl) and the
reality of prayers is connection (waṣl).86
This description of prayer in terms of connection (waṣl), that is, connection

with God, is important to
note because it reflects the Sufi belief that it is
through prayer that the wayfarer witnesses God. What the
mi'rāj was for the
Prophet Muḥammad, so too, the prayer is for the wayfarer.
With regards to prayer, the Islamic mystics of Nasafī's era believed that
there were particular times when
its effects (such as the possibility of
experiencing a mystical vision or witnessing God) were very strong.
Nasafī
himself comments:
When the sun rises, the prayers of dawn are recited twice and when
the prayers of dawn have been performed, a
time is reserved for the
complete recital of the morning prayers until the sun rises high. And then
once it has
risen, [the wayfarer] performs the mid-morning prayer twelve
times. When this is completed he may become occupied
with whatever
he wishes. So from the start of the morning until this point, not one word
concerning this world
has been spoken and he has not left the place of
prayer. The Sufis hold this time very dear because many divine
graces
have been found during this period.87
Such careful attention to the details and times of prayer, as has already been
shown, has a basis in the Koran.
Muḥammad directed his community
concerning the time of prayer in the following way, "Perform the prayer at
the sinking of the sun to the darkening of the night and the recital of dawn;
surely the recital of dawn is
witnessed."88 In the
following verse, prayer
during the night is advocated: "And as for the night, keep vigil a part of it, as
a
work of supererogation for thee; it may be that thy Lord will raise thee up
to a laudable
station."89 The Sufi
orders complied in these commands, and
some zealous orders went to extremes in performing them. For example, the
Sufis of the Shadhiliyya order used to drink coffee to keep themselves awake
during their litanies and
vigils.90 By the thirteenth
century, the Sufis believed
that they had discovered the reason why the night and early morning were
set aside by
Muḥammad for prayer. It was considered that during these
times, man's five external senses were incapacitated
and did not work so
efficiently. The Sufis held that while man's senses were incapacitated, the
"internal senses" had a better chance to perceive what the external senses
blocked. This included the possibility of witnessing God. Hence, Nasafī's
exhortation that after service to a
wise man, there is nothing better than
eating little, speaking little and sleeping little becomes
clear91 for this is
considered
as one of the ways to incapacitate the external senses.
Other practices which are associated with prayer include the dhikr (which
was discussed
in the previous chapter). Nasafī's descriptions of the different
forms of performing the dhikr have
been noted by M.I. Waley, so it is not
necessary to repeat them here.92
(iv) Contemplative Discipline, the Mastering of One's Soul and

Other Sufi
Practices
There are other Sufi practices which cannot be classified as devotional

because they are concerned with the
individual's examination of his own
thoughts and actions. For example, "contemplative vigilance"
(murāqaba) is
the attention paid by the Sufi to all his thoughts and actions, including the
dhikr,
to ensure that he is concerned only with God.93 Vigilance over
thoughts (khawāṭir) is a major element in contemplative
practices and Nasafī
describes four kinds of thought of which the Sufi must be able to distinguish;
divine
(raḥmānī), angelic (malakī), egotistical (nafsānī) and satanic
(shayṭānī).94
Special attention is paid to the khāṭir when the wayfarer undergoes a
period of seclusion (chilla)95
during which time he also engages in prayer,
dhik and fikr. Recognition of the
khawāṭir is necessary because they are an
indication of the position the wayfarer has made on the path,
and frequently
they can give an indication of his spiritual station and also if any obstacles
remain in the way.
Nasafī mentions that during the chilla, it is necessary to
negate the khawāṭir, even those of a
divine nature. If a khāṭir does arise and
it cannot be put aside, then it is necessary for the wayfarer to
present it to the
shaykh, who can explain it in order that it does not obstruct the
wayfarer's
path.96
The chilla is instrumental in mastering the wayfarer's soul or spirit, ideally
leading to human
perfection. For a period of forty days the wayfarer is
engaged in devotional and ascetic practices, adhering to
his shaykh's rules.
One of these rules as described by Nasafī is the implementation of a strict
diet:
O dear friend! It is necessary that the wayfarer eats once every day, any time which is better and
more
suitable for him. It is [also] necessary that on that particular occasion, he eats
"pure" food
(ṭa'ām-i laṭīf). The quantity of food differs for each
wayfarer; he must eat an amount that does not
make him full, because being too full is not pleasant, yet he
must not become a slave to eating an
extremely small amount which may cause his strength to fail, for this is
not pleasant either.97
One shaykh may give an amount of food each night of less than fifty dirham, and another may
give more.
Our shaykh ordered a loaf of bread worth forty dirham, a piece of meat worth forty
dirham and a
bowl of stew (āb-i gūsht). I suffered if I did not eat, and now it is clear that he was
right. . . some
ate forty mouthfuls during the first night [of the chilla] and they ate one mouthful
less each night so
that they ate only one mouthful by the last night. Others ate one man [about
three kilograms] during the
whole chilla and [some] ate the equivalent of seven dirham each night.
Others did not eat meat at
all during the whole period of the chilla.98 Our shaykh said that all of
this was unimportant because performing [the
chilla] is [more] important. The meaning of
decreasing food and how much each person eats pertains to
the shaykh.99
Thus Nasafī advocates the middle way between excessive fasting and
excessive eating in order to control the
nafs. Some Sufis prior to Nasafī are
said to have starved to death whereas others are known to have
enjoyed
lavish spreads.100 The
importance that Sufis attached to eating the proper
food in correct amounts can be seen in the comment by
'Alā' al-Dawla
Simnānī that "the mystics advancement on the path is four sixths worship of
God
through observing the [lawful nature] of the morsel, one sixth
recollection [dhikr], and one sixth following the
guidance of the master."101
In addition to offering advice to dervishes concerning the quantity of food to
be eaten during the chilla, Nasafī also gives instructions on how the
wayfarer should behave when he
participates in the communal meals of the
khānaqāh:
The dervishes must be present and sit politely at meals and they must
not eat anything greedily. They must
respect the elders and not sit above
them, nor should they start eating before them. Moreover, they must not
look
at anyone else's plate, rather, they should look at their own. They
should eat in small morsels, chewing
well, and they may take another
morsel after swallowing the first. If it happens that the dervishes eat from
one
dish, then each dervish must eat from the part facing him and not
stretch across the other dervishes. If
something falls from his hand, he
must pick it up with his left hand and not put it in his mouth, but place it
to
one side. The dervish must not refuse food in front of the other
dervishes. If they do not want food then they
must keep themselves busy.
Before starting the meal, the dervish must wash his hands, and he must
wash his hands
and mouth when the meal is over.102
The foregoing passage is significant because it reveals the importance of the

communal
nature of Nasafī's Sufism (not to mention the concern for selfless
behaviour and purity). This attention to
communal Sufism is highlighted in
Nasafī's discussion of disputes among the dervishes:
If a dervish makes a remark or does something which causes the
others to suffer, the [dervish] who has been made
to suffer must not keep
the problem in his heart. He must disclose tactfully whatever has taken
place to the
dervish who has caused the suffering, before the other
dervishes. If he has a clear answer, in such a way that it
is accepted by
the other dervishes, then he explains until the problem is solved for the
[accusing] dervish. If
he has no clear answer, then he should not draw
out the explanation but he should quickly apologise and beg
forgiveness.
He should rise up and go to wherever the shoes are stored and stand there
with his hands placed
together with his head hung low until the accusing
dervish rises and the other dervishes arise in unison with
him. Then the
two dervishes embrace and become happy. Then all the others in accord
with the two dervishes
embrace one another and they sit down again.103
It is clear from such comments that Nasafī was intimately involved in life
within the khānaqāh. In other
words, he was not merely a speculative Sufi,
but he was also actively engaged in the practice of Sufism in the
company of
other Sufis. Of course, this does not prove his affiliation to the Kubrāwiyya
order, but it does
appear to be the case that Nasafī was genuine in stating that
one should first go the madrasa and then go to the khānaqāh.
One of the activities that took place within the confines of the khānaqāh
and which became a major point
of controversy within the Islamic
community, was the samā. The samā' is "sacred music and
dance" in which
the individual opens himself "to an influence, to a vibration of suprahuman
origin
'made sound' in order to awaken in us the echoes of a primordial state
and to arouse in the heart a
longing for union with its own Essence."104 Both
the philosophers within the Islamic world and Sufis had
noticed the effects
that music had upon the mood of the human soul. Nasafī underlines this idea
in the following
passages:
All humans share in a feeling of release from hearing singing voices (aṣwāt) and melodies
(alḥān)
but some not only feel released [but] pleasant singing voices and melodies cause unveiling
in some and cause
sadness in others. Because of this, one person [has] asked, "What are the effects
of
samā'?" It is said that it depends upon the listener because pleasant singing voices and
melodies
are like raindrops and the listeners are like plants, or we say that singing
voices and melodies are
like sunlight and the listeners are like minerals, and although in truth, the sunlight
is one thing, it
reveals something in each mine.105
If a dervish weakens in religious effort or ascetic discipline, or if there is an illness in his mind,
he must
quickly become busy in curing it, arranging for suitable oils, pure food and temperate air.
A cure that can help him is a pleasant voice. One of the dervishes who has a pleasant and sad
(hazīn)
voice should occasionally sing for him. If it does not cause trouble for anyone, and if the
dervishes are
weary, that weariness is eased away by one of the dervishes singing something at an
expedient time and at an
agreed place where there are no common people present. It is permissible
if he sings along with a tambourine.
There are some wayfarers for whom states are produced
during the samā' and innumerable benefits and
openings come to them from those states. It is
expedient for such people to engage in samā' if the
time, place and brothers are all appropriate.106
Some jurists, such as Ibn Abi'l Dunyā (d. 894) condemned singing and
music since they held that it stimulated
the "soul inciting to evil." The Sufis
themselves had mixed feelings towards the samā'
because it acted upon both
the sensual and spiritual. The Naqshbandiyya order forbade participation in
the
samā' since they saw its dangers were stronger than its benefits.107 Other
Sufis, including Sa'd al-Dīn Ḥammūya deemed it
permissible108 and Abu
Ḥafṣ
Suhrawardī recognised that the matter depended upon the individual.
Music does not give rise, in the heart, to anything which is not already
there: so he whose inner self is
attached to anything else than God is
stirred by music to sensual desire, but the one who is inwardly attached
to
the love of God is moved, by hearing music, to do his will.109
For this reason, participation in the samā' requires the permission of the
shaykh
who understands the true nature of each of the dervishes. The shaykh
is able to determine which individuals are
suitable to participate and those
who are not able to appreciate the spiritual nature of the samā'. By
Nasafī's
era, it appears that the samā' had degenerated somewhat, or at least, the
ecstatic states
of the Sufis (during which clothes were rent and dancing
breast to breast was known to occur)110 had been misinterpreted by the
common
people. Nasafī is cautious about the Sufis engaging in samā' when
the common people are present and he
gives this warning:
O dervish! It is the custom of these times that the élite and common people sit together and
perform the
samā', but this is neither the dervish way, nor the tradition of the
shaykhs. It is one of
the customs and habits of the common people. The shaykhs have said that the dervishes
must not
go to this samā'. According to this helpless one, the People of Discernment should not be
present
in this samā' because learned people do not do childish things. Playing is the pastime of
children.
O dervish! The dervish must certainly keep the somā' for the appropriate time, place and
brothers so
that it is in line with the tradition of the shaykhs.111
Nasafī also gives guidelines for how one should behave during the
performance of the samā', such as
whether or not one should stand up and
whether it is permissible to remove one's turban, and these
instructions are
the very same as those offered by Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī.112
The speculative and practical form of Sufism that Nasafī advocates places
the wayfarer in the middle ground, for
he does not encourage excessive
ascetic disciplines and religious effort, nor does he permit free licence to the
self:
Don't be a slave to [either] too much prayer and fasting or to excessive
pilgrimage (ḥajj), but
perform God's ordinances (fariẓa) accordingly.
Don't be a slave to either remembering too many
words or story telling.
And don't be a slave to understanding much wisdom but be satisfied with
the required
amount.113
By following this path, the wayfarer will find that gradually the self (that he
once knew) is transformed. The
"dropping off" of concerns pertaining to the
body and mind is an unveiling which reveals the real self
beyond the ego.
God may even reward the wayfarer by bestowing a ḥāl upon him, and it may
be the case that
he realises the unity between himself and his Lord. This, the
ultimate mystical experience is the subject of the
next chapter.
Notes
1 Koran, 10: 65.
2 See L. Massignon, art. "Taṣawwuf," Encyclopaedia of
Islam (Leiden: E.J. Brill).
3 The full shahāda is "There is no god but God and
Muḥammad is the messenger of God."
4 Maqṣad-i aqṣā, p. 266
5 See Margaret Smith, Rābi'a the Mystic (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1928).
6 Ibid, p. 30.
7 This description is found in al-Ghazālī,
Mishkāt al-anwār, translated Gairdner, pp. 60-61.
8 The shaṭḥ of Bāyazīd Basṭāmī (d.ca. 845).
9 The shaṭḥ of Husayn Ibn Manṣūr al Ḥallāj (d. 922).
10 In Maqṣad-i aqṣā, p. 277, Nasafī attributes this
shaṭḥ to Abū Bakr al-Shiblī (d. 945).
11 In Maqṣad-i aqṣā, p. 277, Nasafī attributes this
shaṭḥ to Abū'l-'Abbās Qaṣṣāb.
12 Bayān-i tanzīl, fol. 7a line 3 - 7b line 6.
13 See Chittick, Faith and Practice, p. 13-14.
15 al-Insān al-kāmil, p. 290-291.
16 Koran, 19: 71.
17 The Tubba' tree occurs in sura
44: 37. The Zaqqum tree is described in sura 37: 62-66. "We have
appointed it as a trial for the
evildoers. It is a tree that comes forth in the root of Hell; it spathes
are as the heads of Satans, and they
eat of it and of it fill their bellies, then on top of it they
have a brew of boiling water, then their return
is unto Hell."
18 Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq, p. 180-181. The imagery of the
tree is also found in the Koran: "A good word
is as a good tree - its roots are firm, and its branches are
in heaven. It gives its produce every
season by the leaves of its Lord. So God strikes similitudes for men,
haply they will remember.
And the likeness of a corrupt word is a corrupt tree - uprooted from the earth,
having no
establishment. God confirms those who believe with the firm word, in the present life and in
the
world to come." (Koran, 14: 30)
20 Nasafī, Kitāb-i tanzīl, fol. 71b line 18 - fol. 72a line
6.
21 For an account of the Mongol invasion and the atrocities they
committed see 'Alā al-Dīn 'Ata al-
Malik Juwainī, History of the World Conqueror, trans, J.A.
Boyle. See also chapter 1.
26 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
31 Ibid, p. 223.
34 Koran, 4: 79.
35 Koran, 13: 35.
38 Ibid, p. 455-6.
40 Ibid, p. 282. The poem is attributed to
Shaykh Rūzbihān Baqlī (1128-1209), see M. Hillman's
comments in M. Boylan's Hafez: Dance of Life
(Washington: Mage Publications, 1987), p.
102.
41 Ibid, p. 224.
43 Ibid, p. 224-225.
44 Ibid, p. 225.
45 "Ijāza-nāma" (literally, letter of permission)
was given by a Sufi master to a disciple which in
effect was the disciple's certificate to teach the
gnostic wisdom that he had learnt under the
guidance of the Shaykh. The "ijāza-nāma" given to
Sa'd al-Dīn Ḥammūya by Najm al-Dīn
Kubrā exists to this day in the Suleymaniye Library in Istanbul. See
J.J. Elias, "The Sufi Lords
of Bahrabad: Sa'd al-Dīn and Ṣadr al-Dīn Ḥamuwayi," Iranian
Studies, volume 27, numbers 1-
4, 1994, p. 55-56.
46 Professor H. Landolt delivered a lecture in September 1995 at
the third European Conference of
Iranian Studies at Cambridge University entitled "A free-thinker among
the Sufis: the case of
'Azīz-i Nasafī."
47 See J.J. Elias, "The Sufi Lords of Bahrabad," p. 73.
48 For example, there are explicit criticisms of some of the
so-called Sufi Shaykhs in the
introduction to Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq, in a discussion concerning the wise
man. It is said that one
will not find him in the khānaqāh, prostrating himself with the People of
Imagination and self-
worshippers. (Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq, p. 28).
49 These silsilas are based on those in J.S.
Trimingham's The Sufi Orders in Islam (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1971). See pages 262 and 31.
See also H. Landolt's comments on Ḥammūya's
silsila, "Sa'd al-Dīn Ḥammū'ī,"
Encyclopedia of Islam (second edition, 1995), vol. VIII, p. 703.
50 Najm al-Dīn Kubrā, ed. E Meier, Fawā'iḥ al-jamāl wa
fawätiḥ al-jalāl, ed. F. Meier
(Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1957), 6, 80, 93, 109, 127, 148.
51 Najm al-Dīn Kubrā, al-Sā'īr al-ḥā'īr (Tehran:
Naqsh-i jahān, 1361).
53 See J. Baldick's comments in Mystical Islam (London:
I.B. Taurus, 1989), p. 45-46.
55 Ibid, p. 118.
56 Bayān-i tanzīl, fol. 7a line 3 - 7b line 6.
57 See Najm al-Dīn Kubrā, Fawā'iḥ al-jamāl wa fawātiḥ
al-jalāl, and J.J. Elias's "A Kubrāwī
treatise on mystical visions: the Risāla-yi Nūriyya of
'Alā ad-Dawleh as-Simnānī," The Muslim
World, 83 no. 1, January 1993.
58 See G.S. Colin, art. "Baraka," Encyclopedia of
Islam2.
61 Ibid, p. 221 .'
62 Ibid, p. 226-7.
63 Koran, 24: 40.
65 Ibid, p. 28-29.
66 Suhrawardī's 'Awārif
al-ma'ārif is also mentioned by name in Maqṣad-i aqṣā, p. 226.
67 Nasafī cites Ghazālī in Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq, p. 125.
68 Nasafī cites 'Ayn al-Quḍāt in Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq,
p. 114.
69 Maqṣad-i aqṣā, p, 226.
71 Ibid, p. 27-28.
74 This reflects the ḥadīth, frequently quoted by Sufis,
that "The Shaykh in his group is like a
Prophet in his people." See Furūzānfar, no. 224.
79 Koran, 4: 110.
80 Koran, 3: 135. (A slightly adapted version of Arberry's
translation).
81 Koran, 17: 79.
82 Koran, 97: 1.
83 Koran, 86: 1.
84 The indications of thoughts are discussed in note 94 below.
88 Koran, 17:78.
89 Koran, 17:79.
90 A. Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, p. 254.
92 M. I. Waley, "Najm al-Dīn Kubrā and the Central Asian
School of Sufism," Islamic Spirituality
II, ed. S.H. Nasr (New York: Crossroad, 1991).
93 See M.I. Waley, "Contemplative Disciplines in Early
Persian Sufism," in Classical Persian
Sufism, ed. L. Lewisohn, pp. 535-38.
94 Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq, p. 133, see also al-Insān
al-kāmil, p. 105. The indications of these thoughts
were described by other Sufis such as Qushayrī (d.
1074) and Najm al-Dīn Kubrā. For
Qushayrī see M. Sells, Early Islamic Mysticism (New York: Paulist
Press, 1996), pp. 142-145.
Najm al-Dīn Kubrā described these thoughts in al Sā'īr al-Ḥā'īr,
edited by Mas'ūd Qāsimī
(Tehran: Naqsh-i jahān, 1361), p. 35-37, and also in Fawā'iḥ al-jamāl wa
fawātiḥ al jalāl, [25].
95 For Nasafī on chilla, see Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq,
p. 134-35.
98 This was the position advocated by Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī
(al-maqtūl). In his Ḥikmat al-
ishrāq he states, "Before beginning [to read] this book, one
should engage in ascetic practices
for forty days and refrain from eating meat." (Persian translation by
S.J. Sajjādī, Tehran
University Press, 1978, p. 403). One may also refer to Sahl al-Tustarī who commanded that
his
disciples did not eat meat except on Fridays so as to regain strength for worship
(see
Böwering, The Mystical Vision of Existence in Classtcal Islam, p. 78).
99 Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq, pp. 134-35.
100 See Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, pp. 115-17.
101 J.J. Elias, "A Kubrawi Treatise on Mystical
Visions," The Muslim World, Vol. 83, No.l (1993), p.
76.
104 J.L. Michon, "Sacred Music and Dance in Islam,"
Islamic Spirituality: Manifestations, ed. S.H.
Nasr, pp. 474-475.
105 Bayān-i tanzīl, fol. 16a lines 9-13.
107 A. Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, p. 180.
108 Sa'd al-Dīn Ḥammūya composed the following:
When the heart attends the spiritual concert (samā'), it perceives the Beloved
And lifts the soul to the abode of the divine mysteries.
The melody is the steed of thy soul; it raises it up
And takes it joyful to the world of the Friend.
Cited by S.H. Nasr, "The Influence of Sufism on Traditional Persian Music," Studies in Comparative
Religion, 1972, Vol. 6, no. 4, p. 227.
109 M. Smith, Readings from the Mystics of Islam (London:
1950).
110 See Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, p. 181.
112 See Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī's section on samā' in
Kīmīyā-yi sa'ādat, edited Husayn Khadīwjam
(Tehran: Markaz-i intishārāt-i 'ilmī wa farhangī,
1361/1983), in particular pp. 497-8.
113 Zubdāt al-ḥaqā'iq, p. 116-117.
5
Visionary Experience and Unity with

God
I. TYPES OF VISIONS
AND MYSTICAL
EXPERIENCE
The aim of Sufism is felicity and the greatest felicity for Sufis is witnessing
God. By
Nasafī's era, the wayfarer followed the Sufi path and engaged in
practices such as dhik, fikr, chilla and samā' along with other devotional
acts which were means to the end,
that is, they were tools for polishing the
mirror of his heart. For the
Sufi, a transparent heart could reflect the
knowledge of the spiritual world and thus he could come close to God.
As
he progressed along the path and achieved a greater degree of proximity to
God, he discovered
"imaginal" signs and indications manifested in his heart.
These signs matched his experiences or
states, thus the manifestation of an
inner sign without the inner experience or feeling was interpreted as a
hallucination, thus signs were witnesses of what the wayfarer was.1
Frequently appearing in the form of coloured lights, or photisms, the
imaginal signs were discussed by the Sufis of the Kubrāwiyya order, such
as Najm
al-Dīn Kubrā, Najm al-Dīn Rīzī and 'Alā' al-Dawla Simnānī.2 The
visions of these Sufis were remarkably similar its. that each one
portrayed a
seven-fold hierarchy of photisms, however, the ranking of colours (which
symbolised a particular
spiritual level) differed for each of the three
mystics. The seven-fold hierarchy represented the seven heavens
referred to
in the Koran3 and
it was these seven heavens that Muhammad had to pass to
reach God during his "night ascent."4 Likewise, the Sufi had to traverse
seven
levels of being until he was able to encounter his Lord.
Nasafī does not discuss photisms or a seven-fold hierarchy, however, he
does describe various kinds of visions
and spiritual occurrences that the
wayfarer may experience. In this chapter, the different mystical visions and
experiences included in Nasafī's works will be presented, revealing his
acceptance of
all beliefs as genuine expressions of reality. This is followed
by an examination of how Nasafī regarded the
ultimate spiritual station and
vision of God, and this is compared with the explanations of Najm al-Dlīn
Kubrā
and Ibn 'Arabī, thus enabling us to see if Nasafī's version of Sufism
was representative of the age.
(i) The Journey to God Represented Through Symbols
The works of thirteenth century masters such as Najm al-Dīn Rāzī and 'Azīz
Nasafī depict the spiritual ascent
through images of the stars, moon and sun.
It is not surprising that mystics witness such images because these
are
symbols which occur in the Koran, and Sufis spend many hours in
contemplation of the esoteric meanings of
verses in which these symbols
appear. For example, Nasafī refers to the sixth sura of the Koran which
concerns the Prophet Abraham, to explain the reality of the hierarchy of
spiritual existents:
. . .there are three angels in Malakūt which are the leaders of angels and they are called the
Great
Angels. Of these three, one is in such a way that the body of existents comes from him, and
this Great Angel
has four rows of angels, each row having several thousand angels which are
busy in obedience and submission to
God. These are the terrestrial angels, so each particle of
earth has an angel with it. Abraham's first
glance was upon this Great Angel and this is the
meaning of: "When the night covered him over, he saw a
star, he said 'This is my Lord,' but when
it set he said, 'I love not those that
set.'"5
Of these three angels, one is bigger than the first angel, and the life of the existents comes from
it. And
this angel has nine rows of angels, and in each row there are several thousand angels and
they are occupied in
obedience and submission to God and all these angels are equal. Abraham's
second glance fell upon this
Great Angel: "When he saw the moon rising in splendour he said,
'This is my Lord,' but when he saw
the moon set he said, 'Unless the Lord guide me, I shall be
among those who go
astray.'"6
There is another Great Angel which is bigger than these two, and this Great Angel has ten rows
of angels and in
each row there are several thousand angels each yearning for God Most High and
Holy and they are absorbed in
the Lord of creatures, and this Great Angel is not informed about
the earth or heaven. Abraham's third
glance fell upon him, and this is the meaning of: "When he
saw the sun rising in splendour he said,
'This is my Lord, this is the greatest of all.' But when the
sun set he said, 'O my people! I am
indeed free from your guilt of giving partners to God.'"7 This
angel guided Abraham to the Lord of creatures so that he was
liberated from association of others
with God, and when he attained the world of unity he said, "For me, I
have set my face firmly and
truly towards Him who created the heavens and earth, and I shall never give partners to God."8
The reason that Abraham's glance tell upon Malakūt is set out in the verse, "So also did we
show Abraham the power and the laws of the heaven and earth that he might have certitude."9
Half a century prior to Nasafī, Najm al-Dīn Rāzī portrayed a similar

account of Abraham's mystical encounters
and he related these visions to
the mystic's ascent and the condition of his heart. His
exegesis of visions of
the sun, moon and stars matches the ontological hierarchy of Jabarūt,
Malakūt and
Mulk that Nasafī so often describes.
As for those lights that are seen in the form of heavenly bodies, stars,
moons and suns – they
derive from the lights of spirituality that appear
in the sky of the heart, in accordance with its degree of
purity. When the
mirror of the heart becomes as pure as a star, the light of the spirit
becomes apparent to the
amount of a star ... it sometimes happens that
the soul attains such purity that it appears to be like the sky,
and the
heart is seen in it like the moon. If the full moon is seen, the heart has
become completely pure; if it
is less than full, a degree of impurity
remains in the heart. When the mirror of the heart attains perfect purity
and begins receiving light of the spirit, that light will be witnessed in the
likeness of the sun. The brightness
of the sun is in proportion to the
degree of the heart's purity, until a point is reached at which the heart
is
a thousand times brighter than the external sun. If the moon and the sun
are witnessed together, then the moon
is the heart, illuminated with the
reflection of the light of the spirit, and the sun is the spirit.10
(ii) Visions of the Next World
Visions of the sun, moon and stars are not the only form of
"imaginalisation," for Nasafl describes
another type of vision which enables
the mystic to witness the state of the spirit after natural death:
Observing the states after death is a great task for the wayfarer. People are ignorant about this
reality, if
they were not, surely they would make an effort and endeavour in order for these states
after death to be
revealed to them, so that they could witness the station which they will return to
after separation from the
body.11
Know that the ascent for Sufis means that the spirit of the wayfarer leaves the body in a healthy
and wakeful
state. And the state that will be revealed to [the wayfarer] after separation from the
body is now revealed to
him before death. He surveys Heaven and Hell and he arrives at the level
of the eye of
certainty from the level of knowledge of certainty, and he sees whatever he has
understood.12
Our Shaykh stated, "My spirit spent thirteen days in the heavens and then returned
to my body.
And during those thirteen days my body was like that of a dead man and had no concern for
anything.
Others who were present said that my body had been in such a way for thirteen days."
And another dear one
stated, "My spirit remained there for twenty days and then came back to the
body." And another dear
one said, "My spirit spent forty days and then returned to the body." He
remembered everything that
he saw in those forty days.13
(iii) Encounters with Spirits, Future Events and Dreams
Once the heart has become mirror-like, it is able to reflect knowledge that
has come from the
spiritual world, an example of this includes
communication with the spirits of dead people, such as the Friends.
Nasafl
describes the process of pilgrimage to tombs:
If [the wayfarer] pays a pilgrimage to the tomb of a Friend, and
requests help from the spirit of the Friend, it
will be obtained. The
manner of paying pilgrimage and praying is in this way; he must walk
around the tomb and
concentrate, freeing his mind from everything,
thus making the mirror of the heart clean and pure so that his
spirit can
encounter the deceased through the grave. Then, if the wayfarer desires
knowledge or wisdom, the
solution to [his] problem will be manifested
on his heart in that very hour. If he has the receptivity for
discovering it
and if his request is for help and assistance, not only will his important
affairs be resolved
sufficiently, but the approval of the prayer will also
be manifested in his other affairs after the pilgrimage.
This is because
the spirit of the deceased has favour with God and that spirit asks that
the important affairs of
the wayfarer are resolved in a sufficient manner.
If the deceased spirit has not found favour near God but has
favour near
God's esteemed ones, he asks of them that God resolves the important
affairs
sufficiently.14
In addition to this, the mirror of the heart can reflect images about the states
of living people and the states
of future events:
There are some people who can tell the names of whoever they see or whoever they have not
seen. Moreover, they
can tell the names of that person's parents and kinsmen and tribe even
though they are not informed of
those peoples' past and present circumstances.15
There are some people who see m their sleep the occurrence of a thing even before it has taken
place in this
world. Other people witness the occurrence of a thing even before it has taken place
while they are awake.
There are several types [of vision]: either a form becomes illustrated
outside of the mind and describes a past
or future circumstance, or a picture appears upon their
heart. This is the reality of
revelation (wahī), inspiration (ilhām), a thought (khāṭir) and intuition
(firāsat).16
The witnessing of visions, as mentioned earlier depends upon dulling the

five external senses, and this occurs
naturally for most people during sleep.
. . .the invisible world has levels and from level to level there are many differences, and the
non-manifest
dimension of the wayfarer also has levels and from level to level there are many
differences. The first level
[of the non-manifest dimension of the wayfarer] can extract from the
first level [of the invisible world] and
the last level [of the nonmanifest dimension of the
wayfarer] can extract from the last level [of the invisible
world]. The knowledge and insight of
the wayfarer are also obtained in this way, and veridical dreaming
(khwāb-i rāst) is one example
of this. Ecstasy (waid), spiritual occurrences (wārid),
inspiration (ilhām) and divine knowledge
('ilm-i ladunnī) are expressions for this reality.
This reality does not pertain to infidelity (kufr) or
Islam. Each person who makes his heart clear will
find these effects and such meanings are
discovered in the dreams of many people, but occurs less in
wakefulness because the senses are
incapacitated in dreams. And the obstructions which are produced by means of
the senses and by
means of anger and appetites, are lessened. For this reason, the non-manifest dimension [of
the
wayfarer], at that hour, is able to acquire knowledge from that world. So isolation and seclusion,
the
wayfarer's ascetic discipline and spiritual effort are for the sake that during wakefulness, his
body can
be like that of the person who is asleep, perhaps cleaner and purer.17
When the senses are incapacitated by means of sleep, at that time the heart finds suitability
with the heavenly
angels in the same way as two clear mirrors which are opposite one another.
The reflection
of the angel's knowledge will appear on the heart of the sleeper . . . This dream can
be interpreted and
explained. And this is the meaning of veridical dream, and this dream is one
part of the forty-six parts of
prophecy.18
It is interesting to note in the foregoing passage that Nasafī admits that

making the heart mirror-like is not
confined to Muslims, thus the
opportunity of witnessing visions and having mystical experiences such as
communicating with the spirits of the living and the dead is open to non-
Muslims:
O dervish, this manifestation of reflections does not depend on
unbelief (kufr) or belief (islām),
it depends upon a heart which is plain
and without colouring. This manifestation of reflections appears in the
complete and the incomplete and in the pious and in the lewd person.19
Moreover, this form of knowledge is not confined to humans:

And apart from wayfarers there also exists a people whose hearts
have been made plain and are not tarnished, and
it is also manifested
upon their hearts. And some say it is even manifested for animals. Some
of the animals
inform people before the arrival of each calamity or
fortuity which comes to this world. Some people understand
and some
do not understand.20
Najm al-Dīn Rāzī also indicates that non-Muslims can witness mystical
visions, yet he stipulates that they cannot
reach the same degree of gnosis
that Muslims enjoy. Indeed he classifies visions into two varieties; the first
is
the mystical vision of the spirit, and the second is the mystical vision
when God reveals himself to the mystic
in the form in which the mystic can
comprehend Him as the Real God.21
(iv) The Different Levels of Mystical Experience as Manifested

Through
Visions
The distinction that Najm al-Dīn Rāzī draws between two forms of
mysticism enables him to discount non-Muslims,
for they cannot see the
"lights of the attribute of unity" and therefore cannot transcend the human
state. The reason that Rāzī gives for the inability of followers of other
religions (Hindus,
Christians and Philosophers) to reach the ultimate stage
is because their practices are
deficient. For example, the "extreme
mortification of the soul" can only lead to a certain degree of
unveiling, and
they cannot know whether or not they have been lead astray in their journey
by their own ego since
they do not see the necessity of having a shaykh.22
Nasafī also divides mystical experience into two different kinds:
O dervish, life, knowledge, desire, power, hearing, seeing and speech
are the attributes of the First
Intelligence, and creation, giving life and
instruction are the actions of the First Intelligence. No one except
for
God knows the greatness and splendour of the First Intelligence. Many
great men among the eminent shaykhs
have arrived at this First
Intelligence and have been obstructed by it because they have seen its
attributes and
actions, and have not seen anything greater than its decree
or found anything above its command: "When He
decrees a thing He
need only say 'Be,' and it is."23 They believed that perhaps it was God,
and they worshipped it for a while
until the favour of the Truth Most
High came to them and they saw a decree greater than that of the First
Intelligence and a command above that [of the First Intelligence] "And
Our command is but one, as the
twinkling of an eye."24 At that time it
became clear for them that it was God's caliph, it was not
God, but it
was the locus of manifestation of God's attributes and actions.25
In the foregoing quotation, the first realisation of the shaykhs is the unity of
existence seen in the First
Intelligence (that is, Jabarūt). The superior
realisation is the unity of existence which stretches from
man to the level of
God beyond the First Intelligence which is the level of Aḥadiyya. In the
Sufi
tradition, this level transcends man's experiences and therefore it can
only be considered theoretically.
With this perspective in mind, we can now return to the question of
whether non-Muslims can enjoy the same range
of mystical experience as
Muslims. As we have seen, Najm al-Dīn Rāzī denies this possibility, and
although Nasafī
does not say so explicitly, it seems that he does not share
the same opinion. This is revealed by his discussion
of the discourse of the
Indians (ahl-i hind) which describes human perfection in exactly the same
way as
the discourses of the Muslims, which draws inspiration from the
Light verse of the
Koran.26
. . . understanding this discourse is very important, for the ascetic disciplines and spiritual
effort of the
Indians are included as the foundation of this discourse. In other words, this
discourse is extremely good and
many problems are resolved by understanding it.27
The world is made of two things, light and darkness, in other words, a sea of light and a sea of
darkness.
These two seas are mixed together and it is necessary to separate the light from the
darkness in order for the
attributes of light to be manifested. Indeed, this light can be separated
from the darkness within a given
creature, because there are workers in the creature's body . . .
The alchemy that man performs is that he
takes the "soul" of whatever he eats; in other words, he
takes the select and quintessence of food.
In this way, light is separated from darkness in such a
way that light knows and sees itself as it is. Only the
Perfect Man can do this.28
O dervish! It is not possible to completely separate this light from darkness because light cannot
exist
without darkness . . . Light must be with darkness just as a lamp in a niche, so that its
attributes may be
witnessed. When the light ascends in levels and each one of the workers
completes its task, so that the light
reaches the brain, it is like a lamp in a niche. The reality of
man is the lamp.29
When this lamp becomes strong and pure, the knowledge and wisdom which is hidden in its
essence becomes more
apparent.
O dervish! From beginning to end, this discourse has been explanation of the journey of the
Indians.30
So non-Muslims can also witness God by following their own divine laws
and engaging in spiritual exercises. This
conclusion reflects Nasafī
discussion concerning man's perfection and its
relationship with the "four
times", for each of the four moments carry the specific
qualities of the
heavens and stars which determine the characteristics of each individual. It
is possible for the
"four times" to bring the same qualities to one person in
each climate, whereby individuals outside of
the Dār al-Islām (the Islamic
world) can attain perfection.
Nasafī was not the first Sufi to believe that non-Muslims could witness
God. For example, Shihāb al-Dīn
Suhrawardī (al-maqtūl) explained that
divine wisdom or mystical intuition manifested itself in pre-Islamic
sages.
According to Suhrawardī, two chains of divine wisdom were united in
himself: the first of these came from
Hermes and was passed on through the
Greek sages including Empedocles, Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle; the
second chain commenced
with Zoroaster and was then given to Iranian
sages such as Jāmāsf, Farshāwashtar and Buzurgmihr.31
This ecumenical position in Sufism accords with verses in the Koran
which express tolerance towards other
religions: "To each among you We
have prescribed a Law and an open way. If God had so willed He would
have
made you a single people but His plan is to test you in what He hath
given you; so strive as in a race in all
virtues. The goal of you all is God. It
is He Who will show you the truth of the matters in which ye
dispute.32
The Kubrāwī exegesis of visions played an important part in the
development of 'irfān during the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries in Iran and
Central Asia. There are two reasons which may explain the
formulation of
the particular techniques and methodologies in the Sufi orders. Firstly, it
was a reaction to the
popularity that Sufism enjoyed during this period, and
secondly it was a way to recognise the correct spiritual
station of Sufis,
some of whom mistakenly thought that they had reached the ultimate
station and whose
"Ḥallājian" shaṭḥiyyāt incurred the wrath of the 'Ulamā'.
The great appeal of Sufism was indeed a problem because it resulted in
lay people desiring a "popular"
form of Islamic mysticism which in reality
obscured the essence of Sufism. Indeed, Nasafī himself was opposed to
such a "vulgarization" of Sufism as his comments concerning the Sufis and
the common people sitting
together for samā' (see previous chapter)
indicate. His concern about the popularisation of Sufism is
mirrored in
Trimingham's observation that "the practical goal of Sufism for the majority
came to be the
attainment of ecstasy (wajd = faqd al-iḥsās), 'loss of
consciousness.' This is not the wajd
(encounter with God) of the Sufis; it
was in fact a degeneration which the early masters
of Sufism had perceived
and warned against when dealing with the question of samā'." For the
masses, ". . .loss of consciousness is regarded as 'union,' an emotional
identification of seeker
and sought. To some this experience became a drug
for which soul and body craved. For the ordinary lay member,
participation
in the ritual of dhikr, which for him occasionally leads to the
tranceecstasy,
provides at lowest a release from the hardships of everyday existence, and,
at a higher level,
some measure of freedom from the limitations of human
life and a glimpse at transcendental
experience."33 Nasafī
hinted at this
problem outlined by Trimingham:
And "inviting ecstasy" (tawājud) is an expression for a person who is
not an ecstatic but [for a
person] who makes himself resemble an
ecstatic (wājidat), since inviting ecstasy is the same as feigning
illness.34
II. THE VISION OF

GOD
In the previous section, it was shown that a correct interpretation of the
wayfarer's visions reveals his
proximity to God, thus the stars, moon and
sun represent Mulk, Malakūt and Jabarūt.
Jabarūt is the level of God's
knowledge of things, and this level is the wayfarer's ultimate aim
because at
this station he understands that there exists a higher level still. This is God's
essence which
was called Aḥadiyya by Farghānī and termed "the invisible,
invisible, invisible
world," by Nasafl. In chapter two, the Sufi idea of
reaching
God's essence was discussed and it was established that attaining
the essence is only a metaphor because man
can witness nothing other than
God's face. In this section, the reasons behind this are re-investigated by
concentrating upon Nasafī's views concerning the ultimate spiritual station,
and in addition, his beliefs are
also compared with those of Najm al-Dīn
Kubrā and Ibn 'Arabī to show the "orthodoxy" of his
position within the
Sufi world.
Most Sufis held that it was impossible for any individual to reach and
know God's essence, yet the author of
Kashf al-ṣirāṣ (who may have been
Nasafī)35 describes the views of two groups of Sufis who differ on this
issue. According
to the author of Kashf al-ṣirāṭ, one group of Sufis believe
it is not possible to know God's essence:
Know that each person has an interpretation (ta'wīl) for the ḥadīth:
"Whoever knows
himself knows his Lord," and also for the ḥadīth:
"God created Adam upon His own form."
Some, including Ḥujjat
alIslām Shaykh Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī, 'Ayn al-Quāat and Shaykh
Yūsuf Hamadānī hold
that it is not possible for men, Prophets and
Friends to know in truth God Most High just
as God Most High is. They
say that the interpretation of the ḥadīth: "Whosoever knows himself
knows
his Lord," is that it is not possible for anyone to know the self as
the self really is because one cannot
recognise the Truth Most High as
the Truth Most High is. So the knowledge of the Truth is actualised
from the
knowledge of the self according to this mode. Likewise you
should also understand the interpretation of the
ḥadīth: "God created
Adam upon His own form." It is not possible to recognise both in
reality.
In addition, it has been said that the world of man is the
conceptualisation of the form of a thing and it
conforms to the known
(ma'lūm) in the mind (dhihn). So it is necessary that the known is seen
(mubṣar) or heard (musma') by this person, or its conceptualisation is
possible. If such a
thing is not the object of sensory perception (maḥsūs)
it is necessary that there is no genus
(jins) or similarity (mānand) for it.
So how is it possible to conceptualise a thing for which
there is no like
(mithl), genus or species (naw') and is not the object of sense
perception? It
is not possible to conceptualise the Real One (aḥd-
iḥaqī1qī). So knowledge of the reality of His essence
is not possible.
There is no path for intelligence to the reality of His essence but there is
a path for
intelligence to His existence and attributes through signs and
indications. His excellency the Messenger said:
"Think about God and
not the essence of God," and he also said, "The person who speaks of
God's essence is foolish."36
The other group of Sufis claim that it is possible to go beyond this stage and
reach God's essence:
Others, including Shaykh of Shaykhs Sa'd al-Dīn Hammūya, Ibn 'Arabī, Ibn Sab'īn and Imām
Aḥmad
Ghazālī – may God sanctify their spirits – hold that is possible for man to know in reality
the Truth Most High
just as the Truth Most High is, by the servant's becoming wise (dānā) of the
Truth. They say that
Muhammad's knowledge of the Truth was just as the Truth Most High's
knowledge of the Truth Most High.
They also say that no one recognises himself just as the self is
except Muḥammaḍ. So the meaning of this
ḥadīth [He who knows himself knows his Lord] is
obvious (ẓāhir) according to them, for the person
who recognises himself just as the self is,
recognises the Truth Most High just as the Truth is.
So you have understood the meaning of the [foregoing] ḥadīth and you have understood the
meaning of the
ḥadīth that "God created Adam upon His own form," in other words, upon the
form of instruction
(ṣurat-i ta'līm) or the form of free disposal in the world (ṣurat-i taṣarruf fī
'ālam) or
in a form transcendent of direction. Some have said that the meaning of this ḥadīth is
obviously clear
and people have fallen into error as a result of this clarity. The meaning of this
ḥadīth is that
whoever recognises himself recognises his Lord because there is no more than one
existence. The Unitarian
(muwaḥḥid) is the person who understands and sees one thing and if he
sees or
knows two things he is an associator of others with God (musbrik). So on the basis of this
thinking that
existence is one, whoever recognises himself also recognises his Lord.37
The beliefs of the second group of Sufis do not follow the "orthodox"
interpretation of Sufism where
man witnesses God's face in everything but
cannot reach His essence. In works aside from Kashf
al-ṣirāṭ, Nasafī
explains the highest spiritual station as the level where man sees God's
essence as it
is manifested through His infinite faces. This station is the
subject of the following section.
Variegation (talwīn), Stability (tamkīn) and

Creative Power
(takwīn)
Nasafī's standpoint regarding the highest spiritual station in relation to

attributes is representative of
Sufism in the thirteenth century, although the
terminology that individual Sufis employed to describe this
underlying
reality differed. As stated above, Nasafī uses the word stability (tamkīn) to
denotate the
pinnacle of spiritual achievement:
When [the wayfarer] ceases reflection and inspiration presents itself, and inspiration becomes
dominant over
him, he passes from the world of intelligence and reaches the world of love. When
he ceases from inspiration
and witnessing presents itself, he passes from the world of love and
reaches the station of stability
(maqām-i tamkīn) and in [the station] of stability, he becomes
attributed with whatever attribute he
desires.
So at first the dhikr is dominant over the wayfarer, then reflection is dominant,
then inspiration
and then witnessing, and finally he reaches the station of stability, and he becomes pure from
any
variegation. In other words, at first the attributes of the wayfarer become dominant over his
existence and
each day, perhaps each hour, an attribute becomes dominant over him. But when
the wayfarer passes from the
station of variegation (talwīn) and reaches the station of stability, his
existence becomes dominant
over his attributes, and the indication of the station of stability is
that he can actualise whatever station
or attribute that he desires, that is, he can choose, and all
attributes are his property. If he desires he
engages in the dhikr, and if he wants he can be busy in
reflection, if he doesn't want he does not
engage himself in the dhikr or reflection, he has made
himself ready for inspiration so that he can be
informed of past and future events. In other words,
the mirror of his heart has been polished from the illuminations of both worlds, so that the
reflection of whatever
occurs or will occur in this world will become apparent upon his heart. If
he wishes he can put the past and
future to one side and enjoy his moment.
As long as the wayfarer is in the station of variegation, sometimes grace (fayḍ)
is dominant
over him, and sometimes expansion (basṭ) and sometimes the word (kalām) is dominant
over
him; sometimes silence and sometimes familiar talk (ikhtilāṭ) is dominant over him; sometimes
seclusion ('uzlat) and sometimes anger (qahr) and sometimes kindness (luṭf) is
dominant over
him. All of these come regardless of the wayfarer's desire but when he reaches the station of
stability, they all come at his desire. Through his words and actions, he is a doctor and cure for
peoples'
states, and he is a king with regard to his own state because he can be any way that he
desires.
O dervish! Until the wayfarer reaches the station of stability he is not free from slavery and has
not reached
freedom. The People of Heaven are kings because while they were in the station of
variegation, they were slaves
to their appetites and their attributes were anger and incapacity, but
when they arrived at stability, they
became kings over their appetites and the master over wrath
and the lord of all their attributes.38
For Nasafī, the wayfarer in the station of stability is similar to God; just as
God can create anything that He
desires and manifest whatever He desires,
so too can the perfect wayfarer be a master of his self and
"create" or
display whatever attribute he desires. In this station, the spirit of such a
wayfarer is
like pure light and his body is like a prism which separates all
the colours from this pure
light, in other words, he has become attributed
with all the Godly character traits and he knows the appropriate
occasion
for their manifestation.
Najm al-Dīn Kubrī expresses the same reality that Nasafī describes
although the terminology that the former uses
is a little different. His views
are stated clearly in his discussion of walāyat, or Friendship:
Three levels are possible for the wayfarer in the station of Friendship,
and all of his Friendship is condensed
in those three levels. The first
level is variegation (talwīn) and the second level is stability
(tamkīn)
and the third level is "bringing to be" (takwīn). To use another
expression, the
first level is knowledge, the second level is state, and
then it is annihilation from that state in the changer
of states. We also
say that the first level is disengagement then it is solitariness and then
unity, or we can
say that the first level is fear and hope and then
contraction and expansion and then it is familiarity and awe;
39
Najm al-Dīn Kubrā offers many alternatives for explaining this one reality,
however, the first definition is the
important one for our discussion. Here
Friendship of God is explained in terms of talwīn, tamkīn
and takwīn.
Takwīn occupies the top rung, and this is another way to describe Nasafī's
view of
tamkīn. In Najm al-Dīn Kubrī's triad of talwīn, tamkīn and takwīn,
takwīn is related to the Arabic kun, or "Be," which is the divine command.
The perfect
wayfarer is attributed with this power to manifest whatever
attribute he desires and (just as in Nasafī's
depiction of the situation) this
desire does not come into conflict with God's desire because
when the Friend of God enjoys a form of this reality and is clothed in
these garments, he does not have any
desire himself because he has
annihilated his desire and established it in His desire. Each time he
establishes
his annihilated desire in the desire of the Truth Most High,
his desire is the desire of the Truth. God Most High
does not desire a
thing unless the servant desires that very thing, and the servant also does
not attach his
desire to anything unless the Truth Most High desires that
very thing, just as the Beneficent Truth says:
"but desire, you shall not,
unless God desires, the Lord of the two worlds."40'41
Several years before Najm al-Dīn Kubrā was conveying this message to his
followers in Central Asia, Shihāb al-Dīn
Yaḥyā Suhrawardī was also
explaining the same idea in the form of the station of kun for the Prophets
and
Friends: "In this station they are able to create and fix for themselves
the suspended exemplars (muthui
mu'allaq) in whatever form they desire.
This station is that very station of kun."42 As we have seen, the ultimate
station for Najm al-Dīn Kubrā is takwīn where the
wayfarer has the power
to manifest any attribute he desires; Nasafī's system fully accords with this
although
he names it stability (tamkīn). Ibn 'Arabī uses a similar term,
"stability in variegation"
(al-tamkīn fī'ltalwin) – although he is explaining
the same situation from a slightly different
perspective. Stability in
variegation portrays the ultimate vision of God, the moment when the
wayfarer realises
that he can never witness the essence of God but always
contemplates a face of God. He is stable in witnessing
everything as God,
but the variegation is due to the fact that God's faces are infinite in number.
In existence, the "reality" is variegation. He who is stable in
variegation is the Owner of Stability.
The heart longs to witness this
reality. God made the heart the locus of this longing to bring the
actualisation
(taḥsīl) of this reality near to man, since there is
fluctuation in the heart. God did not place this
longing in the rational
faculty, since reason possesses delimitation. If this longing were in the
rational
faculty, the person might see that he is fixed in a single state.
But since it lies in the heart, fluctuation
comes upon him quickly. For
the heart is between the fingers of the all-merciful, so it does not remain
in a
single state in the reality of the situation. Hence it is fixed in its
fluctuation within its state in accordance
with its witnessing of the way
the fingers cause it to fluctuate.43
One of Ibn 'Arabī's favourite sayings is that God's self-disclosure never
repeats itself,44 thus,
whatever the wayfarer sees, it is a brand new face of
God which is unique to that wayfarer and to that moment. In
this way
neither the wayfarer, nor God becomes bored: "God does not become bored
that you
should become bored."45 In
the same way that not one attribute is
dominant over the wayfarer, so too the wayfarer does not become tied or
limited to one face of God. This is Ibn 'Arabī's "station of no station," for no
one particular
station is dominant over the wayfarer.46 Nasafī describes a
similar idea after presenting the six different stations of
the Friends in the
first chapter of Kitāb-i tanzīl:
O dear friend! The stations of the Friends are no more than these six
stations, and a person should not think
that these six stations are in order
and that the wayfarer completes the first station and then goes on to the
second station, because it is not in this way. At the end of journeying,
each wayfarer is in one of these
stations and one of these stations has
became his aim and he remains there. There are few wayfarers who are
informed of all six stations, and until the wayfarer discovers the
information of these six stations and sees the
correctness and corruption
of each one – not through imitation (taqlīd) and supposition (gumīn) but
through unveiling and contemplation – he will neither reach the end
point of the journey nor be informed of the
extremity of the journey nor
recognise the truth from the false nor understand God.47
From another perspective, the "station of no station" is the "station of

bewilderment." This is because the wayfarer has one eye of tashbīh and one
eye of
tanzīb, that is, one eye focused upon God's incomparability and the
other eye on God's similarity,
the result can only be confusion, becoming
cross-eyed, perplexity and bewilderment. The station of bewilderment
is
also described by Nasafī.
O dear friend! The final task of the wise man is bewilderment in the
gnosis of God and the gnosis of the world.
And the greater [his]
bewilderment, the greater his gazing (niẓāra kardan) because wisdom is
the cause of
bewilderment, and bewilderment is the cause of gazing. So
for the person whose wisdom is greater, his
bewilderment will be
greater. And for the person whose bewilderment is greater, his gazing
will be greater.
Gazing without complaint is a sublime station and a
magnificent task.48
The wayfarer keeps on gazing because he witnesses God's face in

everything. It is not the same as beholding
God's essence, for no-one has the
preparedness to do this. Nasafī explains this reality through the Koranic
story of Moses requesting to see God.
Moses was at this station when he desired to see God. The Truth
Most High said, "You
cannot see Me,"49 He did
not state "I will not
show Myself to you."50
The wayfarer sees God's essence in as much as it is revealed through the

signs of the world, but he can never
truly reach God's essence.
Likewise, Najm al-Dīn Kubrā posited bewilderment as the final spiritual
station, and his description of the
mystic's vision graphically reveals the
oscillation between tanzīh and tashbīh:
When the wayfarer reaches bewilderment after fulfilling his purpose
by means of the manifest and non-manifest
signs and the self-disclosure
of the attributes and essence, his longing for Him increases and the sky
and earth
are like a prison, a battlement or a fortress for him in which he
is imprisoned.51
Thus tanzīh is witnessed here, but at this point things begin to change until
tashbīh becomes
apparent:
When he decides to find a way to escape and be released and free, the
veils of the signs and indications of the
sky and earth, face him, and all
the things on the earth – ranging from fire, light, animals, plants, rocks,
clay, and everything which is existent from them bring themselves level
with him. Now the divine signs concord
with him in bewilderment, and
sometimes they share his anxiety and discomfort and their crying voices
are heard.
Sometimes they call him to themselves and sometimes he
hears their individual voices [which say], "Come to
me and look at the
wonders that have been concealed in me." Yes, all of them are wonders,
even the weed of
the earth or the particles of the sky. Sometimes his
changing spiritual state and spiritual aspiration reaches
the extent that
he witnesses God's signs in himself or he witnesses himself inside of
them, or he feels that
the stars are falling into him, or the sky is
descending upon him, or he feels the taste of the sky in his
inside, or he
witnesses himself upon the top of the sky and at the same time he is
looking at the
earth.52
The signs of God are a veil, but whether they hinder or help the wayfarer
depends upon how he looks at them.
Veils can hide something, and in this
respect, they represent a tanzīh position, and since it is
impossible for the
wayfarer to reach the essence of God, he will always be faced by veils.
However, if the
wayfarer realises that the veils reveal something about God,
then he will pass from one veil to another, enjoying
the knowledge that he
can obtain from each one. Najm al-Dīn Kubrā's portrayal of tashbīh
continues:
Sometimes the earth rises in companionship with him and is like a
friend and associate and it speaks with him and declares, "Behold me
and the wonders in me and see how God
Most High is generous to you,
since you can walk upon me. I am your mother and greater than you and
look upon
what a foundation I am based upon!"53
It is interesting that Najm al-Dīn Kubrā's visionary experiences included

such discussions with the earth.
His visions were inspired by the Koran
which states: "We shall show them Our signs upon the horizons and in
themselves."54 For many
Sufis, the earth (or horizon), is considered from
one perspective as the most distinguished element that God
created.55
Nasafī himself says
that the first substance that God created was earth and
the last thing is intelligence,56 all things are created through the earth, even
Adam, who is made of earth and of God's spirit.57 In Najm al-Dīn Kubrā's
visionary portrayal, the earth is the mother and
that which God breathed
into man (i.e. the spirit) is the father. Thus in the state of bewilderment, the
wayfarer
recognises that he is composed of two seemingly conflicting
substances: earth and spirit, density and subtlety,
darkness and light. This is
another reflection of the tanzīh – tashbīh
relationship, which appears
contradictory until the wayfarer reaches station of bewilderment where all
opposites
are fused together. Like Najm al-Dīn Kubrī, Nasafī also describes
the earth and spirit, or elements and natures,
in terms of mothers and
fathers:
This sea of light is called father and this sea of darkness is called
mother, and the fathers and mothers place
their arms around each others
neck and embrace, and the kingdoms are born from them.58
Earth is considered a distinguished thing because it has the preparedness to

receive the spirit. Having received
the spirit, the earth reaches its perfection
in two ways: through the macrocosm and through
the microcosm. Thus God
has two mirrors in which he can witness himself.
Earth, the primal element
is a non-composite and can neither be corrupted nor decay, thus it is
relatively
eternal. 59
Najm al-Dīn's visionary descriptions of bewilderment continue, revealing
that the wayfarer flashes from
tashbīh to tanzīh and from tanzīh to tashbīh
like a coin spinning in the air. In the
previous section, the earth is witnessed
in a tashbīh manner, but then suddenly it flips to a
tanzīh nature:
Sometimes the earth under his feet resembles a billowing ocean with
waves crashing around him, and he is set upon
that stormy ocean but he
does not drown. This ocean becomes corporealised in a form for
him
when he does not listen to the discourse of the earth, or if he listens, he
will be in a state where he
enters the station of bewilderment and he
constantly looks at that until a group of spiritual ones who live in
the
earth attack him, but since he has fortified himself in the garrison of
truthfulness and freedom they cannot
defeat him. In the end everything
on the earth is vanquished in his circle of power.60
Najm al-Dīn Kubrā concludes his section on bewilderment and its effects in
the following way:
The main aim of discussing this reality is that each time the changing
spiritual state of the wayfarer reaches
the extremity of strength, and his
spiritual aspiration (himmat) ascends to the highest
rung, he can enjoy
the effect of that very spiritual state through the faces of the signs and
indications.61
The vivid unveilings experienced by Najm al-Dīn Kubrī graphically portray
the Islamic concepts of tanzīh
and tashbīh which were explained in chapter
two. This dual nature
of God is confirmed in much of the Sufi literature of
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. (Another example
includes the
extraordinary visions described in what amounts to a spiritual
autobiography by Rūzbihān
Baqlī).62 Unfortunately, Nasafī
does not reveal
the character of his visions, however, as has been shown earlier, he does
provide wayfarers with
an answer to the seemingly contradictory nature of
Islamic visionary experience, which is the
tanzīh-tashbīh relationship.
III. SPIRITUAL
PERFECTION AND
CREATION
Related to this discussion of the ultimate spiritual station of bewilderment,
and already alluded to above, is
the capacity of wayfarers to use the
attributes given to them to "create," that is, creation not in the
sense of
manifesting the appropriate attributes or character traits, such as generosity
or wrath, etc., but
creating objects on a corporeal plane and causing effects
in the world of sense perception. The word for this
creative power or
himma, is found in the Koran and has been translated as "purpose" and
"design."63 By the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, himma had become a
technical term of the Sufis. For example, the great
Persian poet Niẓāmī (b.
1140) refers to himma in his Makbzan al-asrār (1166) when he describes
how
Mahmud of Ghazna (969-1030) fell sick while besieging an Indian
city. Niẓamī explains that the cause of the
sickness was the efforts of three
Hindu ascetics who had combined their himma in
an attempt to make
Mahmūd leave India.64 The Sufi "theoreticians" of the same period,
including Ibn 'Arabī,
Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (al-mutqūl), Najm al-Dīn
Kubrā and Nasafī, all discussed the significance of
himma in their works.
Himma is manifested at the stage of human perfection where the Perfect
Man assumes the
noble character traits:
People may apply the word "state" and mean by it the servant's
becoming manifest in the attribute
of God by engendering (takwīn)
things and producing effects through his Resolve (himma). This is
the
becoming similar (tashabbuh) to God which is called assuming the
character traits of the names
(al-takhalluq bi'l asmā').65
The ability to "create" an effect in this world through himma depends upon
the strength of the
individual's concentration:
Every man creates by his fancy in the Imaginative faculty that which
has existence nowhere else, this being a
common faculty. The gnostic
however, by his Concentration (himma) creates that which has existence
beyond
the origin of Concentration, indeed, the Concentration continues
to maintain its existence, which depletes it in
no way at all. Should the
attention of the gnostic be deflected from the maintenance of what he
has created, it
will cease to exist, unless the gnostic commands all
planes (of existence), in which case such deflection does
not arise, since
(at all times) he is present on some plane or another.66
Najm al-Dīn Kubrā also employs the word himma in several of his works67
but his most interesting explanations appear in his Fawā'iḥ
al jamāl wa
fawātiḥ al jalāl, where himma is posited as the highest level:
The end of love (maḥabba) is the beginning of passionate love
('ishq), and love belongs to the
heart and passionate love belongs to the
spirit and the mystery (sirr) connects (yajmu'u) the
dearest ones, and
himma is the effect of [this] connection.68
Kubrā states that each time the wayfarer's desire becomes strong and he has
preparedness and constancy in
searching for the Truth, then a link is created
between the possessor of himma and his desired object.
This connection is
like a chain which is drawn between two things, or it is like a spear between
a
combatant's hand and the breast of his enemy, or it is like an arrow, or it is
like a light than shines from
the sun to the earth.69 As a
result of this
connection, the wayfarer's himma is now able to create. The
progress of the
wayfarer's himma from beginning to end is summarised by Kubraā:
The traveller is a horseman and himma is the horse. There is a
beginning and end for himma; the
beginning is desire, then searching,
then connection (rabṭ), then free disposal (taṣarruf), then
being
(alkawn). Himma is power, and the mystery (sirr) unites with the himma
and the power
of the Truth.70
This creation through the "hand of himma" is found when the wayfarer has
a pure heart and when
his hands do not reach towards this or that. Then
another hand appears which participates in his affairs and
performs tasks
that ordinary hands are incapable of undertaking.71 Kubrā gives the
example of his being able to feel his own Shaykh's
shadow and himma
within him. He thought that his shaykh had left the city but he realised that
he had
returned because the shaykh's shadow and himma felt like a heavy
mountain upon him so that he was not
able to move in any direction. Kubrā
told those around him to go out and greet the shaykh. Those who were
present
were amazed to see Kubrā's shaykh riding towards the city in the
distance.72
This ability to cause things to occur or appear in the visible world from
the invisible world cannot be realised
by the common people. However,
those who have a pure heart and a connection with God are able to actualise
the
things that appear in the invisible world. Thus, they are able to fly, walk
on water, pass through fire without
injury, in fact they have the power of
free disposal (taṣarruf) through their himma.
One of the distinctive features of Kubrā's theosophy is its attention to the
lights and
colours that the wayfarer sees throughout the spiritual journey.
Therefore, it is of little surprise that Kubrā
describes a particular "vision"
which is related to himma. These lights, colours and visions are
induced by
the continual practice of dhikr. Unlimited space and broad expanses of land
around oneself may be seen as well as colours ranging from green, red,
yellow and blue. The colours are
representative of a spiritual state: green
indicates the life of the heart, while fire in a pure form free from
turbidity is
a sign of the life of himma, and the reality of that himma is power (qudrat).
If there is turbidity in the fire which causes the wayfarer discomfort, he is
witnessing the fire of the soul and
Satan. Blue is an indication of the life of
the soul and yellow is a sign of the wayfarer's weakness and
inability.73
Since Nasafī is associated by some to the Kubrāwiyya order, one might
expect to find
similar descriptions of lights and visions within his works.
Although he does discuss visions, there is not a
single reference to such
coloured lights or fire. Despite this, Nasafī follows in the tradition of Ibn
'Arabī
and Najm al-Dīn Kubra by portraying a spiritual station which
reflects the effects of himma. In Kitīb-ī
Tamīl, Nasafī discusses one station
for the Friends which presents the idea of creation at every moment in
time
when God replaces something which was existent in the west and replaces
it with something similar in the
east. This is one way of explaining the
miracles of Prophets and charismatic powers of the Friends, or in other
words, the himma of the Friends.
. . . forms are annihilated every moment and something similar to that
becomes existent and the senses do not
perceive that because of the
extreme speed. Now know that if a fixed (mu'ayan) form in a fixed time
in
the east becomes non-existent, in that very fixed time something
similar to that becomes existent in the west. Is
it not a marvel ('ajab),
for how is it possible that whatever is existent in the east at a fixed time
becomes non-existent and something similar to that becomes existent in
the west? Why is it impossible for
whatever is existent in the east
[suddenly] to become non-existent there and become existent in the
west? It is
God that becomes manifested with these forms and the east,
west, south, north, over and under are the same for
God because God's
light is expanded, unlimited and infinite. This is the meaning of the
manifestation of
angels and Gabriel, the Throne of the Queen of Sheba
(takht-i bilqīs), Khiḍr, the Invisible Shaykh,
miracles and charismatic
powers.74
The possession of himma is one of the distinguishing features of the

hierarchy of the three hundred and
fifty six Friends who oversee the world
(to be discussed in the next chapter). Nasafī's explanation of the
abilities of
these individuals resembles that of Najm al-Dīn Kubrā:
Their charismatic powers and power are in such a way that earth,
water, air, fire, desert and mountains do not
obstruct their vision, and
they can see and hear the words of the People of the West when they
themselves are in
the east. If they want they can travel to the west from
the east in an hour. Land, sea, mountain or plain are the
same to them,
and water and fire are equal. There are many of these charismatic
powers (karāmat) and
powers (qndrat) which belong to them. Although
each one of the three hundred and fifty six are wise
(dānā), esteemed
(muqarrab), the possessor of himmat, the possessor of power (ṣāḥib-i
qudrat) and one whose prayers are answered (mustajāb al-da'wat), the
Pole
(quṭb) is wiser and more esteemed than them all and his power and
himmat is greater. The person who
is nearer to the Pole is wiser and
more esteemed.75
In al-Insīn al-kāmil, however, Nasafī is more reticent in confirming his

belief in
this station. This is somewhat strange because in other places he
discusses the miracles of the Prophets and the
charismatic powers of the
Friends.
O dervish, this is the eighth Heaven and according to the helpless one, it is the last Heaven and
there is no
other than these eight. But some say that there is another Heaven other than these
eight, and there is a tree in this Heaven and it is called the Tree of Power. When the wayfarer
reaches the eye of
certainty ('ayn al-yaqīn), – that is, until this point he has known the knowledge
of certainty
('ilm al-yaqīn) – he sees the eye of certainty which is the existence of God . . . But the
understanding of this helpless one does not reach this ninth Heaven of which this group has
related and I have
not seen anyone among them nor among their peers. I have only heard very
much [about them].
Know that some say that there is a group and God gives them whatever they desire, and
everything that is
necessary appears for them; and in whatever they fix their himmat, [that thing]
accords with their
himmat: "Many a dusty and dishevelled one clad in rags, to whom men pay no
head, will have his oath
fulfilled when he swears to God."76 In other words, they have the
wisdom to perfection and power to perfection and
himmat to perfection. All of their desires are
actualised and everything comes about in the way that
they desire because they have died the
voluntary death before the natural death and they have passed on from
this world and they are in
the next world. For example, if these people want rain to come, in the moment that
it passes
through their minds, clouds appear and rain begins to fall. If they do not want rain to fall, in the
instant that it passes through their minds the clouds disperse and disappear. If they want someone
to fall
sick, that person becomes sick instantly; and if they want a sick person to become healthy,
in an instant that
person becomes healthy. In all things it is in this way. In addition, it is said that
this group can journey
from the east to the west in one hour and can come from the west to the
east in one hour. They can walk upon
water, fly in the air or walk upon fire if they want. People
can see them if they want and people cannot see
them if they want, and everyday their food is
ready and cooked for them without the effort or endeavour of any
person.77
O Dervish! Today as I am writing this, I do not have this [power] and my acquaintances do not
have this, and
despite this, its [reality] cannot be denied. It may be that God Most High will give
and grant this to me since
He is capable in everything.78
There are several possible explanations for Nasafī's hesitance regarding the
ninth heaven and the Tree of
Power. Firstly, one has to consider that there
was always danger to Sufis from the secular rulers or those
members of the
'Ulamā' who favoured a more exoteric interpretation of Islam. Reference
was made in
chapter one to the dangers faced by followers of Ibn 'Arabī in
Egypt
during the generation after Nasafī. It has also been suggested that
Shihāb al-Dīn
al-Suhrawardī was executed as a result of the political
implications of his esoteric beliefs.79 (Although the word himma is not
used
in his Ḥikmat al-isbrāq, Suhrawardī describes sages who possessed
illuminationist wisdom within them
and who could make anything appear
before them at will, such as food, shapes and beautiful sounds and other
things).80 Another reason lies
in the reluctance of masters of charismatic
powers and himmat to demonstrate their
power to the common people. In
Kitāb-i tanzīl, Nasafī himself comments that it is necessary for Prophets
to
manifest prophecy and miracles but it is not necessary for the Friends to
show their Friendship and
charismatic powers. In fact the Friend sees
charismatic powers as a trial and a test and they are anguished and
afraid at
their manifestation. This is because some of the "Friends" desired that the
common people
look at them and the charismatic power, and thus recognise
them. Such a person is not a Friend, rather, he is
"a demon, a deviator of
others, in other words, he puts on the clothes of the good and pious and
attracts
people to himself and in this way actualises fortune and fame."81
In Zubdat al-ḥaqā'iq, Nasafī also is cautious about himmat:
The thought and plans of humans have effects but the himmat and wishing of humans have no
effect ... if
human himmat and wishing had effects then no one would be incapable and poor, they
would all be capable
and rich. If action ('arnal) is united (jam') with human himmat and wishing
(khwāst) then tasks are completed through that himmat and action.
If one recognises sickness and killing as an effect of one's himmat and says that this is my
action
(fi'l) then in fact this claim is a lie and this claimant is a liar. But it is possible if God Most
High frees one of His Friends from sickness through prayer and kimmat and intercession
(shafā'at) or makes one of His enemies sick or kills him. Indeed there have been many such
cases.
But the reality (ma'nā) is that it is the Truth's action. But when this action of the Truth is
manifested through the prayer and intermediary of one of the Friends, that is called "charismatic
power," and "intercession." In other words, God Most High bestows upon the Friend the
acceptance
of prayer, intercession and charismatic powers.82
The meaning behind this passage is that himmat ultimately comes from
God, and the Friend who has reached
the highest spiritual station does not
desire to do anything that God does not desire. At this point, the
himmat of
the Friend on the one hand and God's desire on the other are the same,
leaving the question
of who is actually exercising himmat somewhat
ambiguous. Are the Islamic mystics who describe "monistic" experiences
actually stating that they are identical with God? The
problem of identity
between the mystic and God may best be explained with reference to the
mirror imagery which
so often occurs in Sufi texts. The pinnacle of the
mystical experience has been interpreted by J.J. Elias:
It is no longer possible to differentiate God as He witnesses Himself
in the mirror from the mirror as it bears
witness to God. They are like
two bright lights reflecting back at each other. The beauty of God is
reflected and
witnessed by the mirror, which then reflects this beauty
back to God Who witnesses the perfect reflection of His
own beauty as.
identical to His beauty. In other words, God witnesses the same image
of Himself in the mirror as
the mirror witnesses in God.83
Is the mirror identical to God? Who exercises the power of himmat man or
God? This ambiguity is
beautifully expressed by Maḥmūd Shabistārī (d. ca
1339) in his Gulshān-i rīz. Shabistārī discusses
God's essence in the form of
the beauty spot on the beloved's face which is reflected in the heart of the
lover.
I know not if her beauty spot is our heart's double, its projected image,
or the heart the image and facsimile of her face's fascinating beauty spot. Has the heart, as a
reflection
or facsimile of that face come forth or was her image therein projected so
palpably?
Is the heart within her face or her face within the heart? An intricate enigma, ineffable, invisible
to me as well!84
The answer to the problem of identity between God and the spiritual
wayfarer must be affirmative and negative. It
is affirmative in respect of the
fact that it is God's image that is reflected in the heart of the wayfarer,
but it
is also negative because the reflection is only one form, that is, it is only a
self-disclosure of God in
the form that the heart is capable of reflecting. At
this point it is necessary to recall Nasafl's warning in
his introduction to
Kitāb-i tanzīl that the pure essence and Holy Face of the Truth is so great
that an
individual's intelligence cannot encompass Him and the extremity of
man's knowledge is that point where
he knows that he cannot know God as
God really is.85
In chapter three it was described how "contemplation" is the ultimate
epistemological level that the
wayfarer can reach. In a state of
contemplation, the wayfarer has returned to the world after witnessing a
state
of absolute unity of existence. In this world He realises that everything
is a sign of God and he sees the unity
in multiplicity. At this point, he
knows that God is both transcendent from His creation and at the same time
He
is also immanent. One should speak neither of an "Allah transcendent"
nor an
"Allah immanent." This position, which is generally representative
of Ibn 'Arabi's so-called
school of the Unity of being (waḥdat al-wujūd) was
severely criticised by some Sufis,
including Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī (1564-
1624). According to one modern commentator of Sirhindī, Ibn 'Arabī was
censured by Sirhindī because the former "expounded the doctrine (of
waḥdat al-wujūd) in the light of
his experience of oneness and identity.
Though he did not stay at the stage of 'pure union' and moved
ahead, he did
not move sufficiently enough and affirm the complete transcendence of God
and His absolute
difference."86 Sufis such
as Ibn 'Arabī and Nasafī indeed
did move on from 'pure union' since they returned to this world and
through
contemplation witnessed God's incomparability and similarity. They could
not "affirm the
complete transcendence of God and His absolute difference"
because this would have been a distortion of what
they perceived to be the
real ontological and epistemological relationship between man and God.
Sirhindī believed the ultimate situation was one of servanthood
('abdiyat), which affirmed God's
incomparability, whereas he held that the
wujūdīs saw unity (tawḥīd) as the pinnacle of spiritual
realisation.87 Indeed,
Nasafī
does view unity as the final spiritual level, equating unity (tawḥīd)
with contemplation
('iyān):
. . .when the wayfarer reaches the station of unity (maqām-i tawḥīd), which is the ultimate
station of
the wayfarers, he reaches his perfection and becomes mature (bāligh). . .88
Know that there are four kinds of maturity: One [kind] is the maturity of surrender
(bāligh-i
islām) which is the station of imitation (taqlīd) and compliance (inqiyād). In
this station, the
wayfarer says with his tongue that God is one.
Another [kind] is the maturity of faith ('īmān) which is the station of reasoning (istidlāl)
and
knowledge ('ilm) and in this station the wayfarer knows in his heart that God is one.
Another [kind] is the maturity of certitude (īqīn) which is the station of assurance (itminān)
and
tranquillity (ārām) and it is in this station that the wayfarer sees that God seems to be one
(khudā'
ī-rā gūya yikī mī-bīnad).
Another [kind] is the maturity of contemplating ('iyīn) which is the station of the unveiling of
obscurities (kashf-i ghiṭā') and the rending of the veil (shaqq-i sbaqāq) and it is in this
station that
the wayfarer sees that God Most High is one . . . and this maturity of contemplation is the
perfection of man and the ultimate station.89
So although Nasafī posits unity (tawḥīd) as the ultimate spiritual level in the
foregoing, it has been
shown in other places that his explanation of unity in
terms of contemplation indicates
that it is a situation where the wayfarer has
returned to the world after experiencing "absolute unity"
and sees both
God's incomparability and also His similarity through His places of
manifestation in the world.
Likewise, Ibn 'Arabī did not claim that unity
was the highest spiritual level as Sirhindī appears to be
saying. Rather,
perfection is described as servanthood ('ubūdiyya) and manliness
(rajūliyya) or
in other words, incomparability and similarity.90
The mystical experiences that Nasafī describes are both theistic and
monistic but the language that is available
to us in the West has been
determined culturally by a tradition which is theistic. While it includes
terms for
the monist, as yet there is still no word for the tanzīh/taskbīh
position. Perhaps Corbin did the best
thing by creating his own terminology,
such as "theo-monist."91
Notes
1 H. Corbin, The Man of Light, p. 78.
2 Ibid, pp. 61-144.
3 Koran, 2: 29, "It is He who created for you all that is in
the earth, then He lifted Himself to
heaven and levelled them seven heavens; and He has knowledge of
everything."
4 For Muḥammad's night ascent M. Sells, Early Islamic
Mysticism (New York: Paulist Press,
1996), pp. 47-56.
5 Koran, 6: 76.
6 Koran, 6: 77.
7 Koran, 6: 78.
8 Koran, 6: 79.
9 Koran, 6: 75.
10 Najm al-Dīn Rīzī, translated H. Algar, op. cit., p. 296.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid, p. 109.
14 Ibid, pp. 236-7.
16 Ibid, p. 107.
18 Ibid, p. 246. The forty-six parts of prophecy refer to a
ḥadīth, see Wensinck, Concordance et
Indices de la Tradition Musulmane (Leiden: E.J. Brill,
1936-1969), Vol 1, 343, s.v. juz')
19 Ibid, p. 243.
20 Ibid, p. 174.
21 Najm al-Dīn Rāzī, translated H. Algar, op. cit., p. 289.
22 Ibid, p. 239.
23 Koran, 36: 82.
24 Koran, 54: 50.
26 Koran, 24: 35.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid, p. 25.
30 Ibid, p. 26.
31 H. Ziai, "The Source and Nature of Authority," op.
cit., p. 324.
32 Koran, 5: 51.
33 J.S. Trimingham, The Sufi Orders of Islam, p. 200.
35 The passage in Kashf al-ṣirāṭ is similar to a discussion
found in Kashf alḥaqā'iq, p. 159-160.
36 Kashf al-ṣirṭt, Veliyuddin 1767, fol.
208b, line 13 onwards.
37 Kashf al-ṣirāṭ, Veliyuddin, 1767, fol.
209a, line 14 onwards.
39 Najm al-Dīn Kubra, ed. F. Meier, [174], There is also a Persian
translation of this work by
Najm al-Dīn al-Kubrā, trans, Muhammad Bāqir Sa'ādī Khurāsānī see Fawā'iḥ
al-Jamāl wa
Fawātiḥ al-Jalāl (Tehran: Intishārāt-i marwī, 1368). This passage appears on pages 242-243.
40 Koran, 81: 29.
41 Najm al-Dīn Kubrā, Arabic [175], (Persian translation p. 244).
42 Suhrawardī, Ḥikmat al-ishrāq, op. cit., p. 387.
43 Ibn 'Arabī, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiya (II 532.30) trans.
Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, p.
108.
44 Ibn 'Arabī, Futūḥāt (I 266.9), translated Chittick,
The Sufi Path of Knowledge, p. 103.
45 A ḥadīth quoted several times by Ibn 'Arabī in the
al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiya, see for example the
discussion in (III 254.23, 255.8), translated Chittick,
The Sufi Path of Knowledge, p. 101.
46 See Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, p. 376-379.
47 Kitāb- tanzīl, fol. 51a, lines 11-16.
49 Koran, 7: 14.3.
50 al-Insān al-kāmil., p. 116.
51 Najm al-Dīn Kubrā, Arabic [185], Persian p. 254.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Koran, 41: 53.
55 For example, Ibn 'Arabī comments, "The earth . . .
gives all benefits from its own essence and
is the locus of every good. Hence it is the mightiest of corporeal
bodies. In its movement it
vies with no moving thing, since none of them leave the earth's location. Each
pillar manifests
its authority within the earth while it is patient, the receptive, the fixed, the
stable." Quoted by
S. Murata, The Tao of Islam, p. 140.
56 Kashf al-haqā'iq, p. 57.
57 Koran, 32:7-9.
59 It is possible to interpret the following passage about the
earth in two different ways. The first
belittles earth while the other praises it due to its
non-composite, non-corruptible nature:
when many of the Great Ones had seen the calamities and catastrophes in
this universe, and
had witnessed much torment and various vexations in this world and the next world, they said
'I wish I had never been born from my mother, I wish I were earth,' since there is no level
lower than
earth and they desired that level. (al-Insān al-kāmil, p. 231). "I wish I were earth"
is an
allusion to the Koran, 78: 41: "O would that I were dust."
60 Najm al-Dīn Kubrā, Arabic [185J, Persian, p. 255.
61 Ibid.
62 See C. Ernst, Rūzbihān Baqlī. The second chapter of this
work entitled "The Inner Structure of
Sainthood," pp. 17-110, neatly portrays this
tashbīh-tanzīh dynamic.
63 This appears several times in Arberry's translation of the
Koran, for example 9: 74 (London:
Allen & Unwin, 1955).
64 Niẓāml, Makhzan al-asrār., Matba'a Armaghān, Tehran,
1313, 10991101. For an English
translation see Gholām Hosein Dārāb's The Treasury of Mysteries
(London: Arthur
Probsthain, 1945), p. 90.
65 Ibn 'Arabī, al-Futụhāt al-Makkiya, II 385.12,
translated Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge,
p. 265.
66 Austin, Ibn al-'Arabī: The Bezels of Wisdom, p. 102.
67 For example, see Najm al-Dīn Kubrā's Ila'l-hā'tm
al-khā'if min lawmat aliā'im (Tehran:
Sāzmān i intishārāt-i kayhān, 1364), p.57.
68 Najm al-Dīn Kubrā, Fawā'ih al jamāl wa fawātiḥ al
jalāl [84].
69 Ibid [106].
70 Ibid [106].
71 Ibid [182].
72 Ibid [155].
73 Ibid [13].
75 Manāzil al-sā'īrīn, p. 318-319.
76 Ḥadīth. Also quoted by Najm al-Dīn Razī, translated H.
Algar, op. cit., p. 242. According to
Algar, this ḥadīth is recorded by al-Ḥakīm, and also by al-Ghazālī
in Iḥyā 'Ulūm al-Dīn, III,
270.
78 Ibid, p. 308.
79 See H. Ziai, "The Source and Nature of Authority: A Study
of alSuhrawardi's Illuminationist
Political Doctrine," op.cit, pp 304-344.
80 Suhrawardī, Ḥikmat al-ishrāq, op. cit., p. 374.
81 Kitāb-i tanzīl, fol. 64, lines 12 64b line 2.
82 Zubdat al-ḥaqā'iq, p. 69.
83 J.J. Elias, The Throne Carrier of God, p. 96.
84 Trans. Lewisohn, Beyond Faith and Infidelity, p. 198.
86 Muhammad Abdul Haq Ansari, Sufsm and
Sbari'ah (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1986),
p. 94.
87 Ibid, p. 15.
89 Ibid, p. 125.
90 Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, p. 366.
91 For this term see H. Corbin, History of Islamic
Philosophy, translated L. Sherrard (London:
Kegan Paul International, 1993), pp. 294-95.
6
The Perfection of Man: The Concepts

of Friendship and Prophecy
I. THE SPIRITUAL
ASCENT
Achieving human perfection is viewed by Sufis as a journey or a spiritual
ascent which reaches a pinnacle with
the Prophet Muḥammad, the last
messenger of God and Seal of the Prophets. This perfection is comprised of
three
elements, for according to a Sufi axiom attributed to Muḥammad: "The
Law is my words, the Way is my works
and the Reality is my states."1 In
other words, the Law is knowledge, the Way is putting the knowledge into
practice and the Reality is the inward states and stations that the wayfarer
may enjoy on the Sufi
path.2 This is the simplest
guide for the wayfarer:
At first, the wayfarer must study and learn whatever is necessary from
the Holy Law, Then he must perform and
comply with whatever is
necessary from the Way until the reality becomes manifest from the
lights in accordance
with the wayfarer's effort.3
Although Muḥammad is the example of perfection for Sufis, from one

perspective the sealing of Prophecy means that
there can be no other
legislating messenger and this (according to Ibn 'Arabī) is "a terrible blow"
for the Sufis or Friends because it implies the impossibility of experiencing
total and perfect
servitude.4 In other words, the
Sufis cannot attain
Muḥammad's level of spiritual perfection, yet as it will be shown in this
chapter, from
another perspective, the relationship between Prophecy
(nubuwwat) and Friendship of God (walāyat)
is interpreted in such a manner
that it is possible for the Friends to reach the Prophet's spiritual level.
Nasafī was one Sun who highlighted the importance of the relationship
between Prophecy and
Friendship:
Once in the district of Nasaf, in fact in the [whole] area of
Transoxania, the topic of
whether or not the attribute of Friendship is
stronger than the attribute of Prophecy was widespread. Some people
thought that this debate over the Friends and the Prophets was the only
topic of discussion. When I came under
the service of Shaykh of
Shaykh's, Sa'd al-Dīn Ḥammūya, we also discussed this subject. Now
after his
death, his followers are also discussing the Prophets and
Friends.5
Nasafī sets out a spiritual hierarchy (which is accepted by the 'Ulamā and
Philosophers) and which
clearly distinguishes the station of Prophecy from
that of Friendship of God. For example, the station of the
Seal of the
Prophets is four stations higher than that of the Friend. This hierarchy is set
out below:6
Spirit Reason for Ascent Station
9. Seal of the Receives final set of Holy Laws and annuls
The Throne
Prophet previous Laws.
8. Men of Receives a new Holy Law and the previous
The Stool
Resolution Holy Law is annulled.
7. Seventh Heaven
God gives the Messenger a Holy Book.
Messengers (Saturn)
God gives revelation to be sent to the Sixth Heaven
6. Prophets
people, and miracles. (Jupiter)
As a result of gnosis, God gives love and Fifth Heaven
5. Friends
inspiration. (Mars)
Fourth Heaven
4. Gnostics Knows and sees things as they are.
(Sun)
Turns away from this world and renounces Third Heaven
3. Ascetics
the pleasures of this world. (Venus)
2. Worships very much on the basis of Second Heaven
Worshippers confirming the Prophets (Mercury)
First Heaven
1. Believers Confirms the Prophets
(The Moon)
With Muḥammad, the cycle of Prophecy came to a close and on the basis of
the above chart, this means that
individuals can progress no higher than the
fifth spiritual station (the Messengers and Men of Resolution are the
higher
ranks of the Prophets). This "orthodox" representation of the Islamic
spiritual hierarchy in
which the Friends occupy a lower position than the
Prophets is clearly established by the author of Kashf
al-ṣirāt. In this work,
humans are classified into four categories, reflecting the Koranic verse 4: 71,
"And whosoever obeys God and the Messenger shall be with those whom
God has blessed; the Prophets, the
truthful, the martyrs and the righteous."
The righteous are those people in the station of submission
(islām), the
martyrs (also called the gnostics) are those in the station of faith
(īman), the
truthful (also named the Friends) are those in the station of excellence
(iḥsān) and
the Prophets are in the highest station of witnessing ('iyān).7 Yet
Sufis such as Tirmidhī and Ibn 'Arabī hint of a secret that
spiritual progress
is possible for the Friend to the extent that one can reach the same level as
the Prophets.
The forcible disclosure of such a secret, according to Ibn
'Arabī, would shake God's Throne.8
On discussing the spiritual hierarchy outlined above, Nasafī suggests that
the relationship is not as simple as
it appears at first sight. To begin with, he
gives the views of the 'Ulamā' who endorse these nine
levels and claim that
the spirits are created before bodies thus having a fixed station and therefore
the spirit
of each person cannot progress beyond that fixed station. The
Philosophers also agree that there are nine levels,
but hold that the spirits are
created with the bodies and therefore the spirits can ascend depending upon
the
degree of wisdom and purity attained during life on earth. Nasafī does
not say whether the people of Unity accept this nine-fold division, however,
he remarks that there is no limit to the progress of
the human spirit because
. . .if man could live for a thousand years, and during this time he was busy in education, review,
ascetic
discipline, religious effort and dhikr, each day he would understand and discover something
which he had
not known or discovered the previous day through wisdom, for God's wisdom and
knowledge has no limit. . .
According to the People or Unity, perfection in a human does not exist because whatever
perfection a human attains, he is still relatively incomplete in relation to his preparedness and in
relation
to God's knowledge and wisdom. Therefore a man who is said to be perfect is relatively
perfect. According
to the People of the Holy Law and the Philosophers, perfection exists.9
These remarks of the People of Unity that man's spirit has no limit and
therefore can ascend to the pinnacle
of the spiritual hierarchy, is endorsed in
another section of al-Insān al-kāmil:
A group among the Sufis also say that the Seals ascend as far as the
Throne, that is, the Seal of the Prophets
and the Seal of the Friends. This
group sees Friendship of God as the superior level, but how can the level
of
Friendship be higher than the level of Prophecy? We have explained
this discussion in Kashf
al-ḥaqā'iq. Anyone who wishes can refer to it
there. This group says that Friendship is the heart of
Prophecy, and Deity
is the heart of Friendship. Prophecy is the Moon when it splits and
Friendship is the Sun
when it becomes manifest.10
The possibility for man to reach the spiritual perfection of the Prophet had
been alluded
to (or discussed prior to) Nasafī by mystics such as Sahl Tustarī
(d. 896), Ḥallāj, Tirmidhī, Rūzbihān Baqlī, Abū
Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī and Ibn
'Arabī.11 To demonstrate both why Friendship is the heart of Prophecy and
also why a
Friend can reach the spiritual station of a Prophet, it is necessary
to analyse the nature of perfection and the
Perfect Man.
Qualities of the Perfect Man
In his works, Nasafī describes three qualities which each Perfect Man
possesses. Through an investigation of
these qualities and then seeing if
these qualities apply to the Friend and the Prophet, it is possible to show
the
differences between the two. In this way, the meaning of "Friendship is the
heart of Prophecy" can
be explained.
The first quality of the Perfect Man is that he is always existent, both in
cosmological terms and also in
"reality" within this world. This idea reflects
the distinction between the Muḥammadan Reality and the
Perfect Man. The
Muḥammadan Reality is a term for the first thing that God created, which is
both perfect and
eternal and is empowered by God to create. A frequently
cited ḥadīth states: "The first thing created
by God was my [i.e. Muḥammad]
spirit then He created all the creatures from my spirit."12 This ḥadīth became
part of the
Sufi tradition, for Sahl Tustarī related how Khiḍr told him that,
"God created the light of Muḥammad out of
his own light and He gave it
form and kept it for a hundred years and each day –which is a thousand
years in this
world – He looked at this light seven thousand times. And seven
thousand lights were created from each glance at
this light. So all the
existents were created from this light."13
The Muḥammadan Reality is then a cosmological reality which is
manifested within the world as the Perfect Man.
This explains the ḥadīth: "I
was a prophet while Adam was
between the water and clay,"14 and Nasafī
also refers to this ḥadīth:
The origin of human spirits is from the Spirit and the origin of bodies
is from Adam's body. Thus, there is
no father of spirits except for
Muḥammad and there is no father of bodies except for Adam.15
Such an interpretation closely resembles that of the Arab poet Ibn Farīd (d.
1233) who had the Prophet say,
"There is no living thing that does not derive
its life from me, and all desiring souls are subject to
my will. Even though I
am son of Adam in form, in him I have an essence of my own which
testifies
that I am his father."16
Although Muḥammad's spirit was the first of things to be created, he is the
last of a chain of Prophets, and
he manifested God's light completely and so
he was the epitome of the Perfect Man. Yet it would be wrong to
view the
Perfect Man and the Muḥammadan Reality as interchangeable as
Chodkiewicz has indicated, "the terms
ḥaqīqa Muḥammadiyya and insān
kāmil (perfect man) are not purely synonymous, but express differing
views
of man, the first seeing him in terms of his primordiality and the second in
terms of
finality."17 It is
possible to see the Muḥammadan Reality and the
Perfect Man as a circle, that is, of descent and ascent, which was
a familiar
motif in all of Nasafī's works.
. . .the Perfect Man, who in both his descent and ascent, will have
passed three heavens and three
earths18 and then is firmly
established
upon the Throne, that is, he will have come from and returned to the First
Intelligence. Thus the
circle is completed, the First Intelligence is firmly
established upon the Throne and the Perfect Man is also
firmly
established upon the Throne.19
As mentioned above, the Perfect Man is a manifestation of the

Muḥammadan Reality, and therefore this quality is
not unique to the
historical Muḥammad alone. According to Nasafī, Solomon, Khiḍr (see
below)
and Jesus are all considered Perfect Men.20 Indeed, Nasafī remarks
that the Perfect Man has been known by different names
such as Shaykh,
Leader, Guide, Mahdī, the Wise Man, the Mature, the Perfect, the Perfector,
the World
Reflecting Chalice, the Cosmos Reflecting Mirror, the Mighty
Opium and the Great Elixir.21 Yet even with the sealing of Prophethood, the
Muḥammadan Reality, with its manifestation in the Perfect Man still
continues as an actuality in this world.
The second quality of the Perfect Man is that he is the centre of the
universe. The Perfect Man is considered the
fruit of the tree of creation, and
the purpose of God's bestowing existence upon the
things is so that Perfect
Man will be manifested. The Perfect Man being the centre of the universe
can be
described with reference to the ancient idea of man being a
microcosm of the universe which is called the
macrocosm. The early Islamic
Philosophers such as al-Kindī and al-Farābī had read such descriptions of the
microcosm in Greek philosophy, but it was a group of tenth century Arab
thinkers named the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā'
(the Brethren of Purity) that developed
this concept, in particular, the comparison between man's body with
the
universe. The similarities between man's soul and the universe were
subsequently
described by Sufis such as Ghazālī, Ibn 'Arabī and Nasafī. The
idea of man as the microcosm being superior to the macrocosm has already
been discussed in detail in
section three of the first chapter, so it is not
necessary to repeat it here.22
In brief however, Nasafī describes the relation of the microcosm with the
macrocosm which integrates both
man's spirit and body. The intelligent man
becomes God's caliph in the macrocosm because everything that
exists in the
macrocosm is created to serve him. In addition, everything in the macrocosm
also exists within the
microcosm and so it is the task of man to become
master of these, making his attributes obedient and subservient
to himself.
Nasafī describes this in another way, that is, when the Perfect Man separates
light from darkness so that all of God's attributes are manifested in the
appropriate manner.
The alchemy that mankind performs is that he takes the soul of whatever he eats. He takes the
select and
quintessence of those things, that is, light is separated from darkness in such a way that
light knows and sees
itself as it is. This is not possible except in the Perfect Man.
O dervish! The Perfect Man completes this alchemy and completely separates light from
darkness because light
does not know or see itself in any other place and it sees and knows itself in
the Perfect Man.23
The third quality of the Perfect Man as described by Nasafī is that only one
exists at any one time.
This Perfect Man is always in this world and there is only one Perfect
Man. This is because all creatures are
like one person and the Perfect
Man is the heart of that person and creatures cannot exist
without a heart.
There is not more than one heart, so there is not more than one Perfect
Man in this world. There
are many wise men in this world, but there is
only one heart. Other people are in the process of perfection, each one
has its own perfection. When the unique wise man passes away from this
world,
another person reaches his level and becomes his successor so
that this world is not without a heart.24
God requires only one Perfect Man in which to display the entirety of His
attributes.
If in all the world one person reaches perfection, this light can see its
own beauty and witness its own
attributes, names and actions. There is
no need for all humans to reach perfection. If all humans reached
perfection, then the attributes, names and actions of this light would not
be completely manifested, and the
order of this world would not exist. It
is necessary for each person to have a level and be the locus of
manifestation of an attribute. Each person has the preparedness for a task
in order that
the attributes, names and actions of this light become
completely manifested and so that the order of the world
exists.25
From these three qualities of the Perfect Man (that is, his eternal
existence, his existing as the heart of
existence and the existence of just one
Perfect Man), it is now possible to make a distinction between the
Prophet
and the Friend. This is especially the case regarding the eternal existence of
the Perfect Man. Prophecy
terminates with Muḥammad, however, the
existence of the Perfect Man in this world continues. There is no such
obstacle when the concept of the eternal existence of the Perfect Man is
applied to Friendship, for Friendship is
also eternal. The word "Friend"
(walī) is one of God's names mentioned in the Koran:
"Allah is the Friend of
those who believe,"26 and this name is shared by some of His creatures,
again this has a Koranic
basis: "Now surely the Friends of God – they shall
have no fear nor shall they grieve."27 Izutsu has made the relevant point that
if God's names are eternal, and if man shares a name with God, then it
follows that both the Friendship of
God and the Friendship of man are
eternal. Moreover, God does not call Himself "prophet" or
"messenger"
which means that the functions of the prophet and messenger are not eternal,
but
historically limited.28
The relationship between Friendship and Prophecy becomes clearer with
Nasafīs own definition of the two terms:
O dear friend! The meaning of "Prophet" in Arabic is "informer", and the meaning of
"Friend"
(walī) is "proximity". So in Arabic, the person who is an informer is a
Prophet and the person who
is in proximity is a Friend.
O dear friend! At first the wayfarer says that the Friend is the person that God Most High
chooses among his
servants for Friendship and makes him the near one (muqarrab) of His
Excellency. He designates him for
His inspiration so that he can be certain of God's existence and
oneness. This is the meaning of the
Perfect Man. A Prophet is the person that God Most High
selects from His Friends and designates for His
revelation, and He sends him to the creatures so
that they are made aware of God and he shows them the path
that leads to God. This is the
meaning of the Perfecting Man (insān-i mukammil).29 So a Prophet has two faces, one face
is
turned to God and the other face is turned to the creatures. He accepts from the Truth and passes
on to the
creatures. That is, he accepts with the face that is turned to God and he passes on God's
orders to the
creatures with the face that is turned to them. The name of the face which is turned to
God is Friendship and
the name of the face which is turned to the creatures is Prophecy.30
So the Prophet is also a Friend, and it is through his Friendship that he is a

Perfect
Man, hence Nasafī's statement that Friendship is the heart of
Prophecy. With respect to the Friendship of the
Prophet, it is true that the
Prophet can be the Perfect Man, satisfying all three conditions mentioned
above, but
with the termination of Prophecy, Friendship continues in the
Friends.
II. THE SUPERIORITY

OF FRIENDSHIP OVER
PROPHECY
(You are only a warner and the people has its guide)31
In then previous section it was shown that through an analysis of the Perfect
Man and the Muḥammadan Reality that
Nasafī believed the Friends could
reach the spiritual station of the Prophets. Moreover, he commented that
Friendship was the heart of Prophecy, so now it is necessary to describe the
manner in which the superiority of
Friendship over Prophecy is manifested.
Knowledge and Friendship
Friendship is a rank which has a closer standing to God and this is reflected
in the knowledge of the Friend
compared to that of the Prophet in his
capacity as Prophet:
O dervish! According to the people of Unity, the wise men (dānāyān)
are of three kinds:
Philosophers, Prophets and Friends. A Philosopher
knows the natures of things, a Prophet knows
the natures and qualities of
things, and the Friend knows the natures, qualities and realities of things.
No one
is equal to the Friend in knowledge ('ilm) and power (qudrat).
This is because God has two
self-disclosures (tajallī): a common self-
disclosure (tajallī-yi 'āmm) and a special
self-disclosure (tajallī-yi
khāṣṣ). The common self-disclosure is an expression for the individual
existents and the special self-disclosure is an expression for the Friends,
and this is the meaning of: "And
it is God, He is the Friend, He gives life
to the dead: It is He Who has power over all things,"32 and this is the
meaning of: "God
is omnipotent, He knows everything."33,34
The knowledge of the Philosopher is of the natures of things, in other words,

of things as manifested in the
cosmos, while that of the Prophets is the
knowledge of revelation which is specific to a historical setting.
Nasafī
offers another three-fold classification to explain the relationship between
the Philosopher, Prophet and
Friend. The man of knowledge ('ālam) is a
believer, the man of much knowledge ('alīm) is a
Prophet and the man of
most knowledge ('allām.) is a Friend. Nasafī then
discusses the differences
between Moses (the Prophet) and Khiḍr (the Friend). For Sufis, Khiḍr
was
the un-named individual that Moses met in verse 18: 65-82 of the Koran. In
this story, Khiḍr recognises that
Moses is unable to understand his
knowledge and therefore he says to Moses: "Surely you cannot have
patience
with me; and how can you have patience in that of which you have
not got a comprehensive
knowledge?"35 However,
Khidr allows Moses to
accompany him on the condition that he does not question him on anything
that occurs, and
that if Moses asks such questions, then the two would have
to separate from each other. Khiḍr and Moses set off,
and on their way,
Khiḍr makes a hole in the bottom of a boat, kills a young boy and finally
fixes a wall of a
city where some people had refused them hospitality. For
Moses, each of these acts is inexplicable and seems
contrary to the actions of
a person who follows the Holy Law, and therefore he questions Khiḍr each
time. Khiḍr
explains that he made the hole in the boat because the king
intended to appropriate it from its owners who were
poor men. He killed the
young boy because his parents were believers and they feared that the boy
would become
dishonest and ungrateful. Finally, he fixed the wall because it
belonged to two orphans and beneath the wall was
a buried treasure. Thus,
Khiḍr possessed a knowledge of the unseen whereas Moses understood the
manifest
dimension of things:
Moses was a Prophet and a man of much knowledge because he had the knowledge of a Holy
book. Khiḍr was a Friend
and a man of most knowledge and had witnessed the knowledge of the
book's word. A word in unseen, thus
Khiḍr was a man of most knowledge about the unseen
(ghuyūb).36
It is related that Moses met with Khiḍr and they spent some time together. One day when they
were in the
desert, they became hungry. [Suddenly] a gazelle appeared and stood between them.
The side of the gazelle which
faced Khiḍr was cooked and the side which faced Moses was raw.
Khiḍr began to eat but Moses could not eat.
Khiḍr said, "O Moses! Bring some fire wood and cook
the meat in a pan and eat it!" Moses asked Khiḍr,
"Why is your side cooked and my side raw?"
Khiḍr answered, "O Moses! I am in the next world and
you are in this world. The sustenance of
this world is acquired and the sustenance of the next world is ready
and cooked. This world is the
abode of toil and the next world is the abode of reward. Our provisions are ready
and available, but
your provisions depend upon striving and effort."
"Whenever Zacharias went into the chamber to her, he found provisions with her, and he said,
'O Mary!
Where is this food from?' She answered, 'This is from God, for God gives without stint
to whom He
will.'37"38
Moses's lower degree of knowledge (that is, Prophetic knowledge) is useful

in a
practical sense but it is not sufficient for those who have the capacity to
comprehend the realities behind the
qualities of things:
O dear friend! The Prophet is a warner and the Friend is a guide. This is because the Prophet
wants to ward off
corruption from the creatures and manifest wholesorneness among them, and
this is impossible without warning.
The Friend wants to remove association of others with God
(shirk) and manifest unity among the creatures
and this cannot be guaranteed without guidance.
Philosophers have made commands and prohibitions, and promises and threats, based upon the
natures of things. The Prophets have made commands and prohibitions, and promises and threats,
based upon the
qualities of things . . . But the Prophets could not say to everyone what the quality
is in speaking the truth
or lying, in eating lawful food or forbidden food, in honesty or treachery,
because not everyone can
understand. Moreover, [if the Prophets had done so] then [their] warning
would have become long and drawn out,
so they gave their warnings in a brief manner. They said
that Hell is a place for the person
who lies or is treacherous, and there are many torments and
punishments there. Likewise, they said that Heaven is a place for whoever tells the truth and
remains honest and there is much comfort and
happiness there. . .
The Friends say that the removal of corruption from the people and the manifestation of
wholesomeness among
them is extremely good. But because [the Prophets] made their warnings
brief, the good souled pious person and
the chaste seeker are always placed in veils and do not
reach God, and this is not good.39
Even though the Friend has the most knowledge that humans can hope to
acquire, they should realise that their
knowledge is limited in relation to that
of God. The knowledge of the Friend is that of the immutable entities
(or to
use Nasafī's phrase, "the immutable realities"40). Since these are infinite, it is
impossible for man to know them as they
are, thus any idea of perfection in
knowledge is only relative:
O dear friend! The knowledge of the Philosopher is of the natures of things, and the knowledge
of the Prophet
is of the qualities of things and the knowledge of the Friend is of the realities of
things. Whoever truly
understands these three kinds of knowledge is a Philosopher, Prophet and
Friend. So perhaps a Philosopher is
perfect in wisdom (ḥikmat) and has understood God [through
wisdom], and perhaps a Prophet is perfect in
Prophecy and has understood God [through
Prophecy], but it is impossible for a Friend to be perfect in
Friendship and have understood God
[perfectly through Friendship].41
The knowledge which is particular for the Prophet is one thing and the knowledge which is
particular for the
Friend is another. Although knowledge is [only] one attribute of God, and power
is
[only] one attribute of God, knowledge and power have many levels and types in relation to the
object of
knowledge and the object of power. It is impossible for one person to obtain all the
various kinds of power
because man's life is short and there are many kinds of knowledge. It is
extremely difficult for one person
to reach perfection in one kind of knowledge, and in this world
there are few people who are perfect in [even]
one kind of knowledge. For example, it is difficult
for a person to reach perfection in knowledge and know
through verification in such a way that
nothing remains concealed for him, even if he lived for a hundred
years. [It is difficult] to reach
perfection and know through verification the knowledge of astrology and the
insight of the
microcosm and the macrocosm and all the different kinds of knowledge. In this world, there are
Philosophers, Prophets and Friends who each have a particular knowledge, so it is not necessary
for a person to
know all the different kinds of knowledge.42
As discussed in chapters three and four, the goal of Sufism is felicity, which
is having
knowledge of God. This knowledge is intimately related to man's
practical effort and is expressed by Nasafī
in terms of freedom:
Know that freedom has three ranks:
The first kind is dying from the veils of both fortune and fame and also
darkness and appetites,
and forgetting the veils of darkness and becoming free from the bonds of darkness'
veils.
The second kind is dying from the veils of light which are intelligence, virtue and
obedience,
and becoming free from their bonds. Prophecy is dying through seeing and becoming free from the
bonds of self-conceit, and this is the freedom of the Prophets. Our Messenger, the Master of
Prophets said,
"Poverty is my pride."43
The third kind is dying from oneself and becoming free from the bonds of oneself and this is the
freedom of the
Friends. The greater Friend and Master of the Wise said, "Die before you
die."44
O dervish! At this point the wayfarer is freed from Hell and arrives at Heaven, and that dear one
stated:
If you want to live, die before death, o friend!
Because Idris [Enoch] become a dweller of heaven from such a death.45
III. THE SUPERIORITY

OF PROPHECY OVER
FRIENDHIP
It has been shown that the Prophet is also a Friend, but his Friendship is
superior to his Prophecy.46 Yet in another respect, Prophecy is
superior to
Friendship, which is indicated by the author of Tabṣirat al-mubtadī
(Clarification for
Beginners) which was composed in the same century as
Nasafī's works:
. . .the furthest limit of the stage of Friendship is the beginning of the
stage of
Prophecy. Hence all the sciences of unveiling bestowed upon the
Friend are known by the Prophet but not vice
versa.47
The important point here is that the Prophet has all the sciences of unveiling
bestowed upon him which the Friend
has. For Nasafī, however, the Prophet
is a Prophet because he informs the creatures about the exoteric dimension
of the knowledge that God gives. The Friend remains a Friend because he
does not perform this function, but keeps
the esoteric knowledge to himself
until the time comes when he can divulge it to others. Since it is the
Prophet's duty to deliver the exoteric form of knowledge to all people, it is
possible to see Prophecy as
superior to Friendship. God places this
obligation on the Prophets and even the Friend must respect these
commands
and prohibitions of God. This superiority is revealed in the Koranic story of
Moses
and Khiḍr, especially in Khiḍr's response to a command of Moses.
According to this story, after killing the
young boy, Khiḍr reprimand Moses,
saying, "Did I not say that you will not be able to have patience with
me,"
Moses replied, "If I ask anything of you after this, keep me not in your
company." However,
Moses could not restrain himself and asked Khiḍr
about his subsequent actions. Hearing these new questions, Khiḍr
realised
that he had to depart from Moses since the Prophet had previously
commanded this.48 Thus Khiḍr pays respect to Moses, that
is, he is a
follower of Moses because of Moses's Prophetic capacity.49
This story presents some problems because if the Prophet possesses both
Prophecy and Friendship, then why was
Moses, in his capacity as Friend,
unable to understand the esoteric actions of Khiḍr? The answer to this
question
is that no one can be perfect in Friendship (as Nasafī states several
times), so no Friend or Prophet can know
everything. Another explanation
(although not explicitly discussed by Nasafī) is found in Ibn 'Arabī's
understanding of the "solitary ones" (afrād) who comprise the individuals of
various spiritual
ranking (from the quṭb to the awtād and abdāl). The
singular of afrād is fard
which is one of the divine names, meaning the
Unique. According to Chodkiewicz this "explains the fact that
their spiritual
level is unknown and why they experience misunderstanding and reproach,
for 'they have
received a knowledge from God which is known to them
alone.' This is illustrated by a reference to the story
of Moses and Khiḍr."50
For Nasafī, the significance of the relationship between Moses and Khiḍr
is that Friendship is recognised as the
higher rank from one perspective, and
Prophecy is superior from another. He expresses the
tension involved in this
relationship of each one being a follower of the other thus:
. . . knowledge about the realities of things is from the lamp of Friendship for the Prophet, and
knowledge
about the qualities of things is from the lamp of Prophecy for the Friend.51
O dear friend! The prophet is a warner and the Friend is a guide. The Possessor of the Holy Law
is an
Estabiisher and the Possessor of Realities is an Unveiler. Each Prophet is not a Possessor of a
Holy Law, but
each Possessor of a Holy Law is a Prophet. Each Friend is not a Possessor of
Realities, but each Possessor of
Realities is a Friend. An Unveiler is the follower of an Estabiisher
in what is established, and an Estabiisher
is the follower of an Unveiler in what is unveiled. The
story of Moses and Khidr demonstrated this.52
This relationship is fundamental to Nasafī's ideas of the perfection of man

after the cycle of Prophecy. A
Friend must be a follower of a Prophet in
order to preserve the Sharī'a from innovation, thus providing the
basis for a
stable Islamic community; a Prophet must be a follower of a Friend so that
individuals can claim some
of the attributes of Prophecy, which means the
possibility of achieving the same degree of spiritual unveiling as
Muḥammad
on his ascent to God. Ibn 'Arabī expressed this point by indicating that in
fact Friendship is a
form of Prophecy:
Know that Saintship (walāyat) is an all-inclusive and universal function that never comes to an
end,
dedicated as it is to the universal communication (of divine truth). As for the legislative
function of
prophecy and apostleship, it came to an end in Muḥammad. After him there will no
longer be any law-bringing
prophet or community to receive such, nor any apostle bringing divine
law.
God however is kind to His servants and has left for them universal Prophecy, which brings no
law with it. He
has also left to them the power of legislation through the exercise of individual
judgement (ijtihād)
concerning rules and regulations. In addition he has bequeathed to them the
heritage of legislation in the
tradition "The learned are the heirs of the Prophets." This inheritance
involves the use of
individual judgement in certain rulings, which is a form of legislation.53
Nasafī explained that Shaykh Sa'd al-Dīn Ḥammūya also believed that the
Friends could be considered as
Prophets:
Know that Shaykh Sa'd al-Dīn Ḥammūya said that prior to
Muḥammad, there were no Friends among the old
religions and the name
"Friend" did not exist. All of the esteemed ones were
called Prophets,
although in each religion there was one person who was a Possessor of a
Holy Law. There was no
more than one [Possessor of a Holy Law]; the
other [esteemed ones] who were called [Prophets] called the people
to
his religion. So there were many Prophets (payghambarān) in the
religion of Adam who
called the people to his religion, and this was the
situation in the religions of Noah, Abraham, Moses and Jesus. When
Muḥammad came he said, "After me there will
be people who will be
my followers and they will be the esteemed ones of His Holy Presence.
They will be called
"Friends" and these Friends will invite people to my
religion."54
Ibn 'Arabī also makes the important point (mentioned already) that
Friendship can only be considered higher
than Prophecy on the condition
that the two are discussed in the context of Friendship and Prophecy being
within
the same person:
When the Prophet speaks on matters that lie outside the scope of the
law, he is then speaking as a saint and a
gnostic, so that his station as a
knower (of truth) is more complete and perfect than that as an apostle
and law
giver. If you hear any of the Folk saying or transmitting sayings
from him to the effect that Saintship is higher
than Prophecy, he means
only what we have just said. Likewise, if he says that the saint is superior
to the
prophet and the apostle, he means only that is so within one
person. This is because in his Saintship he is more
perfect than he is as a
prophet or apostle. It does not mean that any saint coming after him is
higher than he,
since one who follows cannot attain to the one who is
followed, as regards that which follows him in. were he
indeed to affect
such a position, he would no longer be a follower; so understand. The
Apostleship and Prophecy
stem from Saintship and learning.55
The sealing of Prophecy means that God's message to the creatures has been
perfected. This does not imply
that God abandons His creation, since the
Perfect Man (who is always in the world) and the
Friends (who have the
spiritual stations of the Prophets as their inheritors) provide advise and
comfort for men
and women. Nasafī explains that the Friends are those
individuals who follow the Prophets in the Holy Law and who
know its
esoteric meaning since their faced are turned to God. For this reason, they
are considered the heirs of
the Prophets. In their Prophetic capacity, the
Prophets understand the special qualities of revelation and as
Friends they
comprehend the realities or esoteric dimensions of such revelations. Hence,
the sealing of Prophecy
and the end of legislative prophecy is not a "great
blow" because non-legislative Prophecy or
Friendship, deals with the secrets
of religion. In other words, legislative Prophets are
limited in explaining the
qualities of revelation whereas the Friends are not restricted in this way and
may
explain the hidden realties. This is what Nasafī appears to be saying in
the following:
Since you have understood that Friendship and Prophecy are the attributes of Muḥammad, know
that until now the
attribute of Muḥammad's Prophecy was manifested. He stipulated the
establishment and manifestation of the
form, and in fact, all the Messengers have stipulated the
establishment of the form. Prophecy was completed
when the form was established and perfected,
but now is the time for Friendship to become manifest and for the
spiritual realities to appear. The
aforementioned Owner of Time is the Friend and when he
appears the form is concealed,
Friendship becomes manifest and the spiritual realities appear.
Until now, there was discussion in the religious schools about the exoteric knowledge and
spiritual realities
were concealed since it was the time of Prophecy which stipulates the
establishment of the form. When the
establishment of the form was completed, Prophecy was also
completed. Now it is the time for Friendship to
become manifest. When Friendship appears, the
spiritual realties become manifest and the form is concealed.
Until now, there was discussion of
form in the religious schools and now there is discussion of spiritual
realities.56
Know that the Philosophers are free in expressing knowledge, if they want they train others
and
they do not train others if they do not want to. The Prophets are compelled in expressing Prophecy
for this
is the special quality of this station. Whoever is in this station prevents the people from
doing anything
which has bad qualities and he calls people to do those things which have good
qualities. This is impossible
without causing bother and vexation to the Prophets, but they endure
it all even though it brings them so much
trouble. The Friends are free in expressing Friendship. If
they want, they can tell people about the reality of
things so that God becomes manifest [for them],
and they do not tell these things if they do not want to, and
this is impossible without unity and
guidance.57
The relationship between Prophecy and Friendship is complex and this is

nowhere more apparent than in the
portrayal offered by Sa'd al-Dīn
Ḥammūya:
Know that the beginning of Prophecy is the end of Friendship because
the Prophet comes from the Truth to the
creatures and the Friend goes
from the creatures to the Truth. But in the same way that the end of
Friendship is
the beginning of Prophecy, the end of Prophecy is the
beginning of Friendship. [This is] because the end of the
Friend is from
form (ṣurat) with meaning (ma'nā) and the beginning of the Prophet is
from
meaning with form, so the beginning of that is the end of this, and
the end of this is the beginning of
that.58
IV. THE FRIENDS AS
HEIRS OF THE
PROPHETS
The continual existence of the Perfect Man in this world after the sealing of
Prophecy raises
important questions. Under the name of "Friend", he enjoys
the spiritual station of the Prophet and
understands the esoteric meaning of
God's revelations. This meant that the concept of the Friend, as
described by
Nasafī and other Sufis of his era, held very important social and political
implications. This
section will investigate the different interpretations of
these Friends and the next section will focus on the
political significance of
Nasafī's interpretation of Friendship.
The arguments concerning political-religious authority in Islam was
focused on the exegesis of a ḥadīth
which stated, "The learned are the heirs
of the Prophets."59 Nasafī, as one would expect, refers to the Perfect Man (or
Friend) as
the heir of the Prophets:
. . . after recognition of and encounter with God, the [Perfect Man]
does not see any task or understand any duty
as equal to or better than
consoling people. He does not hold any comfort greater than saying and
doing something
so that the people pass their time in this world in an
easy way after listening [to him] and taking his advice.
Thus they
become safe from the calamities and misfortunes of this world and they
will be
saved in the next world. Whoever [causes] such comfort is an
heir of the Prophets because the knowledge and deeds
of the Prophets are
the children of the Prophets. Their legacy passes to their children.60
For Sufis, the concept of inheriting from the Prophets dates back at least to
the ninth century when Sahl Tustarī
discussed the Muḥammadan Light, the
source of all creation.61 Tustarī described a pre-eternal column of light from
which everything in existence inherits, although the Prophets inherit in a
more comprehensive manner. With the
sealing of Prophecy, Tustarī claimed
that there existed a Friend who shared in the charisma of the Prophet, which
of course, is another way of saying that there is a Friend who is the heir of
the Prophet. Three centuries after
Tustarī, Ibn 'Arabī developed this idea by
focusing upon a tradition in which Muḥammad mentioned 124,000
Prophets
and 313 Messengers.62
For a full manifestation of the Prophetic legacy, the
Sufis believed that the number of Friends in this world at
any time had to
match the number of Prophets.63 Nasafī also refers to the number of Friends
in a similar way, although he has
some reservations about the exact number:
O dervish! The discourse about the Friends is well known and has
been written in many books. It is said that
there are 124,000, but it is
better if the number is not fixed because no one knows the true number.
It was said
to Muḥammad, "We have spoken to you about the affairs of
some."64 Since the affairs of some were not told to Muḥammad, then no
one
knows the true number. Of this total, some were "Prophets without a
book" (nabī) and some were
"Prophets with a book" (rasūl). Some were
"Men of Resolution" and one was "the
Seal." The Seal was
Muḥammad.65
Nasafī's discussion of the heirs of the Prophets can be divided into two
sections. The first represents an
interpretation of the Friends known as the
"substitutes" (abdāl) which was elaborated in more
detail by other Sufis
including Ibn 'Arabī and Rūzbihān Baqlī (1128-1209). Since Nasafī's
description of
the abdāl is somewhat limited, reference will be made to the
beliefs of these mystics in order to clarify
its significance. The second
discussion of the Friends as heirs of the Prophets centres around Nasafī's
position towards Shī'-ism. Several contemporary scholars have suggested
that Nasafī was sympathetic towards
twelver Shī'-ism and so it is necessary
to address this issue once again.
(i) The Heirs of the Prophets: The

Abdāl
Although the real number of Abdāl cannot be determined, Nasafī describes a

hierarchy of three hundred and
fifty six individuals:
Know that there are three hundred and fifty six Friends in this world
and there are always three hundred and
fifty six present in this world.
When one passes away, someone else takes his place. Therefore, there is
never
less than three hundred and fifty six and they are always in God's
court and attending Him. Their
tranquillity is through the dhikr of God,
their knowledge is through witnessing Him and
their tasting is through
contemplating Him. There are six levels among these three hundred and
fifty six: three
hundred, forty, seven, five, three and one person.66
Nasafī's explanation of the number of Friends was orthodox in the Sufi

world, for virtually the same system
was described by Hujwīrī (d. 1071) in
his Kasbf al-maḥjūb.67 Hujwīrī sets out a hierarchy of three hundred
individuals named
akhyār, forty abdāl, seven abrār, four awtād, three
nukabā and one pole (quṭb).68 The function of some of these Friends was
explained by subsequent Sufis. The
seven continually move about and
spread the Muslim faith in this world, and the four live at the cardinal points
of the compass with reference to Mecca and every night they traverse the
universe in thought and inform the Pole
of any defects in order that he can
remedy them.69 Another distinction between the ranks of the Friends given
by Nasafī (and by
other Sufis including Rūzbihān and Ibn 'Arabī) is that they
are the heirs of particular Prophets or angels
who emphasise certain
character traits:
the three hundred are upon the heart (bar dil) of Adam, the forty are
upon the heart of
Moses, the seven are upon the heart of Jesus, the five
are upon the heart
of Gabriel, the three are upon the heart of Michael and
the one is upon the
heart of Isrāfīl.70
Yet it appears that Nasafī's spiritual hierarchy does not reach the pinnacle
with the abdāl who follow
the heart of Isrāfīl because he also describes a
Friend who is the Seal of the Friends. Nasafī does not mention a
Friend
being the heir of Muḥammad, but there can be little doubt that he knew of
this concept since it was a
central theme in the works of Ibn 'Arabī and Sa'd
al-Dīn Ḥammūya. The inheritance which the Seal of the
Friends receives
from the Seal of the Prophets is the same degree of spiritual insight.
Do not suppose that the Seal of the Friends is additional (zā'īd) to the Seal of the Prophets
because they are the loci of manifestation of one reality. But there are two forms
(shikl) in creation.
One is at the beginning of time and the other is at the end of time.
Muḥammad and Aḥmad are two names and they are manifested in one named object
(musammā). At the beginning
of time it is manifested through the Muḥammadan name, and he
invites and calls people from this world to the
next world, and at the end of time he is manifested
in the Aḥmadan name and he invites the people from the next
world to the Lord (mawlan) and to
the origin of places of creatures and the secret of the Holy Law.
The Seal of the Prophets and the Seal of the Friends are of one art (ṣan'a) and their source
(manshā') is one.71
In Ibn 'Arabī's words:

As for the Seal of the Saints, he is the Saint, the Heir, the one whose
(knowledge) derives from the source, the
one who beholds all levels (of
being). This sainthood is among the excellencies of the Seal of the
Apostles,
Muḥammad, first of the Community (of apostles) and Lord of
Men as being he who opened the gate to
intercession.72
The idea that the Seal of the Friends is the heir of Muḥammad is implicit in
Nasafī's works because he states
that the Seal of the Friends is able to reach
the same spiritual station as the Seal of the Prophets:
It is said that each person's spirit can ascend to its original station. In
addition, it is said that the
spirit of the Seal of the Prophets can ascend to
the Throne. A group among the Sufis say that the Seals can
ascend to the
Throne, that is, the Seal of the Prophets and the Seal of the Friends.73
Yet Nasafī makes a distinction between the ascent of the Seal of the Prophets
and that of the Seal of the
Friends:
Know that there is another death before natural death for the Prophets
and the Friends, that is, they die a
voluntary death before natural death,
and they can see before natural death what others see after it. They are
able to observe the states that exist after death and they can see from the
stage of knowledge of certainty to
the stage of the eye of certainty. This
is because man's body is veil and when the spirit leaves the body,
there is
no other veil for it. The ascent of the Prophets is of two kinds; either the
spirit without the body or
the spirit with the body. The ascent of the
Friends is of one kind, that is, the spirit without the
body.74
The question to be asked is what relevance is there for the individual in this
doctrine relating to the Friends.
The answer is found in how Ḥammūya (in
Nasafī's words) defines the
Friend/abdāl and how a person is able to join
their ranks:
. . . the three hundred and fifty six people are not called "Friends" but
"substitutes"
(abdāl).75
The term substitute is used because in Nasafī's system, when one of the
"Friends" dies, another
takes his place. Nasafī explains the situation when
the Pole, who occupies the pinnacle of the hierarchy, passes
away:
O dervish! When the Pole departs from this world, one of the three
may succeed him, and one of the five may
succeed to the position of the
group of three, and one of the seven may succeed to the position of the
group of
five, and one of the forty may succeed to the position of the
group of seven, and one of the three hundred may
succeed to the position
of the group of forty, and one of the individuals of the earth may succeed
to the
position of the group of three hundred so that there are always
three hundred and fifty six in this
world.76
Theoretically, it is possible for anyone to become a Friend. Of course there

are many factors which come into
play, such as the "four times" and man's
constitution (mizāj). However these factors cannot
be known by man and
therefore if he engages in ascetic discipline and religious effort and follows
the Sufi path,
he may just reach his perfection and be admitted into the ranks
of the Friends, perhaps even progressing within
the hierarchy towards the
Throne.
(ii) The Heirs of the Prophets: Nasafī and Shī‘-ism
In the middle of the twentieth century, Nasafī was associated by several

Western scholars as a Shī'-ite
mystic. This idea was advanced by H. Corbin
who called Nasafī a "master of Iranian Shī'ite
Sufism"77 and named
Ḥammūya a "fervent Shī'ite."78 Other scholars have noted the Shī'-ite
inclinations of the Kubrāwiyya order,
pointing to the reverence of
Kubrāwiyya Sufis (such as Najm al-Dīn Kubrā and 'Alā' al-Dawla
Simnānī)79 to 'Alī b Abī
Ṭālib and the Shī'-ite Imams.80 Yet despite these
claims of Nasafī's Shī'-ism, one is struck by the
scarcity of explicit
references to this form of Islam within his treatises, and therefore it is
necessary to
re-investigate the nature of Nasafī's "Shī'ite Sufism". Such a
discussion is necessary within
the context of the heirs of the Prophets
because the Shī'-ites held that their Imams were the heirs of the
Prophets.
(a) As one would come to expect by now, Nasafī does not relate his own
opinions with regard to Shī'-ism. He
is content to present the beliefs of Sa'd
al-Dīn Ḥammūya and the following passage
has been taken to refer to his
belief in twelver Shī'-ism:
God Most High chose twelve people from Muḥammad's community
and made them those who are near to Himself
(muqarrab-i khūd) and He
designated them for Friendship. He made them Muḥammad's deputies
(nayibān): "The wise are the heirs of the Prophets."81 Concerning the
truth of these twelve it is said: "The wise in my community are like the
Prophets of the children of Israel."82 According to the shaykh [Sa'd
al-
Dīn Ḥammūya], the Friends in Muḥammad's community are not more
than these twelve. The last Friend, who is
the twelfth, is the Seal of the
Friends and his name is Mahdī and the Owner of
Time.83
The foregoing, by itself, is not enough to prove Nasafī's Shī'-ite sympathies.

More detailed passages
which explain the nature of these twelve members of
Muḥammad's community are required if Nasafī is to be
associated with Shī'-
ism. However there are no such passages in any of Nasafī's known treatises.
(b) Nasafī discusses Shī'-ism within the second chapter of Kashf al-
ḥāqa'iq, entitled "The
Gnosis of Man."84 In this
section, he lists the various
Shī'-ite schools of thought, such as the Twelvers, Kaysanis and Ismā'īlīs.
This portrayal of Shī'-ism may reflect the importance (or lack of importance)
that Nasafī held for the
Sunnī/Shī'ite question. In his works the beliefs of the
'Ulamā' are explained first, followed
by those of the Philosophers and finally
the discourses of the People of Unity are presented.
Thus, it seems that the
sections which Nasafī considered as the most relevant are saved till last.
Now, the
aforementioned discussion pertaining to Shī'-ism in Kashf al-
ḥaqā'iq is presented within the
explanation of 'Ulamā' belief which comes
before those of the Philosophers and People of Unity.
Thus, it may have been Nasafī's opinion that the Sunnī/Shī'-ite question
was insignificant when compared
with the fundamental message of Sufism.
This appears to be the message of the author of Kashf al-ṣirāṭ
(who may
have been Nasafī, as is explained in the appendix). In this work, the author
adopts a conciliatory
approach on the Sunnī/Shī-ite conflict by stating that
although some Sufis say that Friendship arose from Abū
Bakr and other
Sufis say it arose from 'Alī, it is better to say that both Abū Bakr and 'Alī
were in the
station of Friendship and argue no further.85
This is the conclusion that Nasafī draws from the ḥadīth: "My community
will split
into seventy-three factions after my death, but all of them will be in
the fire except for one."86 Nasafī's discussion focuses upon
why there is no
unity in the Islamic community and he cites Abū Manṣūr
Māturīdī (d. 944)87
and
Muḥammad Ghazālī as advocated of the Sunnī position and he offers
Abū Ja'far Ṭūsī88 as typical of the Shī-ite side. Having explained the
views
of both sides, Nasafī comments that their opinions are regarded as
hypocritical (takalluf) by the
Verifiers of the Truth (muḥaqqiqān) and Wise
Men (dānāyān) because they know that the community is
not split into
seventy-three sects, rather they see that in one small area there are one
hundred conflicting
beliefs.89 The significance of
this discussion is of course
that Nasafī is repudiating both Sunnī and Shī'-ite sides, a stance which
accords
with the general spirit of his non-partisan, non-sectarian works,
representing perhaps, a belief that the
Sunnī/Shī'-ite squabble is irrelevant
and misses the essence of Sufism.
(c) The return of the Owner of Time (ṣaḥib al-zamān) who is also known
as the Mahdī, is a fundamental
article of faith for Shī'-ites. Nasafī also
discusses the return of the Owner of Time by referring to
Ḥammūya's views:
The locus of manifestation of Prophecy is the Seal of the Prophets and the locus of
manifestation of Friendship
is the Owner of Time . . .
Shaykh Sa'd al-Dīn Ḥammūya wrote many books regarding the reality of the Owner of Time
and he said that he
will appear in the time in which we are in now. But this helpless one [Nasafī]
believes that the time of his
appearance is unknown. O dervish! He will certainly appear since
Muḥammad spoke of his appearance and signs,
but it is not known when he will appear. As a
result of Sa'd al-Dīn Ḥammūya's discourses, many people
have become astonished and they swore
to themselves, "I am the Owner of Time and those signs concerning
his reality will be manifested
in me." But they were not manifested in them and they died in this regret
and many other people
come and die in this regret.90
The concept of the Mahdī and his return to this world just before the Day of
Judgement is a belief which is
affirmed by both Shī'-ites and Sunnīs.91
Therefore the above quotation is not sufficient to label Nasafī and Ḥammūya
Shī'-ite. Yet Ḥammūya's views are interesting in that they may represent a
reaction to the turbulent
thirteenth century in which there were several
Mongol invasions, the capture of Baghdad and the execution of the
Caliph,
and also the millenarian propaganda of the Ismā'īlīs. Given such
circumstances, it would hardly be
surprising if both Shī'-ites and Sunnīs
were expecting the return of the Mahdī to restore justice to the
devastated
Islamic community.
Although Nasafī himself claimed contrary to Ḥammūya that the present
time may not be the moment for the Owner of
Time to appear,92 it may be
the case that he held the return to be very near. The reason for this
assumption is due to the fact that in Nasafī's dream mentioned at the start of
Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq,
the Prophet told him not to reveal his treatises until seven
hundred years had elapsed since the hegira. At such
a time, the various
religious schools and beliefs would no longer exist, they would all be
replaced by a single
belief and then people would be able to study and
understand his treatise.
There are two possible explanations of the significance of seven hundred
years after the hegira. The first is the
idea that the Islamic community is
renewed or revived every hundred years. (This is based upon a ḥadīth
which
states: "At the beginning of every hundred years, someone belonging to that
time will renew its
religion."93) The
"orthodoxy" of this belief is reflected in
al-Ghazālī's reference to this ḥadīth in his
al-munqidh min al-ḍalal.94 The
second possible explanation is related to the return of the Mahdī which may
also be connected to the cycles that Nasafī describes in the discourses of the
Transmigrationists. The Transmigrationists believed in a series of three
cycles. After each period
of one thousand years there is a lesser resurrection
(qiyāmat-i ṣughrā) and after each
period of seven thousand years there is a
great resurrection (qiyāmat-i kubrā) and after each period of
forty-nine
thousand years there is the greatest resurrection (qiyāmat-i 'uẓmā). With the
lesser
resurrection, peoples' customs and habits change and the Holy Law of
the Prophets are annulled. During the
great resurrection, a Prophet finds it
easy to establish a new Holy Law whereas in other times it is impossible.
With the greatest resurrection, the world is ruined through floods and storms
and no life remains on earth until
the process of life through plants, animals
and humans commences once again.95 Did Nasafī hold these cycles as his
own personal belief and in
some way connect the year seven hundred after
the hegira with one of the resurrections, and did he somehow
associate the
Owner of Time with the resurrections? The answer is not clear, but I doubt
that they were
Nasafī' s own beliefs since these discourses appear in the
sections of the Transmigrationists.96
Even though he was told by the Prophet Muḥammad in his dream that the
circumstances of the Islamic community
would change after seven hundred
years after the hegira, it seems that Nasafī was somewhat sceptical:
In the opinion of this helpless one, the circumstances will always be
just as they are in this very hour. The
circumstances will not change one
iota, although the conflicts between people may cease in one or two
regions.97
One may also speculate of the Mahdī or hidden Imam that both Nasafī and
Ḥammūya had in
mind. Again there are two possible interpretations, the first
being a cosmic Mahdī for each individual and the
second is the conventional
Mahdī who returns to the world prior to the Resurrection. Regarding the first
of
these, it is interesting that Ḥammūya is reported to have said: "The hidden
Imam will not appear before the
time when people are able to understand,
even from the very thongs of his sandals, the secrets of
tawḥid."98 In other
words, the Mahdī or hidden Imam is internalised and appears at any time for
the individual who has knowledge of
him. Is this the identity of Nasafī's
Invisible Shaykh (shaykh al-gkayb)?99 According to 'Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'ī, ". .
.it is the hidden Imam who directs man's spiritual life and orients the inner
aspect of human action toward
God . . . The Imam watches over men
inwardly and is in communication with the soul and spirit of men even if he
be hidden from their physical eyes."100
Since the hidden Imam appears just before the resurrection, he may be
considered as a herald of what is to come.
Just like Ḥammūya's
internaiisation of the Imam, Nasafī describes a belief of the People of Unity,
which internalises four possible days of resurrection for each individual. The
first day of
resurrection is termed the "lesser resurrection" which is when the
individual is born and has a life of
form (ḥayat-i ṣūratī). The "intermediate
resurrection" occurs when the child is able to
distinguish right and wrong
and commences the life of meaning (ḥayat-i mā'nā). When the individual
has
belief and attains peace (sakīna), the "greater resurrection" takes place.
Finally the
"greatest resurrection" is when the individual reaches the world
of contemplation ('iyān)
and stability (tamkīn), which is the highest spiritual
station as described in chapter five.
The ideas concerning the Mahdī are not specific to Shī'-ism, for the roles
of the Sufi Invisible Shaykh and
the Mahdī seem very similar once the
wayfarer internalises the Mahdī as a spiritual guide. Thus once again,
Nasafī's reference to the Mahdī and his dream are not sufficient proof to
label him a Shī'-ite.
(d) Another factor which may link Nasafī with Shī'-ism is his belief
expressed in the very beginning of
Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq that he is in a state of
infallibility ('aṣmat) with
God. This word is related to ma'ṣūm, meaning
infallible, which is a state attributed to
Shī'ites to the twelve Imams. Nasafī
was told by Muḥammad in a dream that he (Nasafī) was infallible. Nasafī
then asked Muḥammad the meaning of infallibility and who is infallible:
The Prophet said, "Infallibility is security (amānat) from oneself.
Whoever
brings his own hand and tongue under control is safe from
himself and he becomes infallible since no nuisance or
remorse comes to
him from them." When you have understood the Prophet's answer and
comprehended the
meaning of infallibility, now know that infallibility,
protection (ḥifz) and continence
('āfiyat) share the same meaning.
However, the 'Ulamā' have used each one in a
particular place out of
courtesy (adab). If this security (amān) is with a Prophet, they say that
he is in [a state of] infallibility with God. If it is with a Friend, they say
that he is [in a state of]
protection with God. And if it is with a believer,
they say that he is in a [state of] continence with
God.101
Thus Nasafī gives a meaning to infallibility which "orthodox" Twelver Shī'-

ites would find
difficult to accept, since it encompasses believers as well as
the Imams. The self-attribution of infallibility
by individual Sufis was not
unique to Nasafī, for Rūzbihān Baqlī indicates that this was one of his
characteristics.102
Infallibility then is not the preserve of the Shī'-ite Imams,
but this point may be considered as yet another
indication of the similarity or
of the close relationship between Shī'-ism and Sufism during this period of
Islamic history.
The Shī'-ism of Nasafī or Ḥammūya has yet to be conclusively proven,
and recent scholarship has begun to
question Corbin's ideas.103
The reality of
Nasafī's and Ḥammūya's beliefs are far from clear and more detailed
research needs to be
undertaken to determine their positions regarding Shī'-
ism. One suspects that there are very strong
sympathies with Shī'-ism
beyond those of the usual reverence for the Prophet's family104 and also
beyond the general
convergence of Sufism with Shī'-ism during the
thirteenth century.105 It is most likely the case that those who wanted to
interpret
Nasafī's treatises in a Shī'-ite manner could certainly have done so.
M. Mole, in his introduction to
Nasafī's al-Insān al-kāmil states: "Avec sa
théosophie de structure ismaélienne et
d'affinités dudécimaines, Nasafi
apparait comme le représentant d'un ces mouvements shi'ites dont le
bouillonement est si caractéristique pour les deux siecles qui séparent
l'époque des Mongols de celle des
Safavides, et qui préparent le terrain pour
le shi-isme safavide."106
The convergence between Shī'ism and Sufism became stronger after
Nasafī's death and nowhere is this more
evident than in the treatises of
Ḥaydar Āmulī (d. after 1385) who was well aware of Nasafī's
works.107
Āmulī integrated Ibn
'Arabī's ideas with his understanding of Shī'-ism, for
example, he believed that 'Alī b. Abī
Ṭālib was the Seal of the Friends, not
Jesus.108
V. PERFECTION AND ITS POLITICAL

SIGNIFICANCE
In chapter four, it was argues that the Kubrāwiyya order favoured a more
"sober" version of Sufism. Nasafī also described a perfect wayfarer as one
who returned from his
encounter with God in a sober state. At this stage, the
wayfarer had to become "free" (āzād):
Know that it has been said that the Perfect Man is the person for
whom there are four things
to perfection: good words, good acts, good
character traits and gnosis. The Free Perfect Man is the person for
whom
there are eight things to perfection: good words, good acts, good
character traits, gnosis, renunciation, seclusion, contentment and
anonymity.109
Having defined the Free Perfect Man, Nasafī proceeds to classify them into
two groups:
Two groups appear when [the Free Perfect Men] have undertaken
renunciation and have become free and released.
After renunciation,
some choose seclusion, contentment and anonymity and others choose
satisfaction, submission
and gazing (niẓāra), but the aim of all of them is
freedom and release.110
Those who choose seclusion, contentment and anonymity know that disunity
(tafraqa) and confusion
(parākandagī) come with association with the
people of this world. So they are afraid and flee if by
chance, something
worldly or a worldly person appears before them. In contrast, those who
choose satisfaction,
surrender and gazing know that man cannot understand
in what his fate lies. So if something of this world or a
worldly person
appears before them they do not flee and they are not afraid because this
encounter may be
beneficial to themselves or to others.111 Nasafī himself
commented that he had spent time among both groups, but since he
perceived advantages and disadvantages in both, he could not decide which
one had chosen the best
path.112
However, in his other treatises, Nasafī seems to give preference to the
group which accepts association with
worldly people. His own definition of
the perfect person is the one who possesses good words, good acts,
character
traits and gnosis.113
Although Nasafī states that obtaining gnosis without
seclusion is impossible, he also comments that the
acquisition of good
character traits comes only with association and interaction with people.114
Thus perfection requires both
seclusion and association. Once gnosis and
good character traits have been acquired, the task of the Perfect Man
is to
help others:
The Perfect Man does not see any obedience better than correcting this
world and finding correctness among the people, removing their bad
habits and customs, placing good rules and
regulations among them,
calling people to God, informing them of His magnanimity, greatness
and unity, praising
the next world very much – informing the people of
its eternity (baqā'ī) and permanence
(thābat), and warning them about
this world – describing its changability and impermanence, speaking of
the advantages of mendicity (darwishī) and anonymity until these two
attributes become sweet to them. .
.115
The idea of there being no better obedience than correcting this world rather
than fleeing from it is reconfirmed
in other passages:
As far as possible, do not harm others since there is no disobedience
other than causing harm. As far as
possible, bring comfort to everything
and every person, since there is no obedience other than bringing
comfort.
Know for sure that whatever a person does, he does that thing
to himself. If he is the cause of harm, he harms
himself. If he brings
comfort, he comforts himself.116
However, this guidance for the benefit of worldly people is merely one of
advice giving. There is no compulsion
involved for the worldly people to
accept the recommendations of the Perfect Man since he does not have the
political power to enforce his wishes. In any case, making people conform to
God's commands and compelling
them to be obedient would remove the
necessity of God's judgement. Therefore, the Perfect Man advises people
and they heed his counsel if they are wise. Concerning the Perfect Man and
political power, Nasafī comments:
. . .this Perfect Man does not possess power (qudrat) despite his perfection and greatness, and he
lives
with unfulfilled desires (nāmurādī) yet he passes his time in comfort. He is perfect in terms
of
knowledge and character traits but he is incomplete in terms of power and desire.
O Dervish! There is a time when the Perfect Man is the possessor of power and he is a ruler
(ḥākim.) or
king (pādshāh). However, it is clear that human power is weak and when you look at
the reality,
man's inability is greater than his power, and his unfulfilled desires are more
[numerous] than his
fulfilled desires. The Prophets, Friends, kings and sultans have desired many
things to be and they were not,
and they desired many things not to be and they were. So it is clear
that all people, from the complete to the
incomplete, from the wise to the ignorant, from kings to
subjects are incapable and helpless and live their
lives with unfulfilled desires. When some of the
Perfect Ones saw that man does not have the power to fulfil
his desires and that power cannot be
obtained through his own effort or endeavour and that it is necessary to
live with unfulfilled
desires, they knew there was nothing better for man than
renunciation, and there was no obedience
equal to freedom and release, so they renounced everything and became
free and released.117
In addition, the Perfect Man does not actively seek political power nor the
approval of those
around him:
O Dervish! Do not suppose that the Free Person does not have a house
and lodging or garden and orchard, for he
may own them. He may be a
ruler or king, but he is not happy if kingship is given to him and he is not
sad if it
is taken away from him. The coming and going of kingship is the
same for him and the rejection and acceptance by
the people is [also] the
same for him. He does not say, "I want to be rejected," if they accept
him.
And he does not say, "I want to be accepted," if they reject him.118
There was no real consensus among Sufis regarding contact with secular
rulers, for several leading shaykhs are
known to have had connections with
the secular leaders of society. One famous example is Shaykh 'Ubayd Allāh
Aḥrār (1403-1490) of the Naqshbandiyya order who considered it necessary
to keep contact with the rulers and
influence them to protect Islamic Law
and the community.119 However, Sufis affiliated to the Kubrāwiyya order are
generally regarded as
distancing themselves from the worldly corruption that
comes with power and kingship.120
O dear friend! Do not eat or accept anything derived from the fortune
of the court of kings because their fortune
hardens the heart. And do not
eat or accept anything derived from the fortune of religious bequests
(waqf)
because the fortune of religious bequests blackens the heart.121
Nasafī followed a hard line with rulers and connections with political power:
O Dervish! The Wise Man, the Verifier of Truths and the Men of God
are beneath domes122 which are their keepers and guards and become
their
fortress and armour and are the cause of their cleanliness and purity
. . . O Dervish! Their manifest dimension
is like the manifest dimension
of the common people and their non-manifest dimension is like the non-
manifest
dimension of the élite. They do not give access to any leader or
chief and they do not make claims of leadership
or lordship. Each one is
engaged in an occupation which is necessary to him and their occupation
is their means
of livelihood. They flee from the fortune of kings and
tyrants.123
Nasafī's personal advice to his dervishes is that they need to be aware that
the love
of leadership is inherent in the soul of all men. Therefore the
remedy is to oppose the soul and renounce this
love from the heart and
become free:
O Dervish! The love of being a king, minister, master, director, leader, shaykh, preacher, judge
or teacher of
a religious school and others like these, are all the doorways to Hell. The ignorant
person
is he who tries every day to make these doorways wider and larger for himself. The wise
man is he who tries to
block these doorways or else make them more narrow for himself. Closing
off the doorways to Hell for oneself is
the renunciation of fame.
O Dervish! There is no world without these [kingship, etc], and it is necessary for these
positions to exist in
this world. But it is not necessary for you to occupy these positions. When the
wayfarer relinquishes these
cruel wildernesses and renounces leadership, he is released. The
wayfarer remains in a state of terror as long
as he has not relinquished these cruel wildernesses and
there is no security for him.124
Nasafī's non-political world view may be explained in several ways. Firstly,

if he was a Shī'-ite, or
else associated with Shī'-ites, he may have found it
expedient to conceal his ideas. Although little is known
of the particular
religious environment in which Nasafī lived, it is probable that the orthodox
Sunnī
'Ultimā' who were in the majority would not have favoured the
passages in Nasafī's works which
express a certain "Shī'-ite" leaning. In
addition, some Ismā'īlīs believe that Nasafī followed
their path125 and if this
is
the case then it is likely that Nasafī would have attempted to conceal his
ideas given that the Mongols came to the Middle East on the pretext of
wiping out the threat of the Assassins.
Nasafī's vision of Sufism, however,
contained no explicit threat to the rulers. Such a threat was to emerge
with
the combination of Sufism and Shī-ism as propounded by certain
descendants of Shaykh Ṣafī al-Dīn (1252-1334)
who eventually succeeded in
creating the Safavid state. Aside from the danger that Sufis faced from
secular
rulers, they also had to be careful in their relations with the 'Ulamā'.
Although Nasafī pays
respect to the 'Ulamā' and believed that the wayfarer
should attend the madrasa before entering the khānaqāh, his Sufi views
which were similar to those of Ibn
'Arabī could have resulted in problems for
him. As mentioned in chapter
one, the possession of Ibn 'Arabī's books in
Egypt in the fourteenth century was prohibited and any
person advocating
his ideas was threatened with execution.
Notes
1 A popular ḥadīth among Sufis, see Schimmel, Mystical
Dimensions of Islam, p. 99.
2 See Chittick, The Sufi Path of Love (Albanv: SUNY Press,
1983), p. 10.
4 R. Austin (translated), lbn al-'Arabī: The Bezels of
Wisdom, p. 168.
7 Kashf al-ṣirāṭ, Veliyuddin, no 1767, 218-219.
8 See M. Takeshita, lbn 'Arabī's Theory of the Perfect
Man and its Place in the History of Islamic
Thought (Tokyo: Institute for the Study if Languages and
Cultures of Asia and Africa, Tokyo
University of Foreign Studies, 1987), p. 159.
10 Ibid, p. 110.
11 M. Takeshita, op. cit.
12 Quoted by Nasafī, Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq, p. 103. See B.
Furūzānfar, op. cit., pp. 113-14.
13 Quoted by Nasafī, Maqṣad-i aqṣā, p. 276. See also
Chodkiewicz, Seal of the Saints, p. 65-66.
14 Quoted by Nasafī, Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq, p. 104.
15 Nasafī, Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq, p. 104.
16 Chodkiewicz, Seal of the Saints, p. 67.
17 Ibid, p. 71.
18 That is, Mulk, Malakūt and jabarūt.
20 Ibid, p. 5. See also Maqṣad-i aqṣā, p. 217.
22 See chapter II, III. For Nasafī's summarised treatment of
this discussion, see al-lnsān al-kāmil,
p. 142-43.
23 Ibid, p. 25.
24 Ibid, p. 5. It is interesting that lbn 'Arabī also
described the Perfect Man as being the heart of the
universe. "Through the Perfect Man appeared the
perfection of the image. He is the heart to the
body of the universe. The universe is the expression for
everything other than God. It [the
heart] is the Well-Visited House of God, since it contains him. He says in a
ḥadīth, 'Neither my
earth nor my heaven contains me, but the heart of my pious slave contains
me.'" See Takeshita,
p. 114.
26 Koran, 2: 257, cited by Nasafī in Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq,
p. 186.
27 Koran, 10: 62.
28 T. Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1983), p. 264.
29 The Persian of this word is ambiguous because it can read
either insān-i rnukammal (which
means the Perfected Man, i.e. perfected by God) or insān-i
mukammil (which means the
Perfecting Man, i.e. perfecting the creatures). From the
text, it seems that the Perfecting Man is
the correct reading. See also F. Meier's comments in "The
Problem of Nature in the Esoteric
Monism of Islam," p. 186.
30 Kitāb-i tanzīl, fol. 61b, line 6-15.
31 Koran, 8: 7, cited by Nasafī, Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq, p.
102.
32 Koran, 42: 9.
33 Koran, 28: 12.
35 Koran, 18: 67-68.
37 Koran, 3: 37.
38 al-lnsān al-kāmil, pp. 307-8.
39 Kitāb-i tanzīl, fol. 62b, line 3 - fol. 63a, line 2.
42 Ibid.
43 Ḥadīth, Furūzānfar, op. cit., no. 54.
44 Ḥadīth, Furūzānfar, op. cit., no. 352.
46 "Friendship is more powerful than Prophecy concerning the
reality of Prophecy." Kitāb-i tanzīl,
fol. 61b, line 15.
47 Tabṣirat al-mubtadī' translated by Chittick in
The Faith and Practice of Islam, p. 88.
48 Koran, 18: 75-6.
49 See also R. Austin, Ibn al-'Arabi: The Bezels of
Wisdom, p. 260.
50 Chodkiewicz, Seal of the Saints, p. 107.
53 Austin (translated), Ibn al-'Arabī: The Bezels of
Wisdom, p. 168.
55 Austin (translated), Ibn 'Arabī: The Bezels of
Wisdom, p. 168-69.
58 Sa'd al-Dīn Ḥammūya, al-Miṣbāḥ fī'l-taṣawwuf, p.
137.
59 Reliable ḥadīth, quoted by Najm al-Dīn Rāzī, translated
by H. Algar, op. cit., p. 445. Algar has
found this ḥadīth in the collections of Bukhāri, Muslim, Abū
Dā'ūd and Ibn Ḥanbal.
61 See G. Böwering, The Mystical Vision of Existence in
Classical Islam (Berlin/New York: Walter
De Gruyter, 1980), p. 65.
62 See Schimmel, And Muḥammad is His Messenger (Chapel
Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press, 1985), p. 56. See also Chodkiewicz, Seal of the Saints,
pp. 53-54.
63 Chodkiewicz, Seal of the Saints, pp. 54 & 84.
64 A reference to the Koran 40: 78, "And certainly We sent
apostles before you: there are some of
them that We have mentioned to you and there are others whom We have not
mentioned."
67 The only difference between
Nasafī's explanation and that of Hujwīrī is that in Nasafī's scheme
there is a group of five
individuals whereas in Hujwīrī's system there is a group of four rather
than five. See Hujwīrī (translated
Nicholson) Kashf Al-Mahjūb of Al Hujwiri, (Gibb Memorial
Series, no. 17. 1911; reprint London: 1959), p.
214.
68 Ibid. In addition, Nasafī's hierarchy resembles that of
Rūzbihān Baqlī. The Latter added four
more individuals, making three hundred and sixty, "God has three
hundred and sixty eyes each
day and night," Rūzbihān Baqlī, Sharḥ-i shaṭḥiyyāt, edited H. Corbin
(Tehran: Department
D'Iranologie de L'Institute Franco-Iranien, 1966), p. 367. These four other
individuals are
identified as Idris, Khiḍr, Elijah and Jesus who were
carried off alive from death. In fact, the
spiritual hierarchy offered by Rūzbihān was much more comprehensive
than Nasafī's. The
former mentions twelve thousand hidden Friends in Turkestan, India, Africa and Ethiopia,
four
thousand in Anatolia, Khurāsān and Iran, four hundred in Shatt Bahar, three hundred in North
Africa and
Egypt, seventy in Yemen, Ta'if, Mecca, the Hijaz, Basra and Batiyih, forty in Iraq
and Syria, ten in Mecca,
Madina and Jerusalem, seven who travel and fly around the world,
three individuals (one in Fārs, another in
Anatolia and another in Arabia) and finally the Pole.
Rūzbihān, op. cit., p. 10.
Ibn 'Arabī's hierarchy is by far more detailed and complex than Nasafī's and Rūzibihān's, for
he
lists eighty four different classes of spiritual men, thirty-five of these have a constant number
at any
given time (see Chodkiewicz, Seal of the Saints, p. 103).
69 Carra de Vaux, "Walī," op. cit., p. 1109-1111.
70 Manāzil al-sā'īrīn, p. 319. Rūzbihān states:
"There is a connection (paywasta) between God and
those of the earth. There are three hundred
people whose hearts resemble (mānad) Adam's
heart, forty people whose hearts
resemble Gabriel's, five people whose hearts resemble
Michael's,
three people whose heart resembles Isrāfīl's and one person whose heart resembles
Azā'īl's."
Rūzbihān, op. cit., p. 52-3.
In Ibn 'Arabī's system, the first of these follows in the footsteps of Abraham, the
second follows
Moses, the third follows Aaron, the fourth follows Idris,
the fifth follows Joseph, the sixth
follows Jesus and the seventh follows Adam. The pinnacle
of these thirty five is the Pole,
followed by two Imams and four awtād and seven abdāl. See
Chodkiewicz, Seal of the Saints,
p. 103.
71 Ḥammūya, al-Miṣbāḥ fī'l-taṣawwuf, p. 98.
72 Austin (translated) Ibn al-'Arabī: The Bezels of
Wisdom, p. 67.
74 Ibid, p. 107.
76 Ibid, p. 317.
77 H. Corbin, History of Islamic Philosophy, p. 69.
78 Ibid, p. 298.
79 See J. J. Elias, The Throne Carrier of God: The Life and
Thought of 'Alā ad-dawla as-Simnānī,
pp. 54-55 & 123. However, the fact that individual Sufis held
the Prophet's family in esteem
did not necessarily mean that they were advocates of Shī'ism.
80 H. Halm, Shiism, translated J.
Watson (Edinburgh University Press, 1991), p. 74. See also M.
Molé, "Les Kubrawiya Entre Sunnisme et
Shiisme Aux Huitieme Siecles de l'Hégira," Revue
des Études Islamique 52 (1961): 61-141.
81 Ḥadīth, Bukhārī, 'Ilm 10, Ibn Dā'ud,
'Ilm 1, Ibn Māja, Muqaddima 17.
82 This is variant of the previous ḥadīth.
83 Manāzil al-sā'īrīn, pp. 320-21.
84 Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq, for the discussion of Shī'-ism
see page 82.
85 Kashf al-ṣirāṭ, Veliyuddin no. 1767, fol. 236a.
86 Ḥadīth quoted by al-Ghazālī in Faith and Practice of
al-Ghazālī (al-munqidh min al-ḍalal), op.
cit., p. 18.
87 See D. B. MacDonald, "Māturīdī"
E.I.1, vol V.
88 See R. Strothmann, "Al-Ṭūsī" E.I.1, vol VIII.
91 A. A. Sachedina, Islamic Messianism (Albany: SUNY Press,
1981), p. 69.
92 Another example is found in Manāzil al-sā'īrīn, p.
321:
One day I said, "O Shaykh! Is it expedient to propagate about the reality of one who has not yet
come?
Perhaps it may not be so [i.e. the moment of his appearance]." The Shaykh was very
much vexed so I did not
pursue the matter and did not speak of it.
O Dervish! Whatever the Shaykh spoke about was a result of [his] gnosis, but many people were
harmed by these
discourses and many were perplexed. I mean that in my lifetime, I have seen
several people in Khurāsān, Kirmān
and Fārs who claimed to be the Owner of Time . . . But
[their claims] were not true and they
died in deep regret and many other people come and make
this claim and they also die in deep regret.
93 See A. J. Wensinck, Concordance et Indices de la Tradition
Musulmane (Leiden: E. J. Brill,
1992), 1:324; Abū Dā'ūd, Malāhim 1.
94 See al-Ghazālī in The Faith and Practice of al-Ghazālī,
op. cit., p. 81.
95 Manāzil al-sā'īrīn, p.415-16.
96 F. Meier seems to be saying that these were Nasafī's own
personal beliefs, "The Problem of
Nature in the Esoteric Monism of Islam," op. cit., p. 182.
98 Cited by H. Corbin, History of Islamic Philosophy, p.
71.
99 al-Insān al-kāmil, p. 241. Najm al-Dīn Kubrā also
mentions the Shaykh al-ghayb. For Kubrā,
the Shaykh al-ghayb is not the eschatological figure in the
exoteric Shī'-ite tradition who
appears before the Resurrection. Rather he is the
wayfarer's guide to the inner spiritual journey.
The reality of the Shaykh al-ghayb is in fact the
reality of the wayfarer himself:
"Know that there is a witness (shāhid) for the traveller and he is called the Invisible Shaykh. The
traveller is taken to heaven and he is made manifest there. The reason that he [the Shaykh al-
ghayb] is
his witness, [is because] he [the shaykh] is he [the traveller] because the traveller
moves and rests through the moving and resting of the Shaykh." Fawā'iḥ al-jamāl wa fawātiḥ
al-jalāl [69].
"The first spiritual opening is through the eye, then through the face, then through the breast, then
through the whole body, and this is called "the man of light" and what is in front of you is
named
the "leader of the people" and he is also called the Invisible Shaykh." Fawā'iḥ al-jamāl
wa fawātiḥ al-jalāl [66].
100 'Allāmah Sayyid Ṭabāṭabā'ī, translated S. H. Nasr,
Shi'ite Islam (Albany: SUNY Press, 1977). p.
214.
101 Kashf al-ḥaqāiq, p. 4-5.
102 C. Ernst, Rūzbihān Baqlī, p. 48.
103 J. J. Elias has mentioned a treatise entitled Risāla fī
zuhūr khatm al-walāya (Treatise on the
Appearance of the Seal of Friendship) in which the Seal is not the
Shī'-ite Mahdī (as one might
suppose from reading Nasafī's works) but Jesus, which is more in line with
Ibn 'Arabī's
discussion of the Seal of the Friends of God. Indeed, Elias has also suggested
'Alā' al-Dawla
Simnānī made a criticism of Nasafī's "misinterpretation" of Ḥammūya's
beliefs regarding the
nature of Friendship. See "The Sufi Lords of Babrabad," Iranian Studies, 27,
no. 1-4, 1994, p.
71-72.
104 For example, Ibn 'Arabī comments on an interpretation of a
ḥadīth in which the Prophet asked
God to "pray for Muḥammad and for the family of Muḥammad as You
prayed for Abraham
and the family of Abraham." See Y. Friedmann, Prophecy Continuous (University of
California Press, 1989), p. 72. See also V. Banner who states, "We have only to recall that the
early
Shī'-ite Imams of the first century or so of Islam were also authorities in Sunnism and in
Sufism precisely
because they were the most prestigious of the Prophet's descendants." In "The
Early Development
of Sufism," Islamic Spirituality: Foundations, edited S. H. Nasr, (London:
SCM Press, 1985), p.
246-7.
105 See H. Corbin, "De la Philosophie Prophetique en Islam
Shī'ite," Eranos Jahrbuch 1962
(Zurich, 1963), p. 75, and H. Halm, Shiism, pp. 72-74.
106 M. Molé, Kitāb al-Insān al-kāmil, p. 26.
107 Amulī refers to a "student" of Ḥammūya, see H.
Landolt, "'Azīz-e Nasafī Et La "Monisme
Ésotérique," op. cit., p. 167.
108 Sayyid Ḥaydar Āmulī, Inner Secrets of the Path,
translated Assadullah ad-Dhaakir Yate (Dorset:
Zahra Trust, 1989), p. 125.
110 Ibid, p. 9.
111 Ibid, p. 9.
112 Ibid, p. 10.
113 Ibid, p. 4.
116 Ibid, p. 182.
117 Ibid, p. 7-8.
118 Ibid, p. 139.
119 K. A. Nizami, "The Naqshbandiyya Order," in
Islamic Spirituality: Manifestations, edited S. H.
Nasr, p. 173.
120 D. DeWeese has suggested that the
early Kubrāwl shaykhs such as Najm al-Dīn Kubrā, Najm al-
Dīn Rāzī and 'Alā' al-Dawla Simnānī ultimately
rejected political connections and this policy
may account as one reason why this order declined in Central
Asia to be eclipsed by the
Naqshbandiyya. See "The Eclipse of the Kubrāviyah in Central Asia,"
Iranian Studies, Vol 21,
no. 1-2, 1988). Yet not all of the early Kubrāwl shaykhs were non-political.
DeWeese himself
cites the case of Sayf al-Dīn Bākharzī (d. 1261) who was involved in the waqf
administration
and was responsible for the education of the Mongol khān, Berke. In addition, it has been
suggested that Sa'd al-Dīn Ḥammūya was collaborating with the Il-khān state. See J. J. Elias,
"The
Sufi Lords of Bahrabad," op. cit., p. 73.
122 Reference to the ḥadīth, "My Friends are under My
domes and only I know them." Furūzānfar,
op. cit., no. 131.
125 F. Daftary, The Ismā'īlīs (Cambridge University
Press, 1990), p. 454.
Conclusion
The obvious question that arises after studying Nasafī's treatises is what
contribution did he make to the
existing Sufi beliefs in thirteenth century
Central Asia and Iran? Nasafī was not an original mystic in the same
way as
Ibn 'Arabī or Najm al-Dīn Kubrā, for Ibn 'Arabī's esoteric interpretation of
the Koran
probably cannot be matched by any other Sufi,1 and Najm al-Dīn
Kubrā's explanation of the ascent of the soul through
visionary experience
was quite unique during his lifetime.2 However, Nasafī's importance lies in
his ability to both incorporate all the
major elements of Sufi belief as
discussed by others and also to present them in a coherent fashion for
novices
of the Sufi path. Thus many familiar themes appear in a
summarised yet lucid fashion including God's
incomparability and
similarity, the ultimate station of bewilderment, the all-encompassing nature
of Sufism
(hama list), spiritual creating through himmat and the perfection
of man in the
form of walāyat. This simple and clear version of Sufism is
demonstrated in his systematisation and order
of Sufi ontology and
epistemology; proof of this is Nasafī's six spiritual stations and the four
stages of
mystical knowledge, from dhikr to fikr, and then to
ilhām and
finally to contemplation ('iyān) which is the station of stability (tamkīn).
It is highly probable that his treatises provided the foundation for many
Sufi novices to progress to more
profound works of other Sufi masters. That
Nasafī was establishing a basis and foundation and addressing
beginners on
the Sufi path may explain why he did not elaborate on more "advanced"
topics, such as Najm
al-Dīn Kubrā's shaykb al-ghayb and the wujudī
explanation of the nature of the soul in the
grave. Whatever the reason for
Nasafī's failure to discuss these topics in detail, he
should be considered as
a major figure in strengthening and developing Sufism in Central Asia and
Iran. Yet his
influence extended further than these two areas as the existence
of numerous manuscripts
of his treatises in Turkey, China, Egypt and India
demonstrate. Regarding the last of these, it has been shown
that the Indian
Sufi Muhammad Gīsūdirāz (d. 1422) cited and utilised Nasafī's Kitāb-i
tanzīl and also
called Nasafī a "wise man."3
The popularity of Nasafī's brand of Sufism may be a result of the
following points.
(i) Nasafī's "orthodox" Sufi treatises continued the trend of presenting

Sufism in the
terminology of the kalām and of the Philosophers as well
as utilising their logic to demonstrate the
"Islamicity" of Sufism. He
aimed to deliver the Sufi message to an audience who probably would
have
been familiar with the terminology of the Koran and kalām, and
may even have had some knowledge of the
language and ideas of the
Philosophers. Had Nasafī composed his treatises in the fashion of Sa'd
al-Dīn
Ḥammūya's highly enigmatic and esoteric works, such as
Miṣbaḥ fī'l taṣawwuf, it is unlikely that
the audience which Nasafī
desired would have understood very much.
(ii) One of the major concerns of speculative Sufism is the classification
of the levels of existence, which
for Nasafī meant Mulk, Malakūt and
Jabarūt. The Sufi would have found
Nasafī's classification and
interpretation of these levels both simple and comprehensive.
(iii) Nasafī attempted to be impartial in portraying the discourses of the
various Islamic beliefs, that is,
the beliefs of the 'Ulamā', Philosophers,
Transmigrationists and the Sufis (who
included the People of Unity).
This non-partisan perspective was assisted by his belief that
everything
is a self-disclosure of God, which meant that every belief was a
genuine expression of reality. Such a
nonbiased standpoint may have
appealed to an audience larger than that claimed by more dogmatic
Islamic thinkers.
(iv) Nasafī's version of Sufi belief was not extreme and adherence to it
probably would not have caused
excessive difficulty to novices. The
discussions on ascetic discipline and religious effort, renunciation and
other Sufi practices, constantly advised moderation. Moreover, his
Sufism was strictly personal, in other words,
between the novice, the
Shaykh and God. For example:
O Dervish! Make your manifest dimension resemble [that] of other

people. You should live in the same way that
others live since this is the
legacy of the Friends and the dome (qubba) of the Friend, and everyone is
beneath this dome.
O Dervish! If there is interaction (mu'āmala) for you with God, [then]
these
are the states (aḥwāl) of the heart and no one else is aware of
them. The progress and
ascent pertain to [one's] inside (andarūn), and
your advantage (imtiyāz) over others is at the
inside not at the outside
(bīrūn). The advantage of the hypocrites over others is at the outside,
not the
inside.4
Such advice from Nasafī contained several layers of meaning. Firstly it was
a warning against those who made
claims and used Sufism for their own
gain, for the true Sufi upheld values such as humility and selflessness.
Secondly, it provided a way for preserving the teachings of Sufism should
any danger arise from unsympathetic
political rulers. The threats of secular
rulers always hung over Sufism, as did the opposition from some members
of the 'Ulamā' who stressed the exoteric dimension of Islam. One is struck
by Nasafī's refusal
to discuss matters pertaining to the letter of the law,
however, the 'Ulamā' may have been
reconciled to Nasafī's Sufism because
of his belief that the dervishes must first attend the madrasa and then
progress to the khānaqāh. Related to this issue of not antagonising the
"established" powers in society is the problem surrounding Nasafī's Shī'-
ism. While some Sufis
(such as Ḥaydar Āmulī) may indeed have witnessed
such a nexus between Sufism and Shī'-ism, Nasafī's own
beliefs remain a
highly contentious issue. It appears that the problem of Shī'-ism was really
quite
peripheral to his Sufi message of perfection through ascetic discipline
and religious effort.
Nasafī's form of Sufism was able to thrive during one of the most
traumatic periods of Islamic history. His
greatest contribution to Sufism in
Central Asia and Iran was an interpretation of Sufism which was acceptable
to
most groups in society. It did not alienate the Mongol rulers or the
'Ulamā' and at the same time
his uncomplicated and summarised version of
themes explained by Ibn 'Arabī and Najm al-Dīn Kubrā found new
audiences, ensuring the survival and spread of Sufism.
Notes
1 See M. Chodkiewicz, An Ocean Without Shore: Ibn 'Arabī,
The Book, and the Law, translated
D. Streight, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1993).
2 Najm al-Dīn Kubrā, Fawā'ih al-jamāl wa fawāṭih
al-jalāl.
3 H. Landolt, "Azīz-e Nasafī Et La Monisme Ésoterique,"
p. 168.
Appendix
Nasafī's Known Works
(1) Kitāb-i tanzīl (Book of the Descent)
This work of twenty chapters was probably one of Nasafī's very first
because he mentions that the first six
chapters were composed in Nasaf.1
The subsequent four chapters were written in Bukhārā,2 and this must have
been before the devastation of
Abaqa's massacre in 1271. The remaining
chapters were set out in Bahrabād3 at the tomb of Sa'd al-Dīn
Hammūya.
The contents of Kitāb-i tanzīl are in fact representative of all of Nasafī's
subsequent works. The
first and by far longest chapter, entitled "the gnosis
of God," reflects his ontological
pre-occupation. This is continued in the
next chapters on the gnosis of the world, the angels and man. The fifth
chapter is one of the most interesting because it focuses upon the
differences between Prophets and Friends of
God. In most of his works,
Nasafī includes short passages that mention a distinction between the two,
but
chapters five through eight are more detailed and clear. The second half
of the work is much shorter than the
first half and concentrates mainly upon
issues that are relevant to the practical dimension of Sufism (such as
chapter fifteen, entitled "the gnosis of service, seclusion and love").
One last significant point about Kitāb-i tanzīl is that there are two Arabic
translations.4 This work was most likely composed in
Persian and then
translated at a later date into Arabic, and this indicates the extent to which
Muslims held
Nasafī's treatises in esteem.
(2) Kashf al-ḥaqā’iq (Unveiling of

Realities)
This major work which was probably completed in 1281, is longer than
Kitāb-i tanzīl, despite the fact that
the last three chapters and conclusion
that are mentioned in the introduction are missing. The seven chapters are
entitled "existence," "man," "the journey," "unity," "man's
return," "this
world and the next world, the night of destiny and the day of resurrection,
and life and
death," and "which are the seven heavens and earths, what the
transforming of the land and the folding
up of the skies are, which is the
land of resurrection, which is the land of 'Arafāt, and what
Ḥajj is an
expression for and how many kinds there are." Fortunately, Nasafī gives the
titles of the
three missing chapters and the conclusion to the book and it is
possible to find similar issues discussed in his
other works.5
(3) Bayān-i tanzīl (Explanation of the Descent)
In the introduction to this treatise, Nasafī comments that the dervishes

requested him to write a book which is
longer than Kitāb-i tanzīl and
shorter than Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq, which suggests that it was
written after 1281.
The dervishes found the former work was a summary in terms of words and
they could not
understand the meanings behind them. The latter was so long
that the dervishes could not memorise all the
meanings.6 Despite the
request
to write a work longer than Kitāb-i tanzīl, Bayān-i tanzīl is in fact shorter
than the
latter treatise.7
Bayān-i tanzīl has ten chapters whereas Kitāb-i tanzīl has twenty. The
content is similar although
not the same. Of particular interest is the first
chapter on God and the seventh and eighth chapters on the Book
and Word
of God.
(4) Maqṣad-i aqṣā (The Most Sublime Goal)
As mentioned in the introduction, this was one of the first Sufi works
translated into Latin and was finally
rendered into an English paraphrase by
E.H. Palmer in 1867. Palmer's efforts should be recognised in the
light of
the nineteenth century when scholars did not have the benefit of a wider
range of academic Orientalist
studies which modern researchers have.
However the truth of James Morris's statement that Oriental
Mysticism is a
"truncated, grossly inadequate summary,"8 cannot be denied.
It is probable that Maqṣad-i aqṣā was completed by Nasafī prior to 1281.
The
reason for this assumption is that in the introduction to Kashf al-
ḥaqā'iq, Nasafī gives the date of
1281 and he mentions Maqṣad-i aqṣā in
the very same section.9 He comments that his own opinions are not
included in Kashf
al-ḥaqā'iq but they are set out in Maqṣad-i aqṣā. Despite
this, Nasafī own opinions are not
explicitly revealed in Maqṣad. Typically,
the views of the People of the Holy Law, the Philosophers, the Sufis and the
People of Unity are given. He even explains that
his own views are not set
out so that others cannot accuse him of infidelity (kufr).10
Maqṣad-i aqṣā is a relatively short work.11 Its contents include a lengthy
introduction followed by chapters on "the
gnosis of God's essence," "God's
attributes," "God's acts in the words of the
Philosophers," "the knowledge
of Prophecy and Friendship of God," "the beliefs of the People
of Imitation,
the People of Reasoning and the People of Unveiling," "the gnosis of man,"
"the
Four Seas" and a conclusion. The emphasis is ontological, chapters
seven and eight (which
discuss the levels of existence) being the most
detailed of all.
Within Maqṣad there are several passages which clearly reveal the
"intellectual-spiritual"
influences upon Nasafī. He mentions several Sufis
including Sa'd al-Dīn Hammūya, Ibn 'Arabl and his
Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikām,12
Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī and his 'Awārif al-ma'ārif and Ṣadr al-Dīn Rūmī.
The latter may have been
Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī who is thought to be the
author of Tabṣirat al-mubtadī' and Nasafī quotes this work
several times in
Maqṣad.
The number of extant manuscripts of Maqṣad-i aqṣā suggest that it was a
very popular work among the
Islamic populace. Numerous copies have
been found in regions of Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, India and
China.13 The
lucid language
and the clarity in explaining complex issues in a simple way
may have made Maqṣad-i aqṣā an ideal book for
Sufi novices.
(5) al-Insān al-kāmil (The Perfect Man)

This work is a collection of treatises containing an introduction and twenty
two chapters. In the edited version
by M. Molé, Nasafī comments in his
introduction that he wrote twenty chapters, ten for beginners and ten for
those more advanced in the Sufi path.14 These chapters appear to been
composed by Nasafī over a long period of time.
The first chapter was
written in Bukhārā in 660 (A.H.) before Abaqa's destruction of that
city.
The subsequent chapters were written in other cities, as Nasafī moved
south-west
into Iran. Thus chapter two was put to paper in Bahrabād,
chapter three in Kirmān, chapters four through to seven
in Shirāz and
chapters eight through to ten in Isfahān. The introduction to the work
(which was probably written
after all the other chapters, was composed in
Arbaqūh, a city between Shirāz and Isfahān.15 The work may have been
completed
well into the 1280s because in chapter six there is a mention of
Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq (which is known to
have been completed in 1281).16
Questions have been raised by both Molé and Morris concerning the title,
order and number of the treatises.17 It may indeed be true that the original
work has been added to, or revised by
Nasafī or others, but the style and
content of all the chapters is the same as Nasafī's other works (except
for
Kashf-i ṣirāṭ which shall be commented upon later).
The contents, as one might expect, are discussions of the People of the
Holy Law, the Philosophers and the People
of Unity. They are
predominantly of an ontological nature, such as the three chapters
explaining the levels of
existence (Mulk, Malakūt and Jabarūt). There are
also several chapters of
a practical nature such as chapter six on the rules of
seclusion.
As mentioned in the introduction, Kitāb al-insān al-kāmil has been

translated in to western languages
several times. It was rendered into
French by Isabelle de Gastines in 1984. W. M. Thackston also translated it
into English although it has not been published and my own translation of
this work was published in 1992.
(6) Manāzil al-sā’īrīn (The Waystations of the Travellers)18

In Molé's edition of this work there are eleven chapters, the most interesting
of which is its opening
chapter on the Friendship of God. The remaining
chapters focus on ontological issues such as the origin and
return, and real
and imaginary existence. There are also chapters detailing the beliefs of the
Transmigrationists, the People of Unity and the People of Gnosis. The first
three chapters of this
work were written in Isfahān,19 probably before 1281
since Manāzil al-sā'īrīn is mentioned in
Maqṣad-i aqṣā20
(which was
composed before this date).
(7) Zubdat al-ḥaqā’iq (Quintessence of Realities)21
This is a relatively shorter work, only seventy seven pages in Ḥaqqwardī

Nāṣirī's edition. There are two main
parts to this book; the first discusses
the knowledge of the "big man" or macrocosm
('ālam-i kabīr), while the
second covers the knowledge of the
"small man" or microcosm ('ālam-i
ṣaghīr). Once again, the discussion is presented in the
form of the beliefs of
the People of the Holy Law, the Philosophers and the People of Unity.
Zubdāt al-ḥaqā'iq contains the same discussions that appear in all of
Nasafī's works. Despite
this, he comments that his explanation of man and
the levels of man cannot be found in any of his other
treatises, moreover
such explanations cannot be found even in the books written by different
Sufis.22 Perhaps the reason for such comments
is that Zubdāt al-ḥaqā'iq is
didactic, and he may have wanted his Sufi novices to fully comprehend
this
book before reading others.
In Nasafī's own introduction to Zubdāt, he says that he originally wrote a
work at the dervishes'
request which he called Mabdā' wa ma'ād. However
when they saw Mabdā' wa ma'ād,
they asked him to shorten it and the
result was Zubdāt al-ḥaqā'iq.23
(8) Mabdā’ wa ma‘ād (The Origin and Place of Return)
Although I have not seen this work, there are extent copies in the Indian
Subcontinent. The "Comprehensive
Catalogue of Persian Manuscripts in
Pakistan"24 states that Mabdā' wa ma'ād contains five chapters. These are
"the origin," "the intelligences and souls of the lower world," "the return,"
"the state of souls after separation from the body" and "advice." In addition,
at the end of
the fourth chapter, it is mentioned that the treatise was
compiled at Shīrāz, which suggests a dating of around
1280.
F. Meier's article on Nasafī's manuscripts lists the five chapters as "the
discourse of the People
of the Holy Law;" "the discourse of the
Philosophers," "the discourse of the People of
Unity," "the levels of man"
and "travelling and journeying."25
(9) Kashf-i ṣirāṭ (Unveiling of the Path)26
Kashf-i ṣirāt is the black sheep among works that are attributed to Nasafī.
Before discussing whether or
not Nasafī was the author, the contents are set
out below. Following a lengthy introduction, there are two
sections;
Section A
i) Explaining the natural soul, animal soul (nafs-i ḥaywānī) and human
soul and explaining the inner
and outer senses.
ii) Explaining the real human soul (nafs-i ḥaqīqī-yi ādamī) in an abridged
way.
iii) Explaining the real human in a detailed way.
iv) Explaining the levels of names of the real soul in the terminology of
the Sufis.
Section B
i) Explaining the person who is on the right path (ṣirāt al-mustaqīm); the
Righteous, the Gnostic, the
Friend and the Prophet.
ii) The kinds of disciples (murīdān) and the right path of each one and
explaining the school of free
thinking and the school of compulsion.
iii) Explaining love, stations and states.
iv) The reality of submission (islām), faith (īmān) friendship (walāyat)
and prophecy
(nubuwwat).
The lengthy introduction27
is concerned largely with the ḥadīth "whoever
knows himself knows his lord," and "God
created Adam in His form." In
other words, it focuses upon the degree to which man can know God's
essence and reflects the discussion in Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq.28 This sets the tone
for the second section of the work which describes
the four types of
individual and the limits to their knowledge. Individuals are classified into
four groups,
based upon the Koran which states: "And whosoever obeys
God and the Messenger, shall be with those whom God
has blessed; the
Prophets (al-nabīyīn), the truthful (al-ṣiddīqīn), the martyrs
(al-shuhadā')
and the righteous (al-ṣāliḥin)."29
The author of Kashf-i ṣirāṭ classifies the righteous in the station of
submission (islām), the
martyr (also called the gnostic) in the station of
faith (īmān), the truthful man (also called the Friend
of God) in the station
of excellence (iḥsān) and the prophet in the station of witnessing
('iyān).30
In
Kaṣhf al-ḥaqā'iq, Nasafī also makes the same classification in a section
entitled discussing the
beliefs of "some of the Sufis."31 Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq
differs from Kashf-i ṣirāṭ however, in
that in the former work there are also
sections which explain the esoteric meaning (bāṭin) of Friendship
of God.
In other words, Friendship of God is the level where the natures, qualities
and realities of things are
understood, whereas Prophecy is the level where
only the natures and qualities are understood.32
The whole tone and emphasis of Kashf-i ṣirāṭ is the superiority of
Prophecy over Friendship of God. This
is one of the reasons that M. Molé
has raised doubts concerning Nasafī's authorship
of this work. If Nasafī did
not compose this work then it must have been written by someone who was
very familiar
with his treatises but perhaps did not favour an explicit
revelation of the non-manifest dimension of Islam, or
as Molé suggests, a
position less sympathetic to Shī'-ism. It is interesting that the author of
Kashf-i
ṣirāṭ adopts a conciliatory approach on the issue of Shī'-ism by
stating that although some Sufis say
walāyat arose from Abū Bakr and
others say that it arose from 'Alī, it is better to say that both Abū
Bakr and
'Alī were in the station of walāyat.33
The second reason that Molé cites in doubting Nasafī's authorship is that
the name of this work does not
appear in any of his other treatises. The
mentioning of one of his books within others was a practice often
employed
by Nasafī, for example, Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq is mentioned in both al-Insān al-
kāmil and
Bayān-i tanzīl; Maqṣad alaqṣā in Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq; Manāzil al-
sā'īrīn
in Maqṣad-i aqṣā; and Mabdā' wa ma'ād in Zubdāt al-ḥaqā'iq. This
at least
suggests that Kashf-i ṣirāṭ is a book that was composed after all the
others, perhaps by someone other
than Nasafī. In Kashf-i ṣirāṭ two other
works are mentioned, the names of which do not appear in any of
Nasafī's
other books. The author of Kashf-i ṣirāt intended the work for intermediary
Sufis
(mutawassiṭān), whereas "Courtesies of the Way," (Ādāb-i ṭarīqat)
was composed for the
beginners and "the Unveiling of Secrets" (Kashf-i
rumūz) was written for the advanced Sufis.
Unfortunately there are no
known manuscripts of these works. If it is accepted that Kashf-i ṣirāṭ was
indeed written for the intermediary Sufis, then this may explain why there is
no mention of the esoteric
dimension of the Friendship of God which is
present in Nasafī's books such as al-Insān al-kāmil,
Manāzil al-sā'īrīn and
Maqṣad-i aqṣā.
The final point that Molé makes regarding the authorship of Kashf-i ṣirāṭ
is that the style is very
different from all of Nasafī's other works. Having
read all of Nasafī's works, one is indeed struck by
the relatively long
Persian sentences and also the frequent use of Arabic quotations from Sufis
such as Shihāb
al-Dīn Suhrawardī which are found in Kashf al-ṣirāṭ but not
in other treatises.
Despite this, there are arguments for attributing this work to Nasafī.
Firstly, in the introduction to this
treatise, the author states that his name is
'Azīz ibn Muḥammad al-Nasafī al-Ṣūfī.34 In addition, the style of the work
is exceedingly
reminiscent of Nasafī's treatises. Moreover the content (aside
from the problems already mentioned) is
remarkably similar to the issues
that appear in Nasafī's other works. If Kashf-i
ṣirāṭ was not written by
Nasafī it must have been composed by someone who was familiar with his
works,
perhaps even one of his followers. Even if it was not written by
Nasafī, the fact that someone wrote under his
name gives an indication of
Nasafī's fame and importance.
Notes
2 Ibid. fol. 71b, line 12-13.
3 Ibid. fol. 82b, line 1
4 See F. Coslovi, "Liste des Manuscits Arabe et Persans
Microfilms (Fond Molé) de l'Insitut de
Recherche et d'Histoire des Textes."
5 Chapter eight was to explain the Book of God and the Word of
God. A chapter by the same
name appears in Bayān-i tanzīl - (Oxford, Bodleian Library, Ms. Pers. e 35,
fol. 25a-26b).
Chapter nine was to be a discussion on the reality of submission (ḥaqīqat-i islām), faith
(īmān), excellence (iḥsān) and contemplation ('iyān), which is a fourfold division of
the
ḥadīth of Gabriel that Nasafī associates with four kinds of individuals in other works. The
tenth
chapter was to explain the Possessor of the Holy Law and the author of the resurrection,
and also how many
religions and Holy Laws there are, and what is the abrogation of the Holy
Law and why it takes place (several
of these points appear in chapter five of Kitāb-i tanzīl).
The conclusion to the book explains the Seal
of Prophecy and the Seal of Friendship, which
again is discussed in chapter five of Kitāb-i tanzīl.
6 Bayān-i tanzīl, fol. la. lines 5-8. Kashf
al-ḥaqā'iq is indeed longer than Kitāb-i tanzīl, although
not considerably. In the Veliyuddin
no. 1767 collection of Nasafī's works, Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq
contains seventy two folios while
Kitāb-i tanzīl contains fifty.
7 In Veliyuddin no. 1767, Bayān-i tanzīl contains thirty
four folios.
8 J.W. Morris, "Ibn 'Arabī and His Interpreters part
II: Influences and Interpretations," p. 746.
11 This work is found in Rabbānī, op. cit., pp. 210-85.
13 For the copies found in Turkey and Iran see Coslovi,
"Liste des Manuscrits Arabes et Persans
Microfilmes (Fonds Molé) de l'Institut de Recherche et
d'Histoire des Textes," for those in
Pakistan see Catalogue of the Persian Manuscripts in the
National Museum of Pakistan at
Karachi, ed. S. Arif Naushānī, (Islamabad: Iran-Pakistan Institute of
Persian Studies, 1983).
For manuscripts of Maqṣad-i aqṣā in India see Sufism in the Sub Continent:
Papers presented
in the Second Khudabakhsh South-Asian Regional Seminar on Tasawwuf Manuscripts,
(Patna:
Khudabakhsh Oriental Public Library, 1985). A Persian manuscript of Maqṣad-i aqṣā
has even been found in
China, (Gansu province), see Mozafar Bakhtiyar's article on China in
World
Survey of Islamic Manuscripts, Vol. IV, ed. G. Roper, (London: al-Furqān Islamic
Heritage Foundation,
1994), p. 89. According to research on Islam in pre-modern China
undertaken by S. Murata, only four Islamic
texts were translated into Chinese. These were
Najm al-Dīn Rāzī's Mirsād al-'ibād, Jāmī's
Lawā'ih and Ashi'at al-lama'āt, and Nasafī's
Maqṣad-i aqṣā. The Chinese
translation was made in 1679 (see D. Leslie, Islamic Literature
in China (Canberra, pp. 32-34)).
15 al-Insān al-kāmil. For chapters 1-4 see p. 80;
chapters 5-7 see p. 118; chapters 8-10 see p. 153;
introduction see p. 14.
17 See J. Morris, "Ibn 'Arabī and his interpreters,
Part II," p. 745.
18 This work is appended to M. Molé's edition of
al-Insān al-kāmil, pp. 313456.
21 Zubdāt al-ḥaqā'iq, ed. Ḥaqq-wardī Nāsirī (Tehran:
Kitābkhāna-yi tahūrī, 1985).
22 Ibid. p. 94.
23 Ibid. pp. 41-42.
24 Comprehensive Catalogue of Persian Manuscripts in
Pakistan, Vol II, compiled by Aḥmad
Monzavī (Islamabad: Iran-Pakistan Institute of Persian Studies, 1984),
p. 980.
25 F. Meier, "Die Schriften des 'Azīz Nasafī," p.
178.
26 Kashf-i ṣirāṭ Veliyuddin no. 1767, folios 204-244.
Veliyuddin no. 1685, folios 79-103. The
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique hold microfilm of
Veliyuddin no. 1765; the
"pochette" number is 25587-25588. I was not able to locate a microfilm of
Veliyuddin 1685,
although there is a poor quality photocopy of the manuscript.
27 Kashf-i ṣirāṭ, Veliyuddin no. 1676, fol. 204a-210a.
28 Kashf al-ḥaqā'iq, pp. 123-125.
29 Koran 4:71.
30 Kashf-i ṣirāṭ Veliyuddin, no. 1767, folio 218-219.
32 Ibid. pp. 58-59. The discussion is examined in more detail
in chapter six.
33 Kashf-i ṣirāt, Veliyuddin no. 1767, fol. 236a.
34 Ibid. fol. 204a.
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Koranic and Ḥadīth Index
Koranic References
2: 115 Wherever you turn there is the face of God 36
2: 229 It is He that created for you all that is in the earth 167
2: 255 God, there is no god but He, the Living, the Everlasting 56
2: 257 Allah is the Friend of those who believe 177
3: 37 Whenever Zacharias went into the chamber to her 179
3: 97 God is independent of the worlds 36
3: 135 Those who commit an indecency or wrong themselves 131
4: 71 Whoever obeys God and the messenger shall be with those God has blessed 172, 214
4: 79 Whatever evil visits you is from yourself 117
4: 110 If one does a sinful thing or wrongs himself 131
5: 51 To each among you We have prescribed a law 150
6: 25 We lay coverings upon their hearts 94
6: 59 Not a leaf falls but He knows it 71
6: 76 When the night covered him over 144
6: 77 When he saw the moon rising in splenour 144
6: 78 When he saw the sun rising in splendour 144
6: 79 I have set my face firmly and truly towards Him 144
7: 143 You cannot see Me 157
7: 180 To God belong the most beautiful names 74
7: 205 Remember your Lord within yourself humbly 97
8: 7 You are only a warner and the people has its guide 178
17 So you did not slay them but it was Allah Who slew them 28
9: 129 He is gentle to believers, merciful 66
10: 4 He originates creation, then He brings it back again 58
10: 62 Now surely the Friends of God - they shall have no fear 177
13: 35 For them is a chastisement in the present life 117
14: 30 A word is as good as a tree 139
15: 29 When I have breathed of My spirit into him 65,
86
17: 1 Glory be to Him who carried His servant by night 20
17: 70 We have honoured the children of Adam 64
17: 78 Perform the prayer at the sinking of the sun 133
17: 79 And as for the night, keep vigil a part of it 132-3
18: 67 Surely you cannot have patience with me 179
18: 109 Say: if the sea were ink for the words of my Lord 46
19: 71 Not one of you there is, but he shall go down into it 112
20: 19 It is my staff, upon it I lean and with it I beat down the leaves 96
20: 114 My Lord! Increase me in knowledge 18
20: 57 Out of the earth We created you 63
21: 22 Were there gods in heaven an earth other than God 56
21: 30 The heavens and earth were closed up 38,
57, 61
24: 35 God is the light of the heavens and earth 106
24: 40 It is like the depths of darkness in a vast deep ocean 127
28: 12 God is omnipotent, He knows everything 178
28: 88 everything is perishing except His face 36,
56
30: 4 To God belongs the Command before and after 57
33: 41 Remember God with much remembrance 97
35: 31 Someone among them is being unjust to his own self 95
36: 82 His command, when He desires a thing, is to say Be! 24, 61, 148
38: 5 What, has he made the gods one God? 36
38: 37 And the satans, every builder and diver 106
40: 78 We have spoken to you about the affairs of some 187, 201
41: 53 We will show them Our signs upon the horizons 29, 158
41: 54 Are they not in doubt touching the encounter with their Lord? 58
42: 9 And it is God, He is the Friend. 178
42: 11 Nothing is like Him 17
47: 15 This is the similitude of Paradise for the god-fearing 87
50: 15 No indeed, but they are in uncertainty as to the new creation 34, 57
50: 16 We are nearer to him than the jugular vein 80
54: 50 And Our command is but one, as the twinkling of an eye 23, 148
55: 26 All that dwells upon the earth is perishing 56
55: 29 Each day He is upon some labour 57
57: 4 God is with you wherever you are 23
61: 7 People of the right hand, o how fortunate 95
68: 1 Nūn, by the Pen and what they are writing 38, 61, 63
78: 41 O would that I were dust 169
81: 29 But desire you shall not, unless God desires 155
83: 14 What they were earning has rusted upon their hearts 94
86: 1 By the sky and the nightly visitant 131
89: 27 O soul at peace! return to thy Lord, well pleased 58
97: 1 We have sent down 132
112: 1 Say: He is God, the One 56
Ḥadīth References
The accident does not remain for two moments 34
At the beginning or every hundred years, someone belonging to that time will renew its
religion 193
Bur for thee I would not have created the heavenly spheres 65
Die before you die 30, 181
Everything returns to its origin 63
The first thing God created was intelligence/intellect 11, 46, 57,
77
The first thing God created was the Pen 11, 77
The first thing God created was (my) spirit 77,
174
The first thing God created was the Throne 12
Glory be to He of the Jabarūt 42
Glory be to Me how great is My majesty (Bāyazīd Basṭāmī) 37, 110, 111
God does not become bored that you should become bored 156
God created Adam in His own form 17, 119, 151-2, 214
God Most High sent down the Koran in ten meanings 83
God was and nothing else was 21
O God, why did you create the creatures 38
He who knows himself knows his Lord 17-18, 151-2, 214
The hearts of the children of Adam are like a single heart 93
The Holy Law is my words, the Path is my works, the Reality is my states 82, 171
I am the Truth (Ḥallāj) 37, 110-11
I have a waqt with God 19, 99
I only worship a Lord I see ('Alī b. Abī Ṭālib) 19
I was a hidden treasure and I loved to be known 38-9,
46-7, 119
I was a prophet while Adam was between the water and clay 174
Intelligence is a light in the heart 86, 94
The learned (wise) are the heirs of the Prophets 183,
186, 191
My community will split into seventy-three factions after my death 191
My friends are under My domes and only I know them 205
n. 122
My heavens and earth embrace Me not 93
My servant draws near to Me . . . I am his hearing 27,
28
Neither My earth nor My heavens contains me 93,
200
None knows God but God 17
Our spirits are our bodies 37, 110
People are asleep and when they die they wake up 29
The person who speaks of God's essence is foolish 152
Poverty is my pride 181
Pray for Muḥammad and for the family of Muḥammad 204
n. 104
Reflect upon all things 17
The shaykh in his group is like a prophet among his people 141
The wise in my community are like the prophets of the children of Israel 191
The world is imagination in imagination (Ibn 'Arabī) 29
There is nothing in existence except God 37
There is nothing in my cloak except God 37, 111
There is nothing in the two worlds except Me 111
Think about God and not the essence of God 152
Subject Index
Aaron 202 n. 70
Abaqa 3-4, 6,
8, 209, 211
Abarqūh 8-9, 211
abdāl 182, 187-190
Abraham 34, 144-5, 184, 188, 202 n. 70
abrār 188
Abū Bakr 191, 215
Abū Jahl 34
Abū Turāb Nasaī, 64
accident (see araḍ)
actualised level (ḥāṣiliyyat) 31-2
actuality (world of) 23
Adam 32, 34,
37-38, 43, 50, 63, 92-93, 158, 174-5, 184, 188, 202 n. 70
Adham, Ibrāhīm 115
Advocats of Fire 52
Advocates of Light 53
aḥadiyya 47-8, 148, 151
Aḥrār, 'Ubayd Allāh, 198
akhyār 188
'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib 19, 121, 190-1, 195, 215
Āmulī, Ḥaydar 195, 208
angels 43, 64-5, 92-3, 147; enraptured angels 43
annihilation (see fanā')
Anṣārī 31, 53
'aql 18, 38, 44, 55,
64, 66, 85-9, 92-3, 96, 103-4, 112, 119; universal (first) intelligence/
intellect 51,
55, 57, 59-61, 63, 86, 148-9, 175
araḍ 31
Arberry, A. J. 55
Arghun Khān 3-4, 6
Aristotle 59, 150
Ash'arites 34
'Aṭṭār, Farīd al-Dīn 7, 31, 110
Attributed Spirit (rūḥ-i iḍāfī) 46, 86-8, 119
attributes (of essence) 26
awliyā (see Friends)
awtād 182, 188
a'yān thābita 23,
47, 62, 67
'Ayn al-Quḍāt 14, 44-5, 52, 80,
127, 151
'ayn al-wāḥid 34
Baghdād 2
Baghdādī, Majd al-Dīn 7
Bahā' al-Dīn Walad 5
Bahman 44
Bahrabād 8, 209, 211
Bākharzī, Sayf al-Dīn 5, 7, 205 n. 120
Balkh 5
Balkhī, Shaqīq 115
Balyānī, Awḥād al-Dīn 5, 13
baqā' 28, 56, 84
baraka 121, 125-6
Baraq 3
Bāyazīd Basṭamī 122
bewilderment 156-8
breath (see nafas)
Buddhism 3-4
Bukhārā xi, 1-3, 7-8, 11,
209, 211
Burāq 103-4
Buzurgmihr 150
Byzantium 4
cause(s) secondary (sabab/asbāb), 83-4
Chagatgai Mongols 4, 8
character traits (akhlāq) 82, 92, 112, 119, 154, 160
charismatic powers (see karāmāt)
chilla 19, 134-5
Chingiz Khān 1-3, 8
Chittick, W. 55
Christianity 3-4, 55, 148
constitution (mizāj) 95, 190
contemplation (see 'iyān
and mu'āyana)
Corbin, H. 44
covenant (of alast) 88
creatio ex nihilo 21,
23, 40
devil 92-3, 119
dhāt 31-2, 35-6, 41, 45,
93
dhawq 89
dhikr 5, 69, 85, 97-9, 102-4, 107 n. 84, 119, 121-2, 127, 132, 134-5, 143, 151, 153, 161, 188, 206
disobedience (see ma'ṣiyat)
dreams 94, 96,
146-7
earth 38, 40,
53, 61-4, 70, 158, 169
ecstacy (wajd) 147, 150
ecstatic utterance (see shaṭḥ)
Egypt, 10
emanation 55-8, 61-3, 70, 86
Empedocles 150
Enneads 55, 68-9
essence (see dhāt)
Exclusive unity (see aḥadiyya)
existence 31; imaginary 29; real, 29
Eve 63, 92
evil 117
eye of certainty ('ayn al-yaqīn) 89
face (see wajh)
faith (see imān)
fame 115, 120, 128, 181
fanā' 22, 28, 41, 84
al-Farābī 41-2, 59, 70, 96,
175
Farghānī, Sa'īd al-Dīn 45, 47
Farshāwashtar 150
felicity 109, 113, 120, 143, 181
fikr 97-104, 107 n. 84, 134, 143, 153, 206
finding (wajd) 101
first intelligence (see 'aql)
Five/Six Divine Presences 45, 47-8
food 47, 122,
135, 137, 141 n. 98
fortune 115-16, 120, 128, 181
Four Seas 45-7, 211
four times 78, 95, 150
Friend(s), Friendship 17-20, 29-31, 33, 39, 41, 48,
51, 60, 68, 80, 84-5,
90, 95, 146, 154-6, 162-3,
165, 171-3, 177-88, 192, 195, 197, 206-7, 209, 214-5
Gabriel 35, 81-2, 188, 202 n. 70
Galen 91
Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid 11, 16, 19, 43-5,
98, 127, 138, 152, 174, 176, 192-3
Ghazan Khān 5-6
Ghujdawānī, 'Abd al-Khāliq 126
Gīsūdirāz 207
gnosis (ma'rifat) 101, 113-14, 116, 119-21, 125; People of 9
Golden Horde 4
Gospels 4
grave 48-9, 52, 206
ḥāl/aḥwāl 19, 99-102, 138, 208
al-Ḥallāj, Ḥusayn ibn Manṣūr 174
Hamadānī, Abū Yaq'ūb Yūsuf 126, 151
Ḥammūva, Muhammad 14
Ḥammūya, Sa'd al-Dīn 5, 7-9, 11, 14,
23, 122-4, 127, 137, 140 n. 45, 142 n. 108, 152, 172, 183, 185,
188, 190-2, 194-5, 204 n. 103, 205 n. 120, 206, 209, 211
Ḥammūya, Sadr al-Dīn 5
heart 93-5, 98-102, 114, 124, 143, 145-8, 153, 165, 176, 199, 208
heaven 58, 63,
87, 110-13, 116-17, 145, 180, 188
hecceité 32
hell 58, 110-13, 117, 131, 145, 180, 199
higher world ('ālam-i 'ulwī) 50,
63, 65
himmat 159-62, 164-5, 206
Hindus 148
Holy Law (People of, see 'Ulamā')
Hujwīrī 19, 108
n. 91, 188, 202
Hulegu Khān 2-6
Ḥusayn 34
Ibn 'Arabī xi, 5, 10, 14,
16-17, 23-4, 27, 29, 31-2,
34, 38, 41, 45, 48,
51-2, 55, 61, 67, 93,
98, 120,
122, 127, 144, 151-2, 156, 160, 162, 164, 166-7, 173-4, 176, 182-4, 187-9, 195, 199, 202 n. 68,
204 n. 103-4, 206, 208, 211
Ibn Abī 'l-Dunyā 137
Ibn Farīd 174
Ibn Rushd 54, 92, 96
Ibn Sab'īn 53, 152
Ibn Sīnā 23, 30,
41-3, 45, 53, 59-61, 70, 91-2, 96-7
idol(s), idol-worship 18, 95, 115-16
Idris 202 n. 68, n. 70
iḥsān 81-2, 166, 173, 214; people of 83
Ikhwān al-Ṣafā 23, 175
ilḥām 97, 100, 103, 146, 153, 206
'ilm (see knowledge)
imagination (see khayāl)
imaginal forms-bodies 49, 51-4, 143
imaginalisation 52, 93
īmān 81-2, 166, 173, 214
imitation (people of - see 'Ulamā')
immutable entities (see a'yān
thābita)
Inclusive Unity (see wāḥidiyya)
incomparability (see tanzīh)
India - Indians 4, 50, 149
infallibility 194-5
ink-pot 38, 61
inspiration (see ilḥām)
intelligence (see 'aql)
intent 118
invisible shaykh (shaykh al-ghayb) 69, 194, 203 n. 99, 206
invisible world ('ālam-i ghayb) 42
invisible, invisible world 42
invisible, invisible, invisible world 42, 47, 151
Isfahān 8, 212
'ishq (see love)
islām 81, 172, 214; people of, 83
ism 31
Ismā'īlīs 2, 191-2, 199
Isrāfīl 202 n. 70
isthmus (barzakh) 49
isti'dād 24, 78
'iyān 97, 101, 103, 165-6, 173, 194, 206, 214
Izutsu, T. 61-2
Jabarūt 18, 21-3, 26, 29, 31, 41-7,
54, 60-2, 71 n.13, 97, 104, 145, 149, 151, 207, 212
jadhb 69, 128
Jāmāsf 150
Jāmī, 'Abd al-Raḥmān 7, 14
Jandī, Mu'ayyid al-Dīn 45
jawhar 31, 60
Jesus 34, 92-3, 175, 184, 188, 195, 202 n. 68, n. 70
jinn 43
jizya 3, 6
Joseph 202 n. 70
Judaism 3
Junayd 122
Juwaynī 1-2
kalām 41
karāmāt 35, 162, 164
Kāshānī, 'Abel al-Razzāq 45
kashf (see unveiling)
khānaqāh 5, 83-4, 127, 135-6, 199, 208
khāṭir/khawāṭir 101,
132, 134, 146
khayāl 29-31, 41-2, 47, 50, 52, 54,
72 n. 60, 91, 93, 112,
127, 132
Khiḍr 174-5, 179, 182-3, 202 n. 68
Khwarazm 1-2
al-Kindī 175
Kirmān 8, 212
knowledge ('ilm) 82; of certainty
('ilm al-yaqīn) 89, 163; divine ('ilm-i ladunnī) 147;
experiential 25;
follows its object 24, 33
Kubilai Khān 2-3
Kubrā, Najm al-Dīn xi, 1-2, 7, 14,
69, 82, 108 n. 96, 122, 125, 127, 140, 143-4, 151, 154-5, 157-62,
190, 205 n. 120, 206, 208
Kubrāwiyya order 122-4,
136, 143, 150, 162, 190, 195, 197, 205 n. 120
Landolt, H. xii
light 36-7, 39, 44, 47, 54, 68, 91, 95, 101, 104, 107 n. 84, 145, 149, 154, 158, 161, 176, 181;
Muḥammadan Light 46, 187
love (maḥabbat) 95-6, 101, 103, 160; passionate love ('ishq) 88,
101, 160
lower world ('ālam-i suflī) 50, 65
macrocosm 37, 39, 66-7, 92, 158, 176, 212
madrasa 83-4, 136, 199, 208
Mahdī 191-4, 204 n. 104
Maḥmūd of Ghazna 159-60
ma'iyyat (see withness)
majdhūb 69
al-Makkī Abū Ṭālib 43
Malakūt 18, 21, 23-4, 26, 29, 31,
38, 41-7, 54, 71 n.13, 97, 104, 144-5, 151, 206, 212
Mamluks 4
maqām 18-20, 22, 42, 132-3
ma'ṣiyat 28, 118
matter 61, 63,
68
Māturīdī, Abū Manṣūr 192
maturity 166
Meier, F. xii, 11, 67
Michael 188, 202 n. 70,
microcosm 37, 39, 66-7, 92, 158, 176
miracles (see mu'jizat)
mi'rāj 20, 103, 133, 143, 171
mirror 37, 39,
41, 47, 94, 143, 146, 153, 158, 16
mizāj (see constitution)
Molé, M. xii, 32, 195, 211-2
Mongols 1-3, 114, 199
Morewedge, P. 55, 59, 70
Moses 33-4, 96, 156-7, 179-80, 182-3, 188, 202 n. 70
mu'āyana 101-2,
107 n. 84, 108 n. 91
Muḥammad 9, 19,
48, 58, 81-3, 103, 121, 125-6, 133, 143, 171-2, 174-5, 177, 183, 185, 187, 189,
191, 193-4; Muḥammadan Light 46, 187; Muḥammadan Reality 174-5; Muḥammadan Spirit
46,
86, 88, 175
mu'jizat 35, 163-4
Mulk 18, 21, 23-4, 26, 29, 31, 33-4, 38, 41-7, 54, 71 n.13, 145, 151, 207, 212
murāqaba 134
mushāhadat (see witnessing)
nafas 32, 35-6, 41
nafs (see soul)
name (level of - see ism); beautiful names, 37
Naqshabandiyya order 137, 198
Nasaf 2, 8,
11, 171, 209
nāsnās 50
Neoplatonism 38, 54-6, 58-9, 67-70, 86
new creation 34-5, 54, 57
Nicholas IV (Pope) 4
Nicholson, R. A. 54-5, 58, 62
night ascent (see mi'rāj)
Nishapur 2
Niẓāmī 85, 159
Noah 184
nukabā 188
obedience (ṭā'at) 28, 98, 118
obligatory acts 27
Oljeitu 3
One (Neoplatonic One) 55-9, 68-9
One entity (see 'ayn
al-wāḥid)
order 121
Owner of Time 185, 191-3, 203 n. 92
Palmer, E. H. xii, 210
particulars 26
peacock 92
Pen 47, 60-1,
63, 86, 88
Perfect Man 33-4, 39, 41, 47-8, 149, 160, 174-8, 184, 186, 196, 197, 198
perfection 63, 173, 176
Philosophers 9-11, 18, 20, 22, 29, 31,
38, 40-1, 49-51, 58, 60-2, 64, 67-8, 70, 80-1, 85-8, 90, 92, 95-
6, 112-13, 119, 125, 136, 148, 171, 178, 180-1, 185, 191, 206-7, 211-13
photisms 143
Plato 150
Plotinus 55-9, 61-2, 68
Pole 162, 188-90, 202 n. 70
potentiality (world of) 23, 42
preparedness (see isti'dād)
preserved tablet (lawḥ-i maḥfūẓ) 85
Proclus 68
Prophet(s), Prophecy 17-18, 29-31, 33, 36, 39, 41,
48, 60, 68, 80, 84-5,
90, 95-6, 155, 162-3, 171-4,
177-86, 192-3, 195, 197, 209, 214
Pythagoras 150
Qayṣarī, Sharaf al-Dīn Dāwūd 45
Qūnawī, Ṣadr al-Dīn 43, 45, 51, 55,
127
quiddity 68
Rāb'ia 110
Raḥīm 66-7
Raḥmān 66-7
Rāzī, Najm al-Dīn 5, 127, 143-5, 148-9, 205 n. 120
readiness (ṣalāhiyyat) 31-2, 42
reflection (see fikr)
renunciation 114-16, 121-2, 196
resurrection 34, 119-20, 193-4, 203 n. 99
return (ma'ād) 48-50, 52, 54, 110
revelation (waḥī) 101, 146; manifest revelation (waḥī-yi jahr) 104; revelation of the heart (waḥī-yi
sirr) 104
rūḥ (see spirit)
Rūmī, Jalāl al-Dīn 6, 8, 30, 51,
64-6, 85, 98
Rūmī, Ṣadr al-Dīn 211
Rūzbihān Baqlī 159, 174, 187-8, 195, 202 n. 68, n. 70
sabab (see cause)
Safavids 199
Ṣafī al-Dīn 199
samā' 5, 101, 136-8, 143, 150-1
Satan, satans 34, 43, 45, 127,
161
seal(ing) 186-7, 204 n. 103; of the Prophets 171-3, 188-9, 192; of the Friends 173, 188-9, 191, 195,
204 n. 103
self disclosure (see tajallī)
senses (inner) 91, 104, 133, 213; (outer/external), 91, 100, 112, 133, 147, 213
sensory intuition (wahm) 91-2, 112
sensus communis 91
Shabastarī 98, 165
Shadhiliyya order 133
shahāda 109, 120
Shamanism 3
Shams-i Tabrīzī 8
Skarī'a 118-19,
130, 171, 179, 183, 193
shaṭḥ 36, 125, 150
shaykh 69, 116, 119, 122, 126, 128-31, 134-5, 137, 148, 207
Sheba (Queen of) 35
Shī'ism, 187, 190-2, 194-5, 199, 204 n. 104, 208, 215
Shirāz 8, 212-3
silsila 121-2, 126
similarity (see tashbīh)
Simnānī, 'Alā al-Dawla 4-5, 54, 82, 104,
125, 135, 143, 190, 204 n. 103, n. 120
Sirhindī, Aḥmad 166-7
sirr 102
snake 92
solitary ones (fard/afrād) 182
Solomon 35, 92-3, 175
soul (nafs) 32, 90; animal, 90; blaming 90; commanding to evil 90; holy, 50, 90; human 90; plant 90;
rational 50, 90; at rest-peace 50, 90
sphere of spheres 62-6
spirit (rūḥ); human spirit 86
Sri Lanka 50
stability (see tamkīn)
state (see ḥāl)
station (see maqām)
submission (see islām)
subsistence (see baqā')
substance (see jawhar)
Suhrawardī, Abū Ḥafs 'Umar 69, 127-8, 151, 211, 215
Suhrawardī Shihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā 44-5, 53, 141 n. 98, 150, 155, 160, 164
supererogatory acts 27
Tabrīz 6
Tabṣirat al-mubtadī' 48-9, 181
tajallī 18, 20, 30, 36, 39-40, 62, 92-3, 178, 206; no repetition in 20, 41, 156
takwīn 153-5
tamgha 6
tamkīn 19, 103, 153-5, 194, 206
tanzīh, 17, 19, 22, 28,
40-1, 46, 85-6, 97, 120, 156-9, 167, 206
Taoism 3, 31
tarīqa (see order)
tashbīh 17-19, 22, 28, 40-1, 85-6, 97, 120, 157-9, 167, 206
tasting (dhawq) 89
Teguder 5
testimony of Islam (see shahāda)
Theology of Aristotle 55,
58, 70
Tholuck, F. xii
thought (see khāṭir)
throne 61, 66,
190
Tirmidhī 173-4
Transmigration 50-1
Transmigrationists 9, 11, 20, 49-50, 90, 125, 193, 207, 212
tree 65-6, 121, 139 n. 18, 163, 175; dhāq-dhāq 50; Tubba'
112-13, 139 n. 17; Zaqqūm 112-13, 139 n.
17
triplicity (of God and things) 27
Ṭūsī, Abū Ja'far 192
Tustarī, Sahl 141 n. 98, 174, 187
'Ulamā' (People of the Holy Law) 9-11,
20-1, 41, 49, 64, 80-4,
88, 95, 110, 113, 125-6, 128, 130-1,
150, 163, 172-3, 191, 195, 199, 207-8, 211-13
unity 166-7, 194; People of 9-11, 20, 22, 38, 49, 52, 54, 60-6, 70, 86, 89, 121, 173, 178, 191, 194,
207, 211-13
Unity of existence (see waḥdat
al-wujūd)
universals 26
unveiling (kashf) 98; People of 18, 35, 40, 90
variegation (talwīn) 103, 153-5
veil(s) 132-3, 157, 181, 189
waḥdat al-wujūd 31,
166
wāḥidiyya 47-8
wajh 31, 35-6, 41
walī (see Friend)
waqt 19-20, 22, 36
wārid 101
withness (see ma'iyyat) 23, 80
witnessing (mushāhada) 101-2, 108 n. 91, 153
wujūdī school 17, 41-2, 44-5, 47-54, 61-2, 66-7
Yazid 34
zakat 6

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'AZĪZ NASAFĪ

CURZON SUFI SERIES

The Curzon Sufi Series attempts to provide short introductions to a variety

The Sufi Poetry and Teachings of Mahmud Shabistari

Mysticism and the Rhetoric of Sainthood in Persian Sufism

An Early Sufi Master

A.G. Ravan Farhadi

An Introduction to the Mysticaql Use of Classical Persian Poetry

Bernd Radtke and John O'Kane

Mehdi Amin Razavi

15 The Quadrant, Richmond

Surrey, TW9 1BP

© 1998 Lloyd V. J. Ridgeon

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record of this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN 0-7007-1013-2 (Hbk)

ISBN 0-7007-1014-0 (Pbk)

I. The Life and Times of 'Azīz Nasafī

I. 'Azīz Nasafī's Six Ontological Faces

4 The Sufi Journey

I. Felicity, the Goal of Sufism

5 Visionary Experience and Unity with

I. Types of Vision and Mystical Experience

6 The Perfection of Man

I. The Spiritual Ascent

I. The Life and Times of 'Azīz

I. 'Azīz Nasafī's Six Ontological

I. Felicity, the Goal of Sufism

5 Visionary Experience and

I. Types of Vision and Mystical

6 The Perfection of Man

I. The Spiritual Ascent

The Life, Times and Works of ‘Azīz

I. The Life and Times

Another indication of the conditions that prevailed when Nasafī was

Yet Nasafī's method of ascribing certain beliefs to particular groups does

(Wherever you turn there is the face of God)1

Abū Hāmid Ghazālīs acceptance of Sufism as a genuine expression of

INCOMPARABILITY AND SIMILARITY

There has been a tendency by scholars to explain Ibn 'Arabī's theosophy in

Yet it is necessary to make an attempt to understand oneself (and in so doing,

NASAFĪ'S SIX FACES

In the Sufi tradition, a spiritual station (maqām) describes a relationship

The First Station

The Second Station

These possible non-existent things plead with God to have existence

As Nasafī comments, this is another way of saying that knowledge follows

The Third Station

Even the interpreters of dreams and their interpretations may be considered

The Fourth Station

Existence is one. However, it is described by many attributes, since it is

The Fifth Station

The Sixth Station

This alternative perspective to Neoplatonism is also apparent in Nasafī's

II. NASAFĪ AND

Nasafī's interpretation of Jabarūt is in fact the same as Ibn 'Arabī's

Imagination and the Divine Presences