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546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pilapil vs. Court of Appeals

*
G.R. No. 52159. December 22, 1989.

JOSE PILAPIL, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and

ALATCO TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., respondents.

Civil Law; Transportation; Common carriers; A common carrier does

not give its consent to become an insurer of any and all risks to passengers
and goods.—In consideration of the right granted to it by the public to
engage in the business of transporting passengers and goods, a common
carrier does not give its consent to become an insurer of any and all risks to
passengers and goods. It merely undertakes to perform certain duties to the
public as the law imposes, and holds itself liable for any breach thereof.

_____________

* SECOND DIVISION.

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VOL. 180, DECEMBER 22, 1989 547

Pilapil vs. Court of Appeals

Same; Same; Same; Same; While the law requires the highest degree of
diligence from common carriers, it does not make the carrier an insurer of
the absolute safety of its passengers.—While the law requires the highest
degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport of their
passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does
not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its
passengers.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Art. 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the
duty of extraordinary care, vigilance and precaution in the carriage of
passengers by common carriers to only such as human care and foresight
can provide.—Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of
extraordinary care, vigilance and precaution in the carriage of passengers by
common carriers to only such as human care and foresight can provide.

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What constitutes compliance with said duty is adjudged with due regard to
all the circumstances.
Same; Same; Same; Presumption of negligence; Art. 1756 of the Civil
Code in creating a presumption of fault or negligence of the common
carrier when its passenger is injured, merely relieves the carrier from
introducing evidence to fasten the negligence on the carrier; The
presumption of negligence is rebuttable by proof that the carrier had
exercised extraordinary diligence.—Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in
creating a presumption of fault or negligence on the part of the common
carrier when its passenger is injured, merely relieves the latter, for the time
being, from introducing evidence to fasten the negligence on the former,
because the presumption stands in the place of evidence. Being a mere
presumption, however, the same is rebuttable by proof that the common
carrier had exercised extraordinary diligence as required by law in the
performance of its contractual obligation, or that the injury suffered by the
passenger was solely due to a fortuitous event.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Liability of common carriers for personal
injuries sustained by a passenger rests upon its negligence.—Thus, it is
clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a transportation
company makes it an insurer of the passenger’s safety, but that its liability
for personal injuries sustained by its passenger rests upon its negligence, its
failure to exercise the degree of diligence that the law requires.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the injuries sustained by the
petitioner was not due to any defect in the means of transport or in the
method of transporting or to the negligent or willful acts of respondent’s
employees, the presumption is rebutted.—First, as stated earlier, the

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Pilapil vs. Court of Appeals

presumption of fault or negligence against the carrier is only a disputable

presumption. It gives in where contrary facts are established proving either
that the carrier had exercised the degree of diligence required by law or the
injury suffered by the passenger was due to a fortuitous event. Where, as in
the instant case, the injury sustained by the petitioner was in no way due to
any defect in the means of transport or in the method of transporting or to
the negligent or wilful acts of private respondent’s employees, and therefore
involving no issue of negligence in its duty to provide safe and suitable cars
as well as competent employees, with the injury arising wholly from causes
created by strangers over which the carrier had no control or even
knowledge or could not have prevented, the presumption is rebutted and the
carrier is not and ought not to be held liable. To rule otherwise would make

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the common carrier the insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers which
is not the intention of the lawmakers.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While as a general rule common carriers
are bound to exercise extraordinary diligence in the safe transport of its
passengers, it is not the standard by which its liability is to be determined
when intervening acts of strangers directly cause the injury while the
contract of carriage exists.—Second, while as a general rule, common
carriers are bound to exercise extraordinary diligence in the safe transport of
their passengers, it would seem that this is not the standard by which its
liability is to be determined when intervening acts of strangers directly
cause the injury, while the contract of carriage exists.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A tort committed by a stranger which
causes injury to a passenger does not accord the passenger a cause of
action against the carrier.—Clearly under the above provision, a tort
committed by a stranger which causes injury to a passenger does not accord
the latter a cause of action against the carrier. The negligence for which a
common carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission by the carrier’s
employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same could
have been foreseen and prevented by them. Further, under the same
provision, it is to be noted that when the violation of the contract is due to
the wilful acts of strangers, as in the instant case, the degree of care essential
to be exercised by the common carrier for the protection of its passenger is
only that of a good father of a family.
Same; Same; Same; The rule of ordinary care and prudence is not so
exacting as to require one charged with its exercise to take doubtful or
unreasonable precautions to guard against unlawful acts of

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Pilapil vs. Court of Appeals

strangers.—Although the suggested precaution could have prevented the

injury complained of, the rule of ordinary care and prudence is not so
exacting as to require one charged with its exercise to take doubtful or
unreasonable precautions to guard against unlawful acts of strangers. The
carrier is not charged with the duty of providing or maintaining vehicles as
to absolutely prevent any and all injuries to passengers. Where the carrier
uses cars of the most approved type, in general use by others engaged in the
same occupation, and exercises a high degree of care in maintaining them in
suitable condition, the carrier cannot be charged with negligence in this
respect.
Same; Same; Same; Making the carrier liable for stone throwing
incidents is better left to the consideration of Congress.—Finally, petitioner

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contends that it is to the greater interest of the State if a carrier were made
liable for such stone-throwing incidents rather than have the bus riding
public lose confidence in the transportation system. Sad to say, we are not in
a position to so hold; such a policy would be better left to the consideration
of Congress which is empowered to enact laws to protect the public from
the increasing risks and dangers of lawlessness in society.

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of

Appeals. Gutierrez, Jr., J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Martin Badong, Jr. for petitioner.
     Eufronio K. Maristela for private respondent.

PADILLA, J.:
**
This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision rendered by
the Court of Appeals dated 19 October 1979 in CA-G.R. No. 57354-
R entitled “Jose Pilapil, plaintiff-appellee versus Alatco
Transportation Co., Inc., defendant-appellant,” which reversed and
set aside the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur in Civil Case No. 7230 ordering respondent transportation
company to pay to petitioner damages in the total sum of sixteen
thousand three hundred pesos (P16,300.00).

_________________

** Penned by Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., with Justices Edgardo L. Paras,

Milagros A. German, Jorge R. Coquia, concurring. Justice Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr.
dissented.

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Pilapil vs. Court of Appeals

The record discloses the following facts:

Petitioner-plaintiff Jose Pilapil, a paying passenger, boarded
respondent-defendant’s bus bearing No. 409 at San Nicolas, Iriga
City on 16 September 1971 at about 6:00 P.M. While said bus No.
409 was in due course negotiating the distance between Iriga City
and Naga City, upon reaching the vicinity of the cemetery of the
Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, on the way to Naga City, an
unidentified man, a bystander along said national highway, hurled a
stone at the left side of the bus, which hit petitioner above his left
eye. Private respondent’s personnel lost no time in bringing the
petitioner to the provincial hospital in Naga City where he was
confined and treated. Considering that the sight of his left eye was
impaired, petitioner was taken to Dr. Malabanan of Iriga City where
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he was treated for another week. Since there was no improvement in

his left eye’s vision, petitioner went to V. Luna Hospital, Quezon
City where he was treated by Dr. Capulong. Despite the treatment
accorded to him by Dr. Capulong, petitioner lost partially his left
eye’s vision and sustained a permanent scar above the left eye.
Thereupon, petitioner instituted before the Court of First Instance
of Camarines Sur, Branch I an action for recovery of damages
sustained as a result of the stone-throwing incident. After trial, the
court aquo rendered judgment with the following dispositive part:

“Wherefore, judgment is hereby entered:

1. Ordering defendant transportation company to pay plaintiff Jose

Pilapil the sum of P10,000.00, Philippine Currency, representing
actual and material damages for causing a permanent scar on the
face and injuring the eye-sight of the plaintiff;
2. Ordering further defendant transportation company to pay the sum
of P5,000.00, Philippine Currency, to the plaintiff as moral and
exemplary damages;
3. Ordering furthermore, defendant transportation company to
reimburse plaintiff the sum of P300.00 for his medical expenses
and attorney’s fees in the sum of P1,000.00, Philippine Currency;
and
4. To pay the costs.
1
SO ORDERED.”

______________

1 Record on Appeal, Annex “B”, Rollo, p. 31.

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VOL. 180, DECEMBER 22, 1989 551

Pilapil vs. Court of Appeals

From the judgment, private respondent appealed to the Court of

Appeals where the appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 57354-R.
On 19 October 1979, the Court of Appeals, in a Special Division of
Five, rendered judgment reversing and setting aside the judgment of
the court aquo.
Hence the present petition.
In seeking a reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
petitioner contends that said court has decided the issue not in
accord with law. Specifically, petitioner argues that the nature of the
business of a transportation company requires the assumption of
certain risks, and the stoning of the bus by a stranger resulting in

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injury to petitioner-passenger is one such risk from which the

common carrier may not exempt itself from liability.
We do not agree.
In consideration of the right granted to it by the public to engage
in the business of transporting passengers and goods, a common
carrier does not give its consent to become an insurer of any and all
risks to passengers and goods. It merely undertakes to perform
certain duties to the public as the law imposes, and holds itself liable
for any breach thereof.
Under Article 1733 of the Civil Code, common carriers are
required to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the
passenger transported by them, according to all the circumstances of
each case. The requirement of extraordinary diligence imposed upon
common carriers is restated in Article 1755: “A common carrier is
bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.” Further, in case
of death of or injuries to passengers, the law presumes said common
2
carriers to be at fault or to have acted negligently.
While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from
common carriers in the safe transport of their passengers and creates
a presumption of negligence against them, it does not, however, 3
make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.

_______________

2 Article 1756, New Civil Code.

3 Strong v. Iloilo-Negros Air Express Co., 40 OG Supp. 12 p. 274; Alfaro v.
Ayson, 54 OG Dec. 1, 1958, p. 7920.

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Pilapil vs. Court of Appeals

Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary

care, vigilance and precaution in the carriage of passengers by
common carriers to only such as human care and foresight can
provide. What constitutes compliance with said duty is adjudged
with due regard to all the circumstances.
Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault
or negligence on the part of the common carrier when its passenger
is injured, merely relieves the latter, for the time being, from
introducing evidence to fasten the negligence on the former, because
the presumption stands in the place of evidence. Being a mere
presumption, however, the same is rebuttable by proof that the
common carrier had exercised extraordinary diligence as required by
law in the performance of its contractual obligation, or that the
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injury suffered by the passenger was solely due to a fortuitous

4
event.
In fine, we can only infer from the law the intention of the Code
Commission and Congress to curb the recklessness of drivers and
operators of common carriers in the conduct of their business.
Thus, it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business
of a transportation company makes it an insurer of the passenger’s
safety, but that its liability for personal injuries sustained by its
passenger rests upon its negligence, its failure to exercise the degree
5
of diligence that the law requires.
Petitioner contends that respondent common carrier failed to
rebut the presumption of negligence against it by proof on its part
that it exercised extraordinary diligence for the safety of its
passengers.
We do not agree.
First, as stated earlier, the presumption of fault or negligence
against the carrier is only a disputable presumption. It gives in where
contrary facts are established proving either that the carrier had
exercised the degree of diligence required by law or the injury
suffered by the passenger was due to a fortuitous event. Where, as in
the instant case, the injury sustained by the petitioner was in no way
due to any defect in the means of

_______________

4 Art. 1174, Civil Code; Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657.

5 Art. 1170, 1173, Civil Code; Alfaro v. Ayson, Supra; Necesito, et al. vs. Paras, et
al., 104 Phil. 75.

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VOL. 180, DECEMBER 22, 1989 553

Pilapil vs. Court of Appeals

transport or in the method of transporting or to the negligent or

wilful acts of private respondent’s employees, and therefore
involving no issue of negligence in its duty to provide safe and
suitable cars as well as competent employees, with the injury arising
wholly from causes created by strangers over which the carrier had
no control or even knowledge or could not have prevented, the
presumption is rebutted and the carrier is not and ought not to be
held liable. To rule otherwise would make the common carrier the
insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers which is not the
intention of the lawmakers.
Second, while as a general rule, common carriers are bound to
exercise extraordinary diligence in the safe transport of their
passengers, it would seem that this is not the standard by which its
liability is to be determined when intervening acts of strangers
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directly cause the injury, while the contract of carriage exists. Article
1763 governs:

“Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a

passenger on account of the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or
of strangers, if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the
act or omission.”

Clearly under the above provision, a tort committed by a stranger

which causes injury to a passenger does not accord the latter a cause
of action against the carrier. The negligence for which a common
carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission by the carrier’s
employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same
could have been foreseen and prevented by them. Further, under the
same provision, it is to be noted that when the violation of the
contract is due to the wilful acts of strangers, as in the instant case,
the degree of care essential to be exercised by the common carrier
for the protection of its passenger is only that of a good father of a
family.
Petitioner has charged respondent carrier of negligence on the
ground that the injury complained of could have been prevented by
the common carrier if something like mesh-work grills had covered
the windows of its bus.
We do not agree.
Although the suggested precaution could have prevented the

554

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Pilapil vs. Court of Appeals

injury complained of, the rule of ordinary care and prudence is not
so exacting as to require one charged with its exercise to take
doubtful or unreasonable precautions to guard against unlawful acts
of strangers. The carrier is not charged with the duty of providing or
maintaining vehicles as to absolutely prevent any and all injuries to
passengers. Where the carrier uses cars of the most approved type,
in general use by others engaged in the same occupation, and
exercises a high degree of care in maintaining them in suitable
condition, the carrier cannot be charged with negligence in this
6
respect.
Finally, petitioner contends that it is to the greater interest of the
State if a carrier were made liable for such stone-throwing incidents
rather than have the bus riding public lose confidence in the
transportation system.
Sad to say, we are not in a position to so hold; such a policy
would be better left to the consideration of Congress which is

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empowered to enact laws to protect the public from the increasing

risks and dangers of lawlessness in society.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

          Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Sarmiento and Regalado,

JJ., concur.
     Paras, J., No Part, Concurred in CA. decision.

Judgment affirmed.

Note.—Common carriers are enjoined to teach their drivers on

correct measures that insure the safety of the passengers at all times.
(Juntilla vs. Fontanar, 136 SCRA 624.)

——o0o——

_______________

6 Irwin v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 50 Southern Reporter 32.

555

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