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Module 2.1

Driver examines the position of moral subjectivism, which claims that moral judgments are merely matters of individual opinion and there is no universal moral system. She argues subjectivism is implausible for two reasons: 1) It would mean that contradictory moral claims, like "abortion is always wrong" and "abortion is always permissible", could both be true depending on the believer, which is nonsensical. 2) It implies that morally reprehensible acts, like genocide, could be justified as long as the person believes it is right, which is highly unappealing. Overall, Driver rejects subjectivism and argues there must be objective moral reasons, not just individual beliefs, to determine if

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Allan Patricio
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379 views

Module 2.1

Driver examines the position of moral subjectivism, which claims that moral judgments are merely matters of individual opinion and there is no universal moral system. She argues subjectivism is implausible for two reasons: 1) It would mean that contradictory moral claims, like "abortion is always wrong" and "abortion is always permissible", could both be true depending on the believer, which is nonsensical. 2) It implies that morally reprehensible acts, like genocide, could be justified as long as the person believes it is right, which is highly unappealing. Overall, Driver rejects subjectivism and argues there must be objective moral reasons, not just individual beliefs, to determine if

Uploaded by

Allan Patricio
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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CHAPTER 4

Subjectivism
Julia Driver

Faced with an ethical issue, some people challenge the supposition that the problem
can be resolved through reasoned discussion. They claim that moral judgments are
merely matters of individual opinion. Thus “right” and “wrong” express only personal
preferences. This position, known as “subjectivism,” is here examined and found
unconvincing by Julia Driver, Professor of Philosophy at Washington University in St.
Louis.

[T]here are some people who are very skeptical about morality—about
whether there is such a thing as a truly universal moral system, and whether
any moral claims are true or “just a matter of opinion.” …
On this view of moral evaluation, normative claims will be radically
different from descriptive claims. For example, if someone were to make the
descriptive claim
(1) Wombats are mammals.
she would be stating something that has a truth-value that does not vary
across individual beliefs, or across cultures. If (1) is true, it is true not in
virtue of what someone happens to believe. The truth-value of (1) is not a
relative matter. How do we find out whether or not (1) is true or false? We
look at the features of wombats relevant to their classification as mammals—
Are they warm-blooded and furry, and do they give birth to live young? The
answers to all of these questions are affirmative, so (1) is true. In determining
the truth-value of (1), we don’t look at what people happen to believe about
wombats. After all, people can be mistaken.
Moral relativists hold that normative claims, such as moral ones,
however, are quite different from descriptive claims such as (1) and do have
truth-values that can vary.…
One form of moral relativism … [holds] that the truth-value of moral
claims can vary from individual to individual. This view is sometimes
referred to as … subjectivism. Consider the claim
(2) Abortion is always wrong.
There are some people who believe that (2) is true and others who believe
that (2) is false. If we think that the correct way to relativize moral truth is to
the beliefs or attitudes of individuals, then we need to hold that (2) is true for
those who believe it, but false for those who believe it false. Then (2) is both
true and false—but false for one person, and true for another.
One way to spell out this theory more plausibly is to hold that claims such
as (2) are just reports of approval or disapproval, so that when Mary utters (2)
sincerely, that is just the same as saying something like
(3) I (Mary) disapprove of abortion.
If Mary is being sincere, then (3) must be true. If (3) is the same as (2), then
(2) must be true as well. But note that if Ralph says
(4) Abortion is always permissible.
which is the same (on this theory) as
(5) I (Ralph) do not disapprove of abortion.
then if Ralph sincerely utters (4), (4) must be true as well. Thus, (2) and (4)
are both true, albeit relativized to different subjects. This has the very odd
result that when Ralph and Mary argue about abortion, there is really nothing
that they are disagreeing about. How can Mary disagree with Ralph, really,
when all he is actually saying is that he does not disapprove of abortion? But
this goes against our views about what takes place in moral argumentation—
we do believe that something more substantive, more objective, is at stake.
Subjectivism seems to be an attractive view to some because it seems
highly tolerant. What is “right” for me may not be “right” for you, since you
have different beliefs. We sometimes hear people talking as though, for
example, “Abortion is right for some, but for me would be murder,” but—
upon reflection—most people find the view that “right” is purely a matter of
opinion to lack plausibility. It seems quite counter-intuitive, since it would
result in the truth—albeit subjective truth—of claims such as “For me, mass
killing is perfectly permissible,” as long as the person making the utterance
actually believed that mass killings were permissible. But a genocidal maniac
cannot be acting rightly just because he happens to believe that he is acting
rightly. There are lots of cases to which we could refer to show how
unappealing such a criterion of rightness would be. There have been many
people who have done terrible things and yet have felt very self-righteous
about their actions. The Nazi commander Heinrich Himmler, for example,
believed that morality demanded that he obey his leader for the sake of
German society: of course, he was horribly wrong about this, and his
individual beliefs in no way provide justification for what he did, and the
horrors that he inflicted on others. So mere individual belief about what is
right and what is wrong cannot morally justify someone’s actions. In doing
anything, whether it is right or wrong, a person is not acting rightly or
wrongly just because she happens to believe that what she is doing is right or
wrong. There must be something else that justifies her action (or not), some
moral reasons for or against the action.

Study Questions
1. According to subjectivism, what is meant by saying that “lying is
wrong”?
2. Why does Driver reject subjectivism?
3. In what ways, if any, do moral judgments differ from descriptive ones?
4. Do you suppose that those who believe moral judgments are a matter of
personal preference would say the same about non-moral normative
claims, such as “Susan is a good swimmer”?

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