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GNSS Notes

The document discusses GNSS vulnerability and mitigation measures for maritime navigation in Europe. Studies have found that GNSS signals can be easily jammed or spoofed, interrupting navigation. While failure of individual satellites is common, loss of all GNSS signals would significantly impact maritime traffic. The document recommends increasing GNSS power and robustness, using integrated inertial navigation backup, and improving receiver technology to mitigate vulnerabilities. Redundant systems like Galileo and contingency methods involving radar and visual aids are also suggested.

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Irakli Shavishvili
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44 views

GNSS Notes

The document discusses GNSS vulnerability and mitigation measures for maritime navigation in Europe. Studies have found that GNSS signals can be easily jammed or spoofed, interrupting navigation. While failure of individual satellites is common, loss of all GNSS signals would significantly impact maritime traffic. The document recommends increasing GNSS power and robustness, using integrated inertial navigation backup, and improving receiver technology to mitigate vulnerabilities. Redundant systems like Galileo and contingency methods involving radar and visual aids are also suggested.

Uploaded by

Irakli Shavishvili
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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GNSS Vulnerability & Mitigation Measures

in the European Maritime Environment

Presentation to RIN Technical Committee, 31 March 2004

Studies carried out on GNSS Vulnerability

U. S. DOT Volpe Center - Vulnerability to intentional and unintentional interference


of the US transportation infrastructure relying on GPS

U.S. DOT Radio-navigation Task Force Report

Work has also been carried out by ICAO, ESA - Galileo Project & UK RA

This study was carried out for the European Maritime Radio-navigation Forum

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Significance for marine traffic

• Less effect on maritime navigation than for aviation


• Man-made interference - land-based & line-of-sight
• However, waterborne or airborne jamming a possibility

Reasons for Vulnerability

• GNSS vulnerable because of very low signal level


• System failure likely to be a rare event
• Failure of individual GPS satellites not unusual
(Mean time to repair < 48 hours)
• Failure of shipborne equipment most likely cause
– power supply failure, receiver, antenna faults
(more than one receiver often fitted)

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Unintentional Sources of Interference

• Ionospheric Variability
• Solar Activity
• Spectrum Congestion
• Harmonics or Intermodulation Products
• Powerful Transmitters in other bands

Sources of Unintentional Man-Made Interference

• Television broadcasts
• Microwave communication links
• Consumer-grade equipment such as active TV Antennas
- TV Antenna Amplifier Incidents have affected entire Harbours
• Onboard satellite communications
- same band, latitude dependent, steerable dish antennas

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Jamming and Spoofing

• Low power levels make jamming easy, using low-cost equipment


• Jammers can operate on several frequencies simultaneously
• Counter-measures exist: directional antennas, tunable filters
• Spoofing more difficult, though simulators are readily available
• False signals, indistinguishable from real ones, are the danger
• Analogous to attacking computers with viruses
• GNSS service could be over the whole of an area e.g. Straits of Dover

Jamming

• Becomes more difficult as more frequencies and higher


power levels available
• Duration of jamming event is important
- brief interruptions are less serious

• Teams and resources may be available to deal with


jamming and interference problems
- need to be aware of threat to safety of life from interruption of GNSS

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Risk Analysis

• Identify threats

• Assess probabilities

• Consider consequences

• Determine mitigation difficulty/cost

Mitigation measures
• Increased radiated power
• Added frequencies
• Increased receiver sophistication
- receiver improvements: longer integration time; narrower loop
bandwidth; using L2C; external assistance.
- limitations: oscillator errors; tracking loop errors; user motion.
- antenna improvements: multiple antennas – cancellation,
polarization, spatial nulling, beam forming; signal processing –
spectral filters, space-time adaptive, space frequency adaptive.
- limitations: phase perturbations, dynamic range.

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Mitigation measures

• Awareness of the risk

• System vulnerability cannot be fully eliminated

• Adequate alternative systems are essential

• Integration with Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU)

Integration with IMU

• Most effective method

• Loose-coupled
• Tight-coupled
• Deep integration

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Alternative Systems

• Redundant Systems

• Backup Systems

• Contingency Systems

Redundant Systems

• Equivalent Performance (e.g. Galileo)

• No change in procedures necessary (dual receivers)

• Similar Systems may have common failure modes

• Counter measures likely to be effective in future

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Backup Systems - terrestrial

• Loran:
Position Input compatible with electronic charts, timing reference, modern
receivers, ASF corrections
Suitable for coastal and ocean phases, but Loran receiver not a specific
carriage requirement

• Radar and Radar aids to Navigation:


Radar position not directly compatible input for electronic chart
Generally coastal only, but radar is a required fit on SOLAS Vessels

Vulnerability of backup systems

Loran-C
• Onboard power supplies
• Onboard equipment
• Ground infrastructure
• Ionospheric effects
• Power lines

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Vulnerability of backup systems

Radar
• Onboard power supplies
• Onboard equipment
• Rain & sea clutter
• Masking

Racon vulnerabilities

• Masking, clutter

• Interference nulls (multipath)

• Racon failures – power supplies, damage

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Contingency Systems

• Light and Buoys – case for their retention

• Radar in poor visibility

• Dead-reckoning – uses on-board instruments

• Inertial Navigation Systems - limited by rate of drift &


cost, at present

Vulnerability of contingency
systems

Lights & buoys


• Visibility
• Reliability of lights
• Maintenance

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Vulnerability of contingency
systems

Dead reckoning/depth sounders


• Onboard power supplies
• Onboard equipment
• Drift/cumulative errors
• Charting

Dependent Systems

• GNSS supplies position inputs to other systems

- AIS, ECDIS, GMDSS

• These systems are totally dependent on GPS at present

• Compatible backup needed for direct position input &


timing

• Increasing problem as dependence grows

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Conclusions

• Significant risk of losing GNSS


• Consequences of losing GNSS greater as reliance on it increases
• Galileo fully redundant system, similar vulnerabilities
• Future GNSS additional signals and higher powers
• Loran effective backup, but with its own vulnerabilities
• Radar limited backup
• Visual Aids limit safety consequences
• In poor visibility radar and dead-reckoning used
• Dependent systems (AIS, ECDIS) need compatible backup

Recommendations

• Options for backup systems & vulnerabilities


• Partnerships with other service providers
• Vulnerability Mitigation
• Transfer of Mitigation Technology
• Improved receiver performance
• Awareness about the Vulnerability of GNSS

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Questions?

Contacts: [email protected]
[email protected]

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