THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 247576. March 15, 2021.]

ROSARIO D. ADO-AN-MORIMOTO, petitioner, YOSHIO

MORIMOTO and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J : p

A simulated marriage used as a front for illicitly obtaining benefits is

totally inexistent, as the parties to it have no genuine intent to enter into
marital relations. Courts must recognize such a marriage as void. To insist
on its validity is to enable a greater affront to the institution of marriage than
the perceived dangerous tendency of readily declaring it null.
This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure praying that the assailed Court of
Appeals Decision 2 and Resolution 3 be reversed and set aside, and that
judgment be rendered declaring petitioner Rosario D. Ado-an-Morimoto's
(Rosario) registered marriage to respondent Yoshio Morimoto (Yoshio) be
declared null and void. HTcADC

The assailed Court of Appeals Decision denied 4 Rosario's appeal from

the January 7, 2016 Regional Trial Court Decision, 5 which denied her
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. Subsequently, the assailed
Court of Appeals Resolution denied Rosario's Motion for Reconsideration. 6
Rosario recalls that sometime before December 2007, a friend
introduced her to Yoshio as one with whom she can simulate marriage as a
way to facilitate her acquisition of a Japanese visa. 7 She acceded. Thus, on
December 5, 2007, she and Yoshio met at the Manila City Hall. There, they
signed a blank marriage certificate, but were assured by the solemnizing
officer that the certificate will never be registered or recorded in the Civil
Registry. It was the last time she saw Yoshio. 8
Sometime later, Rosario went to the Philippine Statistics Authority to
secure a Certificate of No Marriage. To her surprise, she found out that a
Certificate of Marriage, registered in the City of San Juan, indicates that she
married Yoshio on December 5, 2007, in a ceremony officiated by a certain
Reverend Roberto Espiritu. It also appears that the marriage was predicated
on Marriage License No. 6120159, issued by the Office of the Civil Registry of
San Juan. 9
On October 5, 2009, Rosario filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage before the Quezon City Regional Trial Court. She maintained that
the marriage attested to by the marriage certificate she discovered never
actually happened and was never backed by a marriage license. 10
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 On September 21, 2011, prior to trial, the Assistant City Prosecutor
issued a Report stating that there is no collusion between Rosario and Yoshio
to obtain a favorable ruling from the Regional Trial Court. 11
During trial, Rosario presented the following documents as evidence:
(1) the Certificate of Marriage attesting to her supposed marriage to Yoshio;
12 (2) a June 17, 2008 Certification issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar,
National Statistics Office, to the effect that "said office mistakenly [stated]
that a marriage was solemnized between [Rosario and Yoshio]"; 13 and (3) a
June 4, 2009 Certificate issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar, San Juan
City, which states that "no record of Marriage License No. 6120159 was
issued the parties[.]" 14 She also presented the testimony of Mary Ann C.
Chico, Registration Officer III of the Office of the Civil Registrar, San Juan City,
who authenticated the June 4, 2009 Certificate issued by the office. 15
On January 7, 2016, the Regional Trial Court issued a Decision 16
denying Rosario's Petition.
Following the denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, 17 Rosario filed
an appeal before the Court of Appeals.
In its assailed October 10, 2018 Decision, 18 the Court of Appeals
denied Rosario's appeal. In its assailed April 25, 2019 Resolution, 19 the
Court of Appeals denied Rosario's Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, Rosario filed the present Petition. 20 She maintains that the
marriage attested to by the marriage certificate she discovered never
actually happened, and that it was never backed by a marriage license.
For this Court's resolution is the issue of whether or not the registered
marriage between petitioner Rosario D. Ado-an-Morimoto and respondent
Yoshio Morimoto should be declared null and void.
This Court finds the supposed marriage between petitioner and
respondent Yoshio to have been simulated and utterly lacking in essential
and formal requisites. It is void ab initio. Thus, it was error for the Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Court to rule against the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
I
The Family Code provides for the essential and formal requisites of
marriage. It further stipulates that marriages lacking any essential or formal
requisite are void ab initio (with the exception of marriages "solemnized by
any person not legally authorized to perform marriages [where] either or
both parties believ[ed] in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the
legal authority to do so"), 21 that marriages attended by a defective essential
requisite are voidable, and that marriages attended by an irregularity as to
formal requisites are valid, subject to the potential criminal, civil, or
administrative liability of those responsible for the irregularity:
ARTICLE 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential
requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must
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 be a male and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the
solemnizing officer.
ARTICLE 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the
appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that
they take each other as husband and wife in the presence
of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
ARTICLE 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio , except as stated in
Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the
marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the
validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. 22
II
As a special contract, 23 consent is, by definition, indispensable to
marriage. Accordingly, the Family Code stipulates the second essential
requisite of marriage to be "[c]onsent freely given in the presence of the
solemnizing officer." 24 aScITE

It is vital to distinguish the authentic, underlying consent of the parties

from the external manifestation of such consent during a marriage
ceremony. Jurisprudence therefore recognizes that, when there is no bona
fide intention of becoming a spouse to another, a marriage is void for want
of consent even when marriage ceremonies have been conducted and,
there, the parties declared their intent to enter into married life.
I n People v. Santiago , 25 defendant-appellant Felipe Santiago
(Santiago) raped his niece, Felicita Masilang (Masilang), and married her in a
wedding ceremony solemnized by a church minister. This Court considered
the marriage "void for lack of essential consent" 26 on the part of either
party. Explaining that Santiago had no bona fide intention of taking Masilang
as his wife, this Court noted that "the marriage ceremony was a mere ruse
by which [Santiago] hoped to escape from the criminal consequences of his
act." 27 It added that "the ceremony cannot be considered binding on
[Masilang] because of duress." 28 Moreover, this Court noted that the
"manner in which [Santiago] dealt with [Masilang] after the marriage, as well
as before," 29 belied intent to marry and cohabit.
This case is worse than Santiago, as there is not even a marriage
ceremony to speak of.
Petitioner categorically declared that her marriage with respondent
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 Yoshio was totally simulated, made for the sole purpose of their ostensible
marital relations being used as an artifice to bolster her chances of obtaining
a Japanese visa. One might be tempted to dismiss this as a self-serving
allegation, made only to obtain a declaration of nullity of marriage. However,
to the contrary, this Court finds petitioner's declarations of having
participated in a duplicitous design to be worthy of even greater credence,
as an admission against interest.
BP Oil and Chemicals International Philippines, Inc. v. Total Distribution
and Logistics Systems, Inc. 30 discussed the admissibility of and evidentiary
weight attached to admissions against interest:
Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation
or by one in privity with or identified in legal interest with such party,
and are admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a
witness. An admission against interest is the best evidence that
affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute, based on the
presumption that no man would declare anything against himself
unless such declaration is true. It is fair to presume that the
declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his fault if it does not.
31 (Citations omitted)

Petitioner's declarations run counter to her interest. Her admission of

simulating marriage by signing a blank marriage certificate when no
marriage ceremony actually took place, and when she and respondent
Yoshio had absolutely no intent to marry, endangered her with the possibility
of being held liable for falsification.
Indeed, among the incidents in Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr. , 32 was
how respondent Benjamin Bangayan, Jr.'s (Benjamin) estranged partner,
petitioner Sally Go-Bangayan (Sally), initiated criminal actions against
Benjamin for bigamy and falsification. These charges were premised on how
she, and Benjamin, who had previously been married to Azucena Alegre,
"signed a purported marriage contract" with an assurance "that the
marriage contract would not be registered." 33 The simulation of marriage
was conceded to have been for the sole purpose of appeasing her father,
who was against their relationship. 34
Similarly, in Quinsay v. Avellaneda , 35 respondent Jay C. Avellaneda
(Avellaneda), who served as a utility worker at a Regional Trial Court, 36 was
shown to have simulated a marriage to facilitate his illicit availing of
benefits. Specifically, to enable the processing of a PhilHealth claim, he used
a faked marriage contract "to one Veronica Gloria[,] which showed that it
was solemnized by a Judge Adelaida G. Mendoza of [Regional Trial Court]-
San Fernando City on January 28, 1999." 37 As proof that no such marriage
happened, it was noted that:
No Judge by the name of Adelaida G. Mendoza has ever been
assigned/appointed in the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, hence, no marriage could have been solemnized by one
such Judge . . .; a verification of . . . collection/filing fee books and
official receipts issued for the month of January 1999 reveal [that] no
marriage fee was paid under date of January 28, 1999 for the
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 solemnization of the marriage between Jay Avellaneda and Veronica
Gloria; also, a verification from the Local Civil Registrar of the City of
San Fernando (P) disclosed that their office has no record of marriage
between Jay Avellaneda and Veronica Gloria[.] 38
Ruling on Avellaneda's liability, this Court noted that "[u]ndoubtedly,
[Avellaneda] committed dishonesty and falsification of an official document,
classified as grave offenses under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service." 39 Commensurate administrative penalties should then
have been meted on Avellaneda, except that his specific liability vis-à-vis
that Complaint had been rendered moot by his prior dismissal from the
service through a September 29, 2004 Resolution. The latter had also
already meted on him the accessory penalties of forfeiture of benefits and
disqualification from holding public office. 40 HEITAD

Equally notable is Pomperada v. Jochico . 41 This involved an aspiring

lawyer who was shown to have cajoled the complainant into signing a
marriage contract, and ultimately faking a marriage, as follows:
Respondent had complainant sign a prepared marriage contract and
when complainant inquired whether it was necessary for them to
appear before the officiating judge, respondent informed her that it
was not necessary because the judge knew personally both
complainant and respondent, and respondent assured complainant
that he would just take care of the signing of the marriage contract by
Judge Felino Garcia of the City Court of Bacolod; later respondent
gave complainant a copy of the marriage contract which appeared to
have been signed already by Judge Garcia; a verification, however,
revealed that the marriage between complainant and respondent was
not registered in the Local Civil Registrar's Office and in a further
confrontation with Judge Felino Garcia the latter denied having signed
the marriage contract . . . and denied as his own the signature which
purports to be the signature of Judge Felino Garcia in the marriage
contract[.] 42
Respondent Benjamin P. Jochico (Jochico) would later claim that the
marriage arose merely out of "a game concocted during the celebration of
complainant's birthday . . . to enliven the complainant's birthday party." 43
This Court was unimpressed with Jochico's defense, and found that it only
further incriminated him as having "fail[ed] to meet the standard of moral
fitness for membership in the legal profession . . . [for he] had made a
mockery of marriage, a basic social institution, which public policy cherishes
and protects[.]" 44 Ultimately, this Court barred Jochico from taking his oath
as a member of the Bar and from signing the Roll of Attorneys. This was in
addition to this Court's instruction for the "fil[ing] with the City Fiscal of
Bacolod City the appropriate complaints for Falsification of Public Document
and Perjury." 45
These references to Go-Bangayan, Quinsay, and Pomperada are not
meant to make conclusions on petitioner's ultimate liability. Nevertheless,
Go-Bangayan, Quinsay, and Pomperada starkly illustrate the jeopardy that
petitioner was courting by making her admission. Thus, consistent with the
standards settled in jurisprudence on the appreciation of admissions against
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 interest, this Court takes petitioner's assertions to be corresponding with the
truth, or otherwise "afford[ing] the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute."
46 They are convincing proof that no marriage between her and respondent

Yoshio ever took place.

In any case, petitioner's assertions do not stand by their lonesome.
They are bolstered by the Assistant City Prosecutor's Report indicating that
there is no collusion between petitioner and respondent Yoshio to obtain a
favorable ruling from the Regional Trial Court. 47 This works to thwart any
claim that respondent Yoshio's not having directly contradicted the Petition
for Declaration of Nullity, or otherwise insisting on the subsistence of their
supposed marriage, indicates duplicity on petitioner's part.
More importantly, a Certification was issued by the Office of the Civil
Registrar, Philippine Statistics Authority, stating that "said office mistakenly
certified that a marriage was solemnized between [petitioner and
respondent Yoshio.]" 48 This categorical turnaround should, once and for all,
negate any lingering doubt on whether the supposed marriage between
petitioner and respondent Yoshio actually transpired. It could even render
this case moot.
Further, to reiterate, the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
was spurred by petitioner's failure to obtain a Certificate of No Marriage.
With the Philippine Statistics Authority now conceding that no marriage
between petitioner and respondent Yoshio was solemnized, it could
conceivably proceed to issue a Certificate of No Marriage to petitioner. With
the Philippine Statistics Authority's own factual affirmation that no marriage
ever transpired, it is baffling that the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals would insist on what now turns out to be just their own version of
the facts, and the validity and subsistence of petitioner and respondent
Yoshio's supposed marriage.
Ultimately, the registered marriage between petitioner and respondent
Yoshio is totally fictitious and inexistent, thereby warranting a declaration of
nullity. This hearkens to this Court's pronouncements in Go-Bangayan:
The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent.
Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under
Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely
simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the beginning."
Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court's
ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and
void ab initio and non-existent. 49 (Citation omitted)
III
Equally fatal to the registered marriage between petitioner and
respondent Yoshio is how no marriage license was ever issued to them. The
lack of a marriage license is borne by the evidence, most notably the June 4,
2009 certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar, San Juan City stating
that it "has no record of Marriage License No. 6120159." 50 ATICcS

In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro, 51 this Court sustained the

Court of Appeals in ruling that the marriage between Edwin Cardenas and
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 Angelina Castro (Castro) was void for lack of a marriage license. Their
marriage contract stated that Marriage License No. 3196182 was issued in
their names in Pasig, Metro Manila. Subsequently, however, the Pasig Civil
Register issued a certification stating that "marriage license no. 3196182
allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be located as
said license no. 3196182 does not appear from our records." 52
The Regional Trial Court initially declined to grant Castro's Petition for
Declaration of Nullity. It reasoned that the "inability of the certifying official
to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no
marriage license issued." 53 In sustaining the Court of Appeals' reversal of
the Regional Trial Court, this Court explained that Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court sanctioned the presentation in court of proof of lack of record issued
by an officer having custody of an official record, that such proof enjoys
probative value, and that it stands as sufficient proof of non-issuance of a
marriage license absent any circumstance of suspicion:
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar
of due search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that
marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not
adequate to prove its non-issuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in
court is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
"Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. — A written
statement signed by an officer having custody of an
official record or by his deputy, that after diligent search,
no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in
the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as
above provided, is admissible as evidence that the
records of his contain no such record or entry."
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to
certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not
exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was
not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil
registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of
maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the
applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other
relevant data.
The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by
the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer
charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance
of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently
proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to
the contracting parties. 54 (Citation omitted)
Twelve years later, Sevilla v. Cardenas 55 strictly applied Republic v.
Court of Appeals and Castro and stated that certifications issued by civil
registrars as to the absence of marriage licenses "must categorically state
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 that the document does not exist in [their] office or the particular entry could
not be found in the register despite diligent search." 56 Thus, certifications
indicating mere inability to find after anything less than a best-effort search
cannot be taken as reliable proof that a marriage license was never issued:
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the
certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar should be read in line
with the decision in the earlier case of Republic v. Court of Appeals ,
14 where it was held that:

The above Rule authorized the custodian of

documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a
particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in
a register. As custodians of public documents, civil
registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter
alia, of maintaining a register book where they are
required to enter all applications for marriage licenses,
including the names of the applicants, the date the
marriage license was issued and such other relevant data.
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar
must categorically state that the document does not exist in his office
or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite
diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or
absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. — A written
statement signed by an officer having the custody of an
official record or by his deputy that after diligent search,
no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in
the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as
above provided, is admissible as evidence that the
records of his office contain no such record or entry.
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by
the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan in connection with Marriage
License No. 2770792 complied with the foregoing requirements and
deserved to be accorded probative value.
xxx xxx xxx
Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that
"hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force
locating the above problem." It could be easily implied from the said
statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert
its best efforts to locate and determine the existence of Marriage
License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work." Likewise, both
certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or not
such license was issued. TIADCc

This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the

representative from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook
due to the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had
already retired. Further, the testimony of the said person was not
presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that the former
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 custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his
testimony could not be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts
to locate the logbook or prove the material contents therein, had
been exerted.
xxx xxx xxx
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect
that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook where
Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the
presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the
Local Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively
rebutted. 57 (Citations omitted)
However, this Court has abandoned Sevilla's inordinately stringent
application of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro. It has since been
clarified that Rule 132, Section 28 of the Rules of Court does not require a
distinct, categorical statement to the effect that a diligent search was
conducted. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
stipulated in Rule 131, Section 3 (m) of the Rules of Court 58 works to create
a presumption that concerned officers have made a diligent search. Only
when there is actual countervailing proof should those officers be taken as
having performed their tasks less than diligently.
Moreover, this Court's 2016 Decision in Kho v. Republic 59 explained
the original wisdom of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro, as well as
how several subsequent decisions rendered by this Court have declined to
follow Sevilla's rigidity:
As to the sufficiency of petitioner's evidence, the OSG further
argues that, on the basis of this Court's ruling in Sevilla v. Cardenas ,
24 the certification issued by the local civil registrar, which attests to
the absence in its records of a marriage license, must categorically
state that the document does not exist in the said office despite
diligent search.
However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals , this
Court considered the certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar
as a certification of due search and inability to find the record or entry
sought by the parties despite the absence of a categorical statement
that "such document does not exist in their records despite diligent
search." The Court, citing Section 28, 26 Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, held that the certification of due search and inability to find a
record or entry as to the purported marriage license, issued by the
civil registrar, enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged
under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court held that
there is absence of a marriage license that would render the
marriage void ab initio .
Moreover, as discussed in the abovestated case of Nicdao
Cariño v. Yee Cariño , this Court considered the marriage of the
petitioner and her deceased husband as void ab initio as the records
reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased
bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the local civil
registrar, their office has no record of such marriage license. The
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 court held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of the marriage license. Their
marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage
license and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage
license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased
is undoubtedly void ab initio . This ruling was reiterated in the more
recent case of Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr.
Furthermore, in the fairly recent case of Abbas v. Abbas , this
Court echoed the ruling in Republic v. CA that, in sustaining the
finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, this
Court relied on the Certification issued by the local civil registrar,
which stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located
as the same did not appear in their records. Contrary to petitioner's
asseveration, nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated
that the officer involved conducted a diligent search. In this respect,
this Court held that Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court does
not require a categorical statement to this effect. Moreover, in the
said case, this Court ruled that:
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is
a disputable presumption that an official duty has been
regularly performed, absent contradiction or other
evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." No
such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal
Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking
the records of their office, thus the presumption must
stand. . . .
In all the abovementioned cases, there was clear and
unequivocal finding of the absence of the subject marriage license
which rendered the marriage void.
From these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void
on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that
the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the
marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification
from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued
to the parties. 60 (Citations omitted)
To reiterate, here, the Office of the Civil Registrar of San Juan issued a
June 4, 2009 Certificate stating that "no record of Marriage License No.
6120159 was issued the Parties." 61 During trial, this certification was
presented along with the testimony of Mary Ann C. Chico, Registration
Officer III of the Office of the Civil Registrar, San Juan City. 62 This
certification and testimony are akin to evidence on which turned two of the
cases cited in Kho. AIDSTE

Further, in Cariño v. Yee Cariño , 63 the local civil registrar certified that
"their office has no record of such marriage license." 64 In Go-Bangayan,
"Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of the Local Civil
Registrar of Pasig City . . . testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City
did not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 to [the parties] Benjamin and
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 Sally." 65

Consistent with the standard laid out in Republic v. Court of Appeals

and Castro, applied in Cariño, Go-Bangayan, Abbas v. Abbas, 66 and clarified
i n Kho, this Court considers it adequately established that no marriage
license was ever issued in this case to petitioner and respondent Yoshio.
Moreover, it was neither alleged nor established that the marriage
registered between them falls under any of the exceptional marriages, which
Articles 27 to 34 of the Family Code 67 identify as not needing a marriage
license.
Accordingly, in addition to there being no consent to enter into
marriage and no actual marriage ceremony being performed, the registered
marriage further lacks the formal requisite of a marriage license. For a
multiplicity of reasons, such marriage was inexistent. Therefore, the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals erred in denying Rosario's
Petition for Declaration of Nullity.
IV
The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals find themselves
averse to declaring the registered marriage void, as they are impelled by the
avowed need to preserve the sanctity of marriage and to foreclose the all-too
convenient procurement of declarations of nullity. They, however, fail to see
the irony of how their aversion enables an affront to the institution of
marriage, which is greater than that which they wished to prevent.
The marriage between petitioner and respondent Yoshio is decidedly a
fake. It was a ruse that reduced marriage to an artifice for acquiring a visa.
The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals fail to see that to insist on
this marriage's validity would be to unwittingly lend judicial approbation to
transactional marriages used as fronts for illicitly obtaining benefits, or for
potentially more nefarious ends. This Court most certainly does not condone
petitioner's ruse. But it will work greater damage to society and its
institutions if courts would let themselves be used as unsuspecting
endorsers of duplicitous designs. The original, underlying fraud here is the
stratagem effected by petitioner and respondent Yoshio in simulating
marriage. It is a fraud admitted by petitioner, and a fraud through which this
Court sees. Petitioner and respondent Yoshio never truly meant to be
husband and wife, their registered marriage is a nullity.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals October 10, 2018 Decision and
April 25, 2019 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 108043 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage between petitioner Rosario D. Ado-an-Morimoto and
respondent Yoshio Morimoto registered as having taken place on December
5, 2007 is declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO.
SO ORDERED.
Hernando, Inting, Delos Santos and J.Y. Lopez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
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 1. Rollo , pp. 3-10.

2. Id. at 16-24. The October 10, 2018 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 108043 was
penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., and concurred in by
Associate Justices Ramon A. Cruz and Gabriel T. Robeniol of the Special Ninth
Division of the Court of Appeals, Manila.

3. Id. at 25-26. The April 25, 2019 Resolution was penned by Associate Justice
Ramon M. Bato, Jr., and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon A. Cruz
and Gabriel T. Robeniol, of the Former Special Ninth Division, Court of
Appeals, Manila.
4. Id. at 24.

5. Id. at 27-32. The Decision in Civil Case No. Q-09-65737 was penned by Judge
Jose L. Bautista, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107.
6. Id. at 25.

7. Id. at 28.
8. Id. at 17 and 28.

9. Id.

10. Id. at 16.

11. Id. at 18.

12. Id.
13. Id.

14. Id.

15. Id. at 19.

16. Id. at 27-32. Through Judge Jose L. Bautista, Jr.

17. Id. at 33-34.

18. Id. at 16-24.

19. Id. at 25-26.

20. Id. at 3-10.

21. FAMILY CODE, art. 35 (2).

22. FAMILY CODE, arts. 2-4.

23. FAMILY CODE, art. 1:

ARTICLE 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man
and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may
fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by
this Code.
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 24. FAMILY CODE, art. 2.
25. 51 Phil. 68 (1927) [Per J. Street, En Banc].

26. Id. at 70.

27. Id.

28. Id.

29. Id.
30. 805 Phil. 244 (2017) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].

31. Id. at 260-261.

32. 713 Phil. 502 (2013) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].

33. Id. at 506.

34. Id.
35. 507 Phil. 417 (2005) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, Third Division].

36. Id.
37. Id. at 418.

38. Id. at 418-419.

39. Id. at 423.

40. Id. at 422.

41. 218 Phil. 289 (1984) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, En Banc].

42. Id. at 291.

43. Id.

44. Id. at 296-297.

45. Id. at 297.

46. BP Oil and Chemicals International Philippines, Inc. v. Total Distribution and
Logistics Systems, Inc., 805 Phil. 244, 260 (2017) [Per J. Peralta, Second
Division].
47. Rollo , p. 18.

48. Id.
49. Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr., 713 Phil. 502, 516-517 (2013) [Per J. Carpio,
Second Division].

50. Rollo , p. 18.

51. 306 Phil. 284 (1994) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].

52. Id. at 287.

53. Id. at 288.

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 54. Id. at 289-290.

55. 529 Phil. 419 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division].

56. Id. at 429.

57. Id. at 429-433.

58. SECTION 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by
other evidence:

(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;

59. 786 Phil. 43 (2016) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].

60. Id. at 56-58.

61. Rollo , p. 18.

62. Id. at 19.

63. 403 Phil. 861 (2001) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].

64. Id. at 869.

65. Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr., 713 Phil. 502, 514 (2013) [Per J. Carpio, Second
Division].
66. 702 Phil. 578 (2013) [Per J. Velasco, Third Division].

67. ARTICLE 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of
death, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage
license and shall remain valid even if the ailing party subsequently survives.
ARTICLE 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no
means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the
local civil registrar, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a
marriage license.

ARTICLE 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the
solemnizing officer shall state in an affidavit executed before the local civil
registrar or any other person legally authorized to administer oaths that the
marriage was performed in articulo mortis or that the residence of either
party, specifying the barrio or barangay, is so located that there is no means
of transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local
civil registrar and that the officer took the necessary steps to ascertain the
ages and relationship of the contracting parties and the absence of legal
impediment to the marriage.

ARTICLE 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding article,
together with the legible copy of the marriage contract, shall be sent by the
person solemnizing the marriage to the local civil registrar of the municipality
where it was performed within the period of thirty days after the performance
of the marriage.
ARTICLE 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew
members may also be solemnized by a ship captain or by an airplane pilot
not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also during
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 stopovers at ports of call.

ARTICLE 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer,

shall likewise have authority to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis
between persons within the zone of military operation, whether members of
the armed forces or civilians.
ARTICLE 33. Marriages among Muslims or among members of the ethnic
cultural communities may be performed validly without the necessity of
marriage license, provided they are solemnized in accordance with their
customs, rites or practices.
ARTICLE 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years
and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also
state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting
parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage.

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