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Name: Bagsit, Michael Subject: Statutory Construction

Case: Lidasan v. COMELEC, 21 Syllabus:
SCRA 496
Doctrine: Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof

Facts:
This is the case of Lidasan versus COMELEC.

The Fact of the case are as follow. On June 18, 1966, the Chief
Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act
4790, now in dispute. Assailed in this petition is House Bill 1247,
which became Republic Act 4790 entitled “An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton in the province of Lanao del Sur.” It was
found that the bill includes barrios located in another province –
Cotabato. Inn effect, by virtue of the stature, twelve barrios - in two
municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to the
province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the
boundaries of the two provinces.

Prompted by the coming elections, COMELEC adopted a resolution

implementing the statute. This triggered the present action for
certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of
one of the affected municipalities (Parang, Cotabato), and a qualified
voter for the 1967 elections.
Issue:
The issues in this case whether or not the title of the RA 4790 “An
Act Creating Municipality of Dianaton in the province of Lanao del
Sur is unconstitutional for not confirming with the constitutional
requirement.

Ruling:

The decision of the Supreme Court, One Bill-One Subject

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- First, Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one

statute, of heterogeneous subjects
- Second, the title of the bill is to be couched in a language
sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those
concerned of the import of the single subject thereof

RA 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to the areas found within
Lanao del Sur, with the mere nullification of the portion in the other
province of Cotabato. The general rule is that where part of the statute
is void, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and
be enforced. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible,
and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent.

Under the Constitution, in the case of Lidasan versus COMELEC

upon the constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be enacted
into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill". Every Bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof

Name: Joannie Lumbao Subject: Statutory Construction

Case: Giron v. Commission on Syllabus: Bill Title
Election
Doctrine: “One subject – One Title Rule” - Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed
in the title thereof.

Facts:
Petitioner Henry Giron and petitioners-in-intervention assail the
constitutionality of Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and
Section 14 (Repealing Clause) of Republic Act No. (R.A.)9006,
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otherwise known as the Fair Election Act. Giron asserts that the
insertion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates
Section 26(1), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which specifically
requires: “Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.” He avers that
these provisions are unrelated to the main subject of the Fair
Election Act: the lifting of the political ad ban. Section 12 refers to
the treatment of the votes cast for substituted candidates after the
official ballots have been printed, while Section 14 pertains to the
repeal of Section 67 (Candidates holding elective office) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election
Code. Section 67 of this law concerns the ipso facto resignation of
elective officials immediately after they file their respective
certificates of candidacy for an office other than that which they are
currently holding in a permanent capacity.

Issue:
Whether or not the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair
Election Act violates Section 26 (1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, or the "one subject-one title" rule.
Ruling:
Petition must fail.

Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Supporting Articles:
POLITICAL LAW: “one subject-one title” rule
Every bill passed by the congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

STATCON:
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and
titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to
cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that
the subject of an act
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shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a

technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive
enough reasonably to include the general object which a
statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end
and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of
that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be
an abstract or index of the Act.

Name: De Guzman, Mark Subject: Statutory Construction

Daniel
Case: Tolentino vs. Sec Syllabus: Formalities
Finance
Doctrine: No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless
it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies
thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three
days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto
shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

Facts:
Petitioners seeking reconsideration of SC En Banc decision
dismissing the petitions filed for the declaration of unconstitutionality
of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added
Tax Law.
|||
On June 27, 1995 the matter was submitted for resolution.

Petitioners claims made by them that R.A. No. 7716 did not "originate
exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI,
§24 of the Constitution.

Instead what the Senate did was to pass its own version (S. No. 1630)
which it approved on May 24, 1994. Petitioner Tolentino adds that
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what the Senate committee should have done was to amend H. No.
11197 by striking out the text of the bill and substituting it with the text
of S. No. 1630. That way, it is said, "the bill remains a House bill and
the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the House
bill." “Amendment by substitution”

In plain simple language the Senate should have maintained the

original tittle of the house bill “H. No. 11197” and used the contents of
Senate Bill “S. No. 1630” that way the bill remains a House bill which
as petitioners contend is required by Art. VI, §24 of the Constitution

Issues:
1. W/N RA7716 is unconstitutional on grounds that it did not
exclusively originate in the House of Representatives and
therefore violates Art. VI §24 of the Constitution.

2. What is the extent of the power of the Senate to propose or

concur with amendments to the bills initiated by the House of
Representatives?

Ruling:
SC En Banc DENIED the MR of petitioners and upheld the
constitutionality of RA 7716.
The Bicameral nature of the congress follows from the
coequality of the two chambers. While all revenue bills must
exclusively originate from the house of representatives the senate
may propose or concur with amendments. Furthermore, the Senate
may propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure.
In the case at bar, S. No. 1630 is not a “stand alone bill” it is
a mere amendment of the House bill, H. No. 11197. Which received
thorough consideration in the senate and passed legislative
requirement pursuant to Art. VI sec 26 of the 1987 constitution.
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Supporting Articles:

Art. VI, Section 24 of our Constitution reads:

All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of

the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments.

Section 26.

(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof
in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto
shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

Name: Salem A. Rangiris, Jr. Subject: StatCon

Case: PhilJa v. Prado Syllabus: Formalities
Doctrine: Any changes agreed upon by the Conference Committee
need not undergo another “three readings” in the Senate and the
House of Representatives. Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution
must be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first
time in either house of Congress. A law may not be declared
unconstitutional when what have been violated in its passage are
merely internal rules of procedures of the House. The Court may not
inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the
presiding officers of Congress. It has no power to inquire about the
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House of Congress process in enacting the law based on the latter’s

own rules.

Facts:

Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which

withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its
Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices. The
petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds
that: (1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not express
its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses
of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not
distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is
discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary

Issue:
Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.

Ruling:

No. SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional.

1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill
passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof."

The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of

the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail
of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates
the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of
the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the
people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement.
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We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege

from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the
principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a
more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is
that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did
not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.

2. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35

covering the repeal of the franking privilege from the petitioners
and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not
included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House
Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the
Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI,
Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. The petitioners also invoke Sec.
74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that
amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall
have differences thereon may be settled by a conference
committee of both chambers.

Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule

that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in
matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and
nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are themselves
also binding on the Supreme Court. Applying these principles,
we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an
amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that
eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its
final form were not distributed among the members of each
House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify
that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with
Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such
official assurances from a coordinate department of the
government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming
courtesy.
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3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1,

of the Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived of
the equal protection of laws."

It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a

government-controlled corporation, was created and is expected
to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While
it may have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot
excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of
the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the
government and the many advantages it enjoys.

Name: Rachell Ann Uson Subject: StatCon

Case: BOLINAO ELECTRONICS CORP, Syllabus:
CHRONICLE BROADCASTING NETWORK, Approval of Bills
INC., and MONSERRAT BROADCASTING
SYSTEM, INC., petitioners, vs. BRIGIDO
VALENCIA, Sec. of the Dept. of Public Works
& Communications and ROBERT SAN
ANDRES of the Radio Control Division,
respondents.

G.R. No. L- 20740, June 30, 1964

Doctrine: The president has the power to veto any particular item or
items of an appropriations bill. However, when a provision of an
appropriations bill affects one or more items of the same, the
President cannot veto the provision without at the same time vetoing
the particular items to which it relates.
Facts:

• This petition for prohibition, mandatory injunction with

preliminary injunction are made by the Petitioners who are the 3
owners and operators of radio and television stations against the
respondents because of an ongoing investigation regarding the
renewal of their licenses.
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• The petitioners were not able to submit the applications for

renewal of their station licenses two months before its expiration;
hence, notice of hearing were sent to the petitioners for violation
of Sec. 12 and 14 of Dept Order No. 11 on Radio Laws, Rules
and Regulations and hearing was scheduled on Jan. 28, 1963.
This is also in connection with the power of Sec of PWC under
Commonwealth Act 3846 Sec.3 as amended by RA 584.
• Petitioners claim that this violation has ceased to exist because
of an issued circular dated July 24, 1962 intended for all radio
stations et.al to examine their operating practices, permits and
licenses and take remedial measures as soon as possible but
not later than August 10, 1962.
• Another issue is that Philippine Broadcasting Service (PBS)
operated by our State (RP), was given a construction permit to
install and operate a TV station in Manila (still part of Luzon)
particularly on Channel 9. The conflict is that PWC assumed that
CBN abandoned its right to operate and broadcast on Channel
9 because the latter is planning to transfer its station to Baguio
and the assignment will switch to Channel 10 effective only upon
the final transfer.
• Respondents made reference to the remarks appearing in the
construction permit No. 793, issued to the PBS, that
"construction of this station shall be begun after CBN’s permit to
transfer is approved." It is claimed that upon the approval of the
request to transfer, the petitioner was deemed to have
renounced or abandoned Channel 9.
• In reality, CBN did not pursue their plan on transfer. They
continued to operate on Channel 9. So, PBS is claiming for
damages because the alleged agreement between CBN and
said intervenor on the exchange of use of Channels 9 / 10.
• In relation to this, the president vetoed these 2 items of the
appropriation act to operate the PBS (incorporated in the 1962-
1963 Budget of the RP) which says that “no portion of
appropriation shall be used on the operation of television
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stations in Luzon or any part of the Philippines where there are

television stations”.

Issue:
1. WON the investigation being conducted by respondents, in
connection with petitioners' applications for renewal of their
station licenses, has any legal basis;
2. WON there was abandonment or renunciation by the Chronicle
Broadcasting Network (CBN) of Channel 9 in favor of PBS; and
3. WON PBS can legally operate Channel 9 and is entitled to
damages, for CBN's refusal to give up operations thereof.
Ruling: The writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioners were
granted and heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent.
Without costs.

1. Investigation being conducted by respondents has no legal

basis because raison d'etre (the reason for being in existence)
had disappeared due of the circular’s condonement of the
petitioners’ violations. Having been in the same office or agency,
the Sec of PWC who has its own provision (RA 584) cannot
claim the illegality of the issued circular signed by
undersecretary of PWC to evade the effect of enforcement.
2. According to inter alios acta or the principle that a contract made
by other people cannot affect the rights of a non-party. The
respondent’s claim does not establish any agreement between
the radio control authority and the station operator, on the switch
or change of operations of CBN from Channel 9 to Channel 10
and cannot bind petitioner because CBN had no participation in
the preparation of the permit given to PBS. No proof that
petitioner had really waived or renounced its right to operate on
Channel 9, and respondents committed error in refusing to grant
petitioner's application for renewal of the license(Channel 9).
3. PBS would not have been entitled to reimbursement of its illegal
expenditures. There can be no damage because that the
Appropriation Act for PBS does not allow appropriations for the
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operation of television stations in Luzon or any part of the

Philippines where there are existing commercial television
stations. Though the President vetoed the 2 items in the
provision, his action was declared unconstitutional because:
• Executive's veto power does not carry with it the power to strike
out conditions or restrictions. (Art. VI, Sec. 20 of Consti)
• If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced
no effect whatsoever, and the restriction imposed by the
appropriation bill, therefore, remains.

Supporting Articles:

Section 3 of Commonwealth Act 3846, as amended by Republic Act

584 provides that the Powers and Duties of Sec of PWC may
approve or disapprove any application for renewal of station or
operator license: Provided, however, That no application for renewal
shall be disapproved without giving the licensee a hearing."

Sections 12 and 14 of Department Order No. 11 of Radio Laws,

SEC. 12. - License Required for Operation of Transmitter,
Transceiver, or Station. - No radio transmitter or radio station shall
be operated without first obtaining from the Secretary of Public
Works & Communications a radio station license.

'SEC. 14. - When to Apply for Renewal. - If renewal of a station license

is desired, the licensee shall submit an application to the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications two (2) months before the
expiration date of the license to be renewed, Application should be
made on prescribed forms furnished for the purpose.'
---
Appropriations Act for the 1962-1963 Budget of the Republic of the
Philippines
IV. SPECIAL PURPOSES (items that the President vetoed)
"1. For contribution to the operation of the Philippine Broadcasting
Service, including promotion, programming, operations and general
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administration; Provided, That no portion of this appropriation shall be

used for the operation of television stations in Luzon or any part of the
Philippines where there are television stations . . . P300,000.00.

5. No amount appropriated for televisions under Special Fund and

General Fund shall be used for the operation of television stations in
Luzon or any part of the Philippines where there are television
stations."

Name: Jay Balicha Subject: StatCon

Case: ABAKADAGURO PARTY- Syllabus: Approval of Bills
LIST VS. PURISISMA
GR 166715, Aug. 14, 2008
Doctrine:

Facts:
• ||| RA 9335 provides rewards and sanctions to encourage
officials and employees of BIR and BOC to exceed revenue
targets.
• BIR and BOC were task to issue implementing rules and
regulations, TO BE APPROVED BY A JOINT
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE created for
such purpose.
• Petitioners assail constitutionality of RA 9335 on the following
grounds: (1) The law transforms the officials and employees
into mercenaries and bounty hunters (2) It violated the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection due to limiting the
scope of the rewards and incentives to the BIR and BOC
employees (3) The creation of a congressional oversight
committee violates the doctrine of separation of powers.

Issue:
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Whether the creation of the congressional oversight committee

violates the doctrine of separation of powers under the
Constitution

Ruling:
• Any of its members of congress to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle
of separation of powers.
• Section 12, of RA 9335, should be struck down as
unconstitutional. Without Section 12, the remaining provisions
still constitute a complete, intelligible and valid law
• Not violation of EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS, since only the
BIR and the BOC have the common distinct primary function of
generating revenues for the national government through the
collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.

Supporting Articles:

Name: LOTERONO, Rechelle Mae L. Subject: STATCON

Case: Mabanag et al v. Lopez Vito Syllabus:
(The Petitioners are 8 Senators, 17 Representatives, and
the Presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular
Front and the Philippine Youth Party) Module 2: Evidence of
L-1223, 05 March 1947 Enactment of Laws –
Ponente: TUASON, J. Enrolled Bill Theory
This case is a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a Congressional
Resolution “Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the
Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto.” The validity of the above-mentioned
resolution is attacked as contrary to the Constitution.
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Facts:
• Three (3) of the plaintiff Senators and eight (8) of the plaintiff
Representatives were proclaimed by the COMELEC as elected
Senators and Representatives in the elections held on April 23,
1946.
• After the opening of the first session of Congress, the three
Senators were suspended due to alleged election irregularities.
• The eight Representatives were not allowed to sit in the lower
house except during the election of the Speaker. A resolution for
their suspension was introduced in the HOR, but that resolution
had not been acted upon by the House when this petition was
filed.
• As a consequence, these three (3) Senators and eight (8)
Representatives did participate in the passage of the questioned
Congressional Resolution “Resolution of both houses proposing
an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be
appended as an ordinance thereto”, nor was their membership
reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-fourths
vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the
Constitution.

Arguments:
• The Petitioners claimed that some Senators and House
Representatives were not considered in determining the
required ¾ vote. If these members of Congress had been
counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed
amendment would have been short of the necessary three-
fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
• Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the
case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the
enrolled bill or resolution.
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• The petitioners contended that the enrolled bill rule has not
found acceptance in this jurisdiction.

Issue:
WON the said Resolution was enacted in compliance with the
legislative rules

Ruling:

YES. Upon examination of section 313 of the Code of Civil Procedure,

as amended by Act No. 2210, that, roughly, it provides two methods
of proving legislative proceedings: (1) by the journals, or by published
statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary
or printed by their order; and (2) in case of acts of the legislature, by a
copy signed by the presiding Officers and secretaries thereof, which
shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof. The Court looked into the journals in United
States vs. Pons because, in all probability, those were the documents
offered in evidence. It does not appear that a duly authenticated copy
of the Act was inexistence or was placed before the Court. Even if
both the journals and an authenticated copy of the Act had been
presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the
journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as
already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of
the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The
Supreme Court found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the
passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the
effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did
not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate,
namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to
determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the
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two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other.
No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two
documents and the court did not say or so much as give to
understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to
the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified
copies "shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of
the due enactment thereof."

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition without costs.

Supporting Articles:
Enrolled Bill. The bill as passed by Congress, authenticated by
the Speaker and the Senate President and approved by the
President is known as the enrolled bill. Under the principle of
the enrolled bill, the text of the act as passed and approved is
deemed importing absolute verity and is binding on the courts.
Under the “enrolled bill doctrine” the signing of a bill by the
Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the
certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that
it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment.

Name: Teruel, Emmanuel Subject: Statutory Construction

R.
Case: Arroyo vs. De Syllabus: Enrolled Bill Theory
Venecia
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Facts:
• Petition for certiorari and/or prohibition was filed questioning
the validity of R.A. 8240 for amending certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code. Members of the House claim
that there is a violation of the rules of the House which
petitioners claim are constitutionalmandated so that their
violation is equivalent to a violation of the Constitution.

• The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No.

7198 that was approved on the third reading and transmitted
to the Senate which was also approved with amendments. A
bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the
provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The
bicameral committee submitted its consolidated law to the
House.

• In the course of his interpellations, Rep. Arroyo announced

that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although
until the end of this interpellation he never did.

• On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the
House of Representative and the Senate President. The
enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.
Issues:
• Whether or not there was a violation of the rules of the House
which petitioners claim are “constitutionally mandated” so that
their violation is equivalent to a violation of the constitution?

Ruling: Petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED; It does

NOT violate the constitution.

1. It is clear that what is alleged to have been violated are merely

internal rules of procedure of the House rather than
constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law.
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2. It is thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of

their own making. Instead of submitting the proper motions for
the House to act upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of
Rep. Arroyo's question as an obstacle to the passage of the bill.
But Rep. Arroyo's question was not, in form or substance, a
point of order or a question of privilege entitled to precedence.
Furthermore, even if Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep.
Albano's motion to adjourn would have precedence and would
have put an end to any further consideration of the question.
Also, Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued
interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect
acknowledged the presence of a quorum

3. The enrolled bill rule considers that the President has no

authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled
Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the
official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the
President, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the
legislative and executive departments of the government,
charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing
the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The signing of H. No.
7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the
Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses
of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are
conclusive of its due enactment.

Name: Ferdinand E. Apolonio Jr. Subject: StatCon

Case: Astorga v. Villegas Syllabus: Journal Entry Rule

Facts:
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House Bill No. 9266 becomes a law with the approval of the President
of the Philippines on June 18, 1964 thereafter called RA 4065. However
before it becomes a law it shall be noted that when the HB 9266 was sent
to the Senate by House of Representative it was later referred to the Senate
Committee on Provinces, Municipal Government and Cities headed by Sen.
Roxas. The Committee recommended the approval with minor amendment,
suggested by the senator. When the bill was discussed on the 2 nd reading in
Senate, a substantial amendments was introduced by Sen. Tolentino. Those
amendments were approved by Senate. But the recommendation of Sen.
Roxas does not appear in the journal of Senate proceedings as having been
acted upon.
The Secretary of Senate notify the House of Reps. that HB 9266 has
been passed by Senate “with amendments” attached to the letter a
certification of amendment, which was the one recommended by Sen.
Roxas and not Sen. Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually
approved by the Senate.
Later on Sen. Tolentino issued a press statement that the enrolled
copy of HB 9266 was the wrong version of the bill passed by the Senate. The
Senate President considered his signature on the enrolled bill as invalid and
of no effect. Because of that invalidation it is considered that it never been
approved by Senate and therefore did not make the bill a valid enactment.
The President of the Philippines later on withdrew his signature stating that
it would be against the public policy to convert into law what was not
actually approved by the two Houses of Congress.
The Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to disregard
the provisions of RA 4065. Vice Mayor and Petitioner Herminio Astorga filed
a petition before the SC to compel the mayor, among others, to comply with
the provisions of RA 4065. Respondents’ position is that RA 4065 never
became law since it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and that
the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should
be decisive.

|||
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
MODULE 2
STATUTES AND THEIR ENACTMENT

Issue:
Whether the enrolled bill doctrine or the journal entry should be
adhered to.

Ruling:
It is the journal entry that is binding in this case.

The issue is in case attestation is absent and there being no enrolled

bill, the entries in the journal should be consulted. The journals discloses
that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and
approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent
to the President and signed by him, hence the bill was not duly enacted. For
the Court to perpetuate the error by disregarding such rectification and
holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth
to fiction.

This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the

alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the
bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and the

so-called Republic Act No. 4065 is declared not to have been duly enacted
and therefore did not become law.

Supporting Articles:
House Bill No. 9266 / RA 4065 – a.k.a “An Act Defining the Powers,
Rights, and Duties of the Vice Mayor of the City of Manila, Amending
for the Purpose Section 10 and 11 of RA 409 as amended, otherwise
known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila.
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
MODULE 2
Lidasan v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 496
No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject
which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.
Giron v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188179, January 22, 2013
“One subject – One Title Rule” - Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630
No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto
shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
PHILJA v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 203
Any changes agreed upon by the Conference Committee need not undergo
another “three readings” in the Senate and the House of Representatives. Article
VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution must be construed as referring only to bills
introduced for the first time in either house of Congress. A law may not be
declared unconstitutional when what have been violated in its passage are
merely internal rules of procedures of the House. The Court may not inquire
beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of
Congress. It has no power to inquire about the House of Congress process in
enacting the law based on the latter’s own rules.
Bolinao Electronics v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20740, June 30, 1964, 11 SCRA
486
The president has the power to veto any particular item or items of an
appropriations bill. However, when a provision of an appropriations bill affects
one or more items of the same, the President cannot veto the provision without
at the same time vetoing the particular items to which it relates.
Abakada Guro Party-list v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, 562 SCRA
251
1. A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of
constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one.

2. Any post-enactment congressional measure should be limited to scrutiny and

investigation.

3. Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an

administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and
regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee
formed by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or disapprove such
regulations before they take effect.
 4. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of both chambers—it
can be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers nor by a
committee of either or both chambers.

5. Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws)
is vested in Congress which consists of two chambers, the Senate and the
House of Representatives.

6. Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for

approval or veto and in the absence of presentment to the President, no bill
passed by Congress can become a law.

7. Subject to the indispensable requisite of publication under the due process

clause, the determination as to when a law takes effect is wholly the
prerogative of Congress—as such, it is only upon its effectivity that a law may
be executed and the executive branch acquires the duties and powers to
execute the said law.

8. Any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play
any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle
of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.

9. Where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another

part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be
enforced; The presence of a separability clause in a statute creates the
presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete
nullity of the statute.
Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, L-1223, March 5, 1947, 78 Phil. 1 (1947)
Enrolled bill doctrine. Political questions are not subject to judicial review, except
when dealing with questions conferred upon the courts by
constitutional/statutory provision. This is predicated upon the separation of
powers. According to a US case, the efficacy of ratification by state legislature
of proposed amendment to Federal Constitution is a political question. If
ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to
ratification has to be a political question.
1935 Constitution provides two distinct parts for amendments: proposal and
ratification. Proposal to amend is highly political performed by Congress in its
sovereign legislative capacity, and there is less reason for judicial inquiry into a
proposal’s validity rather than ratification. A duly authenticated bill/resolution
imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. The courts cannot mandate
the President to use his calling out power when the situation permits it, or the
legislature to pass a certain kind of law. Such duties are beyond judicial review
if the one charged fails to perform them. Motives are beyond the courts.
Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997, 277 SCRA 268
 Upholding the inviolable doctrine on the separation of powers in the Philippine
government, the courts strictly cannot discuss, examine, and interpret the
procedural and substantive aspects in the enactment of enrolled bills in
Congress which are subsequently approved by the President. Under the enrolled
bill doctrine, the passage of legislative measures has been legitimized and
authenticated by the concurrence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives. As enrolled bills integrally demonstrate the fundamental roles
of the legislative and executive departments in faithfully enacting and executing
laws, the judiciary cannot interfere in the passage and implementation of statutes
unless justiciable issues arise exemplified through the violation of constitutional
requirements and the breach on the inalienable rights of other people. Through
the concurrence of the chief executive along with the attestation of both the
House Speaker and the Senate President, enrolled bills essentially become
moot and academic. Thus, courts are entirely prohibited from intervening in
congressional policymaking to adhere and follow the separation of powers
enshrined in the Constitution vis-à-vis reviewing and evaluating the internal rules
and regulations adopted in the legislature.
Astorga v. Villegas, G.R. No. 23475, April 30, 1974, 56 SCRA 714
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record.
The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated
and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant
in this case.
CASE TITLE BARA LIDASAN vs. G.R NO. G.R. No. L-28089
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 21 SCRA496
PONENTE SANCHEZ, J. DATE: OCTOBER 25,
1967
DOCTRINE Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof
FACTS On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247,
known as Republic Act 4790 "An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur". It came to light later that
twelve (barrios Togaig and Madalum from the municipality
of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan,
Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and
Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the
municipality of Parang, Province of Cotabato) of the twenty-one barrios
that constitute the Municipality of Dianaton are in the province of
Cotabato. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two
provinces.

Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted a resolution

implementing the statute for purposes of establishment of precincts,
registration of voters and for other election purposes.

This triggered the present original action for certiorari and prohibition
by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of
Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. He
prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared unconstitutional; and that
Comelec's resolutions of implementing the same for electoral
purposes, be nullified.

ISSUE/S Whether or not the title of RA 4790 "An Act Creating the Municipality
of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur" is unconstitutional for not
conforming with the constitutional requirement
RULING/S Republic Act 4790 is null and void.

The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative

power: 1. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one
statute, of heterogeneous subjects; 2. The title of the bill is to be
couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public
and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.

The legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute:

(1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one
barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of
Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in
Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.
The title "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province
of Lanao del Sur" projects the impression that solely the province of
Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest
intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of
Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase
"in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion,
makes the title misleading, deceptive.

The title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact
of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and
Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of
their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and
added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in
the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the
bill.

It was further argued that RA 4790 may still be salvaged with reference
to the areas found within Lanao del Sur, with the mere nullification of
the portion in the other province of Cotabato. The general rule is that
where part of the statute is void, the valid portion, if separable from the
invalid, may stand and be enforced. Enough must remain to make a
complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative
intent. However, when the bill was presented in Congress, the totality
of the twenty-one barrios-not nine barrios-was in the mind of the
proponent thereof. Dianaton was created upon the basic
considerations of progressive community, large aggregate population
and sufficient income. Republic Act 4790 is thus inseparable, and it is
accordingly null and void in its totality.
CASE TITLE HENRY R. GIRON vs. COMMISSION G.R NO. 188179
ON ELECTIONS
ALMARIO E. FRANCISCO,
FEDERICO S. JONG JR., and
RICARDO L. BAES JR.
PONENTE SERENO, CJ. DATE: Jan 22, 2013
DOCTRINE “One subject – One Title Rule” - Every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.
FACTS Shortly after then President Gloria Arroyo filed her candidacy to run for
Congress during the 2010 elections, Henry Giron, head of an NGO
named Article 64 movement, filed a petition to the Supreme Court
through a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition assailing the
constitutionality of Section 12 and 14 of the Fair Election Act.

His contention here is that, under the Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution, a bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

However, he contends that there are two provisions which were

included as “riders” or is irrelevant to the subject matter. These
provisions are:

1. Section 12 which pertains to treatment of votes for substitute

candidates; and
2. Section 14, which included the repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code that provides for ipso facto resignation
of incumbent officers upon filing of candidacy for another
government position.

COMELEC, on the other hand, argued that this issue has already been
resolved in Farinas vs Executive Secretary.

ISSUE/S Whether or not the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election
Act violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, or the
"one subject-one title" rule.
RULING/S There is no violation of the Constitution.

COMELEC is correct that this has already been addressed in the case
of Farinas vs Executive Secretary.

Also, an analysis of the Bicameral Conference Committee

deliberations reveals that it really was the intention of the framers of
the law to specifically include Section 12 and repeal Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code through Section 14 since doing so is
consistent with the Fair Election Practices. In fact, they put great
consideration in drafting the title to prevent these provisions from
sticking out, and thus, be ruled out as unconstitutional.
CASE TITLE ARTURO M. TOLENTINO G.R NO. 115455
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE
PONENTE MENDOZA, J. DATE: October 30, 1995

DOCTRINE No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed
three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final
form have been distributed to its Members three days before its
passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon
the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and
the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas
and nays entered in the Journal.
FACTS Petitioners Arturo Tolentino, et al. claims that R.A. 7716 or the
Expanded Value Added Tax Law did not “originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives” as a requirement of Article VI sec. 24 of the
Constitution since it is a consolidation of the following two bills: H. No.
11197 which was filed in the House of Representatives (passed three
readings) then sent to the Senate where it was referred to the Senate
Ways and Means Committee after first reading. The Senate then
passed S. No. 1630 as its own version and approved it on May 24,
1994.

The exception in Art. VI sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution states: “except

when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency” is contended by
the petitioners saying that for Philippines, a "growing budget deficit" is
not an emergency, it is a chronic condition and does not make the need
for R.A. No. 7716 any less urgent or the situation calling for its
enactment any less an emergency.

The members of the Senate (including some of the petitioners)

believed that there was an urgent need for consideration of S. No.
1630, because they responded to the call of the President by voting on
the bill on second and third readings on the same day.

While the judicial department is not bound by the Senate's acceptance

of the President's certification, the respect due coequal departments of
the government in matters committed to them by the Constitution and
the absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion caution a
stay of the judicial hand.
ISSUE/S Whether or Not S. No. 1630 is unconstitutional for not being passed for
a second and third reading on separate days?
RULING/S No. S. No. 1630 received thorough consideration in the Senate where
it was discussed for six days. Only its distribution in advance in its
final printed form was actually dispensed with by holding the voting on
second and third readings on the same day (March 24, 1994).
Otherwise, sufficient time between the submission of the bill on
February 8, 1994 on second reading and its approval on March 24,
1994 elapsed before it was finally voted on by the Senate on third
reading.

The purpose for which three readings on separate days is required is

said to be two-fold: (1) to inform the members of Congress of what they
must vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure is progressing
through the enacting process, thus enabling them and others
interested in the measure to prepare their positions with reference to
it. These purposes were substantially achieved in the case of R.A. No.
7716.
CASE TITLE PHILJA v. Prado G.R NO. 105371
PONENTE Cruz, J. DATE: November 11,
1993
DOCTRINE Any changes agreed upon by the Conference Committee need not
undergo another “three readings” in the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution must be
construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first time in either
house of Congress. A law may not be declared unconstitutional when
what have been violated in its passage are merely internal rules of
procedures of the House. The Court may not inquire beyond the
certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of
Congress. It has no power to inquire about the House of Congress
process in enacting the law based on the latter’s own rules.
FACTS Section 35 of RA 7354 by Phil. Post Corp through its Cir # 92-28 is the
petition’s main focus, for it withdrew the franking privilege of the SC,
CA, RTC, MTC and Land Registration Commission and its Registers
of Deeds, along with certain other government offices. The lower court
judges are the petitioners claiming their official functions will be harmed
by these measures. The NLRA has agreed with them, that’s why its
operation affects the judicial proceedings by permitting its motion to
meddle. The petition attacks the constitutionality of RA7354.
ISSUE/S Whether or not RA 7354 is constitutional on the grounds that:
1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its
purposes;
2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress
and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among
the members before its passage;
3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the
Judiciary.
RULING/S 1) The petitioners' contention is untenable. The title of the bill is not
required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has
been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and
reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to
mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with
the constitutional requirement.
2) These arguments are unacceptable. It is a matter of record that the
conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to
and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of
Representatives. It was then presented to and approved by the
President. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that
the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec.
26(2) of the Constitution. Bound by such official assurances from a
coordinate department of the government, at the very least, a
becoming courtesy.
3) It clearly discriminates and trespasses the judiciary’s independence.
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of
justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate
clause in Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for a more,
specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from
the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the
basis of the due process clause.

Premises considered, the petition is partially granted and Section 35 of

RA 7354 is declared unconstitutional. Circular 92-28 is also set aside
for withdrawing the franking privilege for the Judiciary as an
independent branch of the government. Thus, such franking privilege
is restored. The TRO on June 2, 1992 is declared permanent.
CASE TITLE Bolinao Electronics Corporation, G.R NO. L-20740
Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc.
and Monserrat Broadcasting System,
Inc. vs. Brigido Valencia and Robert
San Andres
PONENTE Barrera, J. DATE: 30 June 1964
DOCTRINE The president has the power to veto any particular item or items of an
appropriations bill. However, when a provision of an appropriations bill
affects one or more items of the same, the President cannot veto the
provision without at the same time vetoing the particular items to which
it relates.

FACTS An original petition for prohibition, mandatory injunction with

preliminary injunction was filed by the Bolinao Electronics Corporation,
Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc. (CBN) and Monserrat
Broadcasting System, Inc. owners and operators of radio and
television against the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
and Acting Chief of the Radio Control Division. The Republic of the
Philippines, as operator of the Philippine Broadcasting Service (PBS),
later on sought and was allowed to intervene. The intervenor having
been granted a construction permit to install and operate a television
station in Manila.

The petitioners were not able to submit the applications for renewal of
their station licenses two (2) months before its expiration, a violation of
Section 14 of Department Order 11. Pursuant to Section 3 of Act 3846,
as amended by Republic Act 584, on the powers and duties of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, he may approve or
disapprove any application for renewal of station or operator license,
provided, however, that no application for renewal shall be
disapproved without giving the licensee a hearing. Thus the notice of
hearing was sent to the petitioners to find out whether there is ground
to disapprove the applications for renewal.

The petitioners’ application was denied for the lone reason of late filing
of application for renewal.

ISSUE/S 1. Whether or not the investigation being conducted by the Secretary

of Public Works and Communication and the Acting Chief of the
Radio Control Division, has any legal basis?
2. Whether or not there is abandonment or renunciation by the CBN
of channel 9 in favor of PBS?
3. Whether or not Philippine Broadcasting Service can legally
operate Channel 9 and is entitled to damages, for CBN’s refusal to
give up operation thereof.
RULING/S 1. The violation of Section 14 of Department Order 11 has ceased
to exist since a circular was issued by the Department and
approved by the Undersecretary of Public Works and
Communication, on 24 July 1962, allowing station owners and
radio operators to take remedial measures regarding the
renewal of their permits and licenses not later than 10 August
1962. The petitioners were able to submit their applications
before said date, or even before the issuance of the circular.
Therefore, there is no reason nor need for an investigation.

2. There was no express agreement of abandonment or

renunciation by the Chronicle Broadcasting Network of Channel
9 in favor of PBS. The only basis of the contention of the
respondents that there was such renunciation is the statement
“Channel 10 assigned in lieu of Channel 9”, appearing in the
construction permit to transfer television station DZXL-TV from
Quezon City to Baguio City, issued to petitioner. The statement
alone, does not establish any agreement between the radio
control authority and the station operator, on the switch or
change of operation of CBN from Channel 9 to Channel 10.
Also, CBN has no participation in the preparation of the permit,
and the fact that CBN was allowed to continue and did continue
operating on Channel 9 even after the approval of its proposed
transfer, is proof that there was no renunciation or abandonment
of the channel.

3. There is no right that has been violated by the petitioner’s

refusal to give up its operation of Channel 9. Records also show
the appropriation to operate PBS as approved by Congress and
incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the Republic of the
Philippines does not allow appropriations for the operation of
television stations in Luzon. For this reason, there can be no
damage. Any expenditures made by PBS for the purpose of
installing or operating a television station in Manila, when there
are already television stations in operation, is a violation of the
law. Also, even if it is shown that the then president vetoed the
provision of the Budget Act, such veto is illegal since it is not
within his power to strike out conditions or restrictions attached
to an appropriation or item in the appropriations bill.
CASE TITLE Abakada Guro Party-list v. Purisima G.R NO. 166715, 562
SCRA 251
PONENTE Corona, J. DATE: August 14, 2008,
DOCTRINE 1. A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of
constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
equivocal one.

2. Any post-enactment congressional measure should be limited to

scrutiny and investigation.

3. Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or

an administrative agency to present the proposed implementing
rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or
through a committee formed by it, retains a “right” or “power” to
approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect.

4. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of both

chambers—it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two
chambers nor by a committee of either or both chambers.

5. Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and

repeal laws) is vested in Congress which consists of two chambers,
the Senate and the House of Representatives.

6. Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President

for approval or veto and in the absence of presentment to the
President, no bill passed by Congress can become a law.

7. Subject to the indispensable requisite of publication under the due

process clause, the determination as to when a law takes effect is
wholly the prerogative of Congress—as such, it is only upon its
effectivity that a law may be executed and the executive branch
acquires the duties and powers to execute the said law.

8. Any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its

members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of
the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional.

9. Where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution,

while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the
invalid, may stand and be enforced; The presence of a separability
clause in a statute creates the presumption that the legislature
intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute.
FACT/S A petition for prohibition was filed to prevent implementing and
enforcing Republic Act 93352 or the Attrition Act of 2005. RA 9335 as
enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs.

Petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee,

in Section 12 of the said law, on the ground that it violates the doctrine
of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed
accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the
law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits
legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the
law.

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created

to approve the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by
the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC, and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it
approved the said IRR. The issue of its
alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and
enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic. However,
the Court chose to confront the issue of the constitutionality of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created under RA 9335 (or other
similar laws for that matter).
ISSUE/S The constitutionality of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created under RA 9335 (or other similar laws for that matter)
RULING/S In exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a
determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions of
RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power
exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.
The requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to
approval by Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the
cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on
presentment. Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the
President for approval or veto. In the absence of presentment to the
President, no bill passed by Congress can become a law. In this sense,
law-making under the Constitution is a joint act of the legislature and
of the Executive.

From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle,
a provision that requires Congress or its members to approve the
implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be
unconstitutional. Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should
be struck down as unconstitutional.
CASE TITLE Mabanag vs Lopez Vito G.R NO. L-1223
PONENTE Justice Tuazon DATE: March 5, 1947
DOCTRINE Enrolled bill doctrine. Political questions are not subject to judicial
review, except when dealing with questions conferred upon the courts
by constitutional/statutory provision. This is predicated upon the
separation of powers. According to a US case, the efficacy of
ratification by state legislature of proposed amendment to Federal
Constitution is a political question. If ratification of an amendment is a
political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a
political question.
1935 Constitution provides two distinct parts for amendments:
proposal and ratification. Proposal to amend is highly political
performed by Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity, and there
is less reason for judicial inquiry into a proposal’s validity rather than
ratification. A duly authenticated bill/resolution imports absolute verity
and is binding on the courts. The courts cannot mandate the President
to use his calling out power when the situation permits it, or the
legislature to pass a certain kind of law. Such duties are beyond judicial
review if the one charged fails to perform them. Motives are beyond
the courts.
FACT/S This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a
congressional resolution designated "Resolution of both houses
proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be
appended as an ordinance thereto."
The petitioners contend that their vote was not taken into consideration
in requiring that in amending the constitution, the law requires 3/4 of
the votes of the member of the Congress thus arriving in the question
of constitutionality of the said resolution.
ISSUE/S 1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction.
2. Whether or not the journals can be investigated against the
conclusiveness of the enrolled bills.
RULING/S No. Petition is dismissed without cost. The Court held that to go behind
the enrolled bills which were already authenticated and to investigate
the journals amounts to disregard of the respect due to the coequal
and independent department of the state, and it would be an inquisition
into the conduct of the members of the legislature, a very delicate
power, the frequent exercise of which must lead to confusion in the
administration of the law.

Enrolled bill doctrine. Political questions are not subject to judicial

review, except when dealing with questions conferred upon the courts
by constitutional/statutory provision. This is predicated upon the
separation of powers. According to a US case, the efficacy of
ratification by state legislature of proposed amendment to Federal
Constitution is a political question. If ratification of an amendment is a
political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a
political question.
1935 Constitution provides two distinct parts for amendments:
proposal and ratification. Proposal to amend is highly political
performed by Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity, and there
is less reason for judicial inquiry into a proposal’s validity rather than
ratification. A duly authenticated bill/resolution imports absolute verity
and is binding on the courts. The courts cannot mandate the President
to use his calling out power when the situation permits it, or the
legislature to pass a certain kind of law. Such duties are beyond judicial
review if the one charged fails to perform them. Motives are beyond
the courts.

The sensible solution is not to patch casual errors by asking the

Judiciary to circumvent the Constitution, but to represent ourselves
with competent legislators.
The Code of Civil Procedure provides proving legislative proceedings
1) journals, clerk/secretary certified; 2) copy signed by presiding
officers and secretaries, conclusive proof. But this Court chooses to
pass over the question. The journals have no signs of irregularity. Duly
certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of Acts and
the due enactment thereof.

Duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of Acts

and the due enactment thereof.
CASE TITLE Joker P. Arroyo, Edcel C. Lagman, G.R NO. 127255
John Henry R. Osmeña, Wigberto E.
Tañada, and Ronaldo B. Zamora,
Petitioners, vs. Jose de Venecia, Raul
Daza, Rodolfo Albano, the Executive
Secretary, the Secretary of Finance,
and the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, Respondents.
PONENTE Mendoza, J. DATE: August 14, 1997
DOCTRINE Upholding the inviolable doctrine on the separation of powers in the
Philippine government, the courts strictly cannot discuss, examine, and
interpret the procedural and substantive aspects in the enactment of
enrolled bills in Congress which are subsequently approved by the
President. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the passage of legislative
measures has been legitimized and authenticated by the concurrence
of the Senate and the House of Representatives. As enrolled bills
integrally demonstrate the fundamental roles of the legislative and
executive departments in faithfully enacting and executing laws, the
judiciary cannot interfere in the passage and implementation of
statutes unless justiciable issues arise exemplified through the
violation of constitutional requirements and the breach on the
inalienable rights of other people. Through the concurrence of the chief
executive along with the attestation of both the House Speaker and the
Senate President, enrolled bills essentially become moot and
academic. Thus, courts are entirely prohibited from intervening in
congressional policymaking to adhere and follow the separation of
powers enshrined in the Constitution vis-à-vis reviewing and evaluating
the internal rules and regulations adopted in the legislature.
FACTS On November 21, 1996, the bicameral conference committee report on
House Bill No. 7198 amending the National Internal Revenue Code to
impose sin taxes on beer and cigarettes urgently certified by House
Speaker Jose de Venecia was approved in the plenary session and
consequently transmitted to the Senate on the same night. In the
following day, President Fidel Ramos signed Republic Act No. 8240
with the concurrence of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
The journal of the session was approved on December 2, 1996 with
the lone objection of Representative Edcel Lagman.

After Representative Exequiel Javier gave the sponsorship speech on

the conference committee report on the proposed legislative measure,
several House members interpellated the principal sponsor where
Representative Joker Arroyo constantly questioned the lack of quorum
in the plenary and called for the adjournment of the session. When
Representative Rodolfo Albano who was acting as the majority floor
leader moved for the approval and ratification of the conference
committee report as the interpellation period ended, Deputy Speaker
 Raul Daza approved the motion since there was no formal objection
from the House Members. While Representative Daza was inquiring
on whether there was an objection to the motion raised by
Representative Albano, Representative Arroyo simultaneously
questioned and challenged the motion being raised and eventually
objected to the approval of the committee report. When the session
resumed after Representative Daza suspended the proceedings due
to the vehement upheaval of Representative Arroyo, Representative
Albano moved for the adjournment of the session.
ISSUE/S 1. Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void due to the contested
irregularities and anomalies in the approval of the bicameral
conference committee report in the House of Representatives.
2. Whether or not Congress committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the enactment of
the legislative measure.
3. Whether or not the conference committee report was railroaded
in the legislature amid the urgent certification from the president.
4. Whether or not the Supreme Court can review the passage of
the enrolled bill.
RULING/S The court ruled that the enactment of RA 8240 was constitutional since
non-compliance of the internal rules in the legislative department
cannot be adjudicated as there were no constitutional requirements
infringed in the approval of the bicameral conference committee report.
Under the doctrine of the separation of powers, the courts can only
interfere in the executive and legislative departments when there are
justiciable issues and controversies. Further, the court asserted that
there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Congress since
the enactment and approval of legislative measures constitute political
questions which the judiciary cannot review and examine. To wit,
judicial questions emerge when there are constitutional matters
involved. Moreover, the court rejected that RA 8240 was railroaded
since the objection by Representative Arroyo on the motion to approve
and ratify the conference committee report was out of order due to his
failure to be recognized by Representative Daza who was acting as the
presiding officer. Declaring further that nominal voting was not
procedurally required in the approval of bicameral conference
committee reports, the court stated that there was no irregularity in the
ratification of the measure in Congress. Regarding the justiciability of
enrolled bills, the court affirmed the inviolability of the separation of
powers among the three branches of government through asserting
that the enactment of statutes remains binding on courts unless there
are constitutional issues encountered which necessitate judicial
review. Given the co-equal independence of the other departments,
the judiciary recognizes the concurrence on the legislative measure.
CASE TITLE ASTORGA vs. VILLEGAS G.R NO. 23475
PONENTE MAKALINTAL, C.J DATE: April 30, 1974
DOCTRINE The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no
ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the
journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting
and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case.
FACT/S House bill No. 9266 was filed on March 30, 1964 in the House of
Representatives. The bill passed the third reading without
amendments on April 21, 1964. It was then sent to Senate for
concurrence. The committee head, Sen. Gerardo Roxas suggested a
minor amendment that instead of the City Engineer, the President
Protempore should succeed the Vice-Mayor in the latter’s incapacity to
act as Mayor.

During the 2nd reading on the Senate, amendments to Sec 1 were

introduced by Arturo Tolentino. They were approved while the
amendments presented by Roxas were not.

The bill was passed with amendments on May 20, 1964, then, a letter
was sent to HOR the following day informing that the bill has been
passed. Attached to letter is the certification of amendment. The
certificate states that the amendment suggested by Roxas were
approved instead of those of Tolentino. The bill was signed into RA No.
4065 or The Revised Charter of the City of Manila by the President on
June 18, 1964.

After the law was implemented, Tolentino held a press release about
the error in the passed law. Following the acknowledgment of the error,
the Senate President withdrew his signature. The President also
withdrew his signature saying that he can’t pass a law not approved by
the HOR and the Senate.

The Mayor then issued a circular about the changes brought about by
an invalid law. This includes recalling the police force assigned to the
Vice- Mayor. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S W/N Republic Act No. 4065 is valid?- No
RULING/S Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly approved
by both Houses, namely, by the signatures of their respective presiding
officers and secretaries on the printed copy of the approved bill. It has
been held that this procedure is merely a mode of authentication, to
signify to the Chief Executive that the bill being presented to him has
been duly approved by Congress and is ready for his approval or
rejection.

In one case in the United States, where the (State)Constitution

required the presiding officers to sign a bill and this provision was
deemed mandatory, the duly authenticated enrolled bill was
considered as conclusive proof of its due enactment. Another case
however, under the same circumstances, held that the enrolled bill was
not conclusive evidence.

The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due

enactment of a bill. It does not require the presiding officers to certify
to the same. But the said Constitution does contain the following
provisions:

Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and
from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in its
judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays on any question
shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in
the Journal."

Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of

Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment, required, it is
said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the government,
is neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate President
declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent
clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he
had signed had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously, this
declaration should be accorded even greater respect than the
attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is undisputed in
fact and indisputable in logic.

The petition was denied and the so-called Republic Act No. 4065
entitled "An act defining the powers, rights and duties of the Vice-
Mayor of the City of Manila, further amending for the purpose sections
ten and eleven of Republic Act numbered four hundred nine, otherwise
known as The Revised Charter of the City of Manila” is declared not to
have been duly enacted and therefore did not become law.
Lidasan vs Comelec (1967)

Summary Cases:

● Bara Lidasan vs. Commission On Elections (COMELEC) 21 SCRA 496

Subject:

One Subject, One Bill Rule; Partial Constitutionality

Facts:

Assailed in this petition is House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790 entitled "An Act Creating
the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur." It was found that the bill includes barrios
located in another province – Cotabato. Inn effect, by virtue of the stature, twelve barrios - in two
municipalities in the province of Cotabato - are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought
about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.

Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted a resolution implementing the statute.

This triggered the present action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer
of one of the affected municipalities (Parang, Cotabato), and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. He
prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared unconstitutional alleging violation of the constitutional
requirement that "[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which
shall be expressed in the title of the bill.”

Held:

One Bill-One Subject

1. The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to
refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is
to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the
import of the single subject thereof.

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2. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if
the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons
interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and
discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the
legislators

3. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, while technical
accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly
inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would
not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really
embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is
bad.

4. In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form should be considered,
and the purpose of the constitutional requirement, of giving, notice to all persons interested, should be
kept in mind by the court.

5. Republic Act 4790 is null and void. The title - "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the
Province of Lanao del Sur" - projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected
by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent
province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of
Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. Such title did
not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the
towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory
is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur.

6. The lumping together of barrios in adjacent but separate provinces under one statute is neither a
natural nor logical consequence of the creation of the new municipality of Dianaton. A change of
boundaries of the two provinces may be made without necessarily creating a new municipality and vice
versa.

Partial Unconstitutionality

7. It was argued that RA 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to the areas found within Lanao del
Sur, with the mere nullification of the portion in the other province of Cotabato. However, when the bill
was presented in Congress, the totality of the twenty-one barrios-not nine barrios-was in the mind of the
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proponent thereof. Dianaton was created upon the basic considerations of progressive community, large
aggregate population and sufficient income. Republic Act 4790 is thus inseparable, and it is accordingly
null and void in its totality.

8. The general rule is that where part of the statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while
another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. But in
order to do this, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to
presume that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not
constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute,
which carries out the legislative intent. The language used in the invalid part of the statute can have no
legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the legislative will
independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate.

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Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

Summary Cases:

● Arturo M. Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, et al.

Subjects:

Revenue Bills to “originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives, Procedure for Passage of Bill
into Law; Presidential certification, Bicameral Conference Committee, Enrolled Bill Doctrine, “One Bill,
One Subject” rule, Congressional Franchise subject to amendment, Freedom of Speech and of the
Press (VAT on Print Publications), Progressive System of Taxation, Non-impairment of Contracts

Facts:

Tolentino and other petitioners questioned the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the EVAT
Law. RA 7716 sought to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration
by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.

The original draft of RA 7716 (House Bill No. 11197) originated in the House of Representatives where it
passed three readings and afterward was sent to the Senate which came up with its own version
(Senate Bill No. 1630). The house bill and senate bill were then referred to a Conference Committee
which consolidated the two bill versions to produce the “enrolled bill” which the President signed into law.

Tolentino avers that (1) RA 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Section 24 of the Constitution because it is the result of the consolidation of two
distinct bills; (2) Senate bill did not pass three readings on separate days as required by the Art. VI,
Section 26 of the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day; and
(3) the Conference Committee version included provisions not found in either the House bill or the
Senate bill

Held:

Revenue Bills to “originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives

1. The contention that the constitutional design is to limit the Senate's power in respect of revenue bills in
order to compensate for the grant to the Senate of the treaty-ratifying power and thereby equalize the
powers of both houses overlooks the fact that the powers being compared are different. We are dealing
here with the legislative power, which under the Constitution is vested not in any particular chamber but
in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of a 'Senate and a House of Representatives.' The
exercise of the treaty-ratifying power is not the exercise of legislative power. It is the exercise of a check
on the executive power.

2. It is not the law - but the revenue bill - which is required by the Constitution to "originate
exclusively" in the House of Representatives. A bill originating in the House may undergo such
extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. As a result of the
Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced.

3. To insist that a revenue statute must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the
Senate's power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to " propose amendments." It would
violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House
superior to the Senate.
| Page 1 of 4
4. What the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing appropriation, revenue or tariff bills,
bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills must come from the
House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the
House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the
senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national
perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.

5. In fact, the Constitution does not prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its
receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt
of the House bill.

Procedure for Passage of Bill into Law; Presidential certification

6. The second and third reading of the Senate bill were done on the same day because the President
had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement
not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days.

7. The phrase ‘except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc.’ in
Art. VI, Sec 26(2) qualified the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has
passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed three
days before it is finally approved.

Bicameral Conference Committee

8. It is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision that is
not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. If the committee can propose an amendment
consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose several provisions,
collectively considered as an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," so long as such amendment
is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final but needed
the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department. The
charge that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a third legislative chamber is thus without
any basis.

9. As to the contention that the Rules of the two chambers were disregarded in the preparation of the
Conference Committee Report because the Report did not contain a 'detailed statement of changes in,
or amendments to, the subject measure', this Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these
internal rules. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no
concern. So long as the procedural requirements under the Constitution have been observed, the court
will not step in to interfere.

10. Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committee's Report must have undergone three
readings in each of the two houses. The nature of the bill requires that it be acted upon by each house
on a 'take it or leave it' basis, with the only alternative that if it is not approved by both houses, another
conference committee must be appointed. Art. VI, Sec 26(2) must be construed as referring only to bills
introduced for the first time in either house of Congress, not to the conference committee report.

Enrolled Bill Doctrine

11. An enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment.

12. On the mere allegation that the Conference Committee ‘surreptitiously’ inserted provisions into a bill
| Page 2 of 4
which it had prepared, the court should decline to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard
the "enrolled bill" rule in such case would be to disregard the respect due to a co-equal branch of our
government.

“One Bill, One Subject” rule

13. Art. IV, Sec 26(1) provides that "Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof."

14. The amendment of Sec. 103 of the NIRC (which removed the VAT exemption of PAL) is fairly
embraced in the title of RA 7716. The title states that the purpose of the statute is to expand the VAT
system, and one way of doing this is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the exemptions granted
before.

15. It is sufficient if the title expresses the general subject of the statute and all its provisions are
germane to the general subject thus expressed

Congressional Franchise subject to amendment

16. Sec 103 (Vat Exemptions) of the NIRC was amended by RA 7716. The effect of the amendment is to
remove the exemption granted to PAL, as far as the VAT is concerned.

17. This is within the power of Congress to do under Art. XII, Sec 11 of the Constitution, which provides
that the grant of a franchise for the operation of a public utility is subject to amendment, alteration or
repeal by Congress when the common good so requires.

Freedom of Speech and of the Press (VAT on Print Publications)

18. Republic Act No. 7716 amended Sec 103 by deleting par. (f) with the result that print media became
subject to the VAT with respect to all aspects of their operations.

19. If the press is now required to pay a value-added tax on its transactions, it is not because it is being
singled out, much less targeted, for special treatment but only because of the removal of the exemption
previously granted to it by law. Other transactions, likewise previously granted exemption, have been
delisted as part of the scheme to expand the base and the scope of the VAT system. The law would
perhaps be open to the charge of discriminatory treatment if the only privilege withdrawn had been that
granted to the press. But that is not the case.

20. The press is not exempt from the taxing power of the State. By granting exemptions, the State does
not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign prerogative.

21. Likewise, the removal of the exemption of printing, publication or importation of books and religious
articles, as well as their printing and publication, does not violate freedom of thought and of conscience.
For as the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization,
the Free Exercise of Religion Clause does not prohibit imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax
on the sale of religious material by a religious organization.

22. The registration fee is not equivalent to a prior restraint. The registration requirement is a central
feature of the VAT system. The fee is not imposed for the exercise of a privilege but only for the purpose
of defraying part of the cost of registration. The registration fee is thus a mere administrative fee.

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Progressive System of Taxation

23. Congress shall “evolve a progressive system of taxation” has been interpreted to mean that “direct
taxes are to be preferred and as much as possible and indirect taxes should be minimized.”

24. What Congress is required by the Constitution to do is to "evolve a progressive system of taxation."
These provisions are put in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially
enforceable rights.

Non-impairment of Contracts

25. As to the contention that the imposition of the VAT on the sales and leases of real estate by virtue of
contracts entered into prior to the effectivity of the law would violate the constitutional provision that "No
law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed," it is enough to say that the parties to a contract
cannot fetter the exercise of the taxing power of the State. For not only are existing laws read into
contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of
sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal order.

26. The Contract Clause has never been thought as a limitation on the exercise of the State's power of
taxation save only where a tax exemption has been granted for a valid consideration.

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Philippine Judges Association v. Prado

Summary Cases:

● Philippine Judges Association (PJA) vs. Prado

Subject: Title of a Bill, Bicameral Conference Committee, Enrolled Bill Doctrine, Equal Protection,
Philipipne Postal Corporation

Facts:

RA 7354 was passed which contained a section withdrawing the franking privileges of the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial
Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other
government offices. Thus, the constitutionality of this provision was questioned by the petitioners, all
members of the lower courts, based on three grounds, namely:

1.The title of the law embraces more than one subject, without indicating its purpose;

2.The law was passed without undergoing the required number of readings in both houses of Congress
and copies of the bill were not distributed to its members; and

3.It encroaches upon judicial functions and discriminates against the judiciary.

Held:

Title of a Bill

1. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as
to cover every single detail of the measure.

2. The withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the
principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service
system. By virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in
the title of the said law.

Bicameral Conference Committee

3. While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between
the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to settling differences between amendments
made by the House of Representatives and the Senate.

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Enrolled Bill Doctrine

4. Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the
approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress.

5. The Court should decline to look into the charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading
of the bill that eventually became the law and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed
among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the
measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution.

6. The Court is bound by the assurances provided by the enrolled bill and the legislative journals from a
coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.

Equal Protection of the Laws

7. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a
separate clause in Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for a more, specific guaranty against
any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.

8. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular
act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the
equal protection clause.

9. The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or
things without distinction.

10. However, the unequal application of the law should be based on substantial distinctions which make
fore real differences, which is not present between the Judiciary and the other agencies of government
which were also denied franking privileges. In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the
franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which
it does not belong.

Philippine Postal Corporation

11. The Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation, was created and is
expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service.

12. While it may have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing
certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the
| Page 2 of 3
government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter.

| Page 3 of 3
Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima (2008)

Summary Cases:

● ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Purisima (Secretary of Finance) 562 SCRA 251

Subject:

Accountability of Public Officers, Equal Protection, Undue Delegation, Congressional Oversight,

Legislative Veto

Facts:

Petitioners seek to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 or the
Attrition Act of 2005.

RA 9335 provides for a system of rewards and sanctions to encourage the officials and employees of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) to exceed their revenue targets.
Covered officials and employees are those with at least six (6) months of service in the BIR and the BOC,
regardless of employment status.

RA 9335 created the Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund), which is sourced from the collection of the
BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year, as determined by the Development
Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC).

The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate
and issue the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335 to be approved by a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee created for such purpose.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 9335 on the following grounds: (1) The law transforms the
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters as they will do
their best only in consideration of the reward (2) It violated the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection due to limiting the scope of the rewards and incentives to the BIR and BOC employees (3)
The law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient
standard on that matter. (4) The creation of a congressional oversight committee violates the doctrine of
separation of powers.

Held:

Judicial review

1. Aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a judicial controversy by the mere
enactment of the law even without any further overt act, petitioners fail either to assert any specific and
concrete legal claim or to demonstrate any direct adverse effect of the law on them. They are unable to
show a personal stake in the outcome of this case or an injury to themselves. On this account, their
petition is procedurally infirm.

2. This notwithstanding, public interest requires the resolution of the constitutional issues raised by
petitioners. The grave nature of their allegations tends to cast a cloud on the presumption of
constitutionality in favor of the law.

Presumption of Constitutionality
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3. The law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of Constitutionality. To justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
equivocal one.

Accountability of Public Officers

4. Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties. This presumption
necessarily obtains in favour of BIR and BOC officials and employees. The presumption is disputable but
proof to the contrary is required to rebut it. It cannot be overturned by mere conjecture or denied in
advance specially in this case where it is an underlying principle to advance a declared public policy.

5. Public officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A system of
incentives for exceeding the set expectations of public office is not anathema to the concept of public
accountability.

6. Notably, RA 9335 establishes safeguards to ensure that the reward will not be claimed if it will be
either the fruit of "bounty hunting or mercenary activity" or the product of the irregular performance of
official duties

Equal protection

7. Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality under the same conditions and
among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are classified based on substantial differences
in relation to the object to be accomplished. The Constitution does not require that things which are
different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not
forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in
the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.

8. The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has
reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.

9. The requirements for valid classification are:

(i) It should be reasonable
(ii) It must be germane to the purpose of the law
(iii) It must be limited to the existing conditions only
(iv) It must apply equally to each member of the class.
10. There is valid classification in this case. Since the subject of the law is revenue –generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law
should logically pertain to said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because
they have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government
through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.

Undue Delegation

11. Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power:

(a) The completeness test - A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate.

(b) Sufficient standard test - A law lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of
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 the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it
is to be implemented
12. RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets
and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law. Revenue targets are based on
the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal
year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the Budget of Expenditure and Sources of Financing
(BESF) submitted by the President to Congress. Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not
rest solely on the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.

13. RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC.
The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service
for causes other than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded the employee. In the
case of RA 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls short
of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of
collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official
duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws.

14. At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public interest,"
"justice and equity," "public convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy and welfare." In this case,
the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the
BOC is infused with public interest.

Congressional Oversight

15. The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided into
three categories, namely: (a) scrutiny, (b) congressional investigation and (c) legislative supervision.

16. As discussed in the case of Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections: “the power of (congressional)
oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence
over the implementation of legislation it has enacted.

17. Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an
encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of
powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government.

18. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress. However, to

forestall the danger of congressional encroachment “beyond the legislative sphere,” any post-enactment
congressional measure should be limited to scrutiny and investigation, specifically:
(a) Scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation and the budget hearings
conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be
heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation;

(b) Investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
19. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the
Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class. Congress exercises supervision over the executive
agencies through its veto power.

Legislative Veto

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20. Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to
present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through
a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before
they take effect.

21. Legislative veto disrupts the system of separation of powers because it effectively entrusts to
Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.

22. From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of the law that empowers Congress or
any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle
of separation of powers. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or its members to
approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a
provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling made by the members
of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the law.

23. Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as unconstitutional. In exercising discretion to approve
or disapprove the Implementing Rules and Regulations based on a determination whether or not they
conformed to the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power
exclusively vested in the Court by the Constitution.

24. Having been duly published, the IRR are presumed valid and effective even without the approval of
the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee

Separability of Unconstitutional Provisions of the Law

25. The separability clause of RA 9335 reveals the intention of the legislature to isolate and detach any
invalid provision from the other provisions so that the latter may continue in force and effect. The valid
portions can stand independently of the invalid section. Without Section 12, the remaining provisions still
constitute a complete, intelligible and valid law

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Mabanag vs Lopez Vito (1947)

Summary Cases:

● Mabanag vs Lopez Vito 78 Phil 1

Subject:

Enrolled Bill

Facts:

Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a congressional resolution
designated "Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to
be appended as an ordinance thereto."

Petitioners are 3 senators and 8 house representatives who had been proclaimed as elected winners by
in the 1946 elections, but who were not allowed to sit and participate in the legislative proceedings by
their respective Houses on account of alleged irregularities in their election.

Consequently, they did not take part in the passage of the questioned resolution, nor was their
membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which is required in
proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If they had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of
the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of
Congress.

Respondents, on the other hand, claims that the court is without jurisdiction on the matter, and relies on
the conclusiveness on the courts of an enrolled bill or resolution.

Held:

Political Question

1. Political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal
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with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provision.
This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation of powers.

2. In Coleman vs. Miller, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the efficacy of ratification by
state legislature of a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question and hence
not justiciable.

3. If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a

political question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single
objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory process as provided in section I of Article XV of the
Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in
attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the
Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity
and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even independent of
any intervention by the Chief Executive.

4. The Constitution grants Congress exclusive power to control submission of constitutional amendments.
Final determination by Congress that ratification by three-fourths of the States has taken place 'is
conclusive upon the courts.' In the exercise of that power, Congress, of course, is governed by the
Constitution. However, whether submission, intervening procedure or Congressional determination of
ratification conforms to the commands of the Constitution [are] questions of a type which this Court has
frequently designated 'political.' (citing the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Miller vs Coleman)

Enrolled Bill doctrine

5. The enrolled bill doctrine pertains to the rule that, in the case of Acts of the Philippine Legislature,
when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it
shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof. (based on
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure)

(Note: this means that courts are not to look behind the enrolled copy of the legislative bill and examine
the pertinent journals of the legislative proceedings to determine if the bill was indeed passed in
compliance with the Constitution and legislative rules)

6. It has been declared that the rule against going behind the enrolled bill is required by the respect due
to a coequal and independent department of the government. (citing American Jurisprudence)

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7. The rule is also one of convenience, because , otherwise, courts could not rely on the published
session laws, but would be required to look beyond these to the journals of the legislature and often to
any printed bills and amendments which might be found after the adjournment of the legislature. (citing
American Jurisprudence)

8. Section 313 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, provides two methods of
proving legislative proceedings: (1) by the journals, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies
certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their order; and (2) in case of acts of the legislature, by a
copy signed by the presiding Officers and secretaries thereof, which shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.

9. The Court looked into the journals in United States vs. Pons because, in all probability, those were the
documents offered in evidence. It does not appear that a duly authenticated copy of the Act was in
existence or was placed before the Court. Even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of the Act
had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply
rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in
either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. More importantly, the court
did not say that if a discrepancy existed, it would give greater weight to the journals.

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Arroyo v. De Venecia

Summary Cases:

● Joker P. Arroyo, et al. Vs. Jose De Venecia, et al.

Subject: Separation of Powers, Power of Judicial Review, Yeas and Nays, Enrolled Bill Doctrine,
Legislative Journals

Facts:

Members of the House of Representatives filed a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the
validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which amended the provisions of the tax code on sin taxes imposed on
the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. They alleged that the law was passed in violation of the
House rules, which are mandated by the Constitution, and thus, violation thereof is a violation of the
Constitution itself.

The law originated from the House, and approved on third reading. It was transmitted to the Senate, and
again approved on third reading, but with amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed
to reconcile conflicting provisions in both versions passed by the two houses. The report of the
committee was then submitted to the house. When a representative was delivering his privilege speech,
the presence of a quorum was questioned, and Rep. Arroyo’s motion to adjourn for lack of quorum was
not granted. The conference committee report, however, was approved by the house, despite the
objections posed by Rep. Arroyo regarding the lack of quorum. Thus, he posits that the law was passed
in violation of the House Rules of Procedure.

Held:

Separation of Powers

1. Each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere which the others may not
invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests.

2. Due regard for the working of our system of government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance
on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House.

3. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for the Court either to
set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules
of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum
when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself.

4. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined,
of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave
abuse of its discretion were it to do so.
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Power of Judicial Review

5. No rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking
redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court.

6. The Court has no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that
House have to look over its shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.

7. The jurisdiction of the Court is subject to the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII, §5 of the
Constitution and, therefore, to the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate
constitutional questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations.

8. For while Art. VIII, §1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the
political departments to decide, such as those relating to national security, it has not altogether done
away with political questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations.

9. If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account
merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not
present a situation in which a branch of the government has “gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction” so as to call for the exercise of our Art. VIII, §1 power.

Yeas and Nays

10. The Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time a House
has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill, at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present, and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President.

11. Considering the fact that in the approval of the original bill the votes of the Members by yeas and
nays had already been taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.

Enrolled Bill Doctrine

12. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the
President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was
passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.

13. To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary
of Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption.

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Legislative Journals

14. The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to
be recorded therein.

15. With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also
been accorded conclusive effect.

16. The bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment has been
duly proven.

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Astorga v. Villegas

Summary Cases:

● Astorga vs. Villegas, et al. 56 SCRA 714

Subject: EnrolledBill Doctrine, Certification of Bills, Legislative Journals

Facts:

RA 4065 was passed which amended the Revised Charter ofthe of the City of Manila and provided for
the power, duties and rights of thevice-mayor of the city. It turns out that the bill which was signed into
lawcontained amendments different form those approved by the Senate. The Presidentof the Philippines,
after learning of such, had already withdrawn his signaturetherefrom. This being the case, the Mayor of
Manila issued circulars to thevarious departments of the local government unit to disregard the
provisions ofthe said law. thus, the petitioner, then vice-mayor of Manila filed a petitionfor Mandamus,
Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory andProhibitory Injunction to compel the
necessary parties to comply with the law.Respondents alleged, however, that the bill never became a
law as it was notthe bill approved by Senate, and in such a case, the entries in the journal,and not the
enrolled bill itself should be the basis for the decision of theCourt.

Held:

Enrolled Bill Doctrine

1. The enrolledbill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independentdepartments,"
which requires the judicial department to accept, as havingpassed Congress, all bills authenticated in the
manner stated.

2. If theattestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of astatute, the courts may
resort to the journals and other records of Congressfor proof of its due enactment.
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3. That theattestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of dueenactment of the
law cannot apply in this case because the Senate Presidenthimself had already declared his signature
on the bill to be invalid. Thus, theenrolled bill doctrine cannot apply.

Certificationof Bills

4.As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in thecertification made by the
presiding officers. It is merely a mode ofauthentication.

5.The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by bothHouses, and the
certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cureany defect already present upon its passage. In
other words it is the approvalby Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential.

LegislativeJournals

6. The journal ofthe proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. TheConstitution
requires it.

7. While it is truethat the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks ofmisprinting and other
errors, the point is irrelevant in this case.

8. The Court ismerely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by theChief
Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under thespecific facts and
circumstances of this case, this Court can do this andresort to the Senate journal for the purpose.

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9. The journaldiscloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floorand
approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sentto the President and signed by
him.

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