Popular Culture,

Geopolitics, and Identity

Second Edition

Jason Dittmer
University College London

Daniel Bos
University of Oxford

ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD

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Names: Dittmer, Jason, author. | Bos, Daniel, 1988– author.
Title: Popular culture, geopolitics, and identity / Jason Dittmer, University
College London, Daniel Bos, University of Oxford.
Description: Second Edition. | Lanham : ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD, [2019] |
Series: Human geography in the twenty-first century: Issues and applications
| “First edition 2010”—T.p. verso. | Includes bibliographical references and
index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2018055318 (print) | LCCN 2018056428 (ebook) | ISBN
9781538116739 (ebook) | ISBN 9781538116715 (cloth : alk. paper) | ISBN
9781538116722 (paperback : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Geopolitics—Social aspects. | Popular culture—Political
aspects. | Mass media—Political aspects.
Classification: LCC JC319 (ebook) | LCC JC319 .D4995 2019 (print) | DDC
306.2—dc23
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For my grandmother Florence Fitzpatrick,
who always told me to work hard
at something I loved.
Jason

For my parents, Diane and Derek.

Daniel
 Contents

Preface to the First Edition vii

Preface to the Second Edition xiii
Acknowledgments xv
Introduction: Popular Culture—between Propaganda and
Entertainment xvii
1  Geopolitics: Histories, Discourses, and Mediation 1
2 Popular Culture and Popular Geopolitics: Definitions,
Theories, and Convergence 21
3  Methodologies: Researching Popular Geopolitics 45
4  Representation of Place and the British Empire 69
5  Narration of Nation in the Post-WWII United States 95
6  Affect, Embodiment, and Military-Themed Video Games 119
7 Audiences, Assemblages, and the Everyday Geopolitics
of Heritage 141
8  Social Media and the Networked Self 165
9  Conclusion: Identity, Subjectivity, and Going Forward 191
Bibliography 199
Index 209
About the Authors 221
v
 Preface to the First Edition
Jason Dittmer

What is the relationship between popular culture and geopolitics? And

what does that relationship have to do with you and me? These are the
questions that animate this book, and hopefully they will interest you
as much as they interest me. I’ve seemingly always had an interest in
popular culture and geopolitics, although it’s only relatively recently that
I started asking myself these questions. At the risk of self-indulgence, I’d
like to walk you through a retrospective of how these twin interests have
developed in my life—not to talk about myself (although I rarely need an
excuse) but to give an example of how the three main topics of this book,
popular culture, geopolitics, and identity, are enmeshed in often very
personal ways. Hopefully this will inspire some introspection about how
these three things intersect in your own life and will pique your interest
enough to read the rest of the book.
In 1988 I was twelve years old and entering junior high school. It was
a brutal time for me, as early adolescence is for most of us, and it didn’t
help that I was perhaps a bit more bookish than most. My favorite class
that year was World Geography, taught by Mrs. Schoenberger. It was
an excellent class, and as she told us about various parts of the world I
paid close attention; this was the start of a lifelong passion for the variety
and difference found in the world, in terms of both physical and cultural
landscapes (a professional passion most geographers share, I would later
discover). The class was, however, not a politically neutral experience. It
was, after all, the very end of the Cold War, with the Soviet Union still
perceived as a very real threat. Growing up in a city with three naval
bases (Jacksonville, Florida), I had been told from a very young age that

vii
viii Preface to the First Edition

if there was a nuclear war we would likely be a target. Mrs. Schoenberger

taught us about the various parts of the world, who was with us and who
was against us in the global struggle; I distinctly remember hearing about
the economic “backwardness” of Eastern Europe and other areas ruled
by proxy from Moscow, as well as about Soviet aggression in places like
Afghanistan. It was world geography as viewed from a certain place,
with certain geopolitical perspectives. Of course, while I had never had
a geography class before, none of this struck me as exactly new. While I
could not have found Afghanistan on a map prior to that class, I knew
the Soviet Union; at least, I knew the type of people who lived there. They
were the Klingons.
I, from a very young age, had tuned in to watch the original Star Trek
series in reruns every weekday. There I watched the exploits of the USS
Enterprise as it set about exploring the universe. “Its five-year mission: to
explore strange new worlds; to seek out new life and new civilizations;
to boldly go where no man has gone before.” The USS Enterprise was
thus tasked with the advancement of scientific knowledge, and it was
part of Starfleet, itself an extension of the United Federation of Planets,
an interstellar coalition of alien races that nevertheless seemed to be
dominated by humans from Earth. The Federation resembled, in some
ways, the present-day United Nations, from its logo, to its founding in
San Francisco, to its focus on peace, progress, justice, universal rights,
self-determination, and equality among peoples (see figure 0.1). In other
ways, however, it resembled the United States—especially in the appar-
ent existence of American-style civil rights enshrined in law throughout
the Federation and in Starfleet’s ranks and terminology (note the designa-
tion “USS” Enterprise as well as the existence of real-life American aircraft
carriers and space shuttles of the same name). Star Trek seemed to indicate
that in the future, racism, poverty, and the Cold War would all disappear;
liberal American ideals would become universal, expand to incorporate

Figure 0.1. Left: The seal of the United Nations (courtesy of the United Nations). Right:
The seal of the United Federation of Planets from Star Trek. Note the similarities.
 Preface to the First Edition ix

the entire planet, and eventually go even further (a Russian even serves
as navigator of the Enterprise). A more cynical viewer might note that
Starfleet’s explorations seemed primarily to colonize new planets and that
the Enterprise, armed with phasers and photon torpedoes, seemed more
like Spanish conquistador Hernándo Cortés than pacifist Martin Luther
King Jr. Of course, the twelve-year-old me did not think that way (I also
had little idea at the time of the connections between the Federation and
the United Nations).
While there were infinitely many humanoid races in the Star Trek
universe, there was one group that featured more often than others. The
Klingons were introduced in a 1967 episode as the main rivals of the Fed-
eration. In the original series, the Klingons were portrayed as a savage
race of vaguely North Asian appearance. Rather than being a federation
like Star Trek’s protagonists, the Klingons were an empire, and they ruled
by force, with the empire expanding as a result of a seemingly innate need
to dominate. It should come as no surprise that Gene Roddenberry, Star
Trek’s creator, has said that the Klingons were explicitly modeled on the
Soviet Union. Thus, the geopolitical conflict that characterized the Cold
War had been displaced, leaving the Earth united in a seeming postracial
utopia of liberalism but locating the danger of tyranny and aggression
elsewhere in the universe, able to be called upon whenever needed to ad-
vance the plot. While no one ever told me the Klingons were the Soviets
and the Federation was a loosely defined “us,” nobody needed to. They
fit together in my twelve-year-old mind, so when Mrs. Schoenberger told
me about the Cold War, it seemed quite natural to me—after all, the 1988
geopolitical order was largely the same as it had been twenty years earlier
when Star Trek was made.
In 1994 I graduated from high school and went to college, choosing
international studies and political science as my majors. This resulted
from the same interest in difference that I had discovered in Mrs. Schoen-
berger’s class. While my own interests were unchanging in their particu-
lar inchoate and inarticulate way, the world had rapidly changed in the
intervening years. The Berlin Wall had been torn down, and the Soviet
Union had splintered into fifteen different countries. The world seemed
to be progressing in the ways that Star Trek had predicted: democracy was
ascendant, and the utopia of the Federation seemed a few steps closer.
The Gulf War (1991) had seemed to promise a “new world order” based
on collective security, in which violence was occasionally necessary but
only for liberal internationalist purposes. My interest in geopolitics began
to blossom as I considered my career options in a world characterized by
a peace guaranteed via American might and UN diplomacy.
Star Trek had similarly been reimagined, with the Klingons in Star Trek:
The Next Generation no longer the enemy of the Federation but rather
x Preface to the First Edition

a somewhat subordinate ally (following the collapse of their economy,

portrayed with great end-of-Cold-War allegory in Star Trek VI) quite
similar to post-Soviet Russia, which during the Yeltsin era had under-
gone Western-proscribed “shock therapy” to jump-start its economy
and had adopted a Western-style constitution. Rather than just warlike
and aggressive, in The Next Generation the Klingons were portrayed as
dedicated to personal honor above all else. While this is “different” from
many Western cultures at the time the show was made, it is seen as an
admirable, and understandable, trait, thus showing a way forward for
different cultures (the Federation and the Klingons) to coexist peacefully,
without enmity.
In 1999 I started my PhD in geography, planning to go into the U.S.
State Department, but by then the bloom was off the rose. Conflicts in the
former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda indicated that a pacific future had not
yet arrived, and the present seemed very much one of bloody violence,
characterized by the media as intractable ethnic conflict. Further, Ameri-
can power seemed unable (or unwilling) to address these new threats,
and utopia could be seen disappearing in the rearview mirror as mass
graves and genocide proliferated. My own role in this future seemed
more problematic than before, as the ethical basis for American power
seemed shakier than ever.
All of this was, as you by now expect, mirrored in the universe of Star
Trek. The Next Generation had gone off the air when I started college and
had been replaced by a new series called Deep Space 9. Darker in tone than
previous incarnations of Star Trek, the story centered on a space station
located simultaneously at the border of Federation territory with a cruel
race known as the Cardassians and outside a wormhole that provided
access to an unexplored part of the galaxy. This provided the basis for a
deeply geopolitical narrative that illustrated the ethical tensions found
in operating a huge, multicultural enterprise like the Federation. The
Klingons and other familiar races like the Romulans featured in a shift-
ing array of alliances with the Federation as new aliens threatened all
three from the distant areas found through the wormhole, a parallel to
the seeming instability of a unipolar geopolitical order. At the same time,
the uneasy relationship between the Federation and the Cardassians is
tested by the Maquis, a group of ex-Federation settlers who gave up their
citizenship when the colonies they founded were ceded by the Federation
to the Cardassians. The Maquis fight a guerilla war against the Cardas-
sians, pulling the Federation into ethical quandaries where action and
inaction both seem “right” depending on your geopolitical perspective,
paralleling the conflicts over ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and religious
settlements in the West Bank. My own cynicism grew in parallel to Deep
Space 9’s complicated and ambiguous narratives, leaving me unsure of a
 Preface to the First Edition xi

career in government service and much more comfortable with a more

ambiguous position myself—that of the scholar, unattached to an official
foreign policy.
While it would be easy to see Star Trek as simply reflecting trends in
world politics in a crass attempt to cash in on conflict, that would be too
simple an analysis. It is important to consider the full cycle of events
described above. As a fan of Star Trek during the first two decades of my
life, I was predisposed to look at the world in ways that Star Trek laid
out for me. In fact, I was aware of Star Trek’s narrative of progress long
before I had any formal education about the Cold War—to say that Star
Trek followed from “real” geopolitics is to miss out on Star Trek’s role in
formulating my own geopolitical perspective. For me, it was geopolitics.
It is this experience, and many others like it, that brought me to study
the intersection of popular culture, geopolitics, and identity. This book is
an attempt to provide an introduction to the history, concepts, and some
of the academic literature that constitute this increasingly popular area
of study. Although it is written primarily for advanced undergraduates
and beginning graduate students, I hope that it will find its way into the
hands of other interested people. After all, everyone has a part to play in
the creation of new geopolitical orders—and just because the utopia of
Star Trek has not yet unfolded does not mean that we should give up on
making this universe a better place.
Preface to the Second Edition*
Daniel Bos

We live in an era in which the politics of representation has never been

more important. Whether it is the debate over Wonder Woman (2017) being
a feminist, or where Confederate memorial statues ought to be located,
or how Muslims are portrayed in television and film, it is now common-
place to discuss the role of media and popular culture in shaping our
understandings of the world around us. Likewise, over the past decade
the scholarly study of popular culture and geopolitics has gained further
traction within the academy, presenting new ways of thinking about and
theorizing its significance (see, for example, Caso and Hamilton 2015;
Funnell and Dodds 2016; Saunders 2017; Saunders and Strukov 2018).
There has been a growing acknowledgment of a more embodied, perfor-
mative dimension to popular geopolitics—inspired by feminist scholar-
ship—that shifts attention away from screens and texts and instead thinks
through what we do rather than what we see. For instance, contemporary
debates around “clicktivism” and the politics of social media destabilize
the production/consumption binary that structures much of early popu-
lar geopolitics. Further, the rise of “fake news” on social media platforms
during the 2016 elections has contributed to the development of a deeply
cynical and skeptical popular perspective on democratic political sys-
tems, which inflects any subsequent specific geopolitical representation.
There is a vast need for conceptual tools to aid in rigorous, conceptual
thinking about such matters. Therefore, this edition of Popular Culture,

*  I told you so! —Jason

xiii
xiv Preface to the Second Edition

Geopolitics, and Identity will speak to highly contemporary issues using the
latest ideas from social theory.
Besides a new cover, we have made a number of changes to this second
edition of the book. We have included a new chapter solely focusing on
the methodological approaches and techniques used to study popular
geopolitics. While interest in the relationship between (geo)politics and
popular culture has grown, there has been less attention given to the
practice of doing such research. This chapter may not be of relevance to
everyone, but we do hope it can provide a starting point for students who
are keen to pursue their interests in popular culture and geopolitics. Each
chapter has been edited to keep up with the ebbs and flows of popular
culture. As with any book attempting to consider popular culture, exam-
ples and case studies can date very quickly. The increasing significance of
social media (see chapter 8) and the wider deliberation over what can be
considered popular culture (as explored in terms of heritage in chapter 7)
has encouraged us to make substantial updates and edits to the examples
used throughout the book. Likewise, theoretical and methodological
toolkits that help us understand popular geopolitics do not remain static.
Indeed, we attempt to offer important emerging theoretical insights into
the materiality of popular culture (see chapter 2); the ways popular geo-
politics is experienced, practiced, and understood within everyday life
(see chapters 1, 6, and 7); and the increasing significance of social connec-
tions and networks in a digital age (see chapter 8). Throughout this new
edition, we draw on and update scholarly debates that help push and
develop our understandings of popular geopolitics.
Certain aspects of the book have stayed the same. We have maintained
a similar style and format to help introduce core ideas. The initial three
chapters provide broad overviews of geopolitics, popular culture, and
methods. The rest of the chapters outline and take forward a key concept
within popular geopolitics, draw attention to scholarly debates, intro-
duce a case study to outline its significance, and provide questions to
encourage readers to consider how these ideas extend into their everyday
lives. Similarly, we have increased the number of key terms, helpfully
presented in individual textboxes, which provide succinct definitions of
terms and concepts used throughout the book.
 Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank everyone who made the first edition
successful enough to warrant a second edition. When Jason wrote the
first edition, he honestly envisioned that the book would only be used
in his own popular geopolitics course, as he considered it too niche to be
widely adopted. However, since then, reports have surfaced of the book
being used all over the world and in many disciplines beyond geography.
So, credit for the second edition begins with all those who teach popular
geopolitics, wherever and whoever you might be. More personally, the
authors would like to thank Susan McEachern at Rowman & Littlefield
for her faith in the project and her patience in its completion (twice). Bar-
ney Warf, who edits this book series, has been a great friend and mentor
to Jason over the years and was key to the launch of the first edition. Fur-
ther, in the last decade, the community of scholars working in and around
popular geopolitics has grown and pushed the field in new and exciting
directions. Some of that work has been incorporated in this book, but so
much great work had to be left out. Still, that work remains an inspiration,
and we are grateful for those scholars’ great work.
Personally, Jason would like to thank his family. The period in which
this second edition has been planned and written coincides with a period
in which the bonds of family have been renewed and deepened. Daniel
would like to extend his personal gratitude to Jason for providing him
the opportunity to work on the second edition of this book and for his
support throughout the process. He would also like to acknowledge his
family’s continuing love and devotion.

xv
 Introduction
Popular Culture—
Between Propaganda and Entertainment

In November 2014, the international film studio Sony Pictures was

hacked. Calling themselves the Guardians of Peace, the hackers were able
to obtain confidential data and unreleased movies, including the action-
comedy film The Interview. In this film, Hollywood A-listers Seth Rogen
and James Franco play a pair of journalists who are given an exclusive
opportunity to interview the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Catching
wind of this, the CIA quickly moves in to recruit them to assassinate the
leader. The movie’s premise caused outrage among North Korean gov-
ernment officials, who promised a “merciless” response if and when the
movie should be released. Threats were made to launch terrorist attacks
on any theater that showed the movie and to decimate Sony’s potential
future revenues by making their yet-to-be-released films freely accessible
online. While the North Korean government denies any involvement in
the hack, it is unclear who else would have such a specific interest in this
particular film. One theory is that the North Korean leadership was afraid
of what would happen if it made its way into North Korean society. The
concern was that the film’s portrayal of Kim Jong-un as corrupt, weak,
and of course possible to assassinate could be seen as damaging and a
threat to the regime’s ability to govern. What many would regard as a
mere source of frivolous entertainment became a (geo)political event.
While the analysis of the film and its representational politics is im-
portant, as it freights the film with geopolitical meaning, the politics of
the above event are much broader in scope. It encompasses a material-
ist understanding of the film, both in terms of the digital form in which
films are now produced (in contrast to the celluloid of the past) that lo-

xvii
xviii Introduction

cates them within global information networks vulnerable to hacking, as

well as the political economy of film production and distribution (which
leaves big studios extremely susceptible to threats). Any viewer of the
film (it was eventually released on a range of digital platforms) could not
watch it without some awareness of the geopolitical events surrounding
it, thus changing the context of reception and allowing viewers to, per-
haps, view their consumption of the film as a blow for free speech against
totalitarianism. This example is illustrative of the ways popular culture is
linked to questions of geography, power, and, as we shall explore in this
book, geopolitics.
But how exactly is popular culture geopolitical? One word that is often
associated with media and geopolitics is “propaganda.” Propaganda re-
fers to the intentional use of the media to generate public sentiments that
benefit the propagandist. However, it is most often used to designate
other people’s attempts to do this, as a way of invalidating the message
of the mediated culture. This can be in the form of news stories that are
purportedly “slanted” against another government, or a film in which
the villain is a particular nationality, or just a song that inspires martial
feelings at a critical moment in diplomatic relations. The difference be-
tween “propaganda” and “truth” often depends on where you stand and
perhaps on the intentions of the producer, which are difficult to assess
in the world of popular culture. The Interview’s plot puts the spotlight on
the North Korean state’s use of propaganda by mocking it. South Korean
activists even used balloons to airlift DVDs of the movie across the North
Korean border as a means of drawing the North Korean population’s
awareness to their tightly controlled media and culture. However, other
commentators argue that the movie is itself a form of U.S. propaganda
whose aims work in the interest of the U.S. government’s own desire to
remove the Kim dynasty (reportedly U.S. government officials approved
the movie’s grisly death scene of Kim Jong-un) and to undermine the
legitimacy of the regime. This book will not engage with the idea of
propaganda itself, but it is useful as a test—if popular culture does not
matter to geopolitics, then a lot of people are going to a lot of trouble to
contest it for nothing.

IDENTITIES: BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE INDIVIDUAL

The idea of propaganda, as stated earlier, is often used as an opposite

of the self-evidently true position espoused by the speaker. This is true
whether talking about national identities or individual ones (or anything
in between). Therefore, who we think we are, and who others think we
are, is critical to how we evaluate popular culture. In other words, whether
 Introduction xix

popular culture is propaganda or just entertainment is determined not by

its content but rather by the identity of the consumer. Identity is thus a
thread that runs through every chapter of this book.
“Identity” has become a very politicized term since the 1960s, when
various social movements (such as the women’s liberation, peace, civil
rights, and various anti-imperial movements) highlighted the various
ways in which it was possible for people to conceive of themselves as lo-
cated within society. Since then, processes of globalization have not elimi-
nated identity, as some claimed they would, but instead have heightened
attention both to it and the efforts needed to bolster stable place-based
identities in the face of ongoing processes of migration and other global
circulations of people, goods, and ideas. With people’s possible identi-
ties drawing on numerous overlapping geographical definitions, and
with culture being produced and consumed in new and various places,
identity has become less of a taken-for-granted concept than in the past.
Instead it has moved to the forefront of the study of both popular culture
and geopolitics.
Popular culture conveys information about places and also originates
in certain contexts, only to be consumed in various others. In this way it
is doubly geographical, conveying ideas about places from one place to
another. Identity and power are thus invoked in multiple dimensions.
Similarly, geopolitics is about the assignment of values to places, and it
constructs hierarchies of people and places that matter and those that do
not. While geopolitics is usually considered to be conducted in very elite
contexts, this book argues that it in fact circulates in everyday contexts
through popular culture. The idea that geopolitics is only for elites is itself
a way of producing identities—those who are active in shaping the world
and those who are passive. Like popular culture, geopolitics is doubly
geographic—shaping places in various ways and also demarcating the
places and people who do the shaping and those who do not. Identity,
then, is key to both popular culture and geopolitics. The juxtaposition of
these words in the title of this book is therefore not just a label but a call
to consider each topic in relation to the others. Let us briefly turn our at-
tention to this book and its subject matter, popular geopolitics.

THIS BOOK

Popular geopolitics is a niche within political geography wherein scholars

study the everyday experience of geopolitics. As such, the term refers to
both the subject matter (which will be outlined through the rest of this
book) as well as to the project devoted to improving our understanding
of that subject matter. The latter is interesting in that over the past several
xx Introduction

decades the project has moved in fits and starts, as various scholars of
geopolitics have decided to engage with it and then move on. There have
been notably few people who have devoted themselves to it for years
at a time (see Dittmer 2018 for an overview). In fact, one of the defining
features of popular geopolitics has been its lack of definition—not as a
subject matter but as a group of people.
However, another key feature of the project thus far has been its
links to various other academic fields, such as cultural geography, in-
ternational relations, and cultural studies. Scholars in these fields often
produce work that is easily aligned with the project of popular geopoli-
tics, even if they would never label themselves as scholars of popular
geopolitics. This is because the past twenty years or so have seen an ef-
florescence of research on popular culture and identity across academia,
much of which is relevant to popular geopolitics even if not couched
self-consciously within its terminology. Thus, popular geopolitics can
be seen as a tiny niche within political geography (itself a niche within
a relatively small discipline) or, perhaps more optimistically, as part of
a large interdisciplinary project that spans many different perspectives
(Saunders and Strukov 2018). This book seeks to position itself within
both perspectives, adopting the terminology and theoretical perspec-
tives specifically associated with popular geopolitics but reaching out to
surrounding niches for conceptual insights or particularly excellent case
study materials.
This book is intended to be used as a textbook for advanced under-
graduate students and as a quick guide for beginning graduate students
who are hoping to get a sense of popular geopolitics and perhaps how
to go about researching it. As such, it is written in a casual, conversa-
tional style that uses numerous examples to convey what can be quite
complex concepts. A book devoted to popular culture must necessarily
leave out vast swathes of the world’s popular culture because the book
itself is limited in pages and scope, and the world’s culture is not; rather,
it is nearly infinite in scope and continually evolving into new forms
and practices. While we have been mindful in drawing on an array of
global case studies, tough decisions still had to be made about what to
include and what to exclude. These tough decisions are made somewhat
easier by the authors’ own limits—drawing upon popular culture that
is beyond our own experience to create examples is a surefire way to
undermine the accuracy of the book. Therefore, we draw primarily on
popular culture from North America and to a lesser extent the United
Kingdom. Consequently, readers from these regions are more likely to
find the examples illuminating, and apologies are due to readers from
other parts of the world.
 Introduction xxi

CHAPTER OUTLINE AND STRUCTURE

The first two chapters set out the history and theorizations of geopolitics
(chapter 1) and the definitions and theories utilized in the study of popu-
lar culture by current research in popular geopolitics (chapter 2). In these
chapters there will be some references to popular culture when discuss-
ing geopolitics, and to geopolitics when discussing popular culture, but
the two topics are kept relatively separate so as to give the reader a firm
grasp of where the disciplinary concepts come from and how they can be
seen to overlap in isolation. As interest in the field has expanded, so too
have the different approaches to doing research. In this new edition, we
have devoted a chapter (chapter 3) to the methods that have been used to
study popular geopolitics. By exploring methodological approaches, we
hope to encourage and highlight to students some of the possible ways
they might design and undertake a research project in this field.
The subsequent chapters of this book (excepting the conclusion) are
case studies of popular geopolitics, describing some of the most impor-
tant concepts and trends in the field. Chapter 4 discusses representation
of place, which has been one of the most significant strands of research
in popular geopolitics. The British Empire was chosen as a framing de-
vice for this chapter because the construction of ideologies of empire in
a society based on principles from the Enlightenment has often involved
representing places and the people from there as fundamentally different
from those in the imperial center. Thus, representation, particularly in
regard to race, is critical to understanding how people can justify their
(and their government’s) treatment of people abroad.
Chapter 5 discusses the role of narrative in national identity, drawing
on the post–World War II United States as an example of the importance
of narrative because the United States is a nation that more obviously than
most is an imagined community, one that is tied to a narrative of progress
and innocence. The importance of popular culture in constituting that
narrative will be the focus of this case study, drawing mostly on Captain
America comic books. Chapter 6 introduces the idea of affect, outlining its
connections to both cultural studies and psychology. Affect, in contrast
to representation, is fundamentally focused on the body—dealing with
the ways in which popular geopolitics becomes embodied biologically
as adrenaline, passion, and other sites at the interface between the inside
and outside of our bodies. The popular culture to be studied in this case
study comes from the commercial video game industry, in particular the
popular military-themed video game series Call of Duty.
Chapter 7 brings forth the critique that many of the chapters ignore the
role of the audience in producing geopolitical knowledge. This chapter
starts with the idea of the active audience before building toward an
xxii Introduction

understanding of popular geopolitics through the lens of assemblage, in

which culture is coproduced by producers and audiences through en-
counter. The case study for this chapter is military heritage, showing how
objects, artifacts, and technologies come together to produce the sensation
of the past in the present, shaping our geopolitical action. In chapter 8, we
build on the concept of assemblage introduced in chapter 7. This will en-
able a consideration of the “networked self,” a concept of the individual
that is particularly important to our current social media–saturated
world. The case study for this chapter examines the role of social media
in the emergence of digital geopolitics, most clearly seen in the 2016 U.S.
presidential election and its impact on relations between Russia and the
West. The final chapter, chapter 9, is not a case study but rather pulls all
these ideas together and more fully theorizes the role of popular culture
in shaping individuals’ geopolitical attitudes. This chapter will also show
interested students where they can go to get more information and also
how they themselves can contribute to the practice of popular geopolitics.
Similar to the previous edition, each case study begins with an in-
troduction to the terminology of the new concept or perspective before
briefly outlining any debates in the literature. This section is followed
by an introduction to ideas from media or political geography that are
necessary to understand that particular case study. The actual case study
then draws on published research and illustrates the relevance of popular
culture to the particular understanding of geopolitics highlighted in the
chapter. The case study is intended to be both informative and interesting
(hopefully you will find it so). The chapter concludes with a summary of
what has been discussed and other areas in which the concept could be
relevant in everyday life.
 1
,
Geopolitics
Histories, Discourses, and Mediation

We live immersed in a world of popular culture. It is composed of a

bewildering array of narratives, images, and sounds that we often plug
ourselves into for fun or just to relax. But it is also more than that: it is
a space of geopolitical action. Whether it is Trevor Noah’s satire of the
Trump administration’s diplomatic efforts on The Daily Show, Homeland’s
examination of drone warfare, or the villainous Russian oligarch in Jack
Ryan: Shadow Recruit, it is undeniable that while popular culture is often
stigmatized for being a waste of time, it nevertheless feeds off of geopo-
litical events that are deemed to be important.
The geopolitics of popular culture often operates under our own radar,
whether through music in the background (such as country singer Toby
Keith’s “Courtesy of the Red, White, and Blue”) or patriotic displays at
sporting events (such as the singing of the national anthem or a military
flyover). Both of these examples point to the ubiquity of popular culture,
how it is always reminding us of who we are (or are supposed to be). At-
tention to popular culture usually takes the form of concern over violent
video games or bias in the news media, but rarely do we think about the
ways in which popular culture informs us about less controversial topics.
For instance, the above examples of Toby Keith’s song and the national
anthem illustrate the way country music and American sporting events
both utilize and generate nationalist sentiment. While those might seem
obvious, popular culture is often seen to have more subtle encodings.
For instance, 2012’s The Avengers climaxed with an alien invasion
of New York City; the heroic Avengers battled in the streets and skies
of Manhattan to repel the Chitauri invaders. The ensuing carnage was

1
2 Chapter 1

visually reminiscent of the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks

in which the World Trade Center towers fell, leaving dust and debris ev-
erywhere. The similarities between the geopolitical event and its filmic re-
play eleven years later were not lost on viewers; indeed, the overarching
narrative of the Marvel Cinematic Universe (MCU) has gone on to explore
the impact of “what happened in New York” on the heroes’ relationship
with the society in which they are enmeshed. Playing out over dozens
of movies and several TV series, the MCU has explored the relationship
between power, violence, and security in post-9/11 America.
To explore the relationship of film to 9/11, however, we have to go back
in time yet further—even before the attacks of 9/11. Many who witnessed
the attacks in New York felt compelled to refer to it as “like a movie.” Inde-
pendence Day (1996) is just one of many movies in that past that provided a
language for talking about the 9/11 attacks when they occurred later. Cer-
tainly, the U.S. government believes that popular culture and geopolitics
are interlinked—the Pentagon has allocated military equipment to movie
shoots that it thinks are sufficiently pro-American in perspective, such as
the Transformers franchise, and in 2005 the United States Special Opera-
tions Command was soliciting contractors to produce comic books aimed
at Arab adolescents. “In order to achieve long-term peace and stability
in the Middle East, the youth need to be reached. One effective means of
influencing youth is through the use of comic books. A series of comic
books provides the opportunity for youth to learn lessons, develop role
models and improve their education” (U.S. Government 2005; in chapter
6 we will focus more on the military-entertainment complex). Thus, any
full understanding of geopolitics requires that some attention be paid to
popular culture and matters of identity. But what is geopolitics?

WHAT IS GEOPOLITICS?

Even if you don’t know what it is, you have likely heard the word “geo-
politics.” It features prominently in newspaper headlines and on twenty-
four-hour television channels, often in tightly knit, succinct phrases such
as “the geopolitics of oil,” “Russia’s muscular geopolitics,” and “Middle
Eastern geopolitics.” The term “geopolitics” seems to be useful to journal-
ists because it has a veneer of tremendous explanatory power: What has
produced anxiety in the Baltics? Russia’s muscular geopolitics. What is
driving American foreign policy in the Middle East? The geopolitics of
oil. It sounds so helpful, so powerful—like a key opening a lock. It seems
like understanding geopolitics could lead to understanding the world.
But what exactly is geopolitics? Upon second glance, those journalistic
answers ring a little hollow. Just saying the word “geopolitics” does not
 Geopolitics 3

really explain anything at all. However, it does refer to something—a tra-

dition, a way of thinking that has been highly influential in the twentieth
century and, seemingly, one that looks to be key to the current century as
well. It is that tradition that provides the tacit explanation that journalists
love to harness. In these news articles, “geopolitics” seems to refer to a
hard-nosed assessment of the way the world really is, without any pie-in-
the-sky illusions. The world geopolitics describes is a rough place, with
limited resources and land and too many people wanting them. So where
did this tradition come from?

The Origins of Geopolitics

Geopolitics, as a notoriously slippery idea, can be traced back through
time in innumerable ways. However, our narrative starts with Friedrich
Ratzel, a German geographer at the end of the nineteenth century. At
that time Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection was all the rage,
and soon scholars began to try to apply Darwin’s ideas to the study of
societies—a move now seen as dubious as it reduces humans to making
decisions based on what is “natural” rather than what might be moral or
ethical. The resulting movement was known as social Darwinism. Impor-
tantly for our purposes, Ratzel took Darwin’s
ideas of natural selection and applied them to
countries (especially his own, Germany) in what organic theory of
the state  Populations
became known as his organic theory of the state.
draw strength from
According to this theory, which was published territory; expansion
in his book Politische Geographie (1897), countries of the state is a
(here known as states) need to grow in order to sign of strength
thrive. Powerful nations, Ratzel claimed, felt a
powerful urge to expand the borders of their
state in order to have a swath of territory that could reflect and sustain the
vigor of their people. The analogies to Darwin’s “survival of the fittest”
are apparent even here. They are even more obvious when one considers
the consequences of Ratzel’s ideas if implemented: his theory of the state
legitimizes continual war of all against all, as each country must seek the
path of least resistance to territorial expansion and must simultaneously
defend its territory at all costs—or else begin a downward spiral in which
less territory means less national vigor, which means further loss of terri-
tory, and so on. Ratzel’s ideas came to the United States through his stu-
dent, Ellen Churchill Semple, who studied in Germany before returning
to the United States, where she became a leading theorist of the environ-
ment in her own right and the first female president of the Association
of American Geographers (now known as the American Association of
Geographers).
4 Chapter 1

Rudolf Kjellén was a Swedish political scientist who studied under

Ratzel. It was he who coined the term “geopolitics” in 1899, and his fur-
ther contribution was, among others, that the state and society should be
viewed synergistically. This notion, together with Ratzel’s coining of the
now infamous word “Lebensraum” and his legitima-
tion of the violence inherent to it, prefigures the rise
Lebensraum of the Nazi party and its foreign policy. The explicit
“Living space” link between the works of Ratzel and Kjellén and
taken by a strong
the rise of the Nazi party comes through another
culture from
weaker ones in man—Karl Haushofer. A major general in the Ger-
Nazi geopolitics man army, Haushofer retired after World War I and
began a new career as a political geographer, where
he gained familiarity with the ideas of geopolitics,
or “Geopolitik” as it is known in German. Haushofer became the found-
ing editor of the Journal of Geopolitics in 1924, and as such he provided
the intellectual basis of what would become Nazi foreign policy. During
the early 1920s his former aide-de-camp from the army, Rudolf Hess,
participated in the Beer Hall Putsch (the first Nazi attempt to take power
in Germany) and was thrown in jail. It was while visiting Hess in prison
that Haushofer met Adolf Hitler. During World War II, Haushofer’s
propaganda value far exceeded his policy influence, as it was falsely
rumored in the United States during the war that he headed an institute
with more than a thousand geopolitical scientists plotting the perfectly
scientific path to world domination. However, Haushofer was never a
Nazi himself and never shared their view on the importance of race. In
fact, his son was executed by the Nazis for plotting to assassinate Hitler.
Although geopolitics, in the history relayed above, appears to be
purely a Central European invention, and a dubious one at that, it is not
necessarily so (see Atkinson 2000 for the role of Italian geopolitics in this
era). Parallel to the Central European intellectual lineage was another
strand of geopolitical thought, this one Anglo-American. In 1890, around
the same time that Ratzel was conceptualizing his ideas about political
geography, an American admiral named Alfred Mahan published The In-
fluence of Seapower upon History, 1660–1783. In this book, Mahan, a scholar
of naval history, argues strongly that control of the sea was pivotal to
victory in battle, as ships could move troops and resources faster than
land-based methods of travel. Mahan further argues that control of com-
merce is key to survival during wartime, and this means that the success-
ful navy must be able to achieve decisive victory over the enemy’s fleet,
thus protecting their own commerce and exposing that of their enemy to
attack. This geostrategy dominated thinking for decades following the
book’s publication and in fact was the philosophy behind Japan’s attack
 Geopolitics 5

on Pearl Harbor in 1941, proving that ideas soon escape the intentions of
those who originate them.
Mahan’s ideas found fertile soil with influential British geographer
Halford Mackinder, who was variously a scholar at the University of
Oxford, director of the London School of Economics, cofounder of the
University of Reading, and member of Parliament. Mackinder argued
that the expansion of railroad networks was fundamentally reworking
the political geography of the world by giving land-based powers the
ability to move troops and resources with the ease of sea-based powers.
Further, because Europe, Africa, and Asia together could be controlled
by a strong land-based power, while Central Asia could never be suc-
cessfully invaded by a sea-based power as it was too far from the sea,
naval powers such as the United Kingdom (Mackinder was a major pro-
ponent of British Empire) and the Mahan-influenced United States could
ensure that Russia (the occupier of this sea-power-immune tract of land
in Central Asia) remained contained (see figure 1.1). This idea was origi-
nally published in 1904 and then updated in 1919 and 1942. Mackinder’s
strategy, like Mahan’s, proved highly influential, providing, among other
things, an intellectual basis for President Truman’s Cold War doctrine of
containing the Soviet Union.

Figure 1.1. Mackinder’s map of the “geographical pivot of history”; how does this map
make some places seem more important than others?
6 Chapter 1

Environmental Determinism and the Decline of Geopolitics

Thus, there were strands of what we can call geopolitical thinking oc-
curring on both sides of the Atlantic prior to World War I. From these
thinkers we can begin to decipher what geopolitics meant at this time.
Common to all of these thinkers is an effort to systematize political life,
providing order and creating general rules that are seemingly “natural.”
At this point it is worth noting that the discipline of geography has tradi-
tionally incorporated both physical and
human geography, and the scientific
physical and human methods associated with the physical
geography  Primary division sciences were at this time dominant in
within geography; physical
human geography. Just as physics at-
geography emphasizes
environmental processes
tempted to derive the rules by which
while human geography matter and motion operated, human
focuses on social processes geography attempted to derive the rules
associated with the social environment.
Thus, the efforts of these geopolitical
thinkers to derive fundamental rules
environmental determinism was not unusual for the time. Both the
Theory that the environment German and Anglo-American strands of
determines cultural behavior geopolitics were heavily influenced by
environmental determinism—the belief
that human societies and their cultures
are largely a product of the environment in which they develop. This can
be seen in both Mackinder’s focus on land and sea powers as somehow
naturally opposed to each other and also in Ratzel’s focus on territory and
resources as determinative of national power.
The problem with environmental determinism is that the rules derived
in its name invariably turn out to be less than universal. For instance,
environmentally deterministic scholarship has argued simultaneously
that the intellectual developments in classical Greece were because the
landscape of mountains inspired loftier thoughts and that America was
similarly drawn to greatness because of its wide open plains, which led
inhabitants to “think big.” Of course these are simplistic formulations,
and environmental determinism can be quite sophisticated, as in the work
of Jared Diamond (1999). Similarly, the work of Robert Kaplan (2012,
2017) and Tim Marshall (2016) has been very popular in recent years, as
their work purports to explain global geopolitical patterns. Nevertheless,
all forms of environmental determinism suffer from a lack of attention to
what people think and do. Indeed, it is becoming increasingly apparent
 Geopolitics 7

that, while the environment obviously influences what people do, what
people do is increasingly modifying the environment through climate
change and other processes.
What is also true of these writers is that, although they sought to derive
the objective truth about how the world of politics and states works, they
all approached it from a subjective standpoint. Mahan’s “universal” naval
geostrategy was composed in the milieu of a newly industrializing coun-
try with two long coastlines. His proscription for a strong navy is further
contextualized by Mahan’s position as a naval officer—his claims can be
viewed as a strategic maneuver within the long-running interservice ri-
valries of the U.S. armed forces. Mackinder’s geopolitical vision similarly
deals entirely with the anxiety of maritime nations being overwhelmed
by land-based powers. As an avowed imperialist, Mackinder was person-
ally particularly keen to prevent Russia from severing the link between
Great Britain and India (Russia and the United Kingdom engaged in a
long rivalry for domination of Central Asia during the late 1800s, often
referred to as the “Great Game”—see figure 1.2). Haushofer’s Geopolitik
was oriented toward justifying conflict with the purpose of regaining the
territory that Germany lost in World War I, a war in which he fought
and which he viewed as lost by geopolitically unsavvy national leaders.
Thus, every one of these writers approached geopolitics from their own
national, and sometimes personal, perspective. It is important to note
that this is not a personal flaw—it is impossible for anyone to abstract
themselves from their subjective identity in order to conduct objective
research. The problem here is that they did not acknowledge their own
perspective and reduce the scope of their claims. Instead, their universal
theories of how the world works were aimed directly at their national
policy makers; political geographer Isaiah Bowman even went to Paris
as an American negotiator for the treaties that concluded World War I.
In the hands of these scholars, geopolitics was formulated as a kind of
applied political geography—academic knowledge bent to the purposes
of the state.
In the aftermath of World War II, Geopolitik was seen as corrupted by
its association with Haushofer and Hitler’s ambitions. With it went the
English version of the word; Isaiah Bowman even wrote an article claim-
ing to differentiate between the supposedly neutral, objective science of
American geography and the ideological perversion that was German
geopolitics. Geopolitics became a dirty word, described by American ge-
ographer Richard Hartshorne as intellectual poison (Hartshorne himself
had worked for the Office of Strategic Services, a forerunner of the CIA,
so he was hardly neutral himself).
8 Chapter 1

Figure 1.2. Map of Central and South Asia during the period of the Great Game. (UCL
Drawing Office)

The Return of Geopolitics

From shortly after the end of the war until about 1970, geopolitics was
not the subject of serious academic study, although the word did persist
somewhat in the journalistic sense described at the beginning of this
chapter, and political geographers such as Saul Cohen continued to study
politics at the global scale. This, however, does not mean that geopoliti-
cal thinking came to an end. Indeed, the onset of the Cold War brought
global, geopolitical thinking to the fore in a way that had never happened
before. With two global superpowers seemingly locked in conflict, the
entire world had to be rendered understandable for leaders and citizens
of the major powers. This was a distinctly geographical project—both
in regard to constructing a geostrategy and
making populations feel like their security
hinged on events in distant parts of the world. NATO  North Atlantic
Treaty Organization;
It is impossible to understand Truman’s con-
alliance founded to fight
tainment policy (which justified permanent against the Soviet Union
military commitments like the North Atlantic during the Cold War
Treaty Organization [NATO]) and the later
 Geopolitics 9

domino theory (which justified the Vietnam

War) as anything but applied political geogra- domino theory
phy. Indeed, political geographers such as Saul Belief during the
Cold War that if one
Cohen were involved early on, but the term
country becomes
“geopolitics” never reared its head until Henry communist, its
Kissinger became involved in U.S. presidential neighbors will as well
politics. As national security advisor and secre-
tary of state, Kissinger advocated just the sort of
faux-objective calculation in American foreign
policy that the journalistic usage of “geopolitics”
today refers to, and it is perhaps to him that we Henry Kissinger
owe this lingering meaning. While not directly National security
advisor and secre-
referencing (or exonerating) the pre–World War
tary of state in the
II usage of the term, he nevertheless seemed to Nixon and Ford
lift the veil by implying that the study of geo- administrations
politics could work for the United States. (1969–1977)
A new generation of scholars began to look
at geopolitics in the 1960s and 1970s, lending
diversity to the geopolitics described by Saul
Cohen. However, just as Ratzel, Mackinder, and
Haushofer were rooted in their time, so were spatial science
these scholars. The 1970s in geography were a Form of geography
associated with
time dominated by a type of analysis that be-
quantitative analysis
came known as spatial science. The spread of of locations and
computing technology facilitated understand- distributions
ings of geographic phenomena as geometric
relations across space that could be objectively
measured, with foreign policy made on this
rational basis. Generally speaking, this abstract
form of geopolitics envisioned the world as a Cartesian plane
Two-dimensional
Cartesian plane, with geopolitical actors (states)
surface with a
located at specific coordinates and weighted ac- location-finding grid
cording to their power, resources, and the like, associated with it
allowing models to be built. Much like prior for-
mulations of geopolitics (the work of American
geographer Nicholas Spykman in particular foreshadowed this approach,
with his notions of power degrading with distance from its epicenter),
this “new” geopolitics assumed an anarchic, violent world in which the
gain of territory and resources is the main motivating force in action.
However, this reincarnation of “objective” geopolitics was quickly
joined by a radical refiguring of geopolitics led by the French geographer
Yves Lacoste. Where the quantitative form of geopolitics was related to
the technological innovation of the 1970s, Lacoste’s more openly par-
10 Chapter 1

tisan geopolitics reflected the Marxism and

Marxism  Political- radicalism of that same decade. His 1973 paper
economic theory and on the geography of U.S. bombing patterns
practice that argues that near Vietnam’s Red River exposed the United
economic exploitation States’ attempt to destroy the dike system that
is at the root of society
maintained the region’s agricultural system.
This paper was followed by a pamphlet titled
The Purpose of Geography Is, above All, the Making of War! which made clear
the relationship between professional geographers and the maintenance
of inequality around the world. Indeed, historically, geography has been
in the first instance about mapping places to be colonized and later about
teaching imperial subjects about the extent of their domain. Further, as
we have seen, the history of geopolitics in the twentieth century is one
fraught with dubious forays into imperialism and warfare. While linguis-
tic differences, among other things, have kept Lacoste from being more
integrated with the Anglophone geopolitics community, his interventions
marked a turning point in the way geopolitics was conceived in the An-
glophone world.

CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS

In the late 1980s, the Anglophone political

critical geopolitics geography community belatedly began to
Intellectual movement incorporate intellectual currents that were
dedicated to questioning already existent elsewhere in the social sci-
the geographic assumpt-
ences. These currents were collectively known
ions of global politics
as poststructuralism, and they downplayed
(but did not disparage) the role of economic
and political structures in social life. Those involved in poststructuralism
generally advocated the importance of language and culture, alongside
the economic and political structures, in understanding social outcomes.
Those actively incorporating poststructuralism into geopolitics, such
as Gearóid Ó Tuathail (1996), Joanne Sharp
(1996), John Agnew (1994), and Simon Dalby
poststructuralism (1991), sought to refashion the subdiscipline
Body of thought as something more contemporary and dy-
that takes meaning namic than the static geopolitics of the past.
as not pregiven
Hence, their project—dubbed “critical geo-
politics”—focused on discourse.
 Geopolitics 11

Discourse
“Discourse” is a term that refers to the way in
which we talk about things. Discourses are key discourse  A way of
to any understanding of the world, geopolitical talking and thinking
or otherwise. A short example of geopolitical about a subject that
discourse can be found in the oft-used phrase frames discussion
“Middle East” to describe the region around
today’s countries of Iraq, Israel, and Saudi Arabia (among others). This
term, upon consideration, is meaningless without a center point against
which the Middle East is being measured—if something is the “East,” it
must be east of something in particular. That center point is Britain, which
dominated the region after World War I. Using this term, then, tacitly
accepts the British claim to be the center of the world (which is carto-
graphically mirrored by their successful mapping of the prime meridian
to go right through the outskirts of London). This may seem innocent
enough, but consider the Iraqi citizen who self-identifies as a Middle
Easterner—they have accepted a term that reinforces their own geopoliti-
cal marginality. That someone could view themselves as anything other
than the center of their own world illustrates a fundamental tenet of the
poststructuralist turn—that words, and discourse, have great power. It is
worth remembering that “geography” can be translated from the Greek
as “earth writing.” This term comes from geography’s early definition as
the science of mapping and dividing the world up into natural regions.
However, today it lends a new meaning as increasingly geography is
about studying the ways in which we inscribe meanings into places—lit-
erally dividing the world up into spaces with which we associate values.
So, where classical geopolitics sought to root its analyses in “the way
the world is,” critical geopolitics interrogates how and why we have come
to think of the world (or parts of it) in a certain way. This is a very useful
intellectual move, as it calls into question all sorts of received wisdom,
including that which we produce now. For instance, if we view classical
geopolitics as a discourse rather than the truth about the world, we can
identify several features of international politics that are neglected and
several that are overemphasized. For instance, every classical geopolitical
thinker from Ratzel on assumes the primacy of the state in global affairs.
Indeed, for these thinkers it was their job to advance their own state
among the others. The world is seemingly naturally composed of these
states, which unproblematically reflect cultural and historical divisions
among humanity. One term, still used today to great advantage by politi-
cians because of its geopolitical heft, is “the national interest.” By terming
12 Chapter 1

something the national interest, a leader can rhetorically undercut any

opposition, who by definition is then against what is best for the country
(subtly identifying the opposition as traitors is a time-honored tactic in
democratic politics). However, that term elides a great many distinctions
between the people of a nation. Is free trade in the national interest of the
United States? Perhaps for the executives who run Hollister, but perhaps
not for North Carolina textile workers. By adopt-
ing the state as the only frame through which
state-centrism The
assumption that states geopolitical decisions can be legitimately made
are the natural unit of (a notion called state-centrism), less powerful
analysis in geopolitics groups and individuals are literally erased from
consideration.

The Role of Cultural Authority and the Media

Related to this idea of the national interest is the question of cultural
power, which is key to being able to convince others that your idea of
the national interest is what their idea of the national interest should
be. Traditionally, this job was assumed by scholars (like Mackinder and
Mahan) and by politicians. In either case, it was usually older male elites
who used their positions in authority to silence alternatives. In the case of
Mackinder, Mahan, and other classical geopolitical scholars, their claim
to a comprehensive, scientific understanding of the world gave their
views significance. For today’s politicians, that significance comes from
their access to experts, intelligence agencies, and the like. In either case,
the assumption of greater understanding that comes with these positions
masks the potential abuse of the position to frame geopolitical knowledge
in ways that are beneficial to those doing the framing. This does not have
to be intentional. Everyone’s perspective on the world is partial and situ-
ated. This means that we cannot help but see the world through our own
eyes, and this necessarily introduces biases. Hence, critical geopolitical
scholars try to avoid grand, sweeping statements about the way the world
works. Instead, these scholars try to show how the world looks differently
from different perspectives and how those with greater cultural power
shape the overall geopolitical order.
This necessarily involves studying geopolitical perspectives and tradi-
tions associated with people and groups other than the traditional elite. A
good example of this expanded view of geopolitics would be the attention
paid to the media in critical geopolitics. One of the foundational works
in this regard was written by Joanne Sharp (1996, 2000), who analyzed
the ways in which the magazine Reader’s Digest produced a Cold War–
based discourse in which the United States was the polar opposite of the
Soviet Union. Sometimes taking an even tougher stance on the Soviet
 Geopolitics 13

Union than contemporary presidential administrations, the publishers

of Reader’s Digest exercised their cultural power in an effort to shape the
overarching discourse of the day. To many of the media-savvy readers
of this book the idea that the media have ideological “slant” might seem
obvious, but it would never have received any attention from classical
geopolitical scholars, who would see no relevance in the media. This il-
lustrates just how much geopolitics changed over the twentieth century.
One of the ways in which critical geopolitics has been very successful
is by focusing on how power and discourse circulate and reinforce each
other. As the example of Reader’s Digest shows, those with cultural power
can exercise influence over those with less cultural power. However, very
few people (if any) have the power to impose their view on everyone else.
Rather, discourses only become successful if they intersect with, or are
co-opted by, the interests of a wide range of people. In other words, if
the publisher of Reader’s Digest had promoted the idea that America and
the Soviet Union were not so different after all, the magazine might have
been investigated by Senator Joseph McCarthy’s House Un-American
Activities Committee and shut down by J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI. Both of
those men made their careers out of so-called red-baiting (trying to “out”
suspected communists). As it was, Reader’s Digest simply reinforced dis-
courses of anticommunism that were circulating in the highest levels of
the U.S. government. Tracing these connections is key to understanding
how the anticommunism that was seen as being “in the national interest”
became known as such.

Formal Geopolitics
Scholars of critical geopolitics have identified three different types of geo-
political discourse. These are very broad categories, and some discourse
seems to bridge these categories rather confusingly. Nevertheless, the
categories are quite useful in day-to-day usage (see table 1.1). The first
category is “formal geopolitics.” This is geopolitical discourse produced
by academics, either in university settings or in more overtly political
think tanks like the Heritage Foundation or the Brookings Institution. A
think tank is an institution that is funded to conduct research to advance
the policy goals of its supporters. Thus, all the classical geopolitical think-
ing that was described at the beginning of this chapter can be described
as formal geopolitics. Despite our focus here on critical
geopolitics, we should not lose sight of the fact that think tanks
much of the work done in political science and inter- Organizations
national affairs is done within the tradition of classical dedicated to
geopolitics—the tradition of scholars informing policy policy analysis
makers about “how the world is” and telling them
14 Chapter 1

Table 1.1. Definitions of Formal, Practical, and Popular Geopolitics

(adapted from Ó Tuathail 1996)
Type of Geopolitics Definition
Formal geopolitics Discourse associated with academics and think tanks
Practical geopolitics Discourse associated with policy makers
Popular geopolitics Discourse associated with everyday people

what to do to maximize the state’s power. For instance, President George

W. Bush’s second secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, was a professor of
political science at Stanford University who initially gained the ear of the
Reagan administration and subsequently the George H. W. Bush admin-
istration, serving as an expert on the Soviet Union. After being secretary
of state, she went back to teaching political science. From this example we
can see that formal geopolitical discourse is generally formulated to feed
into government decision making.

Practical Geopolitics
The move of Dr. Rice into government symbolizes our segue into the
second type of geopolitical discourse, “practical geopolitics.” This is the
discourse used by politicians and policy makers. While it often follows
from formal geopolitical theorizing, it frequently takes on a life of its
own as politicians seek to frame debate to advantage themselves. A clas-
sic example of practical geopolitical rhetoric would be President George
Washington’s Farewell Address (1796). In it, Washington wrote that

the great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending
our commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as
possible. So far as we have already formed engagements let them be fulfilled
with perfect good faith. Here let us stop. . . .
Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a dif-
ferent course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the
period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoy-
ance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may
at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent na-
tions, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly
hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our
interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.
Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own
to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that
of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of Euro-
pean ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?
 Geopolitics 15

As you might sense, much has changed since 1796 in terms of how
presidents communicate. In this passage, Washington argued that the
geographic location of the United States—across the Atlantic from the
ongoing wars between the United Kingdom and France—provided the
infant country with a buffer that ought to shape its foreign policy. Indeed,
Washington’s principle that the United States ought not enter into any
permanent alliances was followed until after World War II, when the
United States began building up a network of regional alliances around
the world.
Practical geopolitics may seem to be the most important form of geopolit-
ical discourse; it is certainly the “business end” of geopolitics, as the words
of politicians can unleash death and destruction on the objects of their dis-
course. However, it is not necessarily the most common. That honor is held
by the third type of geopolitical discourse, “popular geopolitics.”

Popular Geopolitics
Popular geopolitics refers to the everyday geopolitical discourse that
citizens are immersed in every day. In a democratic society (which is not
a given, of course) popular consent is necessary to some degree for the
conduct of foreign policy. In June 2018, President Trump wanted to initi-
ate a trade war with America’s allies in order to get them to agree to terms
of trade that were more beneficial to the United States. That is, Trump
wanted to raise tariffs (taxes) on goods imported from countries such as
the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Canada, all of which had
been America’s closest allies over the last fifty years. However, American
law only allows the president to deviate from agreed trade deals with
these countries if the tariffs are necessary to protect American national
security. Trump duly certified that this was a matter of national security,
and the tariffs were put into place. This caused Canadian prime minister
Justin Trudeau to call Trump on the phone, asking how America’s closest
ally could be a threat to national security. Trump replied that Canada had
burned the White House down during the War of 1812 (it was actually
the British).
This exchange played to the Canadians’ benefit when it was leaked to
the press, with comedians and late-night TV hosts mocking the president.
Even the conservative Fox News joked, “Maybe we need a northern wall.”
While most Americans know little about Canada, they generally associ-
ate Canada with a stereotype of cheerful politeness, hockey, beer, maple
syrup, and so on. The stereotype is a distinctly unthreatening one. In fact,
Canada’s good neighborliness has been a staple of Hollywood comedy
for decades, spoofed in films like The Canadian Conspiracy (1985), Canadian
16 Chapter 1

Bacon (1995), South Park: Bigger, Longer & Uncut (1999), and Super Troopers
2 (2018). It was not one of those films that accomplished this or a particu-
lar late-night comedian. Rather, it was all of these examples, and more,
saturating everyday life with the idea of Canada as friendly and unthreat-
ening to Americans. Therefore, Trump’s attempt at enacting a practical
geopolitical discourse around Canada crashed into a deeply set popular
understanding of Canada and could not take root as a discursive “fact.”
As this example demonstrates, popular geopolitics involves the study
of the media in virtually all its forms. We use the word so often just refer-
ring to the news media that we often forget the root meaning of it—media
are avenues through which information is mediated to us. Any formal or
practical geopolitical discourse needs to be broadly disseminated if it is
to become a popular geopolitical discourse. In addition, it is important to
remember that geopolitical discourses can be formulated “from below”
by grassroots discussion. Those, too, would have to be mediated to a
larger audience to become truly popular. The focus of popular geopolitics
on the media includes the news media (newspapers, TV journalism, etc.)
and, most important for this book, popular culture, such as comic books,
television shows, novels, movies, music, and the internet. We live in a me-
diated world—all that we know about the world beyond our immediate
experience comes to us via various media, whether it is the printed word,
the televisual, radio, or something else entirely. The media even colonize
our personal experiences; it is almost impossible to go somewhere with-
out preconceived notions of what to look at and how to feel about it. What
would it be like to experience a place not having read about it or seen it
on screen? Thus, the media play a major role in not only how we see the
world but also how we make sense of it.
This mediation of the world is geopolitical because it occurs in ways that
associate values and behaviors with various parts of the world, which in
turn influences the ways people interact. For example, during the Reagan
administration, there was a steady flow of anticommunist action films,
including Red Dawn (1984), in which the Soviets, Cubans, and Nicaraguans
launch an unlikely invasion of Colorado, only to be turned back in part
by a group of American teenagers who refuse to collaborate, and Rocky
IV (1985), in which the “Italian Stallion” defeats a much bigger, steroid-
enhanced Soviet boxer through sheer American hard work and willpower.
In the latter movie, the final match takes place in Moscow, and the crowd
is so convinced that Rocky deserves to win by what they see that they be-
gin to chant his name—even the Soviet leader (a Mikhail Gorbachev look-
alike) is compelled to stand and applaud Rocky’s superiority.
Although both movies are somewhat comical in retrospect now that the
Cold War is long over, they served to reinforce what was common sense
at the time—the Soviets wanted to defeat (and possibly kill) Americans
 Geopolitics 17

if they could, and they would utilize underhanded trickery (the steroids)
to do so; but the United States would always triumph because of innate
traits that made us successful in geopolitics (and boxing, apparently).
Later, completely different villains would take the place of the Soviets,
with nevertheless similarly derogatory characterizations. For instance,
when Red Dawn was remade in 2012, the villainous invaders were re-
written to be North Koreans, backed by ultranationalist Russians. There
is plenty more that could be discussed about these movies, but we will
have to limit our discussion here to providing an example of how popular
culture serves to mediate popular geopolitical discourse about who “we”
are and what “our” position in the world is vis-à-vis those who are dif-
ferent from us.

Popular Geopolitics beyond the Media

The focus thus far on geopolitical discourse has tended to emphasize the
mediation of elite views, whether those are of geopolitical theorists, of
presidents and prime ministers, or of Hollywood moguls. This is a prob-
lem in that popular geopolitics is necessarily the realm of everyday life,
and even the biggest couch potato doesn’t spend all their time in front of
a screen. How can we think about popular geopolitics in a more lived,
embodied way?
One way to think about this is in terms of a global sporting event like the
World Cup, in which football (soccer) teams representing many countries
around the world come together in a tournament every four years. Each
region of the world has a tournament in “off years” to qualify for the tour-
nament, so only the best teams from each region attend. Given the global
popularity of football, the Men’s World Cup is second perhaps only to the
Summer Olympics as a global sporting phenomenon. One way to think
about the World Cup as a form of popular geopolitics is to think about the
players. Their bodies, wearing jerseys decorated with national symbols,
become invested as avatars of the nation—their successes and failures
mapped onto the nation itself. There is a great deal of pressure to represent
the nation well, both in sportsmanship and in actual performance. As an
extreme example, consider the Colombian football player who acciden-
tally scored a goal against his own team in the 1994 Men’s World Cup,
causing his team to be eliminated. Five days later, he was assassinated in
Colombia by (it is rumored) a drug cartel. Usually the stakes are not that
high. But the players’ bodies become important in other ways as well.
For instance, during the 2018 Men’s World Cup, the winning French
team was notable for its diversity—seventeen players (of the team’s
twenty-three total) were the sons of immigrants, largely from North
Africa. Other successful teams like Belgium and England have similarly
18 Chapter 1

built winning teams from their immigrant populations. The Belgian suc-
cess stems from the funding of youth football programs, not only to make
a better national team but also as a means of integrating native-born
Belgians and immigrant communities that otherwise might remain in
ghettos. Playing football together is seen as a way of overcoming racial,
religious, and linguistic divides and forging a unified country. When the
team is advancing in a global media event like the World Cup, it also puts
those multiracial bodies on screens all around the world, making a tacit
claim about citizenship and belonging in those countries.
Speaking of screens, let’s consider the people watching those screens
all over the world. Unlike Hollywood films or TV shows, sporting events
are unscripted and so the outcome is not known in advance. Your player
or team may perform well, or they may not. Your opponent may perform
well, or they may not. But notice what has already happened—the viewer
has been positioned as part of a nation, and among the many types of
nationalism (see chapter 2), cheering for your national team is understood
as among the most benign and socially acceptable forms. Many people
watch World Cup games in public spaces, either in bars or in public
squares where a Jumbotron has been set up. Watching national teams in
groups allows for a kind of group synergy to form, with high-fives or mu-
tual consolation bonding the group under the banner of the nation when
a goal is scored. That group synergy, mixed with the tension of the un-
scripted game and the high stakes, can lead to outbursts of public emotion
when either victory or loss is realized. Sometimes this takes benign forms,
like a street party. Sometimes it takes a darker turn, such as when English
fans in 2018 trashed an Ikea after their team defeated Sweden. Through
this example of the World Cup, we can see how popular geopolitics can
be a more lived and embodied experience. While the televisual aspect of
the World Cup absolutely matters (about 815 million people were esti-
mated to be watching at any given time in 2018), as it connects the players
with the viewers, it is what players (and viewers) do with their bodies
that matters—the running and kicking, the high-fiving and shouting.
Popular geopolitics of this sort happens all the time, and not just at ma-
jor events like the World Cup. What we do, and how we do it, is central to
shaping geopolitics. Our bodies remain our most potent geopolitical tools.
Necessarily, one person has relatively little geopolitical power. However,
one person can make a difference, especially when their action is picked
up and mediated to the masses. Such was the case in December 2010
when a father of eight children named Mohamed Bouazizi set himself
on fire in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia. Bouazizi did so after his produce cart was
confiscated by the Tunisian government, which had been led by a dicta-
tor, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, since 1987. This act of desperation resonated
with the people of Sidi Bouzid, who erupted in riots. Within a month, Ben
 Geopolitics 19

Ali was driven from the country, and Tunisia began the process of set-
ting up a democracy. The Tunisian revolution spread, with social media
fueling unrest throughout the Middle East, and came to be known as the
Arab Spring. Few of the subsequent revolutions were as successful as the
Tunisian one, and many turned into long-term bloodbaths (as in Syria).
But this serves as an excellent example of the power inherent in a single
body when amplified by various forms of media. Crucially, this gives all
of us a role in shaping geopolitics.

CHANGING THE WAY GEOPOLITICS WORKS

Geopolitics is fundamentally about who “we” are and what other people
are like. Much to the chagrin of geographers and other academics who
feel they can answer these questions best, these lessons are increasingly
taught via everyday popular culture, whether through TV shows such as
Archer or through everyday use of social media like YouTube, Twitter,
and Facebook. This book will provide you with the tools to understand
the ways in which geopolitics and popular culture intersect in your lived
experiences. This raises the question, however, of “why bother?”
The academics who crafted the formal theories of classical geopolitics
would not have had to worry about this. They had a clear objective: to
uncover the hidden truths about geography and politics and use those
truths to advantage their own states and nations. There were lives, re-
sources, territory, and treasure on the line, and academics were part of
the national repertoire of weapons in an ongoing competition with other
states and nations. Critical geopolitics, however, seeks to establish a dif-
ferent relationship between academia and power. Critical geopolitics, as
a project, is extraordinarily well aware of the discipline of geography’s
complicity in past imperialisms. Indeed, the mapping of new territories in
the post-Columbian era (1492–) has usually been followed by the march-
ing of armies. Critical geopolitics, then, is not about being aligned with
state power, which is sometimes a politically unpopular position to take.
Although most scholars of critical geopolitics would love for their ideas
to be taken up by policy makers, we suspect that most doubt they ever
will be. For instance, the probability of a state’s government voluntarily
dissolving, having been convinced of their own state’s lack of historical
underpinnings, is probably next to nil.
However, academic ideas such as those espoused in this book do filter
through the political/cultural system, as we outlined earlier in the case
of formal, practical, and popular geopolitics. For instance, scholars in
critical geopolitics (and beyond) have long observed that a discourse of
inhumanity is used to distinguish between those deemed worthy of life
20 Chapter 1

or not worthy of life. That is, humanity is attributed to the “Self,” while
the “Other” is designated as inhuman. A famous example is when Adolf
Hitler, the leader of Nazi Germany, described Jews prior to the Holocaust
as disease-carrying vermin. The same process of dehumanization has
been documented in many other times and places, such as Cambodia in
the late 1970s, where enemies of the state were described as “worms”
who “gnawed the bowels from within” (Travers-Smith 2012). In 1990s
Rwanda, the Tutsi were described as “cockroaches” prior to the start of
the genocide that took upward of one million lives. In 2018, the president
of the United States described immigrants on the southern border as
“infesting” the country (Bouie 2018). This process of “Othering”—des-
ignating one group as inhuman and therefore not comparable to your
own—psychologically prepares people to do inhuman things, such as
suspending civil rights, taking children from their parents, or killing
people in large groups.
“Othering” has been a staple of critical geopolitics since its inception,
and now it has filtered out of academia into popular culture. A 2016
episode of Black Mirror (“Men against Fire”) featured a futuristic science
fiction story in which a human soldier was blasting shrill, squawking
mutants into oblivion, as is found in numerous action films over many
decades—recall the villainous Chitauri of The Avengers (2012) mentioned
earlier in this chapter. However, when an implant in his brain malfunc-
tions, he comes to see the “roaches” (the soldiers’ nickname for their en-
emy) for what they really are: members of a “genetically inferior” group
within his human society. The government had given him the implant to
keep him from seeing the humanity in those the government wanted to
eliminate through violence, and indeed once the humanity of his victims
is apparent, he is horrified to see his crimes. Therefore, we can see that
popular culture is now self-aware of its role in perpetuating Othering
and capable of offering a more critical take on geopolitical discourse. Of
course, it would be ridiculous to claim that critical geopolitics, as a group
of people involved in an academic movement, is solely responsible for
this event. However, it is not ridiculous to think that the scholarship of
critical geopolitics played a small part.
While it is fair to be skeptical that critical geopolitics can “save the
world,” it is not so wrong to hope that it can make it a better place, and
even manage to improve some lives here and there by exposing the dis-
cursive and material bases for conflict. In regard to popular geopolitics,
this requires critical appraisal of media, its role in helping to constitute
geopolitical imaginations, and our own role in enacting popular culture.
It is to this task that we now turn.
 2
,
Popular Culture and
Popular Geopolitics
Definitions, Theories, and Convergence

The study of popular culture is a relatively recent phenomenon in aca-

demia, generally dating back to the 1960s and the founding of the Centre
for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham
(UK). However, the study of culture has a long and privileged position
within the academy—one need only think of the literature courses that
are usually required in any liberal arts curriculum, or the art and music
history courses that usually supplement them. For the most part, these
courses are the result of early ideas about what going to college should
be about: educating young men (women, of course, largely being barred
at the time) so that they could become gentlemen in society. According
to Oxford poet and cultural critic Matthew Arnold (1869), culture was
about “the best that has been thought and said in the world.” A basic
knowledge of that canon of cultural tradition was seen as a civilizing in-
fluence that could bring about social cohesion, inasmuch as knowledge
of these topics brought with it authority over those who did not have
that knowledge. Thus, the study of culture was limited to the “high-
lights” and was limited to forms of culture that were associated with so-
cial elites (painting, sculpture, classical music, etc.). This book, however,
is primarily concerned with popular culture. So what is the difference?

21
22 Chapter 2

DEFINING POPULAR CULTURE

Popular vs. High Culture

Most definitions of popular culture involve mass

high culture consumption—that is, popular culture is avail-
Culture distinguished able to most people in a society relatively easily.
by its connection This includes a wide variety of goods and activi-
to cultural elites ties, such as magazines, television shows, sports
activities, the cinema, comic books, novels, and
the internet. Popular culture, as described above, is framed as the opposite
of high culture, or the culture of elites. Popular culture was first conceived
of, and deemed a threat, with the invention of the printing press in the
1400s, which began to shift cultural authority away from elites to new
sources of cultural production. Geopolitically, this was visible with the
Protestant Reformation, which sparked several wars in the 1500s and early
1600s as the authority of the Catholic Church to interpret scripture was de-
volved to “the masses” by the proliferation of Bibles in popular languages
(rather than Latin).
That was just the beginning, however, and ever since then authority
figures (from national governments to parents) have anxiously won-
dered what their “subjects” were reading, listening to, or seeing. Gov-
ernments have often been concerned with other sources of information
“contaminating” their citizens, and indeed the social sciences’ first foray
into studying the content of messages came during World War II as the
Allies became concerned about German propaganda efforts (Severin and
Tankard 1992). Similarly, recent news stories about the effect of Facebook
culture or violent video games on adolescents mirror earlier concerns
with “propaganda” in their anxiety about the mediated messages in
which youth are immersed.
The rise of popular culture primarily aimed at young people stems
from the rise in post–World War II prosperity in North America and
Western Europe, where for the first time most households could have a
television and young people had their own spending money, either from
parental allowances or from their own part-time jobs (which, also for the
first time, did not have to be used for household purposes). This increase
in disposable income led in turn to the growth of companies dedicated to
mass consumerism, particularly the growth of Hollywood studios, record
companies, and other corporations that cater to the youth demographic.
This notion of popular culture as degraded (or degrading) lingers and
can be heard in every moan and groan from the intelligentsia over the
amount of time spent in the press discussing the antics of celebrities such
as Kim Kardashian and Justin Bieber. However, the line between popular
 Popular Culture and Popular Geopolitics 23

and high culture is not as distinct as advocates

of high culture (or popular culture) would like pop art  Visual art
to imagine. Producers of each form of culture that reuses pop culture
commodities to make
draw inspiration from the other side. For in-
high culture art
stance, the pop art movement of the 1950s and
1960s illustrated the fuzziness of the borders
between high and popular culture. This fuzziness has only grown, with
popular authors like Stephen King now under more scholarly scrutiny
(e.g., Badley 1996) or the mixing of rap and orchestral music (an example
being the “Yeethoven” concerts, which combined music from American
rapper Kanye West and composer Ludwig van
Beethoven in orchestral form). Further, the
cultural authority that used to belong to the Paris Review An elite
literati like the Paris Review is now increasingly literary magazine in
which many successful
shared with popular culture institutions like
novelists first appeared
Rolling Stone magazine and MTV. From all this
hybridity of popular and high culture, we can
see that there really is not a clear divider between the two; instead we are
left with the issue of aesthetics. High culture is ultimately defined as be-
ing of “higher quality” than popular culture, but as quality is an element
of personal taste, this divide is ultimately indefensible.

Popular vs. Folk Culture

Popular culture has also been defined through
its opposition to folk culture, rather than high
folk culture Culture
culture, particularly within the discipline of
associated with a
geography. Folk culture can be defined as specific place, often one
traditional culture linked to a particular place deemed premodern
and people. Folk culture has historically been
understood within geography in relation to
the pressures supposedly put upon it by globalization. Globalization is
another slippery concept (like geopolitics), but for the purposes of this
discussion we will define it as an intensification of global connectivity,
driven in part by revolutions in transportation and telecommunications
over the last thirty years. The effect of these
revolutions has been called time-space com-
pression, which refers to the decrease in rela- globalization
Intensification of spatial
tive distance between places.
interactions associated
Time-space compression has significant im- with revolutions in
plications for local economies, however, as transportation and
goods and services now circulate around the communications
globe with increasing ease. Some view this as
24 Chapter 2

a good thing, with cross-fertilization of culture pro-

time-space viding opportunities for greater international un-
compression derstanding, embodied in popular culture such as
Decline of relative “ethnic” restaurants, “world music,” and the recent
distance caused yoga boom in the United States and Western Eu-
by globalization
rope. Others view this negatively as the commodi-
fication of difference, with elements of folk culture
being stripped of their local meaning and sold to Western consumers
who use them to project a cosmopolitan, modern identity predicated on
their worldliness. This practice is clearly linked to Orientalism, which we
define in more detail later in the chapter, with the West characterized by
its progress and universality and the East (or, here, the rest of the world)
by its exotic traditional folk culture, which is linked to the past as well as
to a specific region (thus being particular rather than universal). Because
of this, popular culture is thought of in many parts of the world as a
steamroller, incorporating into itself the parts of folk culture that Western
consumers want but destroying the rest in a blitz of modern Western
commodities and entertainment.
In particular, this charge is often leveled at American culture, in part
because the United States is the chief proponent of free trade around
the world (but, as with the inclusion of folk culture in popular culture,
only on its own terms). Further, the United States dominates many of
the culture industries, such as Hollywood and the music industry. This
domination is sometimes referred to as cultural imperialism, which
is the deliberate attempt to supplant local culture and make a people
consumers of your culture rather than producers of their own (Tomlin-
son 2001).
However, others have seen this hypothesis of increasing homogeneity
as misleading. An assumption of the “cultural imperialism” hypothesis
is that popular culture is limited to material goods
and excludes cultural practices. Put another way,
cultural you are what you consume. In fact, many Ameri-
imperialism
can (and other Western) goods take on entirely
Promotion of
one country’s
different meanings when used in non-American
culture in another or non-Western contexts. For example, one classic
country’s territory study analyzed the meanings that audiences in
the United States, Israel, and Japan found in the
consumption of the equally classic television soap
opera Dallas and found that each audience took something different
from the show because each audience brought something different to
the show (Liebes and Katz 1990). Thus, while globalization might cause
goods to circulate more widely, it will not erode the differences that
make places distinct.
 Popular Culture and Popular Geopolitics 25

The similarities between the “popular culture vs. high culture” and
“popular culture vs. folk culture” paradigms is instructive. Both para-
digms are ultimately definitions of popular culture, in which popular
culture and its polar opposite constitute each other (i.e., it would be
impossible to have “popular culture” if there was no high culture or folk
culture with which to contrast it). In both definitions, popular culture
is defined as threatening: high culture is conceived of as a bulwark of
civilization, and folk culture is similarly conceptualized as the difference
within the world that makes life interesting (for those with the resources
to partake in it). However, the power imputed to popular culture in that
act of threatening is in some ways negated by the dim view that many
cultural authorities (and those aspiring to that authority) take of popular
culture. Rarely do critics say that orchestra audiences are smaller and
aging rapidly because The Voice is better. Equally rarely do we hear that
Hollywood films do better than art house foreign cinema because they are
superior. Instead, we hear that the fault lies with the audience—“they just
don’t get good culture.” This shift from the quality of popular culture to
the quality of the audience is instructive. It tells us that popular culture/
high culture/folk culture are closely linked to identity—that of the people
who produce it, the people who consume it, and the people who use it to
their own ends. It is through popular culture (at least in part) that we de-
cide who we are, who we want to be, and how we want people to under-
stand us. Hence, as we saw in the preceding chapter, popular culture and
geopolitics are intertwined in this field of popular geopolitics. So, how do
we move forward from this understanding to theorize the relationship
between popular culture and geopolitics?

THEORIZING POPULAR CULTURE

As we have seen, early ideas about the nature of popular culture stemmed
from the anxiety that many elites held regarding the effect of popular cul-
ture on the masses and the maintenance of the social hierarchy. This anxi-
ety could not be expressed as such, and so indulging in popular culture
was pathologized, with some claiming that popular culture aficionados
were endangered by their behavior. The following 1965 critique of jazz
fans is now commonly directed at video gamers and their compatriots:
“looking through magazines and newspapers and listening to jazz music
does not merely fail to help him [the pop culture fan, apparently male by
default], it prevents him from normal development” (Leavis 1965, 104).
However, this conservative critique mirrored earlier engagements with
popular culture by left-leaning academics, most obviously the Marxist-
inspired Frankfurt School.
26 Chapter 2

The Frankfurt School and Classical Marxism

The Frankfurt School refers to a loosely associated group of scholars that
coalesced around the Institute for Social Research at the University of Frank-
furt in the early 1930s. These scholars were all influenced to some extent
by the ideas of Marxism. According to Marxist
thought, popular culture is only understandable
Frankfurt School A through analysis of the economic structure that
collection of dissident
produced it. Therefore, while you might consider
Marxists who studied
society from the
the aesthetic or other qualities of a Hollywood
1930s onward blockbuster like Black Panther (2018), a proper
analysis requires a fundamental understanding
of the circumstances that originally made Hol-
lywood cinema popular. Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Walter Ben-
jamin, and other Frankfurt School scholars took that classical Marxist view
of popular culture and tried to update it to explain the flowering of popular
culture in the twentieth century. Adorno and
Horkheimer (1979) argued for the understanding
culture industry  of popular culture as the result of the “culture
In Frankfurt School industry,” a monolithic, faceless element of the
theory, a monolithic capitalist economy that sedates the masses with
source of popular
pleasure, causing them to ignore their own eco-
culture believed to
dominate workers’
nomic alienation and subordination. In much the
consciousness same way that capitalism produces desires that
might be achieved in the short to middle term
(e.g., buying a dream car or taking a cruise),
thereby convincing workers to participate in the capitalist system rather
than creating a new system that might be more advantageous in the long
term, capitalism produces popular culture that makes workers consider
only the pleasures that can be achieved soon—like watching your favorite
television shows or seeing Black Panther. By stringing workers along in this
way, popular culture is part of a system that keeps workers from rising up
and doing something more politically meaningful.
This is a very popular concept today among cultural critics because
it allows them to reinforce their own class status by disdaining popular
culture in favor of high culture, which as we have seen above is a com-
mon modus operandi. However, most of these people are not Marx-
ists—rather, they have appropriated the critique for their own purposes.
For example, there has been much annoyance lately in certain circles (e.g.,
Kohut and Parker 2007) over the amount of press coverage that the re-
sults of reality television competitions receive, in contrast to, among other
things, the wars in Iraq (2003–2011) and Afghanistan (2001–). Without be-
ing Marxist, this critique enables popular culture to be designated as that
 Popular Culture and Popular Geopolitics 27

which distracts from “real” issues. The common denominator between the
Frankfurt School and the more contemporary use of their ideas comes in
their theorization of popular culture consumers. Here the term “consumer”
takes on something of a literal meaning in that consumers of popular
culture are denied any agency—the effects of the
popular culture are encoded in the moment of pro-
agency  Ability
duction, leaving consumers in the role of zombies,
to effect change
internalizing the preferred meanings of the popular
culture with which they are presented. While the
intent of the Frankfurt School was to explain that the working classes were
not rebelling because of the machinations of capital, it effectively blamed
the working classes for not being able to resist popular culture in favor of
more authentic, revolutionary culture.

(Post-)Marxism and Consumption: Gramsci, Foucault, and de Certeau

In contrast with the classical Marxist critique just described, a second
tradition has emerged and become entrenched in academia under the
term “cultural studies.” Whereas the Frankfurt School was associated
with German scholars (who largely migrated to the United States), this
particular perspective originated in the United
Kingdom, although it draws from an international
cultural studies
group of theorists who would not necessarily
Academic
have thought of themselves as part of cultural movement, begun
studies (these influences will be discussed below). in Birmingham
The leading names of early cultural studies (UK), that seeks
included Stuart Hall, Richard Hoggart, Raymond to connect the
Williams, and others. Together they launched issues of culture,
a new way of thinking about popular culture. agency, and power
Rather than viewing popular culture as degraded
or deviant, they saw it as just another part of the multitude of ways in
which people come to share meaning in their lives. By this we mean that
the consumption of similar elements of popular culture provides a com-
mon cultural framework for seeing, interpreting, and ultimately finding
meaning in the world:

Culture, it is argued, is not so much a set of things—novels and paintings or

TV programmes or comics—as a process, a set of practices. Primarily, culture
is concerned with the production and exchange of meanings—the “giving
and taking of meaning”—between the members of a society or group. . . .
Thus culture depends on its participants interpreting meaningfully what
is around them, and “making sense” of the world, in broadly similar ways.
(Hall 1997, 2)
28 Chapter 2

Thus, popular culture can be something good (or bad). It can be some-
thing essential by providing social cohesion and common understanding.
This formation of cultural studies as an intellectual movement occurred
in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, which saw disil-
lusioned Marxists in the West abandoning communist orthodoxy and
looking for new theories that were nonetheless critical of capitalism. One
inspirational figure to arise in this rethinking of Marxism was Antonio
Gramsci, who had died decades before in relative obscurity. Gramsci was
a founder and onetime leader of the Italian Communist Party who, like
many of his colleagues, found himself in real jeopardy when the Fascists
took over in 1922. In 1926 he was jailed and remained in prison until he
died from poor health in 1937, but during this time he committed many
of his most influential ideas to paper.
Gramsci’s starting point was that it was impossible for capitalist elites
to coerce the working classes into doing the elites’ will because there were
simply too many workers if they were united as a result of attempted
coercion. Instead, the domination that Gramsci saw around him could
only come as a result of a reframing of the debate. His Prison Notebooks
(1992) famously outlined his concept of
hegemony, which is the process by which
class is deemed beyond politics. The key hegemony  Concept
to the prevention of a workers’ revolution, that describes the ways
in which elites colonize
according to Gramsci, lay in making the
workers’ culture but must
elites’ culture hegemonic throughout soci- adopt some elements of
ety. Because of this, the working class no working-class culture
longer saw its own best interests but rather as well; now not strictly
viewed its interests as coinciding with used in relation to class
those of the elites. Examples of this false
consciousness at work include working-
class nationalism and the liberal belief in the primacy of the individual,
both of which are broadly visible in today’s society and contribute to the
erosion of working-class solidarity. Thus, Gramsci argued that Marxists
should first attempt to gain hegemony
over working-class culture by loading it
false consciousness
with their own anticapitalist ideology, and State of not being aware of
only then should an actual revolution take your own best interests
place (with the terms of conflict back in the
Marxists’ favor).
It is easy to see the similarities between Gramscian hegemony and the
Frankfurt School, but there are a few key differences. Hegemony does not
imply monolithic domination of workers’ minds, as the Frankfurt School
does, but rather the co-optation of workers’ culture through an almost
infinite number of daily social interactions. The consequence of this co-
 Popular Culture and Popular Geopolitics 29

opting is that the elites must make their culture more recognizable by the
working class as their own in lots of miniscule, everyday ways. Recent
examples from American electoral politics spring to mind as candidates
traditionally fall all over themselves to appear like “one of the people”:
President Donald Trump’s penchant for playing golf, Hillary Clinton’s
appearance on the talk show Between Two Ferns with U.S. comedian Zach
Galifianakis, and more generally how electoral candidates use social me-
dia in a bid to connect with voters. Hegemony does not exactly involve
“meeting in the middle,” but it does require some flexibility on the part
of elites. This theorization not only imputes more agency to the working
class than the classical Marxist perspective (it shows that they have, in
effect, negotiating power—even if the end result is that they participate
in their own alienation), but it also puts culture (particularly popular cul-
ture, as the most everyday form of mass culture) front and center in an
understanding of politics.
The ideas of Gramsci, like most ideas, soon escaped the intentions of
their author. Gramsci’s focus on culture as a major component of power
and politics has been widely understood and adopted by right-wing
movements that would have been anathema to Gramsci himself. The as-
sociation in the United States of the Democratic Party with unions, and
thus the white working class, has long roots, but it has been widely rec-
ognized over the past couple of decades by many commentators that the
Republican Party has sought to shift the debate from a class-based politics
to one that emphasizes nationalism and culture, such as debates about
immigration and gay marriage (see, for example, Frank 2004). This has
been generally successful since 1980 as a strategy for fusing two dispa-
rate economic interests—social conservatives (often working and middle
class) and fiscal conservatives (often middle and upper class)—into a
working coalition. Another example of this strategy at work at the global
scale, rather than the national, is the Cold War itself, which can be inter-
preted in Gramscian fashion as the muddling of the economic interests of
the developing world by the introduction of faux-ideological conflict (ef-
fectively sculpting global conflict as east–west rather than north–south).
This had the added benefit for the state’s ruling class of uniting (virtually)
all Soviets and Americans under their particular
nationalist banners. But, as Gramsci would have
predicted, that co-optation required concessions welfare state 
in elite political culture. In the case of Western State in which there
Europe this concession came in the form of the is redistribution
welfare state, and in the case of the United States from the wealthy
it came in the form of a watered-down welfare to the poor
state. The U.S. version can be differentiated from
some of the Western European versions (there are
30 Chapter 2

several) by a more minimalist government role, such as subsidies for the

poor and elderly and regulation of markets. In both forms, however, the
welfare state enabled mass consumerism by redistributing some wealth
to the working class. This mass consumerism is in many ways the very
basis of popular culture.
Another perspective that has been highly influential in cultural studies
is the work of Michel Foucault (1974, 1977, 1989). His work seems super-
ficially very similar to that of Gramsci, but there are some key differences
that will be drawn out here. Foucault was one of the main theorists in the
poststructuralist tradition (see the preceding chapter’s discussion of the
beginnings of critical geopolitics), and as such he was primarily concerned
with discourse and meaning. Because he saw meaning as essentially un-
hinged from language, he believed that meanings were constantly in flux
as different people with varying degrees of power struggled to make their
meaning hegemonic—the influence of Gramsci is clearly there. However,
unlike Gramsci, Foucault did not adopt the Marxist assumption that eco-
nomic production and class are at the root of social reality. To paraphrase
the two scholars, Gramsci viewed discourse (and popular culture) as the
way in which reality was artificially masked from the working class; Fou-
cault would have seen Gramsci’s claim as itself a discourse that sought to
become hegemonic, no different from the elite discourses against which
Gramsci was arguing: “In Foucauldian terms, discourses are not simply
reflections or (mis)representations of ‘reality’; rather they create their own
‘regimes of truth’—the acceptable formulation of problems and solutions
to those problems” (Lees 2004, 102–3).
It is the popularity of Foucault’s poststructuralism that moves cultural
studies away from a strictly Marxist perspective into something that has
been referred to as post-Marxist (Chang 1986). Post-Marxism is a perspec-
tive that acknowledges the tremendous insights into economy, culture,
and oppression that mainstream Marxism has
made over the past century and a half, but it de-
post-Marxism nies the Marxist assumption that the only form of
Beliefs that derive oppression that ultimately matters is class based
from Marxism but do (all other forms of oppression being also rooted
not share Marxism’s in capitalism). Therefore, Foucauldian analysis
focus on economics
of popular culture often focuses on the ways
in which popular culture discourses contribute
to the creation of hegemony, whether that is
patriarchy (gender-based hegemony), bigotry (race-based hegemony),
heteronormativity (sexual preference–based hegemony), or other forms
of hegemony. Foucault also provided a boost for the study of popular
culture because, like Gramsci (although Foucault usually gets more credit
for this), he directs attention away from the massive, depersonalized
 Popular Culture and Popular Geopolitics 31

economic structures of Marxism toward the everyday, banal forms of

discourse that permeate daily life.
Foucault’s ideas, unlike Gramsci’s, have not been adopted by right-
wing commentators, which in some ways is interesting because, while
Gramsci was an avowed communist, Foucault was quite apolitical in
the traditional sense (although he did advocate for social change). This
seeming paradox results from Foucault’s belief that there is no truth, but
only truth effects, which are quite transitory. As an example, the debate
in many parts of the United States about teaching evolution or the “intel-
ligent design” hypothesis in public schools is viewed by both sides in a
Gramscian manner—with “truth” being on their side and the other side
trying to obfuscate that truth. Foucault would likely see it differently, as
two essentially political positions (evangelical Christianity and secular
rationalism, both seeking to be the hegemonic philosophy of the United
States) trying to legitimate their perspectives—with “truth” being the
effect of each side’s relative ability to harness the discourse of science to
their own ends and deny that legitimacy to their opponent. Thus, Fou-
cault’s ideas are difficult to adopt for traditional political campaigning or
criticism because they not only deconstruct your opponent’s position but
also undermine your own. However, Foucault remains wildly popular in
academic circles, where his poststructuralist form of hegemony remains
incredibly helpful for explaining the political world around us because
of its focus on the way in which truth claims are mobilized.
The theorists mentioned thus far in this chapter have been ordered
such that they are increasing in the amount of interest they have in the
act of consumption—the Frankfurt School paid very little attention to it,
Gramsci slightly more. Foucault, in particular, envisions hegemony as
emerging out of the everyday cultural consumption among and between
large numbers of people in specific localities. One step further on this
spectrum is Michel de Certeau, who in his book The Practice of Everyday
Life (1984) theorized about the ways in which consumption occurs. His fo-
cus is on the ways in which we perform our everyday, routine lives, often
without conscious concern for how we do so. The most influential parts
of this work for cultural studies deal with de Certeau’s division between
tactics and strategies.
Strategies, in de Certeau’s formulation, are the hegemonic practices
and discourses of institutions, bureaucratically entrenched in particular
places and procedures. Because they are institutional, they are powerful
but slow, with great resources but also great overhead costs. Tactics, on
the other hand, are the practices of individuals who are decentralized and
lack power but are infinitely more flexible than strategic-acting institu-
tions. Subversive and slippery, tactics are incapable of revolutionizing
the system but are only strong enough to prevent the crushing of the
32 Chapter 2

Table 2.1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Strategies and Tactics

(adapted from de Certeau 1984)
Advantages Disadvantages
Strategies Powerful Slow
Vast resources Expensive to maintain

Tactics Fast Weak

Cheap Vulnerable

individual by the institutions and their strategies (see table 2.1 for a sum-
mary). The virtue of tactics vis-à-vis strategies is that tactics are utilized
in a covert way, avoiding outright confrontation, which is also why it is
difficult for social theorists to witness them being used. This in part also
explains why the consumption of popular culture is historically under-
theorized in comparison to production.
An example of tactical engagement with institutional strategies can
be found in the work of Jonathan Leib. He has analyzed license plates
for automobiles as governmental strategies to disseminate their favored
geopolitical image (e.g., Leib 2011). For example, in 1961 the plates of the
Dominican Republic were marked “Era de Trujillo” across the top of the
plate. This referred to the decades-long rule of strongman Rafael Trujillo,
who dispensed with elections shortly after taking office. When he was as-
sassinated in 1962, however, Leib has noted that drivers quickly dispensed
with the top part of their license plate, in what is clearly a tactical maneu-
ver to reshape the discourse of national identity (see figure 2.1). This kind
of focus on consumption is key to any study of popular geopolitics.

Material Culture
In this section we want to examine the way cultural studies have come
to consider the material form that popular culture takes. While cultural
studies have long privileged a focus on popular culture representations,
discourses, and texts, there has been less consideration of the importance
of physical objects—or what Daniel Miller (2010) calls “stuff”—which
are ever present in our everyday life. Our engagements and encounters
with the materiality of popular culture take
many forms that vary in size and scale, including
DVDs, magazines, books, toys, fashion, televi- material culture
The relationship
sions, cinemas, stadiums, and nightclubs. Since
between material
the 1990s, scholars from a range of disciplines objects and cultural
have sought to consider what has been termed and social relations
material cultures and why it (literally) matters
 Popular Culture and Popular Geopolitics 33

Figure 2.1. Altered Dominican license plate; the unaltered plate has “Era de Trujillo”
across the top. (Photo by Jonathan Leib)

to questions of consumption, identity, and everyday life. As Storey (2018,

237) suggests, “we produce and consume [material objects], we exchange
them, we talk about them and admire them, and we use them to say things
about ourselves.” Objects thus play an important role in how we come to
encounter, experience, and perform popular culture.
The study of material culture is not rooted in a particular discipline per
se but has engaged a wide range of scholars from a variety of disciplines.
One means of exploring objects has been to consider their cultural and
political power. Rather than inert lumps of matter, objects play a role in
shaping who we are and how we relate to other humans and nonhuman
entities. The work of philosopher Bruno Latour (2005) has been important
in breaking down dualistic thinking that has long separated the human
and the nonhuman. Objects, in his view, have long been artificially treated
as separate from social and cultural life. Latour is interested in the rela-
tionships and associations of phenomena that emerge out of networks of
human and nonhuman actants (for more on this, see chapter 7’s discus-
sion of assemblages). Rather than seeing objects as passive, they can be
understood as having agency when they combine with people and other
nonhuman actants. This perspective shifts the focus to understanding how
34 Chapter 2

humans are always entangled in relations, not only

actant  Anything with other humans but with nature, technology, and
that modifies material objects. Our engagements with popular cul-
other actors ture are mediated and constructed in large part by
through actions our relationships with objects. Take the smartphone;
it is increasingly common to see people glued to
their smartphone screens, allowing some to claim that such devices have
become extensions of ourselves. They are a source of entertainment, com-
munication, and interaction and a provider of information and news. This
object has given us new capacities to communicate but also to engage with
forms of media and popular culture on the move.
We can see how material objects are important to understanding the
ways popular geopolitics is encountered in everyday life. The work of
Carter et al. (2016) has considered the object of the military Action Man
toy. First launched in 1966 (two years after the intro-
duction of the U.S. equivalent G.I. Joe), Action Man
Action Man An became a popular children’s militarized toy man-
action toy figure
nequin. In its initial outing, the figure was clothed
first released in
the UK in 1966
with a military uniform and moveable joints that
can be manipulated to perform actions and hold
additional objects such as weapons. Playful engage-
ments with material objects such as Action Man offer a means by which
military cultures become embedded within the domestic setting and both
shape and normalize our imaginations of war, conflict, and military vio-
lence (Carter et al. 2016). Taking this a step further, in 2009 the Ministry
of Defense in the UK launched its own range of action figures called H.M.
Armed Forces (see figure 2.2). The toy figures were designed to be highly
realistic, including weaponry and clothing used by soldiers on the front
line. The purpose of these toys was to raise the profile of the armed forces,
with some of the profit going back into further public relations activities.
However, it is important to note that while the material design of such
objects can shape the possible ways they are interacted with, children
(and adults) can also creatively interact with and give meaning to the toys
and play in ways that are not expected or determined by the producers.
These military figurines were co-opted as objects of dissent and resistance
and used to challenge geopolitical cultures of militarism. The Veterans
for Peace UK “Battlefield Causalities” campaign (2015; http://battle
fieldcasualties.co.uk) uses the toy to call into question how young people
are subjected to military recruitment pressures within the context of the
UK. It is therefore important to consider the ways that material objects
are made geopolitically meaningful within particular social and cultural
contexts and through everyday practices.
 Popular Culture and Popular Geopolitics 35

Figure 2.2. H.M. Armed Forces action figure and Action Man in the background.
(Copyright © Tara Woodyer and Martin Schaefer)

Lacan and Psychoanalysis

Another form of cultural theory has emerged that
is quite separate from the work associated with cul-
tural studies, drawing instead from the discipline of psychoanalysis
Study of human
psychology. Specifically, it spins out of the practice psychology
of psychoanalysis, most generally associated with and behavior
the work of Sigmund Freud. The theorist most asso-
ciated with the study of popular culture, however,
is Jacques Lacan, who expanded on Freud’s ideas by linking them with
the poststructuralist focus on language and discourse.
Freud (2000) linked sexuality and human development in a narrative
that eventually leads to the sublimation of desire into the unconscious.
This narrative begins with infancy, when sexuality is undeveloped but
in which pleasure nevertheless crystallizes around specific parts of the
body. This occurs at a moment prior to the formation of the infant’s sense
of identity. Later, when gender and identity begin to become significant,
children are taught to deny themselves these pleasures, whether because
of moral codes, religion, or social propriety. This desire for pleasure, how-
ever, does not go away, as it is fundamental to humanity—resulting in the
development of the unconscious, a reservoir of unacknowledged desire
and potentially self-destructive energies.
36 Chapter 2

Lacan (1998) focused his work on the stage in which gender and
identity become significant, because he believed that it was during this
stage that the unconscious was produced through language (a focus, you
might recall, of poststructuralism). One of Lacan’s major contributions to
psychoanalysis was his description of the mirror stage, in which children
begin to recognize their image in the mirror as not actually themselves
but just an image, thus composing a coherent subjectivity for themselves
where just prior there had been a prelinguistic feeling of unity with the
world. This shift from the prelinguistic world (or imaginary, in Lacan’s
words) to the linguistic (or symbolic) world is critical for the formation of
our own identity, but it nevertheless creates a gap between the new sub-
ject and the old sense of unity with the world that was ruined by the in-
troduction of language and identity. This
sense of alienation becomes sublimated
mirror stage Psychoanalytic
(as in Freud), thus driving a subconscious
concept that describes the
moment of identity formation
desire to seek pleasure in a return to a
unified, prelinguistic self. The ability to
recognize ourselves in the mirror is key
to the formation of subject identities, but it does not have to literally be
a mirror. The mirror can be other people or, crucially for the study of
popular culture, characters in movies. Lacan is especially popular in film
studies because the cinematic screen metaphorically serves as the mirror,
and the dim lights promote the audience’s connection to the movie, en-
abling a childlike forgetting of ourselves and a pleasurable return to the
presubjective self (consider how often someone who sees a good movie
describes it as so good that they forgot where they were).
If Lacan seems a bit far removed from the subject of geopolitics, we
believe most scholars of popular geopolitics would agree with you.
However, Lacan and psychoanalytical readings of popular culture have
become quite popular in the subdisciplines of cultural geography and me-
dia geography. Further, Lacan’s focus on identity holds out potential for
making inroads in the field of geopolitics, where, as we have seen, iden-
tity is key to the construction of geopolitical discourses. Further, the role
of the visual gaze in the mirror stage dovetails nicely with the increasing
focus on visuality in geopolitics, and the centrality of gender and sexual-
ity to psychoanalysis with the growth of
feminist perspectives on geopolitics, so
subjectivity  An indiv- it is perhaps only a matter of time before
idual’s sense of self,
including perspective,
psychoanalysis becomes a full part of the
thoughts, and emotions. popular geopolitics repertoire of theories
(for some possibilities, see Nast 2003).
 Popular Culture and Popular Geopolitics 37

Convergence Culture
Rounding off our discussion on the theo-
retical influences of cultural studies, we convergence culture
want to briefly allude to current trends. The flow of content across
The theories discussed above were de- media platforms
veloped within specific contexts and
at specific times. What is there to be
said on how the media industries and old media  More traditional
consumer relations are now changing media such as newspapers,
in an era of dramatic technological, cul- television, and radio
tural, and economic changes? For Henry
Jenkins (2006), we have seen the rise
of what he terms convergence culture.
new media  Use of digital
One aspect of this convergence culture is technologies and platforms
an acknowledgment of the ways media such as the internet to
and popular culture can be experienced allow mass electronic
across multiple platforms. You can now media communication
listen to music using a CD player, an
iPod, a smartphone, or through a digital
music provider such as Spotify, which technological determinism
can then be streamed onto a television The notion that technology
set, or through an Amazon Echo. Yet determines social structures
this is not simply the case of new media and cultural values
pushing out and superseding old media.
Indeed, while Netflix can be watched on
portable devices such as an iPad, it is reported that 70 percent of streams
are still watched on a television set. The ability to engage with content
has certainly been dramatically aided by technological developments. But
suggesting that this convergence culture is shaped solely by technologi-
cal development runs the risk of technological determinism, overlooking
the wider cultural and economic processes at play. Convergence culture
emerges out of the interplay of “top-down” and “bottom-up” processes,
as Jenkins (2006, 17–18) goes on to suggest:

The American media environment is now being shaped by two seemingly

contradictory trends: on the one hand, new media technologies have lowered
production and distribution costs, expanded the range of available delivery
channels and enabled consumers to archive, annotate, appropriate and re-
circulate media content in powerful new ways; on the other hand, there has
been an alarming concentration of the ownership of mainstream commercial
media, with a small handful of multinational media conglomerates dominat-
ing all sectors of the entertainment industry.
38 Chapter 2

Convergence culture is thus the struggle between the “top-down”

power of media industries and their desire to disperse content across
multiple media formats and the “bottom-up” power of participatory cul-
tures (see Jenkins 2012) in which consumers
both interact with and create media content
participatory culture in a variety of ways. The lines between
Audiences acting not just consumer and producer therefore become
as consumers but also increasingly blurred. Convergence culture
as producers and often
also paves the way for transmedia storytell-
evident in fan cultures
ing in which elements of a popular culture
narrative are dispersed across a range of
media platforms and formats. This can
present a variety of means in which popu-
transmedia storytelling
A narrative that unfolds
lar culture phenomena are encountered
across multiple media within the everyday life of their audiences.
platforms and formats The popular franchise Pokémon is a prime
example. This popular culture phenom-
enon spans video games, television and
film series, comic books, a trading card game, and toys, allowing mul-
tiple forms of audiences to immerse themselves and generate meaning
within the fictional universe of Pokémon. Audiences can thus encounter
popular culture in multiple different ways and forms, which allows
new engagements, practices, and knowledges of popular culture texts to
emerge. Moreover, as suggested, this is not simply a top-down decision
imposed by the entertainment industry but can also emerge out of par-
ticipatory cultures in which fans create their own texts and meanings of
the franchise. We have outlined how cultural studies (and beyond) can
come to help us conceptualize the significance of popular culture within
society; in the next part we draw attention to the concepts that have been
instrumental in defining the field of popular geopolitics.

BASIC CONCEPTS OF POPULAR GEOPOLITICS

Imagined Communities
It is worth taking a moment to study some of the work outside of geo-
politics that has been very influential in the popular geopolitics we will be
focusing on for the rest of the book. The first of these ideas is that of the
imagined community. In order to understand this idea, you have to un-
derstand the difference between “states” and “nations.” While in every-
day language we use the term “nation” to mean “country,” in the world
of academia, “state” actually means “country.” This is particularly con-
 Popular Culture and Popular Geopolitics 39

fusing in the United States, where “state” colloquially refers to a smaller

component of the country. For the purposes of this book, however, we
will use the academic terms—with “state” meaning a full-fledged country
(like France) and “nation” referring to a group of people who primarily
identify with each other (like the French people). Sometimes these two
terms roughly coincide (as in France), but
you can always find people within the state
who belong to another nation, and you can imagined communities
always find members of the nation outside Societies brought
the state. Benedict Anderson (1991, 6–7) into existence by
the use of common
calls nations “imagined communities” be-
literature and media
cause they are different from regular com-
munities in that they are not based on face-
to-face contact:

It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never
know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet
in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. . . . It is imagined
as a community because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation
that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal
comradeship.

According to Anderson, these imagined communities sprang into exis-

tence shortly after the invention of the printing press. It was then that
profit-minded capitalists began to publish in the vernacular languages of
particular regions in an effort to boost sales beyond that which the Latin-
reading elites (the church and aristocracy) could provide. This had three
effects. First, it began to standardize regional dialects, creating a group
of people with a recognizably common cultural characteristic (language).
Second, it undermined the power of the Latin-reading elites by provid-
ing the masses with access to religiously and politically sensitive texts.
Finally, and crucially for popular geopolitics, it created an avenue (or
medium) through which consumers of popular texts and culture could
gain common understandings of what was going on in the life of this new
community, this new nation.
However correct Anderson might be, the story does not end there. Very
few people would be willing to kill or be killed in the name of an “imagined
community” that results from common reading material. Nevertheless,
thousands (if not more) die every year under the banner of nationalism.
This is because nations are not popularly understood the way that Ander-
son has described them—in most of the world, nations are seen as primor-
dial entities, with roots back in the mists of time. For example, today’s Irish
are envisioned by advocates of primordial nationalism as a branch of the
40 Chapter 2

Celtic race that existed as long ago as there are written records. This theory
carries with it associations of racialism, but its eighteenth-century propo-
nents were more interested in language as an indicator of identity. Un-
like Anderson, who sees language as a commonality that links otherwise
disparate people together, the primordialists like Johann Herder believed
that, because people in different nations thought in different languages,
they would innately think different things (and people in the same nation
would think similar things). Thus, there is a fundamental difference be-
tween people of different nations. You can see how it is a short trip through
German philosophy from the language-based nationalism of Herder to the
organic state of Ratzel described at the beginning of the last chapter. It is
this view of the nation that has become popular—as something hardwired
and fundamental. Even among groups where a primordial perspective on
the nation seems somewhat abhorrent—like the United States—the funda-
mental importance of the nation to an individual’s identity remains.

Geopolitical Imaginations
Once we see nations not as fundamental, always-existing identities but
rather as identities contingent on relatively recent historical processes and
our relationship to common media, we can start to see how a focus on
discourse, and everyday practices such as saluting the flag, is necessary
for explaining why people continue to feel so strongly about their nation
well after its “imagining.” Part of the reason for this is that the imagined
community of the nation serves as a foundation point for what Edward
Said (1978) referred to as “imagined geographies.” Anyone attempting
to make sense of the world must resort to exactly the kind of generalities
that are inherent to the idea of the nation. Imagined geographies are col-
lections of facts and stereotypes about places in the world that together
compose an individual’s or a group’s worldview. In a way, we already
discussed imaginary geographies when we discussed popular imagina-
tions of Canada in chapter 1.
Another example would be Said’s classic term “Orientalism,” which he
used to refer to a way of thinking about the Middle East. While he was
specifically referring to British and French imaginary geographies of the
Arab world, his term has been used by others to refer to any imaginary
geography of “the East” that stereotypes
the people there as exotic, premodern,
Orientalism  Belief that there emotional, and indolent. This stereotype
is a fundamental distinction was used to describe Arabs and Muslims
(and opposition) between
anywhere in the region, eliding the dif-
Western and Eastern societies
ferences between, for example, the peo-
ple of Oman and the people of Algeria. It
 Popular Culture and Popular Geopolitics 41

became politically useful to think of “the Orient” as lazy and backward

because it justified the intervention of the British and French (and, later,
the Americans) in the region as being
“for their own good.” In the discipline of
geography, the phrase “imaginary geog- geopolitical imagination
raphies” has usually been inverted to be- A person’s (or society’s)
come “geographical imaginations” (e.g., constellation of taken-
Gregory 1994), and in this book we will for-granted truths about
twist it yet further, referring more often the world and the way in
to “geopolitical imaginations,” a phrase which power should be
utilized in that world
that heightens the sense of the power and
danger that is mediated along with these
discourses.

Banal Nationalism
Geopolitical imaginations are often, though not always, conceived in
largely national terms. Whereas Anderson’s concept of imagined commu-
nities focused on the ways in which the first nations were formed, Michael
Billig’s concept of banal nationalism (1995) refers to the ways in which
nationalism is perpetuated. Instead of conceiving of nationalism as some-
thing extreme and peripheral to everyday life (as in the oft-cited examples
of nativist political parties or separatist movements), Billig suggests that
we look at our own daily existence and how already-established nations
are reproduced over time and why people continue to believe in them.
This is an important corrective to the notion that nationalism is something
“out there” while the modern West has become effectively postnational
and therefore is more rational and less emotional than other parts of the
world (see the discussion of Orientalism above). Billig makes effective
use of the example of the object of the flag (indeed, he refers to banal na-
tionalism as the “flagging” of everyday life). He points out that if you see
a crowd on television at a rally all waving national flags, you recognize
that as nationalism. However, citizens of the West see innumerable flags
of their own country every day, but they go unremarked because they
are “unwaved.” These flags include those on public buildings, postage
stamps, used car lots, bumper stickers, T-shirts, politicians’ lapels, and
television weather maps.
Of course, banal nationalism does not
have to entail actual flags—rather, it banal nationalism Everyday
is any instance when citizens are en- ways in which citizens are
reminded of their national
couraged to think of themselves using
affiliation; a reservoir that can
national categories. This can be overt, be drawn on in times of crisis
such as in the Olympics, which has tran-
42 Chapter 2

scended its intentions as a movement to promote peaceful coexistence

among nations through amateur athletics to become a platform for na-
tionalist competition, complete with national medal counts. The Ameri-
can broadcasts of the Olympics, for example, drip with flags and personal
narratives of the American athletes, with competitors from other nations
largely serving as narrative foils, hoping to crush American Olympic
dreams (as we begin to outline in chapter 6, such questions are not just
about national symbols and narratives but also about emotive and affec-
tive collective experiences). The transnational empathy that the Olympics
were originally intended to foster has seemingly been extinguished by na-
tionalism. However, just as the Olympics only occur every four years (or
every two years if you count summer and winter games), nationalism is
not always overtly on display in the countries that Billig studies (like the
United States, the United Kingdom, France, etc.). These nations are gener-
ally understood to exist, to be stable, and to not be in imminent danger.
Thus, there is not a huge need to be demonstrative about the nation, and
in fact by avoiding overt nationalist displays, it is possible to feel superior
to the emotionalism of nations that do not have the luxury of sublimating
their nationalist displays. Having said that, banal nationalism sustains
that identity until it is needed in a more overt form. Consider for instance
what occurred in the United States following the attacks on September
11, 2001. Flag manufacturers (generally located in China) were unable
to keep up with the soaring demand for American flags following those
attacks, leading to flag shortages. Similarly, a wave of patriotic magnets
soon adorned seemingly every car in the United States, as consumers
went out of their way to demonstrate their commitment to the nation
through public display. It was obvious to all who saw this that American
nationalism was alive and strong.
Since one of the goals of critical geopolitics is to question the state-
centric nature of geopolitics, it is important to consider these processes
that lead us all to think of ourselves as national citizens. Why are these
national identities so entrenched? Answering that question is one of the
goals of the rest of this book—but, in short, the answer lies in concepts
like banal nationalism that root our identities in the everyday popular
culture in which we are immersed.

Intertextuality of Popular Culture and Geopolitics

It is worth taking a moment to remember that the structure of this book
(as outlined in the introduction) reinforces the idea that these ideas, and
case studies, are all independent. For instance, the theories of geopolitics
and popular culture are separated into two chapters for clarity but were
both developed in the same world, with the same events swirling around
 Popular Culture and Popular Geopolitics 43

them. Similarly, the case studies serve to, for example, isolate representa-
tions of the British Empire from the affective media of the United States—
nevertheless, this is also an illusion.
The term for this enmeshing of ideas and texts is
intertextuality, in which authors borrow from, or
intertextuality
refer to, other texts to create a totality that is referred How a text
to in academic thought as the “literature.” It soon influences
becomes impossible to chart these influences chrono- another text
logically (i.e., who influenced whom), and instead
we must approach the literature as always in pro-
cess. For example, when President George W. Bush told the media that
he wanted Osama bin Laden “dead or alive” in December 2001, was he
purposefully harnessing the macho mythology of the American Western
movie genre to look tough for the electorate? Or, conversely, does the
Western movie genre shape American geopolitical culture in such a way
that Bush was expressing something that felt natural to him? Ultimately,
the answer is both. This synergy of ideas, actions, and speech is at the
root of geopolitics. Before we consider the case study examples, the next
chapter considers the methods and techniques that have been used to
study popular geopolitics.
 3
,
Methodologies
Researching Popular Geopolitics

The previous chapters have dealt with the histo-

ries, definitions, and theorizations of both geopol-
itics and popular culture. This chapter considers methodology
Research methods
the methodologies and approaches used to study
and the assumptions
popular geopolitics. In other words, it examines that are associated
the set of research practices that should flow with them
naturally from the field’s research questions and
theoretical assumptions. While we have outlined
the exciting scholarly work currently engaging with popular geopolitics,
there are limited insights thus far into how we study and research it. The
methods we choose play an integral role in the process of research; they
shape what we come to know about popular geopolitics, and therefore
they need to be carefully considered. The purpose of this chapter is to
outline the process of research design, to discuss key strengths and weak-
nesses of a range of methods, and to provide examples that can offer
guidance in embarking on your own research project. By no means can
we provide an exhaustive list and discussion of methods. Nor are we
advocating that these techniques offer the only way of studying popular
geopolitics. Indeed, some of the most exciting popular geopolitics re-
search is experimenting and engaging creatively with methods. We do of-
fer a starting point that will help orient the design and conduct of research
that considers the relationship between geopolitics and popular culture.

45
46 Chapter 3

WHAT TO RESEARCH?

The first step you’ll need to consider is what exact research idea you wish
to take forward. We have hopefully started you thinking about the range
of popular culture texts, images, events, and performances that are ripe
for critical geopolitical analysis. The freedom of engaging in your own
research, in the form of a dissertation, for example, can be both exciting
and daunting. Your motives and inspiration for undertaking research into
popular geopolitics may emerge from a variety of reasons.
In the first instance, your inspiration may originate from either ongo-
ing contemporary or historical geopolitical events and issues. As hope-
fully we are beginning to indicate in the book, there are multiple ways
and forms in which the relationship between popular culture, media,
and geopolitics unfolds in everyday life. We don’t need to look far to
note the recent debates concerning the role of social media and its impli-
cations for geopolitics (see chapter 8). Keeping up to date with relevant
news and media outlets on a daily basis is generally a good idea, while
the creation of RSS feeds can keep you informed of the latest develop-
ments on topics of interest. On the other hand, your chosen topic need
not be contemporary. Both digital and physical archives, discussed later
in this chapter, can offer a wealth of documents and objects that can ex-
plore and unpack the geopolitical imagination over time and its implica-
tions for the present.
Second, research can come from intellectual curiosity. Intellectual curi-
osity refers to the desire to explore or advance our academic understand-
ing of a specific concept or theory. A key motive for Daniel’s interest in
the popular geopolitics of military-themed video games stemmed from
attending courses on military geography and geopolitics at Newcastle
University. Through engaging with the academic literature, it became
notable that there was a distinct lack of scholarly engagement with video
games, despite their mass popularity, and that studies often privileged an
examination of geopolitical discourses and representations at the expense
of how individuals experience and interact with video games. These
observations were crucial in the theoretical and methodological devel-
opment of the subsequent research undertaken,
which explored players’ embodied experiences of
positionality A virtual war.
recognition of one’s Third, the desire to undertake a popular geo-
own interests and
political research project may originate from a
how they inform
and shape the
personal interest. Indeed, it is not uncommon for
research process research into popular culture to be motivated by
the scholar’s own personal interests and emotional
investments with popular culture artifacts. This
 Methodologies 47

can be helpful in developing a project, as you will have prior knowledge

and understanding of a popular culture text. But it is important to bear
in mind questions of positionality and how your own attitudes, knowl-
edges, and preconceptions subsequently shape the research that is under-
taken. These sources of inspiration can combine in many ways to flesh
out a research project (an interest in video games also encouraged Daniel
to take up his research project). The next step is to implement a plan that
will help take the research forward.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Once you have decided on a topic you wish to

take forward, the next step you should think research design
through is research design. This should be con- A general plan
sidered the blueprint of your project, which will about what you will
guide the process of your research. Clifford et al. do to answer the
(2016, 8–11) provide six key points that need care- research question
ful consideration for effective research design:

1. Research question. After deciding an appropriate topic of interest,

you will need to develop an overarching question that frames the
project. The question should be clear, specific, and answerable. Your
research question (or questions) will help frame and focus every-
thing that follows. It is worth pointing out that your research ques-
tions may evolve during the course of your project as unanticipated
themes emerge, and you also might have practical problems in data
collection that necessitate changing your project.
2. Methods. These are the tools you use to answer your research ques-
tion. As we shall discuss later in the chapter, there are a range
of methods that have been used to study
popular geopolitics. Each method has its
mixed methods
own strengths and weaknesses, and each
Using qualitative
generates different forms of data; therefore and quantitative
methods need to be carefully considered in methods to study the
relation to the research question. It is also same phenomenon
possible to mix methods. Indeed, the use of
multiple methods can help maximize your
understanding of the defined research question.
3. Data. The methods you use will determine the type of data you
obtain. It has become commonplace to think of two types of data:
quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative data is numerical in
form and is often amenable to statistical analysis. Such data can
48 Chapter 3

 be collected via the method of question-

naire surveys, for example. Qualitative
quantitative data data, on the other hand, is concerned with
Data that is collected meanings and interpretations and is better
and analyzed in obtained through methods such as inter-
numerical form views or focus groups. The study of popu-
lar geopolitics has more affinity with quali-
tative approaches and data, and it is these
methods that are predominantly discussed
here. It is important to note that data col-
qualitative data Non-
numerical data, such as lection is not the end of your research, and
field notes, interview you will need to consider how it is securely
transcripts, etc. stored, managed, and analyzed for the du-
ration of your project (and beyond).
4. Practicalities of doing research. Depending
on the project, you will need to consider
the practicalities of fieldwork. Of course
fieldwork  The
collection of data
not all research requires fieldwork (a lot
outside a formal setting of the research undertaken in popular
such as a laboratory geopolitics has not involved entering the
field, although more recent interests in the
everyday is changing this [see chapter 7]).
Nevertheless, you will need to consider
key practical points about what exactly
participation  The you are going to research, where and
question of who does,
and who does not,
when you will do this, and how you will
partake in research, go about doing it. In most cases, it will be
including any potential important that health and safety concerns,
risks or harm that they appropriate equipment, and ethical con-
might encounter siderations be deliberated prior to under-
taking research.
5. Ethics. Common ethical issues center on
participation, informed consent, and confi-
informed consent
dentiality. Research involving human par-
The provision of full ticipants will often require prior ethical ap-
information about the proval from your university. If you plan to
research project prior conduct interviews, for example, you may
to gaining permission be expected to obtain informed consent,
from the people who providing relevant information concerning
are willing to partake
the project, appropriate contact details, and
in the research
how the data will be used. Such ethical con-
siderations should always be at the heart
of research design and not just an add-on.
 Methodologies 49

6. Presentation. Finally, you will need to con-

sider the presentation of the research. The
confidentiality
proposed suggestions are based more Safeguarding
around undertaking an extended research personal information
project, such as an undergraduate or mas- of participants and
ter’s dissertation. Each university will have collected data
different expectations and guidelines, so it
is important that you know the regulations
and what is expected from you. You may be expected to present
your research at a local conference, in an extended lecture format, or
even in an oral defense, with your teachers questioning you about
your work. If you have used a good research design, you will feel
confident in your presentation, whatever form it takes.

While the above points offer some of the essential ingredients for suc-
cessful research design, you should not underestimate the messiness of
doing research. No matter how much prior planning goes on, unexpected
issues can occur. You may encounter issues around accessibility to key
data sources, canceled interviews, and changing personal and political
circumstances, which can prevent the successful implementation of a
research design. It is therefore important to be flexible and to see the re-
search design as an iterative process to which you are continually refer-
ring and making appropriate changes.

RESEARCHING POPULAR GEOPOLITICS

Sites
In considering the process of choosing a topic and research design, we
turn now to the different sites and features in which popular culture can
be researched. A useful starting point is Gillian Rose (2016), who outlines
four different sites at which culture can be studied and three different
modalities that can be studied at each site (see figure 3.1). While she is pri-
marily interested in visual culture, her schema can be adapted for popular
culture more broadly defined. Rose’s schema is generally rooted in the
cultural studies paradigm (see the previous chapter), which focuses on
the poststructuralist view of culture’s meaning as fundamentally in pro-
cess throughout its existence (although she does include psychoanalysis,
which in this book has been separated from cultural studies approaches).
We will now examine the four key sites in which Rose claims that mean-
ing is negotiated.
50 Chapter 3

site
of aud
ien
how inte cin
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wh
wh
la

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cu

a
wh ?
cir

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of

or

w
relation osition

hy
ho
site

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yw

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db

ge xt
nize

ed s?
an

how display

?
ch

ed
orga

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how

w ted?

he
circ ho
ula

re?
technological compositional social
v i s u a l e f fe

modality modality modality

co m po
visual
site of

cts
sitio

de
?
m ea

ma
n?
ima

how
ni n
ge

gs

re?
itse

ge n
lf

?
hy

w
r?
fo
ho
?w
w he n
w h o? on
ucti
rod
of p
site
Figure 3.1. The sites and modalities for interpreting visual culture. (Adapted from Rose
2016, 25)

The first site is that of production and the wider practices and processes
that go into the making of popular culture. This could be a Hollywood
studio, a college radio station, or a blogger’s basement—anywhere
where an object or text originates. Here, the work of the producer
crystallizes into the object or practice under study. The second site
is the image (or object) itself and where the meaning of the image is
made. The third site is that of audiencing. Here, we can observe how
individuals and consumers actually interact with, interpret, and expe-
rience popular culture. Rose’s fourth site is circulation, which speaks
to the increasing mobility of cultural artifacts. The rise of social media
is testament to how culture can move instantaneously and across vast
geographic distances.
 Methodologies 51

By way of example, consider a pop music

single. We could begin with the site of produc- site of production
tion, questioning the meaning of the song for the Where an image
songwriter or the ways in which the record com- is made
pany produced the single to be particularly radio
friendly in order to sell the entire album, expand-
ing its profits. We could then move to the site
of the song itself, inquiring about the key of the
song and its potential impact on listeners’ emo- site of the image
The visual content
tions or about the difference between the way the
of an image
song sounds when heard live in concert versus
as a disembodied, heavily produced song on the
radio. Turning to the site of the audience, where
meaning and judgment are ultimately negotiated
by listeners, we might ask what meaning audi- site of audiencing
ences attribute to the song (in contrast to what The location in
the songwriter thought it was about) and in what which an image or
context audiences hear it (is it heard in night- object is encountered
clubs or at weddings?). Considering the final site by people
of circulation, we might ask how certain songs
travel beyond the initial site of production. The
circulation can be inhibited by social, economic,
and political conditions. During the First Gulf site of circulation
War, for example, in the UK certain songs were Where and how
banned from the radio, including Cher’s (1966) an image travels
single “Bang Bang (My Baby Shot Me Down),”
as their lyrics were deemed inappropriate during
the time of the conflict.

Modalities
Rose goes on to define three modalities or processes that can be found at
each site. The first of these modalities is the technological, which draws
attention to the specific technical processes by which pop culture artifacts
are made, travel, and are displayed. When considering this modality, a
researcher focuses on the medium through which the popular culture
is experienced, from the very generic (i.e., is it printed, televisual, or
auditory?) to the very particular (i.e., is a song played on a vinyl record
or through an MP3 player?). The second modality is the compositional,
which pays particular attention to the formal characteristics of the popu-
lar culture, its material qualities, and the techniques used. For example,
in regard to movies, scholars have often paid attention to the framing of
shots, which literally shape the perspective of the viewer and attempt to
52 Chapter 3

evoke particular responses. One example is the movie Birdman or (The Un-
expected Virtue of Ignorance) (2014), which is filmed in a way that looks like
one long continuous shot (i.e., there are no cuts in the scene as the camera
follows the action). Of course this is an illusion that required significant
editing as the camera follows the protagonist around New York City. The
effect is impressive, providing a sense of realism that inserts the viewer
into the movie as if it were occurring in real time. The final modality,
found in each site, is the social. This refers to the context in which popular
culture is embedded, and thus it changes over time and space. Popular
culture is notoriously short term in its expected life (as an example, look
at fashion magazines, which focus on six-month “seasons” as the shelf life
of their products), but often one does not have to wait very long before
older popular culture becomes “retro-chic.” Thus, the time and place in
which popular culture is produced and consumed matter a great deal in
the processes of meaning-making.
The combination of sites and modalities
allows for several different entry points
technological modality for researchers to study popular geopoli-
Analytical approach tics depending on where they think they
that examines how pop are going to find the most important in-
culture is technologically sights into their subject matter. Research
made, displayed, conducted on popular geopolitics, despite
traveled, or consumed
the wide-open possibilities implied by
these sites and modalities, often has been
quite conservative and limited in the
types of method used. For reasons of
compositional modality space, this section will focus on methods
Analytical approach that that have dominated popular geopolitics,
examines the formal qualities but current research is increasingly think-
of an image or object ing “outside the box” and considering
possibilities beyond previous practices
that are described in Rose’s book and in
other sources on methodology. In what
social modality Analytical
follows, we unpack methods that allow
approach that examines the us to explore these sites of the image/text
range of institutions and itself, production, audience, and circula-
practices that shape how an tion. An important caveat to note is that
image is seen and used in this chapter we use the four sites as a
helpful framework in which to explore
the range of methods used in popular
geopolitics. Some methods used at one site can be used when research-
ing other sites. Indeed, interviews can be useful when studying the site
of production, while discourse analysis can be used to study interview
 Methodologies 53

transcripts. It is rare for studies in popular geopolitics to examine more

than two sites (but see Dittmer 2011). Ultimately, the site(s) you engage
with and the method(s) you choose should be the ones that are going to
provide you with the data you need to answer your research question.

IMAGE, TEXT, OBJECT

A key and enduring focus of popular geopolitics has been the analysis of
representations and discourses found in a variety of popular culture arti-
facts. Through a careful analysis of popular images or texts, scholars have
drawn attention to the compositional, symbolic, and ideological content
in order to understand how geopolitical logics are communicated. Here,
we explore some of the key approaches used to study the site of the image
or text itself in popular geopolitics.

Compositional Analysis
Compositional analysis refers to a set
of research practices that focus on the
compositional modality of a cultural ar- compositional analysis
tifact. An example of this method can be Study of the organization of
found in the work of Sean Carter and elements within a media artifact
Derek McCormack (2006), who analyze
the movie Black Hawk Down (2001) in this
way. Their analysis focused on the way in which the narrative unfolded,
the more technical elements of filming, and how those two elements unite
in the “sublime aesthetics of combat” (Carter and McCormack 2006, 237).
This aesthetic evokes both the unreality of combat and the randomness
of events within the frame. The aesthetics of combat in turn impact the
audience of the film, enmeshing them in a visceral experience similar to
the continuous shot described above in Birdman.
The technique of conducting compositional analysis is dependent
on the type of popular culture you are analyzing. Further, this type of
analysis requires a fairly technical understanding of the type of popular
culture you are analyzing in order to produce a coherent result, as there
are significant bodies of knowledge that filmmakers, musicians, writers,
fans, and the like utilize when produc-
ing or consuming popular culture. These
include genre conventions, the history genre  Category of media that
of the medium in question, and so forth. includes common conventions
Some grounding in those knowledges is
key to compositional analysis because
54 Chapter 3

producers of popular culture include homages, in-jokes, and the like in

many of their creations that consumers may or may not be expected to
understand. Beyond requiring technical expertise, compositional analysis
can be a limiting method because it does not speak to the sites of pro-
duction and audiencing since it is so relentlessly focused on the popular
culture itself. However, in combination with other methodologies it can
be quite powerful.

Content Analysis
Content analysis is a quantitative method developed to study textual
data, and it has been most commonly applied this way in popular geo-
politics, especially (but not exclusively) in the study of newspapers and
other textual media (like news magazines). This method dates back to the
Frankfurt School–influenced period after World War II when interest in
propaganda led to the development of techniques with which to assess
the meaning found in large amounts of text. Because this originated in
the social sciences rather than in the tradition of the humanities, it re-
lies on the scientific paradigm, which requires
quantification and the rigorous application of
content analysis specific methods to create generalizable results.
Quantitative study of Content analysis has a specific set of procedures
textual or other data associated with it. First, the scope of what you
will study needs to be set: which texts will you
examine? Much like methodology itself, this
coding Regimented should flow from the questions that you want
process of quantifying to answer. Second, the researcher must con-
textual or other data sider seemingly objective and nonoverlapping
categories according to which the data will be
categorized. These categories should also follow
from your research questions. Third, the data should be coded using the
categories devised prior. Finally, the actual analysis occurs, in which the
codes are counted and used to answer the research questions. There are
various guides that explain further the processes of qualitative coding
(see Silverman 2015). The rise of “Big Data” computer-driven analysis of
large data sets has brought this method back into fashion.
As an example of how this can be done without Big Data computing
power, Garth Myers et al. (1996) conducted a content analysis of the
newspaper coverage of conflicts in Rwanda and Bosnia from six major
American newspapers in order to compare the ways in which the media
framed the conflicts that dominated those countries in the mid-1990s.
They identified key categories (language associated with civil war, sav-
agery, and ethnicity/tribalism) that appeared in the newspaper stories
 Methodologies 55

and compared their relative frequency to see how conflicts that could be
conceptualized as similar were instead constructed as different. This re-
search was one of the first in popular geopolitics to assess the role of the
media in shaping geopolitical discourse. While the quantification reduces
the richness of the data, it does permit patterns to emerge that might be
unexpected by the researcher. The danger in this reductionism, though,
is that every instance of a word being used counts the same, whereas in
“real life” we know that there is a real difference between, for instance, a
local newspaper describing something and the agenda-setting New York
Times saying something the same way. One turn of phrase is likely to
descend into obscurity, and the other is likely to matter a great deal in
political opinion. Further, content analysis, like compositional analysis,
deals only with the text under consideration and ignores the sites of pro-
duction and consumption.

Discourse Analysis
Discourse analysis is strongly connected to the
ideas of Michel Foucault, discussed earlier in the
previous chapter. It is also related to content anal- discourse analysis
ysis, although it eschews the quantitative method Qualitative study of
that focuses on the actuality of words themselves textual or other data
in favor of a more qualitative perspective that
focuses on the uses to which empowered people
put words. Thus, the first part of any discourse analysis is (similarly to
content analysis) to select the source material for your analysis. However,
dissimilarly from content analysis, there is no need for these materials to
all be comparable. Because discourses can stretch across media, discourse
analyses can do the same. For example, if you are interested in studying
discourses of race, a number of popular culture artifacts could be use-
ful, from old Tarzan movies to magazine advertising. However, it is also
important to limit your study to the sources that you think will be most
instructive because these discourses are so ubiquitous. Can you imagine
trying to study everything in popular culture inflected by race? It would
be a never-ending quest. Following the selection of sources, the researcher
must engage in two processes. First, the researcher must examine the way
in which the claims of a discourse are made, contributing to a critical anal-
ysis of the logic that identifies the flaws and absences in the discourse.
Second, the researcher must investigate the power and positionality of
those constructing the discourse so that they may be contextualized.
An example of this research method in popular geopolitics can be seen
in the work of Joanne Sharp (1996, 2000), who opened up the study of
popular culture in geopolitics with her seminal study of Reader’s Digest
56 Chapter 3

over the span of the Cold War (which was also mentioned in chapter 1).
Reader’s Digest is a magazine that claims to take the best magazine articles
in circulation and condense them down to a more manageable length
for middle-class consumers. In this study she focused on the power of
the editors to promote anticommunist discourses while simultaneously
promoting an “American” can-do attitude of personal action and achieve-
ment, not only through the “condensing” process but also through the
initial article selection. Sharp was also able to identify changes in these
discourses over time, especially as the Cold War ended.
Discourse analysis of this kind is still focused on the site of the popular
culture itself, but the Foucauldian concern with the source of authority
means that the site of production gets attention as well. Further, the focus
of discourse on intertextuality (see the previous chapter) means that the
social modality also receives significant attention. Finally, the Foucauld-
ian interest in power and authority makes this a natural fit for scholars
of geopolitics, who are ultimately also interested in power. Hence, the
majority of works in popular geopolitics can be identified as discourse
analyses.
On a practical note, in performing a discourse analysis, you should be
mindful of the specificities of the text or image you are wishing to ana-
lyze. Video games, for example, add a layer of complexity in applying
discourse analysis because they are played and interacted with rather
than read, watched, or listened to. Video games are multimodal in that
they communicate their meaning through the visual and aural senses and
through narrative, as well as through the act of game play itself (Robin-
son 2015). This also places emphasis on the researcher’s own skills and
abilities to navigate the virtual worlds, which ultimately determines what
analysis can be made. As a player/researcher, you actively contribute to
the message conveyed by engaging with the game’s rules and structures.

AUDIENCE

A noticeable development within popular geopolitics is an interest in how

audiences interact with, experience, and understand popular culture. The
use of questionnaires, interviews, focus groups, and ethnographies offers
ways of engaging with how individuals and groups negotiate geopoliti-
cal meaning. These are relatively recent developments within geopolitics,
which, as was discussed in chapter 1, has historically been studied at
the macro scale. Actually talking to people about what they think about
geopolitics (excepting, of course, elites) would not have occurred to an
earlier generation of scholars. However, in the late 1990s feminist geog-
raphers began to critique critical geopolitics for perpetuating this classi-
 Methodologies 57

cal geopolitical mistake (Hyndman 2001; Massaro and Williams 2013).

The focus of critical geopolitics on discourses and representation left
geopolitics abstract and disembodied—literally devoid of people—and
generally unwilling to consider alternatives. Feminist geopolitics, as an
engagement with geopolitics that was parallel to critical geopolitics, has
brought methodological diversity to popular geopolitics. The methodolo-
gies associated with feminist geopolitics are key to popular geopolitics
because the study of popular culture has increasingly moved away from
the notion that popular culture affects its audiences in ways that are
somehow predictable by studying the popular culture itself. Thus, just as
critical geopolitics was critiqued as “geopolitics without people,” popular
geopolitics could be critiqued as “culture without people.” These meth-
ods help alleviate this concern.

Questionnaire Surveys
The use of questionnaire surveys can offer a way of collecting a sample of
a population to get information concerning how geopolitical meaning is
negotiated. Questionnaire surveys can offer a pretty inexpensive means
of collecting a large amount of data relatively quickly. While question-
naires are sometimes administered that use closed-ended questions that
are therefore amenable to statistical analysis,
they can also be used to collect and analyze
qualitative forms of data. Open-ended ques- closed-ended questions
tions, on the other hand, allow respondents Survey that provides
to answer in their own words their opinions respondents with a fixed
and viewpoints; for example, a question number of possible
responses to questions
might ask people, “What was your favorite
part of the movie?” Questionnaires can be
administered in different ways, including
face-to-face, over the phone, postal, and
online. It is important to recognize that open-ended questions
the response rate can be affected by how Survey that allows
a survey is administered. Postal question- respondents space
naires, for example, might only receive a to detail their own
responses to questions
20 to 30 percent response rate (see Dittmer
and Dodds 2013). Other means such as on-
line surveys can offer the opportunity for wider distribution and higher
rates of completion, but respondents will skew toward the tech savvy,
and results might miss out on the elderly or the poor.
Survey Monkey offers the ability to design and distribute a survey over
the internet, which can both potentially enable a wider geographical circu-
lation and increase the response rate. While Survey Monkey offers a free
58 Chapter 3

basic version, it limits what can be done in terms of questionnaire design

and analysis; payment is required to gain additional features. This type of
questionnaire was used by Necati Anaz (2014) to examine the reception of
the Turkish film Valley of the Wolves: Palestine (2011). In particular, Anaz
was interested in the ways the film shaped Turkish audiences’ geopolitical
understanding of Turkey’s geopolitical role in the Middle East and Israel-
Palestine relations. The use of an online questionnaire allowed a range of
information to be collected, such as participants’ sociopolitical background,
their level of engagement with popular culture, their knowledge of Tur-
key’s geopolitical situation, and the extent to which the film shaped their
geopolitical imaginations. A series of descriptive results were achieved
through the use of closed questions that encouraged structured responses
via the use of a Likert scale (i.e., a continuum
of possible responses from “strongly agree” to
Likert scale  A scale “strongly disagree”). On the other hand, open-
used to represent ended questions offer opportunities for individ-
people’s attitudes to
uals to record responses verbatim. Some limita-
a topic on a spectrum
(e.g., strongly disagree–
tions of the use of questionnaire surveys are that
neutral–strongly agree) questions may be left unanswered by respon-
dents, there is no guarantee of who is actually
completing the questionnaire, and respondents
may not properly understand the questions asked. Such prescriptive and
structured forms of questioning limit the possible responses and therefore
do not necessarily allow us to address the complexity and diversity of audi-
ence reception. Questionnaires can still provide reliable and useful data, but
careful consideration should be given to their design and administration.

Interviews
Compared to questionnaires, interviews can provide more complex and
detailed insights into how individuals engage with and experience popu-
lar geopolitics in their everyday lives. They are one of the most widely
used methods, in which the researcher asks questions of an informant in
order to obtain information. Unlike questionnaires, interviews allow in-
formants to respond to questions on their own terms and to expand and
clarify their own thoughts, practices, and understandings. Undertaking
interviews is always more than just the action of speaking to someone. It
is a process that requires locating a sample, providing practical and ethi-
cal information, designing appropriate questions, finding a convenient
location, and asking and listening to responses in an open and nonjudg-
mental manner. These aspects require careful deliberation. There are dif-
ferent types of research interviews, which subsequently present different
types of data. Structured interviews involve the researcher asking pre-
 Methodologies 59

defined questions, which are thus standardized across all the completed
interviews, allowing for comparability. Semistructured interviews have
some degree of structure and predefined questions or topics to be cov-
ered, but they also entail a degree of flexibility and spontaneity in ques-
tioning. Unstructured interviews are more flexible. While a formal time is
arranged and there is a clear aim of the interview, there isn’t a structured
interview guide or list of questions. Instead, questions are flexible and
open-ended, allowing participants to express themselves in their own
way. Interviews often occur face-to-face
with the informant at a previously agreed
on location. But this is not always the case, synchronous interviews
Interviewing conducted
as online technologies allow interviews to online in real time
take place online in real time (synchro-
nous) over Skype, or when the researcher
and participant are not online at the same
time (asynchronous), as in email.
Interviews are usually recorded with a asynchronous interviews
Interviewing conducted
dictaphone (although permission should
independent of time and place
be sought from the participants), which
means the audio can go through a pro-
cess of transcription and subsequently be
analyzed. This also means that the pro-
cesses of doing in-depth qualitative in- transcription  The process
terviews can be labor intensive. You are of producing a written
reliant upon the ability of the participant copy of an audio recording
from an interview
to recall information accurately about
their experiences and to report truth-
fully about their opinions on popular culture. Interviews are usually
stripped away from the actual contexts of consuming popular culture.
Depending on the questions, the interview process asks participants to
reinterpret items away from the ways they are actually encountered in
their everyday lives. Ethnography, as discussed later, offers a means for
alleviating such concerns.

Focus Groups

Focus groups, in comparison to interviews, involve small-group discus-

sion (usually between four and twelve individuals) on a particular topic,
moderated by the researcher(s). A key strength of focus groups is the
ability to engage with multiple opinions and the way it encourages varied
interactions not only between the researcher and informants but also be-
tween informants themselves. This group dynamic can encourage a level
of interaction, contestation, and open dialogue in comparison to an indi-
60 Chapter 3

vidual interview. There is more emphasis on

the skills of the moderator in his or her ability
to maintain, steer, and encourage participa-
focus groups  Groups of
people gathered together
tion within the group. Being able to prompt
for an in-depth discussion and facilitate group discussion may require
about a topic of interest the use of props, the guiding of discussion,
and the ability to intervene if the discussion
gets heated. Louise Pears (2016) used focus
groups to explore audience meaning-making in regard to the popular
television thriller series Homeland (2011–). The fictional series follows the
work of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operators as they attempt to
foil terrorist attacks and threats targeting the United States. By engaging
with focus groups, the study examined the perceptions and attitudes
of British audiences toward terrorism as well as the series’ depiction of
Muslim people and places. The value of the focus groups was their abil-
ity to encourage varied interactions and sympathetic and critical opinions
generated through the group discussion.

Ethnography

The above methods rely upon understanding what people say rather than
looking at what they actually do. Ethnography refers to the immersion of
the researcher into a community, within which social practices are not
only witnessed but participated in by the researcher. This enables the
researcher to participate in the everyday life of the group, perhaps notic-
ing things that even the group could not tell the researcher were he or
she to ask about them in an interview. The
researcher is, to a certain extent, implicated
ethnography  Research in the research to a greater degree than other
method that entails methods because the researcher is a partici-
a holistic description pant observer—often working alongside the
of a group of people group at a task, both to put the group at ease
and their practices and to better understand the group’s dynam-
ics. As an example, Nick Megoran (2008)
gained insight into the role of pop music and music videos in affirming
the government of Uzbekistan’s claims of danger from neighboring Kyr-
gyzstan by living in the borderlands between the two countries. There he
met people who were able to attest to the power of the music in their lives.
This account of geopolitics at the scale of individual people told a vastly
different story than would have been available through other methods.
The foundational work that considered research into audience recep-
tion within popular geopolitics focused on observing online feedback and
forum interaction (see Dodds 2006; Dittmer 2008). Klaus Dodds (2006) ad-
 Methodologies 61

vanced his work on James Bond by observ-

ing audience feedback from the film Die participant observation
Another Day (2002) on the Internet Movie Method in which a
Database (http://www.imdb.com). IMDb researcher becomes part
of a group to gain deeper
is a hugely popular website, receiving over
insight into their lives and
250 million unique monthly visitors (IMDb practices of groups of people
website 2018). The website presents an
online forum where users discuss, evalu-
ate, and criticize films. This offers insights into the ways in which fan
communities both converge and diverge around particular geopolitical
interpretations of films. This kind of online ethnography is different from
traditional ethnography in that it can be done with no “footprint” by the
researcher, but it also means that there is a consequent lack of knowledge
that could be gained through full participation. Of course, scholars could
participate in the internet forum they are studying should they wish, thus
generating more information but also making them more personally im-
plicated in the research. However, online ethnographies cannot claim to
be comprehensive, and “offline” approaches can offer further insight into
the actual practices of popular culture consumption.
Central to ethnography is an appreciation of the significance of place
and of key events. We might therefore consider the exact ways in which
popular understandings of geopolitics are situated and experienced.
Whether this is the space of the cinema theater, the bedroom play-
ing video games, or the site of a museum (see chapter 7), the places of
consumption can offer important insights into where and how popular
understandings of geopolitics emerge. By employing ethnography at
British military air shows, Matthew Rech (2015) has shown how such
popular events evoke a spectacular celebration of militarism. Data col-
lection involved a range of practices, including the use of photography,
unstructured interviews, participating in activities and observation (i.e.,
watching the air show), and collecting
documents and various paraphernalia as a
means of producing a “thick description” thick description
(Geertz 1973a) of the event and detailing Detailed interpretative
how geopolitical meaning is shaped and accounts of social and
constituted in place. Focusing on the ev- cultural behavior along
eryday offers more nuanced accounts that with the specific context
in which it is performed
take into consideration the actual contexts
and spaces in which popular mediations of
geopolitical power are expressed and experienced.
Presently, ethnographic methods are engaging with new and creative
ways of both capturing and presenting data. For example, video ethnog-
raphy is the video recording of an activity with participants in a natural
62 Chapter 3

setting. To capture the ways individuals engage with popular geopolitics

in the domestic setting, Daniel Bos (2016) used video ethnography to
record groups and individuals playing video games. Such an approach
first offered practical benefits, as it did not require the researcher to re-
cord the experience in real time with pen and paper, which would have
distracted from full participation. Instead, video ethnography provided
footage that could be consulted and analyzed afterward. Moreover, the
footage can be played back to participants in order to obtain clarification
concerning particular actions, which can add another layer of under-
standing and interpretation. Second, it offered a way of capturing the
social, material, and spatial relations that occurred when playing virtual
war. Finally, it can offer a way of capturing the embodied, emotional,
and affective intensities (more of this in chapter 6) of consuming popular
geopolitics. Such approaches should be used
with a degree of caution, especially concern-
ing the ethical issues of recording and how
camera consciousness
People becoming aware of such footage will be used. Moreover, there
the camera and therefore should be consideration of how the camera
changing their behavior could affect the behavior of the individuals
being recorded, also known as camera con-
sciousness (Pink 2013).

PRODUCTION

Arguably the most underdeveloped aspect of studying popular geopoli-

tics has been at the site of production. What has been missing in the field
is an understanding how a final popular text or image is made. In other
words, popular culture does not appear from nowhere. How cultural in-
dustries are structured and how they operate offer important insights into
how geopolitical ideas are framed and emerge out of the media and popu-
lar culture. As a challenge to such work, Kimberly Coulter (2011), using
interviews and documentary sources, takes us “behind the scenes” in the
practices of filmmaking, noting the key processes of funding, production,
and distribution that influence what geopolitical narratives are able to be
told, as well as where and how they are told. In order to research the site
of production, Jane Stokes (2013) suggests that there are four methods
that can be used to explore production: discourse analysis, interviews,
ethnography, and archival research. We have already explored the first
three methods in this chapter.
 Methodologies 63

Accessing Producers
A chief obstacle to understanding the site of production is accessibility.
The lack of research within these organizations can be attributed to their
often enigmatic nature and to difficulties in contacting and communicat-
ing with media and cultural institutions. Müller (2012) suggests that such
organizations can be considered “black boxes” in the sense that these or-
ganizations’ internal processes are hidden and not readily understood by
the public. Going back to Joanne Sharp’s (1996) study focusing on Reader’s
Digest, she alludes to these difficulties and a number of failed attempts to
gain access to both people and organizational data. Issues of accessibility
may be due to the confidential nature of the production process, to pro-
tection of industry secrets in a competitive industry, or to a more general
apprehensive relationship between academia and industry (Stokes 2013).
Quite frankly, many people working in media or the culture industries
see little benefit to themselves in taking time away from their “real” work
to help out a researcher. However, this is no reason to be discouraged.
While the ability to directly engage with people and organizations
would offer fascinating insights, there are other sources and potential
avenues available to the researcher. Publicly available sources such as
journalistic accounts, press conferences, and interviews can offer insights
into the organization and the production of geopolitics. There is certainly
a possibility to engage with the previously outlined methods, but one
of the most popular means of engaging with the site of production is
through documentary and archival forms of research.

Archival and Documentary Research

Archival research entails a search of historical (and contemporary)
documents and can be used in conjunction with any of the research
methods detailed above in order to provide the contextual information
that is critical to understanding the relationship between popular cul-
ture and geopolitics. However, archival research can also be a method
unto itself. For example, Klaus Dodds (2005) used archival research to
study the role of movie producers in sculpting the geographies of the
early Cold War through the settings of the James Bond films. He did
this by comparing the locations found in the earlier novels by author
Ian Fleming with the locations chosen for the movies in the mid-1960s to
fit the producers’ perceptions of the geopolitical moment. The archival
research utilized the papers of Richard Maibaum, the chief screenwriter
for thirteen Bond films, in order to find the reasons for changes from the
64 Chapter 3

books as well as to document the creative process and how the power
relations shaped it. Archival research is particularly useful in study-
ing the site of production, as Dodds does, and can speak to all three of
Rose’s modalities.
The actual practice of archival research is quite idiosyncratic, depend-
ing on what archives you are studying and what kind of information you
are looking for. Archival research can
encompass many different types of data,
whether textual, numerical (historical
archival research Method
associated with historical
statistics, tables, etc.), visual (advertis-
research on documents and ing, visual art, etc.), or auditory (music,
other, often bureaucratic, media oral histories, etc.). Such data can be
used to supplement your research or as
a data source in its own right.
A key aspect will be locating and finding an archive that houses infor-
mation likely to be relevant to your research. National archives (such as
in Washington, DC—https://www.archives.gov) can provide relevant
governmental official sources and documents outlining the relationship
between state, media, and cultural industries. Media and broadcasting
organizations often have their own archives. For example, the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Written Archives Centre houses files,
scripts, and working papers that can shed light on the contexts in which
radio broadcasting operates (see, for example, Pinkerton and Dodds
2009).
The digitalization of materials also increases accessibility to archival
resources. Previously the examination of newspapers often required a
visit to a physical repository; now online databases, such as LexisNexis,
allow access to a wide range of international newspaper articles. While
such databases offer a wealth of information at our fingertips, there are
notable limitations, especially as the articles presented on LexisNexis
are text only, and therefore images and the context in which the article
was placed is lost. As such, it is important to be mindful that archives
and the material presented should be approached with a degree of
caution. Archives are selective in what they store and present. In other
words, they should be seen as incomplete, fragmentary, and often con-
taining missing information, which shapes the analysis you can and
cannot undertake. You will also need to critically evaluate the validity
and reliability of your sources and not take them at face value. There
are numerous guides that can help when conducting archival research
to minimize the uncertainty of starting a new project (e.g., Baker 1997;
Stokes 2013; Clifford et al. 2016).
 Methodologies 65

CIRCULATION

Circulation examines how texts, images, and objects travel and move
away from the initial site of their production. This matters for the effects
they might have. Thinking about the circulation of popular geopolitics
requires us to consider the technologies that enable movement; the social,
economic, and political processes that shape this movement; and the ef-
fects this movement has on the meaning itself. First, we can consider the
variety of means through which popular culture texts are circulated. A
focus on circulation can give insights into the ways in which popular geo-
political ideas travel and how some do not circulate in the same way. Sec-
ond, it can show us how this circulation can alter and transform the popu-
lar culture artifact depending on when and how it is encountered and
understood. Images often appear on multiple screens, in different forms,
and at different sites. For example, watching Snakes on a Plane (2006) at
home with your friends might be a very different experience than watch-
ing it on an actual plane. Third, how the circulation of culture occurs is
shaped and influenced by particular social, political, and economic geo-
graphical contexts. As Joanne Szostek (2017) suggests, while the ambition
of popular geopolitics has been to highlight how geopolitical discourses
lie outside the formal arena of the state, it often overlooks the continuing
influence of the state in influencing and propagating media and popular
discourses. Russian state money, for example, has paid for commenters
(otherwise known as “trolls”) to ensure that state-directed narratives are
present in internet discussions, blogs, and forums. Finally, circulation
requires that we look to the technological means by which images, texts,
and objects travel. Online social media platforms have enabled mass dis-
play and circulation of texts and images. As such, this has implications for
the ways in which both “elites” and “nonelites” socialize, communicate,
and articulate geopolitical ideas. As Pinkerton and Benwell (2014, 13)
suggest, social media has wider implications for critical geopolitics as it
complicates and “challenge[s] us to think more critically about issues of
geopolitical agency, authority and ‘power’ as well as the interaction of
popular, formal and practical geopolitical discourses and their sites of
production, distribution and consumption.” The focus on social media is
a relatively new area, and there are both methodological opportunities
and challenges facing researchers. It is to this that we now turn.
66 Chapter 3

Researching Social Media

Despite the proliferation of social media usage, and thus the increased
coverage and circulation of geopolitical events and foreign policy direc-
tives, there has been less attention concerning how to study it. Researching
social media touches upon all the previous sites, and therefore, de-
pending on your angle, you might adopt or adapt the aforementioned
methods. For example, interviewing users of social media would give an
insight into how it is used within the contexts of people’s everyday lives.
Research into social media presents important opportunities for popular
geopolitical scholars but also challenges that need to be carefully consid-
ered (see Sloan and Quan-Haase 2017).
The first thing that we might want to consider is that social media en-
compasses a wide array of platforms. Within the Western world, major
social media platforms include Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and Pinter-
est. However, it is important to note that these platforms are not used
universally throughout the world. Indeed, China has banned social media
platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, and instead other platforms
such as Weibo have become popular alternatives. Each social media plat-
form offers different technological affor-
dances—in other words, they offer different
technological affordance forms of communication, interaction, and
The range of actions and circulation. A key challenge of social media
tasks users can perform research can be the unprecedented vol-
with a given technology ume of content, exchanges, and networks
that is produced. Twitter has 320 million
monthly users, and over 500 million tweets
are posted and circulated every day. Moreover, there are cross-platform
circulations that are (re)presented in different formats. This prompts clear
issues around how data is collected, stored, and analyzed, especially how
to systematically sort and filter out mass amounts of potential data.
Another practical consideration is that
of the speed at which social media data is
multimodal  Relating to generated and how quickly users can re-
the interconnection between spond to ongoing geopolitical events. The
visual, audio, and text problem here is how one can capture a field
in generating meaning
that is constantly changing and evolving.
The type and variety of data that is offered
differs between platforms but is often mul-
timodal in a sense that content can include
bot  Software that can
run automated tasks text, images, sound, videos, and geospatial
over the internet (location) data. In examining user posts,
we need to consider the reliability, validity,
 Methodologies 67

and authenticity of the data. An ongoing issue for Twitter is how profile
accounts can be run by what are called bots. Bots are software that can
run automatically with minimal human intervention. Twitter bots can
be used to automatically like, post, and retweet news stories that favor
particular interests. This poses interesting issues around data collection
and who we think we are researching, but this is also worthy of research
itself, in terms of how and which posts are circulated and to what effect
(see chapter 8). We also need to bear in mind ethics in the context of do-
ing social media research. Such ethical considerations, as outlined at the
beginning of this chapter, are somewhat complicated in the context of
using social media data. Sloan and Quan-Haase (2017) note how the legal
terms and conditions of Twitter mean that tweets presented in research
are required to disclose the username. This has implications concerning
the confidentiality and anonymity of users
and protecting them from harm, for example,
in the case of using tweets that contain hate anonymity  A general
speech. These are important ongoing discus- research practice in which
information that could
sions concerning ethics when undertaking
reveal the identity of a
such research, and as such careful consider- participant is removed
ation needs to be placed on how informed
consent and confidentiality are applied to a
social media project.
What we have presented in this chapter is not a definitive overview of
potential methods, but it does provide theoretical and practical examples
that we hope offer a helpful starting point for students wishing to research
popular geopolitics. In the following chapters we draw on case studies to
explore some of the most important concepts and trends in the field.
 4
,
Representation of Place and
the British Empire

THE CONCEPT: REPRESENTATION

Ideas
It is striking how many of our understandings of the world are taken on
faith from other sources and how vague those understandings can be.
The job of a geography instructor is to stand up in front of a class and
represent places, with many of which he or she has no direct experience,
to a group of students who (hopefully) write down what is said as if it
were reliable information. More accurately, the instructor is re-presenting
representations that he or she had previously consumed—whether in ge-
ography classes from his or her own student days or through popular
culture, news media, etc.—even when he or she is teaching about places
to which he or she has personally been (one person’s experience of a place
being far too partial from which to generalize). The power of geographers
and other academics to represent the world in lectures, books, and maps,
and therefore to construct realities that may or may not be recognizable
to the people in the places represented, has historically led to a variety
of outcomes for those people—some positive, some negative. So you can
imagine that the discipline of geography itself has had to do quite a bit of
soul-searching regarding its role in represent-
ing other places in ways that are ethical.
Concern over practices of representation representation
within geopolitics goes back to the origins of Claim about a place’s
the critical geopolitics movement, but geog- characteristics, nature, etc.
raphy (and geopolitics) as a whole has long
69
70 Chapter 4

been about representing places. As was mentioned in chapter 1, the word

“geography” comes from the Greek, roughly translating as “the writing
of the earth.” As Mary Gilmartin (2004, 282) writes,

Earth writing takes the world as we experience or understand it, and trans-
lates it into images. The forms of these images vary: they can be written,
visual or oral and aural, and within each of these categories there exists a
wide range of possibilities. Written representations include academic texts,
newspapers, magazines, travel writing, novels, plays and poetry. Visual rep-
resentations include maps, photographs, posters and films. Oral and aural
representations include music, film soundtracks and audio recordings, as
well as the stories we tell about the relationship between people and places.

Of course, these types of popular culture are just one way in which
places are represented. Since its inception in ancient times, geography
has been implicated in “earth writing.” For example, cartography, the art
and science of mapmaking, is about taking the complexity of the world
(or at least a section of it) and graphically
rendering it for the viewer to understand.
cartography  The art and This involves deciding what is important
science of mapmaking
about a place (should the roads found
in a place be included, or the location of
murders?) and then drawing the map in such a way that people will
understand. This is a simple example of how geographic representations
are political—of the two maps just mentioned as possibilities, which one
is likely to be appreciated (and funded) by the local tourism commis-
sion? Geographers have also represented the world through the writing
of textbooks, academic articles, policy proposals, and so forth, often to
great controversy. For example, geographer Isaiah Bowman’s post–
World War I geography textbook, The New World (1921), was roundly
condemned in Germany for naturalizing
the post–Treaty of Versailles geopoliti-
Treaty of Versailles Treaty cal order, including territorial losses for
that ended World War I
Germany and the breakup of the Austro-
Hungarian and Ottoman Empires.
The ubiquity of geographic representations, once you start looking for
them, can lead to feelings of disorientation—which images are real and
which are false? Or perhaps everything is fake news, and no representa-
tions are understood as authoritative unless they reinforce what we want
to believe. However, rather than falling into this narcissistic trap of believ-
ing that nothing is real and therefore not bothering with the world, it is
more fruitful to consider the ways in which representations are selectively
deployed in ways that have real impacts on the “real world.” So, the trick
 Representation of Place and the British Empire 71

for many geographers has been to use their

awareness of the power of representations to fake news  An epithet
create a more just world. As Gilmartin (2004, used to call investigative
282) again writes, “We operate within broader journalism into disrepute
social and political contexts that attempt to
delineate fact from fiction and right from wrong. Representation, there-
fore, is central to what we as geographers do.”
What, then, is representation? This is not an easy question to answer,
not least because to talk about representation is to try to isolate a nearly
ubiquitous phenomenon. It is very similar to the concept of discourse
(discussed in chapter 1), but, since in the context of this chapter we
are limiting our discussion to representation of places and peoples, it
is possible to conceive of representation as a narrower concept than
discourse—as operating within specific discourses. Representation
makes claims about the way the world is, and as such it is “a power-
ful world-disclosing and world-changing technology” (Castree and
Macmillan 2004, 471). By “world-disclosing,” Castree and Macmillan
argue that representation claims to unveil the world to us. By “world-
changing” they add the notion that representations can have material
consequences.
Representation works through the comparison of one thing to another.
There is no way to independently describe somewhere; it can only be
done through the use of analogy to other ideas, places, and peoples.
Even if you describe a place as “hot” or “polluted,” you are analogizing
that place to either your personal reference point (home, perhaps) or to a
mythical “average” place. Further, representations tend to treat their ob-
jects as unchanging—the representation assumes that there is something
stable and essential about its object to be represented. “Representation is
constitutively inadequate therefore; it is always exceeded by the world it
seeks to ‘capture’” (Castree and Macmillan 2004, 476).
Nevertheless, despite the inadequacy of all representations, they are
necessary parts of our everyday lives. Not talking about places does
not seem to be a viable alternative, although it is the only way to avoid
misrepresenting those places and peoples in some way. While the
authenticity of a representation is always something to be aimed for,
equally important is attention to the effects of particular representa-
tions. Authenticity is difficult to assess, because the very excess of a
place can provide evidence for multiple competing representations, all
of which may be true in their own way. Thus, critical geographers have
often looked at the political impacts of specific representations—that is,
whom they advantage and whom they hurt, or whom they include and
whom they exclude.
72 Chapter 4

Debates

realism  Philosophy that says The study of representation has sparked

there is a knowable reality debate within geography since its incep-
tion. As alluded to above, representa-
tion called into question, in many ways,
the discipline’s conception of itself as
the authoritative source of authentic
social constructionism earthly knowledge. By problematizing
Philosophy that says reality is geography’s role in the production of
the product of social interactions knowledge, the study of representa-
tion brought into conflict two different
groups within the discipline—those scholars associated with the philoso-
phy of realism and those associated with social constructionism.

•  Realism refers to the perspective that there is a knowable reality out

there and that the role of academic geographers is to gather objec-
tive knowledge about that reality and create theories about how that
reality works (this is a vast oversimplification but will do for these
purposes).
• Social constructionism calls into question the idea of objective knowl-
edge itself and argues that “reality” is not real but rather the product
of a web of representations spun by sources deemed authoritative.

It is clear how conflict would emerge between these two positions. The
social constructivist geographers viewed the realist geographers as part
of a larger coalition of empowered groups that represented certain places,
and the peoples who live there, for example, in ways that contributed to
colonial domination. Although popular geopolitics (and, consequently,
this book) obviously adopts a more social constructivist perspective than
a realist one, it is easy to sympathize with the realists, who are generally
motivated by a genuine desire to improve the world through the genera-
tion of new knowledge—an Enlightenment-era notion of progress that
has a great deal of appeal (and has often generated great achievements).
To the realists, questions of representa-
tion appeared like an attempt to under-
Enlightenment  Era in mine the possibility of that progress,
which reason was held up as and further they had the feel of a per-
the ultimate arbiter of truth sonal attack, given the realists’ personal
investment in their work.
Nevertheless, the social constructiv-
ists were on to something—the history of geography is replete with what
are now obviously quite partial representations of place. Further, it would
 Representation of Place and the British Empire 73

be prideful to think that geographers used to be biased, but now we have

conquered that aspect of ourselves. Rather, it seems obvious that within
even the span of just a few years we can become aware of how cultur-
ally situated our past thoughts are. So, how was this debate concluded?
Rather than one side crushing the other, a set of compromises have been
made. It is hard to find any pure realists in geography anymore, as most
seem to have shifted to a position called
critical realism. Critical realism refers to
the belief that there is a reality out there, critical realism Philosophy
that says there is a reality,
and it can be studied, but the researcher but we will never completely
must strive to be aware of his or her understand it because of
own cultural positioning when conduct- our flawed perception
ing that research (as discussed in chapter
3). Likewise, social constructivists have
moderated their position a bit, generally rejecting the notion that reality
is nothing but representation. Rather, climate change and other processes
have reminded us that material realities proceed regardless of whether
we deny them; nevertheless, scholars understand that those processes are
shaped ineluctably by discourse.
Having thus arrived at an almost-consensus about the role of represen-
tation in geography, the 1990s and 2000s were the heyday of studies of rep-
resentation in geography. The astute reader will recall that this coincides
(but not coincidentally) with the rise of critical geopolitics as a corrective
to the “realist” impulses of classical geopolitics (see chapter 1). Much of
the work discussed in the case studies of this chapter and the next emerges
out of this period. However, representation itself has been problematized
over the last decade. This is not because it is no longer considered impor-
tant, but because the domination of geographic (and geopolitical) thought
by representation has been so thorough that other ways of understanding
(and, importantly, experiencing) place have been occluded.
Nonrepresentational theory (Thrift
1996) is the term that has emerged as an
umbrella under which several criticisms
nonrepresentational
of representation have been grouped. theory  Social theory that
Here we will focus on two. The first criti- downplays cognition and
cism is that analysis of representation po- representation vis-à-vis
sitions scholars at a critical distance from other elements of social life,
events in the real world. This sense of de- such as practice and affect
tachment reinforces the perception of the
scholar as occupying a privileged posi-
tion, able to see representations for what they are, rather than being duped
by them like the rest of humanity. Ironically, it was exactly this sort of
criticism of objectivity that the social constructivists had leveled at the real-
74 Chapter 4

ists—only now the same critique is being made from within. The second
criticism is that representation privileges certain forms of experiencing the
world: the cognitive, the textual, and the visual. Indeed, as we have seen
(and will see in later chapters as well), popular geopolitics has at times
been “mesmerized” (Thrift 2000, 381) by texts and inordinately focused
on geopolitical maps, films, and other envisionings of the way the world
works. Chapter 6’s discussion of affect will develop this critique further.
There is, nonetheless, a lot of good reason to continue paying attention
to representation. Despite new interests in discovering nonrepresenta-
tional engagements with the world, representing is still a key strategy
knowingly or unknowingly utilized by virtually everyone every day. For
scholars of popular geopolitics to stop paying any attention to represen-
tation while, for example, the entertainment industry continues to churn
out highly politically charged television shows such as Game of Thrones
and The Americans would be, in part, to abandon an important role for
academics as critics of society. On that note, this chapter now shifts to
a discussion of the ways in which literature and film have represented
places in ways that provided justification for empire.

INTRODUCTION TO EMPIRE

Representation was selected as the first concept to be discussed among

the case studies in this book because it is so fundamental to geopolitics

Figure 4.1. A map of the British Empire in 1910. (UCL Drawing Office)
 Representation of Place and the British Empire 75

specifically, and geography more generally. The British Empire from the
nineteenth century until the present provides a case study through which
we can look at this concept in action because it provides a rich array of
representations of various parts of the world (see figure 4.1) and because
it is so well documented in popular culture. Prior to beginning this case
study, though, we must spend a moment discussing empire and why
representation of place is so important for it.
There are, essentially, two forms of empire. These forms are not op-
posed to each other but roughly approximate the evolution of the idea of
empire over time. As such, they overlap quite a bit, with both forms being
found simultaneously in various parts of the world over the past several
hundred years. Nevertheless, the historical emphasis has shifted from the
first form of empire, which in this book will be referred to as colonialism,
to the second form of empire, which we will call imperialism. It should
be noted that other scholars use different labels, such as “imperialism”
and “neo-imperialism,” for these same concepts, but this book uses these
labels because they emphasize the most important elements of each, as
shall be described below.

Colonialism
Colonialism refers to the control of territories
by a foreign power in an explicit attempt to colonialism  Invasion,
enrich itself through preferential access to the occupation, and
colony’s resources. In the modern era (i.e., administration of
leaving aside for now the Roman Empire and a foreign land for
other ancient empires), colonialism emerged economic or other gain
from the economic theory known as mercantil-
ism. Mercantilism, simply put, was the belief
that a country’s relative wealth was governed
by its balance of trade. That is, if a country imperialism
was exporting more than it was importing Maintenance of
unequal economic
(in terms of value, not actual quantity), then
relations through
wealth would accumulate within the country. (generally) non-
One strategy that emerged from this theory military means
was colonialism. By conquering a foreign
place (preferably one that had resources the
colonizer needed) and imposing a colonial
administration, it was possible to restrict to mercantilism
whom the colonized could sell their resources Economic theory that
(thereby lowering the cost by lowering the argues for protectionism
demand for the resources) and simultane- and a trade surplus
ously monopolize the supplying of markets
76 Chapter 4

in the colony (thus raising prices for the colonizer’s goods by restricting
the supply in the colony). Therefore, the balance of trade would shift in
the colonizer’s favor, with high-value goods being sold to the colonized,
who could only pay for those goods by exporting more and more of their
own low-value goods. This is a highly simplified description, but it pro-
vides the most important elements.
As an example, the American colonies provided many different re-
sources to the United Kingdom, such as corn, flax, and wheat. By the 1700s,
mercantilism had largely been made redundant by the vast economic
changes associated with the Industrial Revolution. The Industrial Revolu-
tion led to a change in the global division of
labor, with workers in Western Europe (the
hearth of the Industrial Revolution) increas-
Industrial Revolution
ingly focusing on industrial labor (manufac-
Economic shift from
manual labor to other turing things cheaply, aided by nonhuman
forms of power in power sources like coal) and the rest of the
manufacturing, usually world increasingly relegated to supplying the
dated to the eighteenth natural resources that fed into the industrial
and nineteenth centuries processes in Western Europe. Thus, colonies
like South Carolina were founded and settled
as a collection of commercial plantations to
grow cotton and other crops that could be used in textile mills in the mid-
lands of England. Why did the colonies not build their own textile mills
and convert their cotton into high-value cloth? They did not do so because
they were barred from industrializing by colonial authorities. This, among
other grievances, like the lack of political freedom and perceived overtaxa-
tion, led to the American Revolution—the first successful rebellion against
colonial control (beginning in 1775)—and helps explain why the United
States still does not represent itself as an imperial power despite having
taken up that role in the twentieth century. It would be followed by a
series of revolutions: throughout Latin America in the eighteenth century
(against the Spanish and Portuguese Empires) and throughout Africa and
Asia in the twentieth century (against the British, French, Dutch, German,
Italian, and Belgian Empires).
However, these later revolutions were not just expressions of patrio-
tism and a desire for political independence; they were also laden with
national hopes of economic advancement, to be realized by breaking the
restrictive trading patterns imposed by the colonizers and competing on
the open market. However, just as France supported U.S. independence
as a way to weaken its rival, the British Empire, other powerful (and
industrial) countries such as the United States supported the end of the
Spanish Empire in the 1800s and the British and French Empires in the
1900s because they thought it would be advantageous for themselves.
 Representation of Place and the British Empire 77

Imperialism

Imperialism refers to the maintenance (or expansion) of national power

at the expense of other, less empowered countries through methods of
governance at a distance (rather than imposing colonial rule). This gover-
nance at a distance reflects the fact that conquering far-flung parts of the
world and maintaining military control in the face of imperial rivals and
increasingly embittered populations is an expensive (and probably im-
possible) proposition (see, for example, the struggle by the United King-
dom to prevent the Japanese takeover of their Asian colonies in World
War II). An ever-changing set of ephemeral strategies rather than a spe-
cific action (like colonization), imperialism can best be seen in its effects,
such as the continued economic peripherality of most places in the world
that were colonies for any substantial amount of time. For instance, most
of Latin America, which has been politically independent for almost two
hundred years, still lags behind the United States and Western Europe in
virtually every economic category. This reflects their economic resubjuga-
tion by first the United Kingdom and later the United States in the period
following their political independence.
So how does this imperialism work? In Latin America it is possible
to identify three interlinked imperial strategies. The first strategy is the
promotion of free trade. When the British became the world’s leading in-
dustrial power, they soon recognized that with their built-in advantages
they could outcompete countries that were just emerging from the colo-
nial experience, thereby relegating those newly independent countries to
the economic tasks that the United Kingdom did not want to specialize
in (because of their generally low profit), such as agriculture, mining,
etc. Thus the British advocated the global adoption of free trade—a set of
trading rules that ostensibly eliminate any tariffs, quotas, or preferences
by one country for another. The same thought process led the United
States to support the dismantling of the British and French Empires after
World War II—and led to U.S. support for free trade principles in Latin
America that lasts to this day (except in areas in which the United States
is economically disadvantaged, like agriculture). This belief in free trade
is at the time of writing a matter of debate in the United States.
The second imperial strategy used in Latin America is support for
friendly political regimes. While the idea of foreign intervention in U.S.
elections is anathema to most U.S. citizens (see the investigation of Rus-
sian interference in the 2016 election), the United States has a long his-
tory of overt intervention in Latin American politics. This strategy takes
various forms, from having U.S. ambassadors campaign for specific
candidates (Nicaragua), to requiring countries to amend their constitu-
tion (Cuba), to sponsoring the assassination of democratically elected
78 Chapter 4

presidents (Chile), to funding and arming pro-U.S. rebellions (Guatemala,

Nicaragua, and Cuba). The governments supported by the United States,
either via active military and financial aid or by passive nonintervention,
generally support the United States in international forums and promote
free trade policies, often in the face of their own populations’ desires.
The third imperial strategy is traditional military intervention, similar to
colonialism. However, under imperialism, military intervention is much
more likely to be short term. The goals are to achieve a quick resolution
to an imperial problem (often regime change) and to demonstrate the
empire’s potential to intervene elsewhere in the hopes of getting what
it wants in other parts of the world without actually having to exercise
military might. Examples of U.S. interventions in Latin America that fol-
low this pattern include invasions of the Dominican Republic (1916, 1965),
Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), and Haiti (1915, 1994). It should be noted
again that during this period (and still today) it is not acceptable in Ameri-
can political discourse to describe the United States as an empire, although
in many other parts of the world this is a common representation.

Empire and Enlightenment Principles

Now, most of the strategies just mentioned, associated with both colonial-
ism and imperialism, do not sound very pleasant. In fact, most of them
would probably be considered by most people in the abstract to be im-
moral. Even the seemingly least offensive of these strategies, free trade,
essentially comes down to the imposition of policies on other countries
that lead to millions of people suffering material deprivation. Most of the
strategies are perceived as far more obviously immoral than that. This is
because they fly in the face of a set of abstract principles that were derived
during the Enlightenment and remain very important today in the coun-
tries that are most often associated with imperialism. These principles
include human equality, conflict resolution through a fair legal system,
and the universality of human rights. In the abstract, these are principles
in which most people in imperial countries believe. So, then, how is it
possible that there have been imperial interventions all over the world
for as long as there have been modern empires? The answer lies in how
those interventions are represented—ultimately morality is seen to lie
in the particulars of each intervention rather than in general principles.
Those particulars are, in turn, framed through processes that represent
the people and places of imperial intervention in certain ways. Now this
chapter will turn to the specific case study of the British Empire, using
examples from literature, film, and cartoons to illustrate how the world
was represented through popular culture in ways that served the growth
and maintenance of empire.
 Representation of Place and the British Empire 79

CASE STUDY: THE BRITISH EMPIRE

Literature and Colonialism

One of the most influential thinkers regarding culture and its relation-
ship to British colonialism and empire was Edward Said, and it could be
argued that the entire field of popular geopolitics owes its existence to
his influence. We discussed his idea of imagined geographies in chap-
ter 2, where we also outlined his concept of Orientalism, in which the
spatial categories of East and West are constructed as mutual opposites.
As such, he was intimately concerned with processes of representation:
“Representation itself has been characterised as keeping the subordinate
subordinate, the inferior inferior” (Said 1993, 95).
By juxtaposing culture and imperialism (as in the title of his 1993 book),
Said hoped to illustrate the constitutive relationship between the two—
how the latter cannot occur without the former. “The idea of overseas
rule—jumping beyond adjacent territories to very distant lands . . . has a
lot to do with projections, whether in fiction or geography or art, and it
acquires a continuous presence through actual expansion, administration,
investment and commitment” (Said 1993, xxv). Thus, Said recognized the
relationship between the discursive (culture) and the material (imperial-
ism), and he then explored specific cases where literature constructed the
colonized in particular ways.
One of his subjects was Jane Austen’s Mansfield Park (1814), which
was written just as the United Kingdom was about to go into its great-
est period of geopolitical significance, as Napoleon’s France had been
dispatched and the United Kingdom had no major rivals, save Russia’s
ambitions in Central Asia. Austen’s work has become increasingly popu-
lar and is now read in college literature courses and is the subject of many
film adaptations. This particular novel is the story of a poor girl named
Fanny who is taken into her aunt and uncle’s prosperous British estate
(Mansfield Park). The estate’s wealth (and, broadly at this time, Britain’s)
comes primarily (if tacitly) from the production of crops in the colonies
(in this case, sugar production in the Caribbean), but Said notes that this
is rarely mentioned in the narrative. At one point Fanny inquires about
the treatment of slaves, but her questions are met with silence. Further,
the structure of the narrative incorporates a lesson about life, embodied
in young Fanny. Said (1993, 88) quotes this passage from Mansfield Park,
in which Fanny returns to her childhood home:

Fanny was almost stunned. The smallness of the house, and thinness of the
walls, brought everything so close to her, that, added to the fatigue of her
journey, and all her recent agitation, she hardly knew how to bear it. Within
the room all was tranquil enough, for Susan [her sister] having disappeared
80 Chapter 4

with the others, there were soon only her father and herself remaining; and
he taking out a newspaper—the accustomary loan of a neighbour, applied
himself to studying it, without seeming to recollect her existence. The soli-
tary candle was held between himself and the paper, without any reference
to her possible convenience, but she had nothing to do, and was glad to have
the light screened from her aching head, as she sat in bewildered, broken,
sorrowful contemplation.
She was at home. But alas! it was not such a home, she had not such a
welcome, as—she checked herself; she was unreasonable. . . . A day or two
might shew the difference. She only was to blame. Yes, she thought it would
not have been so at Mansfield. No, in her uncle’s house there would have
been a consideration of times and seasons, a regulation of subject, a propriety
an attention towards everybody which there was not here.

Said’s commentary on this passage (1993, 88) illustrates how the book’s
narrative, in which Fanny reaches her potential only after coming out into
the globally connected (via colonialism) Mansfield Park, is itself support-
ive of the UK’s colonial project:

In too small a space, you cannot see clearly, you cannot think clearly, you
cannot have regulation or attention of the proper sort. The fineness of Aus-
ten’s detail (“the solitary candle was held between himself and the paper,
without any reference to her possible convenience”) renders very precisely
the dangers of unsociability, of lonely insularity, of diminished awareness
that are rectified in larger and better administered spaces.

Thus, Mansfield Park (and most British literature of the time, Said ar-
gues) not only naturalized colonial exploits by making the positive effects
of colonialism visible (through the opulent lifestyle of the characters)
and masking the negative impacts, but it also constructed the notion that
personal and national progress could only be found through increasingly
large impositions of organization over larger and larger spaces.*

James Bond and Imperial Decline

Just as Orientalism not only constructed the spatial category of the Ori-
ent but also the Occident, the long-running James Bond movie franchise
(since 1962) not only represents the United Kingdom but also the various
“exotic” locations in which the scenes are set. These films

drew on current fears in order to reduce the implausibility of the villains and
their villainy, while they also presented potent images of national character,
explored the relationship between a declining Britain and an ascendant

*  It should be noted that this is not an uncontested view on Mansfield Park. For a contrar-
ian perspective, see Fraiman 1995.
 Representation of Place and the British Empire 81

United States, charted the course of the Cold War, offered a changing demon-
ology, and were an important aspect of post-war popular culture, not only in
Britain but also more generally, particularly after the Americans created and
financed the filmic Bond. (Black 2004, 292)

Indeed, these films provide a lens for watching changes in geopolitical

representation over time, with almost thirty films produced since 1962’s
Dr. No.
Following World War II, the United Kingdom faced the implosion of
its empire, with its “jewel in the crown,” British India, fragmenting into
two new states (India and Pakistan—and later Bangladesh). The 1950s
and 1960s marked a more complete collapse, with Sudan, Iraq, Ghana,
Malaysia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Sierra Leone, Cameroon, Uganda, Jamaica,
Trinidad and Tobago, Kenya, Zambia, Malawi, Barbados, Guyana, and
various others (this list is necessarily shortened) departing from the Brit-
ish Empire. Britain attempted to maintain some
of its imperial prestige, however, forming the
Commonwealth as an organization intended to Commonwealth of
maintain the patriarchal relationship between Nations Organization
founded as a successor
the postcolonial states and their former ruler.
to the British Empire
However, as time has gone on, that relationship
has become increasingly hollow, with the United
Kingdom able to exert very little power over its former colonies. Bond,
however, ignores most of this. “One of the ideological functions of the
Bond narrative is to construct an imaginary world in which Pax Britannia
still operates. Thus, Britain is presented as being in the frontline of the
conspiracies directed against western civilization” (Chapman 1999, 39).
This representation of the United Kingdom as a global power requires
Bond to project that power around the world, effectively creating a hier-
archy that consists of countries that act and those postcolonial states that
are acted upon. Or, to describe this hierarchy more callously, some coun-
tries play chess while others are the chessboard. As Klaus Dodds (2003,
132) points out, the places in which Bond movies are set were not neces-
sarily in the British Empire, but they are places “that British audiences
could nonetheless imagine as centers of intrigue and where they could
take pleasure in witnessing their secret agent triumph against the odds.”
To see this geography, see table 4.1. Jeremy Black (2004) has argued that
there are massive geographical absences in the Bond corpus, with the
intelligence agencies of continental Europe not figuring at all, even when
Bond is working in their countries, despite their being nominally on the
side of the British. Similarly, when Bond goes to Africa (which he rarely
does—in this case nonrepresentation is itself a form of representation),
South America, or Asia, the local authorities never impede his mission.
82 Chapter 4

“Non-alignment means non-existence for the local government. It is as if

these countries are non-governed, ripe for exploitation by international
megalomaniacs, and waiting for the order (and purposeful glamour)
brought by Western intervention in the shape of Bond” (Black 2004, 300).

Table 4.1. Bond Films and Their Locations (updated from Dodds 2003, 132)
Movie Locations
Dr. No (1962) Jamaica
From Russia with Love (1963) Turkey, Italy, Yugoslavia
Goldfinger (1964) Switzerland, USA
Thunderball (1965) Bahamas
You Only Live Twice (1967) Japan, Hong Kong
On Her Majesty’s Secret Service (1969) Switzerland
Diamonds Are Forever (1971) USA, Netherlands
Live and Let Die (1973) USA, San Monique
The Man with the Golden Gun (1974) Thailand, Hong Kong
The Spy Who Loved Me (1977) Austria, Egypt, Sardinia
Moonraker (1979) Italy, USA, Brazil
For Your Eyes Only (1981) Greece/Corfu, Italy
Octopussy (1983) India, Germany
A View to a Kill (1985) USA, France
Never Say Never Again (1986)* Monte Carlo, North Africa, Bahamas
The Living Daylights (1987) Austria, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan,
Morocco, Gibraltar
License to Kill (1989) USA, Central America (Isthmus City)
GoldenEye (1995) Russia, Cuba, Monte Carlo
Tomorrow Never Dies (1997) Vietnam, China, Germany
The World Is Not Enough (1999) Spain, Azerbaijan, Turkey
Die Another Day (2002) Cuba, Iceland, the Korean DMZ
Casino Royale (2006) Czech Republic, Madagascar, USA,
Montenegro, Italy
Quantum of Solace (2008) Austria, Haiti, Italy, Bolivia
Skyfall (2012) Istanbul, United Kingdom, China
SPECTRE (2015) Mexico, Italy, Austria, Morocco

* Not produced by Eon Productions/United Artists.

 Representation of Place and the British Empire 83

Dodds (2003) focuses his geopolitical analysis of the James Bond phe-
nomenon on Istanbul, arguing that its geographical location at the edge
of the Soviet-influenced zone of the Balkans, as well as its traditionally
Orientalist and exotic representation by Europeans, makes it the perfect
setting for Cold War intrigue. In From Russia with Love (1963), Bond is sent
to Istanbul to retrieve a decoding device from a Soviet female agent. In his
search for the device, he is paired up with a local informant, Karim Bey,
who guides Bond’s path through such “Oriental delights” as the Grand
Bazaar and ancient Byzantine ruins. Bond also witnesses a somewhat
erotic fight between two Roma (known as “Gypsies” in the film, a now
outdated label) women over who will marry their tribal chief’s son (the
British Board of Film Classification required the scene to be shorn of its
most revealing images). Perhaps unsurprisingly, Bond manages to escape
Istanbul with the decoder (and the Soviet agent) on the famous Orient
Express. The representation here is of a pleasure-filled city fundamentally
rooted in its history, while the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom
are locked in a conflict of global significance that requires their agents to
sneak into other countries, like Turkey, to steal and kill.
In The World Is Not Enough (1999), Bond once again returns to Istanbul.
The plot centers on a new oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea to bypass
Russian dominance in oil transport. To avoid “dangerous” places like
Iraq, Iran, and Syria, the new pipeline ends on the Turkish coast just south
of the Black Sea (see figure 4.2). The primary villain in the film, a merce-

Figure 4.2. A map including Turkey and the Caspian Sea region. (UCL Drawing Office)
84 Chapter 4

nary known as Renard, plans to explode an ex-Soviet nuclear submarine

in the waters of Istanbul (laden with stolen radioactive materials) to cut
off the waterways to the Black Sea, leaving oil from the Russian pipeline
with no way to be shipped globally. Thus, secondary villain Electra (who
owns the new Turkish pipeline) comes to hold the monopoly of oil trans-
portation, with all the power that implies. Bond, of course, prevents the
detonation of the submarine and the subsequent geopolitical upheaval.
This plot summary may sound like it is grounded in “hard geopo-
litical facts,” but it is nevertheless a representation. Turkey has multiple
geopolitical identities. Debate over Turkey’s “European” credentials has
been in the news a lot in recent years as Turkey has made a bid to join
the European Union (EU), only to be stymied by opposition from within
the EU, and now is turning to Islamist authoritarianism. Indeed, as we
have said, Bond movies tend to play up the exotic elements of their loca-
tions, and Istanbul is no different. Instead, in The World Is Not Enough,
Turkey is situated within an exotic Central Asian/Black Sea region that,
while represented as culturally distant from life in the United Kingdom
(see again the exotic representation of From Russia with Love), is seen as
critical to the maintenance of world order because it is the source and/or
transit point for petroleum supplies necessary to keep British consumerist
lifestyles afloat.
It should be noted that the Bond movies often paired the hero up with
American agents (like perennial also-ran colleague Felix Leiter), and Bond
often gets backup from U.S. troops (as in 1979’s Moonraker). However,
in these scenarios it is always Bond who
is smarter, smoother, and more critical to
the special relationship the successful resolution of the crisis. Thus,
Term coined by Winston the special relationship between the United
Churchill to reflect the States and the United Kingdom is repre-
diplomatic, cultural,
sented as being reciprocal—Britain gets the
and other ties between
the United Kingdom money and brute force that the United States
and the United States can offer, while the United States gets Brit-
ish intelligence, subtlety, and panache. This
representation of Britishness is expanded in
the work of Paul Stock, who reverses Dodds’s focus on Bond’s adventures
overseas and instead focuses on the one place in the United Kingdom
that Bond is always pictured returning to: the office of his boss, M. “It is
a place where ideology, iconography, and office fittings converge; where
changes and challenges to that ‘office space’ are juxtaposed; and where
cognitive maps and the resonance of a British signifier on the margins of
Empire can be examined” (2000, 35).
Stock identifies M’s office as the historical memory of bygone empire,
but it is also the nerve center of ongoing attempts to maintain global
 Representation of Place and the British Empire 85

power. It remained virtually unchanged from 1962 to 1995. Laden with

leather armchairs, polished wood walls, paintings of sailing ships, rep-
lica cannons, busts of historical figures, and, perhaps most anachronis-
tically, a globe with the British Empire still colored in pink, M’s office
served as a museum to Britain’s lost maritime empire, or perhaps as a
denial of that loss. Humorously, when M meets Bond on a submarine
in You Only Live Twice (1967), his entire office has been crammed into
a small cabin on board, as if Britain’s maritime past enables M to be as
at home at sea as he is in London. M’s office within the British intel-
ligence services is located, tellingly, within a “front” corporation called
Universal Exports, which dovetails nicely with our earlier discussion of
empire and its relationship to commodity trading. Indeed, when Bond is
undercover he often travels as a salesman, the conceit being that British
businessmen overseas are so natural, so expected, that he can go any-
where in the world and not seem unusual.
Most recently, the Bond films have been relaunched with Daniel Craig
as the eponymous hero. These films made a clean break with the some-
what anachronistic Cold War–dependent films of the previous fifteen
years, instead featuring story lines about
neoliberal corruption of governments and
neoliberalism  The belief
exploitation of natural resources (interest- that states should provide
ingly, in Quantum of Solace [2008] it is water, minimal services, shifting
rather than the traditionally geopolitical oil public responsibilities
of The World Is Not Enough). More interest- onto private enterprise
ing for our purposes, though, is that the
character of James Bond is portrayed as
increasingly damaged psychologically by the things he is asked to do by
his government. In Skyfall (2012), Britain’s MI6 headquarters is attacked,
and the culprit (played by Javier Bardem) is revealed to be a former MI6
agent who had been disavowed by M (played by Dame Judi Dench). He
seeks revenge on his former spymaster for the lack of loyalty shown when
he was traded to China in exchange for six captured agents. Altogether,
the arc of the narrative in the Daniel Craig films tends to emphasize that
the enemy is not something out “there,” like the Soviet Union, competing
for influence in the former British colonies. Rather, it is instead some-
thing within, something corrupting of Bond and MI6. Perhaps the whole
endeavor is flawed. Indeed, the idea of Britain’s role in the world as still
inherently problematic is manifest in our next example.

Postcolonial Social Movements and #RhodesMustFall

If James Bond maintained the fiction that the United Kingdom was an
imperial power well after decolonization, the word “decolonization”
86 Chapter 4

maintains the fiction that the end of colonialism can be achieved simply
with independence. Rather, as described above, the achievement of politi-
cal independence is just the first step of many. Decolonization must be
considered as a process, perhaps one that is never truly complete. Indeed,
colonization is something that filters through society, altering everything
from the language in which people think and write, to the structure of
the economy, to the landscape in which people live their everyday lives.
The latter is the subject of this case study, in which we first trace the im-
plications of postcolonial thought and then examine a transnational social
movement enacted through social media (see chapter 8) that sought to
decolonize universities throughout the former British Empire.
Postcolonialism is a complex body of
thought, an intellectual critique that tries
postcolonialism Strategy
to break down the categories and spa-
of the subaltern that
refuses the categories tial boundaries into which conventional
imposed by the hegemon hegemonic knowledges put people and
places. As Edward Said (1978) reminded
us, the Orient was created as a mirror to
the Occident (or West). By representing the Orient in particular ways,
the West was implicitly constructed as the Orient’s opposite—a positive
beacon of civilization and order. Thus, a class of people and places, the
“Oriental,” was created as a way to bring order to the messiness of real-
ity. The postcolonial perspective looks at the ways in which geopolitical
knowledge such as this has been constructed and asks for whom it is
beneficial.
This is important because knowledge, in the Western tradition, is often
seen as a way of shutting down debates, by proclaiming what is, and
what is not, available for disputation. Knowledge is generally seen as
universal (i.e., the same everywhere), with rational thought contributing
to progress, itself defined as the expansion of human knowledge. This is
a very powerful and attractive way of thinking, especially in the West,
which sees such rapidly changing technologies, all owed to scientific
advances. However, when we apply the insights of physical science to
the social world, we can often overreach. While gravity may be a con-
stant wherever you go, people’s social experiences are not constant in
all places. For example, in the United States the meaning of “the police”
is often contested, with white Americans generally seeing the police as
a protective force whom you would ask for help in any situation. How-
ever, African Americans, with collective memories of the police beating
protestors still relatively fresh from the civil rights era and more recent
police shootings that inspired #BlackLivesMatter, sometimes formulate a
different meaning for the police: as protectors of white privilege. Both of
these formulations are rooted in actual experiences, but one has emerged
 Representation of Place and the British Empire 87

as hegemonic in popular culture—the notion of the police as a force for

good certainly dominates television shows like CHiPs, CSI, and Law and
Order (the occasional “corrupt cop” or “a few bad apples” story, like
2001’s Training Day, notwithstanding). These shows and movies always
have a specifically multicultural cast in an effort to portray the police as
anything but a defender of traditional privileges. In this way, we can see
popular culture as serving those who have a vested interest in viewing
the police as a legitimate user of force. Postcolonial approaches shake up
those foundations and ask questions about the power inherent to those
who construct “valid” knowledges.
Postcolonial theorists argue that knowledge itself has been so domi-
nated by European and North American scholars that knowledge based
on experiences from other parts of the world is delegitimized. Joanne
Sharp (2003) argues that there are several ways that postcolonial thought
challenges the boundaries that Western knowledge has imposed on its
various “Others.” First, postcolonial thought is highly suspicious of geo-
political binaries such as the aforementioned Oriental/Occidental, as well
as others such as civilization/barbarity, developed/underdeveloped,
and land power/sea power. Having exposed these as being more about
those creating the categories than about those being unwillingly catego-
rized, postcolonial theorists have abandoned binaries as useful ways of
analyzing the world. These binaries are more notable for how they have
legitimated the exercise of geopolitical power time and time again, with
the reputed laziness, barbarism, and immorality of non-Europeans legiti-
mating the colonization of resource-rich lands by reputedly hardworking,
civilized, and moral Europeans (or European descendants) in Africa, the
Middle East, North America, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and across
the Pacific. Remember that for hegemony to take root, these structures
of knowledge must permeate colonized peoples; in this way they can be
prevented from rising up against their colonial masters.
A second impact that Sharp identifies in postcolonial thought is a
heightened role for ambiguity in our understandings of people and
places. Often it is easy to feel trapped between the modern, universalist
claim that people are the same everywhere, which erases cultural differ-
ence, and the opposing view that people’s culture is entirely determina-
tive of who and what they are. Both notions are objectionable—the first
because it leads to the assumption that everyone would want what we
want if only they had the chance, the second because it limits people to
static, unchanging categories (often defined through binaries). Thus, post-
colonial thought often rejects labels completely.
Postcolonial thought’s third impact, Sharp argues, is in its recognition
of hybrid identities. Here I will refer to an old article in the New York Times
(Rockwell 1994):
88 Chapter 4

Then again, maybe “Hollywood” is itself no longer all that American, and its
success abroad may be a testimony to its cosmopolitanism. When our sup-
posedly national film industry boasts an Austrian named Schwarzenegger as
its biggest star, a Belgian named Van Damme close behind in action films and a
Chinese, Bruce Lee, as an honorable ancestor, when the French and the Japa-
nese own studios or invest heavily in “American” films, when Hollywood
gets half its profits from outside the U.S., when the new star of the Chicago
Bulls is a Croatian named Toni Kukoc, then just how parochially American is
our entertainment industry, anyway?

Although suffering a little from its mid-1990s popular culture refer-

ences, this quote hints at the notions of hybridity that postcoloniality
offers. The blending of diverse values and conceits begins to undermine
any kind of geographic categories that we might try to impose on people
or things. An example of the traditional way of thinking about hybridity
would be the nationalist movements that fought for national indepen-
dence from the empires of Britain, France, the United States, and others.
These groups fought for their own state on the model of those founded
in Europe. So, while they generally achieved these material outcomes,
they remained prisoners of the geopolitical imagination spread from
Europe—that of nation-states, with borders, a
capital, and all the trappings of power that their
mimicry  Adoption former colonizers had. Often, the new national
of the behaviors and elites became just as corrupt and aloof as the
attitudes of colonizers old colonial elites had been—a performance
that has been called mimicry. The choices, then,
are either European rule or rule in the European
style.
hybridity  Flexibilities The postcolonial take on this is quite differ-
of identity that are ent, however, seeking liberation of the prevail-
possible once identity
ing geopolitical imagination. Hybridity refers
is seen as fluid and
not predetermined
to the possible flexibilities of identity that be-
come visible once we abandon the idea of mu-
tually exclusive categories of identity. In other
words, the citizens of relatively new postcolonial states ought to feel free
to adopt European cultural elements that are useful but also do not have
to turn their back on precolonial traditions (which are not necessarily
better for being such). Nor do they have to accept the entire heritage of
Europe. An example of this latter point can be seen in South Africa, which
has a complex history of empire.
The indigenous people of what is now South Africa come from a range
of groups, such as the Zulu and the Xhosa. Initial colonization came in
1652 from a group of Dutch settlers, who became known as Boers and
later as Afrikaaners. Following the Napoleonic Wars in the early nine-
 Representation of Place and the British Empire 89

teenth century, the British took possession of the colony and began to
settle the area, and the Boers moved inland. When diamonds were discov-
ered, the uneasy division of the region between Zulus, Boers, and British
did not hold, with the British seeking to unify the region. Ultimately, after
several bloody wars, they succeeded.
The primary result of this was that the British and the Afrikaaners
unified to subjugate the Zulu, Xhosa, and other groups, eventually set-
ting up a system of racial segregation known as apartheid. However, the
Afrikaaners resented the British for their own
colonization and led the campaign for indepen-
dence (which was fully achieved in 1931). Apart- apartheid  Literally,
heid was most visibly ended in 1994 when South “separation”; a
system of racial
Africa had its first elections in which the black 80
oppression that
percent of the population was finally allowed to maintained minority
vote and Nelson Mandela was elected president. white rule in South
In some ways this was the real moment of politi- Africa until 1994
cal independence, as the 1931 independence had
only shifted authority from the distant colonial
masters to the local ones.
Nelson Mandela
Fast-forward to 2015. At the University of
Revolutionary
Cape Town, a bronze statue of Cecil Rhodes, leader of the
an avowed British imperialist, had stood (sat, African National
actually—see figure 4.3) since 1933. Rhodes had Congress and first
served as prime minister of the British Cape black president
Colony in the 1890s and worked to build a rail- of South Africa
way connecting Egypt to South Africa through a
string of British colonies in East Africa. Today’s
countries of Zambia and Zimbabwe were, when
Cecil Rhodes
colonies, named Northern and Southern Rhode-
The racist leader of
sia in honor of Rhodes. He was famous for his British colonialism
racist views on Anglo-Saxon (British) superior- in southern Africa
ity and his strongly negative view of the black
African population. Opposition to the statue at
the university began in the 1950s, with Afrikaaners seeing it as an at-
tempt to commemorate British colonization of their culture. However,
in 2015—with the end of apartheid twenty years past—the statue came
instead to be seen as a symbol of continued white supremacy in South
Africa. Indeed, while the black population had political equality from
1994, economic equality had not followed, with the wealth of the country
still largely locked up in white hands.
On March 9, 2015, black African students at the university began to
protest at the site of the statue, throwing feces on the statue and dancing
around it to call attention to the way that white supremacy was literally
90 Chapter 4

Figure 4.3. The Cecil Rhodes statue at the University of Cape Town. (Photo by Ian
Barbour, Cape Town, South Africa)

ensconced in the campus. This started a rapid series of protests, with stu-
dents marching on the university administration and occupying offices.
One month later, to the day, the statue was removed by the university
administration.
 Representation of Place and the British Empire 91

This could have been the end of it, but instead the success launched a
broader campaign to look at how South African universities, and intel-
lectual life more broadly in the country, had been “colonized.” Their
concerns ranged from a lack of student housing to a lack of black profes-
sors. The protests soon spread via social media to other universities, such
as the University of Stellenbosch and the University of Pretoria, where
Afrikaans was a language of instruction. Somewhat predictably, students
at Rhodes University began to protest for a change in the name of the
university. There was some success, although not all student demands
were met.
Intriguingly, the #RhodesMustFall controversy made its way back into
the heart of the British establishment when students in Oxford University
(home of the Rhodes Scholarship, funded by the Cecil Rhodes estate)
began to call for decolonization of their curriculum through the decenter-
ing of British and European literature and theory. They also sought the
removal of a Rhodes statue from one of the campus’s colleges and greater
institutional concern for students of color. As in Daniel Craig’s Skyfall,
the chickens of empire had come to roost. Here, however, the protests
ran aground when wealthy donors to the university—themselves part of
the same British establishment to which Rhodes had once been integral—
threatened to pull their donations to the university if Rhodes was taken
down. Here we have a reminder that the geopolitics of representation can
be seen on movie screens and in novels, but also in our everyday lives
through landscape and commemoration. The result at Oxford reminds
us that imperialism was always more than representation; it was also a
system through which wealth could be accumulated by the privileged,
which in turn translated into (geo)political power.

CONCLUSION
Summary
In this case study of the British Empire, we have caught a glimpse of
the complex web of representations that help compose our geopolitical
imaginations. While Mansfield Park, James Bond, and anti-imperial pro-
tests could never be said to encompass the whole spectrum of popular
culture that represents the British Empire or the rest of the world, they
provide a sample of the methods used to naturalize empire (or, indeed,
to argue against it). Said’s critique of Mansfield Park was twofold: that it
left unspoken the social relations that enabled Fanny’s wealthy uncle to
provide such opulence for his family, and that the unfolding of the nar-
rative itself denigrates the local, favoring regional and global scales of
organization (like empire). Thus, empire is tacitly promoted even as it is
92 Chapter 4

left unspoken (often literally, in the case of Fanny’s question to her uncle).
The James Bond movies both portray the United Kingdom (through the
changing decor of M’s office) and the global geopolitical spaces that the
United Kingdom acts within (most especially Istanbul, but also other
“exotic” places), but both of those specific representations construct an
overarching representation of the United Kingdom as a global power,
well past the empire’s heyday (à la Mansfield Park). Finally, both Skyfall
and #RhodesMustFall erode the key distinction between the United
Kingdom’s domestic and foreign spaces. In Skyfall the cost of maintain-
ing imperial power is born by the ethical compromises and psychological
damage experienced by Daniel Craig’s Bond. The villain is, indeed, one
of “us.” Similarly, #RhodesMustFall shows the ways in which empire is
embedded in everyday life, both in places that are formally “decolonized”
and also in the heart of the British establishment. But it also shows the
limits of a focus on just representation, as often behind representational
(geo)politics can be found powerful issues of wealth and the maintenance
of inequality.
The failed attempt to get rid of the Rhodes statue in Oxford raises sev-
eral important questions. Why do some representations “take root” in the
public consciousness and others are pushed aside? That is a very com-
plex question, but generally speaking the answer can be found in power.
Power itself is a complex notion but is generally understood as the ability
to influence. Rather than being something people (or things) have, it is
best understood as being relational (i.e., power
is not an object to be held or expended, but a re-
power  Relationship lationship between people; see Allen 2004). The
between two entities relationship here is between the producers of
that features unequal
representations and the consumers, with compe-
agency between them
tition between producers being the area in which
power is exercised. As we will see in more detail
in chapter 7, consumers of representations also have power (remember
that power is always held in relation to someone or something else).
Thus, the emergence of one representation as more significant than others
not only has to do with the relative power of the producers but also the
power of consumers to adopt one representation over others. This may
be because the representation fits into a discourse that they favor (e.g., it
is “scientifically authentic”) or because it justifies or supports an advan-
tageous belief (e.g., the belief that imperial subjects are too lazy to work
without a firm colonial administration). Perhaps it just makes those ac-
cepting the representation feel good about themselves (e.g., Orientalism).
In any event, for a representation to emerge as hegemonic, it requires the
audience to believe it—it is ultimately a collaboration.
 Representation of Place and the British Empire 93

Extensions in Your Life

When going through heavily mediated everyday life (and education), it
is worth considering the role of representation in constructing personal
worldviews. While it is impossible to do without representation, a little
daily awareness about it can go a long way.

•  In the last action movie you saw, where did the villains come from
and what was that environment like?
• Where did the hero or heroine come from, and what was their
“home” space like?
• What images would be representative of everyday life in your country?
• Would everyone in your country be likely to agree with you about
those images?
• In what ways are popular representations of places and people chal-
lenged?
 5
,
Narration of Nation in the
Post-WWII United States

THE CONCEPT: NARRATIVE

Ideas
Related to the idea of representation is the concept of narrative, which has
storytelling at its core. This is, at first glance, an idea that sounds very far
from the foundation of academic knowledge, since for most of us when
we think of storytelling we think of tall tales, fiction, or at least embellish-
ment of the facts, and we like to think of academia as being about the ex-
act opposite of that: truth, and the unvarnished version at that. However,
since the 1970s academics have generally agreed that much of knowledge
production is really the construction of narratives (White 1973).
If representation frequently involves places and what they are like (or
are perceived to be like), then narrative is about time: about events un-
folding in a way that makes sense to the reader or listener. A good way
to begin considering this is with a fundamental question: Is the world
getting better, getting worse, or staying the same? Each answer is an in-
dicator, at base, of a kind of historical narrative about the world. If some-
one thinks the world is getting worse, he or she will read news stories of
tragedy and see proof that he or she is right, while if he or she thinks the
world is getting better, he or she will sort for the positive and feel equally
validated by the very same world events. Just as people will ignore evi-
dence that contradicts the geographic representations they believe in (as
in “she’s not like other [insert nationality]”), people sort through evidence
for that which substantiates their master narratives.

95
96 Chapter 5

Walter Fisher (1987) has argued (in what

narrative paradigm has become known as the narrative para-
Notion that people perceive digm) that people do not think only in
and organize reality through
terms of reason (what the Greeks referred
practices of storytelling
to as Logos) but also through Mythos, or
story. In other words, while traditional
models of human behavior indicate that we
make decisions based on the rationality of
Logos  Logic and reasoning arguments with which we are presented,
Fisher argues that we make decisions
based on the coherence of the stories with
which we are presented. As has been dem-
onstrated by the proliferation of the term
Mythos  Story and narrative “fake news” in recent years (mentioned in
the last chapter), with many conservative
Americans lining up behind Fox News as
a “true” representation of current events
narrative rationality and others lining up behind the other net-
Confirmation of a narrative’s works, one important measure of a story’s
validity by comparison coherence is how well it meshes with
with personal experiences our already-existing understandings of the
world. Thus, a “good” reason to believe
something is if it is fundamentally linked to
our own life stories: what we have experienced and how we have made
sense of our own personal narratives. Traditional notions of rationality
can then be understood as relying on outside, objective measures of valid-
ity, while narrative rationality relies on an audience’s subjective judgment
of how well the story hangs together and validates their own experiences.
Of course, even decision making based on traditional rationality is rooted
in a specific narrative of scientific progress. Most important, audience
members’ identities are in part constructed through which narratives they
invest in personally.
Beyond questions of personal identity, narrativity gives us tools to un-
derstand the world and our location within it. Because a narrative unfolds
over time, it shows us that it is impossible to understand events in isola-
tion. Rather, they should be understood
as episodes in a larger narrative. Within
plot  Relationships in space a narrative, a plot serves as the internal
and time that promote an
logic that holds the episodes of a narrative
understanding of narrative
together. A plot is a series of relationships
(some causal) between people and things
that are grounded in both history and geography. It is only through an
elemental understanding of a narrative’s plot that people know which
 Narration of Nation in the Post-WWII United States 97

details to pay attention to as life unfolds: “in the face of a potentially

limitless array of social experiences deriving from social contact with
events, institutions, and people, the evaluative capacity of emplotment
demands and enables selective appropriation in constructing narratives”
(Somers 1994, 617, emphasis in original). In other words, what someone
thinks is important in a narrative shapes the stories he or she tells (and
experiences). If he or she is interested in women’s rights, his or her history
of the United States will be very different from one interested in military
history. Both selectively appropriate the episodes in history that speak to
their narrative.
There are three scales to narrativity of
which it is worth being aware (Somers 1994).
The first is ontological narrativity, which ontological narrativity
Personal narratives
refers to the narratives that compose us at of who you are and
the scale of the individual. They define who how you got here
we think we are and therefore inform our
actions, which in turn add to the narrative.
Thus, the narrative, and our sense of self, is always in a process of be-
coming. What are the five most important events in a person’s life? They
might be when the person met someone special, when they realized they
could do something they did not know they could do, a completely ran-
dom event (like winning the lottery), or perhaps when they lost someone
important. Once that is answered, it is possible to think about why the
events were selected and glimpse that individual’s ontological narrative.
People have a location in the plot of their ontological narratives that
informs their current behavior. Some of these narratives are incredibly
personal; others are shared among vast groups of people. These collec-
tive myths might be termed public narratives, and they are the second
scale of narrativity. An example might be the
Holocaust, which is a touchstone for many
younger Jews who did not even live during public narratives
that time. These narratives are shared by at Communal narratives
of history, inclusion,
least a few people, and often millions. They
and exclusion
are often promoted by powerful institutions,
like governments, parents, corporations, and
the like, that aim to structure the perspec-
tives of those within a collective identity. An
example would be the narratives of American Manifest Destiny
The belief that the United
identity that help shape collective responses States was destined to
to new experiences. There are many of these colonize all the land
narratives, from imperialist narratives such between the Atlantic
as Manifest Destiny, to America as the cul- and Pacific Oceans
mination of human progress (i.e., a “new
98 Chapter 5

Jerusalem” or a “shining city on a hill”), to individualist narratives of the

American Dream (“anybody can make it”).
The third scale of narrativity is metanarrativity. Metanarratives are the
overarching theories and concepts that we see as unfolding in all times
and places. An example could be the notion of
human existence as slowly improving (see the
metanarrativity beginning of this chapter), or human existence
Overarching narratives
as a timeless conflict between East and West
about the way in
which history is
(see Said’s notions of Orientalism from chapter
unfolding and will 2), or human existence as a battle between our
continue to unfold animal natures and our civilizing humanity
with various people located in different roles
within that plot.
These narratives, then, are all linked through their provision of plots
that not only structure the way in which we view the world but also the
way in which we view ourselves. “Narratives help to construct personal
and social identity, provide sense and order to experience, and frame
and structure action” (Roberts 2006, 710). As structures, though, they are
incredibly resilient, especially as a result of the selective appropriation
of experiences that fit an individual’s ontological and public narratives.
However, confusion reigns when our narrative rationality cannot make
sense of an anomalous experience. For instance, after the attacks of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, many Americans asked themselves and others, “Why do
they hate us?” because the narrative of American innocence that domi-
nated within the United States did not prepare them for an attack like
that. For these reasons, the narrative paradigm has a lot to say about how
we understand geopolitics and react to changing circumstances.

Debates
This idea of narratives, as mentioned earlier, is somewhat anathema to
a lot of traditional views of the social sciences. Narrative was originally
associated solely with history, which was itself seen as fundamentally
about describing the world rather than explaining it. The social sciences,
in contrast, were defined by their quest to abstract and theorize the world,
while historical narratives were perniciously particular and specific. By
the 1960s and 1970s, even historians began to question the validity of
narratives. Thus, the first debate about narratives revolved around their
very legitimacy as an object of study. In the 1970s, however, both histo-
rians and other scholars interested in the study of people rediscovered
narratives and radically refigured why they were important. Whereas
originally narratives were descriptive (e.g., “this is what happened”), nar-
ratives were reconfigured as being constitutive: “all of us come to be who
 Narration of Nation in the Post-WWII United States 99

we are (however ephemeral, multiple, and changing) by being located or

locating ourselves (usually unconsciously) in social narratives rarely of our
own making” (Somers 1994, 606, emphasis in original).
A second point of contestation about narrative revolves around what is
called essentialism. Essentialism refers to the treatment of people as sim-
ply members of categories. This is exemplified in what has become known
since the 1990s as identity politics. Identity politics is the implementation
of political strategies meant to improve the con-
dition of a social group that is considered op-
pressed. This highlighting of oppressed groups essentialism 
calls into question the universality of some pub- Treatment of an
individual as primarily
lic narratives. This is sometimes controversial,
a member of a category
as dominant groups often view identity politics
as an attack on their own privilege, affluence,
and capacity to shape public narratives; for instance, white nationalists
in the 2016 U.S. presidential election argued that white people, despite
their vast economic and political power, were really victims of a system
that privileged people of color. This, too, is a kind of identity politics.
Dominant groups may also consider themselves oppressed as a result of
identity politics—some groups are best served by the idea of the “uni-
versal” experience. Identity politics connects to public narratives because
these groups often contest the history of the
nation in which they coexist with other groups
identity politics
because they feel ignored or underrepresented.
Politics organized
For instance, in the United States, Black History around the promotion
Month has elicited controversy by promoting of a particular
African American history during the month of category of people
February. The month is intended to counteract
the white-centric history that supporters claim
is taught in schools. Some critics argue that it is wrong to single out one
ethnic group in the United States for special treatment; others argue that
it is tantamount to segregation—an excuse to keep history classes focused
on white history for the other eleven months out of the year.
At the other end of the political spectrum, many neo-Confederate
groups contest the dominant historiography of the American Civil War,
arguing that, despite overwhelming historical evidence, the Civil War
was not about slavery but instead was about liberty and the ability of
the Confederate states to secede from the Union when they felt that their
interests (usually related to taxation and trade policy) were not being ad-
dressed. This re-narration of the Civil War has not emerged as strongly
in popular culture as the reinvigoration of African American history, but
many bumper stickers reflect this view throughout the American South
and beyond.
100 Chapter 5

In any event, what is at root here is a recognition that narratives mat-

ter—and that the traditionally taught history of the United States is
not recognizable by at least some of its citizens as telling the history of
their people. Popular culture has gone some way to acknowledge these
absences. For instance, Hidden Figures (2016) was the tale of the African
American female mathematicians who worked at NASA during the
period of legal segregation. Similarly, Marshall (2017) told the story of
Thurgood Marshall, the first African American justice on the Supreme
Court. Similar inclusiveness can be seen in other forms of popular cul-
ture, such as literature, TV, and advertising, and also for other population
groups. The movie Windtalkers (2002), for example, highlighted the role
of Native Americans in World War II. Note that all these movies locate
these marginalized groups in key landscapes and moments of American
history that are seen as fundamental to national identity. Thus, the idea of
national unity can be seen to fragment as other identities exist alongside
national identities. National identities do not cease to exist in identity
politics, but they become just one loyalty that people have among many
(and perhaps for many still the strongest).
These re-narrations of American history were done in reaction to an es-
sentializing narrative that proclaimed a particular experience and public
narrative as “American.” However, making a movie about “the black
experience” is also essentializing—claiming a particular experience and
public narrative as “black” and ignoring the possibilities for diversity
within it. While it is certainly a step in the right direction (the “black
American” experience being a more specific one than just “American”), it
nevertheless creates a box and puts a variety of people, experiences, and
narratives into it.

INTRODUCTION TO THE NATION

Nations are, in many ways, the fundamental building blocks of our geo-
graphic imaginations. Generally speaking, nations are the largest-scale
collective identities to which we are strongly attached. For example, many
Americans identify strongly as an American citizen, but only weakly
as a North American. Many Europeans, however, give a much greater
emphasis to their identity as such, for a variety of reasons but also as a
result of the active efforts by the European Union to foster that identity.
It is possible to imagine a European nationalism emerging through these
processes. Given the ubiquity of nations and nation-centered discourse, it
is interesting to note that there is very little agreement about how nations
came to be. There are, however, three approaches to theorizing nations
and how they come into being—each focused on a particular scale of
 Narration of Nation in the Post-WWII United States 101

time. In this section, these three approaches will be introduced, with more
attention paid to the last formulation, as it is the most closely linked to
narratives and narrativity.

Primordial Theories of the Nation

Primordial theories of the nation were briefly mentioned in chapter 2,
but here we will give more space to these views. Primordialists view the
nation as a preexisting category, one that is essentially an extension of
kinship units. Thus, the nation has existed since human society began
(or shortly thereafter). The links between people in primordial nations
are either genetic or cultural (or both). These links reflect a fundamental
connection that is perceived by the nation’s members themselves as key
to their commonality (Geertz 1973b). These could be a language, religion,
lifestyle, or even a physical trait. The latter of these indicates how nations
exist in our imagination at the nexus of biology and culture, much like an
extended family, with members of the nation seen as having common an-
cestors, even if only mythological. This idea of the nation as an extended
family is conveniently ignored when some nations discourage ethnic mix-
ing and promote reproduction within the national group.
Because in this formulation your national identity is rooted in where
and to whom you were born, your national identity is essentially fixed in
stone (van den Berghe 1981). While there is some usefulness to be found
in being part of a grouping like this (like protection for the weak, etc.), it is
argued by advocates of primordialism that this kind of nationalism fills a
deep-seated need for collective belonging, often to the material detriment
of the national subject (consider, for example, the soldier who dies in
war for his nation). Thus, primordialists argue that trying to ignore these
identities is a mistake because they are simply too fundamental to human
existence. This kind of perspective is well suited to explaining the situa-
tion in postcolonial Africa, where a common explanation for geopolitical
turmoil is that states were created that encompass tens or hundreds of
nations within them. Efforts to create a nationalism based on these new
states have often struggled precisely because people still think of them-
selves as Yoruba, Ibo, Tswana, or other national identities.
The strength of primordialism as a framework is that it highlights the
role of cultural factors (and sometimes the biological ones that are deemed
culturally important) in the determination of the nation. An important
weakness, however, is that primordialism has no real account for change
within nations. If nations are defined by certain characteristics and ap-
peared long ago out of the kinship traditions of early humans, then how
do we account for change, which even a cursory view of history can reveal?
102 Chapter 5

Modernist Theories of the Nation

Modernist approaches are even more diverse than the primordial ones.
They do, however, have two related elements in common (Smith 2000).
First, modernists believe that nationalism is a fairly recent phenom-
enon—usually dating to the end of the eighteenth century. Second, the
nation and nationalism result from trends associated with modernity and
modernization: especially industrialization, capitalism, secularism, and
urbanization.
Most formulations of modern nationalism
in the Euro-American world begin with the
modernity  Time period shift in Europe from an agricultural to an
associated with rapid industrial society. The agricultural society
political, cultural, and was spread out over large geographic areas,
economic change in Europe, with very particularistic and local cultural
generally beginning in
and food production systems. The feudal
the seventeenth century
elites that ruled over these maintained in
many ways a completely separate existence.
However, with the rise of industrialism, these family networks were
disrupted as workers moved to cities to make their living from factories
rather than from the land. This massive
shift of population left many adrift; hav-
feudalism  A political- ing understood their “place” in the world
economic system rooted through their family connections and local
in aristocracy’s ownership roots, they found themselves now without
of land, with peasants either—just one of thousands (or millions)
indebted to the lord
of new immigrants in tightly packed urban
whose land they worked
tenements. Thus, a new form of collective
identity needed to be constructed, in par-
ticular one that united national citizens (no longer feudal vassals) and
state leaders (Gellner 1983).
Here is where various modernist theo-
rists begin to differ among themselves.
Some scholars, like Eric Hobsbawm (1990),
modernization  Processes
associated with industriali-
argue that nationalism is a way for elites
zation, the growth of to gain social control over the increasingly
capitalism, and subsequent mobile and democratically minded popu-
social reorganization lation. However, he argues that this will
become increasingly impossible in a global-
izing world, when people, goods, and in-
formation flow across borders with increasing regularity. As an example,
some have argued that the heartland of modernity, Western Europe, has
become postnationalist (Ignatieff 2003), embracing a new state building
 Narration of Nation in the Post-WWII United States 103

in the European Union that is not dependent on (and is arguably in con-

tradiction to) traditional notions of nationalism. Just as nationalism was
invented in Western Europe and spread throughout the world, postna-
tionalism may do the same.
However, other modernist scholars disagree with this notion. For in-
stance, Benedict Anderson (1991), whose ideas were introduced in chap-
ter 2, agrees with Hobsbawm that nations provide a new source of iden-
tity for those uprooted from their ancestral homes. However, he adds the
importance of print capitalism, in which vernacular languages became
standardized through the uniformity of the printing press, giving readers
a sense of being part of a larger community. Although the printing press
is in the process of giving way to other, more contemporary technologies
(such as broadband and cable TV) for the dissemination of news, the
importance of language in formulating community remains. Thus, An-
derson is far less pessimistic about the future of nationalism. Indeed, a
second look at the European Union provides just as much evidence of
nationalism as of Hobsbawm’s postnationalism—as a case in point, look
at the debates around Brexit in the United Kingdom, where British na-
tionalism featured heavily in the 2016 decision for the UK to leave the EU.
What all these perspectives have in common, though, is an opposition
to the primordialists’ notion of nations as categories that exist in their
own right. They argue that our belief in nations now has led us to interpret
the past using our present categories. This can lead to fundamental his-
torical inaccuracies (like believing today’s Germans to be fundamentally
the same people as the Germanic tribes that began invading the Roman
Empire two thousand years ago). The modernists direct our attention to
the processes that produced nations at a specific moment in time and in
a specific place.

Poststructuralist Theories of the Nation

While Anderson introduces language as a critical part of understanding
nationalism, more recently scholars have begun to wonder about the
ways in which language, and popular culture more broadly, are constitu-
tive of nations and nationalism—that is to say, they are the same thing or
constitute each other. While primordial theories emphasized the distant
past and modernist theories emphasized the relatively recent past, post-
structuralist approaches emphasize the present as the site of national (re)
constitution.
It is here that narratives and narration reenter our discussion. Mod-
ernist scholars acknowledged the importance of national mythology—
agreed-upon conventions of national history that define it (Hobsbawm
and Ranger 1983). They nevertheless thought about nations as groups of
104 Chapter 5

people, whereas poststructuralist scholars focus on the mythology as what

actually constitutes the nation and view the people as following from that
point. As an example, virtually every high school and university in the
United States teaches a course (or many) on American history. This course
takes as its basis the existence of a nation whose history is to be told. Thus,
before the class is even taught, there is a lesson being given—that there
is a United States and that its story is worth learning. Further, there is an
act of exclusion—other people will only enter the story as they become
relevant to the United States, most likely as enemies or sources of conflict.
This class, once it begins, is traditionally taught as a battle against vari-
ous external “Others”—the British, the American Indians, the Germans,
the communists—and against various internal “Others”: British loyalists,
slavery proponents, and the like. Thus, American history (and identity) is
portrayed as the antithesis of all these opponents. What we can see is the
construction of an American narrative that is dependent on a variety of
other non-American things to help us learn what it means to be a member
of the American nation. This is fundamentally an open-ended narrative,
stretching into the past and into the future.

Nations, like narrative, lose their origins in the myths of time and only fully realize
their horizons in the mind’s eye. Such an image of the nation—or narration—
might seem impossibly romantic and excessively metaphorical, but it is from
those traditions of political thought and literary language that the nation
emerges as a powerful historical idea in the west. . . . To encounter the nation
as it is written displays a temporality of culture and social consciousness more
in tune with the partial, overdetermined process by which textual meaning is
produced. . . . These approaches are valuable in drawing our attention to those
easily obscured, but highly significant, recesses of the national culture from
which alternative constituencies of peoples and oppositional analytic capaci-
ties may emerge. (Bhabha 1990, quoted selectively from 1–7, emphasis added)

But how do we actually encounter this narrative? In the above example,

it was through a textbook, which often comes in many editions as it is
revised and updated. Yet we know from Michael Billig’s concept of banal
nationalism (again, see chapter 2) that nationalism is ubiquitous—that
we learn and relearn what it means to be national all the time. This im-
plies that we encounter our “nationalization” more often than just in our
formal education. Indeed, how is this national narrative continued? Epi-
sodes of the narrative appear around us all the time, taking the form of
news programs, movies, television shows (like Star Trek, discussed in the
preface), end-of-year retrospectives, and so on. The daily news provides
episodic updates of the national story, with other forms of popular cul-
ture shifting to reflect the current communal understanding of who “we”
are and who “they” (nonmembers of the nation) are as well.
 Narration of Nation in the Post-WWII United States 105

Of course, there is no singular version of American history, identity, or

narrative. There is a multitude, all in competition for hegemony because
some forms of history, identity, and narrative advantage some groups
over others by providing discursive justification for certain policies and
actions. This is the case in the example, given at the beginning of the
chapter, of Black History Month. Similarly, debates in the United States
about whether or not the “Founding Fathers” (itself an interesting term in
regard to the role of gender in nationalism) envisioned a Christian coun-
try have ensconced themselves in contemporary political debates about
the proper role of religion in public spaces.
So, now that we know how we might encounter these narratives, how
do particular narratives emerge as hegemonic or not? That has a great
deal to do with how individuals perform these narratives. Performativ-
ity refers to a repetitive act that either seeks to change social norms or
reinforce them (Butler 1990). To extend the example just given, if you
decide that the United States is fundamentally a Christian country, you
might act out that belief by erecting a nativity scene at Christmas on the
grounds of a public school or court-
house. Another way to perform identi-
ties is through consumption choices—an performativity  Everyday
behavior based on social norms
idea that underwrites boycotting, a very
that reproduce those norms
popular form of protest. For instance, as
explored in the previous chapter, in the
1980s many people, and even whole countries, performed their antiracist
identities through the boycotting of goods from South Africa, which at the
time had apartheid policies of racial segregation and oppression in place.
However, consuming popular culture can be seen as a positive affirma-
tion of identity and narrative as well. As a simple example, the New York
Times and the Wall Street Journal are often characterized as representing
two different perspectives on what America is or should be. The New
York Times and the Wall Street Journal are generally thought of as liberal
and conservative, respectively. Which newspaper a New Yorker decides
to read, then, can be seen as a performance of a particular American nar-
rative, a claim that it resonates with the lived experiences of the reader.
Altogether, then, popular culture can be understood as one of the
main avenues through which narratives of the nation are produced, and
national subjects perform those narratives through their repeated con-
sumption of that popular culture (Edensor 2002). While these narratives
may be quite different from each other, what they share is their associa-
tion with a particular nation. This is one of the most interesting features
of the poststructuralist view of the nation—that there are a multitude of
narrations, each claiming to be the truthful narrative of the nation. People
then affiliate themselves with these various narrations, and, though they
106 Chapter 5

(mostly) all disagree about which narrative is “correct,” they all believe
themselves to be members of the same nation. Having looked at the con-
cept of narrativity and connected it to the latest theorizations of nations
and nationalism, it is now time to examine how these ideas all interact in
a specific example from popular culture.

CASE STUDY: THE NARRATIVE OF AMERICA

In this section, we will examine how the comic book superhero Captain
America has worked as a public narrative of the United States. Created
in 1940 and published continuously since 1964, Captain America’s tales
provide an ongoing archive of some of the changing meanings associated
with America. This case study will first briefly illustrate how the charac-
ter of Captain America serves as a representation of the United States (à
la chapter 4) before discussing the characteristics of serial narratives and
delving into a particular narrative of this hero that spans four decades
and provides particular insight into how national narratives work.

Representing America
As we saw in the previous chapter, places can be represented in a
variety of ways, some subtle (the absence, or nonrepresentation, of
the Caribbean in Jane Austen’s novels) and some blatant (the exotic
Orient found in James Bond movies). Captain America decidedly falls
into the blatant category. Given his origin as a jingoistic wartime cru-
sader against Nazi Germany and imperial Japan, this should not be
too surprising. In fact, Captain America predates the American entry
into World War II, but he nevertheless punches Adolf Hitler in the face
on the cover of Captain America Comics, no. 1 (see figure 5.1). This was
because the early comic book industry was dominated by Jewish artists
and writers who were far more aware of Hitler’s treatment of German,
Polish, and Czechoslovak Jews than most Americans were (Jones 2004).
Hoping to push America off the bench and into the fight, Joe Simon and
Jack Kirby (writer and artist, respectively) created Captain America and
located him in an America that was rife with German spies and subver-
sives. American munitions factories were being preemptively bombed
by these “fifth columnists,” who sought to weaken America in advance
of a future German conquest. Thus, in the world represented by Simon
and Kirby, the moral geographies are clear—America is freedom loving
and peaceful, while Germany is aggressive and underhanded. As these
facts are given, political positions are also imbued with a moral dimen-
sion. Any American who opposes U.S. intervention in Europe is weak-


Figure 5.1. Cover of Captain America Comics, no. 1, which predates Pearl Harbor by
ten months. (Copyright © 2009 Marvel Characters, Inc. Used with permission)
108 Chapter 5

minded or corrupt, and those in favor of preparing for war are noble
and purposeful. This comes through in a variety of early stories, such
as 1941’s “Trapped in the Stronghold,” in which an American financier
supporting the British war effort is kidnapped from the United States by
Hitler’s agents and sent to a concentration camp while an impersonator
of the financier tries to recruit neutral countries for the Axis. Captain
America, of course, is wise to these tricks and rescues the original finan-
cier from Germany (Dittmer 2007a).
Captain America himself can be seen as the embodiment of a particu-
lar narrative of the United States. Steve Rogers was a New Yorker who
volunteered for the army but was rejected because he was too scrawny.
Overheard griping because he was so committed to serving the United
States but had been turned away, he was brought in to serve as a test
subject for the super-soldier serum, a U.S. military project that would
give him peak human strength and stamina. Although the experiment
was a success and Steve Rogers instantly transformed into the ultimate
soldier, the project was shut down after the scientist in charge was killed
by a Nazi spy. With only one super-soldier instead of thousands, the
U.S. government decided to deploy him as a morale-boosting symbol of
America, so they outfitted him in a star-spangled red, white, and blue
uniform and gave him an indestructible shield. While the colorful uni-
form is somewhat self-explanatory, it is worth considering the symbol-
ism of the shield, as it constructs a narrative of America as fundamentally
innocent and the victim of foreign aggression (much like the name of
the U.S. Department of Defense—formerly known as the Department
of War—does). Further, while Captain America is at the peak of human
strength and athleticism, he is not superstrong like Superman or invul-
nerable to injury like the Incredible Hulk. Instead, he gets by in a world
of superpowered villains through his dauntless courage and commit-
ment to continual training.
In retrospect, the Captain America episodes from World War II can
seem pretty hokey and unsophisticated. Characterization was minimal,
and story lines were mostly excuses for the action scenes. Most egre-
giously, the deployment of blond-haired, blue-eyed Steve Rogers as a
propaganda device against the racist Nazi ideology seems perverse. Still,
there was a huge market for these stories, both among domestic popula-
tions and among servicemen serving overseas. Captain America Comics
was one of the best-selling wartime comic books, selling more than one
million copies per month (Wright 2001). There was a great deal of plea-
sure to be had in watching the Nazis be made fools of by a man draped
in the American flag, especially in the early part of the war when things
were not looking good for the Allies (most of Western Europe was occu-
pied, and the United Kingdom was enduring the Blitz).
 Narration of Nation in the Post-WWII United States 109

Thus, Captain America can be seen as embodying a patriotic, innocent

representation of the United States. One of his greatest appeals was that
he was not entirely a fantasy figure like Superman. If Superman fought
the Nazis, it would be a very one-sided affair. The war would be over in
a few scant issues of the comic book, and then what? It would be depress-
ing to read a comic book in which the war was over and live in a world
where it was not. Captain America, then, was just right—strong enough
to win every battle he was in, but certainly not able to fight the entire war
himself. Thus, the world Captain America lived in (especially once the
United States was in the war) could continue to be analogous to the one
the reader lived in—a symmetry of narratives that made the episodes that
much more enjoyable.
When World War II ended, however, interest in these kind of jingoistic
tales waned. Without Germans or Japanese to fight, a nationalist figure
such as Captain America seemed out of place and purposeless. Further,
reader interests began to change, and the golden age of superheroes
ended as horror and crime-related comic books became the real growth
engine in the industry. Captain America Comics struggled to maintain its
audience, even briefly becoming Captain America’s Weird Tales (a horror
comic) before being canceled in 1949 as the Cold War was beginning.
Shortly thereafter, the United States became involved in the Korean
War (1950–1953), and the comic’s publishers decided to try to tap into
the patriotic market again, resurrecting Captain America and telling new
tales of the hero (subtitled “Captain America . . . Commie-Smasher!”) in
which the hero again fought against saboteurs and spies, but this time,
instead of Nazis, they were communists from the Soviet Union. However,
this did not sell, either—both because the stories were again thin and the
characters one-dimensional, but also because the war-weary American
public was not interested in that jingoistic narrative (Wright 2001). The
comic book was again canceled after a short run (1953–1954).

Narrating America
In the above mini-history of Captain America Comics from 1940 to 1954,
it should be obvious that the long-term failure of the comic book came
about as a result of its divergence from its audience’s expectations. In
1940, Captain America Comics clearly meshed with some element of the
audience’s public narratives, as illustrated by its enormous sales figures.
It was that connection that allowed Simon and Kirby to introduce their
desired geopolitical representation to the audience—illustrating Nazis as
everything that was un-American. However, after World War II, the Cap-
tain America narrative no longer seemed to fit the mood of the audience,
and the type of America that was represented no longer connected. This
110 Chapter 5

relationship between the world portrayed within popular culture and the
“real” world is critical. As we saw in the example of Superman in World
War II above, the world as portrayed in popular culture must resemble
in some way the readers’ world. Even the genres of science fiction and
fantasy (in which superhero comics surely must be included) are only
interesting to readers because these stories comment, often in dystopian
ways, on the world in which readers live. For example, think of the furor
around The Handmaid’s Tale (2017), which details
a dystopian future in which women are owned
as property by the rich and do not make their
#MeToo movement
A social movement, own sexual or reproductive choices. The (coinci-
launched in 2017, dental) airing of this TV show during the launch
that sought to combat of the #MeToo movement and the widespread
sexual harassment reaction against the election of President Trump
(widely accused of sexual misconduct) gave the
show an extra critical edge.
This need for continued connection between the narrative of the text
and the narrative of the “real” world is particularly problematic for se-
rial narratives. Serial narratives are narratives that unfold in a particular
order, like Game of Thrones. It is very difficult
to understand what is happening in Game of
serial narratives Thrones if you have missed any episodes. You
Narratives that can compare this to, for example, an episodic
have no preset
TV show like Elementary or Black Mirror, which
length or ending
generally has a self-contained story. In practice,
most TV shows have elements of each (e.g., on
The X-Files, which was in many ways a tradi-
continuity  In tional episodic show featuring a “monster of
serial narratives, the the week,” but with longer story arcs like the
body of knowledge relationship of Mulder and Scully). Comic books
associated with what like Captain America are serial narratives, with is-
has happened prior
sues released (usually) monthly and building on
previous events that cannot simply be ignored
(this principle is referred to in cultural studies as continuity). If each issue
must

•  start with the fictional world resembling the reader’s world,

• have conflict (to hold the reader’s interest), and
• conclude with the fictional world still fundamentally resembling
the reader’s world,

then the narrative woven through the comic books must ultimately be
a conservative one in which conflicts are decided in favor of the status
 Narration of Nation in the Post-WWII United States 111

quo. Indeed, if you think about superheroes, they are ultimately defend-
ers of the world as it is, not as it might be. Villains are, by definition,
those who want to change the world (albeit usually to better suit them-
selves). To illustrate the truth of this, why has Superman not used his
powers to solve global hunger by ensuring the equitable distribution of
food? Because, as with the World War II example above, once he did
so the world would be fundamentally different from the one we live in
(Dittmer 2007c).
So, continuity in serial narratives ensures that they must remain
parallel in some way to the readers’ world. But for long-running serial
narratives, the world is apt to change in fundamental ways during the
narrative’s unfolding. Thus, while superheroes defend the national status
quo, the specifics of that status quo can change. As we saw earlier, this
is what happened to Captain America in 1954. Creative staff (whether in
comics, TV, etc.) must recognize these societal shifts if they are going to
remain influential—because, remember, a fundamental premise of this
book (and the narrative turn of the social sciences, described above) is that
narratives (and hence popular culture) are key to our understandings of
our own identity. The tension here between cultural elites, who produce
narratives, and popular culture audiences, who decide if those narratives
“work” with their own ontological narratives, is more fully discussed in
chapter 7. For now, we will remain focused on the narrative produced
when Captain America returned to newsstands in 1964.
Captain America’s decadelong absence from the world of publishing
came to an end when he was found frozen in an iceberg in the North
Atlantic by a band of superheroes called the Avengers. Captain America
had fallen into the ocean in 1945 while trying (and failing) to save his teen
partner Bucky from an exploding rocket plane. Among fans, this kind
of event is called a retcon (“retroactive change in continuity”) because
it contradicts the narrative as it has gener-
ally been understood. Caught in suspended
animation for twenty years, the World War II retcon  Retroactive
veteran woke up to face an America that had continuity; a rewriting of
what has happened prior
turned on itself, questioning its own identity.
The 1960s were a time of revolution—the civil
rights movement, the sexual revolution, the war in Vietnam—all of these
made the United States almost unrecognizable to someone from the pre-
vious generation. Playing the venerable science fiction role of the “man
out of his time” (like Buck Rogers, etc.), Captain America was able to
sympathetically comment on these events from an outsider’s perspective.
However, Captain America was not the same man he was in his previ-
ous incarnation. Having learned the lesson of 1954 (when the hero was
last canceled), Captain America was no longer the sometimes-racist xe-
112 Chapter 5

nophobe and red-baiting hero of the 1940s and 1950s. His role as soldier
was downplayed, and a new role as symbol of the American ideal was
emphasized. Indeed, Captain America only goes to the controversial war
in Vietnam twice, and then only to rescue American soldiers, not to try
to fight the war there. In fact, communism is rarely mentioned, probably
because the young audience of the comic book was increasingly dubious
of Cold War binaries and skeptical of what they saw as an imperial war
in Vietnam.
Captain America was no radical, however, and he straddled political
debates by seeming to be a New Deal Democrat (then a fairly centrist
position to take). With communism unavailable for Captain America
to battle, he instead continued his old rivalry with, of all people, Nazis,
such as the Red Skull and the Prussian aristocrats Baron Zemo and Baron
Strucker. While this seems bizarre given the lack of real-world threat
posed by Nazis in the 1960s, it makes sense if you consider the ideological
value of Nazis as still to this day being seen as inimical to the mythologi-
cal values of America. By pitting Captain America against Nazi plots to
bring tyranny and social hierarchy to America’s shores, the creative staff
constructed an opposing idea of America as home to individual freedom
and equality. Indeed, Nazis feature in the pages of Captain America to this
day because they are deemed incontrovertibly un-American.
There was, however, one major problem with this rewriting of the Cap-
tain’s narrative. If he was frozen in an iceberg in 1945, who was starring
in all those comic books from 1945 to 1949 and from 1953 to 1954? This
violation of continuity was ignored for a time, as it conveniently erased
the by-now embarrassing episodes in which Captain America had sought
out communist sympathizers in the United States, much like the pub-
licly censured Wisconsin senator Joe McCarthy. But fans of comic books
are notoriously particular about maintaining continuity. The problem
was finally addressed in 1972, when it was revealed that, when Captain
America fell into the ocean in 1945, the U.S. government assumed he
died. A fan of Captain America’s discovered a Nazi
version of the super-soldier serum that created the
Joe McCarthy original Captain America and blackmailed the U.S.
American senator; government with it until they made him the new
anticommunist Captain America, even giving him plastic surgery
crusader famous to make him indistinguishable from the original.
for unsubstantiated This narrative, while fantastical and utterly im-
accusations against
plausible, nevertheless explained the hole in con-
individuals inside
and outside tinuity created by the earlier retcon—it was this
government Captain America who featured in those later comic
books. Beyond “fixing” the narrative, it actually
advanced it. The 1950s Captain America never re-
 Narration of Nation in the Post-WWII United States 113

ceived the proper medical treatment, causing him to slowly become men-
tally unbalanced and paranoid. Thus, the red-baiting Captain America
was not the “real” Captain America but instead
a pale imitation suffering from the original sin of
blackmailing his own country. This effectively Red-baiting  The
relocates the paranoia and backstabbing of the mid-twentieth-century
McCarthyite era outside the “real” America. In practice of accusing
others, in the style
fact, the 1954 disappearance of Captain America
of Joe McCarthy, of
is explained as being the result of the U.S. gov- being communist
ernment imprisoning him as a danger to society
(Dittmer 2007b).
However, in 1972 he escapes, ostensibly as the result of a disgruntled
government worker upset about Richard Nixon’s opening of relations
with communist China. When he appears in the pages of the comic book,
the 1950s Captain America says things like, “Don’t worry, pal. The Col-
oreds never bother anybody” (Englehart and Buscema 1972a, 6), which
the “real” Captain America would never say (see figure 5.2). Naturally,
the two Captains America encounter one another, and the dialogue em-
phasizes their ideological differences (Englehart and Buscema 1972b,
22–23):

“Real” Captain America: You think I’m a traitor? Grow up, fella—times
have changed! America’s in danger from within as well as without! There’s
organized crime, injustice, and fascism—or wouldn’t you recognize that?
1950s Captain America: Are you calling me—a fascist? You mealy-mouthed
rat! You’re scared to face up to the commies in a war, like a real man! I’m a
real man! And I’ll kill you to prove it!

In this exchange, the 1950s Captain America is framed effectively as

no different than the Nazi villains that the “real” Captain America is
used to fighting. American identity in Captain America is locked into a
“freedom vs. fascism” binary that must fit all times. Nevertheless, the
history of the United States in the 1950s as commonly understood is dif-
ficult to fit into that binary (see the 1998 film Pleasantville for a popular
representation of the era as repressive). Of course, following superhero
convention, the two Captains America battle, with the “real” Captain
America emerging triumphant. Thus, this retcon excises that uncom-
fortable period from the serial narrative of America and leaves behind a
morally pure American identity.
While this battle between Captains America from different eras en-
abled a discursive link to be made between Nazism and red-baiting, with
both being categorized as un-American, a 1979 story line added racism
to that category. In this story, Captain America’s girlfriend, secret agent
Figure 5.2. The 1950s Captain America returns in the 1970s as a proxy for intolerance and
bigotry in America. (Copyright © 2009 Marvel Characters, Inc. Used with permission)
 Narration of Nation in the Post-WWII United States 115

Sharon Carter, has been investigating the National Force, an organization

opposed to racial integration. Wearing Ku Klux Klan hoods and Nazi
swastikas, they hold rallies in Central Park in which they burn crosses
that seemingly convert to their cause white people who were protesting
against them in the crowd. Sharon had been in the crowd and is thus con-
verted into a National Force supporter. Captain America, looking for her,
finds that the National Force is run by someone named the Grand Direc-
tor (Mackenzie et al. 1979, 26): “My fellow Americans, I say to you that we
must act now—and act swiftly—to make our beloved country strong once
more! The only way to insure [sic] America’s strength is to make her pure!
Because a white America is a strong America!” Captain America himself
makes the initial connection to the Nazis (Mackenzie et al. 1979, 31): “This
is my fight. It’s been my fight since the days of Auschwitz and Treblinka”
(Nazi concentration camps).
As the story line progresses, a “rumble” is set to occur between the
National Force and the African Americans of Harlem, where the National
Force has decided to demonstrate. The Grand Director begins to have
doubts about this course of action, but his partner, Dr. Faustus (a mind-
control expert), urges him on. Captain America manages to forestall the
race war until the authorities arrive, and then he chases after the Grand
Director and Dr. Faustus. When he catches them, he discovers that the
Grand Director is, under his robes, actually the 1950s Captain America.
Thus, the connection is made between the McCarthyite crusades of the
1950s and the fight against racial equality and integration (and, by ex-
tension, the Nazis)—all lumped together as America’s opposite in the
“freedom vs. fascism” frame that was established earlier. However, when
Dr. Faustus orders the 1950s Captain America to attack the “real” Captain
America, the former superhero hesitates and ends up committing suicide
rather than bear arms against the representative of the American ideal.
The narrative thread of the 1950s Captain America makes important
claims about the larger serial narrative of America itself. Most important,
it locates racism as outside the “real” America, which is committed to
multiculturalism. This is done through Captain America’s references to
the racism of the National Force as being the same as the racist policies
of the Third Reich. Although Nazism and racism are not identical, for the
purposes of the American narrative they are indistinguishable. Further, in
both the 1972 story and the 1979 story, corruption is seen as external to the
“real” America: the 1950s Captain America’s paranoia was drug induced,
and the racism of the National Force was the result of Dr. Faustus’s mind-
control gases (indeed, it is unclear if anyone in the National Force was
there voluntarily, even the paranoid Grand Director). Despite the messy
realities of the civil rights struggle, the American narrative is left morally
clean and flawless.
116 Chapter 5

Of course, for most of you, the Captain America you know will be
Chris Evans, the actor who plays the character in the Marvel Cinematic
Universe (MCU). Because the MCU is essentially a reboot of the Marvel
superheroes, they are not bound to all this convoluted continuity. Captain
America, for instance, wakes up from his iceberg-induced sleep in the
twenty-first century, not in 1964. He has missed Joe McCarthy, the civil
rights era, and all of the second half of the twentieth century. In Captain
America: The Winter Soldier (2014), the hero is confronted by a corrupt
American security agency known as SHIELD. SHIELD has a plan to pre-
emptively destroy all potential threats to the government, even if they are
individuals who have not (yet) committed a crime. Here we can see the
freedom vs. fascism narrative emerging again, but with the U.S. govern-
ment as the fascists, addicted to consolidating their rule and purifying
the nation through violence. SHIELD is portrayed as essentially noble
but totally infiltrated by the fascist HYDRA. While this goes some way to
insulating America itself from the fascist critique, Captain America him-
self decides that SHIELD is too corrupt and must be destroyed. Here we
see evidence that the same narratives of America that animated Captain
America in the World War II comics are found in today’s films.

CONCLUSION

Summary
In this chapter we began by outlining what narrativity is and how it
differs from purely rational thought. Of particular importance is the no-
tion that not only are narratives important for our understandings of the
world but also that they are key to our understanding of ourselves. As
stated earlier, everyone has a role to play in the plots of narratives that
they invest in. For example, someone who thinks the world is steadily
getting worse because of declining morals might consider himself or
herself to be someone who “holds the line” by refusing to stand for im-
morality. In the case of Captain America, we saw how his role changed
from someone who “holds the line” against Nazi aggression to someone
who serves as a stable point from which to examine the rapidly changing
United States of the 1960s and 1970s.
In any event, the narration of nation emphasizes our role in the grand
scheme of things—both as narrators and as individuals who perform
particular narratives through our actions and consumption patterns.
From the poststructuralist perspective, nations are continually being re-
narrated and reinterpreted. The “national life” is produced through the
serialized mediation of these narratives through television, the internet,
 Narration of Nation in the Post-WWII United States 117

comic books, and other webs of connection, as well as our performance

of consumption. The nightly news, the monthly comic book, the summer-
time blockbuster action film—these are all episodes of the national life
that bind together a variety of people without much in common except for
their popular culture. Popular culture provides a vast array of resources
for people to discuss and debate their collective identity. In so many
ways, popular culture and national life are co-constitutive.

Extensions in Your Life

A larger point to be made about the Captain America narrative described
above is that narration is often not only just about telling a story but also
about what is not told. National history is not an amalgamation of every-
thing that ever happened; it is a construction that purports to tell the na-
tional story. But every history that is written is also a process of ignoring
and forgetting. The narrative of the 1950s Captain America shows how
uncomfortable truths can be treated within a historical narrative—with
various characteristics or actions attributed to outsiders that absolve the
main characters of guilt.

•  What “outsiders” feature in your nation’s or community’s narrative

past or present?
• What periods in your nation’s or community’s narrative past are
simply not spoken about?
• What do these displacements or gaps in the narrative tell you about
the identity this group is fostering?
 6
,
Affect, Embodiment,
and Military-Themed
Video Games

THE CONCEPT: AFFECT

Ideas
The previous two chapters dealt with discursive relationships between
popular culture and geopolitics. That is to say, we were concerned with
the relationship between language and place—knowing that how places
are represented and narrated has a lot to do with the ways in which they
are imagined by people all over the world. However, there has recently
been a challenge to the overwhelming focus on discourse and representa-
tion in critical geopolitics. This challenge comes from an emergent field
sometimes referred to as nonrepresentational theory. As we have already
suggested in chapter 4, nonrepresentational theory presents a means of
going beyond the analysis of representation, discourse, and language.
Instead it offers new modes of thinking that attempt to explore the ex-
cessive nature of everyday experiences. In this sense we can think about
popular culture not just as representations but as what it actually does to
us. Movies have the power to make us jump out of our seats, fill us with
joy, and well up with tears. These experiences are often overlooked but
play an important role in shaping the meaning of, and our encounters
with, popular culture. While there are a great many possibilities for non-
representational geographies, much of the work in this area has focused
on the notion of affect.
Before we begin defining “affect,” it is worth pointing out that the term
has been used in various different ways and for different purposes. It is
a word used in an everyday colloquial sense, which is a good starting
119
120 Chapter 6

point for defining it. According to the Oxford Eng-

lish Dictionary, to affect something is “to have an
affect  Sensation effect on [it], either materially or otherwise.” In the
linked to your loosest sense, then, “affect” means, in an academic
environment; can
sense, sensation that is linked to your environment.
be both biological
and relational However, this is taken in two different directions
by theorists. The first formulation of affect is as
the connection between the social/cultural world
and the biological realm of our bodies. In the last two chapters we have
been very concerned with how people think and talk about places and
people—both of which are very much concerned with the intellect. Af-
fect turns our attention to the ways in which places and people trigger
neurological/biological responses that have more to do with the biology
of nervous systems and chemical-producing glands (Connolly 2002).
Indeed, considering daily routines and the thousands of decisions that
are made every day, most people find that they do not remember mak-
ing most of the decisions that they nevertheless seem to have made—like
pulling a hand away from a hot stove at the last moment. Thus, many of
our decisions are made at a precognitive level; they are “gut” decisions
that do not have to be thought about, allowing us to save our cognitive
power for just a few key decisions at any given moment. These “gut”
decisions are nevertheless inflected by culture and society—think about
intensely visceral reactions to socially taboo notions like eating insects
or committing incest. Decision making of this sort is thus neither wholly
cognitive nor wholly instinctive but instead exists at the nexus of not only
psychology and sociology but also less metaphorically between the body
and the environment.
The second form of affect that exists in the literature is less focused
on the biological/environmental interface and instead focuses on rela-
tionships between people, or between people and objects. This, like the
other version of affect just described, is precognitive, or existing prior to
active decision making. Just like the Earth moves through outer space,
being pulled in various directions by other objects in space and likewise
acting on them gravitationally, we exist in reciprocal relationships with
the people and things in our environment. What those relationships are
is not obvious, even to ourselves, most of the time. But affect serves as “a
sense of push in the world,” influencing our collective behavior. “Affect,
defined as . . . the active outcome of an encounter, takes the form of an
increase or decrease in the ability of the body and mind alike to act” (this
quote and previous, Thrift 2004, 64).
Both the more neurological form of affect and the more social/relational
form have in common a general sense that emotions and other dispositions
to our environment are not predetermined but certainly highly influenced
 Affect, Embodiment, and Military-Themed Video Games 121

by a myriad of environmental factors. Thus, environmental factors can

contribute to affective attachments to place—subconscious attractions and
aversions to different geographic locations. These considerations have
been important within the retail sector where design and management of
environment is important to commercial success. Consider the feeling of
walking into the coffee shop Starbucks. The open layout, the subtle light-
ing, the soft background music, and the enticing aroma of coffee has been
carefully considered to invoke a relaxing and comfortable place where you
want to spend your time (and money!). While none of this guarantees that
we will actually feel that way when we walk in, it is indicative of how en-
vironments are designed in subtle ways that encourage affective responses
that aim to influence consumer behavior. Affect is not reducible to “emo-
tions,” though—it is both biological and social in a way that emotions
are not. The body’s experience of affect comes in the form of feelings and
sensations prior to their being labeled as particular emotions by the mind.
This will be explored in greater detail in the next subsection.
Affect can be understood to work in several ways. The first is conta-
gion, which refers to the social nature of affect. Affect is more than an
individual’s experience—it is something that
circulates among people, through body lan-
contagion Affect’s
guage and the mutual experience of environ-
ability to circulate
ments. It may be differently experienced by among populations
different people, but it will rely on similar
environmental cues. Amplification refers to
the intensification of experiences, especially
through the use of popular culture and the amplification Affect’s
media. The media can take a local experience intensification of
and amplify it so that it becomes a national individual experiences
one. Amplification can also drag an experi-
ence out over greater lengths of time than it
would “normally” take. Resonance is when
amplified affects sync with each other to have resonance Synchronicity
between two or more
a much greater affective impact than they
affects to produce a
would individually, as they reinforce each much larger affect than
other like tuning forks vibrating at the same would normally occur
frequency. Finally, and more recently, there
has been an interest in affective atmosphere.
Drawing together the understandings outlined above, affective atmo-
spheres consider how bodies become immersed in environments that are
felt in and through our body and yet are experienced collectively and re-
main diffuse. They are conceptually distinct from affect discussed earlier,
as affective atmospheres remain more elusive and circulate around col-
lective bodies rather than just between individual bodies. An example we
122 Chapter 6

Figure 6.1. 2012 Olympic Games in London. (Photo by William Warby, https://www
.flickr.com/people/wwarby)

might consider is the atmosphere created in a

crowd at a sports stadium and collective joy
affective atmosphere when your team is winning, or its dampening
Environmental immersion when losing (see figure 6.1). These moody
that is felt in and
force fields can thus create a feeling of togeth-
through bodies while
remaining diffuse
erness. As Closs Stephens (2016) has shown,
the “happy atmospheres” witnessed during
the London Olympics 2012 helped embolden
a sense of collective British identity. Such an example invites us to further
consider the geopolitics of affect, to which we now turn.
Sean Carter and Derek McCormack (2010) argue that the attacks of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, on New York City and Washington, DC, heightened our
awareness of affectivity and its role in geopolitical thinking. In particular,
they highlight five ways in which affect has become central to debates.
First, they note that the notion of terrorism itself, and a subsequent “War
on Terror,” required a heightened understanding of terror, emotion,
and thus affectivity. In particular it highlights the ways in which affect
can be shaped by governments and other political actors. Related to this
is a second concern with the role that the 9/11 attacks played as an af-
fective reservoir that has provided tremendous justification for military
intervention by the United States and its allies. This has been the subject
 Affect, Embodiment, and Military-Themed Video Games 123

of research by Gearóid Ó Tuathail (2003), who focused on the concept

of somatic markers. Somatic markers draw on the first, more neurologi-
cal version of affect described above (Connolly 2002). Ó Tuathail (2003,
858) describes somatic markers as “an organizing
and categorizing capacity that sets the ground for
somatic marker
higher-order ‘deliberative thinking.’ Operating be-
Key experience
low the threshold of reflection and structured by that serves as the
affect-saturated memory and ‘gut feelings,’ it sim- basis for “gut”
plifies and speeds the process of calculative rea- decision making
soning so that every decision is relatively instan- in the future
taneous rather than a rational-choice marathon.”
He argues that 9/11 made a powerful impression
on many, especially Americans, through the avenues of popular culture
that mediated it: “dramatic visual footage, poignant still photography,
eyewitness experiences, spectacles of catastrophe, ‘portraits of grief,’ and
endless television programs, newspapers articles, movies, documentaries,
theatrical plays, and, of course, songs and music” (859).
The third way in which affect has emerged in geopolitical research is in
studies of violence and the media. Violence is obviously something that
elicits powerful emotions from those involved, but remember that affect
is more than just emotions. Violence increasingly functions at a great dis-
tance and involves more than those immediately in conflict: “The point
here is not just that we see more and more images of violence acted out
on screens of various kinds. Rather, the point is that the very nature of
violence, and the manner in which it is conducted, is organized at least in
part to work through the affective logics of mediated spaces, whether this
is through tactics of ‘shock and awe’ [the blitzing of Baghdad in 2003] or
suicide bombing” (Carter and McCormack 2010, 106).
The fourth way in which affect has emerged in geopolitical research is
through the rise of critical security studies. This is a different field of study
from those who research how to make people feel secure (i.e., criminology,
terrorism studies, etc.), but rather is the study of how feelings of insecurity
are often generated by efforts to secure something.
This paradox of security has been highlighted as
one of the critiques of the “War on Terror”: ef- critical security
forts to find gaps in national security inevitably studies  Academic
find them, which makes citizens feel increasingly field that questions
upset and insecure, which was arguably the goal the basis of
of the terrorists in the first place. “In a world of traditional security
virtual threats, the fears and anxieties of which studies, especially
state-centrism
potential futures are generative become crucial to
and militarism
understanding how the logics of intervention are
reorganized in the present around efforts to en-
124 Chapter 6

gage with threats that have not yet materialized” (Carter and McCormack
2010, 106). The final point about the intersection of affect and geopolitics is
in research on geopolitical decision making. The very idea of affect prob-
lematizes the study of elites’ and everyday citizens’ geopolitical decision
making because it reminds us that there is a vast background noise of influ-
ence through which conscious decisions are filtered in subconscious ways.

Debates
Affect and, more broadly, nonrepresentational theory have emerged as
one of the most dynamic, and hotly contested, areas within geography.
There are three debates about affect that are of particular interest to popu-
lar geopolitics. The first debate is over the way that affect and nonrepre-
sentational theory are often seen as in opposition to the studies of dis-
course, representation, and narrative that have traditionally dominated
popular geopolitics. The second and third debates are narrower, about
the advantages and disadvantages of studying affect vis-à-vis studying
emotions and about the way the media is theorized in studies of affect.
Each of these will be discussed here in turn.
Affect has been controversial in the same way that representation and
narrative were when they were introduced in the 1980s, and this contro-
versy has been heightened in part because of the way in which these ideas
have been framed as “nonrepresentational theory.” That phrase may
sound pretty straightforward to an outsider, but for a discipline like geog-
raphy, which has always had a major focus on representation (remember
geography’s origins as “earth writing” from chapter 1—geography has
long been about actively representing or, later, studying representations),
the notion of a nonrepresentational geography is anathema to many prac-
titioners within the discipline. The framing of nonrepresentational theory
was explicitly intended to distance the project from previous, comfortable
ways of studying geography. However, the exclusionary tone of the term
led many geographers to feel like their research agenda was now being
cast into the disciplinary past, as something retrograde (Castree and Mac-
millan 2004). This was, as is now apparent, never the intention of those
advancing the ideas of nonrepresentational theory; they simply felt that
to get affect taken seriously it would have to be isolated from other intel-
lectual currents. One attempt to blunt this effect is the introduction of the
term “more-than-representational the-
ory,” which is awkward but differently
more-than-representational states the premise of the project—that
theory  More inclusive name understanding the human experience
for nonrepresentational theory
requires more attention to the senses,
the body, and the precognitive moment
 Affect, Embodiment, and Military-Themed Video Games 125

because the human experience exceeds attempts by discourse to abstract

it (Lorimer 2005). As described earlier, however, it is the everydayness
of affect (and popular culture as well) that makes it so relevant. Another
practical concern is how one researches such everyday things that are
meant to be beyond cognition and representation. How do you attempt
to capture and understand the visceral, often fleeting thrill of playing
virtual war, for example? (More on this later.) Moreover, writing up such
research poses the paradoxical dilemma of attempting to represent the
nonrepresentable. The study of affective life is presumed to pose prob-
lems for conventional ways of doing research, but such methodological
concerns have been addressed in recent work (see Vannini 2015).
The second debate of note for scholars of popular geopolitics is between
proponents of the study of affect and those who instead promote an in-
vestment in emotional geographies. Recall from earlier in the chapter that
affect is not reducible to the individual’s experience of emotions. Rather,
affect is centered on a more social sensory experience of the environment
and our relationship with it. Not everyone is in favor of this formula-
tion (Thien 2005, 450): “This model of affect discourages an engagement
with everyday emotional subjectivities, falling into a familiar pattern of
distancing emotion from ‘reasonable’ scholarship and simultaneously im-
plying that the emotion of the individual, that is, the realm of ‘personal’
feelings, is distinct from wider (public) agendas and desirably so.” This
criticism essentially means that, while affect claims to get at a more em-
bodied, experiential type of geography (and
geopolitics), it does so by refusing to actu-
ally look at individuals’ bodies and experi- posthumanism  Belief
ences and instead focuses on posthuman re- that the human condition
as shaped by technological
lationships. This criticism builds on feminist
and other relations alters
critiques that argue that the social sciences our understanding of
have long rejected the personal/emotional/ what it is to be human
feminine in favor of the universal/rational/
masculine.
These critics argue that a shift to considering people as “emotional
subjects” is a path away from the mechanistic, technocratic understand-
ings of geography that affect promotes. “Considering the production and
reproduction of an ‘emotional subject’ informs our understanding of the
relationship between the self and the places of our (en) actions” (Thien
2005, 453). Proponents of emotional geographies also argue that affect
has an impoverished notion of power; with affect, power resides with
whoever can set in place the environmental infrastructure to affect popu-
lations, and everyone else is subject to them. However, the perspective of
emotional geographies is that individuals exist with varying and complex
relationships to power: “The figures of the ‘terrorist,’ the ‘slave’ and the
126 Chapter 6

‘camp’ remind us of the need to challenge universalizing imperatives in

social and cultural theories which ultimately represent [a false] illusion of
‘choice’ for all and a partial theoretical amnesia” (Tolia-Kelly 2006, 216).
The shift in focus from the social to the individual when we shift at-
tention from affect to emotional geographies is, however, seen by propo-
nents of affect as a matter for concern. While the proponents of emotional
geographies seek to get as close as possible to the human and personal,
scholars of affect worry about the ethics of doing research on such an
intimate level. Further, the overriding focus on emotions conjures up a
vision of

emotional authenticity (veering towards emotional fundamentalism) . . . but

this only makes sense if we continue to think of lived experience as emphati-
cally and authentically human, and oppose it to such things as abstraction.
My sense is that we will never get near this kind of experience. . . . The affec-
tive authenticity of an emphatically human experience will always remain
asymptotic—or a matter of faith. (McCormack 2006, 331)

The third debate that is of interest to popular geopolitics regards the

role of the media in affective geographies. Much like affect can be seen to
have an undertheorized understanding of power, its understanding of the
media is very slight and largely relies on understandings of the environ-
ment (of which the media are a part) conveying messages: “the discovery
of new means of practicing affect is also the discovery of a whole new
means of manipulation by the powerful” (Thrift 2004, 58). In other words,
we live in environments that mediate the intentions of the powerful into
our precognitive selves. An example suitable to this argument could be
the use of chemicals to make the air on casino floors smell “fresher,” thus
boosting people’s spending at the slot machines by an average of 45 per-
cent. This would seem to be pretty strong evidence that the powerful (in
this case, casino owners) can shape our environments such that we can
no longer make our own decisions. However, consider this notion for a
moment—the implication is that we are all dupes of the environment that
we live in. There is no room for resistance, no room for alternative affects,
because the “real” work is done before we are even aware of anything
(recall that affect is prior even to feeling).

Classical media-effects research is often criticized for assuming a hypoder-

mic model of media power, ascribing to “the media” the ability to inject
their preferred messages into the minds of their audiences. [Scholar of affect]
Connolly goes one better than this: his account of media-affects is meant al-
most literally as a hypodermic model of influence, with media technologies
ascribed remarkable determinative power in infusing affective dispositions
under the skin of their audiences. (Barnett 2008, 193, emphasis in original)
 Affect, Embodiment, and Military-Themed Video Games 127

Just as we noted in chapter 2, the cultural studies tradition has long

been wary of imputing particular effects to mediated culture because the
ways in which audiences make sense of popular culture can be incredibly
varied. Similarly, it could be said that it is very difficult to know what
effect popular culture has on us in a precognitive sense. Proponents of
affect would argue that consumers are predisposed to a very few inter-
pretations by precognitive affect, but there is no way to verify what they
are and from what range of interpretations we were predisposed. “This
allows the critic to substitute their own analysis of the imputed effects/
affects of Film or campaign advertisements for any substantive analysis of
the practices in which these sound-images are embedded” (Barnett 2008,
193). This is a critique that will be taken up in more detail in chapter 7,
when we address audience-based research.
Now, however, we will turn our attention to one of the “powerful”
groups that are hypothesized to be behind our affective mediascapes:
the military-industrial-media-entertainment (MIME) complex. The media
and entertainment elements of this complex are often criticized as con-
tributing to an affective mediascape that promotes militaristic responses
via American popular culture. We will thus discuss the rise of the MIME
complex before looking at this chapter’s case study: commercial military-
themed video games and their intersection with the concept of affect.

INTRODUCTION TO THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL-

MEDIA-ENTERTAINMENT COMPLEX

In his 1961 farewell address to the American people, President Eisen-

hower gave what is probably his most famous speech. In it, he coined a
term that has remained with us ever since. The term is “military-indus-
trial complex,” and it refers to an emerging assemblage of campaigning
politicians, military elites, arms companies, and their lobbyists that came
into existence as the United States was, for the first time, creating a peace-
time military intended to have a global presence. Here is the relevant
quote from his speech:
This conjunction of an immense military estab-
lishment and a large arms industry is new in the military-industrial
American experience. The total influence—eco- complex  President
nomic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every Eisenhower’s wary term
city, every State house, every office of the Fed- for the institutional rela-
eral government. We recognize the imperative tionships of militarism
need for this development. Yet we must not fail emerging during
to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, his term in office
resources and livelihood are all involved; so is
128 Chapter 6

the very structure of our society. In the councils of government, we must

guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or
unsought, by the military-industrial complex. . . . Down the long lane of the
history yet to be written America knows that this world of ours, ever grow-
ing smaller, must avoid becoming a community of dreadful fear and hate,
and be instead, a proud confederation of mutual trust and respect.

The speech is generally viewed as incredibly prescient, and is all the more
interesting given Eisenhower’s previous career as a five-star general in
the U.S. Army during World War II.

EXPANSION OF THE COMPLEX

The complex, however, has far exceeded the comments made by Eisen-
hower. In 2017, the United States spent over $610 billion on defense,
which is more than China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, India, France, the UK,
and Japan combined. Policy has increasingly been made by a group of
professionals that include military officials, retired military officials who
now lobby on behalf of arms manufacturers, and academics in think
tanks that are funded by the military and arms manufacturers. Threats
are found as a reason to justify ever-higher spending on new weapons
systems (Johnson 2004). The military-industrial complex has naturalized
this state of affairs so that it is taken for granted as a facet of American life
and has become difficult to shift.
James Der Derian (2009) has argued that the discursive absence of this
debate is part of an ongoing revolution in politico-military affairs that
seeks to mask the costs of militarism from domestic populations. He
refers to this as “virtuous war.” “At the heart of virtuous war is the tech-
nical capability and ethical imperative to threaten and, if necessary, actu-
alize violence from a distance—with no or minimal casualties” (Der Derian
2009, xxxi, emphasis in original). The part of this that concerns popular
geopolitics is less the technical capability (by and large the product of the
weapons procurement described above as the military-industrial com-
plex) than the ethical imperative for military action. Der Derian argues that
in order to achieve the ethical imperative, the military-industrial complex
has adapted to include elements of the media and the entertainment in-
dustries (hence the longer title: MIME complex).
The complex increasingly pervades the everyday life of consumer soci-
ety in obvious and not so obvious ways. Take, for example, Global Posi-
tioning System (GPS) technology. The technology has become ubiquitous
for many of us, helping us reach our destinations via in-car navigation
systems, monitoring how far we travel in our fitness workouts, and enter-
 Affect, Embodiment, and Military-Themed Video Games 129

taining us in the case of the mobile game Pokémon Go. Yet it originated as
a military technology and was most famously used during the Gulf War
in 1990–1991 to provide navigation for weapons systems (Kaplan et al.
2013). This dual-use technology is but one of the ways military technolo-
gies have been appropriated for civilian use and shows the ways the com-
plex has become entangled in our everyday life. Perhaps more significant
is how our understandings of the military and
what they do has been shaped by the media and
dual-use technology
popular culture. They become a means by which
A technology that can
war becomes available to civilian and consumer have both military and
society. Roger Stahl (2010) uses the term “mili- civilian applications
tainment” to consider the relationship between
the military and the entertainment industry, in
particular how “state violence translated as an
object of pleasurable consumption” (6). This militainment 
emerging alliance between the entertainment Relationship between
industry and the military has encouraged U.S. entertainment and
the military and its
civilians to understand war in particular ways.
representation
Stahl (2010) outlines three dominant tropes
that have emerged in the mediation of what he
terms spectacular war within U.S. society. First,
there is the trope of “clean war,” in which war is spectacular war 
presented as surgical, sanitized, or absent from War presented as
our screens. The media has been key in promot- a spectacle to be
ing the low casualty rates of recent U.S. engage- watched and con-
ments (for example, an amazing zero, excluding sumed by audiences
accidents, in the Kosovo bombing campaign of
1999). This masking of the costs of war from
civilian and domestic populations speaks to
interactive war 
the virtuous war outlined above by Der Derian.
Spectacular war,
The second trope is that of technofetishism and but produced to
the ways in which weapons take center stage in have interactivity
the presentation of war to audiences. Military with consumers
weapons and technology are celebrated and
worshipped at the expense of acknowledging
what they do to their victims. The final trope concerns “supporting the
troops,” in which debates around the legitimacy of war itself are eclipsed
by the need to demonstrate unequivocal support to the soldiers on the
front line. As Stahl (2010) continues, this notion of spectacular war has
more recently been superseded by what he terms interactive war. Rather
than watching war unfold on screen, civilians are increasingly invited
to interact and step into the screen. This is especially evident in the
proliferation of military-themed video games (discussed later) in which
130 Chapter 6

players virtually enter and experience the battlefield from a first-person

perspective. Before shifting attention to this, we want to expand further
on the historical evolution of the relationship between the military and
entertainment industries.

History of the Military-Entertainment Alliance

The interconnection between military technology and entertainment tech-
nology is nothing new. As Paul Virilio (1989) has documented, the ability
to see the enemy and kill them has developed in parallel with the ability
to take moving pictures—both seeing innovation in the late 1800s as both
the Gatling gun and the motion picture camera required the rotation of a
drum or reel to rapidly move bullets or film through a chamber quickly.
Typically, the flow of technology has been from the military to more light-
hearted uses, but this is not always true as we shall see.
Cinema in particular has typically been supportive of the military. Cecil
B. DeMille used to lead parades of actors carrying prop weapons down
Hollywood Boulevard during World War I. War movies emerged as a
distinct genre shortly after the creation of the industry and the Treaty
of Versailles that ended World War I in Western Europe. Shortly after
the end of the war, movies were being made that dramatized the soldier
heading off to war, facing adversity, struggling with the moral implica-
tions of war, and returning home to find moral absolution in his girlfriend
or wife. The United States took the lead in the industry as a result of the
lack of rebuilding necessary in the United States after the war, but the po-
litical use of film in Europe quickly eclipsed what was being done in the
United States (D. W. Griffith’s The Birth of a Nation [1915] notwithstand-
ing). There, political movements seized on film as
a way of bringing legitimacy to their goals and
methods (Virilio 1989, 54):
Birth of a Nation
1915 silent film set
In 1934 Hitler called on Leni Riefenstahl to make Tri-
during the Civil
War that promoted
umph of the Will, offering the young director an unlim-
white supremacy; ited budget, a hundred and thirty technicians and
biggest Hollywood ninety cameramen (to be placed on specially built lifts,
moneymaker turrets and platforms). All this to film the week-long
until 1937 congress of the National-Socialist Party in Nuremberg,
and to spread the Nazi myth around the world with a
film of unprecedented magnificence.

However, the primary purpose of the Nazi party meeting in Nuremberg

was to be the subject of the film. This is an example of the conspicuous
doubling that takes place with war and the media. Much like the “shock
 Affect, Embodiment, and Military-Themed Video Games 131

and awe” tactics that were used to launch the 2003 invasion of Iraq, it is
difficult to know whether so many bombs were dropped because they
were tactically necessary or because they were necessary for the mediated
images of American power they would provide.
After World War II began, most participating countries became in-
volved in the use of cinema for propaganda purposes, with Hollywood
directors like John Huston and Frank Capra leading the American effort.
Capra’s Why We Fight series (seven movies, released 1942–1945) is perhaps
the most famous and was planned by Capra as a direct response to Tri-
umph of the Will. Intended to counteract the strong isolationist impulses of
many Americans, the first hour-long episodes of Why We Fight were meant
to shore up the will to fight among servicemen but later lapsed into histori-
cal narrative of the war and its antecedents. British propaganda films were
abundant as well, such as In Which We Serve (1942) and The Next of Kin
(1942), the first about the importance of doing your duty in combat and
the second about the ever-popular wartime truism, “loose lips sink ships.”
Nazi propaganda is of course well known, and in fact the analysis of
Nazi propaganda marked the beginnings of modern social science’s en-
gagement with the media. Germany had a Ministry for Public Enlighten-
ment and Propaganda that was responsible for maintaining the moral sup-
port of the German people for government activities. The most infamous
cinematic foray for Nazi Germany (outside the aforementioned Triumph
of the Will) is The Eternal Jew (1940), which portrays in documentary style
Hitler’s vision of the Jews as an unhygienic and lazy race, especially when
contrasted with the healthy German race. The movie is now banned from
public viewing in Germany. Similar to Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy had
established a Ministry of Press and Propaganda by 1935, and it was subse-
quently renamed the Ministry of Popular Culture in 1937 (Caprotti 2005).
The ministry was in charge of the production of propagandistic newsreels
that presented the news from a Fascist perspective, to be viewed at the be-
ginning of feature films in theaters. Documentaries and feature films were
also produced through collaboration with the government.
Today’s world of high-profile cinema, stars, and paparazzi seems a
million miles away from the heavy-handed propaganda of World War II.
Nevertheless, there remains a great deal of interplay between the military
and Hollywood. In November 2001 and the months preceding the decla-
ration of the War on Terror by President George W. Bush, U.S. entertain-
ment industries met with presidential advisor Karl Rove to discuss the
role popular culture has for U.S. national security. The event took place
in the heart of Hollywood, and this so-called Beverly Hills Summit sought
to discuss the ways the U.S. entertainment industries might present par-
ticular narratives to audiences, including
132 Chapter 6

that the war is against terrorism, not Islam; that Americans must be called
to national service; that Americans should support the troops; that this is a
global war that needs a global response; that this is a war against evil; that
American children have to be reassured; and that instead of propaganda, the
war effort needs a narrative that should be told. (cited in Brady 2012, 112)

While the details and implications of the summit remain somewhat

vague, there has been notable increased collaboration between the U.S.
Department of Defense and the wider entertainment industry. While
estimates of these collaborations have been quite conservative, the latest
figures suggest that the U.S. government has worked closely with over
one thousand network television programs and eight hundred films in
projecting a particular narrative on the national security of the United
States (Alford and Secker 2017). Filmmakers with military assistance get
access to ships, planes, and tanks, but they also get military input on
scripts—with the understanding that if they do not accept that advice
they will lose access to millions of dollars worth of military equipment
that they need to make a realistic-looking movie.
The sci-fi naval action movie Battleship (2012), in which the world
comes under attack from extraterrestrial creatures, received a range of
military assistance, support, and equipment from the U.S. Navy. The
retired battleship USS Missouri featured prominently in the film, while
former and currently serving military personnel were cast as background
actors and acted as advisors in the film’s production. It was reported that
the U.S. Department of Defense ceased its cooperation with the superhero
film The Avengers (2012) due to its unrealistic nature. The U.S. Department
of Defense was confused by the film’s portrayal of the fictional extragov-
ernmental organization SHIELD (discussed in chapter 5), an intelligence
agency that brought superheroes together to maintain global security. In
the movie, SHIELD appeared to override the authority of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense and was therefore deemed unrealistic and unworthy of
military assistance.* Furthermore, movies critical of the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan have had a more difficult time getting military approval.
While this is a long way from censorship (after all, the movies can be, and
are, made anyway), the military support for promilitary movies amounts
to a government subsidy for private, commercial enterprise that dovetails
with the vision of virtuous war described above.
The entertainment industry is, of course, far broader than simply Hol-
lywood. What has become increasingly telling is the increasing synergy
between the video game industry and the military. Unusually, this is an
example of the entertainment industry providing technology to the mili-

*  To reiterate: SHIELD pulls rank on the DoD? Unrealistic. A World War II battleship
defeats an alien invasion? Realistic.
 Affect, Embodiment, and Military-Themed Video Games 133

tary (as stated earlier, usually it has occurred in the other direction, as in
the case of the Gatling gun and the motion picture camera). In this case,
the video game industry and technologies have become increasingly im-
portant in helping to both educate the armed services and shape civilians’
understanding of conflict.
Perhaps the most famous example is the Defense Department’s de-
velopment of the game America’s Army. The freely downloadable game
was first released in 2002 and received over fifty thousand downloads on
its first day. By 2009 it was entertaining over nine million registered us-
ers. Unlike other military-themed shooters that put players straight into
the thick of the action, America’s Army seeks to emulate the U.S. Army’s
military policy and procedures. This means players must undergo Basic
Combat Training (BCT) and achieve a satisfactory score before continuing
further in the game. The U.S. military’s Rules of Engagement (RoE) are
strictly enforced through the game rules and structures. If players violate
the RoE, they can face instant reprisal and become incarcerated within a
military prison cell accompanied by the
somber sounds of a harmonica. It is the
rules and structures of the game that gen- Basic Combat Training A
erate the game’s meaning, and in this case training course used by the
U.S. military to transform
reinforce the ideologies of the U.S. Army,
civilians into soldiers
“encourag[ing] players to consider the
logic of duty, honor, and singular political
truth as a desirable worldview” (Bogost
2007, 79). The game has thus become an
important tool for recruitment, offering a rules of engagement
relatively inexpensive means of attracting Internal military rules
that dictate when
possible recruits. Moreover, the modifica-
force can be used
tion of the game allows the training of ac-
tual recruits. The need to understand and
simulate the role of affect, feeling, and emotion in foreign policy and in
combat has long been an imperative for political and military leaders who
want to ensure that soldiers and sailors continue to be an effective fighting
force, but as we saw above, there is also an increasing interest in sustain-
ing the moral underpinnings of militarism among democratic popula-
tions. In the next section we will see how commercial video games have
been used to immerse citizens in their affect-laden virtual environments.

CASE STUDY: EXPERIENCING THE CALL OF DUTY

Having heard about affect and its influence on the geopolitical literature
and then about the construction of the MIME complex, it is now time to
134 Chapter 6

look at a concrete example in which the concept of affect is deployed and

encountered in ways that produce a militarized culture. It could be said
that, in the context of popular culture and the military, representations
and narratives show us why we fight, and affect is the key to understand-
ing how it is to fight, and that by shifting the terms of discussion it limits
the debate to technical questions rather than ethico-political ones. To
demonstrate this, our case study will look at the genre of popular culture
that is perhaps most associated with affect: video games.
While scholarship has been attentive to the ways the U.S. military has
actively engaged with video games (i.e., in the case of America’s Army),
there has been limited focus on the ways war has become a staple back-
drop for a range of commercial video game titles. A host of commercial
military-themed video games, such as Call of Duty, Battlefield, and Medal
of Honor, have become hugely popular. The Call of Duty franchise has
become a worldwide phenomenon, selling over 250 million units glob-
ally and boasting over $15 billion in total sales. The franchise has long
focused on historical conflicts, though more recently they have engaged
with more contemporary geopolitical narratives showing a desire to
“mirror ‘real’ world conflict scenarios” (Power 2007, 272), often from the
first-person perspective of Western military avatars (namely, the United
States and the UK). While such video games are not directly produced or
funded by the military (as is the case with America’s Army), these games
are still caught up within the MIME. In order to create “realistic” and
“authentic” experiences, military advisors are often hired to advise in
the production process. The Call of Duty: Modern Warfare series had its
own military advisor, and the game designers even visited military bases
to witness military exercises and live firing. While the developers do at-
tempt to create a sense of military realism, the prevailing focus is on how
to create an immersive gaming experience that encourages consumers to
play again and again.
For military-themed video games, the gaming experience is essential
for understanding the importance of researching and understanding af-
fect. As Lenoir and Caldwell (2018, 84) suggest,

what becomes important with the rise of wargame franchises is the construc-
tion of an aesthetic—an affective framework for experience—that targets and
exploits embodiment more than cognition to immerse the player in the game
world. Far from concerning themselves with communicating propagandistic
values or skills that are unique to the military, wargame developers focus
their most significant efforts on constructing the gaming experience—that is,
how players feel when immersed in their game.

In other words, rather than striving to create a realistic presentation of

U.S. military structures and ideologies, the commercial sector strives to
 Affect, Embodiment, and Military-Themed Video Games 135

translate war into a positive affective experience for the player. Rather
than just acknowledging the narrative and representations in these com-
mercial military-themed video games, it is argued that affect plays a
powerful role in shaping contemporary U.S. geopolitical and military
imaginations, which we now expand on in further detail.
The affective gaming experience is notable throughout the production,
marketing, and interaction with the game itself. The embodied experience
is central to how popular understandings of war and geopolitics enter
everyday life. In the first instance, considerable effort is placed on the
transformation of war—a topic that is not inherently pleasurable—into
an enjoyable and positive heroic experience for consumers. Unlike games
such as America’s Army (discussed earlier), commercial titles are less in-
clined to strive for credible military procedures. They instead attempt to
engineer an exhilarating and adrenaline-pumping experience that keeps
players hooked. As such, game designers attempt to create and modulate
positive affective encounters with the game world that are accessible and
appeal to mass audiences.
It is the affective qualities of playing virtual war that become a key
selling point for these video games. Due to the highly competitive nature
of the video game industry, huge amounts of money and resources are
devoted to the marketing of games. In what has been dubbed the experi-
ence economy (Pine and Gilmore 2011), West-
ern industries increasingly target and exploit
the senses of consumers to create emotional at- experience economy
tachments in order to boost their product sales. An economy built
around selling sensory
As such, marketing campaigns of commercial
experiences (see, for
video games have become more spectacular instance, the rise of
and focus on the selling of the war experience. the “bucket list”)
The release of Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3
(2011), which saw the game’s conflict spread
into major Western cities, involved spectacular marketing events that
aimed to blur the game world and the real world.
For instance, in London an event for the global release for the game saw
uniformed actors abseil down buildings and patrol the streets, mirroring
the game narrative in which major Western cities such as London became
the scenes of terrorist attacks (see figure 6.2). The military presence can be
seen to connect and exploit the anxieties of terrorist violence in Western
cities in order to sell the pleasures of virtual war. Here, the threats and
fears of terrorism could be overcome by buying and playing the game as
heroic Western Special Forces.
Of course, the affective experience of military-themed video games
largely comes from interacting within the video game itself. Adding a layer
of complexity to the study of other forms of popular culture, video games
136 Chapter 6

require the active, relational, embodied engagement of the player with the
game environment.
This alone marks video games as one of the
most interesting fields in popular geopolitics. As
immersion  State video gaming technology has become more so-
of being in which phisticated, it has become common for games to
full interaction is implement a three-dimensional visualization in an
possible with an attempt to make players feel immersed in the vir-
environment, either
tual environment. Immersion has been described
real or virtual
by humanities and technology professor Janet
Murray (1997, 98–99) as

a metaphorical term derived from the physical experience of being sub-

merged in water. We seek the same feeling from a psychologically immersive
experience that we do from a plunge in the ocean or swimming pool: the
sensation of being surrounded by a completely other reality, as different as
water is from air, that takes over all of our attention, our whole perceptual
apparatus. . . . In a participatory medium [like video games], immersion
implies learning to swim, to do the things that the new environment makes
possible . . . the enjoyment of immersion as a participatory activity.

Immersion toys with the human/environment affective experience to

get players to forget the “reality” in which they sit and instead substitute
the sounds, sights, and perspectives associated with the game. Indeed,
Murray hints that this feeling accounts for much of the pleasure associ-
ated with video games.

Figure 6.2. “Launch night” celebrations in London for Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3.
Note the actors in military uniform in the background. (Photo by Daniel Bos)
 Affect, Embodiment, and Military-Themed Video Games 137

This sense of immersion in such video games has been aided by tech-
nological developments. Here, the re-creation of three-dimensional visu-
alizations of game spaces have become common and allow a particular
mode of encountering virtual environments. As Rachel Hughes puts it
(2007, 978), “the term ‘visuality’ is used to denote vision as something that
is always culturally mediated.” Seeing is more than just looking at some-
thing, but we can consider the ways vision
is organized within the game world. Mili-
tary-themed video games often use a first- visuality  The blending of
biological vision with cultural
person perspective that puts the player in
processes that mediate it
the position (literally, inside the head and
looking out through the eyes) of a soldier
in combat, which “heightens the sense of ‘being there’ and immersion in
the gaming narrative” (Bryce and Rutter 2002, 72). This sense of immer-
sion is not just presented through the visual field offered to players.
In privileging the analysis of representations and visual imagery, there
is a tendency to discount the fact that video games are multimodal. In this
case, video game meaning is generated in a complex interaction between
game play, vision, narrative, and audio that immerse players in war-torn
environments. Audio is integral to generating an affective relationship
between player and game world. There are two predominant modes of
sound to consider here. Diegetic sounds are those that are produced as
a result of player interactions with the game world, such as the sound
of gunfire. Nondiegetic sounds, on the other hand, are sounds that are
presented as external to the in-game environment. This includes ad-
ditional music that can be played in the
background and that can encourage par-
ticular affective states and build tension, diegetic sound  Sound
as in the case of the Resident Evil horror presented as part of
on-screen action
video game. Music is used throughout the
Call of Duty series to amplify the immer-
sive experience of the virtual landscapes
and the places depicted. In-game music nondiegetic sound
becomes an important feature that not Background sound that is
only works affectively, generating states not part of the on-screen
of “safety” and “danger” via players’ action (e.g., theme music)
movement through the landscape, but
is used to actively promote a sense of the wider geopolitical narratives
encountered by players. As one of the producers of Call of Duty suggests,

we [the producers] thus tried to give with the music a persistent sense of the
fact that you’re always part of a team as well as a greater conflict, a much
more geopolitical context, albeit a fictional one. (Van Zelfden 2007, online)
138 Chapter 6

As we can see, the music is crafted in a way that encourages the sense of
the game’s fictional geopolitical narrative, simplifying the conflict to “us”
(Western military forces) versus “them” (non-Western terrorists). Sound
works within the contexts of the imagery and game play in ways that
amplify players’ embodied experience of playing virtual war. This brings
to our attention how geopolitics is communicated and amplified through
various techniques and the complex arrangement of imagery, sound, nar-
rative, and game play.
As discussed earlier in the chapter, drawing attention to affect does not
require ignoring representations. Instead it calls attention to what such
images and representations do to players. In this respect, affects experi-
enced by the player are complemented by representations, as Shaw and
Warf suggest (2010, 1341):
an affective insight sheds some light on the dangers of cultivating hatred
towards [the representation of] “Arab enemies” in games like Call of Duty 4
(or any “Other” enemy), or feelings of desire or disgust for hypersexualized
and racist portrayals of men and women.

As a key object depicted in the game, military weapons are important to

the ways players interact with and experience the game world. The weap-
ons often replicate real-world weapons used by military forces. Moreover,
they structure ways of being within the game environment and stand in for
objects symbolic of the exercise and “performance of state power” (Mee-
han et al. 2013, 8). Yet they are not just understood through their visual
depictions or performances in the game world but also through the ways
they are felt and embodied. In order to give a sense of presence, commer-
cial video games are often designed with technologies of force feedback in
mind. This includes game controllers that vibrate
in ways that respond to on-screen action—the
force feedback  A firing of a weapon in this case. The haptic forces
technology used to and sounds encourage the spillover of the virtual
provide a sensation militarized world into the physical world, expe-
that is felt by the
rienced by players as a bodily sensation, as this
user’s body and
often corresponds player discusses: “I like the suppresser on it [the in-
with on-screen action game weapon] sometimes because it’s quite quiet and
I want that stealth and you can hear the power of the
gun as well. You just feel like you’re doing more dam-
age” (cited in Bos 2018, 61). By turning to affect,
we note how commercial military-themed video
haptic Relating to games generate an affective experience of war,
the sense of touch
but one stripped of danger, political contexts, and
consequences.
 Affect, Embodiment, and Military-Themed Video Games 139

CONCLUSION

Summary
The conceptual part of this chapter began by outlining the various strands
of thought that are united in the concept of affect, both the more neuro-
logical and the more relational. It then covered several criticisms of affect,
including opposition from more discursively minded scholars and also
criticism from those who want studies of affect to pay more attention to
individuals and the ways in which they experience affects. The growth
of scholarly attention to affect can be partly attributed to the attacks of
September 11, 2001, which brought concepts like “terror” more fully into
the realm of geopolitical thought.
In the case study portion of this chapter, the idea of the MIME complex
was introduced. The MIME complex produces a culture of militarism in
the United States, perhaps best emblematized by the fact that the United
States spends more than the rest of the world combined on its military.
The military-industrial complex has long been recognized as a machine
for procuring funding for the U.S. military, but recently attention has
turned to the ways in which the media and entertainment industries work
to procure ethical cover for U.S. interventions around the globe. In par-
ticular, this chapter focused on the affectivity of popular military-themed
video games, which can be seen to predispose viewers and players to a
culture of militarism. However, affect itself is not a militaristic or antira-
tional form of relating to the world; it is instead pliable and can be put to
any end, of any political persuasion.

Extensions in Your Life

On the one hand, affect is a difficult concept to consider applying in ev-
eryday life, given its precognitive basis. However, a fruitful place to start
is to consider our everyday living spaces.

•  What kind of architecture surrounds you on an average day?

• What other kinds of affective influences might be predisposing you
to certain engagements with the world?
• What techniques are used in popular culture to generate and amplify
affective experiences for audiences?
• How can we have an affect that will cultivate a disposition in the
world that reflects a preferred geopolitical imagination?
 7
,
Audiences, Assemblages,
and the Everyday
Geopolitics of Heritage

THE CONCEPT: AUDIENCES

Ideas
In chapter 2, we introduced several different ways of theorizing popular
culture. The work of the Frankfurt School, Antonio Gramsci, and Michel
Foucault were introduced as theorizations of popular culture that saw it
as a way to subvert class-based or other identities by introducing ideolog-
ical content to popular culture’s consumers. While there were differences
among these theorists, they were linked in their view of popular culture
as something produced by elites and consumed by everyday people. Mi-
chel de Certeau, however, was also introduced as providing a different
kind of perspective, one that focused on how people navigate everyday
life. Up until now, the case studies in this book have drawn primarily
from the first tradition (especially from Gramsci and Foucault), but in
this chapter we will instead be drawing more from the perspective that
de Certeau embodies—the practice of everyday life.
In this chapter we will examine the ways in which people engage with
popular culture, moving through three different understandings of audi-
encing: the passive audience, the active audience, and assemblages. To a
certain extent, this evolution of audiencing itself embodies a criticism of
the tacit assumption of the passive audience in our previous case studies.
By “passive audience,” we mean the assumption that readers/viewers/
consumers are passive recipients of whatever messages the popular cul-
ture in question has embedded in it. This idea is sometimes referred to
as the hypodermic needle model of media, conjuring the idea of popular
141
142 Chapter 7

culture as “injecting” secret propaganda

hypodermic needle model  messages into people’s worldviews.
A conceptualization of popular These analyses, of comic books, movies,
culture as a sneaky way to
literature, video games, etc., are pre-
“inject” people with propaganda
sented as authoritative understandings
of the meanings found in these forms
of popular culture. However, they most
active audience  Notion of
definitely are not—they are readings of
audiences not simply as passive those media by specific people: academ-
recipients of messages but ics who have their own geographies
also as creators of meaning and histories that they bring to the con-
sumption and research process. While
there is a role and a purpose for this
(as hopefully the preceding case studies have shown), it is nevertheless
important to think more critically about popular culture and how it is
changed and shaped by the everyday practices of people. In other words,
we are shifting from an understanding of meaning as inherent in a text
(“text” referring to any kind of popular culture) to an understanding of it
as emergent from people’s interactions with popular culture.
This is an appealing perspective for a variety of reasons, but perhaps
most obviously because it seems to reflect our own self-perception as be-
ing something more than just victims of elite cultural producers. We do
not simply think what they want us to think, and we do not simply go
out and consume things because they tell us to. We exercise choice and
restraint, often resisting especially ham-handed attempts to colonize our
consciousnesses by doing the exact opposite. For instance, when U2 made
a deal with Apple in 2014 to automatically download their album Songs of
Innocence to five hundred million iTunes accounts (and associated Apple
devices, like iPhones), Bono, the lead singer of U2, was forced to apolo-
gize for giving his music away for free.
Of course, producers of popular culture, like Island Records or Warner
Brothers Studios, have tremendous power to shape their products. The
example of pop music should not lead us to believe that producers are
powerless—the efforts of cultural producers to create demand for their
products through advertising surround us all the time. For example, fol-
lowing the attacks of September 11, 2001, SUV (sport-utility vehicle) sales
skyrocketed in the United States as these trucks became retooled to have
aggressive styling that made them look more like mobile fortresses. The
Nissan Pathfinder was rebranded as the Nissan Pathfinder Armada and
now is simply the Nissan Armada. The new-look SUVs caught the public’s
imagination as a defensive measure to provide security for children dur-
ing a time of geopolitical uncertainty (Bradsher 2004; Lauer 2005). Never-
theless, many Americans opted not to buy SUVs. Clearly marketing has
 Audiences, Assemblages, and the Everyday Geopolitics of Heritage 143

limits. How can we reconcile these disparate experiences—the inculcation

of an idea via advertising and our frequent rejection of such messages?
It is perhaps best to think of these two perspectives as extremes and
instead think of a text (like a car commercial, magazine article, or movie)
as a cultural resource that may be utilized by consumers to create mean-
ing that is attributed to the text. Each text has certain attributes that might
predispose audiences to a particular meaning. This is because the very
fundamental purpose of language is communication—conveying mean-
ing. Life is full of misunderstandings and cultural dissonance, but it would
be a mistake to think that effective communication is not possible at all.
Now, the question of conveying meaning is of course separate from the
question of convincing an audience that a meaning is true and important
to them. Conveying the idea to people that an SUV is safe is much sim-
pler than making them want to part with $46,000. What made the SUV
marketing so successful? There are many answers to that, some of which
have to do with the marketing materials and some with identity. SUV
advertisements often show images of families experiencing the outdoors,
driving to exotic places, and successfully surmounting physical obstacles.
The SUV, both in commercials and through its visual design (during this
period), was intended to symbolize freedom, which resonates with Amer-
ican notions of the good life. Further, the SUV represents independence
from the need for good road infrastructure (regardless of actual off-road
ability, which is often quite poor) and hence an ability to evacuate from an
area should there be danger. To the extent that individuals felt vulnerable
in the time after September 11, 2001, they likely felt a desire for SUVs and
were thus open to the marketing efforts of companies like GM and Nis-
san. Thus, our understandings of, and openness to, textual meanings are
as linked to our identities as they are to the texts themselves.
Geographer David Livingstone (2005) has theorized the act of textual
interpretation as occurring through two types of geography. The first
type he terms cartographies of textual recep-
tion. This term refers loosely to the imagined
communities described in chapter 2. These cartographies of textual
reception  Fault lines
communities, as you may remember, are
among audiences that
groups of people who, because of their com- primarily reflect linguistic
mon linguistic and other connections, think and other macro-scale
of themselves as a collective unity. This is cultural differences
a connection that links people across po-
tentially vast distances. The implications of
these cartographies might seem obvious to you—for example, that people
from Pakistan will make different sense of a film like Zero Dark Thirty
(2012) than an American audience would (the film portrays the American
mission to assassinate Osama bin Laden, who was hiding in Pakistan
144 Chapter 7

at the time). The second type of geography

cultural geographies through which textual interpretation oc-
of reading  Micro-scale curs has been termed by Livingstone as the
differences among readers cultural geographies of reading. This refers
that reflect different social
to the more complicated social networks in
identities and networks
which every textual consumer is embedded.
Every consumer of popular culture is em-
bedded in many different social networks that provide the frameworks
for his or her interpretations of a text.
Once popular culture is thought of in this way, it is very difficult to go
back to the previous, more passive view. For example, consider the X-
Men franchise (2000–). This franchise features a group of mutants (geneti-
cally gifted people) who have banded together to form a team, the X-Men,
for mutual protection and to create a safe haven for young mutants who
are persecuted by “normal” humans. One of the mutants in the movie,
Magneto, unlike the X-Men, argues for a strategy of confrontation that
will see mutants in the ascendancy on Earth. Professor X, the leader of
the X-Men, instead argues for a policy of accommodation that will see
prejudice decline over time as mutants and humans become accustomed
to each other. This conflict (and the longer story lines available in the
original comic book series) has been read in many ways by its audi-
ences—that is, they are active in the meaning-making of the film. Some
readers saw the story as an allegory for American race relations, with
Professor X standing in for Martin Luther
King Jr. and Magneto standing in for the
more confrontational Malcolm X (Trushell
Martin Luther King Jr. 
African American
2004). This reading makes special sense in
Baptist minister who the comic book, which was first published in
promoted nonviolent 1963. The revelation at the beginning of the
struggle in the American movie that Magneto is a Jewish Holocaust
civil rights campaign survivor heightens the probability of the
movie being read as a tale of ethnic conflict.
However, to many audiences, the fran-
Malcolm X  African chise’s tale of an oppressed genetic minor-
American civil rights ity has equally often seemed to be that of
advocate who rejected homosexuals (Earnest 2007), especially in
nonviolent struggle X2 (2003). In that film, the plot remains fo-
as inadequate in the
cused on ethnic conflict (the plot is driven
face of continued
white oppression
by a new law requiring mutants to register
with the government), but there is a scene
in which mutant Bobby Drake (Iceman)
“comes out of the closet” to his parents by demonstrating his power to
them. His mother’s response—“Have you tried not being a mutant?”—is
 Audiences, Assemblages, and the Everyday Geopolitics of Heritage 145

something of an in-joke with homosexual viewers as the clichéd response

of many parents of homosexuals (in the X-Men comics, Bobby Drake was
revealed to be gay in 2018, retroactively giving extra meaning to the scene
in X2). The third film, X-Men: The Last Stand (2006), is driven by a medi-
cal cure for mutanthood, intersecting with political debates in the United
States about homosexual marriage and whether or not homosexuality is
a choice or a genetic trait. Going further, in X-Men: Days of Future Past
(2014), the villain identifies the “mutant gene” and sets about eradicating
all who possess it, paralleling contemporary attempts to locate the “gay
gene” (Servick 2014). The X-Men movies, and the comic books before
them, provide cultural resources that can be interpreted and used by au-
diences in a variety of ways, depending on what audiences bring to the
encounter themselves.

Debates
So, while once geographers and other cultural theorists could safely mar-
ginalize the audience in studies of meaning, it is no longer possible to do
so. However, that does not mean there is no controversy surrounding
popular culture in everyday life. The question still remains: how do you
research these practices in everyday life given the tension between a pro-
ducer-led and audience-led notion of meaning in popular culture? And
what about affect, which was introduced in the previous chapter? What
role does affect play in the experience of popular culture, and conversely,
how does that experience change the consumer?
Researchers have attempted to answer these questions, both theoreti-
cally and practically, in a variety of ways. Early research on pop culture
consumption centered on subcultures (Storey 1996). Subcultures are
groups within a larger culture that differ in some fundamental way from
the rest of the culture in which they are immersed. Subcultures have
been popular in cultural studies for a variety of reasons. First, and most
practically, remember that cultural studies
emerged in the 1970s in the United King-
dom, a time of youth rebellion against Cold subcultures  Groups
War nuclear confrontation and the conser- distinct within the larger
vative social policies of Margaret Thatcher, culture in which they exist
when subcultures were out front and center
in British life (especially in London). Second,
given that the theory and politics of cultural studies celebrate the active
subversion of popular culture, youth subcultures were very attractive:

Through a process of “bricolage,” subcultures appropriate for their own pur-

poses and meanings the commodities commercially provided. Products are
146 Chapter 7

combined or transformed in ways not intended by their producers; commod-

ities are rearticulated to produce oppositional meanings. Examples include
teddy boys wearing Savile Row Edwardian jackets,
mods wearing Italian suits, punks using bin-liners
bricolage  Something and safety pins. In this way (and through patterns
creatively produced of behavior, ways of speaking, taste in music, and
from whatever so on), youth subcultures engage in symbolic forms
materials are at hand of resistance to both dominant and parent cultures.
(Storey 1996, 135–36)

A further reason research into subcultures became dominant is because

it narrows down the scope of cultural consumption to a select group that
is capable of being studied by a single researcher.
However, these subcultural studies were subsequently criticized be-
cause they focused on the spectacular and exceptional, ignoring the ev-
eryday and the common. The assumption is that subcultures are where
resistance occurs, and therefore there is some “normal” culture out there
that is passive and dominated. The elitism of older theorizations of popu-
lar culture (as an inferior form of culture to high culture) had effectively
been taken up by the scholars of cultural studies, who by celebrating
overt resistance missed out on the everyday resistance that is practiced
by everyone.
The altering of popular culture texts by audiences has been most pro-
nounced with fan subcultures, which have been a focal point for much of
this work in cultural studies. Fandom refers to the most ardent supporters
of a popular culture franchise, such as Star Wars, or, increasingly, to sup-
porters of someone who is involved in popular culture across multiple me-
dia, such as TV/movie scriptwriter and producer Joss Whedon or movie
director/comic book author Kevin Smith. Fandom is significant because,
like the subcultures associated with earlier research in cultural studies
(punks, etc.), fandom overtly takes popular culture seriously in ways that
“regular” audiences do not (at least publicly).
This leads to derision by outsiders, found most
obviously in stereotypes of Star Wars fandom
fandom  Social
and Bronies as basement dwellers trapped in a
networks composed
of fans of particular permanent state of adolescence. Ethnography of
elements of fandom, however, is often very revealing—both
popular culture for the demographic diversity of fandom and
also for the variety of meanings that the popular
culture has across this spectrum of individuals
(Brooker 2002).
Bronies  Older, male Fandom is viewed by cultural studies scholars
fans of My Little Pony as an overt site of performative consumption
(Hills 2002). Performative consumption is a term
 Audiences, Assemblages, and the Everyday Geopolitics of Heritage 147

that tries to describe popular culture’s openness of meaning—reminding

us that culture is forever in a process of reinterpretation by people who
are themselves performing their own identity. This perpetual reinter-
pretation prevents the closure of meaning, a truth of which we need to
continually remind ourselves. Fandom literally produces its own cultural
artifacts based on popular culture—some of which have even become
incorporated by the original producers,
such as the growth of Mulder and Scully’s
performative consumption
romantic relationship, which developed
Creation of new culture
slowly over the last several seasons of through the consumption
the X-Files. This romance first appeared of mass-produced culture;
many years earlier in fanfic (fan fiction), reflects view of culture
stories written by fans that often vary as always in process
greatly from the intentions of the original
producers. The most salaciously studied
topic in cultural studies has been “slash”
fanfic  Fan fiction; new
fiction, so called because of the shorthand
stories written by fans
used to denote these stories of homo- about characters from
sexual relationships among characters popular cultures
who are not portrayed as homosexual
in the canonical stories (i.e., Kirk/Spock,
Frodo/Samwise, etc.). Interestingly, these stories are usually written by
heterosexual women—another example of how fandom and performative
consumption often defy expectations.
Just as performative consumption tries to tie together the acts of pro-
duction and consumption, assemblage is a concept that tries to highlight
the “all at once” dimension of popular culture, by which we mean that
popular culture is not really a thing but rather is a happening (Dittmer
2014, 2015). An assemblage is a coming together of things (DeLanda 2006),
such as the body of a viewer, an iPhone screen, the streaming data coming
from YouTube’s servers through a WiFi router, a set of headphones, and
so on. These things come together to create an event—in this case, one of
the authors laughing through a supercut of every time Steve Carell said
“That’s what she said” in The Office*—which is ultimately unique, even if
it resembles many other viewings by people in other times and places. The
laughter generated the urge in this author
to “like” the video, thus generating data
for the algorithm that decides whether assemblage  A collection
of heterogeneous things, in
that video ought to appear in other time- relation with each other, that is
lines for other users. That event is shaped more than the sum of its parts
by the specifics of how that viewing came

*  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ClzJkv3dpY8.
148 Chapter 7

together—the installation of WiFi in a London train station, its high band-

width, and the author’s adolescent sense of humor.
That event is itself enmeshed in wider assemblages of popular culture,
such as the links between production and consumption that the idea of
performative consumption tries to get at. For instance, the rise of smart-
phones and social media apps such as Facebook and YouTube has re-
shaped more traditional forms of cultural production, such as the Tonight
Show. Late-night television in the United States has traditionally followed
a particular formula: monologue, interview, a comedy sketch, more in-
terviews. In recent years the comedy sketches have
risen in importance as a stand-alone gag meant
event  The coming
to drive traffic to the TV show and increase the
together of forces
to cause a change
cultural relevance of the late-night format, which
of some kind dates back to (around) 1954. Comedy bits like James
Corden’s “Carpool Karaoke” and Jimmy Fallon’s
“Lip Sync Battles” are designed to go viral (more
on virality in the next chapter) and demonstrate how practices of produc-
tion and consumption evolve together simultaneously. That is, assem-
blage highlights the importance of the materials of popular culture—the
technologies, the bodies of producers and consumers, and the affects that
bind it all together—in composing a constantly changing, unstable whole.
Assemblage thought has several implications for popular geopolitics.
First, assemblage shifts the attention of those studying popular geopoli-
tics from texts to events. Instead of studying (for instance) a video game
to examine its meaning, we instead turn to the encounter between players
and the game. While of course the game is important in that assemblage,
it does not determine what that encounter might produce. Subsequent
playings—even if you keep the game and the audience the same—will be
different, if only because they are no longer the first playing. Therefore
each “event” is unique, and although it may be similar (even overwhelm-
ingly so) to other such events, it is never reducible to them. We can there-
fore assume that every interpretation we might put on popular culture is
subject to being overturned.
Second, assemblage is material in orientation; it is talking about actual
stuff and how we sense that stuff. While it does not by any means dismiss
issues of meaning-making (the primary thrust of discourse approaches
to audiencing), it recognizes that processes of meaning-making occur
in specific contexts. Therefore, meaning-making is done by people who
are not just abstract minds; they have bodies that shape how they think.
Consider your own ability to pay attention to a movie or a lecture: did
you sleep well last night? Is your blood-sugar level low? Is your phone on
vibrate, distracting you and making you want to check your notifications?
 Audiences, Assemblages, and the Everyday Geopolitics of Heritage 149

Is the room too hot or too cold? Or, indeed, are you effective at studying
because you’ve got a white noise machine that screens out distractions?
Third, because things that are in assemblage with one another also af-
fect one another, each is changed—however subtly—by the experience
(see the previous chapter). This is most obvious in the aims of popular
culture, which is primarily to entertain and to enlighten (and to make
some money along the way). Popular culture is often described as “escap-
ist,” and this is but one affective reaction that is possible: to feel for a time
distant from your real life, its grind, its worries. But just as often popular
culture is meant to make you feel, to imagine what it would be like to be
in someone else’s shoes. That is, we talk about various genres of film and
literature: horror, thriller, love story. These are explicitly named by the
feelings they are meant to engender in the viewer or reader. However,
it is not just the audience that is changed by the affective dimensions of
assemblage. We have already discussed how pop culture’s meanings are
coproduced by the coming together of text and audience. But then there
are the material dimensions—the electricity used; the wear and tear on
equipment, books, etc.; the aforementioned additional data available for
algorithms to churn through; and so on. The affective impact of popular
culture is not always obvious or measurable, but it is always there.
Fourth, because assemblages are always changing, always becoming
something else, there is a tendency to think of them in very simultane-
ous, or “present,” terms. However, assemblages also incorporate various
pasts and futures into them. For instance, in the Marvel Cinematic Uni-
verse (discussed earlier), there is a complex interplay between the films,
which are frequently in traditional sequence with each other (e.g., Iron
Man [2008], Iron Man 2 [2010], and Iron Man 3 [2013]) but are also part of
a much larger assemblage of films that build the wider universe. So, Iron
Man 3 assumes to some extent that you know the backstory of Iron Man
and Iron Man 2. In the event of viewing, this may or may not be true of
various audience members. Those who have seen the movies bring that
experience with them in their memories. For those who have not seen the
movies, those past films must be explained or gestured toward in Iron
Man 3, at least sufficiently that those viewers do not lose the point of the
film. In other words, the past must be made materially present, either in
the film or in the viewer. Similarly, the knowledge that there is a larger
MCU means that fans anticipate how events in the broader network of
films are adding up to something yet to come. This is perhaps most obvi-
ous in the number of filmgoers who remain in the theater until the end of
the credits, where there is usually a short clip that hints at what is yet to
come. The future is palpable in that moment, in the bodies of filmgoers
waiting patiently in their seats for a glimpse of the yet-to-come.
150 Chapter 7

The complexity of tracing an assemblage—understanding its pasts and

futures and the various material components that compose it—is part of the
excitement around this concept. For instance, assemblage is useful because
it concretely connects the popular culture we consume with our actual
bodies existing in space. That is, thinking through assemblage allows us to
broaden the idea of popular culture from just the consumption of media to
the things we do, the cultural rituals in which we engage. For instance, we
are about to engage with a case study about museum-going, which would
not be considered as popular culture if we limit popular culture to media.
But this inclusiveness is also one of the criticisms. How can all these rela-
tionships be effectively traced? How do you know when to stop?
This section—tracing the shift from passive audiences, to active audi-
ences, to assemblage—has shown how each conceptualization increases
the complexity of what is being studied. If you imagine a passive audi-
ence, it is relatively easy to study—for example—a film. If you assume an
active audience, the study gets much bigger and more complicated. If you
think of the encounter between audience and film as an assemblage, it is
even more complex and indeed potentially endless. For this reason, many
scholars resist thinking through assemblage. However, in the case study
that follows, we consider the utility of assemblage for thinking through
the popular geopolitics of heritage.

INTRODUCTION TO HERITAGE

Altogether, assemblage approaches to popular culture enable us to con-

sider the connections between the four different sites (production, object,
audiencing, and circulation) and the three different modalities (techno-
logical, compositional, and social) discussed in chapter 3 (of course, it is
impossible to cover all of these in a single study, so you must be strategic
about your choices). As discussed above, one of the things that is useful
about assemblage is the way it allows for a range of pasts and futures
to shape the present. The caveat, though, is that those pasts and futures
must be materialized in some way. They have to be presented in order to
affect people, as in for instance the statue of Cecil Rhodes in Cape Town
(discussed in chapter 4). This is a topic that geographers have thought a
lot about through the concept of heritage.
Heritage refers to an element of the past that has contemporary rel-
evance. Remember from our discussion of narrative (chapter 5) that a wide
array of things happened in the past. However, most things are forgotten
or are understood to have been important for a while but have now been
superseded by other events. But plenty of things could still be understood
as important if only we knew about them or felt their presence in our lives.
 Audiences, Assemblages, and the Everyday Geopolitics of Heritage 151

It is for this reason that—for example—there are political debates about

holidays: what should be celebrated and how. Governments and other
groups interested in our collective narratives seek to shape our “heritage.”
Geographers have long been interested in this because of our interests
in landscape. That is, historical and cultural geographers have looked at
the landscape itself as a form of heritage, reflecting historical patterns of
power and identity. Think about, for instance, the monumental landscape
of Washington, DC. With well-known monuments
such as the Lincoln Memorial, the Washington Memo-
rial, the Jefferson Memorial, and the Vietnam Veterans heritage  An
Memorial, it is clear that the array of monuments seeks element of the
to compose a landscape that also narrates American past that has
contemporary
history; it articulates a heritage of the nation (figure 7.1).
significance
Crucially, however, the scene that we just described
is more than merely a story. It is a landscape composed
of stone monuments and urban design that accentuates visitors’ ability to
see these monuments in ways that impress upon the mind. Dwyer and
Alderman (2008, 167–68) discuss the politics of heritage landscapes thus:

Memorials influence how people remember and interpret the past, in part,
because of the common impression that they are impartial recorders of his-
tory. Their location in public space, their weighty space, and the enormous

Figure 7.1. The heritage landscape in Washington, DC. (Photo by Carol M. Highsmith)
152 Chapter 7

amounts of financial and political capital such installations require imbue

them with an air of authority and permanence. . . . Further, their apparent
permanence suggests the possibility of anchoring a fleeting moment in time
to an immovable place. Composed of seemingly elemental substances—wa-
ter, stone, and metal—memorials cultivate the appearance that the true past
is and will remain within reach.

It is because these memorials are so material that they gain their political
efficacy. Recall from chapter 4 when the statues of Cecil Rhodes became
controversial in the postcolonial context and how their permanence was
challenged by students across South Africa and beyond.
However, heritage is much more than just statues and monuments.
Dwyer and Alderman argue that heritage can be understood in our every-
day lives in a range of ways. First, heritage can be understood as a kind
of text. This mirrors our discursive framework for popular geopolitics
deployed in (for instance) chapters 4 and 5 of this book. Thinking of heri-
tage as a kind of text indicates both that some people are understandable
as producers of heritage and others as consumers (or passive audiences)
of heritage. For instance, and going back to our example of Washington,
DC, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial can be understood as the creation of
both the federal government (which commissioned and paid for it) and
the architect Maya Lin, who came up with the innovative design. The
“message” of the memorial is one of loss, because unlike most American
war memorials, the focus is not on heroic action but on the sacrifices of
the dead. This message was controversial at the time of the memorial’s
founding, but over time that message has taken hold and now the memo-
rial is generally beloved.
A second way to think about heritage is as an arena through which
contemporary debates about who “we” are work out. That is, the memo-
rial itself is not the focus, but debates about the memorial are; we might
think of this as the cognate of the “active audience” approaches detailed
earlier, in which audiences contest the meanings of texts. A key example
here has been the debates over Confederate War Memorials, which have
simmered for decades but reached a fever pitch in recent years, espe-
cially with the 2017 rally of a collection of neo-Nazi, neo-Confederate,
and white supremacist groups in Charlottesville, Virginia. This rally, to
show support for maintaining a Robert E. Lee statue in the city, resulted
in a violent clash between the white supremacists and a counterprotest
of antiracist and antifascist groups. One woman, Heather Heyer, was
killed when a Nazi sympathizer drove his car into a crowd of antiracist
marchers. The violence of the rally prompted a national discussion about
the ongoing role of white supremacy in American political life, which
prompted additional scrutiny of Confederate war memorials that remain
 Audiences, Assemblages, and the Everyday Geopolitics of Heritage 153

in place across the South. Note how in this case the “heritage” in question
is less the Confederate war memorials (although they are present) than
the political ideology of white supremacy itself, a dubious inheritance
from America’s founding.
The final way to study heritage in everyday life is as a kind of per-
formance. Dwyer and Alderman (2008, 173–74) note that “the memorial
landscape is constituted, shaped, and made important through the bodily
performance and display of collective memories.” Here we see something
that nears the assemblage approach detailed earlier in that it highlights
the materiality of not only the memorial but also the visitors who give it
meaning. But assemblage goes some ways further. Heritage is not the me-
morial or the meanings that people attribute to it, but instead the event,
the coming together of materials and bodies to affect one another. Because
all participants in an assemblage are changed, however subtly, by the ex-
perience, we cannot assume that the people entering into a heritage event
are the same as the ones coming out of it.
Consider, for example, a study by Crouch and Parker (2003) that fo-
cused on people participating in archaeological digs. By engaging with
heritage in this way—by literally digging up bits of material heritage—
they came to appreciate history in new and complex ways, feeling like
it was theirs. The individual archaeologists were not just academics ap-
plying their professional expertise to the topic—they were both affecting
the artifacts (by cleaning them, labeling them, etc.), and the artifacts were
changing them by altering the ways that the archaeologists felt about his-
tory. Therefore, the artifacts were in some ways reburied in the bodies of
the archaeologists to resurface later when necessary. Recall that heritage
is something from the past given contemporary significance; here the past
is materialized in the bodies of those who have participated in a heritage
event, ready to be activated at an appropriate time in the future.

Indeed, it is through bodily remembering that our engagements with heri-

tage spill out beyond representation, with memories being remembered and
moving through our bodies, where they are expressed once again and come
to affect ourselves, other bodies and other representations. (Waterton and
Watson 2014, 76)

It is this more visceral, passionate notion of the past, as something both

individual (a memory) and collective (heritage), that helps us make sense
of the tears shed day after day at the Vietnam War Memorial, of the ha-
tred that could lead to a woman being killed over a 150-year-old war,
and of the love that could lead otherwise sensible people to dig in the
mud for mere fragments of pottery. Heritage is something that animates
us, that moves us. And in that way it is also capable of being geopoliti-
154 Chapter 7

cal. In the next section we will detail everyday life in the Australian War
Memorial, showing how people encounter a museum and shrine devoted
to Australia’s war heritage. Each individual enters into the museum as-
semblage, with their experience changing them in ways that tend to rein-
force cultures of militarism. However, as we will see, the outcomes of the
assemblage can be unpredictable.

CASE STUDY: THE AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL

The Australian War Memorial (AWM) is, ac-

militarism  The cording to the Australian War Memorial Act of
belief that a strong 1980, intended to “maintain and develop the
military is a crucial national memorial,” to “develop and maintain
component of having
. . . a national collection of historical material,” to
a successful state
“exhibit . . . historical material from the memo-
rial collection,” and to “conduct, arrange for and
assist in research into matters pertaining to Australian military history.”
Located in Canberra, the capital of Australia, the AWM thus serves as a
museum, a shrine, and a research center for those interested in Australian
military history. There is a tension in these aims, particularly between the
“shrine” aspect (which commemorates the sacred sacrifice of Australian
soldiers in war) and the “museum” aspect, which tends to glorify war
through the display of weaponry and recounting of heroic battles. In
some ways this tension is paralleled in the discussion of the Vietnam War
Memorial in comparison to other war memorials in Washington, DC,
such as the World War II Memorial. As a result of these overlapping aims,
a wide array of visitors come to the AWM each day, from school groups
there to learn about military history, to family members researching and
mourning their ancestors, to “regular” tourists trying to see the sights of
Canberra. These people all arrive at the AWM each day with different
affective orientations—enthusiasm, historical curiosity, and solemnity,
just to name a few. They interact with each other, and with the material
architecture and exhibitions of the AWM, to create an assemblage, an
event, that is unique even as it is similar (in some ways at least) to all the
other days.
To explore this assemblage, Waterton and Dittmer (2014) engaged in a
weeklong ethnography of the AWM, observing and recording the indi-
vidual encounters between visitors and between visitors and the exhibi-
tions themselves. In observing the individual interactions over time, it
became possible to see the subtle ways in which patterns were shaped by
the layout of the museum itself, its lighting, audiovisual displays, and so
on. By recording the ambient sound in each room, for example, they were
 Audiences, Assemblages, and the Everyday Geopolitics of Heritage 155

able to isolate and be attentive to the background noise that conditioned

how people behaved. Were there loud movies playing on a loop all the
time? Did visitors speak in the room with normal voices, or did they
lower them as in a library? They also examined their own experiences
and encounters, considering how and why they interacted with others
the way they did. As a result, their findings take the form of vignettes,
or narrative accounts of various events they saw or experienced. Three
will be discussed here to demonstrate how popular geopolitics suffuses
the everyday.

Royal Air Force Bomber Command

It’s 11.00 am as I enter Bomber Command and catch the last moments of his
story. I know already that I’ll stay to hear it again: there’s something about
his voice that draws me in. And so I find myself standing alone in a small
room with mock-metal cladding, a curved roof and a bomb bay in the floor.
A video begins to play and I am introduced to a group of airmen who are
about to undertake a night raid. Engine sounds fill the room and a large
rectangular portion of the floor vibrates beneath my feet, simulating take-
off. Things go well onscreen, with the squadron’s operation proceeding as
planned. That is, until they are detected by radar; then everything changes.
The small room, until then illuminated by a dullish white light, erupts into
colours that surely signify fire, flashing and shifting from white to purple
to lilac to pink to red to orange before fading to black. It utterly transforms
the experience—the colour suffuses the space and the vibrations intensify.
I don’t feel like I’m inside a crashing plane—the movement is not shocking
enough. But I certainly feel haunted, especially in these last few moments.
Yes, I’m haunted by the narrative, the sounds, but more than that it is the
sense of movement that affects me. I’m dislodged. It’s kinaesthetic. And at
that moment I’m more in touch with the Memorial than ever before; literally,
as I tense and flex for balance, gripping the floor a little harder. The screen
in front of me returns to black and white images of the flight crew and I’m
told of their fate—those who survived and those who did not. Somewhere,
in what seems like “the distance,” their injured plane crashes, explodes and
echoes; a repetitive thrum fading into the background. (Waterton and Dit-
tmer, field notes, August 28, 2012, quoted in Waterton and Dittmer 2014,
127–28)

Bomber Command is a special audiovisual component in the World War

II gallery at the AWM, intended not to teach discursive facts about the
Australian military but to let visitors know what it felt like to be in the
war (see figure 7.2). This much is clear from as the panel affixed to its ex-
terior: “This exhibition evokes some of the sights, sounds and sensations
of a Bomber Command Raid on Germany.” As such, it seeks to intervene
156 Chapter 7

Figure 7.2. Bomber Command at the Australian War Memorial.

less on the mind of the visitor than on her or his body, conveying the
sensations that might be experienced on a night raid over Germany. As
new visitors to the demonstration enter the fuselage, they might engage
deeply, squatting down to touch the vibrating floor, or they might take a
quick look around and walk out.
From war movies and other historical and quasi-historical accounts,
many who enter Bomber Command will know that these missions were
dangerous, with many bombers shot down. Obviously the AWM would
not want to convey the full horror and experience of being shot down
over Germany during wartime; to provide some of the sensations without
going too far, the lighting was engineered to contrast the relative dark-
ness within the plane’s fuselage (in which participants were invited to
stand) with the colored lighting that signified the flames licking at the
exterior of the plane over the course of the show. The intensification of
the vibration and of the lighting over the course of the “mission” opens
up the bodies of those in attendance, attempting to make them receptive
to the eventual revelation—that this was a re-creation of a “real” mission,
in which many on board the bomber had not survived.

Dust Off

I’m back in the Vietnam War Gallery, waiting for “Dust Off,” one of the gal-
lery’s light and sound installations. There’s a school group gathered nearby,
 Audiences, Assemblages, and the Everyday Geopolitics of Heritage 157

perhaps fifteen early teens all dressed in [school] uniforms of pressed, grey
trousers and smart, red blazers. Their teacher briefs them excitedly on what
they are about to see. The lights dim. Black and white footage is projected
onto two walls behind the Iroquois and a haze of sound fills the gallery.
We’re listening to radio chatter—original recordings—that play amidst
machine-gun fire, the blur of rotorblades and the distant sounds of tropical
rain. It’s loud—really, really loud. I know that things don’t end well: I know
that the helicopter comes under attack as it attempts to evacuate an injured
soldier; I know that the radio traffic we’re listening to captures the words of
those who didn’t make it; and I know that we’ll hear in the voices of those
at the other end of that communication the realization that they’re gone. The
students watch in silence. As the video draws to a close we’re left to deal
with the fact that the evacuation was profoundly unsuccessful. The lights
“go up” and I see the school group standing just to my left: they barely move
and remain quiet; suspended in their silence. Their teacher shuffles over and
gathers them close. I read on his face, in his gestures, concern, uncertainty, so
I pay attention to his address. He apologises: this was not the video he had
intended them to see. He had meant for them to watch the victorious “Heli-
bourne Assault.” Instead, they were confronted with the voices—those real
voices. I watch as they turn and leave the gallery, far more muted now than
they were when they entered. (Waterton and Dittmer, field notes, August 29,
2012, quoted in Waterton and Dittmer 2014, 130)

This vignette, which took place in the Vietnam War gallery, centers on
one of the biggest artifacts in the gallery—a refurbished Bell UH-1B

Figure 7.3. Dust-Off at the Australian War Memorial.

158 Chapter 7

Iroquois A2-1019 (see figure 7.3). This helicopter, placed in a Southeast

Asia–themed set, surrounded by screens on which imagery and dialogue
can be projected and with a huge fan mounted overhead to simulate
the downdraft of a helicopter landing, was central to two separate nar-
ratives—Dust Off and Helibourne Assault—each of which used radio re-
cordings from real Australian missions in Vietnam. The use of the radio
recordings and the downdraft fan attempts—in a way much more serious
than in Bomber Command—to make the viewer feel like they are there, on
the mission, by immersing them in a multisensory experience. Crucially
for the encounter detailed here, the two shows rotate, with a substantial
gap between them.
This particular encounter, between the teacher, his students, and the
Dust Off show, could have gone in many different ways. The teacher,
having (presumably) seen the Helibourne Assault show, went to corral his
students to provide them with the patriotic pleasures of victory in battle.
Randomly, though, by the time he had rallied his students and primed
them with expectations—thus opening them up to the affective experi-
ence in a way that they might not have been had they just wandered
into it—Dust Off was cued up. For the students, this appeared to be a
memorable—if somewhat traumatic—experience. It could be argued that
this was just an unlucky coincidence, an outlier. However, recall that this
tension was specifically built into the AWM by law—it is required to be
a space that both celebrates the heroism of Australian militarism and also
laments the loss of Australian lives in war.
Relevant to the production of this tension
is that Australian geopolitical culture is satu-
Gallipoli  A battle of rated by the narrative of the Battle of Gallipoli.
World War I to which Beginning on April 25, 1915, Anzac forces,
Australian independence led by British commanders, invaded the Gal-
is often attributed lipoli peninsula (in today’s Turkey). This was
an attempt by the British to force the Otto-
man Empire out of World War I by captur-
ing Istanbul (then known as Constantinople).
Anzac  The Australia–
New Zealand Army However, the invasion quickly ran aground,
Corps, the name under and the Anzacs never got off the beach. The
which both Australian Turkish troops on the cliffs above them kept
and New Zealander them mercilessly pinned down, and after eight
soldiers fought in months and eight thousand casualties the An-
association with the zacs were withdrawn. Gallipoli became syn-
British Empire
onymous with two things: (1) the good cheer
and courage that the Anzacs brought to this
foolhardy endeavor, and (2) the lack of quality military leadership from
British leaders, who had sent the Anzacs into such a terrible situation.
 Audiences, Assemblages, and the Everyday Geopolitics of Heritage 159

Together, these aspects of Gallipoli have led to the battle being narrated
as the fracturing of the imperial bonds that held Australia to the United
Kingdom. Indeed, the Gallipoli narrative can be seen repeated over and
over again in Australian military myth, but with the Americans replacing
the British as the imperial power to be followed and treated a bit shabbily
by. For these reasons, Australian geopolitical culture is less concerned
with victory than with good humor in the face of retreat (Dittmer and
Waterton 2016). Which leads us to the final vignette.

The Roll of Honor and the Hall of Memory

The tour guide concludes his narrative, and then tells the students to fan
out and find a name like theirs on the wall. Some of the students take this
advice, dragging their fingers across the embossed metal letters; others seem
to fixate on the poppies wedged into the cracks by the names. Still others
quickly abandon the wall to talk with one another in small, quiet clumps. I
watch a small group walk briskly to the edge of the reflection pool, where
they pretend to throw in money. They don’t have any actual coins but they
simulate the action nonetheless, with eyes closed and their backs to the pool.
I move on, and enter the Hall of Memory. It is a cylindrical chamber, with
a high dome that immediately draws the eye. The chamber is lit both by
sunlight and a set of indirect lights that give the room a glow. In the center
of the room is the Tomb of the Unknown Australian Soldier, surrounded by
poppy wreathes from organizations as diverse as elementary schools and
the Government of Fiji. Behind the tomb are four columns of different ma-
terials, stretching towards the dome. I sit on one of the benches around the
outside of the room and watch. The room is cold and silent, except for the
sound of footsteps ringing out. A docent stands by the door, watching for
improper behavior. Those who enter tend to stand for a moment at the foot
of the tomb, and then slowly circumambulate, reading from whom all the
wreaths come. Once this is finished, they head back out into the sun of the
Roll of Honor. (Waterton and Dittmer, field notes, August 27, 2012, quoted
in Waterton and Dittmer 2014, 133)

Here we see the most sacred elements of the AWM, in which the museum
is left behind in favor of the memorial. The Roll of Honor (see figure 7.4)
is a similar idea to the Vietnam War Memorial discussed earlier, where
the names of Australia’s war dead are embossed on the walls, bristling
with poppies (an international symbol of war remembrance), and with an
eternal flame in constant motion. The students pretending to throw coins
into the reflection pool conjure up possible futures in their act of wishing,
or perhaps the lack of coins makes it all feel like a joke to them.
The Hall of Memory is a secular space, yet it resembles a religious one
in its cathedral-like height and stone architecture. There is nothing inher-
160 Chapter 7

Figure 7.4. Roll of Honor at the Australian War Memorial.

ently sacred about the space, however; rather it is performed as sacred

by those who enter: the respectful, slow and deliberate walking, the
silence, and so on. Here the focus on individualism of the Roll of Honor
(and the Vietnam War Memorial) is subsumed into the collective of the
nation through the Tomb of the Unknown Australian Soldier (see figure
7.5). After World War I, there was a movement to commemorate the loss
of human life, which had reached new and horrifying proportions with
the industrial expansion of warfare and its technologies. Allied countries
each buried a set of human remains that could no longer be identified as a
specific individual, allowing that body to stand in for the many sacrifices
of the nation, a heritage too vast and unknowable to acknowledge indi-
vidually. Notably, the United Kingdom originally wanted its Unknown
Soldier to stand in for the entire empire. However, after Gallipoli, Aus-
tralia would not be satisfied with such an arrangement, and it demanded
its own (Inglis 1999). Crucial to this, however, is that the body cannot be
identified as an individual; to do so would be to dispel the magic around
 Audiences, Assemblages, and the Everyday Geopolitics of Heritage 161

it that is conjured by its entering into assemblage with the stone, wreaths,
and respectful performances of visitors in the Hall of Memory.
Together, these vignettes demonstrate how there is a popular geopoli-
tics of everyday life, which we all participate in simply by entering into
assemblage with others—whether they be people, texts, movies, muse-
ums, or something else. Assemblage provides a useful way of thinking
through the relations between our bodies, the popular culture we audi-
ence, and the various ways in which we perform and audience in every-
day life, beyond screens and media.

Figure 7.5. Tomb of the Unknown Australian Soldier at the Australian War Memorial.
162 Chapter 7

CONCLUSION

Summary
In this chapter we provided an alternative approach to representations
and narratives by focusing on everyday life. Rather than being passive
consumers of ideological messages produced by cultural elites, consum-
ers are active and powerful agents, using cultural resources tactically to
provide meaning, entertainment, and structure to their lives. Neverthe-
less, they are not entirely liberated—rather, processes of meaning-mak-
ing are embedded in Livingstone’s cartographies of textual reception
and cultural geographies of reading. Fans provide a powerful example
of not only the creative use of existent cultural resources but also of
how different kinds of capital influence individuals’ ability to project
their preferred meanings and have them adopted by others within a fan
subculture. Research into cultural consumption and active audiences is
theoretically and practically complicated, but nevertheless it is a neces-
sary antidote to oppressive readings of popular culture that put those
who enjoy popular culture and take great pleasure from it in the role
of passive victims. The concept of performative consumption offers a
succinct way of expressing the role of consumption not as an endpoint
for cultural processes, but as a jumping-off point for more social engage-
ment between consumers. Popular culture is not a static, dead thing,
but instead an open-ended social process that we all partake in and that
helps animate our social lives.
In order to think through the connections between everyday life and
our interactions with popular culture (as both producers and consum-
ers), we introduced the idea of assemblages. Assemblage allows us to
think through the ways in which people and things are interrelated
with one another, constantly affecting each other and producing events,
which themselves unleash other events much further down the road. We
used the idea of assemblage to examine heritage, a field in which the past
is understood via the way it speaks to, or shapes, the present. Assem-
blage therefore allows us to think of the past, the present, and the future
as a web of relations that can be cultivated by people and institutions
(like the Australian War Memorial) for geopolitical purposes. The case
study of the AWM was rife with examples of audiences interacting with
exhibitions, but in an open-ended way rather than the unidirectional
ways hinted at by the notions of passive audiences and active audiences.
Rather, we can see that the exhibition is nothing without the people who
animate it, who create relations and generate affects. Popular culture
is here perhaps most obviously something alive and indistinguishable
from everyday life.
 Audiences, Assemblages, and the Everyday Geopolitics of Heritage 163

Extensions in Your Life

Usually when we think of geopolitics, we are thinking of something “out
there,” far away from your everyday life. But a major goal of this book,
and this chapter in particular, is to convince you to see yourself as part
of geopolitics—that the actions you take, and the way you respond to
events, matter in terms of their geopolitical outcomes. The case study here
was of a visit to a military museum, which is something that most people
don’t do on an everyday basis. What is “everyday life” for one person is
absolutely exceptional for someone else. But our argument is that even if
you don’t ever go to a military museum, you do things in your everyday
life that would be amenable to a similar kind of analysis. So this chapter
requires a bit of individual thought in your effort to apply it to your ev-
eryday life.

•  Do you find that you are a different kind of audience for some media
than for others? Are you “active” in some contexts and “passive” in
others?
• Can you recall an “event” in your life that seemed unimportant at the
time but that later shaped your response to a situation?
• What do you class as “heritage” in your life, and how do you under-
stand it to be relevant to your everyday life?
 8
,
Social Media and the
Networked Self

THE CONCEPT: THE NETWORKED SELF

Ideas
The invention of the telegraph in 1837 by Samuel Morse was a landmark
moment, in that it separated communication from transportation. Until
then, long-distance communication relied on something being written (or
printed) and then carried physically to its
destination, like a letter carried by a post-
telegraph  A device for
man or a book that was printed and distrib- electrically transmitting
uted through shops. Instead, the telegraph messages over a wire
meant that a message in one place could be
instantaneously transported to another place
(Adams 2009). Given that this phenomenon
has only been intensified in the subsequent
two centuries—with the invention of the time-space compression
telephone, the radio, the television, and the The reduction in the
significance of distance in
internet—it perhaps does not seem very
some areas of human life as
exciting now. But it most certainly marked a result of new media and
a new period in all of human history, link- transportation technologies
ing people and places together in a new
“virtual” space that could not be seen or
physically occupied. These technologies developed slowly, requiring the
creation of large infrastructures to carry the messages through space.
Technologies like the telegraph and the telephone were key in what geog-
rapher David Harvey (1989) calls time-space compression, or the radical
165
166 Chapter 8

reduction in the significance of distance in some areas of human life, and

they helped unleash the processes of globalization described in chapter
2. But as the technologies spread, they quickly became associated with
magic and the occult. How can someone be so far away and yet also seem
to be in the same room as you? To people at the time, the phenomenon
was so unreal, the distance overcome by the
telegraph so immense, that it might as well
Morse alphabet  Also be the distance between the earth and the
known as “Morse code,” afterlife: “the tapping specters of the spirit-
a system for spelling
istic séances, with their messages from the
words over the telegraph
using dots and dashes
realm of the dead, appeared quite promptly
at the moment of the invention of the Morse
alphabet in 1837” (Kittler 1987, 111).
The geographer James Kneale (2010) has highlighted the role these
media play in the horror stories of H. P. Lovecraft (1890–1937). While not
dealing with the (un)dead, Lovecraft’s stories utilized these media in his
stories to allow a “distant witnessing,” with the characters (and, conse-
quently, the reader) simultaneously somewhere safe and yet also “pres-
ent” for whatever horrors are unfolding. Consider, for example, Kneale’s
summary of Lovecraft’s use of a field telephone in “The Statement of
Randolph Carter” (1920):

The story takes the form of a statement to the police by Randolph Carter
concerning the disappearance of his friend Harley Warren in a cemetery in
Florida. Warren enters a crypt below one of the tombs, asking Carter to re-
main on the surface; luckily they have brought
a field telephone, so that they can still talk to
one another. “I promise to keep you informed
field telephone  A wired
telephone used by the
over the telephone of every move—you see
military to communicate I’ve enough wire here to reach to the center
between units in the field of the earth and back!” Carter says. “I was
prior to the development alone, yet bound to the unknown depths by
of the radio, or when radio those magic strands whose insulated surface
might be intercepted lay green beneath the struggling beams of
that waning crescent moon.” Carter and War-
ren carry on a conversation over the field
telephone, with Warren’s part of it in italics to distinguish it from normal
speech. Of course Warren discovers something horrible, and the line goes
silent before a strange voice on the line tells Carter: “YOU FOOL, WARREN
IS DEAD!” (Kneale 2010, 98–99)

The field telephone in this story allows Carter (and the reader) to be there,
but not completely—the horror in the crypt is close enough to send shiv-
ers up your spine, but all the scarier because Carter (and the reader) never
see it—it is left unexplicit, beyond representation.
 Social Media and the Networked Self 167

The idea of communication media as conduits for danger is not some-

thing that exists only in the past. If you don’t believe us, go see The Ring
(2002) for a twenty-first-century update to Lovecraft’s novels. Or open a
newspaper and read about society’s moral panic around social media. For
instance, in 2012 a murderer in Australia made headlines when he saw an
eighteen-year-old’s profile on a dating site
and created a Facebook profile in which he
moral panic  A social
falsely claimed to work in wildlife protec-
reaction in which a person,
tion, purely to lure her with a job offer into group, or thing is demonized
meeting him. He subsequently lured her as fundamentally threatening
into the bush and killed her (Hall 2012). Of to society’s values
course many people are murdered all the
time, and we are right to worry about that.
But what gives stories like this their prominence in the news media are
our anxieties about the ability of the murderer to “approach” the woman
in question through the internet, manifesting on her home computer, and
also his ability to easily create a “new” self—disconnected from who he re-
ally is—that would appeal to her. Here we can see how social media is the
latest version of the telegraph, or Lovecraft’s field telephone in “The State-
ment of Randolph Carter,” in that it allows for a “distanced witnessing.”
This may all seem a far cry from geopolitics. But the key point is that
communications technologies—since the telegraph—multiply us; we can
seem to be in many places at once, and this means that we can effortlessly
affect many people and many people can effortlessly affect us. This can be
threatening (as in the above examples), or it can be productive, as when
the authors of this book take a break from writing in their respective cit-
ies to Skype one another and discuss the book’s progress. Either way, this
phenomenon intensifies the social relations that compose the world.
We can therefore think of this assemblage as a “networked self.” This
refers to a person who has been distributed through space and time via
media technologies. Rather than something from science fiction, this term
likely refers to you and all your friends. Recall the last chapter’s introduc-
tion of assemblages into our geopolitical vocabulary. This intensification
of social relations that comes with social media means that your body is
enmeshed in an assemblage that stretches over great distances. Inher-
ently, this assemblage is political—it is capable of doing great, or terrible,
things—and it acts on, and through, your body. You are able to shape
that assemblage, but you are also constantly buffeted by it and rewired
through it. Some of these affects are short term: the pleasures of your
photo being liked or favorited by friends and strangers on Instagram, the
resentment and anger fueled by flipping through your Twitter feed and
hearing the daily outrage, the joy and mirth of a video involving pup-
pies’ and kittens’ greatest/cutest “fails,” the jealousy of seeing that your
168 Chapter 8

friends’ vacations are better than yours. Yet others are longer term, or po-
tential long-term effects of the short-term affects: the shortening of atten-
tion span, dissatisfaction with your life vis-à-vis others’ cultivated news
feeds, and the social satisfaction of maintaining old friendships over long
distances. Social media matters as it remakes your everyday life, warping
space and time. You are distributed through other people’s lives, and they
are distributed through yours. This is of course true without social media
(unless you are a complete hermit), but it is much truer with social media.
This may seem commonsensical to you, as most of this book’s readers
will have grown up on the internet and are savvy thinkers about these is-
sues. However, the “networked self” described here is radically different
from the ideal citizen of liberal Enlightenment thought. The Enlighten-
ment was discussed in chapter 4, where we outlined that this period of
time privileged rationality. For instance, the writers of the U.S. Constitu-
tion were all rooted in the philosophies of the
Enlightenment, and so their ideal citizen was
citizen  A full autonomous, rational, civic minded, and equal
member of a political
to all other citizens (also, white and male—but
community; the role
has privileges as well
put that to the side for now). That is, citizens in
as responsibilities liberal Enlightenment thought were supposed to
come together, each with their own distinct inter-
ests; discuss the issues of the day in a distanced,
rational fashion; and arrive at a policy that was the best possible course of
action for everyone (more on that in a moment).
The networked self is far from the ideal citizen of Enlightenment
thought; rather, this person is enmeshed in a sea of affects—recall the
aforementioned pleasures, resentments, and jealousies—that shape her
or his (geo)political views. Perhaps most intriguingly, the networked self
can be understood as bypassing the individual as the primary unit of
political theory. The networked self only exists in relation to others and
is only understandable in relation to what those others are thinking, feel-
ing, and doing. An individual can do almost nothing within the network;
power is wielded through the network itself.
Another challenge posed by the networked self to liberal Enlighten-
ment thought is to the assumption of equality. If in liberal Enlightenment
thought “we hold [this truth] to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal” (Jefferson 1776), the networked self has no such concerns. Rather,
some people are extremely well connected, while others dwell in social
network cul-de-sacs. When Kim Kardashian posts a picture on Instagram,
it moves millions of dollars in beauty products. By comparison, when one
of this book’s authors tweets about Popular Culture, Geopolitics, and Identity
to his followers, a copy falls off the shelf and gets lost in an Amazon.com
warehouse. So, the fundamental tenet of the Enlightenment—equality—
 Social Media and the Networked Self 169

cannot be held up as true of the networked self. While we are all produc-
ers and consumers in the world of social media, some voices—and their
affects—are heard much louder than others.
Finally, the networked self is not just enmeshed in a hypothetical net-
work but an actual one; we only have relationships with some people,
and those people only know some people, and actually those people may
overlap quite a bit. That is to say, our social
networks tend toward bubbles, with relatively
few relationships leading out of the bubble bubble  A characteristic
of some social networks,
(Adams 2009). Think about your own social
in which a “small
media experience: over time, have the ideas world” emerges of
and opinions you see in your timeline become similarly minded people
more or less similar? So the affects shared
through the bubble might tend to shape peo-
ple’s political attitudes in similar ways, although, equally, people bring
their own histories and experiences to the bubble and so are affected
differently (as was discussed in the previous chapter with heritage). So,
now we turn to the interface between the networked self and the liberal
democratic political systems in which most of us live.

Debates
When we think about the geopolitical significance of the networked self,
it is easy to quickly go to the dramatic, such as President Trump’s Twitter
feed. However, scholars have focused their debates more on the impact of
the phenomenon itself on politics. One geographical manifestation of the
networked self has been the perceived movement of the public sphere into
online spaces. The idea of the public sphere is strongly linked to the Ger-
man philosopher Jürgen Habermas (1989). To enter into the public sphere,
Habermas argued, one must be a citizen (however that is defined) and be
willing to enter into an orderly debate, treating others as equals. One can
see the link between the idea of the public sphere and the liberal Enlight-
enment values discussed earlier; indeed, many geographers have noted
the way in which the public sphere has traditionally been dominated by
white men of high class, with women, the working class, and people of
color often seen as lacking the full “citizenship” needed to participate in
the public sphere (England 2003). This is most clearly seen in the various
delays in those groups receiving voting rights in the United States and
United Kingdom. In any event, one need only watch the nightly news to
see how many stories now start with the announcer saying, “Today on
Twitter.” Social media, blogs, and the internet in general have become a
venue in which many of our civic debates unfold, in which we encounter
our fellow citizens and hash out how we feel about the issues of the day.
170 Chapter 8

Fuchs (2017) notes that there are positive and negative ways of thinking
about the impact of the online public sphere on our (geo)politics. Some
would argue that the online public sphere is a good thing, in that it creates
a space in which more people can participate. The online public sphere
breaks down the public/private binary that has so bedeviled feminist
scholars. For instance, people working in the home are no longer unable
to participate in civic debates. This is good in terms of opening up partici-
pation and makes the home a less isolated place. Further, the online pub-
lic sphere might be seen as flattening hier-
archies. That is, you can tweet right to your
public sphere  The space
legislator and (maybe) even get a personal
in which civic discussions
unfold, open to all with
reply. Further, the networked self—when
full citizenship rights multiplied to whole populations—composes
networked publics, assemblages of much
greater power than the individuals who
compose it. The dream of a vast coalition of
the formerly powerless, now turned power-
public/private binary  ful through their newfound connections to
The cultural belief that one another over social media, is a very ro-
politics is that which
mantic vision of politics, and its hold on our
occurs in public, while
that which occurs in imaginations is strong.
private is apolitical Those who believe that the online public
sphere is a negative development tend to
focus on the same issues but highlight the
dark side of the online public sphere. For in-
stance, the idea that the online public sphere
digital divide  The opens up participation can be debunked by
inequality of access to looking at the so-called digital divide—the
digital technologies
inequality of access to digital technologies.
among different
demographic groups Those who compose social media tend to
be middle class because of the technological
requirements to participate. For instance,
Fuchs (2017) notes that while the 2011 Egyptian uprising against Presi-
dent Mubarak was widely referred to as the “Facebook Revolution,” only
about a quarter of Egyptians were on the internet at all, and only half of
those on the internet were on Facebook. Further, the opening up of the
public/private binary through social media can be understood as bad in
that conversely it isolates politics by locating it in the home, rather than
in the street or the public square. This means that participants lack the
energizing, positive reinforcement of the face-to-face experience of be-
ing in a group. Further, a fragmented crowd safely in their homes also
lacks the political heft of a large, angry group protesting in a city square.
The powerful will never feel intimidated by a hostile hashtag trending
 Social Media and the Networked Self 171

on Twitter in the same way as they would by

a mob chanting outside their offices. In short,
clicktivism  A blend
some argue that this kind of clicktivism allows of clicking (of your
people to vent their anger (or pleasure) into mouse) and activism
social media without having much hope of ef-
fecting political change.
The other reason to not hold out much hope for the online public
sphere is that it is not public at all. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Google,
and so on are not only platforms but corporate entities, devoted not to
public discourse and the encouragement of civic norms but to making a
profit. This is nothing new, and Habermas himself was critical of the shift
to a commercially oriented press in the 1800s, which put the commercial
interests of a newspaper’s advertisers ahead of the public interest: the
“world fashioned by the mass media is a public sphere in appearance
only” (Habermas 1989, 171). However, what is different about the world
of social media is its high degree of concentration—there are only a few
companies that control the key global platforms through which you
might reasonably get your message out. This is the result of corporate
concentration—because media companies are in competition with one
another, they either drive their competitors out of business or buy them
and absorb them (as when Facebook bought Instagram and WhatsApp).
This is especially true of social networks, because social networks are
more valuable if they include more people; there is a logic of “bigness”
that tends to preclude the idea of small, competing social networks. In-
stead, social networks tend to differentiate based on language communi-
ties (e.g., the Chinese-language Weibo) or on functionality (the primarily
inward-facing Facebook versus the outward-facing Twitter). This makes
these platforms potential chokepoints for public discourse, either through
the heavy hand of state censorship (as with the Chinese government’s
surveillance of Weibo) or through corporate editorial policies. An ex-
ample of the latter can be found in 2018, when all the major social media
companies banned Alex Jones, a noted conspiracy theorist and libeler.
This drive to centralization and “bigness” speaks to the second debate
we would like to introduce here—namely, the value and dangers of Big
Data. As technology has become woven into
virtually every aspect of our everyday lives,
and as those technologies have become net- libel  The intentional
worked through WiFi and the internet, it has spread of lies
about someone
become possible for companies to aggregate
incredibly large and complex data sets about
incredibly mundane things. Consider the last time you typed something
into Google. Likely Google attempted to predict your search terms, filling
in something based on a range of factors, such as your previous searches,
172 Chapter 8

your current location, what other people

have searched for, and so on. This kind of
Big Data  Technological real-time prediction (notice how the predic-
innovations aimed at
tion changes with every key you press, as
processing the enormous
amount of data that is now it recalculates what you are likely to want
available about people’s based on the new information) relies on vast
everyday activities data sets, which must be instantaneously
accessed and integrated in ways that do a
good job of predicting your intentions. The
way in which they are brought together is
algorithm  A process for called an algorithm, which is a formula or
automated problem solving set of rules used for problem solving (Fry
2018). Algorithms can be made to learn on
their own from past performance, adjusting
themselves in a fully automated way without human guidance.
This plays out in your everyday life in a range of ways. For instance,
the things people in your area have been Googling can be brought to-
gether with the things you specifically looked at on Amazon to bring you
targeted advertisements on Facebook for things in which Big Data and
its algorithms have decided you might be interested. Algorithms are also
used to try to present you with things in your social media that will pro-
voke your interest, ordering your newsfeed and prioritizing “While You
Were Away” events based on what you liked, favorited, or interacted
with in the past. This all may seem quite innocuous—who doesn’t want
more of what they like and less of what they don’t?—but that also means
that those who control the algorithm control what you see or don’t see
in your social media bubble. For instance, in 2018 Facebook announced
that it was tweaking its algorithms in order to make fewer news articles
appear, as people were complaining that Facebook had become too con-
flictual. By changing its algorithm, Facebook was attempting to increase
the amount of time its customers spent on the platform, allowing them
to maximize their advertising and other revenue streams. However,
if Facebook is the new “public sphere,” we can see how this might be
counterproductive or could be used to sideline certain political views in
favor of others.
This is all the more important because these algorithms are entirely pro-
prietary; that is, they are private property of the companies that make them
and deploy them, and “we” have no right to even know what they are.
For instance, Google’s algorithm for searching through the entire World
Wide Web and identifying the “top hits” for your search terms—and its
purported superiority to others—is entirely the reason for their market
dominance of the internet search industry. To expose that algorithm to the
light of day would be to give away their product to all their competitors
 Social Media and the Networked Self 173

for free. So this highly technical realm of online life remains beyond any
kind of democratic control, and it is hard to see how it could be otherwise.
Algorithms have become part of our everyday lives, enabling humans
to do things previously impossible. Consider, for instance, airport secu-
rity. To actually search everyone flying and all of their bags in order to
prevent a terrorist event would be both cost and time prohibitive. Quite
simply, it would make air travel impossible on the scale at which it is
currently conducted. So algorithms are introduced to combine a range of
data sets to calculate the level of risk of any individual traveler (Amoore
2006). The variables include things like how an airline ticket was paid for
(cash is a red flag), whether a ticket is one way or round trip (one way
is dubious), to what countries you have made phone calls recently, and
so on. Once the algorithm calculates your score, if that score exceeds a
certain threshold, you will get singled out for enhanced scrutiny. Again,
this may sound very useful, and indeed it enables the airline system to
proceed with a light touch of active security intervention in most cases.
But algorithms are not omniscient decision makers; they embed the biases
of those who create them.
It may seem obvious that algorithms, and computers more broadly,
are not racist or sexist. How can a computer have this kind of profoundly
human flaw? However, according to Noble (2018), algorithms can take
obvious human prejudice and give it a veneer of objectivity. For instance,
in 2016 a tweet went viral showing the different Google Image search
results for “three black teenagers” and “three white teenagers.” The for-
mer resulted in a collection of mug shots (photos taken after someone
has been arrested), and the latter produced more traditional photos of
kids having fun, being young, and so on. Google argued that this was a
“natural” result of the algorithm and not their fault. Nevertheless, Google
subsequently managed to alter the algorithm to generate a different (less
racist) result. This latter algorithm is of course just as human-made and
artificial as the first. Fiddling with Google’s algorithms may feel like a
very minor, technical thing. But then consider what happens when we
take the racist results of algorithms—as demonstrated by Noble—and go
back to the earlier example of the algorithms used to police airplane travel
and immigration.
If algorithms can reproduce racism in their operations, and do so with-
out any direct human supervision (removing people from the process is
the whole point of algorithms, after all), then algorithmic border control
can reproduce that racism in the application of immigration policy. For
instance, using cash to pay for your airfare would be a characteristic of
people who have limited access to banking services and credit; to the
extent that—thanks to histories of colonialism—poorer people around
the world are more likely to be people of color, we can see how that
174 Chapter 8

seemingly race-neutral variable could lead to racially biased results at the

border. The difference between Google and the government’s security
algorithms is that we can test Google ourselves to look for these biased
results (as the above example shows), and the government’s algorithms
are beyond our examination.

INTRODUCTION TO DIGITAL GEOPOLITICS

Digital Diplomacy
If the production of the networked self, through social media and other
technological networks, can be understood as political in a range of ways,
how can we understand it as more specifically geopolitical? One way to do
that would be to look at the intersection of the networked self, social me-
dia, and international relations. The term that has emerged for this field
of study is “digital diplomacy” (Bjola and Holmes 2015). If we normally
think of “regular” diplomacy as a staid, calm business undertaken by
professionals in suits, digital diplomacy is the outreach to various publics
undertaken by foreign ministries and other government offices through
avenues such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and so on. Digital diplo-
macy opens up the potential—irresistible for many—to directly promote
your national perspective to foreign populations
so as to influence their political views.
digital diplomacy However, as we discussed earlier, to enter into
The study of social
assemblage is to open yourself up to the affects
media’s impact on
the field of diplomacy of that assemblage. If you look at a “traditional”
diplomatic communication, it is most definitely
going to be marked by a restrained, careful kind
of prose. Traditional diplomacy is an intentionally “cool” place, where
politeness and civility reign. This is because everybody knows that to
cause offense—intentionally or otherwise—is to make agreement far less
likely, and in extreme cases to make war possible. However, as anyone
who has been on Twitter can attest, social media tend toward a differ-
ent kind of communication that is far from civil. It is a “hot” place, full
of resentment and outrage. It is, to be clear, a fairly undiplomatic place,
in which traditional hierarchies are rarely respected. This poses prob-
lems for digital diplomats. First, there is the question of what types of
communications to attempt. For instance, many foreign ministries limit
themselves to pumping out the equivalent of press releases, using social
media as a broadcast medium. They refuse to engage in back-and-forth
with people who respond to their posts, thereby insulating themselves as
much as possible from the affective swirl of online life. Of course, nothing
 Social Media and the Networked Self 175

prevents people from commenting on the post or quoting it, and so it is

impossible to avoid being caught up entirely in that swirl. Beyond that,
some foreign ministries take the second choice, engaging in limited give-
and-take with their followers, carefully selecting their correspondents
so as to maintain a respectful dialogue (Fletcher 2016). This is clearly an
intermediate step, utilizing some of what makes social media social while
trying to remain somewhat apart. Necessarily, these moments are fraught
with danger for digital diplomats, as a mistaken word can go viral or a
correspondent can humiliate you, with the screenshot then entering into
much wider circulation, damaging your national reputation.
Of course, the third option is to abandon the traditional geopolitical
voice and instead adopt a persona appropriate to the medium, utilizing
snark, memes, and aggression to argue your corner. This approach is
more associated with world leaders than with civil servants, as such an
approach works best with an individual voice rather than an institutional
one. However, there have been high-level dustups on Twitter between
governments, such as a 2014 Twitter beef between Canada and Russia.
Russia had recently occupied the Ukrainian territory of Crimea and was
sending troops into Eastern Ukraine (while denying it). When their troops
were caught on the wrong side of the border, the Russian response was
that their troops had gotten lost. This led the Canadian delegation to
NATO to tweet a map of the region clearly defined as “Russia” and “Not
Russia” (see figure 8.1). While the map clearly identified the legal bound-
aries of Ukraine and Russia, it failed to recognize the Russian annexation
of Crimea or the Russian occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two
breakaway regions of Georgia on the east coast of the Black Sea. Thus it
sparked a riposte from the Russian mission to NATO (see figure 8.2). This
cartographic smackdown may seem tame by most online standards, but
by diplomatic standards it is highly unusual.
It is of course impossible to discuss digital diplomacy without discuss-
ing the Twitter habits of President Trump. He developed his Twitter
habit when he was a reality television star, and he brought that pugna-
cious, self-aggrandizing style to the Oval Office. This has made at times
for awkward moments in the U.S. State Department, not least because he
rarely coordinates his tweets with long-standing, ongoing American for-
eign policy. His use of undiplomatic language is legendary, such as when
he called the leader of North Korea, Kim Jong-un, “short and fat,” “a
madman,” and “Rocket Man” (the latter referring to Kim’s test-firing of
nuclear-capable missiles). Similarly, he sent the Iranian president a tweet
in all-capital letters, widely interpreted as threatening war (see figure 8.3).
While the effectiveness of this kind of digital diplomacy is debatable, it is
clear that it is a vast deviation from existing norms.
176 Chapter 8

Citizen Statecraft
Of course, state use of social media is only a tiny portion of what tran-
spires in online geopolitics. Indeed, if we broaden the idea of the “online
public sphere” from the national to the international, we can see an
enormous array of activities online. As mentioned earlier, one of the fun-
damental features of social media is how it flattens hierarchies, allowing
people to send messages directly to celebrities, politicians, and others

Figure 8.1. Digital diplomacy in action, part 1.

 Social Media and the Networked Self 177

who might otherwise seem out of reach. This flattening opens up many
possibilities for everyday people to intervene in particular issues that they
feel strongly about. Pinkerton and Benwell (2014) trace what they call citi-
zen statecraft with regard to the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. The Falkland
Islands are a British Overseas Territory, a remnant of the British Empire in
the South Atlantic Ocean, three hundred miles off the coast of Argentina.
To Argentina, they are the Islas Malvinas, a part of Argentinean territory
that was colonized by the British in 1833. Argentina actually invaded the

Figure 8.2. Digital diplomacy in action, part 2.

178 Chapter 8

Figure 8.3. The hazards of Twitter for heads of state.

islands in 1982, leading to a war with the United Kingdom in which the
Argentinean forces were defeated. The status of the islands remains in
dispute, with the Falkland Islanders wishing no change in their status,
while Argentina seeks some negotiated settle-
ment with the United Kingdom, which would
citizen statecraft  The ultimately lead to Argentinean sovereignty
intervention of everyday
over the islands.
people in affairs of state
through social media
Pinkerton and Benwell begin their account
and other avenues with an advertisement—subsequently pur-
chased and released by the Argentinean gov-
ernment—which shows an Argentinean field
hockey player training for the 2012 Summer Olympics (which were held
in London). The catch is that the training was secretly filmed in Port
Stanley, the capital of the Falkland Islands. The ad concludes “with the
orchestral soundtrack reaching its climax as the closing titles read, ‘Para
competir en suelo inglés entrenamos en suelo argentino’ [To compete on Eng-
lish soil we train on Argentine soil]” (Pinkerton and Benwell 2014, 16).
The advertisement raised hackles both in the Falkland Islands themselves
and in the United Kingdom, but it was effective in keeping alive the
 Social Media and the Networked Self 179

popular idea (in Argentina) that the Falkland Islands are really the Islas
Malvinas (i.e., they belong to Argentina, even if they do not occupy them
now). The advertisement, which was available on YouTube, became a
sensation, drawing complaints from not only the UK government and the
Falklands Islands government (which would be expected), but also from
the International Olympic Committee, for politicizing the Olympics. The
ad agency that made it was forced to apologize, claiming that the ad was
only meant for domestic Argentinean consumption; however, the logics
of social media clearly indicated that this was unlikely.
Indeed, the circulation of the ad on social media
can be seen to have been both an advantage to the mash-up 
Argentinean government and also a liability. One of A fusion of
the possibilities that digital culture has opened up is previously
the mash-up, in which two things (for instance, songs) different
are woven together in new and exciting ways. This has things into a
been done for a long time, of course, but the advent of new synthesis
digital technologies has made it easier to both make a
mash-up and to circulate it. In this case, the Falkland Islanders took the
original advertisement and digitally inserted a red double-decker bus (a
British icon) into the footage, making it look like the Argentinean ath-
lete—instead of training for the Olympics—was running after, and failing
to catch, a bus. The new concluding text that the Islanders inserted was
“To catch a bus on Falklands soil . . . we advise not using an Argentine
timetable. In homage to those who gave their time and to those that will
never get it back” (cited in Pinkerton and Benwell 2014, 19)—the last bit a
reference to those who died in the 1982 war. In this example, we can see
how the creative practices of everyday people can produce—and circu-
late—geopolitical discourses and images through social media.

Patterns of Life and Death

Of course, the rise of social media is unlikely to collapse all of geopolitics
into Twitter spats and remix culture. Indeed, the networked self is rele-
vant to much more traditional interests of geopolitics far beyond popular
culture. The same media technologies—high-speed broadband internet
connectivity, chief among them—that allow us to play the popular online
game Fortnite with people all over the world also enable the global drone
assemblage to take form and enact violence on targets all over the world
(see chapter 6’s discussion of dual-use technologies).
While there is a long history of drones going as far back as there has
been manned flight (Kindervater 2016), here we will focus on the current
generation of drone technologies, which originated in the 1990s. Drones
were deployed in the Balkans during the late 1990s to monitor events on
180 Chapter 8

the ground as conflict between various states

and ethnic groups unfolded. These drones were
drone  Also known
as a UAV (unmanned
effectively tiny planes, bristling with cameras
aerial vehicle), this and flown by remote control. The pilot—usu-
is a remotely piloted ally sitting somewhere in Nevada, far from the
aircraft that has battlefield—sat in a video-game-like cockpit,
surveillance capability where every tilt of the joystick or push of the
and often the ability button was translated into data, bounced off
to deliver ordinance
of satellites and received by the drone halfway
around the world. There, the data would be en-
acted, directing the drone in one direction or another. The drone, in turn,
would take live video of what was happening on the ground and bounce
that back off the satellite to the pilot (and intelligence analysts) in Nevada.
The technologies in play are basically higher-end versions of what you
use when you watch live TV on a commercial airline. When NATO got
militarily involved in Kosovo (now an independent state in the Balkans)
in 1999, drones provided real-time data that identified and monitored en-
emy targets, allowing manned planes to sweep in, drop bombs, and clear
the area very quickly. This made it easier to destroy targets while pro-
tecting NATO pilots. Further, drones were cheaper than manned aircraft
and could stay in the air much longer without refueling because of their
small size and limited capabilities (the pilots in Nevada could simply be
replaced in the cockpit when they got tired, with the drone remaining in
the air). They enabled long-term, nearly continuous air surveillance of
whole regions.
One aspect of the drone assemblage has been
that long-term aerial surveillance of whole re-
pattern-of-life gions enables so-called pattern-of-life analysis
analysis An analysis through the production of Big Data. That is,
that focuses on because the comings and goings of everyone on
deviations from daily the ground have been documented for years,
routines, enabled
the habits and lives of individual people have
by Big Data
been documented and subjected to algorithmic
analysis, bringing deviations from the “norm”
to the attention of commanders who can then deploy drones (or troops in
the area) to investigate, and if necessary take action. Gregory (2011, 195)
demonstrates how this kind of power results from the development of the
networked self:

The hierarchies of the network are flat and fluid, its spaces complex and
compound, and the missions are executed onscreen through video feeds and
chat rooms (displays show as many as 30 different chats at a time) that bring
a series of personnel with different skills in different locations into the same
 Social Media and the Networked Self 181

zone. Time and space are telescoped so that, as one officer put it, “We’re
mostly online with each other as we go.”

In the early 2000s, concurrent with the invasions of Afghanistan and

Iraq, it became possible to arm the drones themselves, allowing the pilot
to both identify a target using the advanced cameras of the drone and
then fire a missile at the target. This shortened even further the time and
effort needed to deliver lethal violence at a target; no troops need be in
harm’s way at all. Conversely, these programs were frequently criticized
for “turning war into a video game” and for terrorizing the populations
below, with which the United States and its allies were frequently not
even at war. Military claims to perfect understanding of the battle space
were contradicted by well-documented bombings of weddings and other
catastrophes. Whereas for many of us Big Data threatens to bombard us
with unwanted advertisements for things a friend Googled on our com-
puter, in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and many other places, Big Data
threatens populations with a more traditional bombardment, all based on
what an algorithm decided was “normal” for an individual in a particular
time and place. So we can see that digital geopolitics is about much more
than likes and up-voting, although the sharp end of digital geopolitics
relies on the same technologies and analytics as the social media side of
it. Indeed, traditional geopolitics and social media are intertwined in the
case study that follows.

CASE STUDY: RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 ELECTION

Context

The idea of the internet as an online public sphere, promoting rational,

democratic discourse in the fashion imagined by Habermas, has lasted
well past the giddy optimism of the internet’s early growth. As recently
as 2011’s Arab Spring, commentators were discussing the potential of
social media to outflank authoritarian regimes and empower marginal
populations around the world (Bjola 2017). Now, though, social media
are more likely to be discussed as a tool of social
control than of social liberation. This turn has
been especially rapid since 2016 and the expo- Arab Spring  The
sure of Russian efforts to influence American name given to a wide
array of uprisings in
politics during that year’s presidential election
North Africa and the
and beyond. Middle East against
The context for these influence operations authoritarian regimes
is broadly geopolitical and wide ranging. In
182 Chapter 8

2012 the Magnitsky Act was passed in the United

States, allowing Russian human rights abusers to
Magnitsky Act
A law, passed in
be sanctioned by freezing their assets in the United
many countries, States and refusing them entry into the country.
that puts financial This was in response to the murder in police cus-
and other sanctions tody of a Russian accountant who was assisting in
on individuals a tax fraud case brought against many powerful
linked to (usually Russian elites. The law has since been replicated
Russian) human
in many other Western countries, creating a more-
rights violations
or-less unified front against Russia. In response,
Russia ended the international adoption of Rus-
sian children by Americans and created a list of American human rights
abusers (linked to the Bush administration’s use of torture in the War on
Terror). In 2014, there was further escalation of tensions between Russia
and the West over Ukraine, a former Soviet republic that was politically
torn between the Russian sphere of influence and greater integration with
the European Union. When Ukrainian president Victor Yanukovych was
forced to flee to Russia in February 2014 in the face of public demonstra-
tions against his pro-Russian policies, he was replaced by a pro-European
president. By the end of the month Russian troops had occupied a part
of Ukraine called Crimea, which was home to a Russian naval base
and a substantial population that was Russian in ethnicity. Later, Rus-
sia would formally annex Crimea. This taking of
Ukrainian territory is contrary to international law,
annex  The which forbids the annexation of territory obtained
process of through conquest. This, along with a shadow war
incorporating a fought by Russian troops in eastern Ukraine (but
territory into a in which the Russian government falsely denied
sovereign state being involved), earned Russia international op-
probrium. Russia was expelled from the G8, and
both the Russian economy and individual Russians
connected to the government were given sanctions
G8  The Group of (such as the freezing of assets in Western banks).
Eight, a gathering Conversely, Russia’s long-term strategic objec-
of powerful tive had been to drive a wedge between the
countries that
Western allies, especially between Europe and the
seek to shape the
world order
United States. Note how the response to Russian
actions (the murder of Magnitsky, the annexa-
tion of Crimea) relied on common action across
the Western allies. The cumulative effect of that common action was far
greater than if any country—even the United States—had undertaken it
alone. This had long been the Russian strategy, dating back to the Cold
War when Russia was the Soviet Union and the social democracies of
 Social Media and the Networked Self 183

Western Europe had strong welfare states that operated quite differently
than American society did. Similarly, the Soviet Union had recruited
many Americans to communism by comparing the reputed egalitarian-
ism of Soviet society with the deeply entrenched racism of American
society (this went as far back as the 1920s—see Roman 2012). That is,
the Soviet Union had long operated with a “divide and conquer” strat-
egy that sought to exploit the fractures and schisms that are inherent to
democratic society (and some that are not, such as white supremacy). The
geopolitical situation for Russia—the successor to the Soviet Union—was
not dissimilar, and if anything this kind of subversion was even more ap-
pealing given the relative decline of Russia as an economic and military
superpower since its Cold War peak. In 2016, if Russia was to gain its seat
again at the top table of international relations, it needed to split up the al-
liance that was keeping it in the second tier of global power and influence.

Russian Election Interference Online

Splitting that alliance had proven difficult through conventional diplo-
matic means over the span of many decades. However, Russia identified
elections—and the freedom of speech valued in liberal democracies—as
a soft underbelly to the Western alliance. The account that follows has
been taken from two indictments filed by the
U.S. government (2018a and 2018b). In 2016,
the GRU was engaged in hacking efforts indictment  A formal
directed at the emails of the Clinton presi- accusation that someone
has committed a crime,
dential campaign, the Democratic Congres-
submitted to a court
sional Campaign Committee (DCCC), and the for prosecution
Democratic National Committee (DNC). This
hacking came in the form of spearphishing
attempts, in which fake emails are sent to try
to lure someone into entering their password
into a website they mistakenly believe to be GRU  Russia’s
real, and also the insertion of malware into the military intelligence
DCCC’s network, which then enabled them to organization
get into the DNC’s network. Being on the net-
work allowed the GRU agents—through their
malware—to watch in real time as DCCC and
DNC staffers worked. The emails obtained
were then sifted through for embarrassing or spearphishing  A
scandalous material, which was then—begin- technique for stealing
ning in June 2016—released at key moments in someone’s passwords
in which a fake website
the presidential campaign via social media to
spoofs an authentic one
distract from the Trump campaign’s scandals
184 Chapter 8

and to shift the discussion to the Clinton campaign’s woes. There were
also attempts to spearphish passwords that would gain access to several
states’ boards of elections. The theft and release of the emails was only
one part of the conspiracy. In addition, a series of social media accounts
were created, especially on Twitter, to promote the release of the docu-
ments and generate buzz about them. Recall that social media platforms
tend to decide what to put in front of you via an algorithm, which pri-
oritizes things that everyone is talking about.
This is why bots play such an important part
disinformation  False in this kind of campaign; even if nobody is
rumors intended to listening to them, they boost the algorith-
confuse or obfuscate; mic value of the topic simply by repeatedly
the term comes tweeting or posting about it (see social media
from the Russian
methodologies in chapter 3). “Algorithmic
dezinformatsiya, the
name of a 1950s KGB dissemination of content and the circumven-
office devoted to the tion of traditional media filters and opinion-
spread of propaganda formation gatekeepers, make disinformation
spread faster, reach deeper, be more emotion-
ally charged, and most importantly, be more
resilient due to the confirmation bias that online echo-chambers enable
and reinforce” (Bjola 2017, 189).
The project of “signal boosting” news during the 2016 election was run
by a company called the Internet Research Agency, which was based in
St. Petersburg, Russia. The company was founded in 2013, and as the
2016 election heated up it stole the identities of “real” Americans and
created social media pages that purported to be theirs. In this way the
Russians were able to—over time and drawing on the existing political
energies people were investing in the 2016 election—situate themselves
as brokers of partisan news for people on both sides of the election.
By the summer of 2016, there were eighty employees of the Internet
Research Agency working on this project. In the Democratic primaries,
which featured democratic socialist Bernie Sanders against the more
centrist Hillary Clinton, the Internet Research Agency worked to dis-
seminate anti-Clinton propaganda. In the Republican primaries, which
began with well over ten candidates running for president, the Internet
Research Agency promoted Donald Trump over all others. It is safe to
say that both Sanders and Trump were running as “outsiders” who
would upend traditional American foreign policy (more on that later).
In violation of American campaign finance law (which forbids foreign-
ers from spending money on American elections), targeted ads were
paid for (in Russian rubles) that promoted one candidate or disparaged
another. “According to the congressional testimony of Facebook, Google
and Twitter representatives, more than 150 million people were likely
 Social Media and the Networked Self 185

exposed to the Russian disinformation campaign prior to the 2016 Presi-

dential election. To put it into context, only 20.7 million people watched
the evening news broadcasts of ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox stations in
2016” (Bjola 2017, 189). By using social media platforms’ ability to profile
their users via Big Data, the Internet Research Agency was able to place
the right kind of ad in front of the right kind of American in order to
promote disunity and mutual distrust.
Indeed, while these workers definitely favored Trump and undermined
Clinton, their overall stated goal was to “spread distrust towards the
candidates and the political system in general” (U.S. Government 2018a,
6). This much is clear from the accounts they created; for instance, the
workers in St. Petersburg operated accounts titled both “United Muslims
of America” and “Army of Jesus,” posting content in each intended to in-
flame religious conflict in the United States. They also posed as actual po-
litical parties; for instance, they founded the @TEN_GOP Twitter account,
which purported to be the actual account of the Tennessee Republican
Party, and which had over one hundred thousand followers by the time of
the election. The workers at the Internet Research Agency also leveraged
the existing infrastructure of partisan politics in the United States by reach-
ing out to Trump-supporting organizations and people working with the
Trump campaign to promote their online content. In short, they became
part of the Trump network, with everyone assuming they were American
activists like the rest of the network. Skeptics might see all this as clicktiv-
ism, with no real impact on real-world politics. But the Russians were keen
to promote division among the American people offline as well as online.
But how could people working in St. Petersburg, Russia, get people in the
United States to vent their animosity at one another in real life?

Russian Election Interference Offline

The social media assemblage is important politically only inasmuch as it
pushes people to physically do something, most obviously to vote for a
preferred candidate (or, for the Russians, to inspire people—especially
people of color—to not vote at all). However, voting is only one kind of
political activity, and the Russians’ aims of fostering animosity among
Americans—toward each other and toward traditional politics—could
be served in a number of ways. Beginning in June 2016, workers at the
Internet Research Agency began to organize a series of political rallies
in cities along the East Coast of the United States, amping up the affects
of animosity.
For instance, they organized a purportedly pro-Clinton rally titled
“Support Hillary. Save American Muslims” in Washington, DC, by using
their United Muslims of America group on Facebook. However, this rally
186 Chapter 8

was meant primarily to arouse the anger of poten-

sharia law  A tial Trump voters and animate them to vote; the
system for settling Internet Research Agency arranged for someone
disputes within
to be at the rally holding a sign with a picture of
Muslim communities,
parallel to the actual
Clinton and a fake quote from her saying, “I think
legal system sharia law will be a powerful new direction of
freedom.” This person holding the sign was sub-
sequently photographed, and this entered back
into the social media assemblage, circulating and inspiring more outrage
and “shares.”
Similarly, the Internet Research Agency organized a “March for Trump”
rally and a “Down with Hillary” rally in New York City, and subse-
quently “Florida Goes Trump” rallies all across that state. For the latter,
an American was hired to build a cage and mount it on a flatbed truck,
and another was hired to dress up as Hillary Clinton in a prison uniform
and pose in the cage. Additional rallies were organized in Pennsylvania.
Notably, Florida and Pennsylvania are so-called swing states, seen as key
to overall electoral victory. Once Donald Trump was elected in November,
the Internet Research Agency continued stoking resentment, organizing
both a “Show Your Support for President-Elect Donald Trump” rally and
a “Trump is NOT my President” rally in New York City on the same day
in November 2016. Clearly the idea was to pit these groups against one
another, antagonizing the partisan divide in the United States. All of this
was done using stolen U.S. identities or fake social media profiles.
Thinking at a larger scale, we can see how the unlikely election of Presi-
dent Trump, aided by the work of the Internet Research Agency, led to
many of the “offline” geopolitical effects sought by Russia to ameliorate
their geopolitical position:

Trump has sown doubt about some of the United States’ oldest and most
important commitments, such as its support for NATO—an alliance Trump
described as “obsolete” in January [2018], before declaring it “no longer
obsolete” in April. He has flip-flopped on policy positions, publicly under-
mined the efforts of members of his own administration, and backpedaled
on diplomatic agreements, including the Paris climate accord and the Iran
nuclear deal. (Yarhi-Milo 2018, 68)

That is, Trump has effectively called into question the very alliances—
with Europe, Canada, and others—that make the international efforts
to punish Russia for human rights violations or military aggression in
Ukraine possible. We can therefore see how the actions of Russian mili-
tary intelligence and the Internet Research Agency contributed to real-
world effects on the streets of American cities, in American ballot boxes,
and in American foreign policy circles.
 Social Media and the Networked Self 187

Given the closeness of the 2016 election (Clinton won the popular vote,
with Trump winning in the Electoral College), it is easy to make the case
that the GRU hacking of the Clinton campaign’s emails changed the
outcome because it fundamentally shaped the overall discourse of the
campaign. However, as Bjola (2017, 189) notes, it is difficult to measure
the actual political effects of a campaign such as that run by the Internet
Research Agency:

Certainly, the promotion of echo-chambers of hate and the online escalation of

political polarization are tangible effects of digital propaganda, which cannot
be ignored. What is more difficult to assess is the nature of the impact these
digital effects has on the opinion and behaviour of the people exposed to them.

Did the Russian social media campaign change the outcome of the election
and therefore change American foreign policy? It is impossible to say be-
cause any political effects are intangible and fundamentally mixed in with
all the other messages of the campaign competing for people’s attention.
The networked self is complex and always being reshaped by a range of
influences, with no single thing dominating most of the time. Further, it is
important to keep in mind that the Russians exploited Americans’ existing
prejudices against one another, whether those prejudices were rooted in ra-
cial, sexual, religious, or political party. To attribute those things to the Rus-
sians would be to imply that those prejudices are external to an innocent
America, which is obviously not true. Nevertheless, we can see the Russian
effort as one of many forces working to reshape Americans’ political subjec-
tivities. And they clearly believe it worked, as demonstrated by the ongoing
efforts to use popular culture to foster political divides in the United States.

Spreading the Culture Wars into Star Wars

Indeed, popular culture has always been one of the venues in which de-
bates about American multiculturalism, feminism, and religious diversity
play out. However, the advent of social media—and its flattening of hier-
archies—has made popular culture more fraught than ever. One area that
draws a great deal of attention is long-standing franchises (such as the
Marvel and DC superhero universes, the James Bond franchise, and so on)
that were created in a time when the whiteness and masculinity of heroism
were assumed. As these franchises try to adapt to contemporary views on
race, ethnicity, sexuality, and gender, they come under attack by white su-
premacists and others who lament the passing of their cultural dominance.
The relaunch of the Star Wars franchise, now owned by the Disney
Corporation, has proven particularly controversial as the sequels to the
original trilogy have incorporated greater diversity of race, sexuality, and
gender. Particularly controversial has been The Last Jedi (2017), which
188 Chapter 8

spawned much online chatter and even a crowdfunded attempt to shoot

a new fan-directed version of the film. The reasons for this opposition are
as diverse as the people arguing over the film, but the film is notable for
its demolition of traditional heroism, highlighting how it is frequently
ill thought out and produces yet more problems to be solved. This per-
spective—combined with the film’s diverse casting—only enhanced the
perception of its critics that the film was an attack on them and their
worldview.
Social media scholar Morten Bay (2018) analyzed the 1,273 tweets
addressed to The Last Jedi director Rian Johnson in the eight months fol-
lowing the film’s release. This is far smaller than the number of tweets
about the film, but it made the sample manageable for Bay to personally
inspect. He then went to examine the Twitter habits of each account that
had tweeted at Johnson, which allowed him to contextualize their tweet
about the movie. He divided the accounts into three categories: (1) those
who tweet primarily about politics, (2) those who tweet a lot about Star
Wars, and (3) bots and sock puppets. Of course, the latter are difficult
to definitively identify, but Bay compared the characteristics of the ac-
counts he was studying to the characteristics of the Russian bots and
sock puppets conclusively discovered in the wake of the 2016 election.
Of the 206 Twitter accounts heaping abuse on Johnson over the study
period, Bay found that eleven of them were bot accounts, while a further
thirty-three were sock puppets. Of those thirty-
sock puppet  A
three sock puppets, roughly half appeared to be
social media account, Russian trolls (such accounts are frequently a
frequently abusive common English name followed by a series of
in content, that is random numbers or lack profile pictures). Many
unlinked to the real of these accounts were indeed suspended by
user’s identity Twitter in their postelection crackdown on Rus-
sian troll accounts. None of the Russian-linked
accounts posted anything positive about The Last Jedi.
When Bay (2018, 22) examined the tweets of the (non–bot/sock puppet)
accounts that he identified as primarily concerned with politics (rather
than Star Wars), he found that

it is not fair to generalize and paint all of the The Last Jedi detractors as alt-
right activists, racists or misogynists. However, the findings above show that
a majority of the negatively-poised users included in the study do express
such sentiments, either in The Last Jedi-related tweets or in other tweets on
their accounts.
 Social Media and the Networked Self 189

Again, what we see in this example is how existing divides in American

society—around white supremacy, masculinity, and feminism—are am-
plified by social media and exacerbated by Russian state action to fur-
ther their geopolitical objectives. The networked self is both empowered
through the social media (and other) assemblages that it is plugged into,
but also made vulnerable to influence operations and other geopolitical
shenanigans.

CONCLUSION

Summary

In this chapter, we have built on the previous chapter’s focus on as-

semblages and everyday life to think about the networked self. The net-
worked self is capable of exercising power over large distances, but it is
also continuously being shaped through the wider array of relations in
which it is embedded. This approach is broadly applicable to our highly
networked lives, but it is most evident in contemporary anxieties around
social media and the way that they are shaping society and geopolitics.
While there is nothing new about these anxieties (recall the role of the
telegraph and similar technologies in H. P. Lovecraft’s horror stories),
they nevertheless take unique form with concerns from online bullying
in schools to global manipulation of elections.
Social media takes the conceptual development of performative con-
sumption (introduced in the previous chapter, and in which consum-
ers are also producers of culture) and introduces an additional layer of
technological mediation: the role of algorithms and nonhuman agency in
the production of our “online public sphere.” We are the ones who make
the content of social media, but that content is shaped and reworked by
the platforms themselves and how other people interact with our con-
tent. This makes social media a forum for politics, as some people, social
movements, and governments compete to get their ideas to rise to the top.
But it is more than a field of political discourse—tweets, posts, and other
social media interactions all carry with them an affective charge that can
shape the way social media feels to its users. It is for this reason that—for
instance—so many cast members of The Last Jedi have been driven off
Twitter and other social media platforms and why online bullying in
schools has been connected to real-world suicides. Social media is not just
an “online public sphere” but also a way of shaping people’s sense of self
and their potential for (geo)political action.
190 Chapter 8

Extensions in Your Life

•  From where do you get most of your daily information about the
world?
• How do social media make you feel? How do you feel when you take
a break from them?
• What are the advantages of having so many voices at our fingertips
via technology like the internet?
• What are the disadvantages of that deluge of information?
 9
,
Conclusion
Identity, Subjectivity, and Going Forward

This chapter is intended to serve (literally) as a bookend, paired with the

introductory chapter. In that chapter the subject matter of popular culture
and geopolitics was introduced, with identity as a thread that connected
them and ran through all the chapters of this book. After a brief synopsis
of the book, this chapter gives a more extended treatment of our view of
identity and subjectivity, drawing on the collective insights of the rest of
the book. Similarly, while the introductory chapter discussed the project
of popular geopolitics and how the book was structured, this chapter will
speculate about the future of that project and consider ways for the reader
to continue an interest in popular geopolitics beyond this book.

BRINGING IT ALL TOGETHER

This book began with a brief introduction to the topic and the book before
moving on with three chapters that sought to outline two different bodies
of knowledge, those associated with geopolitics and with popular culture,
and the methods through which those bodies of knowledge have been
extended. Very briefly the history of each was sketched, illustrating how
in the development of both fields of study there had been a long-term
shift toward the complication of taken-for-granted ideas by a height-
ened appreciation for everyday people’s ideas and actions. In the case
of geopolitics, that involved connecting the inherent politics associated
with war and diplomacy with the type of consumption activities usually

191
192 Chapter 9

undertaken in our living rooms, shopping malls, and movie theaters, and
on the internet. The case studies of the last five chapters have tried to
show how these everyday activities not only reflect prevailing geopoliti-
cal trends but also actively construct them. The global scale of geopolitics
is inseparable from the everyday scale of our lives.
A fundamental tenet of popular geopolitics that has emerged is that
geopolitics is not only about how we see other people but also how we see
ourselves—our identity. The five concepts highlighted in the case study
chapters of this book each addressed the processes through which our
identities are generated, contested, and sometimes obscured, even to our-
selves. Representation of place (chapter 4) is how we describe the Other—
the peoples and places that are deemed fundamentally different from “us”
or “me.” Narrative (chapter 5), related to representation, is a method of
understanding how “we” or “I” got to this situation, whatever that might
be and wherever it might be going. Affect (chapter 6) attends to the con-
nections between the self and the surrounding environment, geopolitical
extensions of the self that are preconscious and usually unaccounted for in
the more cognitive elements of geopolitics like representation and narra-
tive. Audiencing and assemblage (chapter 7) highlights how we can think
about popular geopolitics in everyday contexts like museums, without
screens and media. Rather, the focus turns to our bodies and how they
sense the world around us, perform within it, and are changed by the
experience. The networked self (chapter 8) extended the notion of assem-
blage to think about our relationship with social media and other digital
technologies that extend our reach through time and space. The case study
of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election showed how
social media have provided a powerful avenue for geopolitical actors to
attempt to shape who we think we are and what we believe: the weapon-
izing of identity. The cumulative effect of considering all these concepts at
once can be extreme disorientation—we are not the absolute decision mak-
ers that we often think we are. Our thought processes are preconditioned
by cultural (and affective) influences that we have been inundated with
since childhood. We still have an incredible capacity for critical thinking,
but it is simply not possible to rise above our own subjectivity and con-
sider geopolitics from a completely objective perspective.

POSTSTRUCTURALISM AND SUBJECTIVITY

In chapter 2 we briefly mentioned subjectivity, which we then defined as

an individual’s sense of self, including perspective, thoughts, emotions,
and the like. Subjectivity has been a major subject of controversy across
 Conclusion 193

the social sciences, even bridging into disciplines such as psychology

(e.g., Salgado and Hermans 2005).
For a long time, it never would have occurred to scholars to question
how we know who we are. René Descartes’s famous Latin dictum Cogito
ergo sum (I think, therefore I am) was the first and last word on the subject.
The subject as Descartes conceived it was
a singular, coherent consciousness that ex-
René Descartes  French
isted through time (indeed, this is how most mathematician and scholar,
people conceive of themselves in everyday known as the father of
life). This notion has been subsequently modern philosophy
branded the Cartesian subject given its close
association with Descartes.
Sigmund Freud’s theories of the subcon-
scious (id) as something separate from the Cartesian subject 
conscious, rational self (ego) began the pro- Notion that the subject
cess of questioning the notion that there is is singular and unified
a core to us that is in control. However, the throughout time
poststructuralist perspective on the subject
makes this simple distinction between ego
and id seem elementary. Poststructuralism
has animated much of the work in popular id  In Freud’s system,
our unconscious drives
geopolitics that is described in this book.
Poststructuralists have been very critical
of the innate value of knowledge (you will
recognize this postcolonial perspective from
ego  In Freud’s
chapter 4, among others). Rather than using
system, our rational/
language to try and describe a fundamental cognitive processes
truth (like who you really are), language and
discourse are tools used to make action pos-
sible. Note the parallels in the following quote from psychologists João
Salgado and Hubert Hermans between the poststructuralist notion of the
subject and our ideas of representational binaries and Orientalism from
chapters 2 and 4:

In this way, the construction of meaning is completely dependent on rela-

tionships between people, including self-related meanings. Each context
specifies certain social and relational games, by which people try to make
themselves intelligible to others and try to make others intelligible to them-
selves. In other words, meaning is a matter of linguistic and social negotia-
tion. Selfhood, in this matter, is only a particular case of intelligibility: what
I am is a matter of how we symbolically and pragmatically negotiate the
meanings assigned to my own person. (Salgado and Hermans 2005, 6)
194 Chapter 9

Thus, when considering the role of identity in popular geopolitics, the

subject is generally considered fragmented or nomadic (Deleuze and
Guattari 1983; Radway 1988). Instead of a monolithic subject, individuals
take various subject positions that reflect different roles or identities that
the individual recognizes. The popular notion of a singular, Cartesian self
is constituted through interactions of your biological self with discourses
(Hall 1996). Again, here are Salgado and Hermans (2005, 6); note how their
“sense of identity” parallels our discussion of narrative in chapter 5: “The
sense of continuity and permanence—the sense of identity—is something
that arises from the continuous processes of creating and granting intel-
ligibility and coherence in the course of relationships with others.”
To further complicate matters, as our bodies come into different re-
lations with discourses, different subject positions emerge (Grossberg
1987). Even a relatively young adult can look
back on some earlier time (early adolescence
subject positions  is always good for some laughs) and recall an
Many different
incident where he or she acted entirely differ-
identities from which
we select in different
ently than he or she would now, such as being
social situations embarrassed about a trait you have that you now
celebrate (or are at least OK with). Sometimes
those memories even take the perspective of the
third person—we know we were there, we know what we did, but we
remember it all as a story, just like we remember stories that we did not
actually take part in (like a plot from television, or a friend’s funny story
you have heard a few times).
Once we acknowledge that the “self” changes over time (i.e., there is
no fundamental “me”), it is a smaller step to recognize that the self often
changes over very short time spans, flipping back and forth between dif-
ferent subject positions. This should not be surprising when we consider
how social life is saturated with multiple (and often competing) discourses,
and also if we take seriously the implications of chapters 7 and 8: that our
material and networked environments shape our subjectivity at any given
moment. Janice Radway describes it thus (1988, 364, emphasis in original):

Social subjects can be multiply addressed by discourses that coincide or

overlap, but they can also be addressed by discourses that contest and even
contradict each other. This possibility for discontinuity highlights the other
feature of the larger process of subject formation I want to stress—that is, the
fact that social subjects actively participate in the process (although by that
participation they do not fully control it or its effects) by deliberately articu-
lating bits and pieces from several, often competing, discourses themselves.

In other words, we can actively contribute to the changing of our selves

by actively engaging with some discourses and affects over others. When
 Conclusion 195

presented with rival discourses and affects that appeal to contradictory

elements of our “selves,” we can actively intervene to decide how (and
who) we want to be in that instance. Of course, it is not possible to “de-
cide” in a purely rational sense how we want to be in a given moment; we
are always also a product of our environments. But what makes human-
ity special is our ability to reflect on our past decisions, why we made
those choices, and then act on them. Consider for instance the idea of the
“social media detox.” Some people decide to
step away from social media for a time, or
even to delete their accounts forever. This social media detox  To
is a decision that is made to shape the affec- take time away from
social media platforms
tive forces that act upon the self: often these
to reduce their impact
people speak to the negativity of Twitter or on your well-being
the jealousy they feel when viewing other
people’s Instagram accounts. In choosing to
sign off, these people are trying to shape who they are and how they feel.
These kinds of interventions can occur in an off-line fashion as well, for
instance, when an alcoholic starts to hang out with people who do not
drink to avoid temptation.
The poststructuralist perspective on the subject, which as you can see
has served as the philosophical underpinning for the early chapters of this
book and for much of the history of popular geopolitics, has nevertheless
come in for some criticism. One such criticism is that poststructuralism, in
its disdain for the notion of a core self, has left no room for private experi-
ences that are not shared with others through discourse. If all “I” am is
a narrative that holds my disparate elements together, who is telling the
narrative?
This problem is addressed by Mikhail
Bakhtin, a scholar of culture who came up Mikhail Bakhtin
with the idea of dialogism (1982). Dialogism Russian philosopher;
originally referred to the idea that texts are famous for his
always in dialogue with each other (see chap- contributions to literary
ter 2 for our discussion of intertextuality). theory and rhetoric
However, this is more than simply authors
(or musicians, filmmakers, or whatever) be-
ing influenced by one another. Instead of
a unidirectional influence (forward though
time, with prior works influencing new
dialogism  Notion
ones), dialogism argues that older works are that texts are always in
influenced by new works—always capable correspondence with
of being reinterpreted and thus changing in each other, forward and
meaning. The implications of this for subjec- backward through time
tivity can be seen by replacing the “works”
196 Chapter 9

in the previous sentence with narrators. “The self cannot be understood

. . . except in relation to an audience whose real and imagined responses
shape the way in which we define ourselves” (Kelly 1992, 44).
Thus, Bakhtin holds out the possibility of an essential self, one that
can only be glimpsed from outside ourselves; that is, as we said regard-
ing popular culture in chapter 7, the audiences with whom we interact
themselves have a role in defining who we are. This is not only true in a
literal sense but also in the sense that our selves are always in dialogue
with each other. “If we assume that thought is, in fact, a dialogue with
oneself . . . we do not need to assume that
self-consciousness is grounded in a kind
polyphony  Literally of internal or homuncular ego or observer.
“multiple voices”; in
literature, the possibility
Consequently, it is possible to admit that
of a novel capturing self-consciousness is a matter of communica-
multiple points of tion with oneself . . . a matter of our ability
view rather than just of relating with ourselves” (Salgado and
the author’s; in the Hermans 2005, 10). Bakhtin then argues that
study of identity, the there is no self without polyphony—they are
constitution of the self
mutually constitutive. This makes intuitive
through conflicting
subject positions
sense when laid alongside our discussion of
geopolitical identity (Self/Other) found in
chapters 1 and 4.
This discussion has been a winding, yet too brief, tour around one of
the deepest human questions—“who am I?” Subjectivity is a topic of in-
terest to scholars from a multitude of disciplines from geography to psy-
chology to literature. It is impossible to understate its relevance for topics
such as geopolitics and popular culture, as can be seen from the way in
which our discussion of subjectivity in this chapter has intersected with
ideas that we encountered in every other chapter. Therefore it should be
clear that the processes by which self-identity is generated are paralleled
by the processes by which collective identities (e.g., nations, religions,
political parties) are constructed. The difference lies in the specifics of the
discourses involved and the scale of the media and everyday practices in-
volved. Our personal identities are formed through interaction with oth-
ers, most often face-to-face but sometimes via technological mediation—
which itself shapes the affective forces that go along with the discursive
content. Our collective identities are also formed through dialogue, but
more often these interchanges take place through popular culture and
other mass media. Hopefully this book has provided the grounding to go
forth and engage in the world with a more sophisticated understanding
of the processes in play and how it is possible to fit into them.
 Conclusion 197

THE FUTURE

Popular geopolitics was described in the introductory chapter as both a

subject matter and a project. While these are distinct, their futures are ob-
viously tied together. If anything, the short history of popular geopolitics
has been a successful one, with more people getting involved and new
perspectives being introduced both from other areas of geography and
from other disciplines. However, much like human geography itself,
there is so much theoretical foment that it is difficult to foresee the future.
For instance, developments in nonrepresentational theory call into ques-
tion the social constructivist underpinnings of popular geopolitics, and
this edition has tried to take into account the full range of approaches,
highlighting the materialism of affect and assemblages. The future is wide
open, and in fact the most likely scenario is an as-yet unforeseen develop-
ment that shakes everything up in new ways.
The end of this book is hopefully not the end of your interest in popular
culture and geopolitics. If you are interested in going forward with the
topic, it could be a never-ending source of interest and passion. There are
two distinct ways in which to carry on.

Contesting Discourses, Performing Identities

There are many ways to learn about popular geopolitics other than just
by reading books like this one. In fact, there is something to be said for
learning by doing. Of course, we are all “doing” popular geopolitics all
the time whether we know it or not because, as we saw in this and the
preceding chapters, our everyday lives are enmeshed in geopolitics—they
are mutually constitutive.
Remember how in the last two chapters we discussed the openness of
culture, its fundamental pliability. The opportunity is always present to
engage with geopolitical discourses and intervene, not only to reshape our
society but also ourselves. The dialogic perspective of identity means that,
when we change the discourses we are immersed in or shift the thinking
of the people around us, we by definition change ourselves because it is
impossible to know who we are except through social interaction.
So what can you do? One of the strengths of geopolitical discourse is
that it makes us feel miniscule and insignificant as individuals. “What can
I do to change the course of globalization?” “The media representation of
Muslims does not match my experience. What can I do?” Nevertheless,
our actions and inactions are what generate these discourses, or at least
enable them. Therefore, it stands to reason that our actions and inactions
can change them, should we so desire. As we saw in chapter 8, there are
198 Chapter 9

limits to this because of inequalities in power among various actors, but

with good tactics you can often overcome weakness.
The most important thing to have prior to starting out is a definite
perspective. This book has outlined concepts and case studies, but it is up
to the reader to use those concepts to identify a geopolitical stance. Then,
with some tactical thinking, it is possible to come up with a plan. Luckily
there are numerous ways to intervene in popular geopolitics and impact
the processes of identity formation and meaning-making that have been
outlined in this book. If someone is really into popular culture and going
to make a career out of it, he or she is uniquely placed to influence the rep-
resentations and narratives that are deployed in public discourse. While
the public seems to hate being lectured by heavy-handed celebrities and
moralizing movies, that is not necessarily what is needed. What we need
is an entertainment industry that is merely socially aware and does not
resort to unsubtle processes of Othering and fear. Instead of this fear and
resentment, we could substitute a popular culture that tries to foster more
positive relationships between ourselves and our environment (for more
on this, see Connolly 2007).
Of course, it is not necessary to make a career out of reworking popular
geopolitics. It can begin with a single letter to the editor, entering words
and ideas into the public sphere. Perhaps you would like to start a blog
that reviews movies, literature, and music from a critical geopolitical
perspective. That would simply involve thinking and writing about the
popular culture already being consumed and putting those thoughts out
on the internet for public consumption. As Foucault argued, power is con-
stituted through the thousands of daily interactions we all have; therefore
we are all implicated in the everyday enactments of geopolitics.
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 Index

Note: Page numbers followed by “f” or “t” indicate figures and tables, respectively.

actants, 33–34 America’s Army (video game), 133, 135

Action Man, 34, 35f amplification, 121
active audience, 141–42 Anaz, Necati, 58
Adorno, Theodor, 26 Anderson, Benedict, 39–40, 41, 103
affect, xxi; assemblage and, 149; bodily annexation, 182
aspect of, 120, 123; Call of Duty anonymity, 67
and, 133–39; concept of, 119–24; anticommunism, 13, 16, 56
critical security studies and, 123–24; apartheid, 89, 105
debates about, 124–27; defined, 119, Apple, 142
120; emotions compared to, 121; Arab Spring, 19, 181
environmental factors in, 120–22; archaeology, 153
everydayness and, 125; media and, Archer (television show), 19
126–27; networked self and, 167–68; archival research, 63–64
operations of, 121–22; relational Argentina, 177–79
aspect of, 120–23; violence and, 123 Arnold, Matthew, 21
affective atmosphere, 121–22 assemblages, xxii; complexity of, 150;
Africa, postcolonial, 101 concept of, 147–48, 150, 162; digital
Afrikaaners, 89 diplomacy and, 174; as events, 148;
agency, 27, 29, 194–95, 197–98 heritage as case study in, 150–62;
Agnew, John, 10 material character of, 148–49;
airport security, 173–74 methodological significance of, 150;
Alderman, Derek, 151–53 mutuality in, 149; temporality
algorithms, 172–74, 180–81, 184 of, 149
American Association of Geographers, 3 Association of American Geographers, 3
American Revolution, 76 asynchronous interviews, 59

209
210 Index

audience, xxi–xxii; active, 141–42; 134–38; role of, in heritage, 153, 156;
concept of, 141–45; cultural role of, in meaning-making, 148–49
backgrounds of, 24; debates about, Boers, 88–89
145–50; as object of research, 50, 51, Bomber Command, in Australian War
56–62; passive, 141–42; for sporting Memorial, 155–56, 156f
events, 18; subcultures as, 145–46; Bos, Daniel, 62
worldviews of, 109–11; for X-Men Bosnia, x, 54–55
films and comic books, 144–45 bots, 66, 67, 184
Austen, Jane, Mansfield Park, 79–80, 91 Bouazizi, Mohamed, 18
Australian War Memorial (AWM), Bowman, Isaiah, 7, 70
154–62 Brexit, 103
The Avengers (film), 1–2, 20, 132 bricolage, 145–46
AWM. See Australian War Memorial Britain and United Kingdom: Brexit,
103; and Falkland Islands, 177–79;
Bakhtin, Mikhail, 195–96 geopolitical framework centered
banal nationalism, 41–42, 104 on, 11; Russia and, 7, 8f; UK
Bardem, Javier, 85 Ministry of Defense, 34; U.S.
Basic Combat Training, 133 relations with, 84. See also British
Battlefield (video game), 134 Empire
Battleship (film), 132 British Broadcasting Corporation
Bay, Morten, 188 (BBC), 64
Beethoven, Ludwig van, 23 British Empire, xxi; case study of,
Belgium, 17–18 79–93; collapse of, 81; James Bond
Ben Ali, Zine el-Abidine, 18–19 films and, 80–85; literature and,
Benjamin, Walter, 26 79–80; map of, 74f; postcolonialism
Benwell, Matt, 65, 177–78 and, 85–91. See also Britain and
Berlin Wall, ix United Kingdom
Between Two Ferns (television show), 29 Bronies, 146
Beverly Hills Summit, 131–32 bubbles, in social networks, 169
Bieber, Justin, 22 Bush, George H. W., 14
Big Data, 54, 171–72, 180–81, 185 Bush, George W., 14, 43, 131, 182
Billig, Michael, 41–42, 104
bin Laden, Osama, 43, 143 Caldwell, Luke, 134
Birdman or (The Unexpected Virtue of Call of Duty (video game series), xxi,
Ignorance) (film), 52, 53 135–39, 136f
The Birth of a Nation (film), 130 Cambodia, 20
Bjola, Corneliu, 187 Canada, 15–16, 175, 176f, 177f
Black, Jeremy, 81–82 Canadian Bacon (film), 15–16
Black Hawk Down (film), 53 The Canadian Conspiracy (film), 15
Black History Month, 99 Capra, Frank, 131
Black Mirror (television show), 20, 110 Captain America Comics, xxi, 106–17,
Black Panther (film), 26 107f, 114
body, xxi; affect and, 120, 123; Captain America’s Weird Tales, 109
decision-making role of, 120; Carell, Steve, 147
geopolitical significance of, 17–19; Carter, Sean, 34, 53, 122
military-themed video games and, Cartesian plane, 9
 Index 211

Cartesian subject, 193 contagion, 121

cartographies of textual reception, 143 containment policy, 8
cartography, 70 content analysis, 54–55
Castree, Noel, 71 continuity, 110–12
Catholic Church, 22 convergence culture, 37–38
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 60 Corden, James, 148
Centre for Contemporary Cultural Coulter, Kimberly, 62
Studies, University of Birmingham, Craig, Daniel, 85, 92
21 Crimea, 175, 182
Charlottesville, Virginia, rally in, 152 critical geopolitics, 10–19; cultural
Cher, “Bang Bang (My Baby Shot Me power, 12–13; defined, 11;
Down),” 50 discourse, 11–12; goal of, 19–20;
Chile, 77–78 typology of discourses, 13–19, 14t
China, 66 critical realism, 73
CHiPs (television show), 87 critical security studies, 123
circulation, research on, 50, 51, 65 Crouch, David, 153
citizens, 168, 169 CSI (television show), 87
citizen statecraft, 176–79 Cuba, 77, 78
Civil War (United States), 99 cultural authority/power, 12–13, 22–23
class, 28–29 cultural geographies of reading, 144
classical geopolitics, 11–13, 19, 56–57 cultural geography, xx
clicktivism, xiii, 171, 185 cultural imperialism, 24
Clinton, Hillary, 29, 183–87 cultural studies, xx, 27–34, 49, 145
closed-ended questions, 57 culture industry, 26
Closs Stephens, Angharad, 122
coding, 54 The Daily Show (television show), 1
Cohen, Saul, 8–9 Dalby, Simon, 10
Cold War: author’s experience of, Dallas (television show), 24
vii–ix; geopolitics foregrounded by, Darwin, Charles, 3
8; hegemony and, 29; in popular data, 47–48. See also Big Data
culture, viii–x, 16–17; Reader’s de Certeau, Michel, 31–32, 141
Digest discourse in relation to, 12, decolonization, 85–86
55–56; U.S.–Soviet relations in, vii– dehumanization, 19–20
viii, 5, 12–13, 16–17 DeMille, Cecil B., 130
Colombia, 17 Democratic Congressional Campaign
colonialism, 75–76, 79–80. See also Committee, 183
imperialism; postcolonialism Democratic National Committee, 183
comic books, 2. See also Captain Democratic Party, 29
America Comics Dench, Judi, 85
Commonwealth of Nations, 81 Der Derian, James, 128, 129
compositional analysis, 53–54 Descartes, René, 193
compositional modality, 51–52 dialogism, 195–96
Confederate War Memorials, 152 Diamond, Jared, 6
confidentiality, 48, 49, 67 Die Another Day (film), 61
consumerism, 30–31 diegetic sound, 137
consumption, 27–32. See also digital diplomacy, 174–75
performative consumption digital divide, 170
212 Index

digital geopolitics, xxii; citizen Facebook, 19, 22, 66, 148, 170–72, 184
statecraft, 176–79; digital fake news, xiii, 70, 71, 96
diplomacy, 174–75; drones and, Falkland Islands, 177–79
179–81; public sphere and, 169–70 Fallon, Jimmy, 148
diplomacy, digital, 174–75 false consciousness, 28
discourse, 11–12, 30 fandom, 146–47
discourse analysis, 55–56 fanfic, 147
disinformation, 184–85 fascism, 28, 113, 115–16, 131
Disney Corporation, 187 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
Dittmer, Jason, 154 13
Dodds, Klaus, 60–61, 63–64, 81, 83–84 feminist geopolitics, 56–57, 125, 170
Dominican Republic, 32, 78; license feudalism, 102
plate, 32, 33f field telephone, 166
domino theory, 9 fieldwork, 48
drones, 179–81 Fisher, Walter, 96
dual-use technology, 129 flags, 41–42
Dust Off, in Australian War Memorial, Fleming, Ian, 61
156–59 focus groups, 59–60
Dwyer, Owen J., 151–53 folk culture, 23–25
football (soccer), 17–18
ego, 193 force feedback, 138
Egypt, 170 formal geopolitics, 13–14
Eisenhower, Dwight, 127–28 Foucault, Michel, 30, 55–56, 141, 198
Elementary (television show), 110 Fox News, 15, 96
emotional geographies, 125–26 Franco, James, xvii
emotions, 121, 125–26. See also affect Frankfurt School, 26–29, 54, 141
empire: colonialism, 75–76; free trade, 77
Enlightenment principles and, 78; Freud, Sigmund, 35, 193
imperialism, 77–78. See also British From Russia with Love (film), 83
Empire Fuchs, Christian, 170
Enlightenment, xxi, 72, 78, 168
entertainment, war experience as, 129, Galifianakis, Zach, 29
135 Game of Thrones (television show), 110
environmental determinism, 6 G8, 182
essentialism, 99 genre, 53
The Eternal Jew (film), 131 geography: concept of, 11, 70; cultural,
ethics: military and, 128–29; of xx; human, 6; imagined, 40–41;
research, 48, 62, 67 James Bond films and, 81–82, 82t;
ethnography, 60–62 physical, 6; political, xix–xx; and
European Union, 84, 100, 103 representation, 69–71, 73
Evans, Chris, 116 geopolitical imaginations, 41
events, 147–48 geopolitics, 1–20; classical, 11–13,
everydayness, 125 19, 56–57; concept of, xix, 2–4,
evolution, 31 9; critical, 10–19; decline and
experience economy, 135 resurgence of, 6–10; formal, 13–14;
 Index 213

identity in relation to, xix, 192, 194; Hoggart, Richard, 27

and imperialism, 7, 10; origins of, Hollywood, 22, 24, 26, 88, 130, 131
3–5; popular culture as, xi, xviii, Holocaust, 97, 144
xix, 1, 42–43; practical, 14–15. See Homeland (television show), 1, 60
also digital geopolitics; popular Hoover, J. Edgar, 13
geopolitics Horkheimer, Max, 26
Germany, 4, 7, 22, 70. See also Nazism House Un-American Activities
Gilmartin, Mary, 70, 71 Committee, 13
globalization, xix, 23–24, 102–3 Hughes, Rachel, 137
Global Positioning System (GPS), human geography, 6
128–29 Huston, John, 131
Google, 171–74, 184 hybridity, 87–88
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 16 hypodermic needle model, 141–42
Gramsci, Antonio, 28–31, 141
Great Game, 7, 8f id, 193
Gregory, Derek, 180–81 identity: affect and, 192; assemblages
Grenada, 78 and, 192; of cultural audiences, 24,
Griffith, D. W., 130 25; dialogic approach to, 195–96;
GRU (Russian intelligence geopolitics in relation to, xix, 192,
organization), 183, 187 194; hybridity and, 88; Lacanian
Guardians of Peace, xvii psychoanalytic theory of, 36;
Guatemala, 78 link of personal to national, 40;
Gulf War (1991), ix, 50 meanings of, xix; multiplicity in,
194–96; narrative construction of,
Habermas, Jürgen, 169, 171 96, 97, 192; networked self and,
Haiti, 78 192; performance of, 105; personal
Hall, Stuart, 27 agency in formation of, 194–95;
The Handmaid’s Tale (film), 110 place and, 192; popular culture
haptic, 138 in relation to, xix, 1; subjectivity
Hartshorne, Richard, 7 and, 192–96; understanding and
Harvey, David, 165 interpretation influenced by, xix, 7,
Haushofer, Karl, 4, 7 12–13, 24. See also national identity
hegemony, 28–29 identity politics, 99
Herder, Johann, 40 imaginary geographies, 40–41, 79
heritage: AWM as case study in, 154– imagined communities, 38–40, 41, 143
61; defined, 150, 151; in everyday IMDb website, 61
life, 152–53; temporality of, 153 immersion, 136–37
Hermans, Hubert, 193–94 imperialism, 7, 10, 19, 24, 75, 77–78. See
Hess, Rudolf, 4 also colonialism
Heyer, Heather, 152 Independence Day (film), 2
Hidden Figures (film), 100 India, 7
high culture, 21–23, 25 indictments, 183
Hitler, Adolf, 4, 7, 20, 106, 108, 130, individual, liberal conception of, 28
131 Industrial Revolution, 76
H.M. Armed Forces action figure, 34, informed consent, 48
35f Instagram, 66, 167
Hobsbawm, Eric, 102 intelligent design, 31
214 Index

interactive war, 129 Latour, Bruno, 33

International Olympic Committee, 179 Law and Order (television show), 87
international relations, xx Lebensraum, 4
Internet Research Agency, 184–87 Lee, Bruce, 88
intertextuality, 42–43, 56 Lee, Robert E., 152
The Interview (film), xvii–xviii Leib, Jonathan, 32
interviews, 58–59 Lenoir, Tim, 134
In Which We Serve (film), 131 LexisNexis, 64
Iraq, U.S. invasion of (2003), 131 libel, 171
Istanbul, Turkey, 83–84 Likert scale, 58
Italy, 131 Lin, Maya, 152
literature, and British Empire, 79–80
Jack Ryan: Shadow Recruit (television Livingstone, David, 143, 162
show), 1 Logos, 96
James Bond films, 61, 63–64, 80–85, 92 Lovecraft, H. P., 166
Japan, 4
Jenkins, Henry, 37 Mackinder, Halford, 5, 6, 7; map of
Jews, 20, 106, 131 geographical pivot, 5f
Johnson, Rian, 188 Macmillan, Thomas, 71
Jones, Alex, 171 Magnitsky Act, 182
Mahan, Alfred, 4–5, 7
Kaplan, Robert, 6 Maibaum, Richard, 63
Kardashian, Kim, 22, 168 Malvinas Islands, 177–79
Keith, Toby, “Courtesy of the Red, Mandela, Nelson, 89
White, and Blue,” 1 Manifest Destiny, 97
Kim Jong-un, xvii–xviii, 175 Marshall (film), 100
King, Martin Luther, Jr., 144 Marshall, Thurgood, 100
King, Stephen, 23 Marshall, Tim, 6
Kirby, Jack, 106, 109 Marvel Cinematic Universe, 2, 116, 149
Kissinger, Henry, 9 Marxism, 26–27
Kjellén, Rudolf, 4 mash-up, 179
Kneale, James, 166 material culture, 32–34
knowledge, 86–87, 95–97 McCarthy, Joseph, 13, 112
Korean War, 109 McCormack, Derek, 53, 122
Kosovo, 129, 180 Medal of Honor (video game), 134
Ku Klux Klan, 115 media: affect and, 126–27; convergence
Kukoc, Toni, 88 culture and, 37–38; cultural
Kyrgyzstan, 60 power of, 12–13; defined, 16.
See also military-industrial-
Lacan, Jacques, 35–36 media-entertainment (MIME)
Lacoste, Yves, 9–10 complex; popular culture; popular
language: Lacanian psychoanalysis geopolitics; social media
and, 36; nations linked to, 39–40, #MeToo movement, 110
103; poststructuralism and, 10, 195 Megoran, Nick, 60
The Last Jedi (film), 187–89 memorials, 151–53
late-night television, 148 mercantilism, 75–76
Latin America, 77–78 metanarrativity, 98
 Index 215

methodologies, 45, 47. See also research narrative, xxi; of America, 97–98,
Middle East, in geopolitical 99–100, 104–17; concept of,
framework, 11, 40–41 95–98; debates about, 98–100;
militainment, 129 identity construction through,
militarism, 154 96, 97; knowledge acquisition
military: cinema in relation to, through, 95–97; national identity
130–31; costs of, 128; entertainment construction through, xxi, 97–98,
industry’s connections to, 131–32; 100, 103–4; nature of, 98–99; scales
ethics and, 128–29; everyday use of, 97–98
of technologies from, 128–29; narrative paradigm, 96
normalization of, 34, 129; video narrative rationality, 96
game industry’s relations with, national identity: narrative
132–39 construction of, xxi, 97–98,
military heritage, xxii 100, 103–4; popular culture’s
military-industrial complex, 127–28 contribution to, 1; primordial
military-industrial-media- conception of, 101. See also
entertainment (MIME) complex, nationalism
2; history of, 130–33; origins of, national interest, 11–12
127–28; overview of, 128–30; video nationalism: banal, 41–42, 104; critique
games and, 134–39 of, 42; post-, 102–3; primordial,
military intervention, 78 39–40, 101; sports as form of, 1, 18;
military-themed video games, 129–30, U.S. politics and, 29; working-class,
134–38 28. See also national identity
Miller, Daniel, 32 nations: biological conceptions of, 101;
MIME complex. See military- defined, 38–39; geopolitical role of,
industrial-media-entertainment 100; language as defining feature
(MIME) complex of, 39–40, 103; modernist theories
mimicry, 88 of, 102–3; personal identity linked
mirror stage, 36 to, 40; popular allegiance to, 39–40;
USS Missouri, 132 poststructuralist theories of, 103–6;
mixed methods, 47 primordial theories of, 39, 101;
modernity, 102 reproduction of, 41–42; theories of,
modernization, 102 100–106. See also national identity;
Moonraker (film), 84 nationalism; the state
moral panic, 167 Native Americans, 100
more-than-representational theory, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty
124–25 Organization), 8, 180
Morse, Samuel, 165 natural selection, 3
Morse alphabet, 166 Nazism, 4, 20, 106–9, 112, 113, 115,
MTV (television channel), 23 130–31
Müller, Martin, 63 neo-Confederates, 99
multimodality, 66, 137 neoliberalism, 85
Murray, Janet, 136 networked self, xxii; affects of, 167–68;
music, in video games, 137–38 and citizen statecraft, 176–79;
Myers, Garth, 54 concept of, 165–69; debates about,
Mythos, 96 169–74; and digital diplomacy,
216 Index

174–75; and drone warfare, 179–81; perspectivism, 12–13

Enlightenment citizen compared physical geography, 6
to, 168; power wielded by, 168–69; Pinkerton, Alasdair, 65, 177–78
in public sphere, 169–70; relational Pinterest, 66
character of, 168–69; and Russian place, xxi, 61, 69–74
election interference, 181–89 Pleasantville (film), 113
new media, 37 plot, 96–97
New York Times (newspaper), 87–88, Pokémon, 38
105 Pokémon Go (game), 129
The Next of Kin (film), 131 political geography, xix–xx
Nicaragua, 77, 78 polyphony, 196
9/11 attacks. See September 11, 2001, pop art, 23
attacks popular culture, 21–38; audience’s
Nissan Armada, 142 world in relation to, 109–11;
Nixon, Richard, 113 concepts and meanings created
Noah, Trevor, 1 by, xiii; folk vs., 23–25; geopolitical
Noble, Safiya, 173 aspects of, xi, xviii, xix, 1, 42–43 (see
nondiegetic sound, 137 also popular geopolitics); high vs.,
nonrepresentational theory, 73–74, 21–23, 25; identity in relation to,
119, 124 xix, 1; intertextuality and, 42–43;
North Korea, xvii–xviii, 17 quality of, 25; study of, 21; theories
of, 25–38. See also media
The Office (television show), 147 popular geopolitics: banal nationalism
old media, 37 and, 41–42; basic concepts of, 38–43;
Olympic Games, 17, 41–42, 122, 178–79 concept of, xix–xx; in everyday life,
online bullying, 189 17–19; geopolitical imaginaries and,
ontological narrativity, 97 40–41; identity in relation to, 194;
open-ended questions, 57 imagined communities and, 38–40;
organic theory of the state, 3 individuals’ potential for impact
Orientalism, 24, 40–41, 79, 86, 193 on, 197–98; intertextuality and,
Othering, 20 42–43; media’s role in, 15–17
Ó Tuathail, Gearóid, 10, 123 positionality, 46–47. See also subject
positions
Pakistan, 143 postcolonialism, 85–91
Panama, 78 posthumanism, 125
Paris Review (magazine), 23 post-Marxism, 30–32
Parker, Gavin, 153 postnationalism, 84
participant observation, 60, 61 poststructuralism: cultural studies
participation, in research, 48 grounded in, 49; defined, 10;
participatory culture, 38 Foucault and, 30–31; Lacan
pattern-of-life analysis, 180–81 and, 35–36; language/discourse
Pearl Harbor attack, 5 as central to, 11, 30, 36, 195;
Pears, Louise, 60 political geography and, 10; and
Pentagon. See U.S. Defense subjectivity, 193–96; theories of
Department nation based in, 103–6
performative consumption, 146–47, 189 power: critique of, 19; cultural, 12–13,
performativity, 105 22–23; defined, 92; discourse and,
 Index 217

55–56; and representation, 92; in Rhodes, Cecil, 89, 91; statues of, 89–92,
social media, 168–69 90f, 150, 152
practical geopolitics, 14–15 Rice, Condoleezza, 14
primordialism, 39–40, 101 Riefenstahl, Leni, 130
printing press, 22, 39, 103 The Ring (film), 167
production, research on, 50, 51, 62–64 Rocky IV (film), 16
propaganda, xviii, 22, 54, 131–32 Roddenberry, Gene, ix
Protestant Reformation, 22 Rogen, Seth, xvii
psychoanalysis, 35–36 Rolling Stone (magazine), 23
public narratives, 97 Roll of Honor, at Australian War
public/private binary, 170 Memorial, 159–61
public sphere, 169–72, 181–82, 189 Rose, Gillian, 49
Rove, Karl, 131
qualitative methods/data, 47–48 rules of engagement, 133
Quan-Haase, Anabel, 67 Russia: Britain and, 7, 8f; digital
quantitative methods/data, 47–48 diplomacy of, 175, 176f, 177f; as
Quantum of Solace (film), 85 geographical pivot, 5, 5f; U.S.
questionnaire surveys, 57–58 relations with, xxii, 17; and U.S.
2016 presidential election, xxii,
racialism, 40 181–89; Western tensions with,
racism, 113, 115, 173–74 182–83, 186
Radway, Janice, 194 Rwanda, x, 20, 54–55
Ratzel, Friedrich, 3–4, 6, 40
Reader’s Digest (magazine), 12, 55–56, Said, Edward, 40, 79–80, 86, 91
63 Salgado, João, 193–94
Reagan, Ronald, 14, 16 Sanders, Bernie, 184
realism, 72–73 Schwarzenegger, Arnold, 88
Rech, Matthew, 61 seapower, 4–5
Red-baiting, 112, 113 Semple, Ellen Churchill, 3
Red Dawn (film), 16, 17 September 11, 2001, attacks, 2, 42, 98,
representation, xxi, 69–74, 79, 92, 138 122–23, 139, 142, 143
Republican Party, 29 serial narratives, 110–11
research, 45–67; analytical methods sharia law, 186
of, 53–56; audience as object of, Sharp, Joanne, 10, 12, 55–56, 63, 87
56–62; on circulation of images/ Shaw, Ian G. R., 138
texts/objects, 65; ethics of, 48, Simon, Joe, 106, 109
62, 67; modalities for, 50f, 51–53; site of audiencing, 50, 51, 56–62. See
practicalities of, 48, 63; presentation also audience
of, 49; on production, 62–64; site of circulation, 50, 51, 65
research design, 47–49; sites for, site of production, 50, 51, 62–64
49–51, 50f; social media as object of, site of the image, 50, 51, 53–56
66–67; topics for, 46–47 Skyfall (film), 85, 92
research design, 47–49 slash fiction, 147
research questions, 47 Sloan, Luke, 67
Resident Evil (video game), 137 Smith, Kevin, 146
resonance, 121 Snakes on a Plane (film), 65
retcon, 111, 113 soccer, 17–18
218 Index

social constructionism, 72–73 surveys, 57–58

social Darwinism, 3 survival of the fittest, 3
social media, xxii; digital geopolitics SUVs, 142, 143
on, 174–81; ethics related to, 67; synchronous interviews, 59
geopolitical aspects of, 19; moral Syria, 19
panic over, 167; political role of, Szostek, Joanne, 65
xiii; as public sphere, 169–72, 181–
82, 189; research on, 66–67 tactics, 31–32, 32t
social media detox, 195 technological affordance, 66
social modality, 52 technological determinism, 37
sock puppets, 188 technological modality, 51, 52
somatic markers, 123 telegraph, 165–66
Sony Pictures, xvii terrorism, 122, 135
South Africa, 88–91, 105 theories, 25–38; consumption as focus
South Park: Bigger, Longer & Uncut of, 27–32; convergence culture,
(film), 16 37–38; cultural studies, 27–34;
Soviet Union: Cold War view of, Frankfurt School, 26–29; material
vii–viii, 5, 12–13, 16–17; Star Trek culture, 32–34; post-Marxism,
and, viii–ix; Western tensions with, 30–32; psychoanalysis, 35–36
182–83 thick description, 61
spatial science, 9 think tanks, 13
spearphishing, 183–84 time-space compression, 23–24, 165–66
special relationship, of Britain and Tomb of the Unknown Australian
U.S., 84 Soldier, at Australian War
spectacular war, 129 Memorial, 159–61, 161f
sports, 1, 17–18, 122 trade. See free trade
Spykman, Nicholas, 9 Training Day (film), 87
Stahl, Roger, 129 transcription, 59
Star Trek (television shows and films), Transformers films, 2
viii–xi, 104 transmedia storytelling, 38
Star Wars franchise, 146, 187–89 Treaty of Versailles, 70, 130
the state: defined, 38–39; discourses Triumph of the Will (film), 130, 131
influenced by, 65; geopolitical role Trudeau, Justin, 15
of, 11–12. See also nations Trujillo, Rafael, 32
state-centrism, 11–12 Truman, Harry, 5, 8
Stock, Paul, 84 Trump, Donald, 15–16, 20, 29, 110, 169,
Stokes, Jane, 62 175, 178f, 183, 184–87
Storey, John, 33 truth: discourse and, 11, 30–31; as goal
strategies, 31–32, 32t of classical, scientific methods, 7,
subcultures, 145–46 11; narrative and, 96; propaganda
subjectivity, 36, 192–96 in relation to, xviii; representation
subject positions, 194 and, 70
Superman, 108–11 Tunisia, 18–19
Super Troopers 2 (film), 16 Turkey, 58, 83–84, 83f
Survey Monkey, 57–58 Twitter, 19, 66, 67, 171, 175, 184, 188
 Index 219

Ukraine, 175, 182 War on Terror, 123, 124, 130–31, 182

United Kingdom. See Britain and Washington, DC, 151, 151f
United Kingdom Washington, George, 14–15
United Nations, viii–ix Waterton, Emma, 154
United States: American Revolution, Weibo, 66, 171
76; British relations with, 84; Civil welfare state, 29–30
War, 99; cultural imperialism of, West, Kanye, 23
24; and geopolitics, 9–10; heritage West Bank, x
of, 151; and imperialism, 76–78; Whedon, Joss, 146
Iraq invasion (2003) by, 131; white nationalism, 99
public narratives of, 97–98, 99–100, white supremacy, 152–53
104–17; Russian interference in Why We Fight (film series), 131
2016 presidential election of, xxii, Williams, Raymond, 27
181–89. See also Cold War Windtalkers (film), 100
U.S. Defense Department, 2, 108, 132–33 Wonder Woman (film), xiii
U.S. Special Operations Command, 2 World Cup, 17–18
U.S. State Department, 175 The World Is Not Enough (film), 83–84
U.S. 2016 presidential election, xxii World War I, 7, 70, 130
U2, 142 World War II, 4–5, 22, 77, 100, 106–9,
Uzbekistan, 60 131, 155–56
World War II Memorial, Washington,
Valley of the Wolves (film), 58 DC, 154
Van Damme, Jean-Claude, 88
Veterans for Peace UK, 34 X, Malcolm, 144
video ethnography, 61–62 The X-Files (television show), 110, 147
video games: criticisms of, 22, 25; Xhosa, 88–89
discourse analysis of, 56; military X-Men films and comic books, 144–45
involvement in, 132–39. See also X-Men: Days of Future Past (film), 145
Call of Duty (video game series) X-Men: The Last Stand (film), 145
Vietnam Veterans Memorial, X2 (film), 144–45
Washington, DC, 152, 154
Vietnam War, 9, 10, 112, 156–59 Yanukovych, Victor, 182
violence: affect and, 123; as Yeltsin, Boris, x
entertainment, 129, 135; video You Only Live Twice (film), 85
games as contributing factor to, 1, 22 youth, 22
virality, 148 YouTube, 19, 148, 171
Virilio, Paul, 130 Yugoslavia, x
visuality, 137
Zambia, 89
Wall Street Journal (newspaper), 105 Zimbabwe, 89
Warf, Barney, 138 Zulu, 88–89
 About the Authors

Jason Dittmer is professor of political geography at University College

London. He is the author of Diplomatic Material: Affect, Assemblage, and
Foreign Policy (2017), Captain America and the Nationalist Superhero: Meta-
phors, Narratives, and Geopolitics (2013), and the first edition of this book.

Daniel Bos is a departmental lecturer in human geography at the Uni-

versity of Oxford. His current research explores the relationship between
geopolitics, video games, and cultures of militarism. His work has ap-
peared in Political Geography, Critical Military Studies, and E-IR: World
Politics and Popular Culture.

221
Human Geography in the Twenty-First Century
Issues and Applications

SERIES EDITOR
Barney Warf, University of Kansas

Human geography is increasingly focused on real-world problems. Ap-

plying geographic concepts to current global concerns, this series focuses
on the urgent issues confronting us as we move into the new century.
Designed for university-level geography and related multidisciplinary
courses such as area studies, global issues, and development, these text-
books are richly illustrated and include suggestions for linking to related
Internet resources. The series aims to help students to better understand,
integrate, and apply common themes and linkages in the social and
physical sciences and in the humanities, and, by doing so, to become more
effective problem solvers in the challenging world they will face.

Boundaries of Faith: Geographical Perspectives on Religious Fundamentalism

by Roger W. Stump
Six Billion Plus: World Population in the Twenty-first Century, Second Edition
by K. Bruce Newbold
Popular Culture, Geopolitics, and Identity, Second Edition
by Jason Dittmer and Daniel Bos
Bordering and Ordering the Twenty-first Century: Understanding Borders
by Gabriel Popescu
Placing Animals: An Introduction to the Geography of Human-Animal
Relations
by Julie Urbanik
Global Information Society: Technology, Knowledge, and Mobility
by Mark I. Wilson, Aharon Kellerman, and Kenneth E. Corey
Imprinting Ethnicity: Segregation, Placemaking, and the Articulations of
Difference
by David H. Kaplan
Environmental Geopolitics
by Shannon O’Lear