Urbana Sredina I LoPo
Urbana Sredina I LoPo
Urbana Sredina I LoPo
Glenn
Steven L. Hartman
Scott Gerwehr
R
Arroyo Center
ISBN: 0-8330-3466-9
iii
iv Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
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vi Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
Conclusion ................................... 35
The Next Step: Functional Area Analysis ............. 35
Chapter Three
ARMING ..................................... 39
Anticipation and Adaptation ...................... 40
Command and Control .......................... 44
Concluding Remarks ............................ 45
Chapter Four
MANNING ................................... 47
Medical and Mortuary........................... 50
Adaptation and Anticipation .................... 50
Command and Control ........................ 61
Preparing for Extraordinary Challenges ............ 63
Legal........................................ 66
Finance and Contracting ......................... 68
Chapter Five
SUSTAINING AND MOVING ...................... 71
Adaptation and Anticipation ...................... 75
Fueling .................................... 75
Water ..................................... 80
Power ..................................... 83
Air Resupply ................................ 84
Sea-Based Resupply........................... 87
Ground-Based Resupply ....................... 89
Command and Control .......................... 91
Extraordinary Demands ......................... 93
Concluding Remarks ............................ 96
Chapter Six
FIXING ...................................... 97
Adaptation and Anticipation ...................... 99
Command and Control .......................... 102
Chapter Seven
OTHER ...................................... 105
Liaison ...................................... 105
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) ................ 107
Vehicle Design ................................ 109
General Engineering ............................ 111
Contents vii
Chapter Eight
SECURITY, FORCE PROTECTION, AND SAFETY ....... 115
Concluding Remarks ............................ 117
Chapter Nine
CONCLUSION: THE UNENDING CALL TO PREPARE
THE FORCE FOR URBAN OPERATIONS ............. 119
Appendix: SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS .......................... 123
Bibliography ..................................... 139
FIGURES
ix
SUMMARY
xi
xii Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
Yet though leaders will most likely adapt by accepting greater decen-
tralization in decisionmaking, the limited availability of many CSS
assets will encourage centralized management of these often too-
scarce resources. The same structures that interfere with radio
communications and global positioning system (GPS) signals sepa-
rate units from each other. A platoon medic will find himself unable
to aid a casualty two squads away; those calling for his assistance will
find that rapidly locating or communicating with him may be im-
possible. Commanders will therefore have to consider heavily
weighting front-line units with such low-density capabilities or
keeping the assets centrally located in the immediate rear area for
dispatch when needed. Habitual CSS task organization relationships
and table of organization and equipment (TOE) allocations are likely
to prove inadequate to the demands of future urban missions.
of situational awareness that has become the norm for soldiers at the
line of contact. There is positive payback for the expenditures inher-
ent in better equipping the men and women providing support. As
noted, the responsibilities of fuel transporters, drivers, maintenance
personnel, chaplains, and many others cause them to travel
throughout an area of operations. These individuals are a potentially
vital source of intelligence during any type of operation. Properly
trained and equipped with the means to determine their location
and report what is seen, each such soldier should be viewed as an
intelligence-collection asset. CSS C 3 responsibilities can include far
more complex requirements as well. It might be appropriate, for ex-
ample, to assign overall responsibility for an operation to a CSS offi-
cer if the primary objectives involve support operations, e.g., during
a humanitarian relief undertaking.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
CSS considerations relevant to the three factors noted above receive
an expanded consideration in each chapter of the report. The ap-
pendix contains a list of over one hundred observations and recom-
Summary xv
mendations extracted from the main body text for ease of reference.
The U.S. Army’s combat service support community is currently
capable of meeting the most likely mission requirements inherent in
operations encompassing hamlets, villages, and small towns. Bar-
ring the incidence of combat, it may similarly be able to accomplish
assigned support and stability operation-related tasks in larger towns
and even small cities should the level of noncombatant support
demanded not be overly great. The same is not true should sus-
tained and intense combat play an eminent role during such under-
takings or should the area of concern be a major city whose citizens
need a significant level of support. The rocket-propelled grenades
and small arms fire ubiquitous during most urban combat actions
pose lethal threats to support personnel in virtually every CSS vehicle
type. There currently exists no means of adequately protecting crews
and passengers from these threats, or from the mines so frequently
found in built-up areas. Urban planning factors that would help in
determining likely personnel replacement rates and class of supply
consumption do not exist even in the most basic form. Doctrine
needed to guide such planning and other preparations, to include
training, virtually ignores CSS urban operations demands. The CSS
community is by no means alone. The situation is little better for
most components of combat and combat support operations.
The authors would first and foremost like to thank Tom Edwards and
the many other representatives of the U.S. Army Combined Arms
Support Command (CASCOM) for their extraordinary interest and
support as sponsors of the work that follows. The topic is one that
has long been in need of analysis; it is to these many ladies and gen-
tlemen that credit for this initial step is due. Major Ben Roth of the
Canadian Army and the U.S. Army’s Captain Sean F. Del Grego pro-
vided vital and most appreciated review comments. Major Kevin
Born was extraordinary in his role as CASCOM’s primary point of
contact. This fine officer’s early review did much to enhance the
study’s value for those in the field. The authors also acknowledge the
support of Mr. Albert H. Pomey, Doctrine Division of the U.S. Army
Armor School, whose expertise on the M908 Multi-purpose, Anti-
Tank (MPAT) round significantly improved the information provided
in this report.
xvii
xviii Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
xix
xx Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
FM Field Manual
FMC Forward Maintenance Company
FSB Forward Support Battalion
GPH Gallons Per Hour
GPM Gallons Per Minute
GPS Global Positioning System
HEMTT Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck
HMMWV High-Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle
HN Host Nation
HQ Headquarters
HUMINT Human Intelligence
IO Information Operations
IPB Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
ISB Intermediate Support Base
IV Intravenous
JP Joint Publication
JTF Joint Task Force
JUO Joint Urban Operation
LAV Light Amphibious Vehicle
LCAC Landing Craft Air Cushion
LHS Load Handling System
LMFF Load Handling System Modular Fuel Farm
LMSR Large Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off Ships
LN Local National
LOGPAC Logistics Package
LOS Line-of-Sight
LWP Light Water Purifier
xxii Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
LZ Landing Zone
MAGTF USMC Marine Air/Ground Task Force
MAO Mortuary Affairs Officer
MCL Mission Configured Load
MCWL Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
MD Medical Doctor
MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation
MEMS Micro-Electrical Mechanical System
METT-TC Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops and
support available, Time available, and Civilian
considerations
MG Major General
MOOTW Military Operations Other Than War
MOS Military Occupational Specialty
MOUT Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain
MPAT Multi-purpose, Anti-Tank
MRE Meals Ready to Eat
MSR Main Supply Route
MTOE Mission Table of Organization and Equipment
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Nongovernmental Organization
NLEC Nonlethal Effects Cell
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
OPSEC Operations Security
ORF Operational Readiness Float
PA Physician’s Assistant
PEGASYS Precision, Extended Glide, and Air Drop System
Abbreviations xxiii
The soldier cannot be a fighter and a pack animal at one and the
same time, any more than a field piece can be a gun and a supply
vehicle combined.
J.F.C. Fuller, c. 1948
______________
1 Robert Graves, The Greek Myths, Volume One, Baltimore: Penguin, 1968, pp. 143–146.
1
2 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
The authors’ primary chronological focus is the next ten years, the
decade encompassing the period from the present to the pending
fielding of the U.S. Army’s Objective Force. The need to confront the
problems associated with urban CSS operations during this period is
an essential one. America’s soldiers already find themselves in urban
areas during virtually every operation they undertake. Their tools—
doctrine, training, technology, and force structure—are not always
up to the demands those undertakings make on them. Like their
comrades manning combat and combat support units, those who
provide combat service support during an urban operation have yet
to fully prepare for its many and varied formidable tasks.
The reader will find passages that employ a particular system or force
structure as exemplars. The specific vehicle or unit type is less
important than the general vulnerabilities or capabilities it repre-
sents. The objective is to abet understanding in the service of finding
solutions, regardless of the organization to which a soldier, sailor,
marine, or airman belongs.
Chapter Two
THE NATURE OF THE BURDEN: THE CHALLENGES
URBAN OPERATIONS BRING TO BEAR
3
4 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
find that the offset separating those units and the enemy is similarly
less.
It would seem that a typical town or city would have a large number
of routes available for CSS use. In reality the actual number is signif-
icantly reduced by myriad operational considerations. These in-
clude:
______________
1 An excellent example of the dangers inherent in complacency is evident in “Witness
the Evil.” This Canadian Forces Production video portrays a soldier at risk when he is
stopped by threatening indigenous personnel while driving. The man, traveling alone
with a single vehicle along a familiar and repeatedly used route, finds himself without
reinforcement or a means to communicate his plight when he is suddenly confronted
by aggressive locals. See “Witness the Evil,” Canadian Forces Production videotape,
Ottawa: DGPA-National Defense Headquarters, Cat. #31-0898F, undated.
The Nature of the Burden: The Challenges Urban Operations Bring to Bear 9
______________
2 Russell W. Glenn interview with 5th Special Forces Group representatives, September
19, 2002, Tampa, Florida.
10 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
______________
3 Elspeth C. Ritchie and Robert Mott, “Caring for Civilians During Peace Keeping
Missions: Priorities and Decisions,” Military Medicine 167 (Supplement 3, 2002), p. 14.
4 “The mission of the CMOC is to coordinate the military and civilian aspects of the
humanitarian assistance effort by providing the linkage between the military
commander and other governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs).” Clay Cooper, “Military Operations Center (CMOC),” Fort Leavenworth, KS:
Center for Army Lessons Learned News from the Front,” January–February 1997,
http://call.army.mil/products/nftf/janfeb97/civmil.htm, accessed October 16, 2002.
The Nature of the Burden: The Challenges Urban Operations Bring to Bear 11
sive. Seizing Paris would task his force with the support of tens of
thousands of civilians, each needing food, water, fuel, and other es-
sentials. Eisenhower was nevertheless ordered to capture the city.
Political decisions resulted in civilian assistance taking de facto
precedence over combat operations. A future military force so
tasked will be hard pressed if not stretched beyond its capacity to
address both its traditional and indigenous population–related
requirements.
______________
5 For more on military operations during this domestic contingency, see James Delk,
“MOUT: A Domestic Case Study—The 1992 Los Angeles Riots,” in Russell W. Glenn et
al. (eds.), The City’s Many Faces: Proceedings of the RAND Arroyo-MCWL-J8 UWG
Urban Operations Conference, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000, pp. 79–157.
12 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
They are often not a formal part of urban governments, but a city’s
influential clan, family, tribe, trade union, or commercial enterprises
can prove very beneficial in helping to meet operational require-
ments. Establishing cordial relationships with these as well as the
previously mentioned official authorities can considerably abet good
military-civilian relations during a force’s presence in a given urban
area. Such favorable relations pay dividends when the inevitable
misunderstandings or points of disagreement later arise, as well as
facilitating intelligence collection.
______________
6 This was a problem for infantry commanders leading Israeli units during 1973
fighting in downtown Suez City, Egypt. BG (IDF, ret.) Nachum Zaken, Battalion
Commander, 433 Armored Battalion, Armored Brigade #500 during 1973 fighting in
Suez City, interview with Russell W. Glenn, Latrun, Israel, April 10, 2000.
7 Perhaps the best, and certainly the most interesting, description of this condition as it
applies to Arabic appears in T.E. Lawrence’s Seven Pillars of Wisdom: “Arabic names
won’t go into English, exactly, for their consonants are not the same as ours, and their
vowels, like ours, vary from district to district. There are some ‘scientific systems’ of
transliteration, helpful to people who know enough Arabic not to need helping, but a
washout for the world. I spell my names anyhow, to show what rot the systems are.”
T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, New York: Doubleday, 1965, p. 25.
14 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
Guards are not the only soldiers who should be better incorporated
into U.S. urban collection efforts. CSS drivers, men and women
manning water purification sites, and others with frequent noncom-
batant contact should all receive training as intelligence collectors.
They need to know their intelligence reporting responsibilities (e.g.,
reporting the locations of potentially useful resources in the urban
area and understanding and remembering the commander’s critical
information requirements (CCIR), priority intelligence requirements
(PIR), and other mission needs). They should know what to report,
how to report, and how to determine whether information merits
being passed on immediately or instead transmitted after mission
completion. They should have the equipment necessary to render
reports. Such preparations will consume both training and opera-
tional time. As in the case of guard personnel, CSS headquarters will
have to process incoming reports, determine which are of internal
use, which should be forwarded, and which can be cast aside.
Reports will have to be monitored, compiled, consolidated, and dis-
seminated to not only intelligence nodes but also operational units
with an immediate need to see specific items. The inordinate
reliance on HUMINT magnifies the role of the CSS soldier as intelli-
gence collector during urban operations. Neither the benefits nor
the costs have heretofore been fully recognized.
16 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
CSS units share many of the many above challenges with other types
of military organizations. The ways in which urban areas impact CSS
operations differ in character and degree; in some cases combat,
combat support, and combat service support units will be able to
benefit from a given adaptation, in others they will not. The follow-
ing section addresses approaches to meeting the challenges via (1)
promoting anticipation and adaptation, (2) integrating CSS C4ISR
operations with others in the force, and (3) preparing for extraordi-
nary CSS urban operations difficulties.
______________
8 Since operations in Somalia during the early 1990s, most units have required that a
convoy include at least one vehicle with a radio. Kevin Born email to Russell W. Glenn,
“Updated CSS UO Study Comments,” October 15, 2002.
The Nature of the Burden: The Challenges Urban Operations Bring to Bear 19
during urban operations can make such options more feasible than
in other environments.
Military, PVO, NGO, and even commercial enterprises can also mu-
tually benefit from a sharing of responsibilities. PVO and NGO in
particular often enter a theater with many of the same objectives
sought by U.S. military forces in their interactions with noncombat-
ants: relief of hunger, provision of health care, and assistance in
developing local resources. The British Army has made progress in
cooperative ventures with some such organizations. Predeployment
training at Catterick Garrison in Yorkshire at times includes PVO rep-
resentatives. The U.S. armed services would be well advised to con-
sider similar team building and expand on it to the benefit of the
armed services, nonmilitary organizations, and civilians in opera-
tional areas by sharing the burden of care. Such organizations will be
in a theater regardless of the military’s preferences. And because
supporting entire urban populations is well beyond the capability of
most deployed forces, such an initiative might be viewed as making
the best out of a situation over which military leaders in any case
have little control. The approach will involve new mindsets and
some assumption of risk. Security will inevitably be a concern. Even
the best-intentioned PVO or NGO might inadvertently compromise
security (e.g., by revealing that a U.S. commander has barred use of a
particular route the next day, thereby unwittingly revealing the
objective of a pending offensive action). Such risks can be minimized
with practice and a building of trust. Alternatively, some PVOs and
NGOs believe (with justification in many contingencies) that too
close a relationship with the military can compromise their appear-
ance of neutrality in dealings with the public and opposing factions.
There are benefits and risks for both sides when attempting to estab-
lish relationships between military and aid organizations. It must be
determined whether the potential benefits override negative reper-
cussions.
tions in Dili and other parts of East Timor, an Australian officer noted
that
______________
9 Alan Ryan, Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks: Australian Defence Force
Participation in the International Force East Timor, Australian Land Warfare Studies
Centre Study Paper No. 304, November 2000, pp. 106–107.
10Born email, “Updated CSS UO Study Comments.”
The Nature of the Burden: The Challenges Urban Operations Bring to Bear 21
pool is kept and the locations of wounded can cause vital moments
to be lost. This is especially true given the difficulty of navigating
through tortuous inner building routes, perhaps with very limited
visibility. And, again, calls for assistance might not reach back
through buildings and walls between forward elements and the
medics’ location.
It has been noted that combat units in built-up areas will frequently
task organize in smaller elements than they do in other environ-
ments. Infantry units maneuvering as squads and vehicles task-
organized individually or in pairs are not unusual. Supporting the
resultant greater number of nodes will tend to promote organizing
CSS units in smaller components similarly and giving their leaders
greater say in their operations, allowing them to properly respond to
immediate tactical demands. Yet the greater number of nodes
means that providers will have to be more efficient if they are to ade-
quately support all in need, a tendency that will encourage retaining
close control and higher-level oversight of limited CSS resources.
______________
11Ibid.
12 Combat Service Support, Field Manual 3-06.11, Chapter 13, http://155.217.58/cgi-
bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-06.11/ch13.htm, pp. 13-1 to 13-2.
24 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
______________
13Ibid.
The Nature of the Burden: The Challenges Urban Operations Bring to Bear 25
the service were CSS staffs to maintain usage records so that the cur-
rent deficiency in historical data is rectified as quickly as possible.
______________
14The literature on “learning organizations” and the need for disseminating lessons
learned in the Army is fairly extensive. Perhaps the best-known book on the first is
Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of the Learning Organization,
New York: Doubleday, 1994. At the macro level, the U.S. Army’s Center for Army
Lessons Learned is a notable resource for sharing information. Much of its work is
available on the World Wide Web at http://call.army.mil. However, units at all
echelons need to have a formal means of internally collecting pertinent lessons and
providing them to those who can make use of them in a timely fashion. Training, the
use of debriefings, and a means of getting the word out are all part of the process
involved in establishing and maintaining such a capability.
26 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
______________
15General Krulak described the future challenges confronting Americans on the battle-
field as follows: “This is the landscape upon which the 21st Century battle will be
fought. It will be an asymmetrical battlefield. Much like the Germanic tribes, our ene-
mies will not allow us to fight the Son of Desert Storm, but will try to draw us into the
stepchild of Chechnya. In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding
and clothing displaced refugees—providing humanitarian assistance. In the next
moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart—conducting peacekeeping
operations—and, finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle—all
on the same day . . . all within three city blocks. It will be what we call the ‘three block
war.’” From “Draft Remarks for The National Press Club 10 October 1997 by Gen.
Charles C. Krulak,” downloadable at http://www.usmc.mil/cmcspeeches.nsf/f9c9e7a1fe
55fe42852564280078b406/6f38a0fe88a127fa85256530006f3951, accessed February 5,
2003.
The Nature of the Burden: The Challenges Urban Operations Bring to Bear 27
______________
16Kevin Born observations on reading Lawrence E. Casper’s Falcon Brigade: Combat
and Command in Somalia and Haiti, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001.
28 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
ments that together comprise CSS are also part of the combat service
support system. Each of these CSS system parts are themselves sys-
tems in their own right, consisting of interrelated functions, capa-
bilities, services, and items that interact to provide end products of
one form or another. CSS and its components are therefore systems
within systems. Just as a force will operate suboptimally if CSS is not
fully integrated with combat and combat support functions, so will
CSS fail to reach its full potential if transport, supply, legal, chaplain,
and its many other parts do not orchestrate their plans and actions.
______________
17 Elspeth C. Ritchie and Robert Mott, “Caring for Civilians During Peace Keeping
Missions: Priorities and Decisions,” Military Medicine 167 (Supplement 3, 2002), p.
145.
18Ibid.
The Nature of the Burden: The Challenges Urban Operations Bring to Bear 29
• Safe havens
• Hospitals
• Police stations
• Embassies
• Hazardous areas
• Construction sites
• Dangerous intersections
• Bridges
• Criminal areas
• Major terrain features
• Parks
• Industrial complexes
• Airports
Despite the examples given, the wise CSS planner will not restrain his
analysis by limiting the concept of “key terrain” to physical features
alone. It could include religious leaders, heads of family, or individ-
uals who control vital resources, influence others, or facilitate activi-
ties critical to people’s livelihoods. Other features—economic,
social, and cultural—will likewise sometimes attain such status. (In
other RAND urban work, these many points of mission importance
are designated as “critical points.” They include centers of gravity,
decisive points, and others defined as “geographic points or other el-
ements that could have an extraordinary influence on the achieve-
ment of objectives.”20)
______________
19Field Manual 3-20.96, RSTA Squadron (2nd Coordinating Draft), U.S. Army Armor
Center, June 12, 2001, pp. 7-13 to 7-14.
20For further discussion of critical points, see Russell W. Glenn, “Urban Combat Is
Complex,” Naval Institute Proceedings 128 (February 2002), pp. 62–65; or Russell W.
30 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
_____________________________________________________________
Glenn, Visualizing the Elephant: Managing Complexity During Military Urban
Operations, Santa Monica, CA; RAND, DB-430-A, forthcoming.
The Nature of the Burden: The Challenges Urban Operations Bring to Bear 31
Support for noncombatants will not end with the cessation of hostili-
ties. Arguably the most intensive urban combat during America’s
involvement in the Vietnam War was that during and following the
1968 Tet offensive. The official Marine Corps history described the
formidable task facing U.S. and Army of the Republic of Vietnam
(ARVN) forces in Hue as the city was retaken:
One other problem that the allies faced was population control.
With the widespread destruction in the city, the estimated 116,000
homeless had to be fed and temporarily housed. . . . [There were]
5,000 refugees in a Catholic church and another 17,000 at Hue Uni-
versity. Another 40,000 displaced people were in the Citadel sector.
[The local subsector advisor, U.S. Army Major Jack E.] Walker ini-
tially concerned himself with three tasks: restoring city services
including water and power; eliminating health hazards including
burying the dead; and securing food. With the assistance of the
local Catholic hierarchy and American resources and personnel,
Walker and his people began attacking all of these problems . . . . In
______________
21Jamison Jo Medby and Russell W. Glenn, Street Smart: IPB for Urban Operations,
Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002.
22 For further discussion of the Continuum of Relative Interests, see Medby, Street
Smart.
32 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
the first two weeks there was hardly any semblance of public
order . . . . Thievery and looting were widespread. War victims stole
from their fellow sufferers. All deserted houses were emptied of
valuables. Robbed victims sought to steal from others.23
______________
23Jack Shulimson, Leonard A. Blasiol, Charles R. Smith, and David A. Dawson, U.S.
Marines in Vietnam, the Defining Year, 1968, Washington, D.C.: History and Museums
Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1997, pp. 219–221.
24 United States Army, FM 90-10-1, An Infantryman’s Guide to Combat in Built-Up
Areas, with Change 1, October 3, 1995, p. G-5. Accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.
org/military/library/policy/army/fm/90-10-1/appg.pdf on October 1, 2002.
The Nature of the Burden: The Challenges Urban Operations Bring to Bear 33
______________
25Ryan, Primary Responsibilities, pp. 108, 110.
26Ibid., p. 109.
27Ibid.
34 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
POSTOPERATION RECOVERY
CSS planners and commanders will be integral to the transition from
ongoing operations to redeployment and post-hostility activities. At
some point, generally well before the cessation of hostilities, the
character of incoming personnel and materiel should shift to that
______________
28 Born email, “Updated CSS UO Study Comments.” See also Edward G. Keating,
Compensating Civilians on the Battlefield, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993.
The Nature of the Burden: The Challenges Urban Operations Bring to Bear 35
needed to prepare the military force for return to home base and
assist the host nation in transitioning to peace. The latter will often
incorporate much in the way of rebuilding both physical and human
infrastructure. The ease of that transition and the strength of the
peace will both be influenced by how well the friendly force demon-
strates concern for the welfare of the indigenous population. Cities
in particular might have large concentrations of civilians lacking
shelter, sufficient sustenance, and medical care. Provision of these
resources will initially take a backseat to combat operations. After-
ward, however, the local and international perception will be that the
friendly force should immediately redress suffering in the areas
under their control. Properly selecting the point in time at which to
begin transitioning from shipments of combat-specific materiel and
personnel to those that will be in demand after the fighting has
stopped will greatly affect urban population suffering and (po-
tentially) worldwide perceptions of an operation’s success.
CONCLUSION
Regardless of the CSS functional area, the ability to anticipate and
adapt, to function as a full-fledged member of the command struc-
ture, and to be ready to handle the extraordinary demands that char-
acterize urban operations will all be essential preconditions to suc-
cess. Soldiers in each functional area will also face tasks that have
specific impacts on their ability to accomplish their missions. It is to
these that we turn in the remainder of the report.
• Arming
______________
29From http://www.army.mil/features/strykeroe/: “The Stryker Brigade Combat Team
(SBCT) is designed to bridge the gap between The Army’s light and heavy forces. The
unit provides combatant commanders increased operational and tactical flexibility.
The Stryker, an eight-wheeled medium weight armored vehicle, is the SBCT's primary
combat and combat support platform. Significantly lighter and more transportable
than existing tanks and armored vehicles, the Stryker fulfills an immediate require-
ment to equip a strategically and tactically deployable brigade, capable of rapid
movement worldwide.”
The Nature of the Burden: The Challenges Urban Operations Bring to Bear 37
• Manning
• Sustaining and moving
• Fixing
• Other (liaison, EOD, vehicle design, and general engineering)
• Security, force protection, and safety
If my men put any more ammunition into the city, we would have
sunk it.
Major General William F. Garrison,
Task Force Ranger Commander, Mogadishu, Somalia,
referring to actions of October 3–4, 1993
39
40 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
______________
1 Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Urban Combat Operations: Appendix F: Simple
Marking Devices,” http://call.army.mil/products/newsltrs/99-16/appendf.htm, accessed
June 18, 2002. The SBCT requires 5.0 short tons (STONs) per day of ammunition based
upon CASCOM-approved planning factors. The ammunition section of the brigade
support battalion (BSB) can issue 62 STONs per day, which are about six flat racks.
This section can surge to 138 STONs from time to time.
Arming 41
______________
2 Information on the M908 round provided by Albert H. Pomey, Directorate of Train-
ing, Doctrine, and Combat Development, Fort Knox, Kentucky, July 31, 2003.
42 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
RAND MR1717-1
90° 400m
504m
50m
Hearing protection
required when firing
200m 1000m
personnel, due to the risk of the potentially lethal effects of the three
discarding aluminum sabots (see Figure 1). The requirements for a
200-meter separation between dismounts and the intended target,
and the prohibition against firing unless soldiers and noncombatants
are under sufficient cover, diminishes its overall usefulness in urban
operations. A similar round with reduced constraints would be es-
pecially valuable due to the likelihood that dismounts will frequently
be operating with armor vehicles in this environment.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Anticipation and adaptation with respect to urban arming issues re-
quire the CSS soldier to coordinate with his combat and combat
support counterparts to determine the munitions needs (both lethal
and nonlethal). These requirements include consideration of the
consequences of both employing such capabilities and dealing with
their aftereffects. With new systems coming on line, the medical
training requirements that will affect U.S. forces, coalition members,
and the noncombatant community should be identified, and means
to communicate them should be developed before any deployments.
Such anticipation of needs should occur during the procurement
process as well. It is the CSS warrior who will treat the wounded,
transport the rounds, maintain the weapon systems, and, probably,
be tasked with the responsibility of cleaning up the aftereffects of an
46 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
47
48 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
______________
1 “While the Interim and Objective Forces both possess streamlined and substantially
more effective methods for casualty evacuation, neither concept addresses the system
to replace killed or severely wounded soldiers . . . The ‘96 Hour Warriors’ can get to the
battle quickly, and can fight initially, but any losses they take will require weeks to
replace even if the support base was mobilized and ready from C-Day [mobilization
day] forward.” Robert R. Mackey, Building a Shallow Army: Replacement Operations
in the Future Force, Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2002,
p. 17. Mackey also recommends using a form of unit replacement (crews and squads)
rather than individual replacement. This has been considered and tested previously.
For one of several other discussions of this topic, see Russell W. Glenn, Reading
Athena’s Dance Card: Men Against Fire in Vietnam, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 2000.
2 Mackey, Building a Shallow Army, p. 36.
3 Some discussions of Israeli actions in Lebanon during the early 1980s and operations
in Israel proper in the opening years of the 21st century posit that crush injuries due to
debris or building collapse, or bullet wounds (due to snipers) will be more common-
place during urban operations than elsewhere. Injuries at U.S. urban operations
training facilities demonstrate a need for gloves, elbow pads, and kneepads to reduce
cuts and impact wounds. On the other hand, John Holcomb noted that wounds
suffered by U.S. personnel during October 3–4, 1993, in Mogadishu, Somalia, had “a
distribution very similar to any that you see in textbooks regarding war injuries.”
While the balance of commentary supports a conclusion that urban injuries will differ
in character from those elsewhere in many instances, the lack of urban-specific
wound and injury data precludes anything more than reporting various empirical
50 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
_____________________________________________________________
observations. There is a definite and immediate need for an extensive analysis of
historical writing to extract reasonable estimates of both personnel and class of supply
urban attrition rates.
Manning 51
______________
4 These three developments in particular show excellent near-term promise for use
during soldier self-care. The tourniquet is very cheap (approximately $9/unit) and
little bigger than what currently fits in the individual first aid pouch carried by every
soldier. Hemostatic bandages, made with human plasma-impregnated gauze, are
currently extremely expensive (approximately $300 each, though the introduction of
artificial plasma could reduce this cost to $50–$100 per unit). Quikclot, essentially a
clotting agent packed into a wound, is much cheaper and has proven extremely
effective in animal testing. As of early 2003, some U.S. Army and Marine units were
purchasing Quikclot. However, reports vary on its effectiveness during the Iraq War of
that year. Further testing and development of this and other clotting products is
advised. Kathleen M. Sheehan email to Michael J. Leggierir et al., “RE: blast overpres-
sure monitory,” June 13, 2002, forwarded to Russell W. Glenn by Sean F. Del Greco,
June 14, 2002; Harold E. Modrow telephone interview with Russell W. Glenn, April 9,
2002; “Current News: New Blood-Clotting Material May Revolutionize Combat First
Aid,” http://www.mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil/active.html, accessed July 16, 2002.
52 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
______________
5 Frank K. Butler and John H. Hagmann (eds.), Tactical Management of Urban Warfare
Casualties in Special Operations, proceedings from panel conducted by the Special
Operations Medical Association, Tampa, FL, December 7, 1998, p. 13.
6 Russell W. Glenn et al., Honing the Keys to the City: Refining the United States Marine
Corps Reconnaissance Force for Urban Ground Combat Operations, Santa Monica, CA:
RAND, 2003, p. 88.
Manning 53
______________
7 James Harris, “My Two Wars,” The New York Times, April 20, 2003, p. 8.
8 Rating the relative value of training with a head-to-head comparison between the
programs for Army medics and Navy corpsmen (who support marines in the field
during combat) is difficult. Commander Joseph Cosentino, a Navy doctor,
summarized the difference based on his experience as follows: “Army medics (91W)
are more focused on field environments and have less clinical experience, versus the
standard Navy corpsman [who] has more hospital care experience with greater clinical
experience.” The greater field emphasis is obviously highly desirable from the combat
soldier (or marine) perspective. However, Commander Cosentino goes on to note that
“Navy Corpsmen gain greater field experience by going to Fleet Marine Force (FMF)
School and becom[ing] 8404’s.” Such individuals gain sufficient expertise to assume
“responsibility of independent duty aboard ships and submarines; Fleet Marine Force,
Special Forces and Seabee units, and at isolated duty stations where no medical officer
is available.” The latter status is the result of a five-year program. While obviously
impractical for across-the-board application, similar (combat care oriented) further
training would be highly desirable in urban environments where rapid evacuation has
frequently proved impossible. Email and accompanying briefing slides from
Commander Joseph Cosentino forwarded to Russell W. Glenn, February 6, 2003.
54 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
host nation health care support was readily available and the quality
was generally on par with U.S. health care. Their laboratory
facilities were more sophisticated than the CSH’s [Combat Support
Hospital’s], so we periodically sent laboratory specimens to the
Hungarians when they exceeded the capabilities of the CSH . . . A
couple of soldiers needed neurosurgical procedures that we could
not provide at the CSH. They were surgically treated in the Hungar-
ian medical facility with excellent post-operative results. 11
______________
9 Russell W. Glenn interview with Special Forces personnel, Tampa, FL, September 19,
2002.
10“Improving Land Armaments: Lessons from the Balkans,” RTO-TR-AC/323(SAS-
041)TP/, Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 2001,
p. 4.5.2.
11William T. Bester, The Preparation and Deployment of the Initial Medical Force in
Support of Operation Joint Endeavor, Carlisle, PA: United States Army War College,
1998, p. 24.
Manning 55
Thermobaric weapons are among those that might be seen more fre-
quently in built-up areas due to their greater effectiveness there.
These systems are particularly destructive when their effects are
contained. They can cause burns or fragmentation wounds, but the
primary damage is inflicted on internal organs due to overpressure
that can leave virtually no external sign of injury. Symptoms of an at-
tack can include deafness (difficult to gauge if the victim is uncon-
scious) and fluid in the ears of some (but not all) victims. Missing the
symptoms of possible overpressure injury can result in treatment
that exacerbates existing damage. Medical training should include
advising personnel to look at the area around the wounded soldier
for telltale signs of a thermobaric attack. On the other hand, factors
such as whether the patient has moved or been moved from the
original place of injury might not be immediately evident to those
providing aid.12 Medical personnel should ask conscious patients for
______________
12Guidance on treatment for thermobaric injuries differs even within the U.S. Army
medical community, probably a function of inexperience with treating such casualties.
Dr. Lee Cancio extrapolates from his experience with blunt trauma and burn injuries
56 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
_____________________________________________________________
when providing his cautions regarding “fluid resuscitation” (use of IVs). IVs can cause
lung failure in blunt trauma patients within a one to twenty hour timeframe after
injury. The danger is that the medic will attempt to rapidly “push” two bags of IV fluid
and cause lung failure. However, Dr. Cancio also cautions that one cannot “run these
patients dry,” as other injuries will worsen should fluids not be provided. The critical
factor seems to be the rate at which the fluid is introduced into the patient. Too rapid
fluid resuscitation risks lung failure. Too slow (or too little) risks failure of other
organs. He recommends treating thermobaric casualties (or suspected thermobaric
casualties) in a manner similar to burn patients or any other severely injured soldier:
Begin by opening the airway and stopping compressible hemorrhaging as necessary.
Introduce an IV if the patient is suffering from a systolic blood pressure of 90 or less
and has a palpable radial pulse and intact mental status. If there is no palpable radial
pulse, check for a coradic pulse. If the coradic pulse is present, introduce an IV and
vigorously resuscitate, thereafter cutting the IV rate to maintain a normal pulse rate
and blood pressure.
With regard to air evacuation, Dr. Cancio recommends using the method if it is
available; the likely severe state of injury may well make the risk of further lung
damage acceptable. If the evacuation is from a more rearward medical treatment
facility, however, the means of evacuation should depend on the PA’s or doctor’s best
judgment. If a lung puncture is known or thought to exist, use air evacuation only if it
is thought clinically feasible, as blow out is a major concern in such cases. LTC Lee
Cancio telephone interview by Russell W. Glenn, February 12, 2003. It is obvious that
further research and discussion of proper treatment methods is highly desirable given
that such advice is based on other injury types.
Manning 57
______________
13While the U.S. Army’s dietary guidelines do not address urban needs specifically,
they do recognize that “military personnel doing heavy work or involved in prolonged,
vigorous physical training may have energy requirements that exceed 125 percent of
the [Military Dietary Reference Intakes] for energy (for example, 4000 to 5000
calories/day).” Army Regulation 40-25, “Nutrition Standards and Education,”
Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, June
15, 2001, p. 4.
14“Objective Force Warrior: Soldiers On Point For The Nation,” brochure published
by the Natick Soldier Center, Natick, MA, undated; and Jean-Lewis DeGay interview
with Russell W. Glenn, Natick, MA, May 2, 2003.
58 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
______________
15Regarding international wars, the “Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed
conflicts (Protocol I)” clarifies and expands on protections from previous conventions.
Relevant to the discussion here, this document states that
_____________________________________________________________
“temporary medical transports” mean those devoted exclusively to medical purposes
for limited periods during the whole of such periods. Unless otherwise specified, the
terms “medical personnel,” “medical units” and “medical transports” cover both per-
manent and temporary categories. (Article 8 (11), http://fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/texts/
BH707.txt; accessed October 21, 2002.)
4712. The term “medical transports” means any land vehicle (cars, trucks, trains etc.),
ship, craft or aircraft assigned to transporting the wounded, sick and shipwrecked,
medical and religious personnel, and medical equipment. Protection applies for
military and civilian medical units and transports, whether they are permanent or
temporary, provided that they are exclusively assigned to medical purposes; while they
are so assigned, whether or not for an indefinite period, depending on whether they are
permanent or temporary, medical units and transports may not be used for any
purposes other than medical ones. The concept “medical purposes” should be
understood in a broad sense. It covers not only the care given the wounded, sick and
shipwrecked, but also any activities for the prevention of disease, blood transfusion
centres, rehabilitation centres for medical treatment and dental treatment.
(http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/1a13044f3bbb5b8ec12563fb0066f226/edb39a930fd78699c125
63cd0043a86d?OpenDocument, accessed October 22, 2002.)
60 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
______________
16 Scripps New Service, “Hold the Lettuce: Nutrition Patches in Soldiers’ Future,”
http://www.thedailycamera.com/science/20apatc.html. Article provided by Jerry
Darsch, Department of Defense Combat Feeding Program, Natick Soldiers Systems
Center, Natick, Massachusetts.
Manning 61
______________
17 Jerry Darsch, Department of Defense Combat Feeding Program, Natick Soldiers
Systems Center, Natick, Massachusetts, telephone interview with Steven L. Hartman,
October 4, 2002.
18Ibid.
19 Email from Jack Briggs to Russell W. Glenn, Subject: HOOAH! Bar, May 20, 2003.
20Work in this area is ongoing. DeGay interview.
62 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
______________
21“Improving Land Armaments: Lessons from the Balkans,” pp. 3.1.36, 4.1.2, 4.4.6,
4.5.1, and 4.5.3.
22Ritchie and Mott, “Caring for Civilians during Peace Keeping Missions,” p. 15.
Manning 63
______________
23 Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned: Volume III—Intelligence, Logistics, &
Equipment, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned, October
1990, no page numbers.
24Ibid.
64 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
______________
25Urban Operations, FM 3-06 (90-10) (Drag edition), Washington, D.C.: Headquarters,
Department of the Army, May 20, 2002, p. IV-11.
26Jack L. Weiss, Personal Experience Monograph: Supporting the Quick Reaction Force
in Somalia—Operation Continue Hope/Somalia, July 1993–February 1994, Carlisle, PA:
United States Army War College, 1996, p. 32.
27Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations, Joint Publication 3-06, Washington, D.C., Office
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 16, 2002, p. IV-11.
Manning 65
______________
28Elizabeth A. Fenn, Pox Americana: The Great Smallpox Epidemic of 1775–82, New
York: Hill and Wang, 2001, p. 36.
29“Chaplains advise commanders on matters of religion as it affects the soldiers within
their units. They also explain the influences of local religions on the urban populace
and their potential effects on Army forces and UO” (FM 3-06, p. 9-24).
66 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
The historical casualty costs of urban combat call the Army’s capa-
bilities to handle its own dead into question as well. The Army has
but one active duty and two reserve mortuary affairs companies.
Extended combat in a major urban area could strain a command’s
resources even if all three were serving in a single area of operations.
Refining standing operating procedures and developing doctrine for
the rapid training of soldiers to temporarily assume mortuary re-
sponsibilities would be a wise precaution.
LEGAL
The limits of authority of commanders at all levels over civilian
government officials and the civilian population must be estab-
lished and understood. A commander must have that degree of
authority necessary to accomplish his mission. However, the host
government’s responsibility for its populace and territory can
affect the commander’s authority in civil-military matters.
______________
30COL Stephen P. Hayward, Personal Experience Monograph, DISCOM S-3, Somalia
(29 Dec 92–25 Feb 93), Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1998, enclosure
“Memorandum for Cdr, 210th FSB, ATTN: SSG Wynn. Subject: Mortuary Affairs
Collection Point MTOE,” HQ, 10th DISCOM, 19 January 1993.
Manning 67
______________
31Combat Service Support, Field Manual 3-06.11, Chapter 13, http://155.217.58/cgi-
bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-06.11/ch13.htm, p. 13-34.
68 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
______________
32Ibid.
33Ibid., p. 13-35. Additional coverage of legal issues appears pp. 13-34 to 13-36.
Manning 69
Schilling felt disbelief, and now some guilt. He had steered the
convoy the wrong way . . . Over and over he muttered, “We’re
going to keep driving around until we’re all . . . dead.”
Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down,
on fighting in 1993 Mogadishu, Somalia
______________
1 RSTA Squadron, Field Manual 3-20.96 (2nd Coordinating Draft), U.S. Army Armor
Center, June 12, 2001, p. 7-17; FM 3-06.11, p. 13-11.
71
72 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
usually established within the theater of operations near to, but not
in, the AO. While not a requirement, an intermediate support base
(ISB), or multiple ISBs if required, may provide a secure, high-
throughput facility when circumstances warrant . . . The ISB may
______________
2 Colonel Larry Harman sees “logistics replenishment [as] a quick, on-the-fly,
sustainment operations that fits within the battle rhythm. This is similar to a ‘pit stop’
operation,” and it would be so in this case. Larry Harman, Objective Force White
Paper: The Expeditionary Support Force (ESF) and Maneuver Sustainment Support
(MSS), Fort Lee, VA: CASCOM CSS Battle Lab, November 11, 2001, p. 37 (emphasis in
original). A coup de main would be an operation in which an attacker storms into a
built-up area in an effort to overwhelm any defenders via shock and, as necessary,
firepower in contrast to a deliberate attack. It could also refer to an operation in which
the attacker suddenly surrounds all or part of an urban area in the same manner to
achieve a similar effect.
3 “Urban Sustainability,” X-File 3-35.12, Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Warfighting
Laboratory (MCWL), June 25, 1999, p. 7.
4 The Interim Brigade Combat Team, FM 3-21.31 (7-32) (Draft), Fort Benning, GA:
United States Army, July 10, 2001, p. 10-2. The concept could of course apply to any
class of supply or service.
Sustaining and Moving 73
In the case of urban operations, such points might well be in the area
of operations but either outside of the built-up area or in a secure
portion thereof.
Support for virtually any unit type can employ split basing to some
extent. The 96-hour objective for deploying the SBCT, for example,
means that the concept will be an integral part of its operations, at
least initially upon its arrival in a theater. SBCT doctrine bases its
sustainment procedures on several assumptions. It is expected that
the brigade will deploy with 72 hours of supply carried on organic
vehicles. Beyond that period, sustainment packages will be delivered
in tailored unit-configured loads by echelons above brigade (EAB)
organizations. Refueling and water operations will normally occur
every other day and be provided from prepositioned stocks or via
host nation contracts, both of which are the responsibility of the De-
fense Logistics Agency (DLA). Meals Ready to Eat (MRE) (or re-
placements under development) will be the only food source until
food service augmentation arrives in theater.
______________
5 Ibid., pp. 10-3 to 10-5.
74 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
______________
6 The U.S. Army is getting ready to distribute a battlebook for configured loads at the
time of this document’s publication. Essentially, these loads will be broken into four
segments: mission, unit, capability, and commodity. A mission-configured load is a
generic package of supplies; a unit-configured load will be a specifically tailored
mission configuration for a particular unit. A capability module will be a smaller
subset of the mission or unit configured load for support of small teams or squads. A
commodity module will include materials configured around a certain class of supply.
CASCOM, DCD-QM telephone interview with Steven Hartman, March 6, 2003.
Sustaining and Moving 75
Urban SCL would conceivably address both the high levels of urban
consumption and the nature of its typical task organizations. Urban
operations’ intense close-quarters combat will mean that soldiers
need more ammunition, more water, and meals denser in calories.
More combat casualties and nonbattle injuries will result in greater
demand for Class VIII materials. Other classes of supply will have
similarly extraordinary requirements. The SCL could include LOG-
PACs tailored for squads or other small elements. A difficulty is that
the current depot system is unlikely to be flexible enough to handle
such detailed needs with adequate responsiveness. It is therefore
worth considering outsourcing or otherwise facilitating the prepara-
tion of these specialized support packages.7
Fueling
Urban operations can complicate fuel distribution considerably.
They demand constant adaptation as the nature of the urban terrain,
mission, threat, and intensity of operations change over time and
space. CSS leaders will have to find locations that provide ready ac-
cess and egress for both fuel delivery and distribution, can be se-
cured without too great a cost in manpower, and will not unneces-
______________
7 Insights on how to approach the problem might be gained from the U.S. Navy. The
Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center is currently developing “Expeditionary
Packaging Technology” that involves packing consumable supplies into ready-to-use
modules subsequently shipped from the manufacturer to end user in unit loads
without interim reconfiguration. The Navy goal is timely delivery of the correct
quantities to the correct customer.
76 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
______________
8 FM 3-20.96 (2d Coord Draft), Chapter 8.
Sustaining and Moving 77
Storing fuel in one location and running hoses from that point
through sewer systems, buildings, or other concealed routes to sup-
ply interior or exterior storage or fueling points would further en-
hance security. This would minimize the impact of attacks on the
“satellite” distribution locations, those most likely to be detected due
to the level of activity around them and the number of vehicles in
their vicinity. Were one fuel storage location to go dry, another at a
different location could be employed with no change in fuel distri-
bution points (given sufficient pumps and hose length). Alternative
and secondary storage points would assume primary status while the
empty one was resupplied (perhaps by a similar underground hose
system). The concept is not without risk. Subterranean fuel leakage
will present a danger of explosion without proper venting, the use of
spark-suppressing gases, or other safety procedures.9 It may be nec-
essary to seal off or otherwise secure portions of underground sys-
tems to prevent interdiction or sabotage. Rebar, steel beams, and
concrete anchors are among the materials that could be employed to
block access points such as doorways, manholes, or the sewerage
itself.
The current allocations of pump and hose assets for U.S. units might
be insufficient should the organizations’ fuel storage and distribution
nodes be scattered in so dispersed a manner.10 It is also possible that
attempts to pump fluids from underground may exceed pump ca-
______________
9 Note that development of “binary fuels” akin to binary munitions would significantly
reduce the danger of accidental detonations. Such development could involve putting
an additive in fuels to make them less combustible during transit, a neutralizing agent
being added during or before the fuel is pumped into vehicles or other equipment. To
the authors’ knowledge, no such capability is under development at this time.
10For example, the SBCT has a brigade support battalion (BSB) with the capability to
store 56,000 gallons of fuel in its 14 Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT)
tankers (each having a carrying capacity of 2,500 gallons) and 42 collapsible fuel pods
(each capable of storing 500 gallons). With all of its vehicles fueled to maximum
capacity, the SBCT’s on-hand fuel exceeds 100,000 gallons. For fuel distribution, the
unit has only 6 centrifugal pumps capable of pumping up to 125 gallons of fuel per
minute. The brigade has 8 sets (25 feet each) of collapsible hose line for a total of a
mere 200 feet. Planning assumptions for fueling are based upon resupply every other
day.
At the time of this writing, SBCT echelon above brigade support is still being debated
and analyzed. One consideration is to augment the SBCT with ten 5,000-gallon bulk
tanker trucks that would be used to transport fuel from host nation support distribu-
tion points or the nearest sea point of debarkation (SPOD).
78 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
One U.S. Army system that is an obvious candidate for such testing is
the currently available Assault Hoseline System (AHS), a bulk fuel
distribution capability able to traverse a wide variety of terrain types.
AHS consists of 14,000 feet of 4-inch collapsible hose and a pressure
regulated pumping assembly that relies on a 350-GPM (gallons per
minute) diesel pump. It can be suspended over gaps of up to two
hundred feet.11 A second contestant is the army’s Rapidly Installed
Fuel Transfer System (RIFTS), a heavy truck-transported bulk fuel
distribution system under development at the time of publication. It
includes pump, conduit, and other components capable of a mini-
mum daily throughput of 850,000 gallons of fuel. Expected rates for
laying conduit are between twenty and thirty miles daily; the system
can handle a total length of conduit up to fifty miles.12 Both of these
systems depend on a soft-skinned vehicle for laying hose or conduit.
______________
11 Assault Hoseline System (AHS), PM Petroleum and Water Systems (PAWS),
http://peocscss.tacom.army.mil/pmFP/pm_paws/systems/ahs.htm. Accessed October
18, 2002.
12Rapidly Installed Fuel Transfer System (RIFTS), PM Petroleum and Water Systems
(PAWS), http://peocscss.tacom.army.mil/pmFP/pm_paws/systems/rifts.htm. Accessed
October 18, 2002.
Sustaining and Moving 79
______________
13“D-Day Mobile Fuel Distribution System,” briefing provided by Buck Thomas, Naval
Facilities Engineering Center, Point Hueneme, California. Received via email to
Steven L. Hartman, September 25, 2002.
80 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
Water
That urban warfare is characterized by small maneuver elements
with unusual task organizations considerably complicates CSS op-
erations. The challenges are magnified in that these exceptional re-
quirements extend to the individual soldier level. Other environ-
ments have particularly notable demands; increases in individuals’
water needs in desert climes and increased caloric intake in cold-
weather areas are two examples. But few environments have as
many extraordinary demands at the individual soldier level as the
urban setting. Like the desert fighter, the urban warrior needs more
water. Like his cold-climate counterpart, he needs more calories.
Men fighting in urban areas will also consume boots, weapons, am-
munition, gloves, other uniform items, first aid supplies, and much
else more quickly than anyone anywhere else. Each of these un-
usually high demand levels requires more of the CSS system and
those who run it.
______________
14 Load Handling System-Modular Fuel Farm (LMFF), PM Petroleum and Water
Systems (PAWS), http://www.peocscss.tacom.army.mil/pmFP/pm_paws/systems/
lmff.htm, accessed October 18, 2002.
Sustaining and Moving 81
medical water usage until the field hospital arrived. A similar process
allowed them to better estimate actual fuel usage requirements.15
______________
15COL Stephen P. Hayward, Personal Experience Monograph, DISCOM S-3, Somalia
(29 Dec 92–25 Feb 93), Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1998, p. 4.
16 “Canteen Insert Water Purifier,” TARDEC Water and Wastewater web site,
http://www.tacom.army.mil/tardec/division/peth2o/peth2o.htm, accessed January 26,
2000.
17 William Purdue interview conducted by Steven Hartman, Fort Lee, VA, April 17,
2002; and briefing slides provided by The Quartermaster School Petroleum and Water
Department, Fort Lee, VA, April 17, 2002.
Obtaining 1.4 pounds of water from a single pound of fuel might at first appear to be a
violation of the conservation of mass principle. However, fuel combustion is not a
closed system. The two main chemical byproducts of burning fuel are carbon dioxide
and water, each of which is created by adding oxygen atoms to carbon-hydrogen
chains in the process of burning or “oxidation.” The extra oxygen atoms from the air
make the water and account for the product being heavier than the original fuel. The
authors thank Matthew Lewis for providing this clarification.
82 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
tem include setting up 3,000 gallon per hour (GPH) Reverse Osmosis
Water Purification Units (ROWPU). The 1,500-GPH Tactical Water
Purification System (TWPS) and Light Water Purifiers (LWP, see Fig-
ure 3) are among the systems that could complement or be used in
lieu of ROWPU for smaller units.18 The LWP is an HMMWV-
mounted system capable of producing 125 GPH of potable water
from a fresh water source and 75 GPH from salt water.19 For distri-
bution, there is the Tactical Water Distribution System (TWDS) that
includes pumps, two 20,000-gallon fabric collapsible tanks, and 10-
mile hose line segments that could distribute potable water over a
considerable urban operational area.20 The Load Handling System
Water Tank Rack (“Hippo”) system provides army units with 2,000
gallons of storage capacity per tank, a size feasible for delivery and
______________
1 8 “Tactical Water Purification System,” http://peocscss.tacom.army.mil/pmFP/
pm_paws/systems/twps1500.htm, accessed October 21, 2002.
1 9 “Lightweight Water Purifier,” http://peocscss.tacom.army.mil/pmFP/pm_paws/
systems/lwp.htm, accessed October 21, 2002.
20“Tactical Water Purification Systems (TWPS),” http://peocscss.tacom.army.mil/pmFP/
pm_paws/systems/twds.htm, accessed October 21, 2002.
Sustaining and Moving 83
Power
Power requirements will be notably troublesome during contingen-
cies in built-up areas.22 Contracting from local power suppliers is
desirable, but operational requirements demand that backup con-
stantly be on hand. A soldier operating in Haiti recalled that “if you
didn’t have a surge protector and [uninterruptible power supply]
connected to your computer, you couldn’t function because the
Haitian power fluctuated and frequently went out completely during
the day. Backup generator power would come on in 5–10 minutes,
[often] not soon enough . . . I guess the lesson here is never to be to-
tally dependent on local resources, especially key things like HQs and
hospitals.” He additionally noted that complete reliance on local
power suppliers makes the friendly force vulnerable to coercion
should the provider threaten to or actually suspend provision. 23 The
same is true of any locally provided resource, whether power, water,
vehicle transportation, or other supplies and services. CSS leaders
and commanders need to balance the inherent risks in local con-
tracting with the benefits gained. Plans should be in place to either
replace local services/supplies if they are suspended or tailor opera-
tions to account for reduced amounts of indigenously supplied re-
sources.
______________
21Load Handling System Water Tank Rack “Hippo,” PM Petroleum and Water (PAWS),
http://peocscss.tacom.army.mil/pmFP/pm_paws/systems/hippo.htm, accessed October
18, 2002.
22 Comment by Major Kevin Born, CASCOM, based on his experiences during
deployment to Haiti.
23Kevin Born, email to Steven Hartman, “Fuel in UO, Part II,” April 16, 2002.
84 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
ments. He noted that “one of the things that I think has been over-
looked is the large power consumption requirement of a digitized
force. Right now in the SBCT and Force XI Division, all of the Force
XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below (FBCB2) computer systems
are mounted on vehicles. So what happens when you have vehicle
mounted systems like this? Even if the vehicle is stationary the op-
erator is going to have to run the engine periodically through the day
to maintain the charge on the batteries.” 24
Air Resupply
There will be instances when the tactical situation will not allow
ground resupply. Leaders will look to helicopters or unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) to fill the void, at least for cases involving the
delivery of the limited amounts of material feasible using such
means. As hovering aircraft have proved very vulnerable to urban
fires, an alternative means of delivery is necessary. The “speed ball”
concept involves rotary-wing delivery of preconfigured loads
prepackaged in aviation kit bags, duffel bags, or other containers to
protect supplies against impact. The containers are encased in bub-
ble wrap; the helicopter flies as close to the receiving unit or desig-
nated drop point as possible, momentarily reduces speed to execute
the drop, and then leaves immediately (see Figure 4). In urban areas,
rooftops or secured drop zones such as small parking lots or playing
fields are prospective delivery points. 25 Many supplies likely to re-
quire speedball delivery will be difficult to package (e.g., plasma,
water). It is therefore advisable that the transportation communities
conduct peacetime experimentation with the objective of providing
guidance on packaging techniques, speed and angle of drop, and
other pertinent factors.
______________
24Ibid.
25FM 3-06.11, p. 13-12.
Sustaining and Moving 85
______________
26 “US Army Precision, Extended Glide Airdrop System (PEGASYS),” Briefing by Ed
Doucette, U.S. Army Natick Soldier Center, May 2, 2003; and “Precision Airdrop
Distribution Concept of Support for Future Military Operations (Draft),” draft paper,
Airdrop/Aerial Delivery Directorate, U.S. Army Natick Soldier Center, undated.
27Mr. Edward Doucette, Airdrop/Aerial Delivery Directorate, U.S. Army Natick Soldier
Center, telephone interview with Steve Hartman, May 14, 2002.
86 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
______________
28CEPs of this size may not suffice for urban operations. Errors of this range could put
drops on the other side of buildings or even in another block. A television-guided
system might supply the additional accuracy necessary by replicating a manned drop
capable of terminal adjustments. Other possible components of a solution include
assumption of terminal guidance by those receiving the supplies or a net recovery
system strung between buildings on the drop zone.
29Images are from the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronomy Aerodynamic
Decelerator System Technical Committee, http://www.engr.uconn.edu, accessed May
14, 2002.
Sustaining and Moving 87
Sea-Based Resupply
Another interesting approach to urban force sustainment involves
supply from the sea. Sea-based CSS offers enhanced security by re-
ducing logistics footprints ashore. Because the U.S. Army is a force
projection service, securing airfields and ports will often be a pre-
requisite to follow-on operations in a country’s interior. These air-
fields and ports are frequently adjacent to bodies of water accessible
to U.S. Navy vessels. Being able to capitalize on naval lift, standoff,
firepower, and support infrastructure during such undertakings will
therefore offer commanders valuable alternatives to more remote
land basing. Potential systems include the heavy lift capabilities of
Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off ships (LMSR). One LMSR can
carry an entire U.S. Army task force of 58 tanks, 48 other tracked ve-
hicles, and over 900 wheeled vehicles.
Each vessel has a carrying capacity of more than 380,000 square feet.
In addition, LMSRs have a sluing stern ramp and a removable ramp
that services two side ports to ease vehicle access or egress from the
vessel. Interior ramps between decks simplify traffic flow once cargo
is loaded. A pair of 110-ton single pedestal twin cranes make it pos-
sible to load and unload cargo where shore-side infrastructure is
limited or nonexistent. There are plans for adding 19 LMSRs to the
Navy’s inventory, giving the military an additional five million square
feet of projection capacity.30
______________
30 United States Navy Fact File, “Large, Medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off ships—T-
AKR,” United States Navy Fact File, http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/
ships/ship-takr2.html, accessed June 14, 2002.
88 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
______________
31 “Landing Craft, Air Cushion,” Military Analysis Network, http://www.fas.org/
man/dod-101/sys/ship/lcac.htm, accessed June 14, 2002.
Sustaining and Moving 89
Ground-Based Resupply
As fighting in 1993 Mogadishu reminded us, it is often risky to send a
convoy of soft-skinned vehicles into streets swept by fire, exposing
the occupants to snipers, booby-traps, and anti-tank weapons. Us-
ing armored vehicles for LOGPAC push offers increased survivability
and force protection. One option would be the use of Abrams tanks
in a sort of Red Ball Express to bring critical support to an engaged
fighting force. Creating and prepositioning urban forward logistics
elements (FLEs) to support critical points identified during CSS IPB
analysis gives sustainers an additional means of enhancing opera-
tional responsiveness. These FLEs could be stationary ISP locations
that provide an opportunity to replenish, rest, or repair. Alterna-
tively, urban CSS leaders should consider developing mobile FLEs
that move from their predesignated locations to dash in and provide
needed services such as resupply, recovery, or casualty evacuation.
Were sustainment based on resupply from a stationary FLE, a dis-
mounted infantry leader would have to consider how to move sup-
plies back to his fighting position with the minimum loss of fighting
power. The SKEDCO litter (fielded with U.S. Army forces since the
mid-1980s) is an innovative means of evacuating wounded or mov-
ing supplies within an urban area. Given the right terrain conditions,
this lightweight system allows one man to evacuate a wounded sol-
dier or bring supplies forward. It is also easily prepared for heli-
copter extraction.32
______________
32 Geocities, “SKED: How to Evacuate Your Wounded Soldiers . . .” http://www.
geocities.com/equipmentshop/skedinstructions.htm, accessed July 1, 2002.
90 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
The size of mouse holes, windows, or even some doorways can make
it difficult if not impossible for soldiers to pass through these open-
ings while wearing a full combat load. Special Forces soldiers operat-
ing in Afghanistan during 2002 found that they sometimes needed to
shed their gear to pass through doors much narrower and shorter
than is the norm in the United States.35 Heavy loads can also prove
impractical during urban assaults. Lessons learned during actions in
1989 Panama included a recommendation to “issue an assault pack
similar to the old butt pack for carrying basic load ammunition and
other items. The rucksack was too large for the final assault and for
MOUT operations.”36
______________
33FM 3-06.11, p. 13-13.
34Nikolai Gorshkov, “Russia’s ‘Humanitarian Weapon,’” British Broadcasting System,
15:34 GMT, July 30, 2002. The authors thank Dr. Theodore Karasik for bringing this
source to their attention.
35Russell W. Glenn, Special Forces interview, McDill Air Force Base, September 19,
2002.
36 Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned: Volume III-Intelligence, Logistics, &
Equipment, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned, October
1990, no page numbers.
Sustaining and Moving 91
existent meal packets may also fall short of soldier needs. Russian
leaders in Grozny, for example, thought a soldier required 5,000
calories daily, considerably above the 3,800 calories provided on av-
erage to a U.S. soldier consuming three MREs. (Though it appears in
literature on the conflict, it is unknown where the Russian value of
5,000 calories originally came from.) The matter is not one of simply
having fighters eat more; a warrior’s stomach can hold only so much.
Testing is needed to determine daily caloric demands during urban
contingencies, but evidence implies that meals designed to provide
more sustenance per unit of food weight are called for.
______________
37 Jerry Darsch, Department of Defense Combat Feeding Program, Natick Soldiers
Systems Center, telephone interview with Steven L. Hartman, October 4, 2002.
Microdialysis research continues at Clemson University.
92 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
______________
38“Trucks and helicopters are critical transportation assets. Units must release these
assets following mission completion.” Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned, no page
numbers.
39“Improving Land Armaments: Lessons from the Balkans,” RTO-TR-AC/323(SAS-
041)TP/, Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 2001, p.
5.3.1; and FM 3-06, p. 9-16.
40FM 3-20.96, p. 8-49.
Sustaining and Moving 93
EXTRAORDINARY DEMANDS
Points of debarkation remote from enemy forces and unopposed ar-
rivals in a theater provide U.S. forces time to “shake out” combat
units before meeting the foe. Ports and airfields in contested urban
areas raise the possibility of units having to roll off the ramp and di-
rectly into combat. Restrictions on vehicles loaded for transport
make such scenarios especially worrisome. USAF or weight restric-
tions, for example, can mean that combat vehicles’ fuel tanks contain
very little and that the systems include but a few rounds of ammuni-
tion during air transit. Other critical vehicle components (e.g., bolt-
on armor and tow bars) might arrive on separate lifts, especially if the
movement is via C-130 aircraft.44 CSS planners will have to work
______________
41Major Kevin Born’s comments on Lawrence E. Casper, Falcon Brigade: Combat and
Command in Somalia and Haiti, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001.
42FM 3-20.96, p. 8-50.
43Ibid.
44Larry M. DeRoche, interview with Russell W. Glenn, Fort Lewis, WA, November 28,
2002.
94 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
______________
45Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned, no page numbers.
46Ibid.
47Ibid.
Sustaining and Moving 95
______________
48FM 3-20.96, p. 8-50.
96 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Existing doctrine, training, and structures, together with careful
consideration of the challenges of urban areas, will provide an
appropriate basis for initial adaptations, command and control pro-
cedures, and general adjustments to the extraordinary demands
inherent in urban missions as discussed above. Close monitoring of
ongoing and future operation lessons learned and continuous ad-
justment of these initial estimates and approaches during the con-
duct of operations will further enhance readiness both during ongo-
ing missions and in subsequent undertakings. This awareness of the
need to constantly adapt is essential to all facets of CSS urban sup-
port, even those such as maintenance of a force’s equipment that
might at first glance seem to be little affected by built-up areas.
Chapter Six
FIXING
William G. Pagonis
Moving Mountains, 1992
97
98 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
______________
1 Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned, no page numbers.
Fixing 99
The SBCT is not alone. Other units may similarly need to bolster
maintenance assets or allocate them in nontraditional ways. The
tendency toward greater dispersion of armored vehicles during ur-
ban contingencies, for example (e.g., assigning one tank per squad or
platoon of dismounted infantry), will strain the vehicles’ parent unit
capacity to sustain and maintain the systems and cause an overbur-
dening of fixing capabilities akin to those that raise concerns about
SBCT deployments.
______________
2 Each CRT is equipped with two Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT)
wreckers.
100 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
______________
3 FM 3-20.96, p. 8-49.
Fixing 101
Although the near future might not allow for fundamental vehicle re-
design in support of CSS activities, it is nevertheless worth embarking
on a path toward developing vehicles and equipment that can be
better tailored to suit the evolving needs of urban (and other types
of) conflict. These could include steps taken to render units better
able to conduct repairs and perform controlled substitutions. Modu-
larity and appliqué/add-on components are potential approaches in
this regard. Rapid replacement of easily identified and replaced
modules makes it easier to quickly return a vehicle to operable sta-
tus. More than merely a repair process, modularity can also expand
functionality. A vehicle that can accept a variety of modules on a
generic bed can carry a load of supplies on one tasking, later in-
stalling a repair module that makes it a field maintenance station
were a mechanic driving or riding shotgun (much as the previously
mentioned addition of a medical module would facilitate a vehicle’s
use as an ambulance).4 If a disabled vehicle required evacuation, a
winch module could be mounted and the vehicle immediately dis-
______________
4 “Shotgun” is a seat in a vehicle next to the driver, the implication being that the
individual has the responsibility to provide security should the vehicle be threatened,
just as did the persons who sat next to Old West stagecoach drivers.
102 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
______________
5 In the longer term, promising technological solutions could revolutionize
maintenance and repair tasks. A sampling of such potential breakthroughs include:
Regenerative materials and composites: Significant advances have already been made
in the development of “self-healing” materials, an example of which is a transparent
organic polymeric material that can repeatedly mend itself after the infliction of mild
damage. University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) chemists and engineers
conducting exotic materials research have produced a plastic called Automend that
consists of interlocking molecular subunits, which together form a single giant
macromolecule. If a product constructed with Automend cracks while in use, as might
an electronic device that heats and cools frequently, it repairs itself during the first
heating cycle following the damage. The restored area regains approximately 60
percent of its original strength.
“Smart” materials: For almost a decade, materials researchers have sought to embed
controls that would allow for control of a material’s properties to best meet the
demands of the task at hand. Recent field tests have demonstrated that properties
such as shape, conductivity, and vibration control can be “programmed” into a
material. This would allow for generic replacement spares that replace more than one
type of damaged component and thereby reducing the number of spare type in
inventory.
Nano-manufactured or ultra-robust materials: Revolutionary materials constructed
from sheets of “Buckytubes” (Buckminsterfullerence, or C60) offer the possibility of
vastly stronger components with much-reduced weights. Although development of
such materials is longer term (in excess of five years) than the innovations previously
mentioned, it nevertheless holds significant implications for vehicle and equipment
durability, system recovery or transport, and spare parts.
Fixing 103
______________
6 “Neutral steer” means that the vehicle can turn within its own body length by
rotating the tracks (or tires) on opposing sides of the system in opposite directions.
The benefits include not having to back up (as there might be insufficient space to do
so or a danger of striking noncombatants), speed in reversing direction, and a
considerable intimidation factor as opposed to jockeying the system back and forth
several times in a tight space.
Chapter Seven
OTHER
LIAISON
105
106 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
The author went on to observe that “there is a distinct need for more
linguists to facilitate understanding between coalitions—not only at
the strategic and tactical levels, but in the all-important area of logis-
tics.”2 His observation will hold all the more true if various nations
agree to pool resources so as to reduce the amount of materiel that
must be imported into a theater by each.
______________
1 Ryan, Primary Responsibilities, p. 92.
2 Ibid., p. 106.
Other 107
______________
3 Foster-Miller, “Man-Portable Robots for EOD Reconnaissance, communication,
sensing and security,” http://www.army-technology.com/contractors/mines/foster/.
108 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
VEHICLE DESIGN
Current logistics vehicles are too often ill suited for operations in
densely populated built-up areas. Despite its value as a troop carrier,
evacuation vehicle, or at roadblocks when the threat level was low,
the M113 armored personnel carrier (APC) was found by Americans
fighting in 1989 Panama to dangerously expose the .50-caliber gun-
ner to enemy fire from overhead or flank positions.4 The APC’s lack
of protection against even small-caliber machine guns, much less
rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), led to an even more severe con-
demnation of the platform by the Israeli Defense Force (IDF). The
Israelis flatly conclude that the M113 is not appropriate for combat.
“It is an administrative vehicle . . . a taxi . . . to get us from one place
to another.”5 The Israelis are considering replacement of their
considerable M113 fleet with light amphibious vehicles (LAVs) but at
the time of this writing are undecided. Notably, they do not consider
the LAV an acceptable vehicle for urban combat operations either.
LAVs are similarly deficient in their ability to protect vehicle
occupants from larger-caliber weapons and the ubiquitous RPG
found in virtually any force, state or nonstate, worldwide. Israelis
instead rely on their Merkava tanks (which have a troop-carrying
compartment) or APCs constructed from captured T55 tanks.
______________
4 Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned, no page numbers.
5 LtCol Ran, IDF, “IDF Lessons Learned Brief,” briefing, Quantico, VA, June 10, 2002.
110 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
CSS providers in several countries have long called for truly armored
vehicles (vice lightly armored systems such as the M113) to comple-
ment those that should remain in the relative safety of more rear-
ward areas. The Israelis used their tanks in this role during urban
operations in Lebanon and, as noted, continue to do so in Israel
proper. Even the seemingly invincible Merkeva, which before Febru-
ary 2002 had never been destroyed by a guerrilla or terrorist force,
suffered successful attacks by Palestinian irregulars four times in the
two years thereafter.6 The losses of so robust a system validate the
need for more urban-capable supply, transport, medical evacuation,
and maintenance vehicles. Ideal characteristics would include re-
duced vulnerability (if not invincibility) against up to RPG-type
weapons, excellent mine protection, good visibility for crew and pas-
sengers, and a reasonable obstacle-breaching capability. A partial
list of additional desirable performance specifications includes:
______________
6 The conditions under which these vehicles were destroyed reinforce the previous
caution against relying on the same routes repeatedly during urban operations.
Because of their invulnerability to RPGs, good thermal sights, and other characteris-
tics, Merkava are used in a number of support roles, including resupply and aiding
reactions to ambushes. Palestinians take advantage of routine, pattern, and
knowledge of the limited number of routes that can support a tank’s movement to
bury improvised mines, command detonating them under their targets.
Other 111
Current design concepts for the Future Combat Systems (FCS) con-
sider a family of fifteen different combat vehicles based upon a
common platform. The efficiency of a common operating platform
offers numerous CSS advantages in terms of reduced demands for
maintenance training, personnel, and unique repair parts.
GENERAL ENGINEERING
______________
7 FM 3-06, p. 9-28.
8 William T. Bester, The Preparation and Deployment of the Initial Medical Force in
Support of Operation Joint Endeavor, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1998, pp.
16–17.
Other 113
______________
9 Pat Easley, California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, interview with
Russell W. Glenn and Steven Hartman, Camarillo, CA, December 11, 2001.
Chapter Eight
SECURITY, FORCE PROTECTION, AND SAFETY
The most important thing was to keep moving. One of the hardest
things in the world to hit is a moving target.
Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down
Mogadishu, Somalia, 1993
Urban areas come with security and force protection advantages and
disadvantages for a CSS commander. Rarely will the abundance of
all-around concealment be found elsewhere, concealment that may
at times provide the additional benefit of significant cover from en-
emy fire. Nowhere else has as many indigenous sources of support,
be they services, labor, equipment, or other resources. Built-up
areas are more likely to have high-quality road surfaces, access to
commercial communications capabilities, and proximity to air, sea,
and land transportation hubs that facilitate rapid evacuation of in-
jured and wounded. Local capabilities will most likely complement
friendly force needs in many ways. Locals may be more familiar with
indigenous diseases, for example. Towns or cities can offer power
supply and lighting sufficient to constantly power or illuminate vital
areas such as decontamination facilities, supply depots, and mainte-
nance bays that keep soldiers from having to work while exposed to
the elements.
115
116 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
The character of threats is wide ranging, running the gamut from at-
tack by enemy forces to demonstrations and riots to simple theft and
disease. Indigenous groups posing these and other hazards often
vary from those a military force expects to confront. They include ir-
regular and paramilitary forces, organized criminal elements, militia,
hostile police, those involved in the black market, and vandals.1 In-
dividuals and groups friendly at one point in time can later turn un-
friendly. Even those with the best relations with friendly forces can
suffer a change in attitude. For example, a demonstration by indige-
nous personnel employed on an American compound erupted in
Mogadishu when U.S. forces announced reductions in the number of
jobs. 2
______________
1 FM 3-20.96 (2nd Coordinating Draft), p. 7-7 lists some of these threats.
2 COL Stephen P. Hayward, Personal Experience Monograph, DISCOM S-3, Somalia (29
Dec 92–25 Feb 93), Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1998, enclosure
“Commander’s SITREP,” 301800 Jan 93.
3 Should structures sufficiently large to house entire TOCs, CSS or otherwise, exist, they
would be prime targets for enemy analysts as they conduct their IPB.
Security, Force Protection, and Safety 117
The IDF found that leaving CSS units in one place for too long in-
creased their vulnerability to attack. They suggested a policy of fre-
quent moves. Such displacements pose significant command and
control challenges. Locations desirable for CSS operations will be
limited. Supporting units need to remain within reasonable distance
of those they support, further limiting the set of feasible locations.
Movement will therefore mean a careful management of a limited
number of acceptable facilities. Yet to simply shift units from one lo-
cation to another, recently abandoned by some other organization,
offers little in the way of force protection. The new unit is vulnerable
to booby traps placed after the previous unit’s departure and enemy
attacks planned against those formerly occupying the site. CSS
headquarters will have to assume responsibility for identifying desir-
able locations, assigning them to subordinate units, and providing a
system for periodically moving the units assigned to them.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The above-noted functional area challenges are but a sampling of
what the CSS soldier will find confronting him in operations yet to
come. Each urban environment will have its own unique individual
and combination of demands for adaptation and innovation. Stay-
______________
4 Hayward, Personal Experience Monograph, enclosure “Commander’s SITREP,”
130600 Jan 93.
118 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
ing alert for such calls for change and communicating them to others
will enhance operational effectiveness and survivability . . . if they are
acted on. Cities are the most dynamic of ground force conflict envi-
ronments. The force able to adapt effectively and in a timely fashion
will reap considerable rewards. The force unable or unwilling to do
so will very likely suffer in consequence.
Chapter Nine
CONCLUSION: THE UNENDING CALL TO PREPARE
THE FORCE FOR URBAN OPERATIONS
119
120 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
scratch. The mind in which a seed has been planted is more fertile
ground for adjustments to new demands than one unperturbed by
relevant thought.
Such considerations of the challenges that lie ahead will be the basis
for creating and refining doctrine, tailoring training, guiding techno-
logical development, and adapting force structure. It is sometimes
the small things that determine the difference between mission suc-
cess and failure: driver training emphasizing how to react under fire
during an ambush, selecting routes that do not unnecessarily endan-
ger indigenous children, spotting a behavior not in keeping with
what the observant soldier has come to know as the norm are exam-
ples. Training will therefore be fundamental to improved CSS urban
readiness. Yet extant training facilities are far too small to incorpo-
rate much more than the lowest echelons of combat units and per-
haps a sampling of their supporting elements (or, as the case might
be, CSS units and their supporting combat and combat support ele-
ments). None is sufficient in size to permit a supporting unit to gain
an appreciation for how difficult positioning and concealing large
numbers of CSS vehicles and functions will be in a city. This con-
straint must be taken as a given barring the (probably prohibitively
costly) construction of an urban facility on a scale that dwarfs any-
thing in existence or the securing of large expanses of abandoned or
condemned built-up sites. Similarly, no urban simulation currently
provides an acceptable training challenge for the American soldier.
Innovation will be necessary, just as it is for combat and combat
support units conducting urban exercises. Tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTP) will have to be conceived, tried, revised, perfected,
and practiced at abandoned or condemned buildings on units’ in-
stallations or during urban terrain walks in nearby towns. CSS orga-
nizations can integrate their leader training with that of maneuver
units exercising at MOUT sites so that providers become more adept
at relevant planning and coordination. There is no reason that those
CSS leaders cannot occasionally secure such sites for their own use.
Staff Judge Advocate officers found considerable value in experienc-
ing first hand the unique demands of urban combat during training
at Fort Knox’s MOUT facility. Post-event comments reported that
the experience was very beneficial and “a valuable template of how
Conclusion: The Unending Call to Prepare the Force for Urban Operations 121
It has been noted that the CSSC is not an organic component of the
SBCT and that the Stryker Brigade Combat Team’s ability to provide
sufficient maintenance support for itself is therefore a significant
concern. (Though it has also been noted that making the CSSC an or-
ganic part of the SBCT is under consideration, as are other corrective
measures in this regard.)3 CSS challenges of equivalent scope exist
______________
1 “CLAMO Note,” The Army Lawyer, DA PAM 27-50-331, Charlottesville, VA: Center for
Law and Military Operations (CLAMO), The Judge Advocate General’s School, June
2000, p. 40.
2 IPB is by character an anticipatory tool designed to allow a force to prepare for
eventualities before they occur. As anticipation and adaptation are so critical during
urban operations, staffs skilled in the use of IPB will have an advantage over those not
employing such means of forecasting possible outcomes. As one way to gain an
advantage is to impede the enemy’s ability to adapt, there is also considerable poten-
tial in employment of IPB as a preemptive tool. For a discussion of IPB’s use during
urban operations, see Medby, Street Smart.
3 FM 3-21.31 further discusses concerns about the need for CSSC support of the SBCT:
“A key tenet of the concept of support is the capability to receive the combat service
support company (CSSC) to augment the BSB to sustain the force after the initial
stages of employment. Key constraints of the BSB include no capability to do
scheduled maintenance, battle damage assessment and repair (BDAR/Class VII
replacement only), field feeding, air medical evacuation, or EOD support. It also has
only a limited distribution capability and minimal manning of the security, plans, and
operations (SPO/distribution management) center (DMC), S6, and supply support
122 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
for other U.S. Army force structures. Armored and mechanized in-
fantry divisions may lack the dismount strength to sufficiently secure
their vehicles and other assets while also conducting noncombatant
support, population control, or building clearing operations. Aug-
mentation by light infantry (or, conversely, augmentation of light
units by mechanized and armored assets) will therefore be necessary
during future contingencies, much as it was in Hue and Mogadishu.
Here too there are deficiencies in suitability for urban undertakings.
The maintenance support needed by M1 and M2 vehicles is lacking
in light units. Assignment of that support to the light unit by the
heavier force could easily strain the latter’s fixing capabilities given
the likelihood that those vehicles will be allocated across a large
number of infantry squads or platoons. Doctrine and force struc-
tures need to account for these light-heavy task organizations, and
for urban operations in general, no less than is the case for the SBCT.
_____________________________________________________________
activity (SSA). The austere design of the CSS structure is also insufficient to sustain the
SBCT in garrison. The CSSC . . . is the minimum solution.” M 3-21.31 (7-32), p. 10-30.
Appendix
SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
123
124 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
______________
1 Further discussion of this point and examples appear in the chapter on manning
issues (in particular, those related to medical adaptation and anticipation).
126 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
MANNING ISSUES
Medical Adaptation and Anticipation
• Urban operations will require more relief for stretcher-bearers
and other CSS soldiers.
• The mix of medical specialists deployed during urban operations
should account for the different mix of wounds and other medi-
cal ailments found during urban operations.
• Changes, perhaps something as straightforward as creation of a
buddy system, can help to mitigate the problem of sometimes
not being able to determine the location of casualties.
• Casualty self-treatment (“Soldier, treat thyself”) might be advis-
able in lieu of sending personnel to provide immediate attention
to wounded, at least in those cases in which the prospective pa-
tient is able to render such self-aid. Training, including how to
forestall the onset of shock in oneself, will be critical to the suc-
cess of such an adaptation.
• Ad hoc means of recovery and evacuation should not be over-
looked (e.g., using an armored vehicle as a screen, employing
smoke, or shining blinding lights toward an enemy at night).
• Move medical care closer to the wounded.
• Adding to the number of combat lifesavers in units is another
way to increase the quality of care forward. Similarly, increasing
the number of medics is desirable.
• A controversial but potentially very valuable further step would
be upgrading the skills required of medics.
• Technological innovation should be considered in the medical
realm as for any other.
• Anticipation and adaptation during concept development and
equipment procurement should be as much a part of improving
urban capabilities as are battlefield adjustments.
• CSS planners should not overlook the use of indigenous health
services in treating U.S. or other coalition member nations’ sol-
diers.
Summary of Observations and Recommendations 129
Legal
• Commanders and those advising them will frequently find that
“the host government” consists of more than a single entity or
representative.
• American soldiers will have to know how to handle matters re-
lated to civilian labor, the protection of noncombatants, the di-
vision of authority between local police and themselves, accept-
able reactions to criminal activities involving local civilians, and
many other issues.
• Lawyers will be further challenged to define what is permissible
so as not to unnecessarily constrain U.S. forces in their pursuit of
mission accomplishment.
Finance
• Contracting for indigenous vehicle support, labor, and other ne-
cessities can (and should) influence the quantities and types of
materiel and personnel brought into the theater.
• Coalition leaders should work with member nation militaries
and, ideally, private and nongovernmental representatives and
commercial interests (to include U.S. contractors) to fix prices or
otherwise address the negative effects of price wars and disrup-
tion of the local economy.
Summary of Observations and Recommendations 133
Fueling
• Innovative CSS leaders might be able to complement traditional
refueling methods with several ad hoc initiatives given that urban
areas are often locations in which large quantities of fuel are
stored. Ports, airfields, and commercial petroleum-handling fa-
cilities can be designated as early targets for seizure, either to al-
low friendly forces to use the fuel on hand (after testing for suit-
ability and modification as necessary) or for storage of imported
petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) products.
• The vulnerability of fuel transporters and the difficulty of pulling
combat vehicles sufficiently far back from the line of contact to
reach those trucks means that innovations are likely to be called
for to augment doctrinal means of replenishment.
• Urban CSS fuel sustainment operations might be well served by
the use of available subterranean facilities.
• Widespread dispersion of fuel in an urban area will likely be
desirable for security purposes. However, the current allocations
134 Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
of pump and hose assets for U.S. units will be insufficient should
fuel storage and distribution nodes be so positioned.
• Experimentation is necessary to determine necessary pump ca-
pabilities, numbers of pumps, length of hose lines, and storage
capacity needed to support each unit type.
• Increases in hose length requirements present an obvious argu-
ment for developing lighter and less bulky hoses.
• The following technologies might offer partial solutions to urban
fuel distribution challenges:
— The AAFARS refueling system (to distribute bulk fuel through
a subterranean distribution system).
— Undersea fuel bladders for both intermediate ship and
ground vehicle refueling.
— DMFD Mobile Fuel Mobility System mounted on a HMMWV.
Water
• As is the case with ammunition and casualty statistics, a lack of
quality data on urban water consumption means that it will be
difficult to gauge the appropriate balance between best guesses
and quantities that overburden lift and indigenous capabilities.
• A means of supply superior to bottled water is necessary.
• Consider the use of subterranean infrastructure to produce and
distribute bulk water.
Other
• Complete reliance on indigenous power supply exposes units to
interruptions or coercion by those that control the source of such
power. (The same is true of water supplies.) Plans should be in
place to either replace local services/supplies if they are sus-
pended, or to tailor operations to account for reduced amounts
of indigenously supplied resources.
• Using armored vehicles for LOGPAC push offers increased sur-
vivability and force protection. Soft-skinned vehicles may be
Summary of Observations and Recommendations 135
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139
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