Ford Pinto Case Study

In the 1960’s there was strong competition in the American small car market. To be competitive in this
market, Ford needed to have a product that had the size and weight of a small car, had a low cost of
ownership and clear product superiority. The Ford Pinto went on to become one of the 1970’s best selling
cars.

The Ford Pinto was designed to meet these criteria. The strict design specifications were that the car was
to weigh less than 2000 pounds and cost less than $2000. Ford also decided on a short production
schedule. Instead of the normal time from conception to production of 43 months for a new model, the
Pinto was scheduled for 25 months.

Under conditions of reduced product-time to market then tooling up for manufacture which involves
making the machines that stamp, press and grind car parts into shape must be done whilst product
development is underway rather than after product design. Ford wanted the car in the showrooms with
the other 1971 models and tooling had a fixed timeframe of about 18 months.

Investigative journalism by Mother Jones established that:

 ‘Ford engineers discovered in pre-production crash tests that rear-end collisions would rupture
the Pinto’s fuel system extremely easily.’
 ‘Because assembly-line machinery was already tooled when engineers found this defect, top Ford
officials decided to manufacture the car anyway.’
 ‘For more than eight years afterwards, Ford successfully lobbied against a key government safety
standard that would have forced the company to change the Pinto’s fire prone gas tank.’

It was concluded by Mother Jones from Pinto accident reports and crash test studies that:

‘If you ran into that Pinto you were following at over 30 miles per hour, the rear end of the car would
buckle like an accordion, right up to the back seat. The tube leading to the gas-tank cap would be ripped
away from the tank itself, and gas would immediately begin sloshing onto the road around the car. The
buckled gas tank would be jammed up against the differential housing (that big bulge in the middle of
your rear axle), which contains four sharp, protruding bolts likely to gash holes in the tank and spill still
more gas. Now all you need is a spark from a cigarette, ignition, or scraping metal, and both cars would
be engulfed in flames. If you gave that Pinto a really good whack – say, at 40 mph – chances are excellent
that its doors would jam and you would have to stand by and watch its trapped passengers burn to death.’

An accepted approach by federal Automotive Safety regulators at that time for decision-making was
risk/cost benefit analysis. Ford applied this method decide how to treat the fuel tank explosion risk.

An internal Ford memo calculated:

The cost at the manufacturing stage to fix the problem was $11 per vehicle and the benefit would be no
payouts resulting from the fuel tank explosion risk.
Benefits

 180 burn deaths, 180 serious injuries, 2100 burned vehicles.

Risks/Costs

 Sales: 11 Million cars, 1.5 Million light trucks.

Ford appear to have decided that it was not ‘reasonably practicable’ to fix the problem during
manufacture. It preferred to ‘retain the risk’ and make payments as required. There were no Standards
for withstanding rear-end collisions at a specified speed until after 1977.

The department of Transportation announced in May 1978 that the Pinto fuel system had a ‘safety related
defect’, Ford recalled 1.5 million Pintos. The modifications included a longer fuel filler neck and a better
clamp to keep it securely in the fuel tank, a better gas cap in some models, and placement of a plastic
shield between the front of the fuel tank and the differential to protect the tank from the nuts and bolts
on the differential and another along the right corner of the tank to protect it from the right rear shock
absorber (Centre for Auto Safety)

The consequences of Ford’s actions were significant. Millions of dollars of civil lawsuits were filed against
Ford and awarded against the car maker. In 1979 Ford Motor Company was charged with reckless
homicide but was acquitted in 1980. The Ford Pinto ceased production within months. The damage to the
company has been incalculable and it is conservatively estimated there are over 500 burns deaths to
people who would not have been seriously injured if the car had not burst into flames.

Reflect on this scenario and prepare to discuss the following points:

1. Imagine you were one of the design engineers working on the FP. What could you have done to
demonstrate your ‘duty of care’ responsibilities?
2. How would you define your professional responsibilities as an engineer in relation to safety and
ethics?