Summary Procedure and Specially Endorsed
Summary Procedure and Specially Endorsed
Summary Procedure and Specially Endorsed
2016
SUMMARY PROCEDURE
1. Introduction
In Uganda, civil Suits are governed by the Civil Procedure Act1 which under Section 19
provides that “Every suit shall be instituted in such manner as may be prescribed by the rules”.
Therefore
Summary Procedure is provided for under Order 36 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Rules2
which gives an option to a plaintiff whose claim is liquidated in nature to commence a suit by
way of specially endorsed plaint as opposed to other modes of procedure.
2. Rationale
The rationale for summary procedure was set out by Hon. Justice Obura (as she then was) in the
locus case of Kyoma Byemaro John V Agro Finance Trust Limited 3 when she stated that “As it
was held in the case of Zola & Another v Ralli Brothers Ltd. & Another [1969] EA 691 at page
694, Order 36 is intended to enable a plaintiff with a liquidated claim, to which there is clearly
no good defence to obtain a quick and summary judgment without being unnecessarily kept from
what is due to him by the delaying tactics of the defendant”.
It should therefore be noted from the onset that summary procedure is a very unique mode of
commencing a suit and that it is only applicable in special circumstances. The first being that it is
only applicable to matters filled in the High Court, a court presided over by a chief magistrate
and one by a magistrate Grade One as was stated in the locus celebrated case of Nakabugo Co-
operative society V Livingstone Changas4.
Summary procedure may be invoked by government as a plaintiff but no such suit can be
commenced against Attorney general as is provided under Rule 17 of Civil Procedure
(Government Proceedings) Rules. It follows therefore that whereas a default judgment may be
obtained against a defendant under Order 9 rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules5, no such
judgment may be obtained against government. This was clearly stated held by Hon. Justice
Katutsi in the celebrated case of Agasa Maingi V A.G6 when he stated that“Judgment shall not
be entered and no order shall be made, against the Government in default of appearance or
1
Cap 71
2
S.I 71-1
3
HCMA No. 376 of 2009
4
HCCS No. 4 of 1991
5
Ibid
6
HCCS No. 4 of 1991
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pleading under any provision of the principal rules without leave of the court, and application
for such leave shall be made by summons served not less than seven days before the return day.
Summary procedure is also restricted to liquidated demand for money or debts arising under a
contract, acknowledgement, undertaking, bills of exchange or promissory notes among others as
listed under Order 36 rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Rules7. Liquidated demand was defined by
Hon. Justice Madrama in the locus case of Vallery Allia V Allionzi John8 the learned judge said
“that the terms "liquidated demand" and "pecuniary damages" may be distinguished. This is
what I said:According to Stroud’s judicial dictionary, the terms “liquidated demand” inter alia
means and includes, the amount on a bill of exchange, definite interest on a contract or under a
statute, a sum certain in money, a statutory demand for the payment of a total debt and an
amount due on a judgment.”
It should therefore be noted that a claim for liquidated demand cannot be combined with any
other claim (unliquidated) in a summary suit under Order 36 of the Civil Procedure rules. This
was held by Hon. JusticeMulyagonja in the locus case of Begumisa George V East African
Development Bank9“… where a plaint endorsed for summary procedure contains claims
correctly endorsed and other claims, the court may, by O.33 rule 3 to rule 7 and 10, deal with
the claims correctly specially endorsed as if no other claim had been included therein and allow
the action to proceed as respects the residue of the claim, the court having no power under O.33
to strike out any part of the claim but being unable to give summary judgment for any relief not
within the scope of O.33 rule 2 aforesaid.”
Where there are mixed claims of liquidated and unliquidated, the court may in the exercise of its
mandate under Article 126 (2) (e) of the Constitution sever the unliquidated demand and proceed
to entertain the liquidated demand as was stated by Hon Justice Egonda Ntende in the celebrated
case of Dembe Trading Enterprises Ltd V Uganda Confidential Ltd 10 where he held that “ In the
case at hand, the plaint has coupled or conjoined the liquidated demands and pecuniary damages. In
such a situation rule 8 would be inapplicable, given that in the context of this case, it applies only when
the claim is for damages only. That rule would not apply in the case of conjoined claims. If a plaintiff
desires to proceed with both different categories of claims, it would appear, it is to other rules that it must
be directed. Probably Order 9 Rule 10, the general rule, may be appropriate. Or should plaintiff drop the
claim for general damages, rule 6 may apply and the plaintiff may obtain final judgment on the liquidated
claims, if it has complied with Order 9 Rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Rules. ”
This in effect implies that interest can also be claimed under the same order provided that such
interest is equally liquidated in nature as was clearly stated by Hon. Justice Mulyagonja in the
7
S.I 71-1
8
HCCS No 157 of 2010 (2012)
9
HCMA No. 0451 of 2010
10
HCCS No. 0612 of 2006
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locus case of Begumisa George V East African Development Bank 11 where he held that “I
reviewed the authorities cited by Mr. Guma, i.e. the decisions in Arjabu Kasule v. F. T. Kawesa
[1957] EA 611 and E. M. Cornwell & Co. Ltd. v. Shantaguari Dahyabhai Desai (1941) 6 ULR
103. It is true that they reflect the position that a claim under O.36 should not include interest,
except where the document sued upon includes an agreement on interest. However, the decision
in Arjabu Kasule discusses the question further. Relying on the decision in Uganda Transport
Co. Ltd. v. Count de la Pasture (3) (1954), 21 EACA 163, it was held that:“… where a plaint
endorsed for summary procedure contains claims correctly endorsed and other claims, the court
may, by O.33 rule 3 to rule 7 and 10, deal with the claims correctly specially endorsed as if no
other claim had been included therein and allow the action to proceed as respects the residue of
the claim, the court having no power under O.33 to strike out any part of the claim but being
unable to give summary judgment for any relief not within the scope of O.33 rule 2
aforesaid.”The ratio that a claim including interest cannot be brought under summary
procedure is therefore not applicable to every suit. It will be necessary here to first establish
whether the rest of the respondent’s claim was validly brought under O.36 rule 2 CPR before I
come to a decision that the suit was wrongly endorsed under Order 36 because of a claim for
interest”.
Summary procedure as provided under Order 36 of the Civil Procedure Rules12 may also apply
to recovery of premises with or without a claim for rent where a tenancy has expired or has been
determined by notice.
Therefore, a defendant so served with the said summons in a summary plaint is required to enter
appearance within 10 days from the date of service by way of filling an application for leave to
appear and defend under Order 36 rule 4 of the CPR. This was held by Hon. Justice Egonda
Ntennde in the locus case of Ready Agro-Suppliers & 2 Ors V Uganda Development Bank 15
that “The foregoing provisions are clear in what is demanded of the defendant. He/She must state
by way of affidavit whether the defence alleged goes to the whole or to part only of the plaintiff’s
11
HCMA No. 0451 of 2010
12
S.I 71-1
13
Ibid
14
Ibid
15
HCMA No. 0379 of 2005
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claim, and if only part, which part of the plaintiff’s claim. The response must be specific and not
general or evasive, so as to leave no one in doubt, as to the extent of the plaintiff’s claim that the
defendant genuinely disputes”
It should therefore be noted that a defendant to a summary suit cannot file his/her defense unless
and until leave is granted by court. The said application is by way of notice of motion
accompanied by a valid affidavit under Order 52 of the Civil Procedure Rules as was stated by
Hon. Justice Yorokamu Bamwine in the locus case of Francis W. Bwenjye V Haki Bonera16 that
“Suffice it to say, first of all, that all applications to the court, except where otherwise expressly
provided for under the Civil Procedure Rules, are by motion to be heard in open court. O.52 r.1
of the Civil Procedure Rules is very clear on this. Secondly, applications for leave to defend are
provided for under O.36 r.4 of the Civil Procedure Rules”.
As already noted above, in all summary suit time is of essence. This implies that in application
for leave to appear and defend, the court may grant either conditional or unconditional leave to
the applicant. This emanates from the rational of summary procedure.
This therefore raises the question as to when can court grant an applicant/defendant an
unconditional leave to appear and defend? To answer this question, regard must be had to the
16
HCCA No. 033 of 2009
17
HCMA No. 0451 of 2010
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judgment of Sir Kenneth O’Connor in the land mark case of Suoza Figuerido V Moorings
Hotel18 where the learned judge stated that “the general rule is that a defendant who can show by
affidavit that there is a bonafide triable issue should have unconditional to appear and defend.”
(Emphasis added).
The application must therefore show that the intended defence to the claim is plausible and raises
issues that merit consideration by the court. A plausible defence does not mean one that must
succeed but one that raises important question of law or fact and contest a claim of fact thereof in
a suit. This was the holding of Hon. JusticeYorokamu Bamwine in the locus case of Uganda
Micro-Enterprise Ltd V Micro-Finance Support Center 19 “It should be appreciated that before
leave to appear and defend is granted the Defendant must show by affidavit or otherwise that
there is a bonafide triable issue of fact or law. When there is a reasonable ground of defence to
the claim, the Plaintiff is not entitled to summary Judgment”.
It is therefore prudent practice for such an applicant/defendant to amend the proposed written
statement to the affidavit in support in order to demonstrate the nature of the defence the/she has
against the claim. This was categorically stated by court in the locus case of U.C.B V Mukoome
Agencies20 that “the applicant/defendant should set out the questions of law and fact to prove
triable issues and to annex the written statement of defence as a basis of ascertaining the
plausible defence.”
Therefore, in considering the grounds upon which leave to appear and defend may be granted,
regard may be had to Mula21 who relies on the case of Michalec engg & Mfg V Bank of Egypt22
and gives five major yardstick to determine this. They include;
a) If the defendant has satisfied court that he has a good defence, to the claim on
merits, he is entitled to unconditional leave,
b) If the defendant raises a triable issue indicating that he has a fair or bonafide or
reasonable defence, although not a possibly good defence, he is entitled to
unconditional leave,
c) If the defendant discloses such facts as may be deemed sufficient to entitle him to
defend, i.e if the affidavit discloses that at the trial, he may be able to establish a
defence to the plaintiff’s claim, the court may impose conditions at the time of
granting leave; the conditions being as to the time of trial or the mode of trial but
not as to payment in to court or furnishing security,
18
[1959] E.A 425
19
HCCS No. 125 of 2005
20
[1982] HCB 22
21
The Civil Procedure Code; Lexis Nexis Butterworth, Volume l 4, 17 th Edition @ page 189
22
A.I.R 1977 S.C 577
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This therefore shows that in the hearing, the court does not indulge in to the merits of the defence
on whether or not it will succeed in evidence though the court must ascertain that the said
defence is not a sham or a bogus one. This was the holding of Hon justice Hellen Obura (as she
then was) in the locus case of Kyomya Byemaro John V Agro-Finance Trust Ltd 23 where the
learned judge held that “In light of the aforementioned principle, the issue for determination in
this application is whether the defendant/applicant has by affidavit or otherwise disclosed a
triable issue. In determining this issue, I was mindful of the holding in Maluku Interglobal Trade
Agency Ltd v Bank Of Uganda [1985] HCB 66 that the defendant/applicant does not have to
show a good defence on the merits but should satisfy court that there is an issue or question in
dispute which ought to be tried and the court should not enter upon the trial of issues disclosed
at this stage”
In addition to the above, it should also be noted that where there is a honest dispute to a claim
that involves an admission of a claim, then such admission must be equivocal thus it must state
the extent of the sum admitted. This was categorically held by Hon. Justice Egonda Ntende in the
locus case of Ready Agro-Suppliers Ltd & Ors V U.D.B 24 where he stated that “The foregoing
provisions are clear in what is demanded of the defendant. He/She must state by way of affidavit
whether the defence alleged goes to the whole or to part only of the plaintiff’s claim, and if only
part, which part of the plaintiff’s claim. The response must be specific and not general or
evasive, so as to leave no one in doubt, as to the extent of the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant
genuinely disputes”
The next sensitive question is that under what circumstances may court grant conditional leave to
an applicant/defendant? To answer this question, regard must be had to the famous judgment of
Hon. Justice Hellen Obura (as she then was) in the celebrated case of Tusker Mattresses (U) Ltd
V Royal Care Pharmaceuticals Ltd 25that “I agree with the submission of counsel for the
applicant that the contention of the applicant raises a triable issue of law, that is, whether the
tenancy agreement relied upon by the respondent to bring its claim applies to the current
relationship between the applicant and the respondent. As was held in MALUKU
23
HCMA No. 376 of 2011
24
HCMA No. 0379 of 2005
25
HCMA No. 38 of 2010
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INTERGLOBAL TRADE AGENCY LTD (Supra), the defendant/applicant does not have to show
a good defence on the merits but should satisfy court that there is an issue or question in dispute
which ought to be tried and the court should not enter upon the trial of issues disclosed at this
stage I will grant the applicant conditional leave to appear and defend the main suit. ”
In my opinion, the learned judge seemed to state that where in a summary suit a defendant raises
a defence that in effect does not deny the claim but is in relation to an issue which is to be
determined by court and that the applicant is ready and willing to be bound by the decision of the
court, then such an applicant will be granted conditional leave to appear and defend.
The other circumstance is where the said application for leave is brought out of the specified
time by the Civil Procedure Rules.27 This was the ruling of Hon. Justice Arachi in the locus case
of Zam Zam Noel & Ors V Post Bank Limited 28 when she stated that “Summons in the
summary suit were issued on the 24th July, 2008, the day after filing the suit, giving the applicant
ten (10) days from service thereof to apply for leave from this court to defend the suit or else the
respondent would be entitled to obtain a decree for the amount claimed.”
26
HCMA No. 0451 of 2010
27
S.I 71-1
28
HCMA No. 530 of 2008
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a) The claim as set out in the specially endorsed plaint must be liquidated in
nature and one that falls within the claims set under Order 36 rule 2
CPR,
b) That summons must have been issued and served on the defendant in the
manner provided for under Order 5 CPR and there must be evidence of
service thus an affidavit of service. The above two positions were held by
Order JSC in his lead judgment in the locus case of Edinson Kanyabwera
V Pastori Tumwebaze29 stated that “With the greatest respect, as I have
already said in this judgment, there was no evidence on record that the
defendant was served. Order 5, rule 17 of the C.P.R provides that where
summons have been served on the defendant or his agent or other person
on his behalf, the serving officer, shall in all cases, make or annex or
cause to be annexed to the original summons an affidavit of service stating
the time when and the manner in which the summons was served and
name and address of the person, if any, identifying the person served and
witnessing the delivery of the tender of the summons. The provisions of
this rule is mandatory, it was not complied with in the instant case. What
the rule stipulates about service of summons, in my opinion, applies
equally to service of hearing notice.”
c) The 10days within which the defendant is supposed to apply for leave to
appear and defend must have lapsed without the defendant filling such
application or seeking extension of time. This was the holding of
Hon.Justice Hellen Obura (as she then was) in the locus case of Pinnacle
Projects Ltd V Business in Motion 30 that “This in my view strengthens
counsel for the respondent’s argument that on the 8th June, 2010 when
judgment was entered there was no pending application before this Court
and so it cannot be faulted for entering judgment accordingly.”
d) Finally, the plaintiff must formally move court by way of letter addressed
to either the registrar if the matter is at the high court or to the trial
magistrate in case the matter is in the magistrate court. This is provided for
under the Practice Direction No. 2 of 200231
29
SCCA No. 6 of 2004
30
HCMA No. 362 of 2010
31
Judicial Powers of registrars (High Court)
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Where the defendant applies for leave to appear and defend and the application is dismissed on
merit, the court will enter judgment against the defendant/applicant and that constitutes a final
determination of the matter. This was the holding of Hon. Justice Arach in the locus case of Zam
Zam Noel & Ors V Post Bank Limited 32 that “The applicant was served with summons on the
26th July 2008, but he had filed the said application on the 27 th august 2008. This was one month
after the expiry of the ten days within which he was to apply. I found and rules in favor of the
respondent. As a consequence I dismissed the application, and entered judgment for the
respondent in the sum claimed against the applicant and the other two defendants severally and
jointly for the amount claimed together with interest and costs of the application and the
application and the suit order O36 r 5.”
Therefore, the remedy available to a defendant against whom such judgment has been entered is
either to appeal or apply for review whichever is appropriate in the circumstances. This was the
holding of Hon. Justice Arach in the locus case of Zam Zam Noel & Ors V Post Bank Limited 33
that “This is because it is inconceivable that rule 11 was intended to allow a person where
application for leave to appear and defend a summary suit was dismissed by court, to re-apply to
the same court to set aside the decree and allow the same person to apply for leave to appear
and defend to the same court. This is what the applicant is attempting to achieve by this
application…where an application for leave to appear and defend was dismissed the only
remedy is in my view an appeal against the dismissal order.”
Where the defendant/applicant applies for leave and the same is struck out on account of having
been filled out of time or on grounds of incompetence, court will proceed to enter judgment
against the applicant/defendant and where such applicant is aggrieved, the remedy available is
either to appeal or apply for review whichever is appropriate in the circumstances.
It should therefore be noted that in the two aforementioned circumstances, it is not possible for
the applicant/defendant to apply to set aside the judgment or decree under Order 36 rule 11 of
the CPR because the defendant was heard and hence is not default judgment ie the defendant
appeared but never moved court as to why the judgment should not be entered.
Where judgment is entered in default against the defendant on account of failure to apply for
leave to appear and defend, the remedy lies under Order 36 rule 11 CPR depending on whether
the defendant can satisfy court on the requirements set under the same rule.
32
HCMA No. 530 of 2008
33
Ibid
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It follows therefore that a defendant being a victim of a default decree or judgment entered under
Order 36 rule 3 may invoke the provisions of rule 11 of the same Order and apply to set aside
the judgment or decree against him/her.
It should therefore be noted that for such an application to succeed, the applicant show that
his/her failure to enter appearance was as a result of “good cause”. Order 36 rule 11 CPR does
not define good cause however, Hon. Justice Hellen Obura (as she then was) defined it in the
locus case of Pinnacle Projects Limited V Business in Motion34 that “The phrase “good cause” is
not defined under the Rules but it is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, as; “a legally
sufficient reason”.However, the phrase “sufficient cause” that is normally used interchangeable with the
phrase “good cause” has been explained in a number of authorities. In the cases of: Mugo v Wanjiri
[1970] EA 481 at page 483. Njagi v Munyiri [1975]EA 179 at page 180 and Rosette Kizito v
Administrator General and Others [Supreme Court Civil Application No. 9/86 reported in Kampala Law
Report Volume 5 of 1993 at page 4] it was held that sufficient reason must relate to the inability or
failure to take the particular step in time.”
One of the “good causes” envisaged in the above situation is where defendant failed to enter
appearance due to “non-service” of summons. This was held by Mulenga JSC in his lead
jugment in the landmark case of Geofrey Gatete & Anor V William Kyobe 35 that “The Oxford
Advanced Learners’ Dictionary defines the word “effective” to mean “having the desired effect;
producing the intended result”. In that context, effective service of summons means service of
summons that produces the desired or intended result. Conversely, non-effective service of
summons means service that does not produce such result. There can be no doubt that the
desired and intended result of serving summons on the defendant in a civil suit is to make the
defendant aware of the suit brought against him so that he has the opportunity to respond to it by
either defending the suit or admitting liability and submitting to judgment. The surest mode of
achieving that result is serving the defendant in person. Rules of procedure, however, provide for
such diverse modes of serving summons that the possibility of service failing to produce the
intended result cannot be ruled out in every case.”
This therefore implies that an applicant who is a victim of default judgment under summary
procedure owing to non-service of summons can successfully apply to set aside such a judgment.
This was the holding by Hon Justice Obura (as she then was) in the locus case of Kensington
Africa Limited V Pankaj Kumar Shah & Anor36 that “I am therefore inclined to accept that the
applicant was not aware of the suit at the time the default judgment was entered. That being the
case, the service of summons on the applicant did not produce the desired effect of making the
applicant aware of the pending case. Consequently, I find that there was no effective service of
summons on the applicant.”
34
HCMA No. 362 of 2010
35
SCCA No. 7 of 2005.
36
HCMA No. 649 of 2012
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Upon lodging such an application to set aside the default judgment, it should be noted that the
burden of proof is on him/her to satisfy court that service of summons was not effected upon
him/her in the manner set out in the rules. Hon. Madrama J. applied this principle in the case of
David Ssesanga v Greenland Bank Ltd (In Liquidation) 37 and held that effective service must
produce the desired effect, which is to make the defendant aware of the suit.
The defendant/applicant should file an omnibus application seeking to set aside the judgment and
decree as well as leave to appear and defend. It is not prudent to merely apply to set aside the
judgment and decree without an order for leave to appear and defend. This also extends to stay of
execution where the plaintiff had commenced execution.
It follows from the foregoing that the applicant other than proving the appropriate grounds for
setting aside judgment, he/she is required to demonstrate that there are triable issues or questions
of law or fact that merit adjudication by the court and warrant the grant of leave to appear and
defend. This was stated by Hon Justice Mukasa Lameck in his judgment in the locus case of Ali
Ndawula V R.L Jane38 that “it was held that before setting aside an exparte judgment the Court
has to be satisfied not only that the defendant had some reasonable excuse for failing to enter
appearance but also that there is merit in the defence or in the case itself.”
In conclusion therefore, the applicant must set out the questions of law/fact that constitute the
alleged triable issues and as a matter of prudent practice should annex the proposed written
statement as a basis for court to ascertain whether the applicant has a plausible defence to the
claim or not. This was held by Hon. Justice Mukasa Lameck in the locus case of Jubilee
Insurance Co. Ltd V Fifi Transporters Ltd 39 that “In an application for leave to defend a suit
under summary procedure the law is that the Applicant must show that there is a bonafide triable
issue of fact or law. Any defence raised should be stated with sufficient particulars as to appear
genuine and not generally vague statements denying liability”
37
HCMA No. 406 of 2006
38
HCMA No. 0624 of 2008
39
HCMA No. 0211 of 2008
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