The State of Texas

Forensic Audit Division Phone: 512-475-2725

P.O. Box 13942 Fax: 512-475-2811
Austin, Texas 78711-3942 Dial 7-1-1 For Relay Services
www.sos.state.tx.us
John B. Scott
Secretary of State

October 18, 2022

Via Electronic Mail

Clifford Tatum
Harris County Elections Administrator
1001 Preston
Houston, TX 77002

Re: Notice of Mobile Ballot Boxes from the 2020 General Election lacking proper chain-of-custody
and request for corrective action.

Dear Mr. Tatum,

We are writing to inform you that our ongoing audit of Harris County has revealed serious breaches of
proper elections records management in the handling of Mobile Ballot Boxes (MBBs) during the November
2020 General Election. The urgency of this letter is to ensure that none of these process issues occur in the
upcoming November 2022 General Election.
As you are aware, the Forensic Audit Division (FAD) of the Texas Secretary of State’s Office has been
conducting an audit of Harris County. Throughout the audit process, we have endeavored to complete the
audit in the most efficient manner possible and to do so with the full cooperation of the counties. While we
have had the benefit of cooperatively working with the other three counties subject to the audit, we cannot
say the same of our experience working with your predecessor. The previous Harris County Elections
Administrator failed to respond to our initial requests for basic information in our December 10, 2021 letter,
forcing our team to take extraordinary steps to obtain responsive records. The lack of response forced our
team to make at least seven trips to Harris County to review paper records in the Election Technology
Center warehouse. We were not provided an inventory of the records nor were we given the opportunity
to speak with Harris County Elections staff.
We are thankful for the efforts you have made to assist our audit team since you began your new role.
When we presented preliminary findings to you on October 4, 2022, you made staff available for the first
time and provided us with some of the electronic records that we had requested since June 2022. Just last
week we received long-requested records that resolved some of our concerns. But what’s troubling is that
the records you recently provided still leave many questions unanswered. Given that early voting for the
November 2022 election begins in a matter of days, there is an immediate need for us to inform you of our
preliminary findings.
We have identified the following issues in the November 2020 General Election:

• There are at least 14 polling locations where MBBs 1 included in the Tally program do not have
proper chain-of-custody. Multiple MBBs were created for these locations but there is no indication
as to why one MBB was used instead of another. Harris County must maintain records that indicate
why electronically stored ballots were either used or discarded. See TEX. ELEC. CODE §§ 1.012 2-
1.013, 3 66.002, 4 129.051. 5 For the November 2022 General Election, Harris County must document
when and if any vDrives 6 are duplicated or otherwise created by Central Count, explain the reasons
why, and document the transfer of custody for all vDrives. See TEX. ELEC. CODE § 129.051.

• Pollbook and provisional voting data provided by Harris County do not match the number of cast
vote records (CVRs) on certain MBBs. Although we continue to investigate this issue, basic
election reconciliation between pollbooks and ballots should be done and documented. See TEX.
ELEC. CODE § 127.131.

• Although we are still investigating, Harris County does not appear to have maintained systems to
read the MBBs or otherwise recover CVRs stored within. Without these systems, we are not able
to review the data on the MBBs, some of which were used at the extralegal drive-through voting
locations. Harris County is required to maintain these records in a readily accessible format during
the 22-month preservation period pursuant to state and federal law. TEX. ELEC. CODE §§ 66.002,
66.058(a); see also 52 U.S.C. § 20701 (for certain Federal Elections such as the 2020 General
Election).

• At a minimum, meaningful records retention should allow for access to all election records. Harris
County has not met this minimum for the records related to the November 2020 General Election.
Harris County should maintain, and be able to produce, records for the November 2022 General
Election in numbered boxes with an inventory of contents for each box. 7 See TEX. ELEC. CODE
§1.012 (“an election record that is public information shall be made available to the public…”)
(emphasis added); 2022 Tex. Op. Att’y Gen. KP-0411; Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 150
(2002) (defining “available” as “accessible” or “may be obtained”).

1
An MBB stores cast vote records (CVRs) and is the removable media storage device that is ultimately read and
tabulated.
2
“Election record” includes anything distributed or received by government under the Election Code; anything
required by law to be kept by others for information of government under this code; or a certificate, application, notice,
report, or other document or paper issued or received by government under this code.
3
Observing election records include “voted ballots, election returns, other election records, or other records that are
preserved under the Election Code.”
4
Defining election records to include “voted ballots.”
5
“The general custodian of records shall create and maintain an inventory of all electronic storage media…shall
develop a procedure for tracking the custody of each electronic information storage medium from its storage location,
through election coding and the election process, to its final post-election disposition and return to
storage….require[s] two or more individuals to perform a check and verification check whenever a transfer of custody
occurs.” (emphasis added).
6
Harris County’s current voting system uses vDrives instead of MBBs.
7
See Chain of Custody Best Practices, Texas Secretary of State Annual Election Law Seminar (August 2022).

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Please verify to us in writing within five days that Harris County will take appropriate actions to ensure
that any of the above issues will not occur during the November 2022 election.
Background
On December 10, 2021, our office sent a letter to the four counties subject to audit for the 2020 General
Election that requested, “A list of Early Voting or Election Day polling locations that had a discrepancy of
one percent or more between the number of voters that checked in to the number of votes cast at that
location.” In essence, this was a request for documentation of standard polling location reconciliation that
should be conducted in every election. Although the other counties provided substantive responses, Harris
County replied on December 21, 2021, that, “Our office has gathered information and is in the process of
comparing for any percentage discrepancies.” Despite continued requests from our office, Harris County
has never provided a list of discrepancies on a location-by-location basis.
From our discussions with the former Election Administrator, Isabel Longoria, and her deputy, Beth
Stevens, it was our understanding that when Harris County upgraded their voting systems from the Hart
InterCivic voting system that utilized eSlates as Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) devices after the 2020
General Election to the current Verity system, Harris County did not retain any equipment or computers
that provide the relevant reports or, alternatively, can read MBBs from that election.
It is also our understanding that while the Hart voting system in use for the 2020 General Election is
equipped with software that has the ability to generate multiple reports and audit logs, Harris County
produced only a limited subset of these records. In response to our request for these documents in June
2022, Harris County stated they provided all reports they were able to produce. Given Harris County’s
failure to respond to our December 2021 request and the absence of a fulsome 2020 electronic record, FAD
has endeavored to compile on its own the previously requested list of polling locations for which there was
a discrepancy of 1% or more. We have compared daily summary-of-voter totals, daily count tapes from the
JBCs and eSlates, the Tally audit log, and other records in an attempt to piece together location-specific
data. We have also reviewed the Central Count Packets, Early Voting Reconciliation Envelopes, and
Election Day Reconciliation Packets. As you are aware, Harris County maintains their paper elections
records in its warehouse. These records comprise the papers for hundreds of polling locations in over 500
boxes and plastic tubs of election records and Harris County has been unable to provide any inventory of
the records. Nevertheless, in the course of our review, we found multiple discrepancies that cannot be
explained from the records that were made available to us.
After speaking with you and your team, Harris County has now provided reports and records that were not
produced previously. As recently as this past Friday, we have been informed that a backup of the election
should exist. Harris County Elections staff has indicated that eSlates and JBCs are backed up which may
lead to the recovery of additional information.

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Harris County’s Handling of eSlates for Certain Locations, Primarily Drive-Through Locations
The voting system Harris County used during the 2020 General Election comprised eSlates 8 (the machine
on which the voter inputs his vote) and a Judge’s Booth Controller (controller or JBC). The CVR was
captured on the JBC in the MBB and also stored internally on the eSlate. Drive-through voting was
implemented for the 2020 General Election by Chris Hollins, formerly the Harris County Clerk.
It is our understanding that Harris County experienced difficulties recovering CVRs from the MBBs used
in Harris County’s extralegal experiment with drive-through voting. Harris County consulted Hart
regarding its intention to use the equipment for drive-through voting, and Hart was under the impression
the eSlates would remain connected to the JBC because there were well-known issues with bent or broken
pins that had prompted Hart to design a protector. 9 At the drive-through locations, however, the eSlates
were routinely unplugged from the JBC, taken to a voter, and then plugged back into the JBC.
Unsurprisingly, pins on the connectors to the JBCs were damaged. Consequently, the eSlates were not
reliably transferring the CVRs to the MBB in the JBCs as would be the typical process, resulting in stranded
votes. Additionally, it is our understanding that in some circumstances eSlates paired with a particular JBC
had been inadvertently “crossed” or paired with a different JBC in the unplugging/replugging process.
Damaged pins and crossed eSlates resulted in inconsistencies in the number of votes captured on an eSlate
versus the number of access codes issued from a JBC. These issues rendered the tapes printed from the
JBCs largely useless in the reconciliation process. In addition, although the eSlates from drive-through
voting were transferred to other custodians to rescue the stranded ballots, there are no chain-of-custody
documents showing the transfers. See TEX. ELEC. CODE § 129.051; Election Advisory 2019-23. The
lack of chain-of-custody of the eSlates is especially concerning because Harris County was aware that the
count of CVRs on the JBCs were inaccurate so the eSlates were by necessity going to be the official record
of cast ballots.
FAD Discovered 14 Locations Where Multiple MBBs Were Created Without Explanation
For at least 14 locations, 10 we have located records of voters voting at these polling locations and ballots
being captured by the eSlates, JBCs, and—in turn—the MBBs. The MBBs from the polling locations,
however, were not the MBBs ultimately tabulated. In some cases, there are chain-of-custody documents
for the MBBs that were returned by election judges to Central Count, but the MBB is not located in the
Central Count packet and there is no record to explain why the original MBBs from the polling location are
not in the packet and were not tabulated. In addition, FAD has been able to locate missing MBBs in an
alternate box or tub, though a chain-of-custody or documentation did not exist to explain why the original
MBBs were not tabulated or how Harris County ensured the votes cast at those particular locations were
tabulated.

8
In some circumstances, the voting device utilized was a disabled access unit (DAU). For ease of reference, the term
eSlate will be used to refer to both interchangeably throughout.
9
See also Appendix A: Hart Voting System Support Procedures Training Manual at 368 (“Bent or Recessed Connector
Pins”); id. at 376 (describing procedure to install Booth Port Protectors and noting: “The pins on the outside of the
eSlate and DAU eSlate booths are subject to damage. If damaged, the solution typically requires that the entire booth
pigtail be replaced.”).
10
List attached as Appendix B.

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Having reviewed the recently provided material in hopes of establishing the connection between the MBBs
tabulated with the votes cast at these locations, we are unable to do so for several locations. Unfortunately,
even the audit logs do not reflect the creation of the MBBs ultimately tabulated or enable us to trace the
votes tabulated back to the polling location without significant breaks in the chain-of-custody.
Among other deficiencies, chain-of-custody documentation 11 for the CVRs from these locations is lacking
in the following respects: the disposition of the original MBBs from the JBCs; the transfer of the eSlates
from one location to the next; the creation of MBBs associated with certain early voting locations; and why
MBBs documented to be associated with particular drive-through voting locations were not the MBBs
ultimately tabulated.
Pollbook and Provisional Data Provided by Harris County Do Not Match the Number of CVRs on
the MBBs
Additionally, in reviewing the pollbook and provisional vote records provided to us, the number of CVRs
for each of the MBBs identified as associated with a location described above show discrepancies between
the expected CVRs and the CVRs that were tabulated. Last week, Harris County provided pollbook records
with voter sign-ins from all Early Voting and Election Day locations. The number of voters checked in on
the pollbook plus the number of provisional votes at a particular location should match the number of CVRs
on an MBB associated with a particular location. This, however, is not the case. For example, the pollbook
record from DTV-141U reflects 19,216 voters checked in on the pollbook. The provisional data provided
reflects 99 provisional votes were cast at that location. The total expected number of CVRs on the MBB
associated with this location is 19,315. Yet the actual number of CVRs contained on the MBB associated
with this location is 19,716 yielding an excess of 401 CVRs. We are continuing to investigate this issue but
we wanted to bring this to your attention to ensure reconciliations are done on a daily basis, or at a minimum
at the end of early voting, to ensure this does not occur in the November 2022 Election.
Summary
FAD has identified at least 14 locations where chain-of-custody documentation is lacking at best and
missing at worst. We also understand that Harris County has no current ability to read MBBs so we are
unable to review the CVRs stored on the individual MBBs to verify the contents.
We appreciate the cooperation and assistance provided by the current Election Administrator and Harris
County Elections staff. The integrity of our election processes is of utmost importance to your team and is
evident in their response and efforts to explain to us what occurred in 2020. We also understand that
processes and procedures have changed in Harris County since the November 2020 General Election, and
that properly implementing chain-of-custody processes and documentation of the handling of ballots is now
a top priority.
In light of the above, and in order to ensure that proper procedures for the handling of ballots and electronic
media are followed, the Secretary of State’s Office will be providing you the following resources:

• We will be sending a contingent of inspectors to the county to observe Central Count during the
November 2022 election to ensure that Harris County establishes appropriate procedures and

11
See TEX. ELEC. CODE § 129.051; Election Advisory 2019-23; and Appendix C: Hart Best Practices Guide (2009)
at 100 (“Record receipt and movement of all equipment and MBBs on a chain-of-custody document.”).

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 follows them. These inspectors will perform randomized checks on election records, including
tapes and chain-of-custody, and will observe the handling and counting of ballots and electronic
media.

• The Texas Office of Attorney General has agreed to dispatch a task force to Harris County that
will be available at all times during the election period in order to immediately respond to any
legal issues identified by Secretary of State, inspectors, poll watchers, or voters.

• Election Security Trainers from the Secretary of State’s Elections Division will be present to assist
Harris County for the duration of the election period from early voting, to Election Day, and
through tabulation.
Thank you again for your cooperation. Please contact me with any questions or concerns.
Best,

Chad Ennis
Director of the Forensic Audit Division
Office of the Secretary of State

Attachments(3)

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CC:
Greg Abbott, Governor
Dan Patrick, Lieutenant Governor
Dade Phelan, Speaker of the House
Brent Webster, First Assistant Attorney General
Bryan Hughes, Chair, Senate Committee on State Affairs
Brian Birdwell, Vice-Chair, Senate Committee on State Affairs
Briscoe Cain, Chair, Elections Committee
Jessica Gonzalez, Vice-Chair, Elections Committee