Member state Source of threat Degree

Austria-Hungary
46 Two Leagues ef ThreeRussia
Emperors High
Germany Moderate Two Leagues ef Three Emperors 47
Italy High
Straits at Constantinople and the Dardanelles, threatened Austria-Hungary. The TABLE 3.2
Russia Austria-Hungary High
extension of Russian influence into Ottoman territory
Great Britain Verytohigh
protect those routes and Threat to Member States of the Three Emperors' League, 1873-78
attempts to facilitate theFrance
Germany creation of states sympathetic
Verytohigh
Russia in that area (such
as Bulgaria) would result in the encirclement of AustriaHungary with Russian
satellites. Austria-Hungary considered the territory to its southeast its natural realm
of expansion. It, too, relied on trade routes through the Danube, which would be
endangered if relations between it and Russia deteriorated even further.
Russia was also threatened by tensions in the Balkans. Once Austria began to
enlarge its sphere of influence in the Balkans and Russian influence began to wane,
the threat to Russia grew. The other major threat to Russia at this time was posed
by Great Britain.17 The threat derived from British strength, ~he_ pro~mity of its
colonial holdings in south Asia, and the perception that its mtentions were adverse
to Russian interests. In addition, Great Britain, as mentioned in the previous
section, also had an interest in the Balkans. Its interests were more closely aligned
with Austria's, in conflict with Russia's.
G~rmany, newly unified, having recently defeated both France and Austria-
Hungary, was wary of those states maintaining hostility toward it. This ·all f d
was especi Y true o France, since Germany was aware France woul
never reconcile itself to the loss of Alsace and Lorraine. Throughout the decades
following the Franco-Prussian War, Germany feared that France would_ launch a
war of revenge to recover the territories annexed by Germany in 1871. Given
warm relations between Russia and France, Germany wanted to prevent an alliance
between the two, a partnership that might en-
courage F ···
. ranee to mitiate a war with Germany. As long as France could be
isolated no such th · ·
• reat was 1mmment. For Germany, then, the League rep-
resented an opportunity to avoid isolation and to drive a wedge between France
and Russia. 18
The situation with Austria-Hungary was not so grave. Because the Treaty 0~
P~ague had not imposed unduly harsh terms, Germany was more opti-
mistic regard· its bili · . . .
mg i a i ty to improve relat10ns with its southeastern neigh-
bor. In short a numb f ial ·
• er o potenti enemies faced Germany but other than
F ranee, none
th at posed any serious threat to it. '
In s~m, the threats external to the alliance were not insignificant, but they were
diffuse and not sh d b al1i
are Y ance members. The internal threats how-
ever, were quite vivid Th · al h '
· e mtem t reats were what drove two of the mem-
ber states to join the alli d ill
inhibi
ance an , as w be seen in the next section, were
w at I ired the coh · fh · .
esion o t . e alliance. Austria-Hungary and Russia
prove una le to better th · la · ·
nurtur . err re tions with one another. Germany tried to
L _e bunprovements between the two, but ultimately to no avail.
ru it ecame clear that Ge......,~- , di" .
.
......... y s me atmg role would not be sufficient
 to resolve the differences plaguing Russia and Austria-Hungary, it also became
evident that Germany would have to choose between the two. An alliance of the
three emperors could not withstand the differing threats facing each country. The
best Germany could do was form an alliance with one or the other while trying to
maintain cordial relations with the third. Relations between Germany and Russia
became strained following the Congress of Berlin, and these tensions were
exacerbated by new tariffs imposed by Germany on certain Russian goods. The
Russian press, reflecting mounting hostility, became increasingly anti-German.
Germany was further antagonized by Russian troop movements in Poland and the
ever-increasing strength of the pan-Slav party. Consequently, in 1879 Germany
decided to pursue a dual alliance with Austria-Hungary.19 The threats to each
member state are summarized in Table 3 .2.

COHESION

The Schonbrunn Convention, initially signed by Russia and AustriaHungary,

provided the legal basis of the League. This convention was a pledge "to prevent
any one from succeeding in separating them in the field of principles which they
s:uy,
regard as alone capable of assuring, and, if neces of imposing the maintenance
of the peace of Europe against all subversions, from whatever quarter they may
come." 20
The agreement also held that the signatories would consult and respond
together in the event of an attack from another state. Five months after the
convention was signed by Austria-Hungary and Russia, it was signed by the
em · 1 ·
. ~eror of Germany. 21 The promise level of the convention was ow, smce
h It stipulated only the loosest of agreements in the event of war. It neverthe-
d b less sp ·fi 'bh·
B eci ied the rules that would govern member states . e avror ...
ecause the League was an attempt to temper contmued hostility betwee~
Russia and Austria-Hungary over their competing interests in the Balkans, Its very
raison d'etre derived from conflicting rather than complemen-
 48 Two Leagues ef Three Emperors
Two Leagues ef Three Emperors 49
tary interests. As it turned out, the League was not wholly able to survive the strategic conflicts between the great powers. Russia coveted control of the
frictions that continually arose, particularly between Russia and Austria- Dardanelles and, as always, desired an ice-free port. Such control, however,
Hungary. The reciprocal threats between Austria and Russia crippled the would endanger Austro-Hungarian trade routes, particularly through the Danube.
League from the start, which lasted only until approximately 1878. It was then The Ottoman Empire's inability to suppress the rebellions caused consternation
reconstituted in 1881 for three years, renewed in 1884 for three more years, but on the part of the European powers as a result of their significant interests in the
expired for the last time in 1887. area. This was true both because of the uncertainty engendered about the
The first serious strain to the alliance came with the war scare of 1875. At this disposition of the territories and also because of the brutal methods being
time, Germany became convinced that France was drastically increasing its employed by the Turks to quell the uprisings. The Russians were particularly
military strength-on the order of some 144,000 troops.22 Although this belief offended by Turkish methods, and when Serbia entered the war many Russian
was not entirely justified, many in diplomatic circles believed Germany was volunteers joined the cause even before Russia decided to intervene. 25 Bismarck,
considering launching a preventive war. The new French military law also afraid that the revolts would disrupt the League of the Three Emperors, did his
sparked a series of articles in German newspapers, the most famous of which utmost diplomatically (in his role of the "honest broker") to produce a resolution
was published in the Berlin Post and entitled "Is War in Sight?" This heightened acceptable to all involved parties.
fears of imminent war in France and Britain.
Despite Bismarck's efforts and Austro-Hungarian and British objections,
. As the crisis escalated and French concerns over a possible German attack
Russian troops continued to fight until they reached Constantinople. The great
mcreased, France sought support from Russia and Britain. Although the Rus-
powers were disturbed by the fact that the Russians intervened in the conflict.
sians were somewhat restrained in their response, they did in fact lend moral
The Turks assumed that British support against the Russians would be
support to France. This angered the Germans, who believed that the League of
forthcoming. A British fleet was sent to Constantinople, yet the Turks received
the Three Emperors should have bound the Russians to them or at least
little other support. In particular, Austria-Hungary decided not to mobilize; war
ensured Russian neutrality. 23
between the allies was averted. The Russians prevailed over the Turks. In March
The war scare of 1875 is significant in demonstrating the tenuousness of th~ 1878, they dictated an agreement with the Ottoman Empire very favorable to
Leagu_e. Russia did not behave consistently with German interests; the their interests, the Treaty ofSan Stefano. The treaty's terms represented virtually
alliance failed to operate in any unified fashion. The crisis represents the extent complete Turkish capitulation to all of Russia's demands. Bulgaria was given
to ~hich th~ member states of the League viewed it as an instrument to independence and exceedingly generous borders, among other concessions. 26
advance mtra-alliance objectives, not as a force to guide external policy. The
Although the League constrained Austrian behavior-it did not directly oppose
me~~er states were simply unable to coordinate their goals and strategies for
Russia as it might have otherwise-the alliance strained under the weight of such
a~nmg them. In this case, Russian commitment to the League was insufficient
asymmetrical gains to one member in an area of critical interest to others. In fact,
for Russia to alter its history of relatively warm relations with France.
both the British and Austro-Hungarians were dismayed by the gains incorporated
The competing interests of Austria-Hungary and Russia in the Balkans were in the Treaty of San Stefano. To resolve the disputes among Russia, Austria-
even mor~ problematic for the cohesion of the League. These tensions ~ame Hungary, and Britain, Bismarck invited representatives from all of the major
to_ a head in 1877-78 with the Russo-Turkish War. In 1875, uprisings powers in Europe to a congress in Berlin. The outcome of this meeting, to the
m Bosma and Herzeg · · h .
ovma against t e Ottoman Empire brought to the fore dismay of Russia, superseded the Treaty of San Stefano and modified Russian
latent competing inter sts fth · d
En d i . e ~ e great powers, Russia, Austria-Hungary, an gains significantly. Bulgaria's borders Were redrawn, and other European powers
glan m particular. Russia, culturally bound to the Slavs believed itself to with interests in the area made significant gains (for example, an Austro-
be the natural " ,, fth '
protector o e provinces. In April 1877 Russia declared war Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was sanctioned). Moreover,
on Turkey. Austria-H th ' · the Russians were not assured free passage through the Dardanelles. This was an
. . . ungary, on e other hand, feared that its own SlaVIC
mmonnes might be e ti d d enormous diplomatic setback for the Russians. As Count Corti, the Italian
n ice an encouraged by Balkan nationalism and seek
h t e same sorts of freedoms A ul · h · · d minister of Foreign Af£"
. · s am net me empire, Austria-Hungary foun airs and representative at the Congress, recollected:
sue rebellion threatening· d h h.
flih b ti . an t oug t it was necessary to resolve the con-
ct • e ore its eastern boundaries disintegrated 24
The uprisinrx: and Russ· · . ·
- Ian mtervent1on served to exacerbate other geo-
 50 Two Leagues
52 Two ef Three
Leagues ef Three
Emperors
Emperors
Two Leagues ef Three<ifEmperors
Two Leagues 51
Three Emperors 53
The
In Congress
sum, shared of Berlintoresulted
threats dynasticincontrol a defeathadfora divisive
Russia all alongonthe
effect theline. Her
alliance. nore The the absence
coming ofstruggle
a uniform between
externalthethreat monarchical and the republican
certainly mattered-the states never
only territorial gain was in Asia. Bessarabia
Thi~ was true in the German case of Kulturkampf as well as in the urgent and direct was restored to her. South of the
principles.
did develop And any if sense
the threeof Emperorspurpose.
common are slowBut to unite
this in viewnot
should of this
obscurecommon the point
Danube, however, everything happened as England and Austria wished.
threat facing Austrian political control from Russia in the form of pan-Slavism. danger, it is the most exposed of the three that will be
that the alliance was not created or intended to be used to achieve shared external the first to suffer from it.
Bulgaria was not made into a large State; on the contrary, the territory inhabited 28
These issues served to exacerbate the threats
by the Bulgarians was divided, and one-the southern-half was rechristened within the alliance, and, as a goals of its members. Intra-alliance dynamics were the focal point of the League.
consequence,
Eastern Rumelia, the cohesion
remaining of thea alliance
Turkish suffered.
province,Even though though ~11 ~hree ~tates
an autonomous one. However,The Three Emperors'faced
each monarchy League illustrates
different domestic the importance
threats, and of examining
their efforts to relations
hadRussia
a mutual was desire to strengthen
once again excluded conservative
from the Balkans elements and waswithincaughttheirinstates,
the mouse- in the shore amongup internal
states withincontrolan often led toBecause
alliance. conflict alliances
within theare alliance.
not solely formed to advance
endtrap theofdomestic
the Black Sea, undermined
threats for the exits the by capacity
way of the of Dardanelles
the states to and act the
in aSea of
united united attacks
goals ofonthe
German itssignatories, it is important
Catholic population through notthe to passing
ignore theirof theinternal
"May laws" dynamics.
way.Marmora were still barred
The monarchical ideology to her.
was Her dream to
connected of threat
reaching andthe hadMediterranean
a corrosive effect had
(the Alliances,
first like
legislation other
of institutions,
Kulturkampf) play
illustrates an thisinstrumental
dynamic. role
The new in shaping
German the
onvanished.
27
alliance cohesion in an- relationships of the states that join them. In the case of the League, there was a very
other way as 11 D ·· state faced significant resistance to consolidation. A major part of the resistance
29

The uprisings
. of ·1875
we ynast1c andInterests
their consequences demonstrate
brought the monarchs the impossibility
together, but of came highfromlevel
theof internalpopulations
Catholic threat. Theofthreat Alsace,level within the
Lorraine, andalliance
Bavariamay and fromhave thekept the
sue~ Interests
maintaining alliancecould not serve
cohesion in the as aface focalofpoint
highly around which domestic
conflicting pop- In
central interests. Poles peace
whoamong
were now the signatories,
part of Germany. but it Germany,
paralyzed fearingthe alliance in every
that these other way.
elements wouldIt was
the case of the Dreikaiserbund, ulations
the riftcould rally Ifby the uprisings and
generated th·the settlement h
id . . forge theanhigh
alliancelevelwithof threat withininthe
the papacy orderalliance
to resist thattheundermined cohesion. began
central government, The threat
revisions proved . to be· any mg, t e very 1 In
insurmountable. eology uponitwhich
addition, became the clear
alliance that Germany level within
to legislate the alliance
increasingly stricthadlawsa more
against significant effect on cohesion than did the level
German Catholics.
would washave pred~cated
to choose needed
between to beitsde-emphasized,
two allies; an alliance given thebetweenliberal preferences
the three powers
and ethruc nationali · hi d . It of external
is not necessarythreat.to describe the specifics of these laws, the first of which were
was not .viable. The Congress srn wit inof anBerlin
surroundmg was thethefinal
empires.blowThe to the
threat League.
of It was
weakerung domestic control fostered a united passed in May 1873. Important for this analysis is, however, that Germany's
unable to survive the heightened threat within it. conservative
The increased front but that
discord among its
front ultimately need d t b d 1 ' counter-Catholic measures served two purposes simultaneously. In addition to
signatories culminated in thee end of the ayed.
o e ownp first League.
Once more, a factor that drew
controlling its domestic opposition, the new laws reinforced German efforts to
Thetheone empe~ors
aspect of together
the Leagueundermined that should the cohesion of the alliance.
have allowed the member states to
Cohesion of the allian 1 wasThthe shared commitment ·to· conservatived The Dreikaiserbund
isolate France.:'? In France duringII, these years (especially I873-75), the Catholic
1881-87
bolster cohesion of the alliance ce was ow. e members of the Dreikaiserbund ha
constant disagreement h· al . Church had a great deal ofinfluence. At the height of the papacy's influence in
monarchicalism. The League . s overhad t eir been forged
go s. Each as a state
individual consolidation
had separate of the The second
aims. Further these aim · di · d France, Germany was Dreikaiserbund
fighting the church shows via the determination
Kulturkamp£ of theand
Hostility signatories
suspicionto find
c_onservative,
. 'dynastic powers s were in m Europe
irect conflictagainstwiththeeachrising tideasofobserve
other revolutionary
m the war scare of I s75 th · · . shared ' I 876 betweena peaceful
the twoway to manage
countries grew.theirFrancedifficulties.
appealed Virtually
to both Russia from and the Austria-
funeral of the first
socialism and democracy. The three empiresin
, e upnsmgs Bosnia theandsame fundamen~ofideology,
Herzegovina
and consequent Russ· · t · League,
Hungary, and Bismarck
while the tried
formerto revive
was it.
lukewarm This alliance,
in its too,
criticism is
of important
Germany analytically;
and it
one that supported monarchical . tan mand dynasticand
erventton, political autho~1ty.atYet
the negotiations thethe conflicts
Congress
0
Berlin. oal f h · O described illuminates vividly the use of alliances to manage
German endeavors to contain the Catholic Church's authority, the latter was more relations among signatories in the
of interest
. andIf1variegated
fundamental array
. of threats g s t e s1gnatones
. ear~1er affected each member
are in conflict, cohesion is
. .
sirnp Y unattamable In th f h absenceAustria-Hungary
receptive. of a common external believed purpose.
Germany was going too far in its quest to
state differently and ·ultimately e case undermined
o t e League, cohes~on
the desire '. to
Those
preserveeffects
the were too
peace among the memb t b destroy As in the first
Catholicism and Dreikaiserbund,
gave tacit support the
to relationship
France, indicating between thatthreat and cohesion
the Habsburg
strong to be overridden by er commons ates was ideological
a out the Interests. In fact, the and
only aim identifiable, ideological
the was interesting
Empire would not and complex. Threat motivated the signatories to form the alliance-
component highlights the domestic aspects of the eaguethreats
was eachbarelystate
succfaced.
ful i Inherent
hi .
. the efforts to bolster the great monarchies ofEurope was a need for strong, f ll
0again, the threats from each to the other. The
ow Germany's lead. Russia was also in conflict with Germany s po icies,
conflicts of interest '
embedded 1· . in the
in . th ess in ac ievtng It. Disagreement on how to
main- alliance, those that gave it impetus, were the
and in I875 it reached a negotiated agreement with the Vatican, resolving very ones that rendered it discordant.
centralized
tam e peace controlwas to quite
compensate
·d for
.,-, their
A questionable
.. legitimacy in the face of
. . evi ent, io ustrra, rt meant that Russia should not The absence
conflicts of interest of abetween
uniformthem. external 31 threat Was only a small part of the story; the high
democratic mtervene and in socialist
the Balkans·sentiments. t R . . As Saburov wrote in his memoirs, Bismarck
th that
R. . ' 0 ussia, It meant Austrian restraint. The price to internal threat
Although Kulturkampfwas what wasprohibited
a domestic thepolicy,
states from it didcoordinating
have ramifications their goals for and
thought e uss1ans for Austrian t · h
res rainr was t e concessions granted to Austria in means to attain those goals.
German relations with France and, more important, with its alliance partners. As
SUMMARY
t~ere is no doubt tha~ the republican spirit is astir in every part of Europe. In
e ongress of Berlin In h t h L Germany pressed ahead with these policies, its relations with Fran~e grew ever
.Italy, smce the death ofV1ctor-Emmanuel, there remains to their King only his
· s or , t e eague did
title. Fran~e goes from bad to worse; that people imagine every day a regime not embody common goals. more antagonistic. Ultimately, this suspicion and hostility culrninated i th . · 0 · ht
more repu~hcan than that of the day before. And now, all the republican parties xpect that the
. n e war scare of 1875 discussed earlier. ne rmg e
have their eyes turned towards England in the hope of finding encouragement ideological issue of containing the influence of the Catholic Church would have
there that the name of Gladstone promises them. I have said al] this to the King, resulted in a manifestation of the member states' commitment to con:ervative
and I added that there was a good side to the matter; and that is that I shall now
dynastic control. It could thus have represented a s~ared threat and
have the_means of setting Haymerle's Austria in motion, and of removing the
obstacle '."'hich stood in the way of the fulfilment of our programme. For nhanced the cohesion of the Dreikaiserbund. Neither Austria-Hungary nor
Austria herself 15 not so safe as she supposes. It. would be the height of Russia h , Although both
' owever, supported the extent of Germany s measures.
imprudence for her to ig- Austria and Russia faced turbulent domestic environments, they were not
of Germany's approach to its problems.
 54 Two Leagues ef Three Emperors
Two Leagues ef Three Emperors 5 5

t C

The first Three Emperors' L FORMATION

threat internal h al1i eague was characterized by high levels of
not exclusiv 1 tdo t_ e dance and low levels of cohesion. The alliance was Russia
e Y es1gne to serve an ext al · · d
simply to balan F B.. em purpose-it was not designe
ce ranee ntain Ital . Russia in the late 1870s and early 1880s was recovering from the military
united front t ~; h ' ' or y; It was not designed to
provide a success of its war with the Ottoman Empire and its diplomatic failures at the
o a ....n s ared goals It d.
states' relations with h th · was esigned to manage the member Congress of Berlin. It was apparent that even a stunning military victory could not
eac o er Thealli 1kd .
threat that dr th h• : ance · ac e cohesion because achieve its political objectives. The conversations between Saburov and Bismarck,
the
ew em toget er m the fi la and the negotiations that ultimately culminated in the
rsr p ce emanated from each other.
 reconstituted League, reveal the difficult position in which Russia found itself 32
Victory in war bred heightened threats from other quarters. Neutralizing those very hostility of Austro-German intimacy led him, the ambassadors, and the tsar
threats via a tethering alliance, the second Dreikaiserbund, became the strategy to desire restoration of the Three Emperors' League. 4o
Russia pursued. Allying with Germany and Austria was the best way to ensure that
Russia need not fear the two forming an alliance against it. 33 Austria
As it did earlier in the decade, the need to tether Austria came from the two The Austrian motive for joining the reconstituted League was above all to tether
states' conflicting policies in southeastern Europe. Events in the Balkans had the Russian threat. Austrian foreign minister Heinrich von Haymerle made his views
heightened the antagonism between Russia and Austria. The second Three very clear to Bismarck when they met in Friedrichsruh in early 1880: he wanted a
Emperors' League was formed and renewed to try to constrain that hostility, truce in the Balkans. "There is only one real influence in the East. We are conscious
perhaps even diminish it. 34 The treaty was important to Russia to prevent the of it at every step. Whenever we wish to turn an Austrian interest to account, we
eastern crisis from overwhelming the two states, to prevent war from occurring clash with the hostile action of the Russian agents." He was, however, afraid that an
between them. The Dreikaiserbund, to Russia, was to keep the peace between it alliance would make the Austrians "dupes of Russian diplomacy." 41 Austrian distrust
and its ally, to manage the eastern situation. As Saburov ~~te in_ l 880, "In the and suspicion of Russia punctuated the negotiations that culminated in the agree-
present situation, our best chance of stemming Austr~a s action would be the way ment. Haymerle sought to constrain Russian hostility and achieve sanction for
of the Triple Entente." These motives sustamed the League as well. As Giers wrote eventual annexation of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Noripazar. He sought, further, to
in a letter in 1883 "It is in our interest to maintain it as long as possible. It enlarge Austrian influence in Serbia. The alliance offered a means to de-escalate the
guarantees us against Germany and saves us from a conflict in the immediate clash of interests in the Balkans. 42
future with Austria." 35
Haymerle was ambivalent about the Three Emperors' League. He wanted to
~usso-German relations deteriorated in the aftermath of the Congress of
prevent the Germans from defecting from the Dual Alliance and to avert Russian
Berhn. Misunderst di b h . .
an mgs etween t e two states were threatemng to dis- encroachments and aggression.43 Austria-Hungary appeared to be moving toward
rupt completely their traditionally warm relationship. An additional worrisome accession to the alliance, although it would not necessarily be a popular decision. As
development for R · h ·d · · · h ussia was t e rapi economic and military growt
that Germany was expe · · · hi . .. . Bismarck remarked to Saburov: "[Austria] gains so much from being reassured with
nencmg m t s period, German military spendmg
we~t u~ ooz.oco 1990 British pounds in 1880-81-a significant sum. 36 This regard to you, and if the choice is between a treaty of alliance and the prospect of
height~ned ~ussia's need for an alliance. The "mutual antipathy" that color~d their bloody conflicts, it is the first duty of governments to close their ears to the
relations at Berlin and after needed to be remedied. 37 These antipathies of public opinion, and save their people from their own impulses." 44
combmed effects-the gr th fG . .
. ow o erman power and the perception of in- There were important tactical side benefits motivating the Austrian decision as
creasmgly antagon · f · ·
is lC mtent1ons-created some urgency for the Russians. well. If left unchecked, a Russo-German agreement could come at the expense of
It was the sharp increase in German threat that ultimately led Tsar Alex- Austria. For Austria-Hungary, facing problems of internal instability, Italian
ander II to view the Th E ,
. ree mperors League as no longer viable or capable animosity on its southern border, and Russian hostility to the east, a strategy of
o preservmg the peace b 88 Th h . 1 .
. Y 7· neutralizing these threats via a tethering alliance made sense. As Bismarck
e t reat levels precluded cooperation via
f a ranee B f h38
·h suggested: "When Austria has worn that flannel for three years next [to] her skin,
.· e ore t at pomt ad been reached, however, "Giers who was in
1 e ect1ve control of R · f · Ii . ' she will no longer be able to discard it without running the risk of catching cold." 45
,. ussian oreign po cy by this stage, readily accepted
ff a urov s view that close t ty l · The advantages of constraining and managing the threat from Russia Were
·
S bd r . rea re anons with Germany formed Russia's best apparent; the Three Emperors' League was useful to Austria until the ~oint at which
e1ence against German hostility R . ,
.. the threat exceeded a manageable level. As will be described m more detail below,
1 · • . • uss1a s decision to enter the alliance
· · · was ~u~ · · · to Russia's conviction that [Bismarck] would be less dangerous the crisis in Bulgaria that started in 1885 and culminated in Austria sanctioning the
Within alliance than outside."39 exclusion of Russian influence in the area by l 887 led to an implosion of the
Russian motivations we · bl
alliance.
.B
re unquest1ona y tethermg ones. In Giers's memo
to aron von Mohrenheim th b d.
, e am assa or in London, he wrote that the
 58 Two Leagues of
56 Two ef Three
Three Emperors
Two Leaguesofo]Three
TwoLeagues ThreeEmperors
Emperors59
57
Similar to the first League, the alliance embodied deeply entrenched con-
Germany TABLE3.4
TABLE 3.3
flicting interests that emanated from within, particularly between Austria and ThreatStates'
Member to Member Statesfor
Motivations of joining
the Three
theEmperors' League,League,
Three Emperors' 1881-871881
Russia. The threat
Germany's motives facing Austriathe
for joining arose from
second Russia,
League andthe
were thesame
threatastothose
Russia
for Coun
derived the
joining from firstAustria.
League.The level to
It sought of hedge
threat itsinternal
bets bytomaintaining
the alliancecordialwas try Motivation

overwhelmingly
relations with both greater
Russiathanand
anyAustria-Hungary
uniform externaland threat. Germany
to balance continued
France. This Austria- Tether Russia
Hungary
strategy
to hedgewould
againstdeprive
a choiceFrance
betweenof anRussia
ally and
and not
Austria,
require preventing
Germanyeither to choose
from Maintain close relations with Germany
Russi Tether Austria-Hungary
between Russia
allying with and Austria.
France. Germany,
Even after as in thedemise,
the League's early 1 Germany
870s, wanted to control
continued on a Keep close watch on Austro-German relations
Austro-Russian
this path by concludinghostility.
the Reconciliation
Reinsurance Treaty. betweens4 Russia and Austria was Germa Balance France and prevent it from finding allies in
crucial. As Bismarck
The second wrote inLeague,
Three Emperors' his memoirs: "We
then, as withcould endure
the first, wasindeed that our
not a product ny Austria or Russia
friends should lose or win battles against each other, but
of a common enemy. It largely served to contain and manage the animosity not that one of the two Hedge Austria and Russia and prevent hostilities
between them from escalating.
should be so severely wounded and injured that its position
between Austria-Hungary and Russia by delineating the spheres of influence as a Great Powerin
taking its part in the council of Europe would be endangered."
the Balkans. The same was true for Russian motives toward Germany. 55 As 46 Bismarck

wanted to
Saburov keepinthe
wrote hispeace;
memoirs he on
believed
Marchthat a war between Austria and Russia
29, 1880: man influence would not be diluted by Russian power. 50 Interestingly, having
would potentially be devastating for Germany. Bismarck was also convinced both Austria and Russia as allies meant that Germany could play each off of the
thatWhatever
avoidingthe warimprovement
was necessary in oursorelations with taking
as to avoid England, we shall
sides always
between thehave
two other, thereby granting it more flexibility in action. An alliance with either might
nea_r us a powerful Germany; we shall always have
neighbors. This would put Germany in a precarious position indeed.
47 the difficulty of struggling eventually become a balancing alliance against the other; alliance with both
agams_t ~he two currents which manifest themselves only too clearly in the public served to hedge its bets. 51 In Bismarck's own words, "I declined at that time also
The Austro-German
opnuon of the New alliance
Russia and alone
the would not beagainst
New Prussia enough thattomutual
keep the peace
antipathy_ the 'option' between Austria and Russia, and recommended the alliance of the
arisi~g from
between Austriathe too
andrapid growth nor
Russia, of ourwould
nei~hbours. That is a asituation
it prevent wh~ch will
Franco-Russian three Emperors, or at least the preservation of peace between them." 52
always carryfrom
combination the risk ofleading to
emerging. catastrophes
The if the Governments
Three Emperors' Leagueremainthus inallowed
tow _to
the popular
Germany impulseitsinstead
to hedge of restraining
bets regarding and guiding
those it .... Asoutcomes.
two possible long as he [Bismarck]
Germany Domestic politics also played an important role in Germany's desire to forge
is there, our best security is to continue to be sincerely will mg for an entente with
~ad a si~ificant stake in preventing France from finding allies and in securmg the second Three Emperors' League. Germany's need to consolidate its power
him. 56 dictated caution in its foreign policy. Moreover, a shared commitment to
Russian neutrality in the event of a Franco-German war. 48 The Three E~per?rs'
League monarchical conservatism in the face of seditious and contagious liberalism
H~nce,wouldthreat also allowa Germany
did play to hedge
role in guiding the its bets by
member guaran
states intoteeing It not
signing an would shore up the power of the great monarchies. Russia appeared disturbingly
become overly
alliance, yet notdependent on either Austria
in a straightforward manner.or In Russia.
the caseSecuring
of Russiaonly and one as a
Austria-
principal ally would restrict interests
German and policy; alliance withhigh bothlevel
would allow close to revolution; Austria-Hungary's internal authority appeared to be eroding.
Hungary, deeply conflicting therefore a very of threa~ An alliance of the three emperors, harking back to the great Holy Alliance of
resulted in an alliance rather than opposition. There were impor~nt tacticalinside
Germany to balance its interests and continue to be fairly independent its
decades past, offered an avenue to consolidate monarchical authority in the face
selected policy course. The Dual Alliance allowed
benefits accruing to the member states as well. As discussed m ~e previous Germany to secure Austrian
cooperation; Bismarck, however, of a multitude of uncertainties. 53
case, Austria-Hungary's authoritydidover not want to become overly
its multiethnic committed
pop~latio~ Was i~ to
The reconstituted Three Emperors' League was highly appealing to Ger-
or overly
jeopardy on dependent
andc weirutz, on
would have Austria. As Hans Lothal v S h · · G
errnanbeen even more gravely threatened 1
ambassador to Vienna 1871-76 ~ Russia
and ambas- many. It allowed the newly unified and powerful state to consolidate its power
contmued to act with a free hand in support of the Slavs.
sador to St. Petersburg thereafter, wrote, "Only mounted on horseback are In addition, both states internally and externally. It served Germany well in hedging its bets against
we as tallonthfree
depended R · access
G. to the Straits of the Bosporus and Dardane_lles. In
. as e ussran rant, and Austria was supposed to be our horse. possible threats in the form of an adversarial neighbor or in the form of
order to reap the gains of cooperation in
The Pnnce wanted to 'ride' Austria, not 'marry' her."4 the face of their9 divergent Interests, the
potential avenues of expansion for its principal rival, France. A summar_Y of
twoInhism
states sought · B·to ally. k
emorrs, ismarc reflects upon a conversation he had with Count the member states' motivations for joining the reconstituted League IS
Although
Paul Shu~alov,conflicting
Russianinterests may generate
ambassador to Germany,an alliance
regardingits cohesion will be-
an alliance be contained in Table 3.3.
very low. The forces that lead states to ally are not necessarily
tween their countries. It highlights the tactical side benefits Germany would the same
ones that enhance their c Oh · I c: if .
reap
t from acceding to theesion. alliance
n tact,of 1 the three interests
divergent emperors. Bismarck
bring states was
ogether,
sv.:ayed bythes~ same interests
~e argument may eventually
that alliance with Russia drivewould
them guarantee
apart. Alliedno adver-
future
saries
~ance may
against ulti~tely
Germany. resolve
He their differences,
understood that especially
alliance with if a
Russia common
was keythreat
emerges as will be seen . th . . EXTERNAL VERSUS INTERNAL THREAT
ut regarded Austria as' necessary. min ethe
peacetime
equationcase so asoftothe ensure
Triple
that
Entente.
Ger-
Yet m
The absence of an overarching threat to the members of the_ Drei~aiserbund
e absence of a common e
allian .. . nemy, t e orces leading to·hthef formation .
of an as a unit highlights the fact that it was principally a tethermg alliance.
ce may ultitnately make the cohesion of the resulting alliance low. Al-
Member state Source of threat Degree
Austria-Hungary Russia High
Italy High
Russia Austria-Hungary High
Great Britain Very high
Germany Moderate
Germany France Very high
Russia Moderate
 6o Two Leagues ef Three Emperors
Two Leagues ef Three Emperors 6 I

though it is logical to assume that the factors contributing to alliance formation

will also enhance cohesion, this is not necessarily true for a defensive alliance.
The domestic struggles each member state faced affected the cohesion of the
League. There were grave consequences if the conflicting interests between
Russia and Austria-Hungary in the Balkans were not contained. Austria-
Hungary's control over its multiethnic population would be strained even further
than it already was. Yet the fact that political authority was predicated on shared
monarchical principles did enhance cohesion, albeit in a limited fashion. Table 3
.4 summarizes the threats to each member state and the degree to which they
were felt by the respective signatories.

COHESION

The League of the Three Emperors was reconstituted in I 88 I for many of the
same reasons it was initially conceived. Germany was still concerned about the
possibility of a Franco-Russian alliance. Russia was concerned about the
German-Austrian understanding, despite the fact that it did not yet know the
substance of that agreement. Furthermore, Russia recognized the potential for
conflict with Austria-Hungary and Germany. Consequently, the best strategy for
Russia was to join them both. In negotiating with AustriaHungary, Russia
recognized that a defensive alliance delineating spheres of influence would
benefit Russian interests.
In January and February 1880, Russia and Germany conferred on the pos-
sibilities available to them. Many of the concerns raised had been heard before:
Russia desired above all to be protected against the possibility of a coalition
against it and to maintain the status quo in the Straits. These objectives would
th be easier to achieve if Austria were part of the deal. 57
Such strategic thinking was evidenced throughout the negotiations. ~ three
powers had important objectives: for Russia, the Black Sea; for Austria-
 62 Two Leagues ef Three Emperors
Two Leagues ef Three Emperors 63
Hungary,
were sanctionWith
numbered. of itsSerbia
new holdings in the Near
within Austria's East as
sphere of well as preservation
influence, Bulgaria of
in
sequently, Russia believed Bulgaria to TABLE
be firmly
3 .5 within its sphere of influence and
the status(however
Russia's quo in Turkey; and for Germany,
problematic), a security
and territorial system
disputes in which
between it wasand
Serbia a
beholden to Russia. Yet in the
Chapter early Alliances,
Summary: 1880s, itThreat,
becameandincreasingly evident that
member oftheanconflict
Bulgaria, allianceofofinterests
three great powersRussia
between in a world
and Austria 58
of five.just For Russia
kept and
growing.
Bulgaria was not goingCohesion
to submit to all Russian demands. An example of Bulgaria's
The fact that Russia
Austria-Hungary, it was
was losing its control
essential to come over Bulgaria
together andfurther
agree complicated
on ~pheres the
of Alli
assertion of autonomy was its decision to favorPrincipal
ance
source of threat
Austrian interests to build a Cohe
railroad
matter.
influenceRussia was
in order afraidmilitary
to avoid that Austria would
hostilities usurp
against eachitsother
rolemasthedefender
Balkans. of
59 sion
extendingDreikaiserbund,
from Austria, through
1873-Serbia and Bulgaria,
Internalall thetoway to Constantinople.
L
Bulgarian interests.the
For all, preserving 6
7 peace was of primary importance. Part of the need to keep 1878 Dreikaiserbund, 1881- by Austrianalliance
The Russians, already threatened advances in the
Internal to region-the signing
ow of
theIn peace was inherent
1885, Bulgaria responded in the three states' Rumelian
to Eastern shared commitment
rebellions and to conservative
desires for 1887 alliance Low
treaties with Serbia and later Romania-were adamantly opposed to Bulgarian
monarchicalism.
union with Bulgaria. Despite the fact that this is what Russia had originally compliance with the railroad construction. When Bulgaria did not concede to
The underlying
wanted ideological
in the Treaty of Santheme thatatdrew
Stefano, thisthe states
point together in the
it threatened first ~ecause
Russia ~eague ate Austro-Russian relations: it endeavored to temper those states' hostility
Russian desires, the probability of conflict between Russia and Austria-Hungary
brought the three conservative monarchies together in the reconsti~uted
Bulgaria was now a free-acting agent. Further, Austrian intervennon to stop League as toward one another. It failed to provide any lasting change in their attitudes 62to
became even more likely, despite their agreement embodied in the Dreikaiserbund.
well. When the Liberals came to power in Britain in _1~80, ~t meant
Bulgaria's march south was tantamount to violation of the delineated spheres of a potential one another, even if it prevented the situation from growing any more dire in the
Meanwhile,
years Austria, to
they managed despite signing
sustain the DualThe
the alliance. Alliance withserved
alliance Germany in 1879,
no real felt
external
disruption
influence; inall
European
vestigespolitics. While liberal
of respect for thepolitic~ did _serve
agreement Russian interests
incorporated m the growing distance between itself and Germany. Signing the Dreikaiserbund was
in the Balkans by encouraging 68 the pan-Slavic nat_ nal1st movement, in general,
10
Dreikaiserbund were gone. The unsuccessful attempts on ~he part of Russia purpose; its principal function was to manage relations among the member
tantamount, once more, to losing its status as Germany's primary ally. Further,
support for nationalist movements, as described earlier, gravely threatened Austria- states. The cohesion of the alliance was low as a result of the high level of threat
to control the Bulgarians, while Austria was making gains in Serbia, Romania, although it allied with Russia, it was still terribly suspicious ofRussian designs,
Hungary's multiethnic empire, which included Slavs. internal to it. Table 3.5 summarizes the alliances, the principal source of threat,
Greece, and Bulgaria, exacerbated Russian antagonism, and renewal of the particularly in Romania.63 As tensions and suspicions grew, it became increasingly
. The immediate consequence of the change in British leadership was to bnng to and the resulting cohesion.
League in 1887 was virtually impossible. evident that the Dreikaiserbund was functioning more as a truce between Austria-
a halt Russian-German negotiations.
. Germany realized it was no longer When the congruence
possible to reconcile of the
interests between
unbreachable Hungary and Russia than as a secure or cohesive alliance. And though it was
Britain and Germany became clear, Austria-Hungary
diffe~ences between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Henceforth, Germany became fearful of a potential Conclusion
renewed in I 884 for three years, it was not long before the same factors that tore the
alliance
co~tmued between Russia Britain
to maintain the Dual andAlliance
possiblywith Austria and in 1887 signed the original League apart led to the demise of the reconstituted alliance as well.
Ital 60 M · . ' ,
~emsurance
Y· ore Treaty
important, with Russia.
Austria It had
feared to be satisfied
the potential alliance,with two
which dyadic rela-
would The principalinlesson
As expected from examining
a tethering alliance, thetheforces
two Leagues of the Three
disrupting Emperors
Dreikaiserbund
hav~ grave
tionships consequences
in place for its interests,
of the conflict-ridden particularly
alliance of theinthree
Bosnia and Herze-
emperors. is that
were alsoalliances
the onesindeed may be formed
most influential without In
in its renewal. a driving external purpose
1883, disagreement and
between
ovina 't A ··b instead are sometimes formed because of the purposes they are to serve within
The second League seemed slightly more effective than its predecessor, yet Russia and Bulgaria reached new heights. Austria was becoming increasingly
· ustria, it ecarne even more essential that the League be re- the alliance. The Leagues were vehicles for Russia and deciding
Austria to
g . level to contain their
0

the of cohesion was still quite low. There had been a truce of some sort_ concerned about revolutionary sentiment in Serbia and was take action.
constituted demarcating spheres of influence between it and Russia. The direct hostility toward one another and for Germany to hedge its bets. If We pay
between
result of this fearand
Russia wasAustria-Hungary
the second League. immediately following the con- Though suspicious of each other, both Austria and Russia were facing domestic
clusion of the alliance al f h L . · exclusive attention to the external goals of this or any alliance,
disturbances, making the possibility of hostility between them all the more we may overlook
. The_ convention, signed , one
ongoJuneo t18,
e eague.
1881, inYet differences
Berlin, over the
superseded Bulgaria
one signed the most important
10 and the Balkans soon took precedence. The states could no longer agree
untenable.v' Further, aspects of the alliance's
as revolutionary operation.
sentiment continued to sweep Europe, the
I873. It was largely defensive and was to be in force for three years. The trea~ The emperors, their chancellors, their ministers, and their ambassa~ors Were
over goals, let alone coordinate means for attaining them; again, as in the monarchies were ever vulnerable to erosion of their political control.
called for benevolent neutrality in the event of war with another keenly interested in keeping close watch over their rivals. Russia desired the
first L~ague,
state; Russiaeach state'stogoals
promised re weret th . different and f many . times in direct
. conflict
with the others' The spec e mterests o Austria-Hungary m regard to Under
alliances present of
because circumstances, a refusal
fear of Austria to renew
and distrusttheofprevious arrangements,
the Austro-German
the. Treaty of Berlin:
· and all th
re was a zero-sum element to the conflict between .
Russia and Austria-H
the Balkans Further
,
the
c ree states agreed to temper discord regardmg or a proposal Austria
combination. to restrictwas
theirsimilarly
continuance to too short
motivated to ajoin
term,thewould have
Three aroused
Emperors'
.d . ~ngary.· onsequently,if Germany could only take one . distrust, or the
Leagues-by perhaps eventhreat
Russian have led
andtothepolitical
desire combinations
to keep closewhich watchiton
wasGermany
impor-
s1 e or the· other, ,
md1cativeconvention speer ied that any territorial changes m
Turkey could be bro h d nl b of a low level of cohesion. tant to avoid in order to maintain pacific understanding between the three im-
and Russia. Germany was driven by the threat from France as well as
ac e o Y Y mutual consent. The agreement also sup- perial courts. The understanding was more indispensable than ever, in order to
ported the principle of p h
SUMMARY o en passage t rough the Straits and threatened to the need to
strengthen thehedge between
principle Austria and
of monarchical Russia.
order in face of increasing peril. of social
.
revoke the assurances m d h0
if'thi . . a e tot e ttornan Empire in the Treaty of Berlin All three states had important developments that had do~est1~
revolution. This common feeling was the bond which should unite sovereigns ramifications
1
s principle were violated.61 These were the rules embodied in the agree- and which
with governments in a stricttosolidarity.
they needed come to 65terms. Germany s _umficatlon, Austro-
ment; they shaped the m b , b h . The reconstituted Leagu d
h . . . em er states e avror and . expectations. The alli- Hungarian loss of territory and vulnerability to pa~-Slavis?1, and the diplomatic
;nce, .10 stipulatmg ~enevolent neutrality in thealliances
event of may
war, be
offered the to
owest Thus, by the end of1883 through early 1884, renewal of the alliance was ne-
e emonstrates t at formed blow to the Congress of Berlin all dictated the need for
level of security
malli~age promise.relations; when this is so, the level of threat internal to the
m~erstate gotiated andRussia
signed.following
66
domestic retrenchment. The League also shows how domestic politics offer a
· esion o. t e
ance will beofhigh
The Treaty c hhad
Berlin
anceewill be
· ft dh Bul
alli . .
low,mdependence
not simply be-
Shortly after the League was renewed in 1884 it became clear that its days
prism through which threats are perceived. Pan-Slavis~ and ~onarchical control
cause . there
.
ts no
0

uniform al h b gran ganan Once

Bul-
garia was established
.thi . 1 d extern t reat ut. because
Russ· . . . of the high
· threat are both examples of the nexus between domestic ~nd mternational level
levelL--i}. d ;_.cc · '• ta P aye a great part m assisnng the new state to threats. They influence how intentions of others are viewed. The Three
un~hna;~
wtuu n•.uuastructure
the alliance. and Thisdevelop
suggests mm·th
its th · d . · ·· . . .
. tary atande political within an alliance
ynamic, organizations. Con-are as Emperors' Leagues served as an institutional context; they were
the external purposes they sometimes serve.
e e Emperors' League ofi881-87 served as an attempt to medi-
 64 Two Leagues ef Three Emperors

4
management devices to the member states as they encountered these threats.
The cohesion of the alliances was very low-the member states entered into the
alliances with varied goals. The very nature of these goals, managing threats CHAPTER
among the signatories, prohibited the states from moving beyond the internal
issues to confront external issues in a united way.
The Three Emperors' Leagues support the propositions from the previous
The Dual and Triple Alliances
chapter. They both offer evidence of the curvilinear relationship between threat
and the propensity for states to ally. As the level of threat grew between Russia .
THE DUAL AND Tnple . were o pebcth a etime alliances concluded
Alliances
and Austria, the two came together in an alliance. As the level of threat by the member states in order to preserve a measure of security in a Europe
continued to grow, the alliance foundered. Once threat began to recede, the . b t een Austria-Hungary and
states formed an alliance once more-an alliance that failed again as the level of fraught with uncertainty. 1 T e Dua
ranee e w
threat between the two increased anew. As we will see in the next two chapters, . . ,:: theGermany
demise ofwas
theconcluded
first League
879, JUSt atter .m of
I
it is not surprising from the vantage point of the theoretical framework that each
Emperors and pnor to tts reconsti. u 10n
. it ti in 1881 The Tnple
·the Three
. Al- .
state sought balancing alliances as the threat to each from the other grew. The
. b
hedging and balancing motivations for Germany support the theoretical
framework as well. These motivations toward Russia, Austria-Hungary, and erf states
th Dualo Alliance with Italy m eliance was signed by. the mem
France were compatible with the tethering motivations of Germany's allies. · b f European alliances dur-
Moreover, as anticipated, the level of cohesion varied with the level of internal h growmg
1882. These pacts represented the I Al we o .
threat-a high level of internal threat produced a low level of alliance cohesion, . . h Th were two of the most
particularly in the absence of any common, external threat. Also, as expected im-mg the latter part of the nmeteent century. ey .
from the predictions in the previous chapter, both alliances were of a low h ost long-lived of the pre-
commitment level. portant alliances of the era; they were so e m
The Three Emperors' Leagues cannot be explained by a realist understanding World War I period. b s of
of alliances alone. These cases highlight the importance of taking a broader a t · Hungary were mem er
view of alliance politics; they reveal the utility in moving beyond the idea that ustna- Despite the fact that Germany an
military alliances are formed to aggregate power capabilities. The Leagues also d A rom f o ne another-they were
both, the two alliances were very diff
1 erent .
show the importance of the dynamics within alliancesan exclusive focus on
diff t functions and they pre-
external aims and objectives would miss entirely the central characteristics of
d
the alliances in regard to both their formation and cohesion. formed for different purposes, they serve eren
1
. ' f
b t The alliances grew out o
sented varying challenges to the mem er sta es. . . B h 11·
common interests, common enemies, · . al antipathies. ot aTh
. an drenpro: !-
If
b
- mlidifyi
ances played an important role so 1 1the
mgdivision ofEurope. . e .gu
1

e a ta .hif hd 11"
I nces became mcreasmg y etween perceived and actual function o t
. .noticeable
. d during inthethis
t trperiod.
renewaThis is most pronounce ..
h
of the Triple Alliance in 1891, when. it appeared th at Great Bntam
. . . . Awas ac-
fth · adversaries joining us-
ceding to the alliance. The threat of anot er O eir F 1
. d R . t gether at last. or
near ytna, Germany and Italy brought France an ussia O d.. 1
, the Central Powers stood atht he eart O f Europe nvmg
forty years, '. re a-
ttons and behavior among the · signatories
. -an d nonmembers ahke.