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Republic of the Philippines

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-29015 April 29, 1975

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Isidro C. Borromeo and Solicitor
Dominador L. Quiroz for plaintiff-appellee.

Pablito Pielago for defendant-appellant.

FERNANDO, J.: ñé +. £ ª w ph! 1

It was the failure of the lower court to respect the constitutional right to counsel,1 so it is alleged, that is the basis for
seeking the reversal of a conviction for murder of appellant Manuel Villegas.2 There is more than ample support in
the records for the charge thus hurled. As therein shown, Attorney Geronimo Pajarito explicitly manifested in the
opening of the trial that appellant intimated to him that he had his own lawyer.3 There was an admission that he did
appear for him in the preliminary investigation but only because there was no other counsel.4 Parenthetically, it may
be observed that while in the original complaint there were two other accused with the same surname as the lawyer,
Geremias Pajarito and Samuel Pajarito, after such preliminary investigation, no doubt due to the efforts of this
particular lawyer, possibly a kinsman, they "were both discharged for lack of probable cause."5 To resume, the lower
court at this stage then asked whether the appellant notified Attorney Pajarito about his change of mind. When he
answered in the negative, the Court stated: "All right, you have a lawyer who is appearing for you."6 It is to the credit
of such counsel that he had reservations about the matter, stating that as the accused had manifested that he had
dispensed with his services, his representation might later on be questioned.7 The court was not sufficiently
impressed. Appellant was informed that "the Court will give you a lawyer. Atty. Pajarito is appointed as counsel de
oficio for you. We will proceed with the trial."8 After marking it of record that he was appointed as such counsel de
oficio, the attorney was asked whether he wanted to confer with appellant. This was the answer: "I think I know the
case." 9 The Court then immediately proceeded with the hearing, having the first witness called.10 In the decision itself, there is this meaningful admission by the
court: "No evidence was presented for and in behalf of Manuel Villegas."11

This is how the matter was characterized in the brief of appellant: "The prosecution during the trial presented its
witnesses, and likewise all the defendants, ... except the appellant Manuel Villegas, took the witness stand and
testified for and in their defense. The appellant is a very old man, ignorant and unlettered; during the entire
proceedings in the case, the appellant while present did not know what was going on; the trial court never apprised
the appellant of his fundamental right to be assisted by a lawyer; the trial court did not even bother inquiring why the
appellant Manuel Villegas did not take the witness stand, [something out of the ordinary as] all defendants, except
the appellant, had testified; and the trial court went on throughout the proceedings of the case without knowing why
the appellant did not testify, that if the appellant testified what would his testimony be like, what would be his
demeanor during his testimony, ..."12 Hence, his insistence that no deference was shown to the constitutional right to
counsel. We are inclined to agree and we reverse. Considering, however, the gravity of the offense charged, instead
of an acquittal, there should be a new trial with all the safeguards thrown around an accused.

1. That would be to vindicate a fundamental safeguard which in this case, perhaps from a desire of the lower court
to proceed with the trial and thus ease what could be a congestion in its sala, was inadvertently disregarded. It is not
enough that a counsel de oficio was appointed, especially so as here, where the accused had indicated that he
wanted a lawyer of his choice, a decision prompted moreover by the fact that he had lost confidence in the member
of the bar thus designated. Nor is it to manifest respect for this right if the counsel de oficio thus named, instead of
conferring with the accused, would just blithely inform the judge that he was already fully prepared for his exacting

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responsibility. It was unintended, of course, but the result could not rightly be distinguished from pure travesty.
Appellant could then rightfully invoke this constitutional guarantee. Inasmuch as it is intended to assure a just and
fair proceeding, he is entitled at the most to a new trial where he can be duly represented either by a counsel of his
choice or by one appointed de oficio, one who would discharge his task in a much more diligent and conscientious
manner and would not readily assume that he need not bother himself unduly with familiarizing himself further with
all aspects of the case. For only in such a way may there be an intelligent defense. If the matter be viewed thus,
there is no unfairness to the state either. It can still see to it that a person against whom a probable cause had been
found would have to stand trial, but, to repeat, with all the constitutional safeguards.

2. It would not be amiss to refer to the opinion of Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado,13 where the importance
of this right was stressed. Thus: "In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be
heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in
the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not
know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated.
It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a
constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to
apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an
attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant
him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own."14 There are a number of American Supreme Court
decisions to the same effect. In one of them, William v. Kaiser, Justice Douglas succinctly summed up the matter
thus: "[The accused] needs the aid of counsel lest he be the victim of overzealous prosecutors, of the law's
complexity, or of his own ignorance or bewilderment."15

What is more, it is one of the worthwhile innovations of the present Constitution that even at the stage of custodial
interrogation when the police agencies are investigating a man's possible connection with a crime, he is already
entitled to counsel.16 In a true sense, that is merely to underscore the historical fact that even under the organic acts
17
prior to the 1935 Constitution, there was an awareness of the importance of the right to counsel.18 This is not of
course to assert that this Court in the past had invariably accorded it an interpretation favorable to the stand of an
accused. Thus in United States v. Labial, 19 a 1914 decision, it was held that the failure of the record to disclose
affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of their right to counsel is not sufficient ground for the reversal
of a conviction. When Labial was affirmed in United States v. Escalante,20 decided in 1917, Justice Malcolm was
moved to file a vigorous dissent. It suffices to recall his conformity to the view of Cooley that this is "perhaps the
privilege most important to the person accused of crime.21 It is in that spirit, or something akin to it, that the framers
of the 1935 Constitution approached the subject. Of even greater relevance is the fact that the present fundamental
law has, as above indicated, vitalized still further its worth and significance.

WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of December 4, 1967 insofar as it found Manuel Villegas guilty of the crime
of murder is reversed and a new trial ordered forthwith for such accused. This decision is immediately executory. No
costs.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur. 1 ä wp h ï 1 . ñ ë t

Footnotes t ê ñ. £ î hqw â £

1 Article III, Section 1, par. 17 of the 1935 Constitution. The applicable provision at the time of the
hearing, insofar as pertinent reads: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be presumed to be
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, ...."

2 He was accused along with a certain Felipe Malunsing and Alfredo Rivera.

3 T.s.n., Session of December 21, 1965, 2.

4 Ibid.

5 Decision, Appendix to Brief for Appellant, 1.

6 T.s.n., Session of December 21, 1965, 2.

7 Ibid, 3.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

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11 Decision, Appendix to Brief for Appellant, 3.

12 Brief for the Defendant-Appellant, 2.

13 85 Phil. 752 (1950). Before this leading case, the following decisions may be noted: People v.
Cachero, 73 Phil. 426 (1941); People V. Miranda, 78 Phil, 418 (1947); People v. Prieto, 80 Phil. 138
(1948); and People v. Silerio, 81 Phil. 124 (1948).

14 Ibid, 756-757. Cf. Montilla v. Sullano, 89 Phil. 434 (1951); People v. Nabaluna, 101 Phil. 402 (1957);
and People v. Espejo, L-27708, Dec. 19, 1970, 36 SCRA 400.

15 323 US 471 (1945).

16 According to Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution insofar as relevant: "Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and
to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates
the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence." Cf. Magtoto v. Manguera, L-37201-02, March 3, 1975.

17 Cf. The Philippine Bill, Section 5 (1902) and the Philippine Autonomy Act, Section 3 (1916).

18 Cf. U.S. v. Gimeno, 1 Phil. 236 (1902); U.S. v. Santos, 4 Phil. 419 (1905); U.S. v. Palisoc, 4 Phil. 207
(1905); U.S. v. Bacarrisas, 6 Phil. 539 (1906); U.S. v. Capa, 19 Phil. 125 (1911); U.S. v. Go Leng, 21
Phil. 420 (1912); U.S. v. Laranja, 21 Phil. 500 (1912); U.S. v. Ramirez, 26 Phil. 616 (1914); U.S. v.
Labial, 27 Phil. 82 (1914); U.S. v. Custan, 28 Phil. 19 (1914); U.S. v. Kilayko, 31 Phil. 371 (1915);
Tamayo v. Gsell 35 Phil. 953 (1916); U.S. v. Escalante, 36 Phil. 743 (1917); People v. Abuyen, 52 Phil.
722 (1929); People v. Del Rosario, 56 Phil. 796 (1931); Chua Go v. Collector of Customs, 59 Phil. 523
(1934).

19 27 Phil. 82.

20 36 Phil. 743.

21 Ibid, 747.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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