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Nonduality - A Refutation

The document refutes the doctrine of monism or nonduality which proposes that there is ultimately only one thing in existence or that plurality is not ultimately real. It provides three arguments against nonduality: 1) nonduality cannot be established through non-conceptuality, 2) it cannot be established through the uniformity of communication, and 3) it cannot be established by positing a single substance to existence.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
339 views6 pages

Nonduality - A Refutation

The document refutes the doctrine of monism or nonduality which proposes that there is ultimately only one thing in existence or that plurality is not ultimately real. It provides three arguments against nonduality: 1) nonduality cannot be established through non-conceptuality, 2) it cannot be established through the uniformity of communication, and 3) it cannot be established by positing a single substance to existence.

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kp88
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Nonduality

a Refutation
by Carl Oort

Copyright 2013

***
Introduction
Monism or nonduality is the doctrine that there is ultimately either only one
thing in existence or, at the very least, there are not two things in existence.
Plurality or duality, they say, is only apparent—that is, it only seems to be.
It is not ultimately real. Reality is composed of only one element, or one
process, and any perception to the contrary is mistaken or hallucinatory.

Some monists or nondualists equate this single element or process with God
such as do certain Hindus, Sikhs, Sufis and certain mystical branches of
Christianity and Judaism. Others equate it with consciousness, or
awareness, or a cosmic or universal mind, as do certain Hindus and the
Cittamatra or "Consciousness-only" school of Mahayana Buddhism, of
which Zen is today the most representative sect. Still others rest in denying
duality, without stating specifically that there is one or otherwise, like the
Madhyamika or "Middle-way" school of Mahayana Buddhism, which is the
predominant philosophy of much of Tibetan Buddhism. The Madhyamikans
propose a universal emptiness of autonomy or self-existence, and say that
this comprises their nonduality. Still others propose a fuzzy notion of nature
as being the whole, like Taoism or certain New Age philosophies, and
establish monism or nonduality on this basis.

At root, monism or nonduality proposes that our perception of the world is


mistaken and this mistaken perception is the cause of our suffering. If we
could perceive reality correctly, our suffering would end. Up to here, it
agrees with every school or sect of thought that exists—yet, where it differs
is that it says that correct perception perceives unity or lack of plurality in
the world. Once we see this, we see properly and are liberated or saved
from suffering—or so they say.

***
Argument 1: Monism or nonduality cannot be established through non-
conceptuality

Monists or nondualists will often first bring up that the notion of "two" or
"many" is only conceptual. Since it is conceptual, we encounter it only in
language—not in reality. Our concepts of things, they say, do not define
reality and therefore since "two" or "many" is a concept, therefore reality is
"not-two" and "not-many". Therefore it may be spoken of as "one".

If that were true, the question that arises is if visual perception—as an


example—can see two or more colors without resort to language, concept
or internal dialogue. If the monist or nondualist admits that it can, then
obviously there are distinctions which are evident prior to conception and,
therefore, if reality is defined as non-conceptual there are real, non-
conceptual distinctions that exist. If the monist or nondualist denies that it
can, then they are given the unenviable task of explaining how the
perception of two or more colors arises at all. Or, said a different way, they
must explain why the perception of a non-conceptual whole would give rise
to the concept of differences.

Often they will then fall back and define it by establishing a new principle
in addition to monism or nonduality, such as the Hindu maya or cosmic
illusion, or the Buddhist notion of beginningless ignorance—although it
should be pointed out that not all Hindus believe in maya, just as not all
Buddhists believe in nondualism, though all Buddhists believe in
beginningless ignorance. Yet to establish a second principle to explain away
why the first principle is insufficient in accounting for perceived duality is
itself an establishment of a duality. If maya causes the perception of
division, for example, or if avidya (ignorance) causes it, then there are two
principles at work: God & his maya, or nonduality and avidya (ignorance).

If you look at the arguments of monists and nondualists themselves, they


will say that maya or avidya is inexplicable, or no account can properly be
given for it. In such case, it is well enough to say that neither can they
explain their monism or nonduality, and as such their doctrine is to be
rejected.
***
Argument 2: Monism or nonduality cannot be established through the
uniformity of communication

The next argument for monism or nonduality is often made by idealists,


such as Advaita Vedanta, Trika Shaivites, or certain forms of Mahayana
Buddhism. It is based on the assertion that whenever we say something
"exists", we imply there is an experience of it existing and, insofar as we
imply an experience we imply there is also consciousness. And, they say,
we cannot divorce the notion of a thing existing and being conscious of it—
at least at some point in time. To state that something exists which we will
never be conscious of in any way, nor have we ever been conscious of it is
—they say—to make a meaningless statement. The very notion of existence
itself is a notion which implies consciousness. And since it implies
consciousness, we can go a step further and state that consciousness and
existence are synonymous. Being synonymous, they are one and not two—
therefore, consciousness alone exists and existence is consciousness alone.

The problem with this is that any experience—just as any notion of


existence—by definition implies also certain dualities. They might still
rightly say that any experience implies consciousness and there is a kind of
unity in this, but they also must admit that while there is an over-arching
unity that there is still, nevertheless, an over-arching plurality or duality in
such consciousness. In such an instance, their espousal of nonduality or
monism becomes as meaningless as stating everything that is seen is seen
by the eye or everything that is heard is heard by the ear. Ultimately, this is
only a tautology, for the notion of "seen" implies an subjective medium that
sees, just as a notion of "hear" implies a subjective medium that hears. And,
yes, experience as a whole implies a subjective consciousness that
experiences—but, this does not mean that all experience is one or nondual,
just as one would not say all images were one or nondual or all sounds were
one or nondual. Images and sounds, like experience, are only existentially
significant because of their plurality and duality. If one were to only see one
thing their whole lives and to hear only one thing their whole lives, the
faculties of sight and hearing would be no more significant than blindness
and silence. It would be just as insignificant as existence of things that we
shall never be conscious of, in the nondualist or monist's system. Thus, the
nondualist or monist uses arguments that refute their own position, making
their position hypocritical and deluded.

***
Argument 3: Monism or nonduality cannot be established through positing
the necessity of a single substance or element to existence

There also exists an especially clever argument to establish the unity of


existence—and, with it, monism or nonduality—by directing our attention
to the different facts of existence and, then, directing our attention to the
fact that these various items interact. If they interact, then there must be
some commonality between them. If there is commonality, then, there is a
subtle identity. Thoughts act with thoughts, for example, and though each
appears different they are utterly alike in being thoughts. Similarly, matter
acts with matter, and though two material objects or series of objects may
be different in their evident manifestation, nonetheless they must possess a
hidden identity for them to interact. And this hidden identity—it is claimed
—demonstrates the subtle but undeniable monism or nonduality of the
cosmos.

The problem with this argument is that it over-reaches in its conclusions. To


demonstrate that objects interact does not demonstrate that they have a
subtle identity. It only demonstrates that there is a principle at work of
interaction—and though this principle may be single and inseparable from
the different objects to which it applies, it only the monism or nonduality of
this particular principle is established. That things are connected does not
mean that they are one—to the contrary, a truly single unit or monad would
not require interaction. For things to interact, they must—by definition—
have change, variance and separate identities, or there is otherwise no basis
for claiming their interaction. A picture cannot be painted on a pure white
wall if all the paint one has is similarly pure white. Difference, then, is
absolutely necessary to establish any fact of existence whatsoever—or,
perhaps more explicitly said, existence is difference by definition. If there is
no difference, separateness, or dualities, there is consequently no existence
at all, for there cannot be said of anything "it is" or "it is not." The monist or
nondualist evidently exists, and says of duality or plurality "it is not", while
saying of oneness or unity "it is". This demonstrates they do exist in a world
of difference, and in the absence of difference there, too, is the absence of
the truth in their position.

***
The solution, then, to the problems inherent in any philosophy of monism
or nonduality is to accept certain dualities, see what is good and beneficial,
contrast it with what is neither good nor beneficial, and seek the good. This
is the Jain, Samkhyin, Nyaya, Vaisesikha and Theravada or so-called
Hinaya Buddhist perspective (which also includes the Sarvastivada sect), as
well as the position of various Hindu sects aligned with the Dvaita or
"dualist" philosophy. Items exist, separations exist, interactions exist,
commonalities exist and differents all exist. And not only this, but they
define existence.

And, further, spirituality does not require all differences to dissolve into a
single principle. At root, spirituality is the attempt to overcome physical and
mental pain—that is its entire purpose. And to end and overcome pain must
result, first, from a recognition of pain's proper place.

the end

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