Title One

FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH

AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Chapter One
FELONIES

A rt. 3 . Definition. — A c t s an d o m i s s i o n s p u n i s h a b l e by
la w ar e f e l o n i e s (delitos).
F e l o n i e s ar e c o m m i t t e d no t onl y b y m e a n s o f de ce i t
bu t als o by m e a n s of faul t (culpa).
T he r e i s d e c e i t w h e n th e ac t i s p e r f o r m e d w it h d e li b e r a t e
i nt e nt ; an d t h e r e i s faul t w h e n th e w r o n g f u l ac t r e s u l t s fro m
i m p r u d e n c e , n e g l i g e n c e , lac k o f f o r e s i g h t , o r lac k o f skill .

Felonies, defined.
Felonies are acts and omissions punishable by the Revised Penal
Code.

Elements of felonies.
The elements of felonies in general are:
That there must be an act or omission.
That the act or omission must be punishable by the Revised
Penal Code.
3. That the act is performed or the omission incurred by
means of dolo or culpa. (People vs. Gonzales, G.R. No.
80762, March 19, 1990, 183 SCRA 309, 324)

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Art. 3 FELONIES

IMPORTANT WOR DS AN D P H R A S E S IN ART. 3 .

Meaning of the word "act."

By act must be understood any bodily movement tending to
produce some effect in the external world, it being unnecessary that
the same be actually produced, as the possibility of its production is
sufficient. (See People vs. Gonzales, supra)
But the act must be one which is defined by the Revised Penal
Code as constituting a felony; or, at least, an overt act of that felony,
that is, an external act which has direct connection with the felony
intended to be committed. (See Art. 6)

Example of felony by performing an act.

A took the watch of B with intent to gain and without the consent
of the latter. The act of taking the watch of B, with intent to gain,
constitutes the crime of theft.

Only external act is punished.

The act must be external, because internal acts are beyond the
sphere of penal law. Hence, a criminal thought or a mere intention,
no matter how immoral or improper it may be, will never constitute
a felony.

Thus, even if A entertains the idea of killing B, as long as he

does not commence the commission of the crime directly by overt act,
A is not criminally liable.

Meaning of the word "o

mission. "
By omission is meant inaction, the failure to perform a positive
duty which one is bound to do. There must be a law requiring the
doing or performance of an act.

Examples of felony by omission:

Anyone who fails to render assistance to any person whom
he finds in an uninhabited place wounded or in danger of
dying, is liable for abandonment of persons in danger. (Art.
275, par. 1)

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 FELONIES Art. 3

An officer entrusted with collection of taxes who voluntarily

fails to issue a receipt as provided by law, is guilty of illegal
exaction. (Art. 213 , par.
3. Every person owing allegiance to the Philippines, without
being a foreigner, and having knowledge of any conspiracy
against the government, who does not disclose and make
known the same to the proper authority, is liable for
misprision of treason. (Art. 116)

It will be noted that in felonies by omission, there is a law re•

quiring a certain act to be performed and the person required to do
the act fails to perform it.

The omission must be punishable by law.

Because there is no law that pu ni sh es a person who does
not report to the authorities the commission of a crime which he
witnessed, the omission to do so is not a felony.

People vs. and Atienza

(56 Phil. 353)

Facts: Martin Atienza was convicted as principal by direct par•

ticipation and Silvestre as accomplice of the crime of arson by
the Court of First Instance.
On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas la Cruz
and his wife, de la Cruz, were gathered together with the
appellants herein after supper, Martin Atienza told said couple to
take their furniture out of the house because he was going to set fire
to it. Upon being asked by Nicolas and Antonia why he wanted to set
fire to the house, he answered that it was the only way he could be
revenged upon the people of Masocol, who, he said, had instigated
the charge of adultery against him and his co-defendant, Romana
Silvestre. As Martin Atienza was at that time armed with a pistol, no
one dared say anything to him, not even Romana Silvestre, who was
about a meter away from her co-defendant. Alarmed at what Martin
Atienza had said, the couple left the house at once to communicate
with the barrio lieutenant, Buenaventura Ania, as to what they had
just heard Martin Atienza say; but they had hardly gone a hundred
arms' length when they heard cries of Fire!" Turning back
they saw their home in flames. The fire destroyed about forty-eight
houses.

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 Art. 3 FELONIES

Romana listened to her co-defendant's threat without raising

a protest, and did not give the alarm when the latter set fire to the
house.
Held: Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere
silence and failure to give the alarm, without evidence of agreement or
conspiracy, is not punishable.
Romana Silvestre was acquitted.

"Punishable by law."
This is the other element of a felony. This is based upon the
maxim, crimen, nulla poena sine that is, there is no
crime where there
is no law punishing it.
The phrase "punished by law" should be understood to mean
"punished by the Revised Penal Code" and not by a special law.
That is to say, the term "felony" means acts and omissions punished
in the Revised Penal Code, to distinguish it from the words
and "offense" which are applied to infractions of the law punished by
special statutes.

Classification of felonies according to the means by which

they are committed.
Art. 3 classifies felonies, according to the means by which
they are committed, into (1) intentional felonies, and (2) culpable
felonies.

Thus, the second paragraph of Art. 3 states that felonies are

committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of
fault (culpa).

Intentional felonies and culpable felonies distinguished.

In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender
is malicious. In the language of Art. 3, the act is performed with
deliberate intent (with malice). The offender, in performing the act
or in incurring the omission, has the intention to cause an injury to
another. In culpable felonies, the act or omission of the offender is
not malicious. The injury caused by the offender to another person is
"unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed
without malice." (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939) As stated in Art. 3, the

36
wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight
or lack of skill.

Felonies committed by means of dolo or with malice.

The word "deceit" in the second paragraph of Art. 3 is not the
proper translation of the word Dolus is equivalent to malice ,
which is the intent to do an injury to another. (I Wharton's Criminal
Law 180)
When the offender, in performing an act or in incurring an
omission, has the intention to do an injury to the person, or
right of another, such offender acts with malice. If the act or omission
is punished by the Revised Penal Code, he is liable for intentional
felony.

Most of the felonies defined and penalized in Book II of the

Revised Penal Code are committed by means of dolo or with malice.
There are few felonies committed by means of fault or culpa. Art.
217 punishes malversation through negligence. Art. 224 punishes
evasion through negligence. Art. 365 punishes acts by imprudence or
negligence, which, had they been intentional, would constitute grave,
less grave or light felonies.
There are crimes which cannot be committed through impru•
dence or negligence, such as, murder, treason, robbery, and malicious
mischief.

Felonies committed by means of fault or culpa.

Between an act performed voluntarily and intentionally, and
another committed unconsciously and quite unintentionally, there
exists another, performed without malice, but at the same time
punishable, though in a lesser degree and with an equal result, an
intermediate act which the Penal Code qualifies as imprudence or
negligence.

A person who caused an injury, without intention to cause

an evil, may be held liable for culpable felony.
The defendant, who was not a medical practitioner, tied a girl,
wrapped her feet with rags saturated with petroleum and thereafter
set them on fire, causing injuries. His defense was that he undertook

37
Art. 3 FELONIES

to render medical assistance in good faith and to the best of his ability
to cure her of ulcer. It was held that while there was no intention to
cause an evil but to provide a remedy, the defendant was liable for
physical injuries through imprudence. (U.S. vs. 12 Phil. 175,
190)

Imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.

Imprudence indicates a deficiency of action. Negligence indicates
a deficiency of perception. If a person fails to take the necessary
precaution to avoid injury to person or damage to property, there is
imprudence. If a person fails to pay proper attention and to use due
diligence in foreseeing the injury or damage impending to be caused,
there is negligence. Negligence usually involves lack of foresight.
Imprudence usually involves lack of skill.

Reason for punishing acts of negligence (culpa).

A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all
his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful and prudent, if not from
instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible
for such results as anyone might foresee and for his acts which no one
would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise,
his own person, rights and property, and those of his fellow beings,
would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury. (U.S. vs.
Maleza, 14 Phil. 468, 470)

In felonies committed by means of dolo or with malice and

in felonies committed by means of fault or culpa, the acts or
omissions are voluntary.
The adjective voluntary used in the old Penal Code is suppressed
in the definition of felonies in Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code. This
omission does not mean that an involuntary act may constitute a
felony. As in the old Penal Code, the act or omission must be voluntary
and punishable by law to constitute a felony. Art. 3 classifies felonies
into intentional felonies, and (2) culpable felonies. An intentional
felony is committed when the act is performed with deliberate intent,
which must necessarily be voluntary.
On the other hand, in culpable felony, which is committed when
the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight
or lack of skill, the act is also voluntary.

38
 FELONIES Art. 3

The only difference between intentional felonies and culpable

felonies is that, in the first, the offender acts with malice; whereas,
in the second, the offender acts without malice.
The definition of reckless imprudence in Art. 365 says "reckless
imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or
failing to do an act from which material damage
Thus, a hunter who seemed to have seen with his lantern
something like the eyes of a deer about fifty meters from him and then
shot it, but much to his surprise, on approaching what he thought
was a deer, it proved to be his companion, performed a voluntary act
in discharging his gun, although the resulting homicide is without
malice, because he did not have the intent to kill the But the
hunter, knowing that he had two companions, should have exercised
all the necessary diligence to avoid every undesirable accident, such
as the one that unfortunately occurred on the person of one of his
companions. The hunter was guilty of the crime of homicide through
reckless imprudence (People vs. Ramirez, 48 Phil. 206)

A criminal act is presumed to be voluntary. Fact prevails over

assumption, and in the absence of indubitable explanation, the act
must be declared voluntary and punishable. (People vs. Macalisang,
22 SCRA 699)

Acts executed negligently are voluntary.

People vs. Lopez
44 O.G. 584)

Facts: Lopez was driving a truck. A girl was crossing the street
during a torrential rain. The girl was struck down by the truck. During
the trial, Lopez claimed that he had no intention of causing injury to
the girl.
Held: Lopez was not accused of intentional homicide, but of
having caused her death by reckless imprudence, which implies lack
of malice and criminal intent. Acts executed negligently are voluntary,
although done without malice or criminal design. In this case, Lopez
was not compelled to refrain or prevented from taking the precaution
necessary to avoid injury to persons.

When there is compulsion or prevention by force or intimidation,

there is no voluntariness in the act.

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 Art. 3 FELONIES

Three reasons why the act or omission in felonies must be

voluntary.
1. The Revised Penal Code continues to be based on the
Classical Theory, according to which the basis of criminal
liability is human free will.
2. Acts or omissions punished by law are always deemed
voluntary, since man is a rational being. One must prove
that his case falls under Art. 12 to show that his act or
omission is not voluntary.
3. In felonies by dolo, the act is performed with deliberate
intent which must necessarily be voluntary; and in felonies
by culpa, the imprudence consists in but
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which
material injury results.

Therefore, in felonies committed by means of dolo, as well as in

those committed by means of culpa, the act performed or the omis•
sion incurred by the offender is voluntary, but the intent or malice
in intentional felonies is replaced by imprudence, negligence, lack
of foresight or lack of skill in culpable felonies.

Requisites of dolo or malice.

In order that an act or may be considered as having
been performed or incurred with deliberate intent, the following
requisites must concur:
(1) He must have FREEDOM while doing an act or
omitting to do an act;
(2) He must have INTELLIGENCE while doing the act
or omitting to do the act;
(3) He must have INTENT while doing the act or omitting
to do the act.
1. Freedom. When a person acts without freedom, he is no longer
a human being but a tool; his liability is as much as that of the
knife that wounds, or of the torch that sets fire, or of the key that
opens a door, or of the ladder that is placed against the wall of
a house in committing robbery.

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 Thus, a person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible
force is exempt from criminal liability. (Art. 12, par. 5)

So also, a person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable

fear of an equal or greater injury is exempt from criminal liability
(Art. 12, par. 6)

2. Intelligence. Without this power, necessary to determine the

morality of human acts, no crime can exist. Thus, the imbecile
or the insane, and the infant under nine years of age as, well as
the minor over nine but less than fifteen years old and acting
without discernment, have no criminal liability, because they
act without intelligence. (Art. 12, pars. 1, 2 and 3)

3. Intent. Intent to commit the act with malice, being purely a

mental process, is presumed and the presumption arises from
the proof of the commission of an unlawful act.
All the three requisites of voluntariness in intentional felony
must be present, because voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and
intentional (U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488, 495)

Intent presupposes the exercise of freedom and the use of

intelligence.
One who acts without freedom necessarily has no intent to do
an injury to another. One who acts without intelligence has no such
intent.
But a person who acts with freedom and with intelligence may
not have the intent to do an injury to another. Thus, a person who
caused an injury by mere accident had freedom and intelligence, but
since he had no fault or intention of causing it, he is not criminally
liable. (Art. 12, par. 4, Revised Penal Code)

The existence of intent is shown by the overt acts of a per•

son.
Where the defendant carried away articles belonging to another
and concealed them from the owner and from the police authorities,
denying having them in his possession, in the absence of a satisfactory
explanation, it may be inferred that he acted with intent of gain.
Intent is a mental state, the existence of which is shown by the overt
acts of a person. (Soriano vs. People, 88 Phil. 368, 374)

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Art. 3 FELONIES

Intent to kill is difficult to prove, it being a mental act. But it

can be deduced from the external acts performed by a person. When
the acts naturally produce a definite result, courts are slow in con•
cluding that some other result was intended. (U.S. vs. Mendoza, 38
Phil. 691-693; People vs. Mabug-at, 51 Phil. 967, cited in People vs.
Lao, 11 C.A. Rep. 829)

Criminal intent is presumed from the commission of an un•

lawful act.

People vs. Sia Teb Ban

(54 Phil. 52, 53)

Facts: The accused took a watch without the owner's consent.

He was prosecuted for theft. The accused alleged as a defense that the
prosecution failed to prove the intent to gain on his part, an element
of the crime of theft.
Held: From the felonious act (taking another's property) of
the accused, freely and deliberately executed, the moral and legal
presumption of a criminal and injurious intent arises conclusively and
indisputably, in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

(See: People vs. Renegado, No. May SCRA

275, 286)
Criminal intent and the will to commit a crime are always
presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which
the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear. (U.S. vs. Apostol,
14 Phil. 92, 93)

But the presumption of criminal intent does not arise the

proof of the commission of an act which is not unlawful.

U.S. vs. Catolico

(18 Phil. 504, 508)

Facts: The accused was a justice of the peace. He rendered

decisions in certain cases, each one for damages resulting from a breach
of contract, from which the defendants appealed. As required by law,
the defendants deposited and a bond for each case.
It appeared that the sureties on the said bonds were insolvent and
that the defendants did not present new bonds within the time fixed

42
 by the accused as justice of the peace. Upon petition of the plaintiffs,
the accused dismissed the appeals and ordered said sums attached and
delivered to the plaintiffs in satisfaction of the judgment. The accused
was prosecuted for malversation (a felony punishable now under Art.
217).
Held: The act of the accused, in permitting the sums deposited
with him to be attached in satisfaction of the judgment rendered by
him, was not unlawful. Everything he did was done in good faith
under the belief that he was acting judiciously and correctly. The
act of a person does not make him a criminal, unless his mind be
criminal.

The maxim is: actus facit nisi mens sit rea — a crime is
not committed if the mind of the person performing to act complained
be innocent. It is true that a presumption of criminal intent may
arise from proof of the commission of a criminal act; and the general
rule is that if it is proved that the accused committed the criminal
act charged, it will be presumed that the act was done with criminal
intention and that it is for the accused to rebut this presumption. But
it must be borne in mind that the act from which such presumption
springs must be a criminal act. In the case at bar, the act was not
criminal.

Where the facts proven are accompanied by other facts which

show that the act complained of was not unlawful, the presumption
of criminal intent does not arise.

There is no felony by dolo if there is no intent.

The presumption of criminal intent from the commission of an
unlawful act may be rebutted by proof of lack of such intent.
Thus, a minor who married without parental consent, in viola•
tion of Art. 475 of the old Penal Code which punished "any minor who
shall contract marriage without the consent of his or her parents,"
was not liable criminally, because she proved that she acted without
malice. The defendant minor testified that she believed that she was
born in 1879; that so her parents gave her to understand ever since
her tenderest age; and that she did not ask them concerning her
age, because they had already given her to so understand since her
childhood. The presumption of malice was rebutted by her testimony.
One cannot be convicted under Article 475 (similar to Art. 350 of the
Revised Penal Code) when by reason of a mistake of fact there does

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Art. 3 FELONIES

not exist the intention to commit the crime. (U.S. vs. 1 Phil.
109)
Also, a person who suddenly got up in his sleep, left the room with
a in his hand, and upon meeting his wife who tried to stop him,
wounded her in the abdomen and attacked others, is not criminally
liable, because his acts were not voluntary, for having acted in a
dream; he had no criminal intent. (People vs. Taneo, 58 Phil. 255)

People vs.
(96 Phil. 566)

Facts: The accused was a military major of La Paz, Abra, in 1944.

He received an order from the regional commander of an infantry,
Philippine Army, operating as a guerrilla unit, to prosecute
for treason and to appoint a jury of 12 bolomen. The jury found
guilty of the charge and the recommendation of the jury was
approved by the Headquarters of the guerrilla unit. For the execution
of Borjal, the accused was prosecuted for murder.
The accused acted upon orders of superior officers which turned
out to be illegal. As a military subordinate, he could not question the
orders of his superior officers. He obeyed the orders in good faith,
without being aware of their illegality, without any fault or negligence
on his part.
Held: Criminal intent was not established. To constitute a
crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be
accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference
to duty or to consequences, as in law, is equivalent to criminal intent.
(U.S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil. 507) The accused was acquitted.

Mistake of fact.
While ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith (ignorantia non excusat), ignorance or mistake of
fact relieves the accused from criminal liability (ignorantia facti

Mistake of fact is a misapprehension of fact on the part of the

person who caused injury to another. He is not, however, criminally
liable, because he did not act with criminal intent.
An honest mistake of fact destroys the presumption of criminal
intent which arises upon the commission of a felonious act. (People

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 FELONIES Art. 3

vs. Coching, et C.A., 52 O.G. 293 , citing People vs. 74 Phil.

257)

Requisites of mistake of fact as a defense:

That the act done would have been lawful had the facts
been as the accused believed them to be.
2. That the intention of the accused in performing the act
should be lawful.

3. That the mistake must be without fault or carelessness on

the part of the accused.

Lack of intent to commit a crime may be inferred from the

facts of the case.
The defendant swore to Civil Service Form No. 1 before a notary
public that he was never accused of a violation of any law before any
court or tribunal, when in truth and in fact he had been charged with
the offense of unjust vexation in a criminal case before the Justice
of the Peace Court. He was prosecuted for the crime of perjury, for
having falsely sworn that he was never accused of any offense. When
he testified in his defense, the defendant claimed that he answered
to the question whether he had been accused of a violation of
any law, because he relied on the opinion of the provincial fiscal that
unjust vexation does not involve moral turpitude and he thought
it was not necessary to mention it in Civil Service Form No. 1. It
appeared that he had been previously prosecuted twice for perjury
for having answered to the same question, and he was acquitted
in one case and the information in the other was dismissed. It was
held that in view of the factual background of the case, the act of the
defendant in answering "No" to the question can be considered only
as an error of judgment and did not indicate an intention to commit
the crime of perjury. The defendant was not liable for the crime of
perjury, because he had no intent to commit the crime. (People vs.
C.A., 70 O.G. 3786)

In mistake of fact, the act done would have been lawful, had
the facts been as the accused believed them to be.
In other words, the act done would not constitute a felony had
the facts been as the accused believed them to be.

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 Art. 3 FELONIES

Thus, in the cases of U.S. vs. and People vs. Beronilla,

supra, the accused in the first case believed that she was already
of age when she contracted marriage and the accused in the second
case believed that the orders of his superior officer were legal. Had
they been the real facts, there would not be any felony committed.
But even if they were not the real facts, since the accused acted in
good faith, they acted without intent. Hence, their acts were invol•
untary.
In mistake of fact, the act done by the accused would have
constituted (1) a justifying circumstance under Art. 11, (2) an abso•
lutory cause, such as that contemplated in Art. 247, par. 2, or (3) an
involuntary act.

U.S. vs. Ah Chong

(15 Phil. 488)

Facts: Ah Chong was a cook in Ft. He was afraid of

bad elements. One evening, before going to bed, he locked himself in
his room by placing a chair against the door. After having gone to
bed, he was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called
out twice, "Who is but received no answer. Fearing that the
intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again,
"If you enter the room I will kill you." But at that precise moment, he
was struck by the chair that had been placed against the door, and
believing that he was being attacked he seized a kitchen knife and
struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his
roommate.

Held: Ah Chong must be acquitted because of mistake of fact.

Had the facts been as Ah Chong believed them to be, he would

have been justified in killing the intruder under Article 11, paragraph
1, of the Revised Penal Code, which requires, to justify the act , tha t
there be —

unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed, (2)

reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself. If the intruder was really a robber, forcing his way into the
room of Ah Chong, there would have been unlawful aggression on the
part of the intruder. There would have been a necessity on the part
of Ah Chong to defend himself and/or his home. The knife would have
been a reasonable means to prevent or repel such aggression. And Ah

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 FELONIES Art. 3

Chong gave no provocation at all. Under Article of the Revised Penal

Code, there is nothing unlawful in the intention as well as in the act
of the person making the defense.

(See: People vs. Mamasalaya, No. Feb. Phil.

639, 654)

People vs. Oanis

(74 Phil. 257)

Facts: Chief of Police Oanis and his co-accused Corporal Galanta

were under instructions to arrest one Balagtas, a notorious criminal and
escaped convict, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive. Proceeding
to the suspected house, they went into a room and on seeing a man
sleeping with his back towards the door, simultaneously fired at him
with their revolvers, without first making any reasonable inquiry as
to his identity. The victim turned out to be an innocent man, Tecson,
and not the wanted criminal.

Held: Both accused are guilty of murder.

Even if it were true that the victim was the notorious criminal,
the accused would not be justified in killing him while the latter was
sleeping.
In apprehending even the most notorious criminal, the law does
not permit the captor to kill him. It is only when the fugitive from
justice is determined to fight the officers of the law who are trying to
capture him that killing him would be justified.

The mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the

part of the accused.
Ah Chong case and Oanis case distinguished.
In the Ah Chong case, there is an innocent mistake of fact
without any fault or carelessness on the part of the accused, because,
having no time or opportunity to make any further inquiry, and being
pressed by circumstances to act immediately, the accused had no
alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared to him, and
such facts justified his act of killing the deceased.
In the Oanis case, the accused found no circumstances whatever
which would press them to immediate action. The person in the room

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Art. 3 FELONIES

being then asleep, the accused had ample time and opportunity to
ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even
effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been
made, as the victim was unarmed. This, indeed, is the only legitimate
course of action for the accused to follow even if the victim was really
Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight, but to
arrest, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression
is offered by him.
Hence, the accused in the Oanis case were at fault when they
shot the victim in violation of the instructions given to them. They
were also careless in not verifying first the identity of the victim.

Lack of intent to kill the deceased, because his intention was

to kill another, does not relieve the accused from criminal
responsibility.
That the accused made a mistake in killing one man instead of
another cannot relieve him from criminal responsibility, he having
acted maliciously and wilfully. (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil. 605)

In mistake of fact, the intention of the accused in performing

the act should be lawful.
in error in personae or mistake in the identity of the victim,
the principle of mistake of fact does not apply.

Example: A wanted to kill B by shooting him with a pistol.

Thinking that the person walking in dark alley was A shot the
person. It turned out that the person killed was C, the brother
of A. A had no intention to kill Since the act and intention
of A in firing his pistol are unlawful, A cannot properly invoke
the principle of mistake of fact in his defense.

No crime of resistance when there is a mistake of fact.

One who resists an arrest, believing that the peace officer is
a bandit, but who submits to the arrest immediately upon being
informed by the peace officer that he is a policeman, is not guilty of
the crime of resistance to an agent of the authorities under Art. 151
of the Revised Penal Code, because of mistake of fact. (See U.S. vs.
Bautista, 31 Phil. 308)

48
 FELONIES Art. 3

When the accused is negligent, mistake of fact is not a de•

fense.

People vs. De Fernando

(49 Phil. 75)

Facts: The accused, a policeman, was informed that three con•

victs had escaped. In the dark, he saw a person going up the stairs of a
house, carrying a and calling for someone inside. The daughter of
the owner of the house was at that time with the accused who fired a
shot in the air. As the unknown person continued to ascend the stairs
and believing that he was one of the escaped convicts, the accused fired
directly at the man who turned out to be the nephew of the owner of
the house.
Held: He is guilty of homicide through reckless negligence. The
victim called for someone in the house. That fact indicated that he was
known to the owner of the house. The accused should have inquired
from the daughter of the owner of the house as to who the unknown
person might be.

The defense of mistake of fact is untenable when the accused is

charged with a culpable felony. In mistake of fact, what is involved
is lack of intent on the part of the accused. In felonies committed
through negligence, there is no intent to consider, as it is replaced
by imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.

Criminal intent is necessary in felonies committed by

means of dolo.
Criminal intent is necessary in felonies committed by means of
dolo because of the legal maxims —
Actus non facit nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not
make a man guilty unless his intention were so."
Actus me invito factus non est actus, "an act done by me
against my will is not my act." (U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 499)

Distinction between general intent and specific intent.

In felonies committed by the third element of voluntari•
ness is a general intent; whereas, in some particular felonies, proof of
particular specific intent is required. Thus, in certain crimes against

49
Art. 3 FELONIES

property, there must be the intent to gain (Art. 293 — robbery; Art.
— theft). Intent to kill is essential in frustrated or attempted
homicide (Art. 6 in relation to Art. 249); in forcible abduction (Art.
342), the specific intent of lewd designs must be proved.

When the accused is charged with intentional felony,

absence of criminal intent is a defense.
In the absence of criminal intent, there is no liability for
intentional felony. All reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate error
and not crime should be indulged in for the benefit of the accused.
(People vs. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48)
If there is only error on the part of the person doing the act,
he does not act with malice, and for that reason he is not criminally
liable for intentional felony.

Criminal intent is replaced by negligence and imprudence in

felonies committed by means of culpa.
In felonies committed by means of culpa, since the doing of or
failing to do an act must also be voluntary, there must be freedom
and intelligence on the part of the offender, but the requisite of
criminal intent, which is required in felonies by dolo, is replaced by
the requisite of imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of
skill.

Such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequence is, in

law, equivalent to criminal intent. (U.S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil. 507)
But in felonies committed by means of culpa, the mind of the
accused is not criminal. However, his act is wrongful, because the injury
or damage caused to the injured party results from the imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill of the accused.
Therefore, in order that the act or omission in felonies committed
by means of fault or culpa may be considered voluntary, the following
requisites must concur:
(1) He must have FREEDOM while doing an act or omitting
to do an act;
(2) He must have INTELLIGENCE while doing the act or
omitting to do the act;

50
 FELONIES Art. 3

(3) is IMPRUDENT, NEGLIGENT or LACKS FORESIGHT or

SKILL while doing the act or omitting to do the act.

In culpable felonies, the injury caused to another should

be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act
performed without malice.
People vs. Guillen
(85 Phil. 307)

Facts: Guillen, testifying in his own behalf, stated that he per•

formed the act voluntarily; that his purpose was to kill the President,
but that it did not make any difference to him if there were some people
around the President when he hurled that bomb, because the killing
of those who surrounded the President was tantamount to killing the
President, in view of the fact that those persons, being loyal to the
President, were identified with the latter. In other words, although it
was not his main intention to kill the persons surrounding the Presi•
dent, he felt no compunction in killing them also in order to attain his
main purpose of killing the President.
Held: The facts do not support the contention of counsel for
appellant that the latter is guilty only of homicide through reckless
imprudence in regard to the death of Simeon Varela and of less serious
physical injuries in regard to Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro
and Maglalang.
In throwing the hand grenade at the President with the inten•
tion of killing him, the appellant acted with malice. He is therefore
liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance
with Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred
by any person committing a felony although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended. In criminal
negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it
being simply the incident of another act performed without malice.
(People vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939) In the words of Viada, "in order that
an act may be qualified as imprudence it is necessary that neither
malice nor intention to cause injury should intervene; where such
intention exists, the act should be qualified by the felony it has
produced even though it may not have been the intention of the
actor to cause an evil of such gravity as that produced." (Viada's
comment on the Penal Code, Vol. 7, 5th p. 7) And, as was held
by this court, deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially
inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. (People vs.
Nanquil, 43 Phil. 232)

51
 Art. 3 FELONIES

Mistake in the identity of the intended victim is not reckless

imprudence.
A deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent
with the idea of reckless imprudence. Where such an unlawful act is
willfully a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot
be considered as reckless imprudence. (People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil.
307, citing People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil. 232, and People vs. Guia, 54
Phil. 605)

A person causing damage or injury to another, without malice

or fault, is not criminally liable under the Revised Penal
Code.
Since felonies are committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or
by means of fault (culpa), if there is neither malice nor negligence
on the part of the person causing damage or injury to another, he is
not criminally liable under the Revised Penal Code.
In such case, he is exempt from criminal liability, because he
causes an injury by mere accident, without fault or intention of
causing it. (Art. 12, par. 4, Revised Penal Code)

Illustration:
Three men, Ramos, Abandia and Catangay, were hunting deer
at night. Ramos carried a lantern fastened to his forehead. Abandia
and Catangay were following him. They saw a deer. Catangay whose
gun was already cocked and aimed at the deer stumbled against
an embankment which lay between him and Ramos. His gun was
accidentally discharged, hitting and killing Ramos. It was held that
Catangay was not criminally liable because he had no criminal intent
and was not negligent. (U.S. vs. Catangay, 28 Phil. 490)

The act performed must be lawful.

In the foregoing illustration, the act of aiming the gun at the
deer while hunting is lawful, it not being prohibited by any law.
But the act of discharging a gun in a public place is unlawful.
(Art. 155, Revised Penal Code) In such case, if a person is injured as
a result of the discharge of the gun, the one discharging it in a public
place is criminally liable for the injury caused.

52
 FELONIES Art. 3

The third class of crimes are those punished by special laws.

There are three classes of crimes. The Revised Penal Code de•
fines and penalizes the first two classes of crimes, (1) the intentional
felonies, and (2) the culpable felonies. The third class of crimes are
those defined and penalized by special laws which include crimes
punished by municipal or city ordinances.

Dolo is not required in crimes punished by special laws.

When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent
to commit the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient that the offender
has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law.
Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act
must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended
to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act
is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. (U.S. vs. Go Chico,
14 Phil. 128)

In the first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal

intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act), it is enough that
the prohibited act is done freely and consciously.

People vs. Bayona

(61 Phil. 181)

Facts: Defendant was driving his automobile on a road in front

of electoral precinct No. 4 in Barrio de Pilar, Capiz. He had
a revolver with him. He was called by his friend, Jose D. Benliro. He
alighted from his automobile and approached him to find out what
he wanted. He did not leave his revolver in the automobile, because
there were many people in the road in front of the polling place and
he might lose it. He was within the fence surrounding the polling
place when Jose E. Desiderio, a representative of the Department
of the Interior, took possession of the revolver defendant was car•
rying.
The Solicitor-General was for his acquittal.
Held: The law which defendant violated is a statutory provision,
and the intent with which he violated is immaterial. It may be conceded
that defendant did not intend to intimidate any elector or to violate
the law in any other way, but when he got out of his automobile and
carried his revolver inside of the fence surrounding the polling place,

53
 Art. 3 FELONIES

he committed the act complained of, and he committed it wilfully. The

Election Law does not require for its violation that the offender has
the intention to intimidate the voters or to interfere otherwise with the
election.

The rule is that in acts mala in there must be a criminal

intent; but in those mala prohibita, it is sufficient if the prohibited
act was intentionally done.
Since the Election Code prohibits and punishes the carrying
of a firearm inside the polling place, and that person did the pro•
hibited act freely and consciously, he had the intent to perpetrate
the act.

No intent to perpetrate the act prohibited.

If a man with a revolver merely passes along a public road on
election day, within fifty meters of a polling place, he does not violate
the provision of the law in question, because he had no intent to
perpetrate the act prohibited, and the same thing would be true of a
peace officer in pursuing a criminal; nor would the prohibition extend
to persons living within fifty meters of a polling place, who merely
clean or handle their firearms within their own residences on election
day, as they would not be carrying firearms within the contemplation
of the law. (People vs. Bayona, supra)

In those crimes punished by special laws, the act alone,

irrespective of its motives, constitutes the offense.

U.S. us. Siy Cong Bieng, et al.

(30 Phil. 577)

Facts: Co Kong, while in charge of appellant's store and acting

as his agent and employee, sold, in the ordinary course of business,
coffee which had been adulterated by the admixture of peanuts and
other extraneous substances.
Question: Whether a conviction under the Pure Food and Drugs
Act (No. 1655 of the Philippine Commission) can be sustained where it
appears that the sale of adulterated food products was made without
guilty knowledge of the fact of adulteration.
Held: While it is true that, as a rule and on principles of abstract
justice, men are not and should not be held criminally responsible for

54
 FELONIES Art. 3

acts committed by them without guilty knowledge and criminal or at

least evil intent, the courts have always recognized the power of the
legislature, on grounds of public policy and compelled by necessity,
"the greater master of things," to forbid in a limited class of cases the
doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without
regard to the intent of the doer.
It is notorious that the adulteration of food products has
grown to proportions so enormous as to menace the health and
safety of the people. Ingenuity keeps pace with greed, and the care•
less and heedless consumers are exposed to increasing perils. To
redress such evils is a plain duty but a difficult task. Experience
has taught the lesson that repressive measures which depend for
their efficiency upon proof of the dealer's knowledge or of his intent
to deceive and defraud are of little use and rarely accomplish their
purposes. Such an emergency may justify legislation which throws
upon the seller the entire responsibility of the purity and sound•
ness of what he sells and compels him to know and to be certain.
(People vs. 106 N.Y., 321, cited in the case of U.S. vs. Go
Chico, 14 Phil. 133)

Reasons why criminal intent is not necessary in crimes made

such by statutory enactment.
The accused was charged with a violation of Section 1 of Act
1696 of the Philippine Commission, which punishes any person who
shall expose to public view any flag, banner, emblem or device used
during the late insurrection in the Philippines. Even if the accused
acted without criminal intent, the lower court convicted him. In
affirming the judgment of conviction of the lower court, the Supreme
Court said —
"The display of a flag or emblem used, particularly within a
recent period, by the enemies of the Government tends to incite
resistance of governmental functions and insurrection against
governmental authority just as effectively if made in the best of
good faith as if made with the most corrupt intent. The display
itself, without the intervention of any other fact, is the evil. It
is quite different from that large class of crimes, made such by
the common law or by in which the effect upon
the public depends upon the corrupt intention of the person
perpetrating the act. If A discharges a loaded gun and kills B,
the interest which society has in the act depends, not upon B's
death, but upon the intention with which A consummated the

55
Art. 3 FELONIES

act. If the gun was discharged intentionally, with the purpose of

accomplishing the death of B, then society has been injured and
its security violated; but if the gun was discharged accidentally
on the part of A, then society, strictly speaking, has no concern
in the matter, even though the death of B results. The reason
for this is that A does not become a danger to society and its
institutions until he becomes a person with a corrupt The
mere discharge of the gun and the death of B do not of themselves
make him so. With those two facts must go the corrupt intent
to kill. In the case at bar, however, the evil to society and to the
Government does not depend upon the state of mind of the one
who displays the banner, but upon the effect which that display
has upon the public mind. In the one case the public is affected
by the intention of the actor; in the other by the act itself." (U.S.
vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 129)

When the doing of an act is prohibited by a special law, it is

considered that the act is injurious to public welfare and the doing
of the prohibited act is the crime itself.

Good faith and absence of criminal intent not valid defenses

in crimes punished by special laws.
It does not matter, for the validity of the conviction of Ongsod,
that he is the owner or borrower, as the proprietary concept of the
possession can have no bearing whatsoever on his guilt, within the
intendment and purview of Republic Act 4 (which amended Section
2692 of the Revised Administrative Code and Commonwealth Act
56). And it is now beyond question that mere unlicensed possession
is sufficient to sustain a conviction of illegal possession of firearms,
regardless of the intent of the unlicensed holder, since the offense
is malum prohibitum punished by special law, and good faith and
absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses. (People vs. Orquijo,
[C.A.] 60 O.G. 836)

(See: Lacson, Jr. vs. Posadas, Matter No. 74-MJ, July 30,
1976, 72 SCRA 168, 171)

Exceptions:
1. Several PC soldiers went to the house of the defendant
and asked him if he had in his possession any unlicensed

56
 FELONIES Art. 3

firearm. The defendant readily answered that he had one

but that said unlicensed firearm was in his possession prior
to his turning it over to the Mayor of in connection
with the drive of the government in the collection of loose
firearms. Defendant told the PC soldiers that he bought
the firearm from a stranger with the purpose of selling it to
the PC who were paying for loose firearms. He even showed
to the PC soldiers a letter of the town mayor authorizing
him to collect loose firearms in his barrio.

Held: To implement the policy of the government on

loose firearms, it is imperative that the persons collecting
and surrendering loose firearms should have temporary
and incidental possession thereof, for how can one collect
and deliver without temporarily laying his hands on
the firearms? It is for this reason that we believe that
the doctrine of the immateriality of animus possidendi
should be relaxed in a certain way. Otherwise, the avowed
purpose of the government's policy cannot be realized. Of
course, it would be a different story if it is shown that the
possessor has held on to the firearm for an undue length
of time when he had all the chances to surrender it to the
proper authorities. (People vs. Landicho, [C.A.] 55 O.G.
842)

2. When neither of the accused had ever intended to commit

the offense of illegal possession of firearms (U.S. vs.
Samson, 16 Phil. 323); when both believed in good faith
that as civilian guards under Councilor Asa, an MIS agent
and a superior officer in the Civilian Guard Organization,
and under the circumstances and facts of this case, they
cannot be held liable for the offense charged because they
never had any intent of violating the law. (People vs. Asa
and Balbastro, [C.A.] 50 O.G. 5853, citing 68 Corpus Juris
39)
Where the accused had a pending application for permanent
permit to possess a firearm, and whose possession was not
unknown to an agent of the law who advised the former to
keep it in the meantime, any doubt as to his claim should
be resolved in his favor. (People vs. Mallari, 55 O.G.
1394)

5
Art. 3 FELONIES

Where appellant was duly appointed as civilian confidential

agent entrusted with a mission to make surveillance and
effect the killing or capture of a wanted person, and was
authorized to carry a revolver to carry out his mission, he
is not criminally liable for illegal possession of firearms.
(People vs. Lucero, 103 Phil. 500)

Note: In th ese cases, the accused had no license to

possess the firearms, but in view of the facts and
circumstances, the absence of intent to violate the
law was considered in favor of the accused.

Mala in se and mala prohibita, distinguished.

There is a distinction between crimes which are mala in se, or
wrongful from their nature, such as theft, rape, homicide, etc., and
those that are mala prohibita, or wrong merely because prohibited
by statute, such as illegal possession of firearms.
Crimes mala in se are those so serious in their effects on society
as to call for almost unanimous condemnation of its members; while
crimes mala prohibita are violations of mere rules of convenience
designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society.
Law Dictionary, Rawle's 3rd Revision)

(1) In acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in those mala
prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated?
(People vs. 106 N.Y., 321 , cited in the case of U.S.
vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 132)
Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited
for reasons of public policy, as in illegal possession of (People
vs. Conosa, C.A., 45 O.G. 3953)
(2) The term mala in se refers generally to felonies and
penalized by the Revised Penal Code. When the acts are
inherently immoral, they are mala in se, even if punished
by special laws. On the other hand, there are crimes in
the Revised Penal Code which were originally defined and
penalized by special laws. Among them are possession and
use of opium, malversation, brigandage, and libel.
The term mala prohibita refers generally to acts made criminal
by special laws.

5
 FELONIES Art. 3

When the acts are inherently immoral, they are mala in se,
even if punished under special law.
People vs. Sunico, et al.
50 O.G. 5880)

Facts: The accused were election inspectors and poll clerks whose
duty among others was to transfer the names of excess voters in other
precincts to the list of a newly created precinct. Several voters were
omitted in the list. Because their names were not in the list, some of
them were not allowed to vote. The accused were prosecuted for viola•
tion of 101 and 103 of the Revised Election Code. The accused
claimed that they made the omission in good faith.
The trial court seemed to believe that notwithstanding the fact
that the accused committed in good faith the serious offense charged, the
latter are criminally responsible therefor, because such offense is malum
prohibitum, and, consequently, the act constituting the same need not
be committed with malice or criminal intent to be punishable.
Held: The acts of the accused cannot be merely mala prohibita
— they are mala per se. The omission or failure to include a voter's name
in the registry list of voters is not only wrong because it is prohibited;
it is wrong per se because it disenfranchises a voter and violates one of
his fundamental rights. Hence, for such act to be punishable, it must
be shown that it has been committed with malice. There is no clear
showing in the instant case that the accused intentionally, willfully and
maliciously omitted or failed to include in the registry list of voters the
names of those voters. They cannot be punished criminally.

The Revised Election Code, as far as its penal provisions are

concerned, is a special it being not a part of the Revised Penal
Code or its amendments.

Intent distinguished from motive.

Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a
definite result. Intent is the purpose to use a particular means to
effect such result.
Motive is not an essential element of a crime, and, hence, need
not be proved for purposes of conviction. (People vs. Aposaga, No. L-
32477, Oct. 30, 1981, 108 SCRA 574, 595)
An extreme moral perversion may lead a man to commit a crime
without a real motive but just for the sake of committing it. Or, the

5
 Art. 3 FELONIES

apparent lack of a motive for committing a criminal act does not

necessarily mean that there is none, but that simply it is not known
to us, for we cannot probe into the depths of one's conscience where
it may be found, hidden away and inaccessible to our observation.
(People vs. Taneo, 58 Phil. 255, 256)
One may be convicted of a crime whether his motive appears to
be good or bad or even though no motive is proven. A good motive does
not prevent an act from being a crime. In mercy killing, the painless
killing of a patient who has no chance of recovery, the motive may
be good, but it is nevertheless punished by law.

Motive, when relevant and when need not be established.

Where the identity of a person accused of having committed a
crime is in dispute, the motive that may have impelled its commission
is very relevant. (People vs. Murray, 105 Phil. 591, 598; People vs.
Feliciano, No. L-30307, Aug. 15, 1974, 58 SCRA 383, 393)
Generally, proof of motive is not necessary to pin a crime on
the accused if the commission of the crime has been proven and the
evidence of identification is convincing. (People vs. No. L-
32276, Sept. 12, 1974, 59 SCRA 136, 160)
Motive is essential only when there is doubt as to the identity of
the assailant. It is immaterial when the accused has been positively
identified. (People vs. Gadiana, G.R. No. 92509, March
SCRA 214-215; People vs. Mandapat, G.R. No. 76953, April 22,
1991, 196 SCRA 157, 165)
Where the defendant admits the killing, it is no longer necessary
to inquire into his motive for doing the act. (People vs. G.R.
No. June 30, 1959)
Motive is important in ascertaining the truth between two
antagonistic theories or versions of the killing. (People vs. Boholst-
Caballero, No. L-23249, Nov. 61 SCRA People vs.
G.R. No. 86454, Oct. 18, 1990, 190 SCRA 706, 714-715; People
vs. Tabije, No. L-36099, 113 SCRA 191, 197)

Where the identification of the accused proceeds from an

unreliable source and the testimony is inconclusive and not free
from doubt, evidence of motive is necessary. (People vs. Beltran, No.
Nov. 29, 1974, 61 SCRA 246, 254-255)

6
 FELONIES Art. 3

Where there are no ey ew i t n e ss es to the crime, and where

suspicion is likely to fall upon a number of persons, motive is relevant
and significant. (People vs. Melgar, No. L-75268, Jan. 29, 1988, 157
SCRA 718, 725)
If the evidence is merely proof of motive is
essential. (People vs. No. L-37483, June SCRA

Proof of motive is not indispensable where guilt is otherwise

established by sufficient evidence. (People vs. 107 Phil. 44, 49)
While the question of motive is important to the person who
committed the criminal act, yet when there is no longer any doubt
that the defendant was the culprit, it becomes unimportant to know
the exact reason or purpose for the commission of the crime. (People
vs. Feliciano, No. L-30307, Aug. 15, 1974, 58 SCRA 383, 393)

How motive is proved.

Generally, the motive is established by the testimony of wit•
nesses on the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately
after the commission of the offense. Such deeds or words may indicate
the motive. vs. Fernandez, 82 Phil. 642, 649)

Motive proved by the evidence.

Appellant stabbed the deceased. It was established that there
were two suffocating smokes noticed during the progress of the re•
ligious service of the Iglesia ni which made appellant to go
around. Certainly, the those smokes, presumably by non-
members, which disturbed and interrupted the service, particularly
at the time when the Minister was preaching, is enough motive for
any member of the sect to be offended thereby, particularly appellant
who was a member of some importance. (People vs. Ramirez, 104 Phil.
720, 726)

Disclosure of the motive is an aid in completing the proof of

the commission of the crime.
Thus, the fact that the accused had been losing in their business
operations indicated the motive and therefore the intent to commit
arson for the purpose of collecting the insurance on their stock of
merchandise. (U.S. vs. Go Foo Suy, 25 Phil. 187, 204)

6
 Art. 3 FELONIES

But proof of motive alone is not sufficient to support a

con•
viction.
The existence of a motive, though perhaps an important consideration, is not sufficient
proof of guilt. (People vs. Marcos, 70 Phil. 468; People vs. Martinez y 106 Phil. 597)
Mere proof of motive, no matter how strong, is not sufficient to support a conviction if there
is no reliable evidence from which it may be reasonably deduced that
the accused was the malefactor. (People vs. 107 Phil. 188, 194)

Even a strong motive to commit the crime cannot take the place of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, sufficient to overthrow the presumption of innocence. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt is the mainstay of our accusatorial system of criminal justice. (People vs.
No. L-32886, Oct. 23 , 1981, 108 SCRA 211 , 226)

Lack of motive may be an aid in showing the innocence of the accused.

In a case, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant acted while in a dream and
his acts, with which he was charged, were not voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal
liability.
Under the special circumstances of the case, in which the victim was the defendant's own
wife whom he dearly loved, and taking into consideration the fact that the defendant tried to
attack also his father, in whose house and under whose protection he lived, besides attacking
Tanner and Malinao, his guests, whom he himself invited as may be inferred from the evidence
presented, we find not only lack of motives for the defendant to voluntarily commit the acts
complained of, but also motives for not committing said acts. (People vs. Taneo, 58 Phil.
255, 257)
Lack of motive to kill the deceased has been held as further basis for acquitting the
accused, where the lone testimony of the prosecution witness is contrary to common
experience and, therefore, incredible. (People vs. Padirayon, No. L-39207, Sept. 25, 1975,
67
SCRA 135)