“G” Jumper Cut

Cause of Failure
1. Due to excess stress.
2. Heat generated on PG clamps.

Non - Overlapping Zone Thermal imager in

heat format
Action Plan
1. Foot patrolling staff had to check “G”- Jumper for stress usually. PG
clamp provided to connect 'G' jumper with conductors should be in
same axis.
2. “G”- Jumper should be of length 4m.
3. All PG Clamps should be opened during AOH. The condition of
strands to be checked for any strands cut. Even for a single strands cut,
the 'G'- Jumper and Clamp to be replaced. The practice of attending
even a single strands cut by binding wire to be strictly avoided.
4. “G”- Jumper at Turnout location in non-overlapping zone to be
transferred to lapping zone.
5. Thermal imager of PG Clamp to be taken and all the PG Clamps
temperatures should be numerically seen in heat format and recorded.
If temperature is high condition inside of PG clamp and tightness of PG
clamps to be checked.
6. In first feeding sector of TSS or in heavily loaded section, 160 Sq.mm
'G'- Jumpers may be provided with PG clamp 1031-3. Utmost care may
be taken that only 1031-3 PG Clamp is used for 160Sq.mm jumper wire.
Melting of Along Track Feeder Wire at Bi-Metallic Strip

Cause of Failure
1. Bus-bar connector bolt not having proper tightness.
2. Bimetallic strip/ Bus-bar connector surface worn out.
3. Heat generated on Bimetallic strip/Connector.

Bimetallic strip melted Bus-bar connector

near by bolt melted nearby bolt

Action Plan
1. As a onetime measure, all bimetallic strips in PSI connectors are to be
checked by opening connectors and defective strips are to be replaced.
2. Thermal imaging should be done every 3 months. Thermal imager
checking is to be done during loaded condition/night time. Thermal
images are to be stored for comparing the temperatures during
subsequent checking. Registers with standard format as per RDSO SMI
no.TI/MI/0055 shall be maintained and all checking shall be recorded.
3. Immediately after every feed extension, switching station
connectors/clamps shall be checked by thermal imager.
4. 800 Amps isolators shall be replaced by 1250 Amps isolators.
5. Short length Aluminum Feeder wires shall be replaced with 150SQMM
Copper wire to reduce the use of bi-metallic connector
 Large span wire ending clamp slipping

Cause of Failure
Feeder Ending Clamp 150 Sq.mm provided in place of Large
Span Wire Ending Clamp 130 Sq.mm

Large span wire ending clamp slipping Bus-bar connector

melted nearby bolt

Action Plan
1. Color coding done to prevent mixing of parts and subsequent slipping
out of large span wire from ending cone

S.No. Ending Clamp Roll No. Colour Drawing No.

1. Feeder Ending Clamp 150 Sq.mm
a) Feeder Ending Clamp Body. 1131
1104 White ETI/OHE/P/1730
b) Feeder Joint Cone.
1102
c) Feeder Joint Socket.

2. Large Span Wire E/C/130 Sq.mm

a) Feeder Ending Clamp Body 1131
b) LSW Joint Cone 1143 Red ETI/OHE/P/1143
1102
c) Feeder Joint Socket
3. Steel Wire Joint Clamp:
a) Feeder Ending Clamp Body 1131
1362 Green ETI/OHE/P/1362
b) Steel Wire Joint Cone
1361
c) Steel wire Joint Socket

2. Large span wire from ending clamp checked during RE/Construction

work for correctness.
 Dead portion of Large span wire under FOB/ROB

Cause of Failure
At NMKL station, live OOR (large span wire) was available under
ROB between locations 52/7-8. Though there was sufficient clearance,
there was a case of tripping due to bird sitting on the large span wire.

failure location cut-in insulator was provided in the OOR

(LS wire) before ROB
Hence cut-in insulator in the OOR (LS wire) was shifted before ROB,
so that the OOR wire under the bridge remains earthed.

Action Plan
1. Study the possibility of putting Cut in insulator before ROB, so that the
OOR wire under the bridge remains earthed.
2. Sufficient clearance to LIVE OHE and earthed LS wire shall be
ensured.
3. FOB/ROB wise Large Span wire availability of cut-in insulator before
FOB/ROB advised to division HQrs.
 Bird fault
Cause of Failure
On 22.02.2021, CB 145 at SRR TSS tripped at 10.19 hrs and again
tripped and locked out at 10.20 hrs and testing charging holding ok.
SM/SRR reported wire hanging on Rd.5, imposed power block on all
roads at SRR at 10.23 hrs. Catenary Wire flashed & slipped from splice
due to external fault. and OHE hanging at location 578/26 Catenary
splicing completed at 14.00hrs.
On analysis of parted tip portion of catenary strands cut, it indicates
flash mark on tip of some strands nearby splice portion. Out of 19 strands,
7 strands inside the centre cone of splice completely came out from splice
and out of twelve strands, eight snapped strands only available in outer
portion of splice. Whereas in snapped portion of catenary wire side, 7
strands only available on outer portion side. It indicates outer portion 4
strands were already parted and missed.
From the above tripping records of CB 145 at SRR, it has oncluded
that, the failure location falls in bird prone area and the catenary wire
slipped from splice due to external fault between roof of any rolling
stocks in that SRR station area.

failure location bird scare on OHE installation

Action Plan
1. To avoid bird fault in future, all divisions shall clearly identify the bird
prone area, all kinds of bird scare on OHE installation as per RDSO
MI/TI/0050, Sep/2017 and SMI No. MI/TI/0059, Dt.16.9.2019.
2. To avoid OHE parting, reason for each tripping shall be identified and
same shall be attended accordingly.
3. Special drive is being launched to remove crow nests
4. Provision of nylon mesh and Saddle in suspension clamp will be
ensured at critical yards/station areas

Excess Splices in Catenary

Cause of Failure
In IGU-PTJ bypass line, from 475km – 483km 17 Nos. of catenary
splice has been provided due to 2 to 3 catenary strands cut caused by
pollution. Between 477km & 478km in which 5 locations were spliced
and 6 splices yet to be provided and 483km-484km 4 locations were
spliced and 3 splices yet to be provided.

Action Plan
1. It is proposed to apply 2-Toil on catenary wire as done in MAS division.
2. It is proposed to replace catenary wire which is having more no. of
splices in IGU-PTJ bypass line.
 Contact wire parting at RRA

Cause of Failure
On 25.09.2021 at DOC Station, NR/Ambala division, Contact wire
parted from RRA clamp. Even though Modified RRA clamp was
provided. Parting may be due to sharp angle termination.
On 15.04.2020 at AVD Contact wire snapped at RRA clamp. OOR
OHE is crossover between up and down fast lines with track separation of
4.86m.(5.143° as against normal 3°). Contact wire got necking at the edge
of RRA clamp and snapped. 50% old crack noticed. Suspected the angle
of deviation is more which caused crack in contact wire and snapping.

Action Plan
1. As per RDSO SMI no.0034, condition of contact wire is to be checked
for cracks/damages and RRA clamp to be checked for sharp
edges/defect with the help of magnifying glass.
2. Modified RRA clamps with rounded edges only to be used.
3. Normal angle of deviation in RRA clamp is 3°. In such cross over
locations, this will be more and causing stress on contact wire.
4. Such locations to be identified and suitable modification to be done to
reduce the stress
5. During AOH RRA clamp at sharp angle termination release and see
with the help of magnifying glass for any crack.
 Double strap in Cut-in-insulator

Cause of Failure
9-T insulator failure due to non-provision of double strap. Insulator
broken Due to excess tension on 9-T insulator due to non-provision of
double strap.

without double strap with double strap

Action Plan
1. As a onetime measure, survey has taken and found that 35 locations in
OHE/PTJ jurisdiction needs double strap to be provided at cut-in-
insulator.
2. Dy.CEE/RE/PGT has been advised to ensure provision of double strap
between compensating plate and 9-Tonne insulator to prevent such
failures (in the PTJ-POY and SA-VRI electrification works)

USFD of nicco make contact wire

Cause of Failure
NICCO make Grooved Copper Contact provided between JTJ-PTJ at
the time of RE work during 1991. To make Grooved Copper Contact wire
of 1.6 km length, number of joints are permitted as per specification of
conductor. These joints are made by silver brazing process.
Therefore, condition monitoring of these silver brazing joints is
necessary to avoid sudden catastrophic failure of wires. The most
common technique for condition monitoring is Ultrasonic Scanning.
 An Ultrasonic flaw detector was used for ultrasonic scanning of GCC
wire. The equipment has frequency band range of – 0.5 to 15MHz. Gate
monitor for monitoring of echoes in specific area of interest and distances
amplitude correction facility exists in this instrument for bringing all
echoes at same height from different distances.

Arrangement for Indication % FSH

ultrasonic scanning Dent mark observed respect to RSL-60%

UT scanning of 10.3 km of overhead line was carried out and 13

indications were recorded. The locations of these brazed joints/defect
indications were marked with red paint and splice provided.

S.No. Section UP/DN Location Indication Action taken

From To % FSH
1 333/16 333/18 30%
2 337/10 337/12 60%
3 SA-VRPD DN 337/12 337/14 60%
4 334/22 334/24 60%
5 335/19 335/21 80%
Splice provided
6 VRPD-SA UP 334/21 334/23 80-90%
7 335/23 335/25 60%
8 UKL-TUP DN 436/24 436/26 70-80%
9 TUP-UKL UP 437/17 437/19 70%
10 437/24 437/22 65%
UKL-TUP DN
11 437/22 437/20 45%
 Bond cut due to rust

Cause of Failure
On 03.10.2021, there was a case of asset failure logged on OHE due to
continuity (longitudinal) bond broken and shorted with signal rail at
170/26-28 in SXR station in VM-CUPJ section. It has resulted in Point
No.50BT track down after passing of T.No. 06179(MS-MQ) Spl at SXR
@ 00:53hrs. Consequently, trains have been received by calling on
signal, four trains got detained. The failure was restored at 02:45 Hrs
The bond circuit drawing and photograph of failed bond is clearly
showing that the bond has broken due to corrosion. The above VM-CUPJ
section was commissioned during MAR-2019 further, after two & a half
years painting of bond has not been done at this location. The root cause is
breakage bond due to corrosion

Bond broken and shorted with signal rail

Action Plan
1. At any situation no bond shall be provided without painting.
2. At the time of receiving new MS flat at depots, two coats painting with
Red oxide to be done.
3. Again, after providing the bond the bend portion where paints got
peeled should be touched upon again. Paints got peeled during
fabrication work should be touched upon again and then only bond has
to be provided.
4. Bonds should never be painted after providing, in position or in site.
 MEGAWIN CB/BM Failure

Cause of Failure
On 13.06.2021 at BZA Division B-346 at Madhuranagar SSP is
tripping intermittently from 05.03hrs due to CB-346 not closing (low Dc
supply), OHE section between BZA VNC to NDM/SP is in dead
condition. TPC Planned to close SM-1736(N/O) at VNC to feed
alternate supply between BZA VNC- NDM/SP. Section from E/S 34602
towards NDM SP is in dead condition due to CB-346 tripping (due to DC
voltage Low) while passing 07212 Express via IOL connecting E/S 68
and 34602 at 05.30hrs.
During this time, contact wire cut-in insulator has broken may be due
to potential difference across cut-in insulator (connecting E/S-68(Live)
to E/S 34602(dead)) at metal cap portion. Due to MEGAWIN CBs and
BMs, battery sets are frequently getting drained and DC Voltage Low
problem is coming frequently. Due to this, Remote control is also failing.

Action Plan
1. Measure total load current of SP/SSP at Battery terminals.
2. Set Battery charger current above load current of SP/SSP.
3. Monitor battery charger current/Load current every week at least 3
months to stabilize the Battery charger current setting
 MEGAWIN CB/BM Failure

On 06.06.2021, IGR/TSS LVCB-126 tripped due to capacitor bank

LA (LA-130B) failed (bursted). Even though capacitor bank OCR
operated during the LA failure, capacitor bank circuit breaker CB-130B
(M/s MEGAWIN make) did not trip due to control card defect and hence
LVCB-126 tripped which caused interruption of 25kV supply to OHE
between TPM/SP to TUP/SP.
1. Capacitor Failures
i) CLOSING CAPACITOR FAILED – CB NOT CLOSING, Partial
closing
ii) T R I P P I N G C A P A C I T O R F A I L E D – C B N O T
OPENING/TRIPPING, Partial closing
iii) ONE TRIPPING CAPACITOR FAILED – CB TRIPPING ONLY
FOR ALTERNATE PULSE.
(There are two capacitors for tripping. One capacitor is used for first
tripping pulse and second on will be for next pulse. As each capacitor is
used for alternate tripping, we may not observe failure of one unit. Once
tripping command is initiated by relay this will make CB operated only if
that particular capacitor is good, this tripping pulse will not be send to
second capacitor. When we are doing operation manually we will release
switch and give command again and CB will operate for second pulse.)

Instructions to be followed
2. Special checking by battery fortnightly maintenance staff:
Two Operations of CB/BM to be done F/N or Monthly along with
battery maintenance by TPC and ensure that opening in single
pulse. Record this in battery maintenance format.
3. Along with Maintenance:
Measure capacitor Voltage with MCB ON.
sMeasure capacitor Voltage with MCB OFF – Voltage should
decrease slowly likely to be in steps of 0.1V. If the voltage drops in
a short span of time, then plan to change the capacitor.
sMeasure capacitor voltage while operating and compare with
previous values.
sMeasure capacitance of each capacitor.
4. Loose connections in Auxiliary switch:
CB/BM Not operating/ indication not working
sVisual checking F/N.
sTightness checking along with maintenance.
5. Connecting rod with Auxiliary switch broken:
CB Not operating or partial closing, complementary status in RCC
sVisual checking F/N
6. Control unit Failure:
CB Not operating
sCheck indications on control unit F/N.
7. Automatic operation not proper:
sMaintain DC voltage less than 120 V, mention the voltage in check
sheet.
 Guy rod Failure

Cause of Failure
KZT/SSP IOL got misaligned due to breaking of ATD guy rod on
dwarf mast at loc.259/26. As a result Rear Pantograph of WAP 7-37179
loco of 06606 (NCJ-MAQ Spl.) entangled and damaged OHE.
The root cause of Failure is standard guy rod for dwarf mast is not used
and long guy rod cut and threaded, which has caused accelerated rusting.
The heavy rusting at thread under the nut and resultant eating away of
metal has resulted in breaking of guy rod which was attached to dwarf
mast.

Photographs of failed ATD guy rod for dwarf mast

Action Plan
Foot patrolling Techinician should point out the Rust/Defect threaded
portion in 4th point (Anchor: Guyrod anchor loop covered with Mud/Any
other) of foot patrolling report. Depot incharge should personally check the
Rust/Defect threaded portion of Guyrod/Anchor loop.
Short Term Action
All locations where rusting is seen during foot patrol in the threaded
portion should not be ignored and as an immediate measure the complete
threaded portion of the guy rod should be checked after releasing the load
from the guy rod by suitable arrangement. Corrosion preventive measures
like applying zinc chromate and aluminium paint or using cold galvanising
spray etc. should be adopted. Target time within 7 days of noticing the defect
or earlier.
Long Term Action
1. All non standard guy rods should be replaced by standard guy rod.
PDC 6 months.
The use of NON Standard Guy rod (Using Cut Guy rods with new
threading to adjust the length) should be avoided as far as possible.
Normal Guy Rod for conventional OHE
9.30 mtr for ACA
9.70 mtr for FTA & BWA
Short Guy Rod for DMA
5.35 mtr for ACA,FTA & BWA
It came to notice the such Non standard Guy Rods were used in some
locations were non standard setting distance for Anchor Block/Dwarf Mast
was used. Hence in New/Modification works the Setting distance should be
as per RDSO Drawings.

Anchor loop immersed in soil

 Earthing bond uprooted

Cause of Failure
On 10.09.2019, at MCRD where a structure bond hit the footboard of
56100 passenger train.
On 11.10.19 at about 20.15hrs, SM/AMPA (Ambalappuzha) reported
that Train No: 16316, while passing AMPA Road-2 heard unusual sound
from S9 coach. SSE/C&W attended at ALLP and found DV releasing
handle of S9 coach bent. SM/AMPA found OHE bond were displaced and
hitting the train. (TVC Division)

structure bond not provided in side Cleeting & Standard

concrete and plastering drawing

Action Plan
1. Cleeting of bonds at Platform area to be done
2. Bonds on platform to be Buried inside concrete and plastered.
3. Ensure not infringing with SOD.
4. Ensure no part of bond projected above platform level
 Composite insulator failure

Cause of Failure
1. Composite insulator flash.
2. Composite insulator disk damaged/Punctured.

Action Plan
1. Composite Insulator shall be cleaned with DRY SOFT COTTON
CLOTH to remove the dust/pollution from the insulator(water shall not
be used). The word smooth cloth is deliberately used as it should not
damage petticoat of insulator.
2. No water, detergents, any solvents and abrasive materials should be
used for cleaning as use of such material leads to deterioration of
electrical properties thus causing failure.
3. The purpose of cleaning of Composite insulator is only removal of
dust/pollutants or any other deposition that adversely affects the
electrical properties of Composite Insulators, hence care should be
taken that during dry cleaning, the insulator should not be rubbed
excessively to make it bright.
(RDSO Instruction no. Tl/lN/0040 Rev.0)
4. Composite insulator shall be provided only as per RB policy with prior
approval of PCEE (RB letter no. 2002/EEM/161/21/Vol-II dated
30.09.2020).
5. Do not climb/stand on composite insulator at any cause (for example
for cleaning stay insulator,staff climbing on bracket insulator should be
avoided).
6. During AOH/IOH, make& batch of all the insulators shall be noted
(whether porcelain or composite) and the same shall be updated in the
records at OHE depot. There are many errors of insulator make & batch
in records available at OHE depotsand it should be corrected during
AOH/IOH.
7. New composite insulators shall be checked thoroughly for any damage.
Tensile load testing of insulators as per SMI is essential before
installation. (RDSO SMI no.TI/MI/0042(12/2008) Rev '0').
8. Guidelines given in the RDSO Instruction no. Tl/lN/0013 Rev.0 shall
be followed for 'Receiving, Storing, Handling and Installation of new
composite insulators'.
9. Foot patrolling OHE staff shall carry Binocular without fail to check for
any flash/ tracking/damages of composite insulator in the section and
the FP staff should endorse the condition of composite insulator in FP
proforma.
10. Any symptom of damage like petticoat broken, holes for water seepage,
electrical creepage, hot burns spots, discoloration spots, or any unusual
identified during AOH (or) foot patrolling, then immediate replacement
is necessitated.
 Monkey Manace

Cause of Failure
1. Insulator flash due monkey claimed OHE/Mast and touching OHE.
Action Plan
1. Identified LCR station area is monkey prone location.
2. Arrangement will be provided on identified Monkey Prone
Locations/Sections approved by PCEE.
3. Monkey Anti-climbing device to be proved at monkey prone area.
 ACC wire replacement work- Proper tension in
ACC wire to be ensured

Cause of Failure
There was a panto entanglement happened at SECR on 26.05.2020
due to excess sag in ACC wire. Failure analysis revealed that the excess
sag in the ACC wire after replacement work was not noticed by the site in
charge of the work thereby caused an OHE breakdown (Panto
entanglement). This failure is caused due to poor workmanship and poor
supervision at site.

Action Plan
1. ACC wire replacement work in TRD/SA division shall be properly
carried out under proper supervision of TRD Supervisor/staff at site to
avoid such panto entanglement.
2. SSE/OHE shall personally ensure the proper tension in the ACC wire
after replacement work and also ensure no excess sag is available in the
ACC wire.
3. The position of counter weights of either end ATDs shall also be
checked prior to & after ACC wire replacement work and it should be
ensured that both counter weight positions do not change after ACC
wire replacement work.
 Silica gel in the breathers of Aux.Transformers (AT)

Cause of Failure
Silica gel breather is an important element in any transformer which
prevents moisture (water) entry in to transformer. The purpose of these
silica gel breathers is to absorb the moisture in the air sucked in by the
transformer during the breathing process.
Silica gel in the breather will be blue when installed and they turn to
pink colour when they absorb moisture which indicates the crystals
should be replaced. Silica gel after colour changed to Pink, will not
absorb the moisture in the air going inside the transformer and thereby
giving way to moisture entry in to transformer which will reduce the oil
BDV & Winding IR value.
It is observed that the checking/monitoring of the condition of Silica
gel in the Breathers of Auxiliary Transformers (AT) in the our TRD
system is not properly done, resulting in silica gel in some ATs remains in
Pink colour (saturated condition) till next AT maintenance schedule
Action Plan
1. Whenever PSI staff going for fortnightly maintenance of batteries at
SSP&SP, they should check the condition of Silica gel in the Breathers
of Signal AT available in that station (also SSP/SP AT) and shall report
the details to the PSI depot in-charge for attention.
2. AT locations which are not covered by PSI staff as above (Ex: IBS
signal AT, LC gate AT, etc.,) shall be checked by PSI depot supervisors
once in a month.
3. All OHE staff should be counseled by OHE supervisors to check the
condition of Silica gland oil leakage in the ATs in the section while
doing foot patrolling and the remarks shall be entered in the foot
patrolling report. OHE supervisors shall convey these remarks to PSI
supervisors for attention.
4. Foot plating TRD officials (OHE&PSI) shall observe the condition of
Silica gel in the ATs in the section and the remarks shall be reported to
concerned PSI supervisor for attention.

M/s GALLAND make PTFE neutral section

Cause of Failure
On 27-10-2020, while doing maintenance of M/s GALLAND make
PTFE neutral section at VNGL/SP,“Composite runner & bracket
assembly” broken condition wasnoticed. This PTFE neutral section at
VNGL/SPwas erected &commissioned by RE on Jan'2019.
PTFE neutral section at VNGL/SP was jointly inspected with M/s
GALLAND's engineer on 03.11.20 and as per the GALAND Engineer,
the cause of the above was“due to incorrect erection & installation
because of that during passing of pantos, the shoe given up”.
Action Plan
1. Maintenance of 'M/s GALLAND make Short neutral section
assemblies (PTFE NS)' should be carried out periodically once in 3
months without fail.
2. During the maintenance of M/s GALLAND make PTFE NS,
“Maintenance and inspection guidelines” provided by OEM instruction
manual (JG1759 and JG3000)should be followed properly.
3. During maintenance, insulators of the PTFE NS are to be cleaned with
soap water and then with plain water.
4. Erection Jig shall be used during erection / any replacement of spares of
PTFE NS.
5. Additional points furnished below shall also be noted during the
maintenance of M/s GALLAND make NS.

Safety locking ring shall be free

from stress. In place of SS rings
copper wires shall not be used.

Maximal admissible wear is 5

mm. So as soon as the thickness
of the runner is 3 mm they must
be replaced

If one shoe is to be replaced due to

wear or any other reason - entire
two / three shoe sets are to be
replaced.
Like that if any runner is to be
replaced due to wear or any other
reason entire four runners are to be
replaced.
Before using erection jig, all the bolts related to adjustments are to
be loosened. After fixing jig, alignment bolts are to be tightened
simultaneously.
For replacing runners and shoes, OHE load need not be taken.
Erection jig is enough.