USSBS Report 55, The Effects of Air Attack On Japanese Urban Economy, Summary Report, 1947, OCR
USSBS Report 55, The Effects of Air Attack On Japanese Urban Economy, Summary Report, 1947, OCR
USSBS Report 55, The Effects of Air Attack On Japanese Urban Economy, Summary Report, 1947, OCR
The
Effects
OF
Air Attack
ON
Japanese Urban Economy
SUMMARY REPORT
Urban Areas
Division
March 1947
>
The
Effects
OF
Air Attack
ON
Japanese Urban Economy
SUMMARY REPORT
Urban Areas
Division
March 1947
Si
ayPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMtNl^
iAAY
13
1947
This report was written primarily for the use of the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey in the preparation of further reports of a more comprehensive nature. Any conclusions or opinions expressed in this report must be considered as limited to the specific material covered and as subject to further interpretation in the light of further studies conducted by the Survey.
'
FOREWORD
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey was established by the Secretary of War on 3 November 1944, pursuant to a directive from late President Roosevelt. Its mission was to conduct an impartial and expert study of the effects of our aerial attack on Germany, to be used in connection with air attacks on Japan
and to establish a basis for evaluating the importance and potentialities of air power as an instrument of military strategy for planning the future development of the United States armed forces and for determining future economic policies with respect to the national defense. A summary report and some 200
supporting reports containing the findings of the Survey in Germany have been published.
The military segment of the organization was drawn from the Army to the extent of 60 percent, and from the Navy to the extent of 40 percent. Both the Army and the Navy gave the Survey all possible assistance in furnishing
men,
supplies,
transport,
and
information.
The Survey operated from headquarters established in Tokyo early in September 1945, with
subheadquarters in Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki, and with mobile teams operating in other parts of Japan, the islands of the Pacific, and the Asiatic mainland. It was possible to reconstruct much of wartime Japanese military planning and execution, engagement by engagement, and campaign by campaign, and to secure reasonably accurate statistics on Japan's economy and war production, plant by plant, and industry by industry. In addition, studies were conducted on Japan's
over-all strategic plans
On 1-5 August 1945, President Truman requested that the Survey conduct a similar study of the effects of all types of air attack in the war against Japan, submitting reports in duplicate to the Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the Navy. The officers of the
Survey during
its
and the background of her entry into the war, the internal discussions and negotiations leading to her acceptance of unconditional surrender, the course of health
ChairmoK
Harry L. Bowman, J. Kenneth Galbraith,
Rensis Likert, Frank A. McNamee,
Jr.,
and morale among the civilian population, the eflfectiveness of the Japanese civilian defens3 organization, and the effects of the atomic bombs. Separate reports will be issued covering each phase of the study. The Survey interrogated more than 700 Japanese military, government, and industrial officials. It also recovered and translated many documents which not only have been useful to the Survey, but also will furnish data valuable for other studies. Arrangements have been made to turn over the Survey's files to the Central Intelligence Group, through which they will be available for further examination and
distribution.
Fred Searls,
Jr.,
The Survey's complement provided for 300 350 officers, and 500 enlisted men.
Ill
PREFACE
Seventy percent of the B-29 bomb tonnage dropped on the Japanese The Urban Areas Division enislands was dropped on 66 cities. deavored to measure the effects of those raids on the urban economy and determine the extent to which that bombing progi-am contributed to Japan's surrender. The effect of mass bombing on the community was an additional aspect of the Division's investigation because of the importance of those effects on economic life.
home
Limitations of personnel and time made it impossible to conduct a thorough investigation of all the 66 cities which were subjected to planned area attacks. The results of such a complete survey, however, would scarcely have justified the effort, since in most of the bombed cities, the period after or between attacks was too brief to measure more than temporary effects. This consideration was important since the Germans demonstrated that they were able, after an attack which appeared to have completely crushed the economy of a city, to bring about industrial recovery in a matter of a few months. In Japan, of the 66 cities attacked, only six were attacked before the last 3 months of the war. Even in those six cities (Tokyo, Yokohama, Kawasaki, Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe) subsequent area and precision attacks followed closely upon the initial attacks and complicated the problem of analysis. In the 60 other cities, there was little possibility of measuring more than the direct impact upon the people and services of the city and the initial industrirJ depression caused by the raids. The six largest cities were chosen as subjects for detailed study because (a) they provided the only cases where recuperation, if it occurred, would be measurable and (b) the bulk of urban industry was concentrated in those cities. Detailed studies were also made of Kyoto, the fourth largest and only unbombed city of importance in Japan. Hiroshima and Nagasaki, targets of the atom bomb, were also studied in detail, although limitations were imposed upon the analysis of economic factors in those two cities, since they were attacked only a few days before the end of the war.
,
Altogether, the Division's investigation included the study of 39 33 on Honshu and Kyushu, and 6 on Hokkaido.^
lected
cities,
Pertinent data relating to Japan's economic and social life were colfrom national prefectural and municipal officials. Industrial statistics were gathered from 4500 detailed responses to factory question-
Approximately 2400 of these, containing a complete series for all production factors were tabulated to a.ssess the effect of bombing on the production of hit and unhit plants. Five field teams were engaged in key urban regions for 8 weeks supervising the collection of industrial and
naires.
collateral material.
>
Urban
The report of the Area Studies Division of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey on the air offensive against German cities is prefaced by
the following statement
"The major cities of Germany present a spectacle of destruction so appalling as to suggest a complete breakdown of all aspects of urban activity. On the first impression, it would appear that the area attacks which laid waste to these cities must have subYet this was not the case. stantially eliminated the industrial capacity of Germany. The attacks did not so reduce the German war production as to have a decisive effect on the outcome of the war."
The cities of Japan, like those in Germany, presented a spectacle of enormous destruction. Although the over-all total damage was somewhat greater in Germany than in Japan the extent of destruction was comparable. Only 160,800 tons of bombs were dropped on Japan's home islands as compared with 1,360.000 tons dropped within Germany's own borders. One hundred and four thousand tons of bombs were dropped on 66 Japanese cities as compared with 542,554 tons of bombs that were dropped on
61
the air attacks against Japanese cities were not the cause of the enemy's defeat. The defeat of Japan was assured before the urban attacks were launched. But this defeat, before it could be translated into the terms of surrender, might have required a costly invasion of the home islands had not the effect of the air attacks, both precision and urban, on Japan's industries and people exerted sufficient pressure to bring about unconditional surrender on 15 August. The city raids contributed substantially to that pressure by their impact on the social and economic structure of Japan.
war economy was the underlying cause Before the air attacks against the cities began, war production had been steadily declining because of the ever-increasing shortages of raw materials, skilled labor, and an ill conceived dispersal program which was initiated too late. The Survey estimated that, even without air attacks, over-all production, by August 1945, would not have exceeded 60 percent and might have been as low as 50 percent of the 1944 peak. By the end of 1944, production in most critical industries had started to decline because of the curtailment of raw materials. This resulted in a growing margin of unused plant capacity. Thus, even substantial bomb damage to plant structures and equipment frequently had little, if any effect on actual production. The effectiveness of the blockade caused some duplication of effort in our air attacks against the aircraft and heavy ordnance industries considerably more in our attacks on aluminum, steel, and oil plants. Such duplication resulted more from precision attacks against major units of those industries. The measure of waste, however, was small in terms of the substantial over-all production loss that did reinsufficiency of Japan's
The
of her defeat.
from the air attacks. As mentioned previously, national production without air attacks, as of August, probably would have been between 50 percent and 60 percent of the 1944 peak, had the shortage of raw materials been the only limiting factor. In July 1945, the actual level of production in 33 of the bombed
sult
Japanese urban areas which included a major proportion of all industry, was 33 percent of the 1944 peak. Despite the fact that part of the air effort against the urban areas proved to be duplicative, the position of the urban economy in July 1945 points to the effectiveness of the attacks.
It cannot be stated, however, that the loss of 67 percent of her major urban production was the major factor in motivating Japan's decision to surrender. The Survey determined that, from July 1944 to August 1945, many different pressures were being exerted upon the leaders who were responsible for that decision. If the state of the economy was, as may reasonably be assumed, a question of concern to the leaders, the magnitude of this loss must have had a substantial effect upon their considerations.
the raids on the social structure of Japan's cities was calamitous. attacks spread destruction and privation throughout the islands.
The
Few
inhabitants escaped the terror of the raids. Those who were not directly attacked shared the experience of millions of refugees who fled into the country seeking food and shelter. The raids brought home to the people the realization that there was no defense against the Allied aircraft that
;
nothing could prevent the wholesale destruction of every inhabited area in Japan and that further resistance was futile. Popular awareness of these facts, which had been known by the political leaders as early as March 1945, exerted further pressure on those leaders to end the war.
VI
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter
I.
Pate
The Target
Economic Situation Before the Urban Attacks
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
Vll.
Impact of the Raids on Industry Effect of the Air Attacks on Public Utilities and Services
20 24 29
33
VIII.
Industrial Labor
IX.
X.
XL
36
Appendix A.
Appendix
B.
Air
Offensive
44
Report on the Effects of the Urban Area Bombing ON Japanese Wartime Economy, Submitted by Tokyo Imperial University
47
LIST OF TABLES
Table No.
1.
Description
Page
1
in
2.
Urban Areas
2
....
.
3. 4.
5. 6.
January 1945
and over
3 6
7
in
Urban
Damage
to
Urban Areas
7.
Comparative Table of Pre-raid Importance and Effects of Bombing on the Six Largest Cities Decrease in Number of Plants and Workers in Tokyo During Raid Period
8. 9.
Number
of Plants in Industrial
Sample by Industry
12
12
13
10.
11.
14
12.
13.
14.
15
16
Sample
Production in Hit and Unhit Plants in Bombed Areas (to provide a rough measure of production loss due to direct effects of air attacks)
Production
in
17
15.
Unhit Plants
in
in
Unhit
Plants
in
Unbombed Areas
16.
(to provide
attacks)
17.
Yen Output Ratios Hit and Unhit Plants Nagoya Railroad Labor and Freight Movements
21
VII
Page
18. 19.
25
Cities
26 27 28 28 28 29 30
30 32 32
Manpower
Distribution in Japan
Manpower-Labor
Distribution of
Conscription
Tokyo
Monthly Value of Component Receipts, Component Sample: Tokyo Percentage Distribution of Component Plants in Tokyo Complex and Outside
Damage
to
Repair History
Osaka
City
35
Urban Areas
42
LIST
Description
Aggregate Loss
of Production in
of Production Loss
Levels of Industrial All Japanese Urban Industry Consolidated All Japanese Urban Industry Hit All Japanese Urban Industry Unhit
Japanese Urban Industry
2 3
4
5
Hokkaido Industry
Kyoto Industry
Hiroshima Industry
6
7
Consolidated
10
11
Consolidated Ordnance Hit Ordnance Un-hit Electrical Equipment Consolidated Electrical Equipment Hit Electrical Equipment Unhit Finished Machinery Consolidated Finished Machinery Hit Finished Machinery Unhit
Machined and Fabricated Metal Parts
Machined and Fabricated Metal Parts
Metals (Production)
Metals
12
13 14 15
16
17
18 19 20
Consolidated Hit
Unhit
21
22
23 24 25 26 27
.
Consolidated
(Production) Hit
Metals (Production)
Miscellaneous
Miscellaneous
Miscellaneous
VIII
28
29
LIST OF
Description
(Continued)
Numhrr
30
31 32
33
Equipment
Finished Machinery
34
35
36 37 38 39
Power Consumption
Labor
Labor Force and Electric Power Consumption
713275-47-2
CHAPTER
The Target
Geographically, the pattern of Japan's industrial economy resembled an elongated S,
stretching from Niigata at one extremity to Nagasaki at the other, to include the important
funneled into centrally located a.ssembly plants. Similarly, but to a le.sser extent, the ordnance,
machine
tries
parts,
and
electrical
equipment indus-
Yokohama, Nagoya, Kobe, Hiroshima-Kure, and Yawata, and their satelAlong this route, Japanese industry lite towns. was heavily concentrated. In the period preceeding the war, certain tentative moves had been made toward the decentralization of urban industry but rapid wartime expansion, decenters of Tokyo,
A number
had been
built
somewhat
The importance
or isolated
be gauged by the fact that the metropolitan districts of Tokyo, Nagoya, and Kobe-Osaka, alone, embraced
industry
may
Slightly
industries
cities.
than one-half the total production of those was concentrated in the 6 largest
Sixty-four percent of the national procities.
about 35 percent of the total industrial labor force, and more than 40 percent of the electric power substations. Thirty of the forty-six ur-
These
ban industrial concentrations selected as the most important by the Joint Target Group were
located in those cities.
percentages, except for the inclusion of aircraft parts manufacture, are in terms of final
In Germany, the 15 cities which were the principal RAF targets were credited with ap-
component manufacture concentrated in the areas. Although there is no accurate way of measuring the importance of such manufacture by city areas, it is estimated that approximately 75 percent was located in the 6 largest cities the remainder being scattered throughout other cities, most of which were bombed. During the war, several of the more important end-product manufacturers established subassembly plants in smaller urban communities. The Naka.jima Aircraft Co., for example, had plants in Omiya, Isezaki, Takasaki, Kumagaya, Maebashi, and other small towns north of Tokyo. The Kawasaki Aircraft Co. had major units at Gifu and Akashi the Kawanishi Aircraft Co., at Himeji and Takatof
general
Germany.
In 1940,
German
cities
with populations of over 800,000 accounted for barely 12 percent of the entire population, while in Japan, cities of that size contained 23 percent of the total population.
of Japan, Tokyo,
goya, and Kyoto accounted for almost 20 percent of the total population. The 66 cities attacked in urban raids accounted for over 75 percent of the urban population, and 28 percent of the total population. In addition, these cities
included almost all of the political, military, and economic administration of the Empire. Table
1.
spread to the
Gifu,
Nagoya including
8 El, 8
<-.
o S
<
CHAPTER
Economic Situation Before the
II
Urban Attacks
Even before the beginning of the Pacific war, Japan's supply of many vital raw materiBy 1944, the blockade and als was inadequate. antishipping campaigns had caused serious and growing shortages in the supply of almost every By June 1944, iron ore basic raw material. stockpiles in Honshu had shrunk to 800,000
from 2.6 million tons in December 1941. The monthly average of finished steel 'production for the second half of fiscal 1944 had dropped to 64 percent of the monthly average In the same year oil imports of the first half. for the October-December quarter had dropped to 67 percent of those for the same period of the proceeding year. Imports of coking coal from China had virtually ceased by the end of 1944, and Manchuria coal imports began seriously to Domestic coal movements from Kydecline. ushu and Hokkaido were sharply curtailed by By the end of the Allied mining of harbors. 1944, imports of bauxite, upon which Japan was almost totally dependent, had ceased entirely. In terms of these items, which are the backbone of any industrial nation, the eventual collapse of the Japanese war economy was assured.
tons,
tom, (b) that the effects of air raids were being felt (primarily by the aircraft indu.stry), and (c) that preparations for dispersal were beginning to interfere with production.
Table
3.
Consumption
Month
Metals
April
A/C
100
105
Ordnance 100
106
103
Metals
100 106
101
A/C
100
91
Ordnance
1Q44
100
91
9.!
May
June
July
100 112
106
111
98
97
97 97
118
121
91 9J
99 100 100
102 109 107 103
101
92
August September
October
109
121 121
126
107
123
89
89
91
126
132
104
November December
January 1945 February
>
m
88
82
134
131 131
116
147 132
109
88
83
72
105
110
96
92
89
102
106
Peak month
lirst
half
1944
100 percent.
Summary
The heavy area raids struck
omy.
at a short econ-
By
output of end-products reached a peak in the After the fall of Saipan, a national drive to increase production of war goods had met with considerable success, with urban industry production rising over 20 percent from April to October. It is obvious, in view of the diminishing imports, that this spurt in production was made possible only by the consumption of critically low stockpiles. In
all
spurt of production in late 1944, the Japanese sacrificed the wherewithal to repair and replace damaged plants and equipment. The dearth of raw materials caused by the 1944 production drive, furthermore, was largely responsible for
the failure of the dispersal was finally embarked upon.
also aflfected
and ordnance
achieved particularly impressive gains in the last quarter of 1944 aircraft reaching its highest peak in October, ordnance in November. This was supported by peak output of metals in September and October. By November, metals production was starting to drop, falling further in December. By January, all
industries
;
by this production drive. After years of war, the working population was 10 exhausted. Added to this, the curtailment of food imports by late 1944 had resulted in a reduction of rations below the level needed to maintain working efficiency. An increase in lost hours from 20 percent in early 1944 to 25 percent by December was the beginning of the rapid decline in the effectiveness of industrial
manpower.
The urban
ideal
air attacks,
three industries were down substantially, indicating (a) that stockpiles were reaching bot-
upon an economic structure with neither the means nor the spirit to offer strong
significant weight in early 1945, fell
target
an
resistance.
CHAPTER
The Air
Table 4
Attacks
lists
III
effort
was not
Only eight
end of April, and two of these, Hamamatsu and Kagoshima, received only moderate tonnages. Nine cities had been hit by the end of May, 18 by the end of June, 57 by the end of July and 66 by 14 August. Until 15 June, the bulk of urban bombing tonnage was dropped on the four large urban complexes, Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe.
In
all,
i square miles out of a total built-up area of 411 square miles. Allied aircraft dropped 160,800 tons of bombs on the home islands of Japan. This was just over 10 percent of the tonnage dropped within Germany's borders. Navy aircraft accounted for 6,800 tons. Army aircraft other than B~29s for 7,000 tons and the B-29s for Of the total, 104,000^ tons of 147,000 tons. bombs were directed at 66 urban areas, 14,150
tons at aircraft factories,
10,600 tons at
oil
cellaneous targets, and 8,115 tons at airfields and seaplane bases in support of the Okinawa operation.
A brief review of the operational problems connected with the bombing of Japanese cities is appended to the report as Appendix A.
Twentieth AAF Operations Summary. Discrepancy with total given on table 4 due to tonnage dropped in attacks of under 100 tons, which are included in the 104.000 figure.
^ ^
The planned
CHAPTER
Effects of Air Attack
IV
on the Population
The vulnerability of the Japanese people to air attacks was never a primary consideration The Theater Air in basic Allied strategy.
painfully aware of the impotence of their government which could do nothing to prevent the
its
effects.
gets primarily on the basis of their economic value, anticipated that, apart from the economic
results of those raids, the impact of
mass bomb-
ing on the people would seriously undermine the enemy's ability to continue the war. These effects are dealt with, in detail, in the reports They of the Morale Division of the Survey. are of interest here insofar as they are im-
The mass flight of people from the bombed The populacities was virtually uncontrolled. dropped 63 percent during tion of Tokyo city the raid period. Official estimates of the number of evacuees from the huge Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama complex, accounting for 11 percent of the total population, were placed at
around
4.6 million or 58 percent of the preraid
bombing.
in
was
war economy.
was the spreadthat continued resistance ing of the conviction Particularly, to the Allied strength was futile. the extension of the bombing program to the
raids on the general population
After the two devastating air raids on Nagoya in mid-March, 317,000 people, or 29 percent of the preraid population fled from When the war ended, less than 50 the city. percent of Nagoya's population remained. Although no oflScial figures on the total number of evacuees was obtainable, the Morale Division of the Survey, on the basis of its investigation, estimated the number to have been in excess of
population.
the
official
Table
of
summarizes the
on
the
physical
in
effects
cities:
the
raids
people
66
in
urban area attacks of 100 tons or over (includes HE, IB and fragmentation)
Table 4 (Continued)
Table
Target area
5.
Damage
to
nrban areas
'411
centers in the
'192
'
cities,
square miles
do do
charted movements
Area destroyed
Total population
-'ITS
of evacuees, seriously agalready critical food situation. The gravated an breakdown of the official rationing .system and
21,928,000
Bombs dropped
tons
121,458
2,094,374
Buildings destroyed
Persons killed
252,769
298,650
8,324,000 2,100,000
Airforcc,
the curtailment of factory food rations caused by the destruction of plants forced refugees and remaining residents more and more to the black markets, not only for food but for all
goods.
Planned evacuations
'
Operational
summary, Twentieth
Refers only
to
66 cities
whicli
-
43
66' cities.
payments for deend-of-employment bonuses, stroyed homes, and which were paid to workers when their factories were destroyed, stimulated the inflation. When it is considered that not only were the residents in 66 cities directly affected by bombing but that the residents of an additional 100
War
risk insurance
table of measurable
damage cannot
fully
effects of
reflect the
The number of people rendered homeless presented an almost insurmountable problem. National and local organizations which had been set up to care for the victims were largely ineffectual because of the magnitude of the disaster. The vast majority of bombed-out residents were, as a result, thrust upon their
precision bombing raids, accidental bombings, recce-aircraft unloadings, and other unplanned
attacks,
understandable that, according to the findings of the Morale Division, over 40 pei-cent of a large sample of the Japanese people in both urban and rural communities expressed themselves as most satisfied at the end of the
it is
own
homes or to move The preraid evacuation program succeeded in moving a small part of the popuelsewhere.
lation out of the cities but postraid evacuation
the cessation of air raids. Division's survey further indicated that of all the gainfully employed people who evacuated their homes, 37 percent had been engaged in war industry. Only 26 percent of
the
was
ties.
workers among the urban non-evacuees were in war production. Of the war workers
the cities, only 4 percent left because their factories were moved; the rest either abandoned their jobs or left because of
Most people left the city on foot, carrying with them the remnants of their possessions. The destruction of food stocks and distribution
Table
6.
who evacuated
effects of
bombing on the
Total
all
Yokohama
Importance
Area (square miles)
Population:
Osaka
Nagoya
Total 6
cities
Total 66
cities
Japan
429
8,048,000
7,994,000
3.559,321 1,485,240
142
12S
56
1,260,000 1,349,000
610
13,529,614 13,105,000
5.335,521
1940
4,221,614 3,762,000
1,227.200
February
Industrial
1944
labjr force February 1945
21.928,000
*549.000
'362,000
613.600
75.50
2.460,840
257.5
B U
area
(square
miles)-
40
Effects
of
Bombing
20,316 49
miles)...
Total
bomb
tonnage^
area destroyed
17,358
32.6
14,670
31
12.4
52,344
42
Percent
B/U
70
24.68
107.0
Number
People
buildings destroyed
861,600
...
490,000
1,542,000
16,802
dehoused
killed
3,446,000
123.100 493,000
8,152
1.474,700
5,483.000
People
People
Total
99.408
99,567
198,975
124,362 156.917
injured
casual ties
47,255
64,057
1,482,000
10.095 18,247
281,279
5,662,000
3,582,000
3598,000
the
destruction
of
their
plants.
The
latter
group seldom sought or heeded official pleas for reemployment. The evacuations resulted in a substantial loss of workers and a sharp increase in absenteeism among those who continued to work. A more detailed discussion of the problems affecting the industrial labor force in the urban economy is presented in a later chapter.
report on the general impact oi the urban was written at the direction of this division by the combined faculties of the Tokyo Imperial University. Of several reports on this
attacks
topic
written for the division by Japanese the University's report reflects the careful and objective preparation. most It is included in its entirety as Appendix B.
sources,
fc
itta
jj;
CHAPTER V
to Industry interpretation indicated that the air Photo attacks destroyed about 43 percent of the built-
Physical
Damage
category
Table
7.
itself
accounted
and workers
number
of plants
up area of the 66
cities.
the area attacks destroyed or seriously damaged from 25 to 40 percent of the storage and manufacturing floor space. In the 60 smaller
Workers
floor
As much
indicated in the
Summary
of this report,
of the floor area affected by urban area raids represented idle or excess capacity. For example, in Nagoya, although area raids de-
stroyed 25 percent of the productive floor area of the aircraft industry, the effort was largely wasted since earlier precision attacks had al-
much
ready compelled that industry to disperse, and of the floor area destroyed in the heavy urban attacks was at the time non-productive. Dispersal, although not as widespread in
other industries as in aircraft, had similarly reduced the target value of a number of plants. In addition, the increasing shortages of raw material were steadily creating further excess However, physical damage to plant capacity.
and equipment affected the production of every industry to some extent and certain industries In Tokyo, by August 1945, the substantially. total number of plants in operation had been
;
reduced to 13,193, or 32 percent of the October 1944 figure. In all, over 25,000 plants were Most of these destroyed or badly damaged. were plants employing under 100 workers. In 1940, such plants accounted for 52 percent of the total industrial output of the city and, in
1942, for 53 percent.
In the
to
same
years, their
labor force
amounted
65 percent and 58
tion
and 55 percent of the total city output. In this same category, 28,256 of a total of 40,641 plants had ceased operations by July 1945, and the number of workers in this group had dropped from 662,561 to 178,986, a loss of 73
percent.
Bomb damage
resulted in a produc-
Structural damage' caused by each attack, in terms of a percentage of the productive floor area that existed just prior to that attack. The yen value of all productive plant (3)
(2)
and ordnance
industries,]
which, respectively, accounted for about 49 per cent and 16 percent of the total city production.! These attacks, and the fear of them, were the]
principal reason
why
dispersal
was
so frantic-Imp;
The
percentage
of
that
plant
and
ally
equipment destroyed by each attack. Factories that were not hit by air attacks provided figures for items "(1)" and "(3)," as of the end of 1944, the beginning of the raid
period.
Loss of production caused by dispersal was one of the largest single factors contributing to the over-all decline in Nagoya's industrial output during the last 8 months of the war. The precision attacks naturally con
initiated.
and plant and equipment were computed for the 90 percent sample of Nagoya's industry, including both hit and unhit plants. It was found that, of a preraid productive
area of 39,334,000 square feet, air attacks destroyed 14,649,000 square feet, or 37.3 percent. More damage was caused by area attacks, particularly by the two that occurred in midMay, than by precision attacks.- As might be expected, ton for ton precision attacks caused
floor
tributed significantly to labor inefficiency and absenteeism, not only in the plants directly at-
tacked but also in many factories that lay near the primary target area.
The area attacks in Nagoya were of considerably less importance, in terms of the actual production decline, than the precision attacks,
even though 71 percent of all the bomb tonnage employed against the city was dropped in area attacks, and even though the area attacks, alone, destroyed 21 percent of the city's industrial structure. The area attacks here duplicated as
nearly twice as much industrial damage as area attacks 4,053 tons of bombs in precision attacks destroyed 6,270,000 square feet of productive area, while 10,001 tons of bombs dropped in area attacks destroyed 8,379,000 square feet. Precision attacks destroyed 1,547 square feet per ton of bombs, and area attacks
:
much
as complemented the effects of precision' The efl'ect of the area raids was felt most by plants manufacturing components for large end-product customers. The chief value
attacks.
There were 15 precision as against 6 area attacks on the city. Because of the dominant position of the aircraft industry in the city, which industry had dispersed a large proportion of its equipment
838 square
feet.
shortages.
early precision missions, the percentage of preraid plant and equipment destroyed was con-
siderably smaller than the percentage of proTwenty-nine point seven ductive floor area.
percent of the plant and equipment was demolished, as compared with 34.8 percent destruction of floor area.
The
air
attacks against
(1)
product manufacture by creating component However, the effect of reduced component supply was substantially lessened by the precision raids, which cut deeply into endproduct manufacture itself, thereby greatly reducing component requirements. Even if the end-product plants had been unaflfected by precision damage, it is questionable, in view of the rapid decline in raw material recipts, whether the component requirements of those plants would have been much greater during the raid period. In the absence of both precision attacks and raw material shortages, however, the area raids would have had a very substantial effect on production. As it was, the cumulative shock
of the
mainly by precision attacks to wipe out Nagoya's aircraft and (later) ordnance production and (2), mainly by area attacks, to eliminate the city's remaining industrial contribution and destroy the people's
broad purposes:
will to resist.
emphasized: they contributed to a serious decline in worker incentive and morale, caused
widespread damage in every industry; rendered homeless more than 400,000 people and caused severe (though temporary) disruption to an
;
damage was
defint'd
ing
members
Monthly
of buildings only.
structural
disregarded.
*
was
to
paralysis of economic
life
figures
of
raid
destruction
appear
in
this
division's
report
10
CHAPTER VI
, T J . Impact of the Raids on Industry
,
.
the division, reallocations of materials to the unbombed cities was not substantial enough to
Introduction. The air offensive against the expected to affect war iiiban areas of Japan was
production substantially.
result through (1)
:
What
benefit the
unbombed
It
was
to achieve this
"
Direct physical
facilities
du tive
which were felt in varying degrees Therefore it is considered in all urban areas. industry at the end of the likely that urban ^^^^ without air attacks, would have been at
^^^^^ ^^ ^ qq percent level of its 1944 peak, pos^^^^^ somewhat higher. With this in mind, the
following
Disruption of internal transportation to and public services, thus creating obstacles goods and, normal movement of labor and
(3)
of production levels, as they attacks in July 1945, becomes were after the air
summary
more meaningful.
^^^
^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
i July 1945 the levels of urban industry pro^ly^tion in relation to the October 1944 peak'
were:
Percent
urban In terms of the broad objectives of the effects attack program, it was expected that the substantial of (1) (2) and (4) would be more larger urban complexes. And by attacks in the on the smaller cities the effects of (3) and (4), wideparticularly, were expected to have a serious effect on the economy and spread and
result in general economic disorganization.
bombing in plants which were not hit by bombing but were located in bombed cities .. both hit and unhit plants in bombed cities m^u.^hit Pjants^ wh.h were located .n unbombed
i^ plants which were hit by
27
51
33 ^^
Before analyzing the effects of the raids on recathe production of urban industry, a brief framework pitulation is given of the economic The Surin which those effects were operative. without air vey estimated that by August 1945, attacks and without invasion, the shrinking supply of basic materials would have imposed a
production ceiling upon the economy of from 50 percent to 60 percent of the 1944 peak. This estimated level of production appears somewhat low for urban industry- In July, production of in unbombed Hiroshima was at 83 percent in 6 its October 1944 peak; in June, production cities in the Hokkaido was at 93 percent of the
both direct and indirect, it was necessary to assume that the level of urban production achieved in October 1944 might have been maintained if three factors had not caused its decline,
r^^ie
three factors were bi'oadly delineated as: direct effects of bombing to productive ^^^^ effects of pjj^,-,^ and equipment, (b) the indirect disruption of bombing (absenteeism, dispersal,
supply
lines,
etc.)
and
(c)
general economic
conditions (raw material shortages, deterioraHad ^jgn of equipment, food shortages, etc.).
the October 1944 production level been maintained through June 1945, the aggregate pro-
duction loss to urban industry caused by all three factors would have been approximately The total loss of 3,200 3^200 million yen.
million yen
'
October peak.
in 8
An
over-all
sample of industries
.
tion in
cities showed a level of produc,, r\ u June 1945 at 94 percent of the Octobei 1944 peak. According to the data collected by
unbombed
J,
i.
Oclnber
,j^,y
the
,^^^,
1944 production equals 100 percent. bombing p,,,ent but thu reflects the eSects of ^^^^
iiukkaido in juiy.
11
apportioned between the three causes of production decline. The method used resulted in the following rough apportionment
Twenty-nine percent of the total aggregate loss was due to (a) the direct effects
of
bombing
Thirty-nine percent of the total aggregate loss iras due to (b) the indirect effects
of
bombing
Thirty-tivo percent of the total aggregate loss was due to {c) general economic conditions
The Nature
the Analysis of
for
The Plant Sample To provide basic data for an analysis of the effects of bombing on industry in urban communities, 9,000 industrial questionnaires were
distributed to Japanese manufacturers in 39
cities
including
factories
in
Nagasaki and Hiroshima). Of these, 4,500 were returned and approximately 2,400 contained sufficient data on yen sales, electric power consumption, and labor to form comproduction series for the period from October 1943 to August 1945, the period which was chosen for the analysis. Many of the incomplete questionnaires, although unsuitable for inclusion in the over-all industry series, proved useful in the analysis of industries in
plete
cities
which were subjects of special reports. The following table lists the industrial classifications and the number of plants which were
used to tabulate the data
Table
Category
8.
00
s S
15
2 a
<!
Eh
the city's industry. Kyoto's industry was about 90 percent represented in the sample. In
Osaka,
a distribution
to plants
of
questionnaires was
made
with less than 50 workers as well as to those with more than 50 workers representing a coverage of almost 75 percent
The
over-all industrial
data covered plants which employed 18 percent of the total Japanese industrial labor force. Production factors of hit and unhit plants were tabulated separately. Of the total sample, the hit plants are in a ratio of about 3:1 to the unhit plants; and the unhit plants in the bombed cities are in about the same ratio to the unhit plants in the 8 unbombed cities. Graphs (3-29) show yen sales, productive hours, and kw.-hr. consumption values month by month for 23 months (October 1943 through August 1945). Table 10 gives the base period values for yen sales, productive hours, and kw.-hr. consumption by industry (1), the 1944 peak period values (3), the July 1945 values (4), the percentage of the base values for each industry compared to all industry (2) and the same percentage for each industrial group in July 1945 (5). Also given are the percentage declines in industry from the base to July 1945 (6) and from the peak to July 1945 (7). Table 10 shows that during the raid period,
,
Table
11.
s e c ^ u
<
S 2 3 U O
lI.
ai*-i
a
s
e
t/3
+-
ii
'
a;
3 o
713275-17-4
hours were required to do similar jobs at the end of the sampling period than at the beginning (further analysis in the chapter on
labor)
products,
tools,
metals production, machinery and and shipbuilding; these amounted to 67 percent (base) and 68 percent (peak) of the
The data indicate that the decline in production was most precipitous in the April-May-June Production in the unhit plants was period. maintained at high levels through April and May when it was still at 106 percent and 118
percent, respectively, of the base period. Thereafter, production in the unhit plants dropped
to 95 percent in
In kw.-hr. consumption, two industries, metals production and chemicals, both high users of electricity per productive hour, accounted for 57 percent and 55 percent of the total declines from the base and
declines in productive hours.
Bomb Damage.
fall-
level since
February 1944.
The
times as many workers, had production levels of 70 percent, 66 percent, and 47 percent of the base in April, May, and June. The Decline in Production by Industry. Table 13 expresses the values in table 10 as absolutes (columns 1 and 3) and percentages of the total los.ses (columns 2 and 4) The sum at the bottom of column 3 is a fictitious value since it is the sum of the 1944 peaks which occurred in different months. Percentages in columns 2 and 4 show for each industry the relative weight of the decline in production as of July 1945 measured from the base and the peak. In terms of yen sales, metals production, aircraft, miscellaneous industries, electrical pro.
The
damage
(b)
to plant, equipment,
The
persal, repair
and replacement
and
disruption of supplies)
General economic conditions (short(c) ages of raw materials, deterioration of machinery, etc.).
(a)
from factors
necessary to compare the decline in production factors in the damaged plants with that in the undamaged plants. These data are shown in Table 14.
and
(c),
it
is
ducts,
tools,
together, ac-
from the base, and 74 percent of the aggregate decline from the peak. Metals production accounts for 21 percent of the aggregate decline from the base, and 19 percent from the peak.
It is asumed that all plants, both damaged and undamaged, would have been affected equally by general economic conditions. Thus factors (b) and (c) may be included as similarly weighted factors in both hit and unhit plant Production in all plants would decategories. cline from these causes to the same extent as
The
was
production
in
in
undamaged
plants.
Production
in aircraft, electrical
undamaged
tSi
"S
53
and
(c), since
it
to direct ef-
fects of
bombing, (a).
Hit plants include some in which damage caused no production loss, and some in which loss due to direct damage was serious. The sample, therefore, represents an average level of production loss in hit plants. This level is
not entirely accurate, however, since production data from numerous completely destroyed plants were unobtainable. If such data had been included they would tend to increase the production loss due directly to bombing. On the other hand, hit plants, because they include most of the large plants, represent a greater
decline in production due to dispersal than do the unhit plants. This would tend to compensate for the lack of data from completely destroyed plants. Because of these compensating factors it is believed that the decline in pro-
aggregate loss of 4,200 million yer in urban production in bombed cities during tht period from October 1944 to July 1945, 3,41? million yen or 81 percent was accounted for bj
total
Of a
te:.-
plants which suffered direct physical damage of the production deficit in the hil plants due directly to bombing was 1,189 mil-
The portion
lion yen, or
all
deficit foi
plants.
Thus factor
of damage, accounted for 28 percent of the aggregate production loss. In order to isolate factor
effects of
duction in hit plants as represented by the sample represents fairly well the actual decline. Production in hit plants suffered a loss equal
to that of the unhit plants in addition to that
bombing, from factor (c), the effects of general economic conditions. Table 15 was prepared, showing production data for unhit plants in bombed areas and for unhit plants in unbombed areas. The latter group included plants of more than 50 workers in Hiroshima (which was not bombed until August), Kyoto, and for six cities in Hokkaido (which were
not bombed until July). The production for each group of plants is in the ratio of slightly more than 3 to 1. This ratio is approximately the same as that between hit and unhit plants in the bombed areas. The analysis could not be
caused by direct bomb damage (a). Table 14 in July 1945 production in undamaged plants had declined 49 percent from the October 1944 peak. Production in damaged
shows that
group
in
which
all
three factors (a), (b),and (c) were operative, by July 1945 had declined 73 percent from the October peak. Table 12 which includes plants
in
beyond June because of the July of the cities of Hokkaido. However, the ratio of decline, even had these figures been entered, would not have been affected mate-
continued
bombing
rially.
cline for
unbombed Kyoto
in the unhit
sample shows
for
all
<hat production in unhit plants declined 46 percent from the October peak.
is evidenced by the ratios of deJune and July as shown on table 14 plants and hit plants. The data from
This
table 15 indicate first that production in unhit plants in bombed areas fell to a level of 63 per-
Table
15.-
ProductioH in unhit plants in bombed areas and in unhit plants in unbombed areas rough measure of production loss due to indirect effects of air attacks)
Unhit plants
in
(to
provide a
bombed
areas
Unhit plant
in
unbombed
areas
Unhit plants
in
bombed
areas
Monthly
1
.000,000
of
Portion of decline
Percent
of
deficit
Portion of deficit
,000,000
of
yen
Percent
of
Percent
decline
peak
yen
peak
from peak
to effects of
due
indirect
below peak
1,000,000
of
due
to
indirect
bombing
effects nf
bombing
yen
1044
October peak
November December
1945 January
February
100
117
111
100
95 93
79
81
97
10
16
96
82 82
109
93
69
71
March
April _
95
105
101
..._
._.
78
69 79
90 86
103 94
75'
22 31
21
May
Juno
July
.._
308 244
198
total
120
or
0,55 0,55
1,00
85
122
or or
or
67
80
144
80
121
63
51
110
88'
37
49'
31/37
0.84
June 'These
597
figures reflect
315
some
effect
of
bombing
in
July.
18
cent in
Ij
Production in the unhit plants in unbombed areas fell to only 94 percent of the October peak These data tend to support a in June 1945.
previous opinion that urban industry, if it had not been bombed, would have maintained a higher level than the general economy, which the Survey had estimated would have been at 50-60 percent of peak by August in the absence
of air attacks.
in the sample, a deficit of 1,260 million yen, or 39 percent of the total, was caused by (b), the indirect effects of bombing. The balance of the deficit, 1,018 million yen, or 32 percent of the total, is found to be caused by factor (c), or general economic conditions.
Table 15 indicates further that the portion of production in unhit plants in bombed areas, due to the indirect effects of bombing, was 315 million yen out of a total of 597 million yen. Since this part of the analysis deals only with that part of the production decline due to (b), the indirect effects of bombing and (c), the effects of general economic conditions, the decline of 315 million yen may be considered as caused by (b), and the total decline of 597 million yen as the sum of (b) and (c). The ratio of (b) plus (c) to (b) is therefore 597 315, or roughly 2 to 1.
the decline in
:
To summarize the preceding analysis, the data indicate that, had urban production levels continued at the level of October 1944 through June, the aggregate loss of production caused by all factors, would have been 3,200 million yen, or slightly more than two full production months at peak. This loss is apportioned roughly as follows
Percent
To direct bomb damage To the indirect effects of bombing To general economic conditions
Table
16.
29
39 32
If the ratio of 597 315 is applied to the total production deficit for all plants shown on table 14, from which the deficit attributable to factor (a), or the direct effects of bombing, had been subtracted, it is found that, for all plants
:
CHAPTER
Effects of the Air Attacks
Utilities
VII
The area raids did not materially
affect the
on Public
and Services
reduced operations of the ports, although loadings and unloadings were at times delayed several days due to damage to lighters, warehouses,"
The urban raids aggravated the difficulties under which public services and utilities had been laboring for some time. Physical damage,
disrupted local transportation and communication facilities and prohibited the except as
it
flight
of harbor labor.
general use of public services, had little effect on the operation of those services to meet essential
Osaka and Kobe were most seriously affected by destruction of lighters and by labor troubles which prevented the efficient handling of the few ships which managed to reach port. In
Osaka, the air attack destroyed or seriously damaged 200,000 tons out of a June 1944 total of 512,000 tons of lighters and 162 of the port's 307 towboats. One third of Osaka's cranes and 13 of the 22 mechanical loaders were put out of commission. The heaviest blow to the port of Osaka, however, during the raid period, was the destruction by area attack of the harbor pump ing system which caused the inundation of a large part of the unloading area. This created greater dislocation than the destruction of 60 percent of the harbor warehousing. In Kobe harbor, facilities suffered less from physicall damage, since the port was well equipped with fire-resistant concrete warehouses and 50 percent of all freight was normally handled at wharves, lessening the port's dependence on lighters. In Kobe, and also in Nagoya, absenteeism among harbor workers proved to be the only limitation to the already crippled harbor operations during the period of urban attacks.
Railroads
Shipping and rail movements were maintained during the raid period with only slight interruptions, and the supply of water, gas and electric power to the remaining essential consumers was always adequate.
needs.
The
the
civilian
population,
however,
tended
to
and
Damage
hindered evac-
uations and dispersal measures and interfered seriously with the efficiency of industrial labor.
Transportation
The network of highways, railroads and shipping lines that made up the transportation system of Japan was extremely vulnerable to enemy action. It was so closely tied-in with the
island the
ration, in
economy that any disruption in its opeany part of the empire, was felt in manufacturing centers.
Shipping
At the time of the raids, shipping activity in the major ports of Japan had already declined
to only a small fraction of capacity.
The ports
The area raids had little effect on mainline At Hiroshima, target of the atom bomb, rail traffic was delayed only 48 hours. Worn-out and inadequate equipment, shortage of coal and overwork were the prin^
rail operations.
of Toityo and
to operate;
Yokohama had
virtually ceased
Osaka's shipping had declined in March 1945 to 38 percent of the May 1944 figure; Nagoya in 1944 was handling but 6 percent of its 1941 shipping; Kobe was approaching a standstill, handling less than 100,000 tons in February 1945. This drastic decline in activity was principally due to the blockade and anti-shipping campaigns. Toward the close of the war, Allied mining further restricted the already limited u.se of the major ports.
network. The air attacks were felt chiefly terms of disruption to local transportation facilities and delays in moving freight from rail heads to receivers, caused largely by worker
rail
in
absenteeism. Railroad labor was the principal limiting factor to efficient service throughout the raid period. This was directly caused by the air attacks which complicated the problems of distributing food, brought about increased fatigue from loss of sleep due to air alerts and
20
from destroyed
local
passenger
facilities.
Dur-
ing the early days of the attacks, factories sent their own labor to help with freight handling, but by
March
become
critical in the factories themselves and it became unprofitable to continue this arrangement.
For the one major city where such figures were avilable, Nagoya, railroad labor statistics
indicate that (a) the total number of freight handlers fell off about 38 percent between November 1944 and July 1945, mainly due to permanent evacuations, while (b) the total productive hours worked monthly by handlers on the job fell about 50 percent, due to increased Local rail absenteeism caused by the raids. officials in Nagoya considered the latter the chief handicap to rail activity in the area dur-
Nagoya
freight
Railroad
labor and
movements
morale. Had the disruption of local transportation been complemented by the early disruption of mainline rail movements, a program which was barely underway at the end of the war, the virtual paralysis of the economic and
social life
were strictly rationed. In general, the supply of gas for essential industrial use
industries
re-
sulted.
Electric
Power
:
Japanese records cover three principal categories of electric power consumption (1) lighting, both private and public, (2) industrial installations having a capacity of more than 50 kw., which consumed normally about 83 percent of the total output, and (3) industrial installations having a capacity of less than 50 kw., which represented some 7 percent of the total
output.
less
In Osaka, after June, extensive leakage caused a curtailment of supply to some essential industrial users, but even there, effects on production were not apparent. In the bombed urban areas, gas plants sustained some, and mains and pipes considerable damage. But the simultaneous destruction of both industrial and domestic consumers was proportionately so much more extensive that no shortage was experienced by
the remaining essential users. As in the case of electric power, the supply of gas was never a limiting factor to industrial activity during the
war.
than 50 kw. capacity generally employed fewer than 50 workers, while those of over 50 kw. employed more than 50 workers. Power
Water
the attacks, but that
Japan was divided between hydro-electric and thermal plants on approximately a 60-40 Thermal stations, while often percent basis. employed as base load plants in certain areas, particularly in west and central Honshu, were normally utilized to offset the drop in hydroelectric production during the dry seasons in the fall and winter. At the outset of the war, because of the coal shortage, electric power was strictly rationed with a view to cutting out nonessential conin
City water systems were hit badly during damage had only a slight effect upon the economy. Only in Nagoya,
where the destruction of conduits and service mains was particularly heavy, is there evidence that industry was affected. Priorities for industrial use were established there after the
heaviest area raids, mostly at the expense of
the shipbuilding and chemical industries.
vilian supplies fell to less Ci-
than 65 percent of
sumers.
No
were made, even after the attacks had reduced the demand, as it was considered better for public morale to keep them in effect. Although the attacks caused considerable damage to many
of the municipal thermal plants, sub stations
and
lines
amounting
although it was claimed that public health was never endangerd. In Nagoya, as in other large cities which were subjected to repeated attacks, the lack of water proved a serious handicap to any efficient defense against incendiary bombs. In most attacked cities, after the raids, water service was suspended for a period of 5 to 10
days.
restored, lack of replacement parts
in
10 percent of all such installations in Japan the electric power supply was always adequate,
sential
Although limited supplies were usually and skilled repair workers prevented any considerable re-
and after March 1945, far in excess of all esdemands. Industrial consumption in the major urban areas declined, on an average, to 50 percent of 1944 use. The decline was less precipitous than that of production. In almost all cities, in 1945, it was unnecessary to operate the stand-by thermal plants, since hydro power sufficed.
cuperation.
Communications
in the urban areas was short during the entire period of the war, being
Bomb damage and disruption to mail, telephone and telegraph services in the urban areas hampered air raid defense measures and the ability of the government and industry to make necessary adjustments after the raids. All communication services had been declining in efficiency before the raid period due to shortage of maintenance supplies and to inefficient personnel. In the larger cities, dam-
22
age to lines and equipment was so heavy that, during the raid period, only highest priority messages were allowed. Normal business matters necessitated transmission either by very slow mail or by personal travel, both of which were rendered extremely difficult by disrupted transportation. Almost any action on the part of industry to obtain materials, labor, and other essentials required innumerable contacts with various government agencies, and when communication facilities were impaired, the effect on business activity, especially in the immediate
post-raid period,
sending and receiving stations were located at some distance from the cities, and mes.sages had to be relayed by mail, telephone or telegraph. Mail service was disorganized by the mass evacuation of people from the cities, the destruction of mail trucks,
slowdowns of
railroads,
and
was
substantial.
long distance telephone calls in July fell to less than 10 percent of what they were in February; in Kobe, to less than 1 percent. To alleviate the shortage of telephone cables in Kobe and Osaka, 30 percent of Kyoto's cables were taken down and sent to those cities as replacements. Wireless
absenteeism of personnel. In the entire Kinki Region, embracing the cities of Kobe, O.saka, and Kyoto, attendance of communications workers after the June raids was only 30 percent of the preraid figure. It is impossible to measure exactly the influence of communications failure on the economy and on the well being of the people. At the time these facilities were most needed, after the raids, when industry had to make adjustments, when dispersal operations required constant communications, and when the plight of the people required communication with relatives and friends, the facilities were not available.
affected, since
most
713275-47-5
CHAPTER
Industrial
VIII
Labor
Si'mmury. By July 1945, the last full month of the war, the effective supply and quality of
production.
labor had become a critical factor in Japanese Drafting and shifting of workers
plement this group of conscript workers, women and students were also drafted for industrial work.
Control. The insufficiency of Japanese administration and management was most conspicuous in the control of labor. The Welfare Ministry, which exercised broad control over
even before the raids had brought about a steady decline in the skill of workers. Air raids had created a general disruption to city life, which had already lost much of its stability because of food shortages, evacuations and inflation. Because of the general disruption, and also because of a short-sighted labor policy, management was unable to utilize, with efficiency, the labor at hand. In certain industries more labor was available than materials, but most Japanese sources claimed that, even had raw materials and components been available in larger quantities during 1945, the increased absenteeism among the workers caused by evacuation, air alerts, dehousing. transportation difficulties, malnutrition and fatigue would have prevented increased production.
a complicated network of regional and prefectural labor offices, was never able or willing to take the strong measures demanded by the situation.
consultants,
who
Pre-raid Period. The Japanese economy had been confronted with the problem of manpower deficiencies even before the war. The rapid industrialization of the country in the 1930's created a shortage of engineering skill and trained labor which remained a constant limitation to a flexible economy.
exerted powerful influence in local labor offices, were largely responsible for the maladministraMilitary conscription tion of the labor force. depleted the ranks of skilled workers by as much as 30 percent in some industries. Allocations of new workers were made on the basis of Army-Navy preferences instead of actual need. No attempt was ever made to check on the utilization of labor by industry, with the result that the quality of the labor force deteriorated. Large industries were favored, both by labor allocations and by extra worker rations of food and clothing, which enabled them to abide by wage controls and still maintain their labor force. Small industries received only neglible allocations of labor and no extra rations, and were consequently forced to patronize labor black markets.
early 1945, the control of labor was disorganized to such an extent that centralized
From 1939
government made
By
a strenuous attempt to consolidate the labor force for a major war. Workers in commerce, export manufacturing, domestic service, and other non-essential activities were gradually
diverted into war production. By curtailment of materials, electric power, and the conscription of workers, nonessential industry, including the traditional 1 to 10 worker "home-in-
administration was relinquished by the Welfare Ministry. However, by that time, perfectural and I'egional controls, to whom final authority was delegated, were themselves so disrupted by the air attacks that control of any kind practically ceased.
Industrial
Labor Force.
The
total
labor
The conscription of workers for war prowhich began in 1939, did not reach a peak until 1943, by which time over 1,300,000 workers had been drafted for war industries. Conscription thereafter, in 1944 and 1945, havduction,
less
force in the industrial sample which has been used as the basis for the analysis of production in a preceding chapter amounted to 1,708,402 workers in January 1945. This figure represents 18 percent of the national manufacturing labor force. During the sampling period from October 1943 through July 1945, the labor force
ing exhausted most of the supply, accounted for than 300,000 additional workers. To sup-
1.6 million
workers
in the
24
larly
months of 1944
to 1.8 million in
October
11)44, the peak month, and declined by July to 1.6 million, or to about the same point as it was
Considering the radical decline in pi eduction during 1945 and the maintenance of the relatively high level of workers, it is immediately clear that there was no scarcity of labor. A labor force, however, cannot be judged in terms of numbers. In terms of productive labor hours worked, the only real index of an effective labor force, the sample data indicated that, in July 1945, the effective labor force was at a level of 61 percent of the base year (October 1943-September 1944) and 55 percent of the October 1944 peak.
in early 1944.
percent of the base year average and 55 percent of the 1944 peak. It is clear from the declines in various production and labor factors, as shown on the preceding table, that there would have been sufficient labor, in terms of the number of workers and even in terms of productive hours, for the volume of production which was However, there was a sharp po.ssible by July. decline in the efficiency of the labor force and
in the
managerial ability to
utilize labor.
Absenteeism.
Productive
ing the pre-raid base year, represented 80 percent^ of the total labor hours. The absenteeism rate at that time was therefore 20 percent. By July 1945, the absenteeism rate (lost hours)
Hit and Unhit Declines, Lost Hours. In Japanese data, lost hours are ascribed to general absence, enforced idleness, air alerts, and bomb damage. The total figures cannot be broken down acurately by causes, because of the loose interpretation of those causes by Japanese plant managers. However, examination of the labor
forces in plants which were
damaged by the
raids and in plants which received no damage, reveals that lost hours increased from 20 per-
had risen to 49 percent with productive labor hours representing only 51 percent of the total.
Output Per Hour. During the base year, a productive work hour yielded 3.4 yen. In the peak month of October 1944 output per hour had increased to 4.1 yen. In July 1945 output per productive hour had declined to 2.5 yen representing a decline of 26 percent from the base year output and a 36 percent decline from the 1944 peak. Thus, in July 1945, approximately one-third more hours were required to produce a similar volume of work than in the
base year.
cent to 56 percent in the case of the former, and from 20 percent to 34 percent in the case of the
latter,
and from 20 percent to 49 percent over-all and unhit plants (see table 19)
in
The difference between 34 percent lost hours unhit plants and 49 percent, which represents
lost hours for the entire sample, is fifteen perHowever, the 84 percent incentage points. crease in lost hours in the unhit plants is lower than, the 40 percent increase for the unhit plants
in the heavily
unbombed
The
in the
shown
cates that, in most of the bombed cities, there was some effort to reallocate labor into the unhit Although this succeeded to a certain plants.
following table.
Table
18.
Declines
in
extent in other bombed cities, in Tokyo, the magnitude of the destruction and the volume of evacuations from the city appear to have pre-
1945/
Factors
base year
Percent
Yen
sales
55
65
61
Kw.-hr. consumption
Productive
59
hours
39
45
vented such reallocation. It is difficult to ascribe an exact portion of the total increase in lost hours to any one factor because of the overlapping influence of indirect bombing effects and general economic conditions in both
areas. Only a rough approximation can be given. Of the total increase in lost hours from the base year to July 1945, from 20 percent to 49 percent, the direct effects of bombing appear to have caused about one half of the increa.se, while general economic
Labor force
n
25
33
hours...
Yen
Kw.-hr.
productive
36 30
87
percent
U.
S. S.
B. S.
conditions and the indirect effects of together caused the other half.
bombing
25
Table
19.
Increase
in
bombed and
complex,
cities.
unbombed
and in unhit plants in unbombed Although the lost hours rates in the base
Ar^a
Base year
Percent 20
July 1945
Percent 56
AH
All All
Japan: Japan:
Hit plants
Unhit plants
...,
20 20
17
"
34
49 40 40
'44
year differ somewhat for different areas, the rates in July 1945 for all the areas are markThis suggests that the general edly similar. breakdown of the economic and social structure had a comparable impact on industrial labor in
all
Kyoto
in
Hokkaido^ Hiroshima^
>
24 23
25
for
The
40
Bombed
July:
until
percentage figure
June.
of
Not bombed
August.
breakdown. Even in Hiroshima and the cities Hokkaido, which were relatively isolated from heavily bombed areas, and were closer to
sources of materials, the rate of increase in lost hours by July was comparable to that in the unhit plants in the heavily bombed areas.
The
bombed Tokyo
26
a
"e
I s
<
Table 21.^-Table
January 1945
labor force
Mimthly
average,
1944
Percent
July 1945 Lost Hours Lost Hours Increase Hit plants Percent Percent
,
July 1945
percent
of
tuly 1945
Percent
of
Unhit plants
"'ercent
Total Hours
labor force
Total Hours
labor force
By
industry:
Aircraft
Ordnance
Shipbuilding
.
.-.
,
360,924 107,817
187,697
72.083
20
17
51
31
41
52
24
28 33 25
31
56 39
57 60
89
62 78
43
11
44
33 49 26
32 41
38
22
24
24 17 18
Motor
Electric
vehicles
.
57
90
61
10
215,341
164,983 142,457
42 49
59
60
60
67
51
39
70 74
74
73
30 26 26
27
25 20
IS
34
227,127
74,631
46
51
Chemicals
Miscellaneous
Total, all industries'...
26 36
26 29
38
32
59
146,178
,708,742
18
44 49
29
66
75
34
34
25
20
56
34
By
region
or city:
28
(50,590)
25 21
listed.
=44
16 IS
40
56
35
The
labor force
for
not included in the industrial breakdown. -June value before bombing, 44 percent; July value 59 percent.
Hiroshima
is
Table
22.
Manpower
in
Classificatio-tis of
gainfully
employed
Japan proper,
CHAPTER IX
Subcontracting and
Component
Parts
Supply
Further
Part of the objective of the urban raids was the destruction of smaller "feeder" plants in the industrial areas. It was believed that the
such destruction would be immediately The felt in the war economy. extent of destruction to such plants in certain major cities was substantial, as evidenced by the discussion on physical damage in a preceding chapter.
effect of
in this cate-
and seriously
Two
to the
problem
power consumption, production and labor force in the major industrial cities the other by studying the subcontracting system of large firms in typical major industries. Labor statistics from Tokyo, Osaka and Kobe made it possible, in those cities, to sample small plants in different industries and to weigh the results on the basis of the relative importplant, electrical
sales,
;
in the 40-50 worker group, and conversely that factories employing more than 50 workers usually fell in the over-50 kw. group. The data, therefore, pointed to the general conclusion that plants employing less than 50 workers, did not, together, contribute more than 10 percent to total industrial activity in Japan. The conclusion that plants up to 50 workers accounted for not over 10 percent of Japan's war time industrial activity was supported by further studies made of subcontracting in the
principal cities.'
"Home"
Industry
Before the urban attacks began, "home" industry, in the strict sense of household industry (which by Japanese definition included plants with up to 10 workers) had almost disappeared. Table 24, showing the pre- and post-raid distribution of workers in Tokyo, illustrates this. The disappearance of "home" industry in a war economy was expected, since it was, at all times, primarily concerned with the production of
,
Further studies of
this size
civilian goods.
1
Japan, corroborated this analysis with one exception, the city of Tokyo. Here it was found that such plants accounted for considerably more than 10 percent of the city's industrial power consumption and almost half of all industrial workers. Attacking the problem from
a
different angle,
it
detailed study in
Osaica sliowed
in
tiiat
major part
fields
of
tliat
city'y
in
were
'^till
when
many
the
of those factories
aircraft
(propeller),
principal
all
Osaka's
wartime industries.
industrial
Before the
the
aircraft
first
attack on Osaka,
29 percent of
was found
that,
in
all
and related industries was in workshops employing less than SO persons. In ordnance, the figure was 2i percent: in shipbuilding, 11 percent; and in machine-tool and other machinery and Electric power consumption data, however, metal fabrication, 27 percent.
labor
in
the principal urban areas, with the exception of Tokyo, industry in the under-50 kw.-
all
industry.
less
than 10 per-
was concluded that those factories aiso total industrial output of the city.
24.
size of firm
Investigation of Subcontracting
in
Table 25
Tokyo
Industry
analysis of the importance of subcontracting obviously cannot be restricted to plants plants of of the "home" industry type or to
An
under 50 workers. These were given special attention only because of the prevalent belief such in Allied quarters during the war that represented an important segment of plants that the economy. It was discovered, however, wartime Japan followed in subcontracting
more or Western
less the
same pattern as
it
did in the
countries, being widely distributed in plants of from 50 to 10,000 or more workers. The effect of the urban raids on the great num-
ber of plants within that range was extensive. The utimate effect of such destruction or damage varied considerably as among cities
other than "home" industries, in the complex this area was chosen for a Tokyo
special
The investigation of subcontracting. this investigation are not applicable results of to all urban areas since only in the Tokyo complex was there such a large concentration of
component plants, as evidenced by electric power and labor statistics. Nagoya, although
almost as significant in over-all production as Tokyo, was dominated by large end-product aircraft plants which were dependent only to a
limited extent on smaller in that immediate area.
component suppliers The cities of Osaka were dependent upon feeder plants to and Kobe a somewhat greater extent than Nagoya, but not to the extent that Tokyo was. Questionnaires were submitted to 100 of the
largest end-product plants in
all
industrial cate-
gories
in
Tokyo,
Thirty-three of the leading end-product plants returned responses which were complete enough
to
Distribution by Size of
Component
Suppliers
size of component plants supplying the 33 assembly plants ranged from small shops employing a handful of workers to large factories with labor forces of 10,000 or more, the latter often, themselves, producing important end-products in volume. The distribution, by size, of component plants for the 33 end-product manufacturers is shown in Table 25.
The
considerable dependence on small subcontractors was shown by the Electrical Equipment industry (75 percent of which was concentrated in this region) and the Machinery and Tools
number
of
man
listed
The former received 73 percent of its components from 303 plants in the under 100 worker category; the latter, 85 percent of its components from 157 plants in the same
industry.
"the inability to obtain sufficient materials," 2 damage to component factory by air raid," 2 listed "disper.sal of component factories to another location," 1 each listed "short-
category.
Industries
manufacturing
larger
end-product units appear to have been less dependent upon small contractors.' Production Loss Due to Component Shortages. Of the 33 plants, 6 reported no loss of production, while 27 reported shortages of component parts with a resultant loss of production during the period of air attacks. Of the reported declines, two set the loss at 65 percent and 60 percent respectively, two set the loss at 50 percent, one set the loss at 40 percent, one at 30 percent, two at 24 percent and 20 percent respectively, two at 15 percent, three at 10 percent, one at 6 percent, seven stated loss as "major" and six stated the loss as "minor." To recapitulate, 13 responses, or percent of the total 33, set the loss at over 39 30 percent or major, 14 responses, or 43 percent of the total set the loss at under 30 percent or "minor", and 6 responses, or 18 percent
age of electric power," "change in number of workers," "poor material distribution," and "change in components manufactured." The Electrical Equipment industry was significantly affected by shortage of components. Nine large factories gave the following reasons
for the failure of their suppliers to deliver.
As
primary cause, 5 listed "direct damage to factory by air raid," while 4 listed "inability to
obtain
sufficient
materials."
and
cause "the inability to obtain sufficient materials" and one listed "direct damage to factory by
air raid."
to component suppliers was primary cause of component failure among the 33 customer plants. Next in order of importance was the shortage of raw materials as it affected these suppliers, and last was labor trouble. The latter two causes were in part induced, in part aggravated, by bomb damThe impact of bomb damage on smaller age. component plants is illustrated by the damage statistics for the Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama complex, which revealed that plants of 100 workers and under were 73 percent destroyed. In Tokyo, the electrical equipment industry, particularly radio and communications equipment, was drastically affected by damage to its smaller component suppliers. Although the 33 customer plants could supply
Bomb damage
cited as the
Of the
six
were
in the aircraft
industry and half in the electrical equipment industry. Of the seven stated "major" losses, three were in the electrical products industry, three in the basic metals industry and 1 in
in
asked to cite the causes which affected the output of their component suppliers. Twentythree responses were recorded. The primary causes of decline cited were, in order of importance: (1) direct damage to component factory by air raid (10 responses) (2) inability to obtain sufficient materials (8 responses), (3) change in number of man hours devoted to
,
full
component
plants,
actual production (2 responses), (4) shortage of fuel, change in number of workers, and
>rttd
aircraft
end-products,
by the sudy of Nagoya's industry, predominantly which was dependent upon subcontractors to only
a negh'gible extent.
representing their primary source of supplies, a total of 3,066 subcontracting plants were listed by 87 large end-product plants which responded to another section of the questionnaire. Geographical distribution and damage information were supplied by these customer plants for 3,066 subcontractors.
713276-47-6
31
Table
27.
Industry
CHAPTER X
Repair
and Reconstruction
Japan's ability to repair and replace damaged plants and equipment was seriously limited by supply shortages. Where supplies were primarily in the hands of Armyavailable Navy plants or the big Zaibatsu companies they were used rather for dispersal than repair. In most cities there was not enough material, or labor, to construct even the simplest covering to protect damaged equipment from exWhile shortages were the underlying posure. reason for the negligible reconstruction which was undertaken, the Japanese appear to have been reluctant to repair, even where available supplies might have allowed such activity.
In some cases replacements were secured by buying out smaller firms which had been damaged and were unable to continue production. Similarly, large firms were at times able to prevail upon machine tool producers to send repair teams and spare parts to their damaged plants and occasionally even to supply replacements. Smaller low-priority firms were entirely dependent upon their own labor force and resources for repair, as replacements were
virtually
impossible to obtain
unless induce-
Whereas the German reaction was characterized by enterprise and ingenuity, the Japanese
in general, reacted with inertia. This may have arisen from their realization that I'emaining capacity was sufficient to process the available
materials and, later, may have been supported by the general feeling that repair was wasted effort since the Allied aircraft would ultimately
ments were offered to the repair companies. The Osaka region contained 20 percent of Japan's machine tool and 34 percent of her production machinery capacity. Assistance from the machine tool industry in Osaka, however, was confined to a few large firms and was not effective in terms of the over-all damage which industrial equipment had sustained. This was principally due to an ill-timed decision of the government to convert the entire machine tool industry to direct production of war mathan to continue production of This affected the industry not only in Osaka, but in all large cities. By 1944, over 20 percent of the entire machine tool industry was in direct production of war materials, no allocations of materials having been
terials rather
destroy everything.
machine
tools.
Even prior to the air attacks, industry had been faced with the mounting problems of maintenance. Normal but unchecked deterioration of equipment, plus mishandling by incompetent and unskilled personnel, had accelerated the
breakdown
after,
to
made
In
rate.
The
May
much
K.K.
The recuperability of a given factory varied with the factory's own resources, its priority standing with the Munitions Ministry and the Armed Forces and, to a degree, its own ingenuity. The larger high-priority firms maintained their
damaged machinery for companies Under the national plan, in war which were damaged were to incompanies form the local office of the Munitions Ministry. The Ministry would then direct member companies to send repair teams to the damaged plant. The teams made recommendations to
repair of
the Munitions Ministry which,
if
approved, au-
own
were drawn. Branch plants of large companies, such as Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and the like, were favored by assistance from the parent organizations.
consuming and many firms frankly stated that they preferred to obtain repairs from private sources or make them themselves, rather than become involved in official negotiations. The aircraft industry alone had a high enough
33
through this channel. The Munitions Ministry at Osaka furnished the following data which shows the percent of machines repaired as against repriority to obtain
effective
aid
types of government aid, 136 were in the highpriority aircraft industry. Machine-tool makers and shipbuilders were the only others (Table receiving significant government aid.
29.)
It
is
quests received.
Percent
50 40 52 40
5
11
20
1
Numerically, the Ministry received requests for the repair of 2,776 machines of which, through its facilities, it was able to repair only
897.
from the mounting The air attacks which began in March 1945. poorly government sponsored repair system was organized and wholly inadequate to carry out an efficient, thorough repair program. The program was in fact so badly administered that most companies avoided its dubious assistance. Only the large producers, particularly of aircraft, received substantial help from either the Ministry or the Armed Forces. The smaller companies were able to accomplish very little, and that only with difficulty and by resorting to
little ability
An
indication of the
is
plished
a special study conducted in Osaka. In that city, repair data for 5,259 damaged shops in 10 industrial categories indicated that approxi^ mately 2,579 of the number were abandoned and no repairs attempted, while 1,642 shops continued production in the undamaged part of the shop. Of the 1,038 shops remaining, 320 succeeded only in replacing roof covering, 309 erected a new building on the cleared site, and 116 were dispersed to new sites and new buildings constructed.
Only 83 shops undertook repair using their special labor and construction staffs and 279 shops were forced to use their productive labor for repair purposes. Another 308 shops were repaired by private contractors. Thus a total of 670 shops were repaired entirely through efforts of the plants themselves; 310 shops were repaired through government facilities and only 20 received aid from the Army or Navy. Of the 322 shops repaired with all
It should be noted, various illegal methods. however, that the extent of post-attack repair or replacement of plant and equipment was not a wholly accurate criterion of productive recuperability. Many companies did not attempt repairs on machinery because material and labor shortages from June through August 1945 were so acute that there would have been insufficient materials to work with and insufficient personnel to man the repaired machines had the damaged equipment been restored. Further, dispersal frequently took priority over repair and many firms simply abandoned damaged equipment to concentrate on removing undam-
own
aged and slightly damaged machinery to dispersal sites. To summarize, the recuperability
of industry
to
was slight in the period from March August 1945 due to dispersal, shortages of repair parts and skilled labor, local transportatration of facilities, the inertia of the indus-
trialists,
34
Table
29.
Repair history
Osaka
city
D.'sposition
Shops abandoned
L'ndaniafied
part
con-
tinued
in
production
Roof
covering
only
re-
placed
Structural
paired,
Site
damage
new
on
re-
shops restored
build-
cleared,
ing erected
New
site
building
new
lab:ir
provided
by
Government
ments
Facilities
depart-
provided
forces
by
armed
was
at-
tempted
CHAPTER XI
Dispersal of Industry
industry,
inertia
to air attacks,
success by the British, Russians and Germans. Since Japanese war industry was largely concentrated in urban areas and therefore highly vulnerable to air attacks, it was expected that the Japanese would profit by the experience of other nations and early utilize dispersal as a protective measure. But the Japanese did not
profit by the experience of others. They failed to disperse on a scale necessary for protection until their vital centers of war production were under heavy air attack. After the raids on the aircraft industry in December, only certain aircraft factories, acting upon their own initiative or upon the prompting of local Army and Navy
officials,
were begun only half heartedly. The which characterized the repair and replacement of damaged plants and equipment also characterized the disparsal program. Even had the initiative been present, shortages of
building
still
ful
began
to disperse.
The area raids, in large part, insured the failure of the dispersal program. They disrupted transportation and supply lines, increased worker absenteeism, and dissipated essential construction materials by forcing their use in emergency repairs. By causing the extension of the dispersal program in May to include all elements of the aircraft and ordnance industries, they committed Japanese industry to an impossible program which, even under nonraid conditions, could not have been completed
The first national decree, which applied to large assembly plants in the aircraft industry, was not issued until 1 April 1945. This was followed on 1 May 1945 by a second national
decree that directed the dispersal of
essential to the aircraft
tries.
all
Dispersal of
Component
Plants
plants
and ordnance indusThe second decree was partially the result of the heavy March area raids against major industrial concentrations. But even the The most first decree in April was too late.
Although there was general reluctance on th( part of end-product plants to disperse, somt pressure was brought to bear upon component
suppliers.
plants
dispersal
of
subcontracting
dis-
probable reason for the Japanese failure to disperse before the air attacks developed was the unwillingness of both government and industry to sacrifice, for dispersal, any part of the peak production achieved in the last half of 1944. By April most stocks and inventories of raw materials had been exhausted by the post-Saipan drive for production. Over-all output had long since passed the peak, and was on the decline because of current short supplies of raw maWith some exce.ss terials and components. available in April, and with much more capacity forseeable in the immediate future, most indu.stries were reluctant to sacrifice their bythen dwindling production for dispersal. The exce.ss cushion of plant capacity offered a certain degree of insurance against disastrous production loss due to bomb damage. Dispersal operations, which ultimately were forced upon
ment
momentum
heavy March raids. Efforts were also made tc disperse 400 subcontracting plants from Osaka
to locations outside the city.
*:
questionnaire submitted to 100 of the largTokyo re gion revealed that most end-product plants assisted some of their component suppliers to The parent disperse as early as February. plants helped in selecting dispersal sites, arrangest end-production industries in the
ing transportation, supplying equipment and underwriting expenses. The results of the dis persal of the smaller plants were uniformly disappointing. The main cause for the failure was Also alleged to be transportation difficulties.
fc
was the difficulty in maintaining contact with the parent companies who, themselves, were struggling against the cumulative effects
cited
ieni
36
of shortages
and air attacks. The few component which did manage to regain operating l)lants Lai)acity in dispersed locations were prevented fiom exploiting it by lack of materials, labor tioubles and changes in the demand for their products. For those reasons, the end-product loducers considered the dispersal of their comAlthough the failure of the Japanese to consider, in time, the necessity for dispersal is only
more
.student workers.
schools in
from the time and energies of the Of 282 primary and middle Osaka City, 221 were utilized in this
In
manner.
essential
addition
to
removals
to
non-
one chapter
in
and economic mismanagement, a review of the steps which led to the "sitting-duck" vulnerability of Japanese war industry presents an object lesson which has significant implications
for our
producers dispersed, in eflfect, by increasing the importance of plants which formerly had functioned as subassembly and parts suppliers. For example, the Kawasaki Aircraft Company which produced 17.4 percent of all combat aircraft in Japan in 1944 established aircraft engine and airframe plants at Akashi, west of Kobe. The Akashi engine plant, a final assembly installation, received parts from plants at nearby Futami and at Takatsuki. In the summer of 1944 the company started to convert both the Futami and Takatsuki plants to final assembly by moving some of Akashi's machine When the tools and other equipment to them. Akashi plant was hit in January 1945, 94 percent of its machine tools and other machinery was still serviceable and the company was able to move much of it to the other two plants, enabling engine production to continue. The Fu-
own
emphasis on the
cities
of
Kobe.
From 1942 to Late 1944 Prior to the fall of Saipan there were few advocates of dispersal among Japan's military and industrial leaders. Neither group realized the magnitude of the air attacks that were to come, and the military, especially, were unwilling to make the necessary sacrifices in production and in the expenditure of materials, eflfort, and labor which a thorough and eflfective dispersal program would have required. Nor did the experience of German industry under air attack modify thinking on this subject. As a result, from 1942 to late 1944, there was no ofl^cial. planned dispersal program for Japanese industry. Such dispersal as did occur during this period was nearly always incidental to the rapid expansion of various war industries and was designed to utilize existing plant facilities as a matter of convenience and economy. Air raid protection was a secondary consideration. In the Osaka area, where a careful study of dispersal was made, leading companies, including Mitsubishi Electric and the Sumitomo Metal Industry, took over the plants or less essential enterprises such as textile mills, breweries, and pottery works. Concurrently, the larger industries moved some shops into schools. In Osaka City alone, 22 schools were utilized as factories. As the war progressed and industry became dependent upon student labor, work-shops were
Dispersal
;
tami plant, as a result of this foresight, was able to produce 1,300 aircraft engines between The Takatsuki January and August 1945. barely started production and produced plant a total of only 13 engines.
It is not possible to make a wholly accurate analysis of the over-all dispersal which took There was no genplace during this period.
nor was there any government agency charged with supervising and
eral policy in effect,
maintaining records concerning that dispersal which did occur. Nevertheless, the records of individual companies during this period suggest the nature and magnitude of the di.spersal and
make
possible certain valid conclusions. Dispersal in Osaka City and region, in this period, was confined entirely to large producers, principally aircraft, electrical equipment,
and machine tool concerns. Inasmuch as dispersal was undertaken on the initiative and responsibility of the individual companies, only
the largest companies had the necessary materials, transportation, capital and labor to un-
dertake
plant far
movements.
Navy were
more
interested in maintaining
other
37
short distances.
aircraft industry, including producers of engines, airframes, propellers, and aircraft ord-
confined to trucks and ox-carts, the latter being by far the more reliable. It took from two
to four
way
at the
new
sites.
at this
Mitsubishi Electric and Shimazu Engineering both stated that their programs were 100 percent completed. Kawa-
reported
success.
Second priority was given to producers communications equipment, special steel, bearings, machine tools, chemicals, antiaircraft ordnance, special attack equipment such as torpedoes, and aviation gasoline. The Home Islands were divided into six autonomous regions so that production could continue in the areas not immediately attacked in
nance.
of
saki Aircraft, Kawanishi Aircraft, and Sumitomo Propeller, whose dispersal consisted of
transferring
final
assembly and parts plants, were able to accomplish their plans with equal facility. Moreover,
these
tion.
rapid,
short
distance,
expansion-dis-
At
were readily absorbed. The success of early dispersal suggests that had a general dispersal program been undertaken during this period, a great deal more
dispersal
could have been accomplished than in the period beginning in 1945 when shortages were more acute and air raids were in progress. The failure to disperse during this period, from 1942 to
late 1944, represents a serious
to
move.
The dispersed plants were to be located on underground and semi-underground installations where necessary and, if possible, where some buildings were already in existence. The companies were to start prosites suitable for
of 1944, a
duction on a temporary basis in such buildings permanent underground, or other installations were completed. They then were to move to the completed plants
as were available until the
and convert the abandoned buildings into ad ministrative and research offices and workers'
quarters.
the government in
tional basis.
Tokyo
March 1945 (3 days after the catastrophic 9 March area raid on Tokyo) the
12
,
On
Central Counter Planning Headquarters of Production and Defense was organized in the Munitions Ministry to supervise and enforce dispersal of all war industry in Japan. It functioned through the regional offices of the Munitions Ministry. Nationally, the organization planned to move certain major war industries to 1,575 dispersed plants, 1,191 of these to be located above ground, 132 .semi-underground, and 252 underground. In addition, it planned to disperse thousands of small producers, on a local basis, through its regional offices. First priority was given the
With respect to production, the Government estimated that losses of 20 percent would be average during the 6 months the program was underway. This estimate proved highly un^
Estimates of individual companies were considerably higher and turned out to be far more accurate. For example, the Sumitomo Propeller Co., which produced 66 percent of all
realistic.
in Japan, estimated dis four major plants would cut production as follows: Sakurajima plant 90 percent, Kanzaki plant 30 percent, Shizuoka plant 40 percent, Tsu plant 60 percent.
aircraft
propellei's
its
persal of
On
tories.
first
38
on 16
May
priority factories.
total
number
order was issued directing the dispersal of all war factories not previously included. Actually many of the important aircraft, ordnance, communications and electrical equipment producers were unofficially informed before the directives
were
issued,
The failure of dispersal of large i)lants in the Osaka region was less marked, but had the same net eflfects upon production. The Kawa.saki Aircraft Co., which earlier had enjoyed fair success by converting its subassembly plants and parts producers to final a.ssembly plants, began
further dispersal early in 1945. This time it planned to disperse its Kagamigahara airframe assembly plant to three production lines running through a series of old mills and forest huts. It also planned to disperse its Futami and Takatsuki engine plants, utilizing tunnels and old mines for shops. At the time the war ended, 1,200,000 square feet out of a planned 1,900,000 square feet of new construction had been completed and the company considered its dispersal 60 percent complete. However, at the war's end, it had not yet started production at the
a
panies were already in the process of moving when the orders were announced. It is difficult to estimate how much of the
1945 dispersal plan was realized. The branch offices of the Munitions Ministry maintained few records and the accuracy of these is open
to serious question.
to report their
was moved to a new site but not installed or was simply enroute, it was reported as "dispersed." Similarly, if employees were no longer at the parent plant, or simply had left their homes because of the air raids, they were reported as
"dispersed."
new
sites.
The
Naruo
Of 400 small companies in Osaka City which were ordered to disperse, 183 reported dispersal in progress and varying degjrees of completion, ranging from 10 percent to a few who reported 100 percent. These smaller firms claimed to have dispersed a total of 13,043 machines and about 18,000 employees. The remaining 217 companies reported no dispersal accomplished
at the war's end.
plant of Kawanishi Aircraft, which produced 3.1 percent of all combat airframes. In the first
months of 1945, the company began to disperse its Naruo plant. In April 1945, the company
built 72 planes, but in
to 61
;
May
1945 production
fell
company attributing the drop entirely to dispersal. On 9 June 1945 the Naruo plant was hit for the first time, and the company The immediately accelerated its dispersal.
the
No
as to the
tually
but,
number
combined effects of dispersal and the air attacks from June 1945 to Augu.st 1945 held production
began production at the dispersed sites, cases, an estimate of 15 percent to 20 percent would be generous. Those few plants that were able to start production at dispersed sites were unable to regain anything approaching their old rates of production. In effect, dispersal of small plants from Osaka
down
against a
from individual
planned 320.
The records
tric
of other
was able to accomplish 35.9 percent of its planned dispersal. The Osaka Arsenal planned
to disperse only 4 to 5 percent of its total capacity because of the nature of its heavy equipment but had completed only 25 percent of Ten antiaircraft this by the end of the war. ordnance companies under the control of the
Fifty-four point two percent of the plants accomplished no dispersal at all despite orders to do so, and of the 45.8 percent which did report some activity, only a fraction were able to start production at their new
City
failure.
sites.
was a
to effect an average
Always
rates of pi'oduction
were subSmall
of 56.5 percent of planned dispersal but production averaged only 17.5 percent of that
plant dispersal from Osaka City was typical of that from other major cities. The net results
were to increase the difficulties of plants for which they were subcontracting; to decrease the
planned at the new installations. Thirty other companies engaged in making fuses, shells, and various aircraft and ordnance parts under the direction of the Osaka Arsenal accomplished
39
an average of 42.4 percent of planned dispersal and production averaged 30.3 percent of that
planned.
Dispersal undertaken prior to late 1944 was main because it was on a small scale, little new construction was necessary, the distances involved were relatively short, and the scarcity of materials was not as great as in the closing months of the war. In 1945 the
successful in the
rather than helped the operations. The Armed Forces, Munitions Ministry and an association of leading contractors, who were supposed to
to
dispersal
was the
principally construction
were extreme shortages of transportation, labor and materials, all of which were intensified by air attacks second, there were basic errors in dispersal policy, planning, and administration. Practically all the dispersing companies in Osaka City and region listed transportation as their single greatest bottleneck. Motor transport
First, there
was already overtaxed when dispersal began. Trucks, generally, were in disrepair and poorly maintained. Ox and horse carts were
more
reliable but not suitable for long hauls; a
materials. Cement was very scarce and while timber was plentiful there was a shortage of personnel to process it into lumber. The shortage of electrical equipment, such as wiring and transformers for installation in new plants, also impeded dispersal. Destruction of a large part of this industry in the Tokyo raids was the primary cause of this shortage. A few companies such as the Sumitomo Comimunications Equipment Co., which had delicate equipment to move, were unable to procure an adequate supply of packing and crating materials.
In terms of policy
late.
requiring from 12 to 24 hours. Transportation of equipment and materials from factories to railroad facilities and again from the railroads to the new sites presented one of the mo.st difficult problems. Moreover, roads at the new sites often proved unsatisfactory for heavy transportation.
trip of 16
km
in-
too
The reluctance
of the
the major producers to sacrifice production for dispersal operations continued until the time
when
Despite the
were
still
many companies
The railroads were overburdened. Breakdowns were frequent and repairs became increasingly difficult and time consuming due to a shortage of skilled labor. Machinery and materials frequently were exposed for days or weeks to the weather while awaiting rail transportation, often resulting in extensive damage to valuable equipment. The important Sumitomo Propeller Co. estimated that it could have completed its dispersal by August 1945 instead of by December 1945 (which it anticipated) if proper transportation had been available.
Labor, under the increasing pressure of wartime conditions, presented a critical problem to
who
did not support the government's policy. Such companies, when directed to disperse a
certain percentage of their production equipment, moved their unessential equipment, continuing production with their most important equipment and thereby defeating the purpose of
dispersal.
The administration of the program was bad. was no coordinated priorities' system. As a result, the entire aircraft indus^-*
Basically, there
The workers had little homes and families to new areas where quarters and food were even more difficult to procure than in the cities. Increased absenteeism, resulting from fear of raids, evacuations, and fatigue, made it difficult
dispei'sal
movements.
desire to
move from
their
and government aid. While the aircrafti industry was trying to move, the second na-i tional directive was sent out and other priority This suc-J companies began their dispersal. ceeded only in adding to the confusion. Super-' vision and enforcement of orders were ineffec-. While the Munitions Ministry and iti tual.
terials,
to
home
plants, let alone to allow for the diversion of part of this labor force for dispei-sal. Some additional labor was available from the con-
regional offices had nominal authority, in the" case of the large companies it meant little as they were inclined to follow the directions oj
the branch of the service from which they re-' ceived such aid as was available. Each of the
40
armed
forces, in turn,
embarked on a program
falling further
ule,
in its .sched-
own most important producers and protecting its own production. This rivalry seriously damaged the authority of the Munitions Ministry and made a shambles of the
of favoring its
dispersal in 1945
priority system.
istic
Finally, planning
was unreal-
and few leaders seemed to understand the magnitude of dislocation which dispersal would cause, particularly in view of the increasing urban area raids. Estimates of production losses due to dispersal were always highly optimistic, and few companies took the government's figures seriously.
them, dispersal could not have been successfully concluded, even if the war had continued an-
The end of the war found the dispersal program in the major cities still under way but
The basic error was one of timing, and once the program was undertaken this error was compounded by the effect of the air raids and the maladministration of the few
other year.
resources
still
remaining.
41
8 a. e
e
o
a <
APPENDIX A
Operational Aspects of the Air Offensive
to discover
The initial attacks against the Japanese homeland by land-based aircraft were executed by crews of the India-based Twentieth Bomber
airfields in China. Because of the logistical problems involved, the long distances covered, the limited bomb loads carried, and the inadequate number of aircraft employed, the results of these operations were
Command, staging on
not significant.
During the summer months of 1944, the Marianas were wrested from the Japanese and airB-29 operations were made availfrom the large industrial center of Tokyo. On 24 November,
fields
for the
These early operations afforded opportunity and correct the problems that were encountered by the flying crews in this theatre of war. Poor weather rendered flying hazardous and bombing inaccurate. Severe weather fronts interfered with air navigation and cloud formations often totally obscured the target. Of 16 attacks executed at high altitudes during the early days of operations, 4 completely failed to bomb the primary target, 7 bombed with three-quarters of the airborne force, and 5 with less than three-quarters of the mission force. Even during periods of good visibility, frequently strong winds at high altitudes interfered considerably with bombing
accuracy.
ft
the
its
Twenty-first
Bomber Command
initiated
operations against the Japanese aircraft industry by sending 111 aircraft from Saipan, to attack the extensive Nakajima Aircraft
Works
The next S^/o months were devoted to an attack on the aircraft industry. This period also served the purpose of tactical experimentation to determine the best methods of utilizing the
operational capabilities of the B-29 in an air offensive against Japan. Between 24 November
1944 and 9 March 1945, apart from tactical missions against Iwo Jima, 20 major missions were flown by the Mariana-based B-29s, 16 of them against priority targets in the aircraft industry, and 4 against the urban areas of Tokyo, Nagoya, and Kobe. These attacks were made from altitudes of 27,000 to 30,000 feet by planes flying in squadron formations. High gas consumption, required to a.ssemble and climb to bombing altitude, limited the bomb load to about In the 4 area attacks, which were 3 tons. largely of an experimental nature, a total of 609 tons of bombs, predominately high-explosive, were dropped on Tokyo on 2 separate missions; 251 tons, principally incendiary, were relea.sed over Kobe, while the city of Nagoya, as a secondary target, received 207 tons when a primary precision target was obscured by cloud cover.
Although high-altitude flying did afford some from fighter planes and antiaircraft, the Japanese resistance to the air attack was, at the outset, both active and effective. A peak was reached in January when 5.7 percent of all B-29s airborne were lost to the enemy and to unknown causes. From January on, enemy fighter reaction declined and flak became the principal cause of losses. When operations were initiated from the Marianas in November 1944, only 119 aircraft were available, and at the beginning of March 1945 the strength was still under 400. The limited number of aircraft and crews greatly hampered flexibility in tactics, and made it difficult
protection to B-29s
to concentrate
m
i\
in
airplanes on a single target or allow a dispersal of force over several targets. Poor airfield facilities, lack of main-
many
K!
tenance equipment and .supplies, and maintenance difl^culties inducted by high altitude operations made possible only 3.3 sorties per month per aircraft assigned in November 1944, compared to 7.1 achieved in July 1945. By the end of March, many of the operaThe crews tional problems had been solved. and ground personnel had gained in experience Loran and other new navigational aids had been introduced the logistical support required to sustain B-29 efforts was improved; airplanes were arriving in the Marianas in increasing numbers and, certain changes in bombing tactics and strategy had been adopted.
;
;
itr
nil
)f;
Ji-
t'
44
The goal of the Command during the early months of operations, that is, late November 1944 to early March 1945, had been to destroy
the principal installations of the Japanese aircraft industry by high-level, daylight precision
results of the early precision Similarly, short of expectations. three experimental high-altitude daylight incendiary attacks executed against urban industrial areas met with limited success.
June the total supplies of incendiaries sufficed, though the desired types were still not available
in quantities
needed.
bombing.
attacks
The
fell
pound type. Other high explosives were available in the States, and had generally been ordered in sufShortages of tail ficient quantities and types. fins, fuses, adapters, and shackles also hindered
felt
was
operations.
The Command
On
Tokyo urban
The
to in-
that the
corporate this
new
technique.
The Tokyo raid was carried out by individual aircraft bombing at an average altitude of 7,050 The advantages of flying at such low alfeet. titude were numerous: (a) the high gas consumption required to assemble for formation
low level urban attacks, but continued to send medium and high-level precision missions whenever the weather perDaytime precision raids were thus mitted. executed from lower bombing altitudes, 12,000 to 20,000 feet, thereby lessening the adverse eff'ects of wind and weather, increasing bombing accuracy and making po.ssible greater bomb loads, and reducing the number of noneffective
tactics in favor of
aircraft.
and to climb to bombing altitude was reduced and the bomb load was correspondingly increased; (b) strain on engines and other parts of the aircraft was lessened, and greater effectiveness and better performance cut
the
down
14 the first medium-altitude day mi-ssion against a major urban industrial area was executed against northern Nagoya. Of 529 aircraft dispatched only 12 were lost and 3.2 square miles of the urban areas destroyed. Thereafter, daylight visual urban attacks were
On May
number
sections of cities
equipment; (c) cloud conditions were fev/er at low altitudes and winds not as strong as those prevailing at altitudes above 30,000
tion of
feet.
difficult to isolate
by
The size of the force striking from the Marianas was continually increasing. During March
During the ten days following 9 March, and including the Tokyo raid of that date, 5 attacks were carried out against 4 major Japanese cities. A total of 1,595 B-29 sorties dispatched on these raids dropped 9,365 tons of incendiary bombs from altitudes averaging 7,000 feet, destroying 32 square miles of densely populated and highly industrialized areas. In these repeated attacks by the maximum force, losses from antiaircraft and enemy fighters were be-
low expectations.
The quantity and types of incendiary bombs required for operations were often lacking, and for a time the number of incendiary missions
Wing began operations in conjuncwith the 73rd and 313th Wings. During tion March and April aircraft of the 58th Wing, formerly based in India, began to arrive on Tinian, and in late May the 315th Wing aircraft began to arrive on Guam. Air strength gradually increased from 119 on 24 November 1944 to 385 on March 1945, and to 1,020 on 14 August Greater strength made possible a dis1945. tribution of force over several targets on the same day, lessening the danger from concentrated enemy aircraft attacks and increasing
the 314th the effectiveness of the force.
was
bomb
loading.
On
B-29s not only had an emergency landing base but were also provided with a
bombs were unloaded from ships in the harbor and transported directly to the aircraft hardstands for loading into the airplanes.
After
staging base for operations against targets in northern Japan and an operating airfield for The fuel reserve could be escorting fighters.
45
bomb tonnage
in
in-
cases of emer-
made
at
Iwo Jima.
By the middle of June, the target value of the principal urban areas had been reduced to such
an extent that the command was confronted with the necessity of extending its program
to smaller cities, or considering a
would be destroyed, the dispersal efforts of larger industries curtailed, and the labor force demoralized. The Theater Command was of the opinion that the impact of this program on the economic and social structure would seriously affect the enemy's desire to continue the
war.
new
target
tal
From
17 June until the end of the war, a toof 57 urban areas were attacked in 60 raids.
The early success of program appeared to warrant its extension. It was conceded that the direct loss of important industrial floor space in the smaller cities would be proportionately far less per ton of bombs
operational conditions.
the
than had resulted in the larger urban concentrations, but the widespread disruption of the economy caused by such attacks would comple-
In July alone 36 urban targets were heavily bombed, and this accelerated scale of effort was maintained through the first fourteen days of August when 10 new urban areas were attacked, and 2 cities received repeat attacks. Throughout the June-August period of intensive area
strikes, precision attacks continued against ob-
Tokyo,
many
46
APPENDIX B
THE REPORT ON THE EFFECTS OF THE URBAN AREA BOMBING ON JAPANESE WARTIME ECONOMY
By
Prof. Dr. C. Maiide and Associates,
23,
1945
effects of the
Japanese opinion on the urban area attacks. One report, by the combined faculties of Tokyo Imperial University, is reproduced in its entirety (with some grammatical corrections), as it was submitted to the Survey on 23 December 1945.
an
effort to .judge
Yasuhira (Industry), Asst. Prof. N. Yokeno (Economic Geography), Asst. Prof. H. Furuya (Economic Theory), Instructor Mr. Y. Ando; research members Mr. H. Toyoda, Mr. Y. Oishi, Mr. S. Ujihara, Mr. S. Shioda, Mr. H. Sato, Mr. K. Ishihara.
:
is
Research of the members of the Committee on "The Effects of the Urban Area Bombing on Japanese Wartime Economy," which was conducted by our Faculty under the order of the President of the University. Our report is rather abstract and not statistical enough, but this does not mean that it is merely the product of dogmatic judgment. On the contrary, it is a product of statistical survey and scientific research by the following
'committee.
In this connection,
The work of the committee was to gather necessary statistics and data to explain the "Effect of the Strategic Bombing of our Wartime Economy" in regard to the productive life of the nation.
Secondly, we conducted hearings to learn the opinions of well-informed officials and also those
of the people
bombing.
who experienced the most terrible Such ministries as the Commerce and Industry Ministry, Agriculture and Forestry Ministry, Transportation Ministry and Communications Board, and manufacturing companies such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industrial (Mutsubishi Jyukogyo K.K.), Nippon Steel Pipe Producing Inc. (Nippon Kokan K.K.), Fuji Electrical Machinery Co., Ltd.. Tokyo Shibaura Denki K.K., Ishikawajima Shipbuilding, Inc. (Ishikawajima Zosen K.K.), "Seikosha" Optical and Precise Machine Maker (Seikosha), supplied us with necessary statisAlso in this tics and suggestive opinion. connection we are obliged to the Tokyo MuniciThis pal Office and Chiba Municipal Office.
Inc.
we
feel it
may
be necessary to explain the method by which the research was made and the course of the studies which we undertook. At first, in order to study the important and extensive problems which were raised in your letter, we formed the above mentioned committee which consisted of the following persons: Chairman, Prof. C. Maiide (Dean of the Faculty,), Prof. T.
Arisawa (Prof, of
Statistics),
Wakimura (Commerce and Industry), Prof. M. Yamada (Agriculture), Prof. N. Yanagawa (Theory of Distribution), Prof. F. Kitayama (Credit and Finance), Prof. K. Okochi
Prof. Y.
method was rather helpful to our study, for it was often difficult to obtain most- recent materials due to the war ravage.
the Committee not only testified and made a scientific research by an inductive method, using statistic and data papers, but also met in conference seven times
Thirdly,
statistics
Labour and Social Problems), Prof. S. Takamiya (Business Management), Assistant Professor G.
Konno (Transportation),
Asst. Prof.
47
REPORT
I.
Before the
first
transmission
ah-eady been thrown into a desperate condition by the effective ocean blockade by the Allied forces, especially by the United States sub-
facilities and raw material reserves resulted in the stoppage or decrease of production.
marine
activities.
(b) Wreckage of many homes, stoppage of communications and confusion of family life due to evacuation of raid victims, increased
On account of the successful blockade and eventually the isolation of Japan proper, the transportation of war materials from the southern regions and the continent had to be stopped. It was indeed a death blow to the war economy of Japan which had been importing almost every item of material from abroad for the use iron, of its home munitions industry, namely ore, petroleum, bauxite, industrial salt, rubber,
considerably the number of absentee employees. The physical and mental overwork owing to the frequent attacks and the shortage of foodstuffs, also decreased productive capacity of labor. Moreover, the deaths and quitting of engineers and skilled workers had much to do with the decrease of Japan's war production.
etc.
tion,
II.
The
strategical
with attacks by medium and small sized planes of the United Sates task forces based on the Volcano Island and the Ryukyu Islands, destroyed many cities and factories, revealing the weakness of Japan's war economy, especially the munitions production, which had already suffered greatly since the latter half of 1944, and thus finally inflicted a death blow on the productive capacity.
to the offensive conducted Air Force aiming mainly at the destruction of munitions factories, which had regionally been concentrated in great cities not sufl^iciently equipped with antiaircraft arms,
all,
The cutting off of means of communicaconfusion of postal and telegraphic services, destruction of railways, disorder of express business, delay in delivery of manufactured weapons and war materials to the Government and the decrease of attendants, resulted in the deterioration of business efficiency and paralyzed the Government's administrative capacity for pushing on productive plans.
(c) (e)
Above
owing
by the U.
S.
great losses were sustained. How fatal and extensive was the damage and devastation
wrought by
(a)
plants,
^
According
regarded as an
data of the economic mobilization plan which can be index-number to the economic strength of our country,
Japan was forced to the verge of collapse in the third quarter of 1944. This circumstance must be concomitant with the fall of the Marianas. ,\s we lost those islands due to the successive defeats sustained on the .Meutianb. the Gilbert drriups and the Solomon Islands, Japanese shipping tonnage decreased rapidly and, furthermore. Japan's efficiency of
navigation greatly deteriorated because of the increase of sunken tonnage
great in the sense that the materials, manpower and transportation capacities, which should have been concentrated on the munitions production, were shifted to the repairing of damaged establishments, installation of air defense equipment and also for evacuation purposes. In other words, the main reasons that greatly lowered the productive efficiency were the removal of plants to safer places in anticipation of air raids, frequent interruption of working process with the issuance of air alerts, shifting of laborers to air defence services and the difficulty of continuing outdoor works and lightemitting operations, as in the case of melting furnaces, because of observance of air-raid warnings.
III.
strategical
bomb-
due
to the
Although
every
material
here
mentioned
oil
is
indispensable
to
tlie
ing of the U. S. Air Force inflicted heavy damage on the munitions production in Japan. Particularly intensive was the damage to essential industries, including the aircraft industry (engine factory, parts and accessory
48
subcontractor's factories, were massed in urban area), special steel, liquid fuel, nitrogen, rubber
became rampant.
The
people's morality
life,
Furthermore,
it
was
impossible to repair the damage systematically and speedily because Japan's economic capacity In view of the had been almost exhausted.
The
bombing on the
were fact that Japan's productive destroyed in large extent, the manufacturing industries of war material were confronted For example, due to with many difficulties. Japan's quantitatively and qualitatively inferior machine tool and automobile industries, the replacement of damaged machines and vehicles was extremely difficult. Thus, as a result of the widespread and severe wreckage of all fields of Japanese economy, the normal circular process of wartime production, centering around
activities
mated.
public
in
Before the severe air raids started, the general, who were hoodwinked by
of collapse.
munitions industries, was on the verge Eventually, the last hope of the spsedy and large-scale production of special
the
arms and others in anticipation of the conversion of the mainland into a battlefield of
attack
decisive battles,
became hopeless.
Preparatory
the establishment of a regional autarchy and self-defensive structure were underway, but the realization of such plans become impossible
As
bombing
and towns were so severe that casualties amounted to a great number and many houses, much clothing, foodstuffs and other necessities were destroyed on a large scale. Impossibilities of recovery from damages, insufficiency of relief materials, and shortage or unfitness of the Government's policies to meet these demands
acquainted with the actual phases of the war and the real condition of the country's potenialities, especially with the deplorable condition of munitions industries. They believed in the propaganda stories concocted by the Government, and seemed to be resolved to fight to the last. However, there is no denying that with the aggravation of difficulties in the people's daily lives, following the progress of the war situation, particularly with the shifting of the attacks from cities to local districts, the people gradually became concerned over the future of the war. In consequence, their fighting morale was weakened. However, as a greater part of the people still indulged in wishful thinking as to the decisive battles in Japan proper, they were yet determined to carry on to the last. On the other hand, the war leaders, confronted with the complete destruction of the industrial centers of Japan by the strategical bombing, belatedly realized the great difference of production capacity between the United States and Japan and came to realize the impossibility of carrying on any longer. Though there were many different views, the majority of leaders entirely lost heart to continue hostilities. Particularly, the debut of atomic bombs in the Pacific war theater was decisive.
made
difficult.
Moreover, traffic was thrown into disorder because streets and roads became too crowded with air-raid refugees, evacuees and their baggage. Of course the confusion of transportation was aggravated, owing to devastation by air raids. This delayed the flow of necessities into the cities, and inefficiency of the functioning of the rationing system aggravated the people's concern over the supply of foodstuffs. As airraid alarms were issued so often, day and night,
the people felt inces.sant unrest. The payment of war insurance and drawing of deposits accelerated inflation.
which had already numberless contradictory elements, due to the prolongation of hostilities,
confronted
blockade.
strategic
a deadlock following the ocean In addition to that, the large-scale bombing completely shattered the
foundation of Japan's economy, particularly the munitions production, revealing its inconsistency and weakness, and finally brought about its inevitable collapse. Even though, at the last phase of the war, the deplorable degradation of Japan's productive capacity was not yet revealed in the production index num-
49
no denying, when viewed objectJapan's munitions production was in a desperate condition due to the constant bombing attacks. Had the war continued longer and the strategic bombing, particularly the atomic bombing been repeated, Japan's munitions production would have been completely destroyed. Had the attacks by the U. S. Air Force begun earlier and been systematically conducted, first against the factories of critical raw materials, then against those of munitions production and had been repeated successively against the same cities without interval, the effect of attacks would have been greater and speedier. The mines layed by planes in the last period of the war almost disrupted water transportation across the strait between Moji and Shimonoseki and in the Inland Sea of Seto. throwing the water transportation over the Sea of Japan
ber, there is
ively, that
Thus, in fact, the communication between the Japanese mainland and the China Continent was disrupted, and thus the dreams of the Japan-Manchuria-China block were brought to naught. Furthermore, due to the attacks by deck-borne aircraft against the water traffic between Hakodate and Aomori, the transportation activities between Hokkaido and Japan proper fell into confusion, and fatal effects were brought upon the Japanese economy. The assaults by small-sized aircraft side by side with the great earthquake in the Tokai District and ship bombardments, dealt considerable damage to the munitions production and at the same time caused confusion to transportation activities. It is generally thought that, had the air attacks on transportation facilities been more intense, Japan would have collapsed
into utter confusion.
sooner.
all cities.
Data for consolidated industries represent summary totals for Data for hit and unhit categories are restricted to cities which
were attacked.
hit
Where there was a question concerning the classification plants into either hit or unhit groups such plants were excluded from the
and unhit summaries but were included in the consolidated summaries. The summary totals of hit and unhit industries, therefore, do not equal
the totals for the consolidated groups.
Note 2. Value given in box legend for graphs 3 through 29 are monthly averages for the period October 1943 to September 1944.
Note 3. In all graphs the monthly average for the period October 1943 September 1944 equals 100%.
to
50
IN
AGGREGATE LOSS OF PRODUCTION JAPANESE URBAN INDUSTRY AND CAUSES OF PRODUCTION LOSS
OCT 1944
TO JUNE 1945
i(
3,200
MM
BOMBINGS
CONDITIONS
39% 29%
1 ,
INDIRECT EFFECTS OF
502
12.000
MM AGGREGATE FOR
MONTHS
>
'"
^'
^ jji
'
r^'j^
Z
>-
i3-
-OTUAL
PRODUCT 10^
500
NOV
1944
APR.
1945
AGGREGATE LOSS
4200
GRAPH
ALL INDUSTRY
OCTOBER 1944
INDUSTRY
IN
JULY 1945
INDUSTRY
IN
IN
UNHIT PLANTS
CITIES
BOMBED
JULY 194 5
INDUSTRY
IN
UNBOMBED CITIES
JUNE 1945
z S
m 2
z o
(01)-
CONSOLIDATE D
JAPANESE
PERCENT
150
URBAN INDUSTRY
1943 TO AUGUST
(07)
CONSOLIDATED
OCT 1943-AUG
1945
129
100
TS
80
JAPANESE
p^^c^^j
URBAN INDUSTRY
1943 TO AUGUST 1945
PRODUCTION
ORDNANCE
PERCENT
ISO
RATIOS
INDUSTRY
25
PRODUCTION
RATIOS
PRODUCTION RATIOS
METALS INDUSTRY
PERCENT
150
(08)
POWER CONSUMPTION
LABOR FORCE
OF REPORTS
17 18
The following is a bibliography of reports resulting from the Survey's studies of the European and Pacific wars; Those reports marked with an asterisk (*) may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents at the Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.
Inc,
Eisenach
&
Durrer-
Germany
Baverische Motorenwerke
A G (BMW)
Kassel,
Munich,
Germany
19
Henschel
Flugmotorenwerke,
Light Metal Branch
Germany
European
War
20
OFFICE OF THE
*1
CHAIRMAN
21 22 23 24
Germany
Deutsche
Part Part
I,
II,
Aluminum Magnesium
Hildesheim,
*2
"3
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: summary Report (European War) The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Over-all Report (European War) The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the Ger-
Vereinigte
Metallwerke,
Germany
Metallgussgesllschaft
Aluminumwerk Germany
Gebrueder
Giulini
H,
Ludwigshafen,
Friedrich-
Germany
AIRCRAFT DIVISION
(By Division and Branch)
*4
5
25 26 27
(Special
Luftschiffbau,
GmbH,
Germany
28
29
30
Germany
6 7 8 9
Germany
Maschinenwerke
Erla
GmbH,
Heiterblick,
German
A T G
(
Maschinenbau,
,
GmbH,
Mockau )
Germany
10
12
Gothaer Waggonfabrik, A G, Gotha, Germany Pocke Wulf Aircraft Plant, Bremen, Germany Over-all Report Part A ! Part B Appendices I, II, III Doi-nier Works, Friedrichshafen & Munich,
32 33 34 35
A A
Bombing
Bombing Bombing Bombing Bombing
on
Hamburg
on Wuppertal
A A
A A
on Dusseldorf
Detailed Study of the Effects of Area
Germany
13
GmbH,
on Solingen
Kassel, Ger-
many
14
36 37 38 39
on Remscheid
Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Darmstadt Detailed Study of the Effects of Area
A
A
Bombing
NAG
on Lubeck
Brief Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Berlin, Augsburg, Bochum, Leipzig, Hagen, Dortmund, Oberhausen, Schweinfurt, and
Germany
Bremen
73
MUNITIONS DIVISION
Heavy Industry Branch
*66
Final
I,
Report
41 42 43 44 45 46 47
Hamburg
Text;
Vol
II,
67 68 69
70
71 72
Germany
Germany*
G, Hallendorf,
Germany
73
74
EQUIPMENT DIVISION
Electrical
Branch
*48
49
German Electrical Equipment Industry Report Brown Boveri et Cie, Mannheim Kafertal, Ger-
many
Optical and Precision Instrument Branch
75 76
A G, Hamborn, Germany Krupp A G, Borbeck Plant, Essen, Germany Dortmund Hoarder Huettenverein A G, Dortmund, Germany Hoesch A G, Dortmund, Germany Bochumer Verein fuer Gusstahlfabrikation A G, Bochum, Germany
August Thyssen Huette
Friedrich
*50
port
Abrasives Branch
*78
79 80
81
German Motor Vehicles Industry Report Tank Industry Report Daimler Benz A G, Unterturkheim, Germany
*51
52
The German Abrasive Industry Mayer and Schmidt, Offenbach on Main, Ger-
Adam
many
Anti-Friction Branch
82 83 84 85
Renault Motor Vehicles Plant, Billancourt, Paris Open, Russelheim, Germany Daimler Benz-Gaggenau Works, Gaggenau,
Germany
Maschinenfabrik
berg,
Augsburg-Nurnberg,
Nurn-
*53
Germany
Auto Union
many
Henschel
86 87
*54
Machine Tools
& Machinery
as Capital Equip-
ment
*55
56 57 58
Machine Tool Industry in Germany Herman Kolb Co., Cologne, Germany Collet and Engelhard, Offenbach, Germany Naxos Union, Frankfort on Main, Germany
Voigtlander, Maschinenfabrik
G, Plauen, Ger-
many
88 89 90
91
Volkswagenwerke, Fallersleben, Germany Bussing NAG, Brunswick, Germany Muehlenbau Industrie A G (Miag) Brunswick,
Friedrich
Ger-
many
62
63
Bombers
64
in the
Description of
Logistics
94 95 96 97
German Submarine Industry Report Augsbui-g-Nurnberg Maschinenfabrik A G, Augsburg, Germany Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany Deutschewerke A G, Kiel, Germany Deutsche Schiff und Maschinenbau, Bremen,
Germany Krupp Germaniawerft, Kiel, Germany Howaldtswerke A G, Hamburg, Germany Submarine Assembly Shelter, Farge, Germany Bremer Vurkan, Vegesack, Germany
Friedrich
MORALE DIVISION
*64b The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale (Vol I & II)
Medical Branch
98 99
100
Ordnance Branch
*101
102
*65
The
Effect of
in
Care
Friedrich
G, Magdeburg,
Germany
74
103
G,
132
Germany
133
Plants of Dynamit A G, Vormal, Alfred Nobel & Co, Troisdorf, Clausthal, Drummel and
Henschel & Sohn, Kassel, Germany Rheinmetall-Borsig, Dusseldorf, Germany Hermann Goering Werke, Braunschweig, Hallendorf, Gei-many Hannoverische Maschinenbau,
G m
H,
Kraiburg,
Germany
Hanover,
Essen,
GerGer134
many
108
Gj-isstahlfabrik
Freidrich
Krupp,
many
OIL DIVISION
*109 *110 *111
Oil Division, Final
comprise
the
Report
above report Food and Agriculture ) 134a Industrial Sales Output and Productivity
Appendix
Rockets
Powder,
Explosives,
Special
Propellants,
War
Gases
and
Smoke
in
112 113
Germany
The German
Oil
Industry,
Ministerial
Report
Team
114
78
Railroad Repair Yards, Hasselt, Belgium Railroad Repair Yards, Namur, Belgium Submarine Pens, Brest, France
Plant, Angouleme, France Plant, Bergerac, France Coking Plants, Montigny & Liege, Belgium
115
116
H, Leuna,
Powder Powder
Fort
Braunkohle Benzin
St. Blaise
many many
117 118
IIP
Wintershall
G,
Leutzkendorf,
Ger-
I G Farbenindustrie G, Ludwigshafen, Germany Ruhroel Hydrogenation Plant, Bottrop-Boy, Germany, Vol. I, Vo!. II Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Harburg
Ludwigshafen-Oppau Works of
Gnome
et
France
Kugelfischer
Plant,
Ebelsbach,
Germany
150
151
Refinery,
Hamburg, Germany
120
121
G,
Gras-
Germany
A.
152 153 154
France
I.
122 123
Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelweike A G, Wilhelmsburg Refinery, Hamburg, Germany Gewerkschaft Victor, Castrop-Rauxel, Germany,
Vol.
I
&
Vol. II
Germany
Europaeische
G,
155
156 157
124 125
G,
Harburg
Refinery,
Goldenberg Thermal Electric Power Station, Knapsack, Germany Brauweiler Transformer & Switching Station,
Brauweiler, Germany Storage Depot, Nahbollenbach, Germany Railway and Road Bridge, Bad Munster, Ger-
&
Vol. II
many
Rubber Branch
Railway Bridge,
Eller,
Germany
Deutsche Dunlop
Gummi
Hanau on Main,
Germany
Continental Gummiwerke, Hanover, Germany Huels Synthetic Rubber Plant Ministerial Report on German Rubber Industry
Propellants Branch
161 162
Gustloff-Werke Weimar, Weimar, Germany Henschel & Sohn G m b H, Kassel, Germany Area Survey at Pirmasens, Germany Hanomag, Hanover, Germany
MAN Werke Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany Friedrich Krupp A G, Essen, Germany Erla Maschinenwerke, GmbH, Heiterblick,
Germany
Maschinenbau
130 131
Elektrochemischewerke, Munich, Germany Schoenebeck Explosive Plant, Lignose Sprengstoff Werke Bad Salzemen, Ger-
167
ATG
GmbH,
168 169
Erla Maschinenwerke
GmbH,
GmbH,
many
Bayerische Motorenwerke, Durrerhof, Germany
many
75
Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke
GmbH,
Taucha,
Pacific
Germany
Submarine
Pens
Deutsche-Werft,
Hamburg,
*1
OFFICE OF THE
War CHAIRMAN
i
Germany
Hamburg, Germany Continental Gummiwerke, Hanover, Germany Kassel Marshalling Yards, Kassel, Germany 4-Tnoniawerke, Merseburg, Leuna, Germany Brown Boveri et Cie, Mannheim, Kafertal, Germany Adam Opel A G, Russelsheim, Germany Daimler-Benz A G, Unterturkheim, Germany Valentin Submarine Assembly, Farge, Germany Volkswaggonwerke, Fallersleben, Germany Railway Viaduct at Bielefeld, Germany Ship Yards Howaldtswerke, Hamburg, Germany Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany Daimler-Benz A G, Mannheim, Germany
Multi-Storied Structures,
Summary Report
The Effects Nagasaki
of
(Pacific
War)
\
*2
*3
Japan's Struggle to
175
176
CIVILIAN STUDIES
Civilian Defense Division
177 178
179 180
181
4
5
Japan
Japan
*6
182
183
184 185 186
Synthetic
Oil
Plant,
Meerbeck-Hamburg, Ger9
many
187 188 189 190
191
Gewerkschaft Victor, Castrop-Rauxel, Germany Klockner Humboldt Deutz, Ulm, Germany Ruhroel Hydrogenation Plant, Bottrop-Boy, Ger-
No.
*10 *11
Protection
many
Neukirchen Eisenwerke
G, Neukirchen, Ger-
and Allied Subjects in Japan Final Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects in Japan
Medical Division
many
Railway Viaduct at Altenbecken, Germany Railway Viaduct at Arnsburg, Germany Deurag-Nerag Refineries, Misburg, Germany
Fire Raids on
I
*12 *13
192
193 194
German
Cities
The Effects of Bombing on Health and Medical Services in Japan The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Health and Medical Services in Hiroshima and Nagasaki
Morale Division
G
Vol
Germany,
*14
195 196
Roundhouse
I
The
Effects of Strategic
Bombing on Japanese
Parbendustrie, Leverkusen,
197
108
Chemische-Werke, Heuls,
Germany Germany
Gremberg,
GarGer*15 *16
Morale
ECONOMIC STUDIES
Aircraft Division
many
199
Hamm,
many
TRANSPORTATION DIVISION
*200
201
The
Effects of Strategic
Bombing on Germany
17
Transportation
Rail Operations Over the Brenner Pass
Effects of
Bombing on Railroad Installations in Regensburg, Nurnberg and Munich Divisions German Locomotive Industi-y During the War German Military Railroad Traffic
UTILITIES DIVISION
*205
*19
German
1
(Airframes & Engines) Kawanishi Aircraft Company Corporation Report No. Ill (Kawanishi Kokuki Kabushiki Kaisha) (Airframes) Kawasaki Aircraft Industries Company, Inc. Corporation Report No. IV (Kawasaki Kokuki Kogyo Kabushiki
Kaisha) (Airframes
206
207 208
to 10 in
Vol
"Utilities Division
Plant RePlant
*20
ports"
11
&
Engines)
20 in Reports"
to
Vol
II
"Utilities
Division
Aichi Aircraft
Company
21
Rheinische-Westfalische
KK)
Engines)
A G
76
(Airframes
&
*21
Sumitomo Metal
*35
XX
Japan's
(Propellers)
in
War Economy
*22
Hitachi Aircraft Company Corporation Report No. VII (Hitachi Kokuki KK)
(Airframes
*23
&
Engines)
The Japanese Construction Industry Japanese Electrical Equipment The Japanese Machine Building Industry
Electric
KK)
*40
*41
Power Division
of of
*24
The The
Electric Electric
Reports)
Civilian
Supplies Division
*25
X
KK)
of Living
and
Manpower
*26
(Airframes) Fuji Airplane Company Corporation Report No. XI (Fuji Hikoki KK) (Airframes)
*43
Japanese Japanese
War
Production Industries
*44
*45 *46 *47 *48
Army Ordnance
*27
Japanese Naval Shipbuilding Japanese Motor Vehicle Industry Japanese Merchant Shipbuilding
Oil
*28
Ishikawajima Aircraft Industries Company, Ltd. Corporation Report No. XIII (Ishikawajima Koku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha) (Engines)
49
50
51
Chemicals
in
Chemicals in Japan's
Oil in Japan's Oil in Japan's
War WarAppendix
*29
52
*53
*30
The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War Economy (Including Appendix A: U. S. Economic Intelligence on Japan Analysis and Comparison; Appendix B: Gross National Product on Japan and Its Components; Ap-
*31
Shoda Engineering Company Corporation Report No. XVI (Shoda Seisakujo) (Components)
Mitaka Aircraft Industries Corporation Report No. XVII (Mitaka Koku Kogyo Kaisha) (Components)
Nissan Automobile Company Co7-poration Report No. XVIII (Nissan Jidosha KK) (Engines)
*54
The
War
Against
Japanese
Transportation,
*32
1941-1945
Kabushiki
*55 *56 *57 *58
59
60
Urban Econ-
*33
Kawasaki- Yokohama
Effects of Air Attack on the City of
Nagoya
*34
Army
Air Arsenal & Navy Air Depots Corporation Report No. XIX (Airframes & Engines)
Nagasaki
Hiroshima
77
MILITARY STUDIES
Military Analysis Division
88
61
62
63
64 65 66
Air Forces Allied with the United States in the War Against Japan Japanese Air Power Japanese Air Weapons and Tactics The Effect of Air Action on Japanese Ground
89
Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure J), Comments and Data on Accuracy of Firing Reports of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure K), Effects of Surface Bombardments on Japanese War Potential
Physical
Damage
Division
Army
Pacific
Logistics
of
90
Employment
Bomb Attacks
o^n
Japan
Forces
Command
The Strategic Air Operations of Very Heavy Bombardment in the War Against Japan
(Twentieth Air Force) Air Operations in China, Burma, India
The
67
68 69 70 71
World
92 93
Effects of the Ten Thousand Pound Bomb on Japanese Targets (a Report on Nine Incidents) Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan
War
The
II
Air Transport Command in the War Against Japan The Thirteenth Air Force in the War Against
94
Japanese Targets
dents)
Report on
Five
Inci-
Japan The Seventh and Eleventh Air Forces in the War Against Japan The Fifth Air Force in the War Against Japan
Naval Analysis Division
95
Effects of
in
Japan (Sum-
mary Report)
G-2 Division
*72 *73
The Interrogations of Japanese Officials (Vols. I and II) Campaigns of the Pacific War The Reduction of Wake Island The Allied Campaign Against Rabaul The American Campaign Against Wotje, Maloelap, Mille, and Jaluit (Vols. I, II and III) The Reduction of Truk The Offensive Mine Laying Campaign Against Japan Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party Foreword, Introduction, Conclusions, and
General Summary Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure A), Kamaishi Area Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure B), Hamamatsu Area Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure C), Hitachi Area Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure D), Hakodate Area Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure E), Muroran Area Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure F), Shimizu Area Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosures G and H), Shionomi-Saki and Nojima-Saki Areas Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure I), Comments and Data on Effectiveness of
97 98
99 100
Japanese Military and Naval Intelligence Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part I, Comprehensive Report Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part II, Airfields
Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part III, Computed Bomb
Plotting
101
Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part IV, Urban Area Analysis
80
81
82
83
VII, Electronics
Intelligence in the
84
85
*106
'107
Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part IX, Artillery Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part X, Roads and Railroads
Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part XI, Indtistrial
86
87
108
Ammunition
Analysis
aU.
S.
78