Subject: Law on Public Corporations

Doctrine: Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and
exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without
interruption or objection for period long enough to afford title by prescription. What is clearly essential is
a factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by the municipal corporation of its corporate powers,
as well as the acquiescence thereto by the other instrumentalities of the state.
Topic: K. De Jure and De Facto Corporations
Digester: Jensen Floren

G.R. NO. 161414 January 17, 2005

Sultan Camid vs. Office of the President
Tinga, J.

RECIT READY SUMMARY

Facts:
By virtue of Executive Order No. 107, the municipality of Andong was created by President Macapagal, along with 32
other municipalities upon issuance of several executive orders. These executive orders was, however, declared null
and void. Petitioner Camid comes before the Supreme Court praying that the Municipality of Andong be considered as
a "regular existing municipality" for the reason that it "has metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality with a
complete set of officials appointed to handle essential services for the municipality and its constituents". Also , he
alleged that Andong is already a “de facto municipal corporation” for it was created by way of executive order and is
covered by covered by Section 442(d) of the LGC of 1991.
 
Issue:
Whether or not Andong is entitled to recognition as de facto corporation.
 
Ruling:
No, Andong is not entitled to recognition as de facto corporation.
 
Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and exercised
corporate functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or objection
for period long enough to afford title by prescription. However, in this case, the Municipality of Andong never came
into existence for EO No. 107 has been declared "null and void ab initio" by the Supreme Court.
 
Also, Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 requires that in order that the municipality created by
executive order may receive recognition, they must "have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of [the Local Government] Code." The Municipality of Andong has failed to meet
said requirement for, as per admission by Camid, Andong has never elected its municipal officers at all.
 
Hence, Andong is not entitled to recognition as de facto corporation.

Facts:
1. Former President Diosdado Macapagal issued several Executive Orders that created 33 municipalities in
Mindanao, and among them was Andong in Lanao del Sur which was created by EO No. 107.
2. In the case of Pelaez v. Auditor General, the Supreme Court has ruled that the assailed executive orders were
null and void. Among the EOs that were annulled was EO No. 107.
3. In November 2003, the DILG issued a Certification which enumerated 18 municipalities certified as existing, per
DILG Records. Notably, these eighteen (18) municipalities are among the thirty-three (33), along with Andong,
whose creations were voided by this Court in Pelaez.
4. Petitioner Sultan Osop B. Camid, as a current resident of Andong, suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, alleges
that said certification results in an unequal treatment to the detriment of Andong as similarly situated
 municipalities were recognized by DILG. He prays that Andong shall be classified as a "regular existing
municipality."
o He claims that Andong "has metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality with a complete set of
officials appointed to handle essential services for the municipality and its constituents"
o It has a high school, post office, DECS office and 17 “barangay units” with respective chairmen.
o Furthermore, its land area was recognized by the CENRO to have been created through the voided EO
107 as well included in the as a municipality by the Provincial Statistics Office of Marawi City.
5. Camid further alleges that Andong is already a “de facto municipal corporation” similar to Municipality of San
Andress, which was also created by way of executive order, in the case of Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon.
Mendez.
6. Furthermore, he alleges that Andong is covered by Section 442(d) of the LGC of 1991 which states that,
“Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have
their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall
henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.”
 
Issue:
Whether or not Andong is entitled to recognition as de facto corporation.
Ruling:
 
No, Andong is not entitled to recognition as de facto corporation.
 
Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and
exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or
objection for period long enough to afford title by prescription. What is clearly essential is a factual demonstration
of the continuous exercise by the municipal corporation of its corporate powers, as well as the acquiescence
thereto by the other instrumentalities of the state.
 
In the present case, the Court pointed out that the Municipality of Andong never existed as EO No. 107 was
declared "null and void ab initio" by the Supreme Court in the case of Pelaez v. Auditor general, along with thirty-
three (33) other executive orders. The phrase "ab initio" means "from the beginning," "at first," "from the
inception." Pelaez was never reversed by this Court but rather it was expressly affirmed in the cases of
Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva, Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, and Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya. No
subsequent ruling by this Court declared Pelaez as overturned or inoperative. No subsequent legislation has been
passed since 1965 creating a Municipality of Andong. Given these facts, there is hardly any reason to elaborate
why Andong does not exist as a duly constituted municipality.
 
The Court also considered the applicability of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991. The said
provision requires that in order that the municipality created by executive order may receive recognition, they
must "have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of [the
Local Government] Code."
 
In the case at bar, Andong does not meet the requisites set forth by Section 442(d) of the Local Government
Code of 1991. Camid admits that Andong has never elected its municipal officers at all. This incapacity ties in with
the fact that Andong was judicially annulled in 1965. Out of obeisance to our ruling in Pelaez, the national
government ceased to recognize the existence of Andong, depriving it of its share of the public funds, and refusing
to conduct municipal elections for the void municipality.
 
Hence, Andong is entitled to recognition as de facto corporation.
FULL TEXT AHEAD:

EN BANC

[G.R. NO. 161414 : January 17, 2005]

SULTAN OSOP B. CAMID, Petitioner, v. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO, DEPARTMENT of FINANCE,
DEPARTMENT of BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and the CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES (HOUSE of REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE), Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This Petition for Certiorari presents this Court with the prospect of our own Brigadoon1 the municipality of Andong, Lanao del
Sur―which like its counterpart in filmdom, is a town that is not supposed to exist yet is anyway insisted by some as actually alive and thriving. Yet
unlike in the movies, there is nothing mystical, ghostly or anything even remotely charming about the purported existence
of Andong. The creation of the putative municipality was declared void ab initio by this Court four decades
ago, but the present petition insists that in spite of this insurmountable obstacle Andong thrives on, and
hence, its legal personality should be given judicial affirmation. We disagree.

The factual antecedents derive from the promulgation of our ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General2 in 1965. As discussed
therein, then President Diosdado Macapagal issued several Executive Orders 3 creating thirty-three (33)
municipalities in Mindanao. Among them was Andong in Lanao del Sur which was created by virtue of
Executive Order No. 107.4

These executive orders were issued after legislative bills for the creation of municipalities involved in that case had
failed to pass Congress.5 President Diosdado Macapagal justified the creation of these municipalities citing his powers
under Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. Then Vice-President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a special civil
action for a writ of prohibition, alleging in main that the Executive Orders were null and void, Section 68
having been repealed by Republic Act No. 2370, 6 and said orders constituting an undue delegation of
legislative power.7

After due deliberation, the Court unanimously held that the challenged Executive Orders were null and void.
A majority of five justices, led by the ponente, Justice (later Chief Justice) Roberto Concepcion, ruled that Section 68
of the Revised Administrative Code did not meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of legislative
power to the executive branch,8 while three justices opined that the nullity of the issuances was the consequence of
the enactment of the 1935 Constitution, which reduced the power of the Chief Executive over local
governments.9 Pelaez was disposed in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently
restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any
disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.10

Among the Executive Orders annulled was Executive Order No. 107 which created the Municipality of
Andong. Nevertheless, the core issue presented in the present petition is the continued efficacy of the judicial
annulment of the Municipality of Andong.

Petitioner Sultan Osop B. Camid (Camid) represents himself as a current resident of Andong, 11 suing as a
private citizen and taxpayer whose locus standi "is of public and paramount interest especially to the
people of the Municipality of Andong, Province of Lanao del Sur."12 He alleges that Andong "has
metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality with a complete set of officials appointed to handle
essential services for the municipality and its constituents," 13 even though he concedes that since 1968,
no person has been appointed, elected or qualified to serve any of the elective local government positions
of Andong.14 Nonetheless, the municipality of Andong has its own high school, Bureau of Posts, a
Department of Education, Culture and Sports office, and at least seventeen (17) "barangay units" with
their own respective chairmen.15 From 1964 until 1972, according to Camid, the public officials of Andong
"have been serving their constituents through the minimal means and resources with least (sic)
honorarium and recognition from the Office of the then former President Diosdado Macapagal." Since the
time of Martial Law in 1972, Andong has allegedly been getting by despite the absence of public funds,
with the "Interim Officials" serving their constituents "in their own little ways and means."16

In support of his claim that Andong remains in existence, Camid presents to this Court a Certification issued by the
Office of the Community Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) certifying the total land area of the Municipality of Andong, "created under Executive Order No. 107
issued [last] October 1, 1964."17 He also submits a Certification issued by the Provincial Statistics Office of Marawi City
concerning the population of Andong, which is pegged at fourteen thousand fifty nine (14,059) strong. Camid also
enumerates a list of governmental agencies and private groups that allegedly recognize Andong, and notes that other
municipalities have recommended to the Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly for the immediate
implementation of the revival or re-establishment of Andong.18

The petition assails a Certification dated 21 November 2003, issued by the Bureau of Local Government
Supervision of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG).19 The Certification enumerates
eighteen (18) municipalities certified as "existing," per DILG records. Notably, these eighteen (18)
municipalities are among the thirty-three (33), along with Andong, whose creations were voided by this
Court in Pelaez. These municipalities are Midaslip, Pitogo, Naga, and Bayog in Zamboanga del Sur; Siayan and Pres.
Manuel A. Roxas in Zamboanga del Norte; Magsaysay, Sta. Maria and New Corella in Davao; Badiangan and Mina in
Iloilo; Maguing in Lanao del Sur; Gloria in Oriental Mindoro; Maasim in Sarangani; Kalilangan and Lantapan in
Bukidnon; and Maco in Compostela Valley.20

Camid imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DILG "in not classifying [Andong] as a regular
existing municipality and in not including said municipality in its records and official database as [an]
existing regular municipality."21 He characterizes such non-classification as unequal treatment to the
detriment of Andong, especially in light of the current recognition given to the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly
annulled by reason of Pelaez. As appropriate relief, Camid prays that the Court annul the
DILG Certification dated 21 November 2003; direct the DILG to classify Andong as a "regular existing
municipality;" all public respondents, to extend full recognition and support to Andong; the Department of
Finance and the Department of Budget and Management, to immediately release the internal revenue
allotments of Andong; and the public respondents, particularly the DILG, to recognize the "Interim Local
Officials" of Andong.22

Moreover, Camid insists on the continuing validity of Executive Order No. 107. He argues that Pelaez has
already been modified by supervening events consisting of subsequent laws and jurisprudence. Particularly
cited is our Decision in Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez,23 wherein the Court affirmed the unique
status of the municipality of San Andres in Quezon as a "de facto municipal corporation."24 Similar to
Andong, the municipality of San Andres was created by way of executive order, precisely the manner
which the Court in Pelaez had declared as unconstitutional. Moreover, San Narciso cited, as Camid does,
Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 as basis for the current recognition of the
impugned municipality. The provision reads:

Section 442. Requisites for Creation. - xxx

(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as
such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which
have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the)
Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.25

There are several reasons why the petition must be dismissed. These can be better discerned upon examination of the
proper scope and application of Section 442(d), which does not sanction the recognition of just any municipality. This
point shall be further explained further on.

Notably, as pointed out by the public respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the case is not a
fit subject for the special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus, as it pertains to the de novo appreciation of factual
questions. There is indeed no way to confirm several of Camid's astonishing factual allegations pertaining to the
purported continuing operation of Andong in the decades since it was annulled by this Court. No trial court has had
the opportunity to ascertain the validity of these factual claims, the appreciation of which is beyond the function of
this Court since it is not a trier of facts.
The importance of proper factual ascertainment cannot be gainsaid, especially in light of the legal principles
governing the recognition of de facto municipal corporations. It has been opined that municipal
corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and exercised
corporate functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or
objection for period long enough to afford title by prescription.26 These municipal corporations have
exercised their powers for a long period without objection on the part of the government that although no
charter is in existence, it is presumed that they were duly incorporated in the first place and that their
charters had been lost.27 They are especially common in England, which, as well-worth noting, has existed as a
state for over a thousand years. The reason for the development of that rule in England is understandable, since that
country was settled long before the Roman conquest by nomadic Celtic tribes, which could have hardly been expected
to obtain a municipal charter in the absence of a national legal authority.

In the United States, municipal corporations by prescription are less common, but it has been held that when no
charter or act of incorporation of a town can be found, it may be shown to have claimed and exercised the powers of a
town with the knowledge and assent of the legislature, and without objection or interruption for so long a period as to
furnish evidence of a prescriptive right.28

What is clearly essential is a factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by the municipal
corporation of its corporate powers, as well as the acquiescence thereto by the other instrumentalities of
the state. Camid does not have the opportunity to make an initial factual demonstration of those circumstances
before this Court. Indeed, the factual deficiencies aside, Camid's plaint should have undergone the usual
administrative gauntlet and, once that was done, should have been filed first with the Court of Appeals, which at least
would have had the power to make the necessary factual determinations. Camid's seeming ignorance of the principles
of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts, as well as the concomitant prematurity of the
present petition, cannot be countenanced.

It is also difficult to capture the sense and viability of Camid's present action. The assailed issuance is
the Certification issued by the DILG. But such Certification does not pretend to bear the authority to create or
revalidate a municipality. Certainly, the annulment of the Certification will really do nothing to serve Camid's ultimate
cause - the recognition of Andong. Neither does the Certification even expressly refute the claim that Andong still
exists, as there is nothing in the document that comments on the present status of Andong. Perhaps
the Certification is assailed before this Court if only to present an actual issuance, rather than a long-standing habit or
pattern of action that can be annulled through the special civil action of certiorari . Still, the relation of
the Certification to Camid's central argument is forlornly strained.

These disquisitions aside, the central issue remains whether a municipality whose creation by executive fiat
was previously voided by this Court may attain recognition in the absence of any curative or
reimplementing statute. Apparently, the question has never been decided before, San Narciso and its kindred cases
pertaining as they did to municipalities whose bases of creation were dubious yet were never judicially nullified. The
effect of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code on municipalities such as Andong warrants explanation.
Besides, the residents of Andong who belabor under the impression that their town still exists, much less those who
may comport themselves as the municipality's "Interim Government," would be well served by a rude awakening.

The Court can employ a simplistic approach in resolving the substantive aspect of the petition, merely by pointing out
that the Municipality of Andong never existed.29 Executive Order No. 107, which established Andong, was
declared "null and void ab initio" in 1965 by this Court in Pelaez, along with thirty-three (33) other
executive orders. The phrase "ab initio" means "from the beginning,"30 "at first,"31 "from the
inception."32 Pelaez was never reversed by this Court but rather it was expressly affirmed in the cases
of Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva,33 Municipality of Malabang v. Benito,34 and Municipality of Kapalong
v. Moya.35 No subsequent ruling by this Court declared Pelaez as overturned or inoperative. No subsequent
legislation has been passed since 1965 creating a Municipality of Andong. Given these facts, there is
hardly any reason to elaborate why Andong does not exist as a duly constituted municipality.

This ratiocination does not admit to patent legal errors and has the additional virtue of blessed austerity. Still, its
sweeping adoption may not be advisedly appropriate in light of Section 442(d) of the Local Government
Code and our ruling in Municipality of San Narciso , both of which admit to the possibility
of de facto municipal corporations.

To understand the applicability of Municipality of San Narciso and Section 442(b) of the Local Government Code to the
situation of Andong, it is necessary again to consider the ramifications of our decision in Pelaez.

The eminent legal doctrine enunciated in Pelaez was that the President was then, and still is, not empowered to
create municipalities through executive issuances. The Court therein recognized "that the President has,
for many years, issued executive orders creating municipal corporations, and that the same have been
organized and in actual operation . . . ."36 However, the Court ultimately nullified only those thirty-three (33)
municipalities, including Andong, created during the period from 4 September to 29 October 1964 whose existence
petitioner Vice-President Pelaez had specifically assailed before this Court. No pronouncement was made as to the
other municipalities which had been previously created by the President in the exercise of power the Court deemed
unlawful.

Two years after Pelaez was decided, the issue again came to fore in Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva.37 The
Municipality of Lawigan was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 436 in 1961. Lawigan was not one of the
municipalities ordered annulled in Pelaez. A petition for prohibition was filed contesting the legality of the executive
order, again on the ground that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code was unconstitutional. The trial court
dismissed the petition, but the Supreme Court reversed the ruling and entered a new decision declaring Executive
Order No. 436 void ab initio. The Court reasoned without elaboration that the issue had already been squarely taken
up and settled in Pelaez which agreed with the argument posed by the challengers to Lawigan's validity.38

In the 1969 case of Municipality of Malabang v. Benito,39 what was challenged is the validity of the constitution of the
Municipality of Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, also created by an executive order,40 and which, similar to Lawigan, was
not one of the municipalities annulled in Pelaez. This time, the officials of Balabagan invoked de facto status as a
municipal corporation in order to dissuade the Court from nullifying action. They alleged that its status as a de
facto corporation cannot be collaterally attacked but should be inquired into directly in an action for quo warranto at
the instance of the State, and not by a private individual as it was in that case. In response, the Court conceded that
an inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto, but only
if the municipal corporation is a de facto corporation.41

Ultimately, the Court refused to acknowledge Balabagan as a de facto corporation, even though it had been organized
prior to the Court's decision in Pelaez. The Court declared void the executive order creating Balabagan and restrained
its municipal officials from performing their official duties and functions.42 It cited conflicting American authorities on
whether a de facto corporation can exist where the statute or charter creating it is unconstitutional.43 But the Court's
final conclusion was unequivocal that Balabagan was not a de facto corporation. ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r† Ï…αl  lαω  lιbrαrà ¿

In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact that the statute creating
it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the consideration that there was some other valid
law giving corporate vitality to the organization. Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was
organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation, as,
independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other valid statute to give color of
authority to its creation.44

The Court did clarify in Malabang that the previous acts done by the municipality in the exercise of its corporate
powers were not necessarily a nullity.45 Camid devotes several pages of his petition in citing this point,46 yet the
relevance of the citation is unclear considering that Camid does not assert the validity of any corporate act of Andong
prior to its judicial dissolution. Notwithstanding, the Court in Malabang retained an emphatic attitude as to the
unconstitutionality of the power of the President to create municipal corporations by way of presidential
promulgations, as authorized under Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code.

This principle was most recently affirmed in 1988, in Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya.47 The municipality of Santo
Tomas, created by President Carlos P. Garcia, filed a complaint against another municipality, who challenged Santo
Tomas's legal personality to institute suit. Again, Santo Tomas had not been expressly nullified by prior judicial action,
yet the Court refused to recognize its legal existence. The blunt but simple ruling: "Now then, as ruled in the Pelaez
case supra, the President has no power to create a municipality. Since [Santo Tomas] has no legal personality,
it can not be a party to any civil action'. "48

Nevertheless, when the Court decided Municipality of San Narciso49 in 1995, it indicated a shift in the jurisprudential
treatment of municipalities created through presidential issuances. The questioned municipality of San Andres,
Quezon was created on 20 August 1959 by Executive Order No. 353 issued by President Carlos P. Garcia. Executive
Order No. 353 was not one of the thirty-three issuances annulled by Pelaez in 1965. The legal status of the
Municipality of San Andres was first challenged only in 1989, through a petition for quo warranto filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon, which did cite Pelaez as authority.50 The RTC dismissed the petition for lack
of cause of action, and the petitioners therein elevated the matter to this Court.

In dismissing the petition, the Court delved in the merits of the petition, if only to resolve further doubt on the legal
status of San Andres. It noted a circumstance which is not present in the case at bar that San Andres was in existence
for nearly thirty (30) years before its legality was challenged. The Court did not declare the executive order creating
San Andres null and void. Still, acting on the premise that the said executive order was a complete nullity, the Court
noted "peculiar circumstances" that led to the conclusion that San Andres had attained the unique status of a "de
facto municipal corporation."51 It noted that Pelaez limited its nullificatory effect only to those executive orders
specifically challenged therein, despite the fact that the Court then could have very well extended the decision to
invalidate San Andres as well.52 This statement squarely contradicts Camid's reading of San Narciso that the creation
of San Andres, just like Andong, had been declared a complete nullity on the same ground of unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power found in Pelaez.53

The Court also considered the applicability of Section 442(d) 54 of the Local Government Code of 1991. It
clarified the implication of the provision as follows:

Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective
municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered
as regular municipalities." No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442(d) of the Local Government
Code is preferred. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The power to create political
subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section
442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to acts done
that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in
this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights. (Emphasis supplied)55

The holding in San Narciso was subsequently affirmed in Municipality of Candijay v. Court of Appeals56 and
Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz57 In Candijay, the juridical personality of the Municipality of Alicia, created in a 1949
executive order, was attacked only beginning in 1984. Pelaez was again invoked in support of the challenge, but the
Court refused to invalidate the municipality, citing San Narciso at length. The Court noted that the situation of the
Municipality of Alicia was strikingly similar to that in San Narciso; hence, the town should likewise "benefit from the
effects of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code, and should [be] considered as a regular, de
jure municipality." 58

The valid existence of Municipality of Sinacaban, created in a 1949 executive order, was among the issues raised
in Jimenez. The Court, through Justice Mendoza, provided an expert summation of the evolution of the rule.

The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal corporation is the ruling
in Pelaez v. Auditor General that the creation of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter and therefore
the President was without power to create by executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban. The ruling in this case
has been reiterated in a number of cases later decided. However, we have since held that where a municipality
created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation
can no longer be questioned. In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., this Court considered the
following factors as having validated the creation of a municipal corporation, which, like the Municipality of Sinacaban,
was created by executive order of the President before the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General: (1) the fact that for
nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality had never been challenged; (2) the fact that following
the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the executive order creating such
municipality; and (3) the fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth class municipality, organized as part
of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the
House of Representatives. Above all, it was held that whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure character of the
municipality must be deemed to have been put to rest by the Local Government Code of 1991 (R. A. No. 7160),
'442(d) of which provides that "municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders
and which have their respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall
henceforth be considered as regular municipalities."

Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a de facto municipal corporation
in the sense that its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially. Sinacaban had been in
existence for sixteen years when Pelaez v. Auditor General was decided on December 24, 1965. Yet the validity of
E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it was only 40 years later that its existence was
questioned and only because it had laid claim to an area that apparently is desired for its revenue. This fact must be
underscored because under Rule 66, '16 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture
of its charter must be commenced within five (5) years from the time the act complained of was done or committed.
On the contrary, the State and even the Municipality of Jimenez itself have recognized Sinacaban's corporate
existence. Under Administrative Order No. 33 dated June 13, 1978 of this Court, as reiterated by '31 of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 (B. P. Blg. 129), Sinacaban is constituted part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the
establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country. For its part, Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban in
1950 by entering into an agreement with it regarding their common boundary. The agreement was embodied in
Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental.

Indeed Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution,
apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part of the Second District of
Misamis Occidental. Moreover, following the ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., 442(d) of
the Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in the creation of Sinacaban'.59  ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r† Ï…αl  lαω  lιbrαrà ¿
From this survey of relevant jurisprudence, we can gather the applicable rules. Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled
that the President has no power to create municipalities, yet limited its nullificatory effects to the particular
municipalities challenged in actual cases before this Court. However, with the promulgation of the Local Government
Code in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly created by executive order but not judicially
annulled. The de facto status of such municipalities as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban was recognized by this Court,
and Section 442(b) of the Local Government Code deemed curative whatever legal defects to title these municipalities
had labored under.

Is Andong similarly entitled to recognition as a de facto municipal corporation? It is not. There are eminent
differences between Andong and municipalities such as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban. Most prominent is the
fact that the executive order creating Andong was expressly annulled by order of this Court in 1965. If we
were to affirm Andong's de facto status by reason of its alleged continued existence despite its
nullification, we would in effect be condoning defiance of a valid order of this Court. ςη αñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r† Ï…αl  lαω  lιbrαrà ¿

Court decisions cannot obviously lose their efficacy due to the sheer defiance by the parties aggrieved.

It bears noting that based on Camid's own admissions, Andong does not meet the requisites set forth by
Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code. Section 442(d) requires that in order that the municipality
created by executive order may receive recognition, they must "have their respective set of elective
municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of [the Local Government] Code." Camid
admits that Andong has never elected its municipal officers at all. 60 This incapacity ties in with the fact
that Andong was judicially annulled in 1965. Out of obeisance to our ruling in Pelaez, the national
government ceased to recognize the existence of Andong, depriving it of its share of the public funds, and
refusing to conduct municipal elections for the void municipality.

The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the municipality in the last four decades
are eloquent indicia of the non-recognition by the State of the existence of the town. The certifications relied upon by
Camid, issued by the DENR-CENRO and the National Statistics Office, can hardly serve the purpose of attesting to
Andong's legal efficacy. In fact, both these certifications qualify that they were issued upon the request of Camid, "to
support the restoration or re-operation of the Municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur,"61 thus obviously conceding that
the municipality is at present inoperative.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r† Ï…αl  lαω  lιbrαrà ¿

We may likewise pay attention to the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, which had also been relied upon
in Jimenez and San Narciso. This Ordinance, which apportioned the seats of the House of Representatives to the
different legislative districts in the Philippines, enumerates the various municipalities that are encompassed by the
various legislative districts. Andong is not listed therein as among the municipalities of Lanao del Sur, or of any other
province for that matter.62 On the other hand, the municipalities of San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban are mentioned in
the Ordinance as part of Quezon,63 Bohol,64 and Misamis Occidental65 respectively.

How about the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly nullified in Pelaez but certified as existing in the
DILG Certification presented by Camid? The petition fails to mention that subsequent to the ruling
in Pelaez, legislation was enacted to reconstitute these municipalities.66 It is thus not surprising that the DILG certified
the existence of these eighteen (18) municipalities, or that these towns are among the municipalities enumerated in
the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Andong has not been similarly reestablished through statute. Clearly
then, the fact that there are valid organic statutes passed by legislation recreating these eighteen (18) municipalities
is sufficient legal basis to accord a different legal treatment to Andong as against these eighteen (18) other
municipalities.

We thus assert the proper purview to Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code that it does not serve
to affirm or reconstitute the judicially dissolved municipalities such as Andong, which had been previously
created by presidential issuances or executive orders. The provision affirms the legal personalities only of
those municipalities such as San Narciso, Alicia, and Sinacaban, which may have been created using the
same infirm legal basis, yet were fortunate enough not to have been judicially annulled. On the other
hand, the municipalities judicially dissolved in cases such as Pelaez, San Joaquin,  and Malabang, remain
inexistent, unless recreated through specific legislative enactments, as done with the eighteen (18)
municipalities certified by the DILG. Those municipalities derive their legal personality not from the
presidential issuances or executive orders which originally created them or from Section 442(d), but from
the respective legislative statutes which were enacted to revive them. ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrà ¿

And what now of Andong and its residents? Certainly, neither Pelaez or this decision has obliterated Andong into a
hole on the ground. The legal effect of the nullification of Andong in Pelaez was to revert the constituent
barrios of the voided town back into their original municipalities, namely the municipalities of Lumbatan,
Butig and Tubaran.67 These three municipalities subsist to this day as part of Lanao del Sur, 68 and
presumably continue to exercise corporate powers over the barrios which once belonged to Andong.
If there is truly a strong impulse calling for the reconstitution of Andong, the solution is through the legislature and
not judicial confirmation of void title. If indeed the residents of Andong have, all these years, been governed not by
their proper municipal governments but by a ragtag "Interim Government," then an expedient political and legislative
solution is perhaps necessary. Yet we can hardly sanction the retention of Andong's legal personality solely on the
basis of collective amnesia that may have allowed Andong to somehow pretend itself into existence despite its judicial
dissolution. Maybe those who insist Andong still exists prefer to remain unperturbed in their blissful ignorance, like the
inhabitants of the cave in Plato's famed allegory. But the time has come for the light to seep in, and for the petitioner
and like-minded persons to awaken to legal reality.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-

Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.

SUMMARY:

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