8/8/2019 G.R. No. 85423 | Tabuena v.

Court of Appeals

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 85423. May 6, 1991.]

JOSE TABUENA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

EMILIANO TABERNILLA, JR., respondents.

Ramon Dimen for petitioner.

Dionisio A. Hernandez for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. EVIDENCE; EVIDENCE NOT FORMALLY OFFERED CANNOT BE

CONSIDERED NOR GIVEN ANY EVIDENTIARY VALUE. — The mere fact
that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not mean it has
thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. They were not
by such marking formally offered as exhibits. As we said in Interpacific Transit,
Inc. v. Aviles, "At the trial on the merits, the party may decide to formally offer
(the exhibits) if it believes they will advance its cause, and then again it may
decide not to do so at all. In the latter event, such documents cannot be
considered evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary value."
2. ID; ID; RATIONALE OF THE RULE. — The offer is necessary because
it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and
strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial.
3. ID; ID; WHEN CONSIDERED ADMISSIBLE AGAINST THE ADVERSE
PARTY. — We did say in People v. Napat-a that even if there be no formal
offer of an exhibit, it may still be admitted against the adverse party if, first, it
has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, it has itself
been incorporated in the records of the case. But we do not fine that these
requirements have been satisfied in the case before us.
4. ID; ORIGINAL RECORD OF A CASE ARCHIVED; WHEN
CONSIDERED READ INTO THE RECORD OF A CASE PENDING BEFORE
A COURT; FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE CONDITIONS. — It is clear,
though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in the absence of
objection," "with the knowledge of the opposing party," or "at the request or
with the consent of the parties," the case is clearly referred to or "the original
or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the archives"
and "admitted as part of the record of the case then pending." These
conditions have not been established here. On the contrary, the petitioner was
https://cdasiaonline.com/jurisprudences/18448/print 1/8
8/8/2019 G.R. No. 85423 | Tabuena v. Court of Appeals

completely unaware that his testimony in Civil Case No. 1327 was being
considered by the trial court in the case then pending before it. As the
petitioner puts it, the matter was never taken up at the trial and was "unfairly
sprung" upon him, leaving him no opportunity to counteract.
5. ID; TAX RECEIPTS AND DECLARATION OF OWNERSHIP;
ACCOMPANIED BY ACTUAL POSSESSION SUPPORT CLAIM OF
OWNERSHIP. — While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible
evidence of ownership they become strong evidence of ownership acquired
by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the
property. It is only where payment of taxes is accompanied by actual
possession of the land covered by the tax declaration that such circumstance
may be material in supporting a claim of ownership.
6. ID; ACTS ACCOMPANYING CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP. — All the acts
of Damasa Timtiman and Jose Tabuena indicate that they were the owners of
the disputed property. Damasa Timtiman and her forebears had been in
possession thereof for more that fifty years and indeed, she herself stayed
there until she died. She paid the realty taxes thereon in her own name. Jose
Tabuena built a house of strong materials on the lot. He even mortgaged the
land to the Development Bank of the Philippines and to two private persons
who acknowledged him as the owner. These acts denote ownership and are
not consistent with the private respondent's claim that the petitioner was only
an overseer with mere possessory rights tolerated by Tabernilla.
7. ID; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE INFERIOR COURTS HELD NOT
CONFORMABLE TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD. — It is the policy of this
Court to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the courts below
and even to regard them as conclusive where there is now showing that they
have been reached arbitrarily. The exception is where such findings do not
conform to the evidence on record and appear indeed to have no valid basis
to sustain their correctness. As in this case.

DECISION

CRUZ, J : p

The petitioner faults the decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the
respondent court, for lack of basis. It is argued that the lower courts should
not have taken into account evidence not submitted by the private respondent
in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land consisting of about
440 square meters and situated in Poblacion, Makato, Aklan. In 1973, an
action for recovery of ownership thereof was filed in the Regional Trial Court

https://cdasiaonline.com/jurisprudences/18448/print 2/8
8/8/2019 G.R. No. 85423 | Tabuena v. Court of Appeals

of Aklan by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena, the herein
petitioner. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the
defendant was required to vacate the disputed lot. 1
As the trial court found, the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. sometime in 1926
to Alfredo Tabernilla while the two were in the United States. Tabernilla
returned to the Philippines in 1934, and Damasa Timtiman, acting upon her
son Juan's instruction, conveyed the subject land to Tabernilla. At the same
time, she requested that she be allowed to stay thereon as she had been
living there all her life. Tabernilla agreed provided she paid the realty taxes on
the property, which she promised to do, and did. She remained on the said
land until her death, following which the petitioner, her son and half-brother of
Juan Peralta, Jr., took possession thereof The complaint was filed when
demand was made upon Tabuena to surrender the property and he refused,
claiming it as his own.
The trial court rejected his defense that he was the absolute owner of the lot,
which he inherited from his parents, who acquired it even before World War II
and had been living thereon since then and until they died. Also disbelieved
was his contention that the subject of the sale between Peralta and Tabernilla
was a different piece of land planted to coconut trees and bounded on three
sides by the Makato River.
Tabuena appealed to the respondent court, complaining that, in arriving at its
factual findings, the trial court motu proprio took cognizance of Exhibits "A",
"B" and "C", which had been marked by the plaintiff but never formally
submitted in evidence. The trial court also erred when, to resolve the
ownership of the subject lot, it considered the proceedings in another case
involving the same parties but a different parcel of land. cdrep

The said exhibits are referred to in the pre-trial order as follows:

Plaintiff proceeded to mark the following exhibits: Exh. "A", letter
dated October 4, 1921 addressed in Makato, Capis, Philippines; Exh.
"A-1", paragraph 2 of the letter indicating that the amount of P600.00
— the first P300.00 and then another P300.00 as interest since
October 4, 1921; Exh. "A-2", is paragraph 3 of the letter; Exh. "B", a
Spanish document; Exh. "C", deed of conveyance filed by Tomasa
Timtiman and Alfredo Tabernilla in 1923; and Exh. "C-1", paragraph 4
of Exh. "C".
In sustaining the trial court, the respondent court held that, contrary to the
allegations of the appellant, the said exhibits were in fact formally submitted in
evidence as disclosed by the transcript of stenographic notes, which it quoted
at length. 2 The challenged decision also upheld the use by the trial court of
testimony given in an earlier case, to bolster its findings in the second case.
We have examined the record and find that the exhibits submitted were not
the above-described documents but Exhibits "X" and "Y" and their sub-
markings, which were the last will and testament of Alfredo Tabernilla and the
https://cdasiaonline.com/jurisprudences/18448/print 3/8
8/8/2019 G.R. No. 85423 | Tabuena v. Court of Appeals

order of probate. It is not at all denied that the list of exhibits does not include
Exhibits "A", "B" and "C". In fact, the trial court categorically declared that
"Exhibits 'A,' 'A-1,' 'A-2,' 'B,' 'C,' and 'C-1,' were not among those documents
or exhibits formally offered for admission by plaintiff-administratrix." This is a
clear contradiction of the finding of the appellate court, which seems to have
confused Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" with Exhibits "X" and "Y", the evidence
mentioned in the quoted transcript.
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides in Section 35 thereof as follows:
Sec. 35. Offer of evidence. — The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which
the evidence is offered must be specified.
The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not
mean it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. It
is true that Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" were marked at the pre-trial of the case
below, but this was only for the purpose of identifying them at that time. They
were not by such marking formally offered as exhibits. As we said in
Interpacific Transit, Inc. vs. Aviles, 3 "At the trial on the merits, the party may
decide to formally offer (the exhibits) if it believes they will advance its cause,
and then again it may decide not to do so at all. In the latter event, such
documents cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be given any
evidentiary value." llcd

Chief Justice Moran explained the rationale of the rule thus:

. . . The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his
findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence
offered by the parties at the trial. 4
We did say in People vs. Napat-a 5 that even if there be no formal offer of an
exhibit, it may still be admitted against the adverse party if, first, it has been
duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, it has itself been
incorporated in the records of the case. But we do not find that these
requirements have been satisfied in the case before us. The trial court said
the said exhibits could be validly considered because, even if they had not
been formally offered, one of the plaintiff's witnesses, Cunegunda Hernandez,
testified on them at the trial and was even cross-examined by the defendant's
counsel. We do not agree. Although she did testify, all she did was identify the
documents. Nowhere in her testimony can we find a recital of the contents of
the exhibits.

Thus, her interrogation on Exhibit "A" ran:

ATTY. LEGASPI:
What is this Exh. "A" about?
A The translation of the letter.
https://cdasiaonline.com/jurisprudences/18448/print 4/8
8/8/2019 G.R. No. 85423 | Tabuena v. Court of Appeals

Q What is the content of this Exh. "A", the letter of the sister of
Juan Peralta to Alfredo Tabernilla?
Court:

The best evidence is the document. Proceed. 6

She also did not explain the contents of the other two exhibits.
The respondent court also held that the trial court committed no reversible
error in taking judicial notice of Tabuena's testimony in a case it had
previously heard which was closely connected with the case before it. It
conceded that as a general rule "courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of
the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are
pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may
have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge." 7
Nevertheless, it applied the exception that:
. . . in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all
parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record
of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case
pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party,
reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in
some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the
original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually
withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at the request or
with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record
of the case then pending. 8
It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in the absence
of objection," "with the knowledge of the opposing party," or "at the request or
with the consent of the parties," the case is clearly referred to or "the original
or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the archives"
and "admitted as part of the record of the case then pending." These
conditions have not been established here. On the contrary, the petitioner was
completely unaware that his testimony in Civil Case No. 1327 was being
considered by the trial court in the case then pending before it. As the
petitioner puts it, the matter was never taken up at the trial and was "unfairly
sprung" upon him, leaving him no opportunity to counteract.
The respondent court said that even assuming that the trial court improperly
took judicial notice of the other case, striking off all reference thereto would
not be fatal to the plaintiff's cause because "the said testimony was merely
corroborative of other evidences submitted by the plaintiff." What "other
evidences"? The trouble with this justification is that the exhibits it intends to
corroborate, to wit, Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", have themselves not been
formally submitted. Cdpr

https://cdasiaonline.com/jurisprudences/18448/print 5/8
8/8/2019 G.R. No. 85423 | Tabuena v. Court of Appeals

Considering the resultant paucity of the evidence for the private respondent,
we feel that the complaint should have been dismissed by the trial court for
failure of the plaintiff to substantiate its allegations. It has failed to prove that
the subject lot was the same parcel of land sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. to Alfredo
Tabernilla and not another property, as the petitioner contends. Even
assuming it was the same lot, there is no explanation for the sale thereof by
Juan Peralta, Jr., who was only the son of Damasa Timtiman. According to the
trial court, "there is no question that before 1934 the land in question
belonged to Damasa Timtiman." Juan Peralta, Jr. could not have validly
conveyed title to property that did not belong to him unless he had appropriate
authorization from the owner. No such authorization has been presented.
It is true that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, as we
have held in many cases. However, that rule is also not absolute and yields to
the accepted and well-known exception. In the case at bar, it is not even
disputed that the petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest have possessed
the disputed property since even before World War II. In light of this
uncontroverted fact, the tax declarations in their name become weighty and
compelling evidence of the petitioner's ownership. As this Court has held:
While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of
ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by
prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the
property. 9
It is only where payment of taxes is accompanied by actual
possession of the land covered by the tax declaration that such
circumstance may be material in supporting a claim of ownership. 10
The tax receipts accompanied by actual and continuous possession
of the subject parcels of land by the respondents and their parents
before them for more than 30 years qualify them to register title to the
said subject parcels of land. 11
The Court can only wonder why, if Alfredo Tabernilla did purchase the
property and magnanimously allowed Damasa Timtiman to remain there, he
did not at least require her to pay the realty taxes in his name, not hers. The
explanation given by the trial court is that he was not much concerned with
the property, being a bachelor and fond only of the three dogs he had bought
from America. That is specious reasoning. At best, it is pure conjecture. If he
were really that unconcerned, it is curious that he should have acquired the
property in the first place, even as dacion en pago. He would have demanded
another form of payment if he did not have the intention at all of living on the
land. On the other hand, if he were really interested in the property, we do not
see why he did not have it declared in his name when the realty taxes thereon
were paid by Damasa Timtiman or why he did not object when the payments
were made in her own name. prcd

https://cdasiaonline.com/jurisprudences/18448/print 6/8
8/8/2019 G.R. No. 85423 | Tabuena v. Court of Appeals

In comparison, all the acts of Damasa Timtiman and Jose Tabuena indicate
that they were the owners of the disputed property. Damasa Timtiman and her
forebears had been in possession thereof for more than fifty years and,
indeed, she herself stayed there until she died. 12 She paid the realty taxes
thereon in her own name. 13 Jose Tabuena built a house of strong materials
on the lot. 14 He even mortgaged the land to the Development Bank of the
Philippines and to two private persons who acknowledged him as the owner. 15
These acts denote ownership and are not consistent with the private
respondent's claim that the petitioner was only an overseer with mere
possessory rights tolerated by Tabernilla.
It is the policy of this Court to accord proper deference to the factual findings
of the courts below and even to regard them as conclusive where there is no
showing that they have been reached arbitrarily. The exception is where such
findings do not conform to the evidence on record and appear indeed to have
no valid basis to sustain their correctness. As in this case.
The conclusions of the trial court were based mainly on Exhibits "A", "B" and
"C", which had not been formally offered as evidence and therefore should
have been totally disregarded, conformably to the Rules of Court. The trial
court also erred when it relied on the evidence submitted in Civil Case No.
1327 and took judicial notice thereof without the consent or knowledge of the
petitioner, in violation of existing doctrine. Thus vitiated, the factual findings
here challenged are as an edifice built upon shifting sands and should not
have been sustained by the respondent court.
Our own finding is that the private respondent, as plaintiff in the lower court,
failed to prove his claim of ownership over the disputed property with
evidence properly cognizable under our adjudicative laws. By contrast, there
is substantial evidence supporting the petitioner's contrary contentions that
should have persuaded the trial judge to rule in his favor and dismiss the
complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with costs against the private respondent. It is
so ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 59-72; decided by Judge Gerardo M.S. Pepito.

2. Ibid., pp. 27-29; Gonzaga-Reyes, J., ponente, with Bellosillo and
Marigomen, JJ., concurring.
3. 186 SCRA 385.
4. Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 6, 1970 Ed., p. 21.
5. 179 SCRA 403.

https://cdasiaonline.com/jurisprudences/18448/print 7/8
8/8/2019 G.R. No. 85423 | Tabuena v. Court of Appeals

6. TSN, April 17, 1980, p. 32.

7. Rollo, p. 25.
8. U.S. vs. Claveria, 29 Phil. 527.
9. Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 533.
10. Heirs of Celso Amarante vs. Court of Appeals, 185 SCRA 585.
11. Samson vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 194.
12. Rollo, p. 64.
13. Exh. "7".
14. Rollo, pp. 39-40.
15. Exhs. "12," "13" and "14."

https://cdasiaonline.com/jurisprudences/18448/print 8/8