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Melissa Donnelly, Production Editor

Phone: 201-748-6438
E-mail:[email protected]
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 Opinion

Formalism and functionalism

in linguistics
Frederick J. Newmeyer∗

Formalism and functionalism in linguistics are often taken to be diametrically

opposed approaches. However, close examination of the relevant phenomena
reveals that the two are complementary, rather than being irrevocably in opposition
to each other. One can be a formal linguist and a functional linguist at the same
time, without there being any contradiction.  2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. WIREs Cognitive
Sci 2010 1 000–0000

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1 THE GREAT RHETORICAL DIVIDE that categorically reject a role for function and those 42
2 IN LINGUISTICS functional theories that categorically reject formal 43

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3 structure. The quote from Paul Postal illustrates the 44
4
5 P erhaps, the greatest rhetorical conflict that exists
(and has long existed) among the linguists of the
former and that from Paul Hopper illustrates the 45
46

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latter:
6 world is between those who practice some variety 47
7 of ‘formal linguistics’ and those who practice some There is no more reason for languages to change 48

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8 variety of ‘functional linguistics’. I stress the word than there is for automobiles to add fins one year 49
9 ‘rhetorical’, because the principal purpose of this and remove them the next, for jackets to have three 50
10 buttons one year and two the next, etc.1 51
paper is to argue that there is no fundamental
11 52
12 incompatibility in the essential content of the two [Grammar is] a continual movement toward structure,
53
approaches to linguistic theory. a postponement or ‘deferral’ of structure, a view of
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13 54
A major impediment to expounding and com- structure as always provisional, always negotiable,
14 55
paring formal approaches and functional approaches and in fact epiphenomenal.2
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15 56
16 is that there are literally dozens of varieties of syntac- 57
In other words, for Postal, pure fashion drives
17 tic theory that call themselves ‘formal’, dozens that 58
language change (and hence the properties of linguistic
18 call themselves ‘functional’, and even a few that call 59
structures). And for Hopper, structures have no
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19 themselves both at the same time. To make things 60

20 mental reality at all, except as a fleeting response 61
even more difficult, the very words ‘formal’ and ‘func-
21 to pressures from discourse. 62
tional’ mean different things to different linguists. For
22 In fact, my sense is that the great majority of 63
some, a theory is ‘formal’ if and only if it accords
23 the world’s self-described functionalists are happy to 64
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center stage to formal structure (as opposed to, say,

24 posit the existence of formal structure and with it a 65
discourse). For others, a theory is ‘formal’ if and only
25 semiotic system linking form and meaning. Such has 66
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26 if it is formalized in minute detail. For some a the- 67

always been true for most European functionalists
27 ory of syntax is ‘functional’ if and only if all of its 68
[see, for example, Refs (3,4 )]. But it is also true for
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28 principal constructs admit to an external explanation. 69

many of the more prominent American functional
29 For others, a theory is ‘functional’ if it merely high- 70
linguists and their allies in cognitive linguists, as the
lights the functioning of the elements of some system
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30 following quotes from Ronald Langacker and Talmy 71

31 internally—that is, with respect to each other. 72
Givón testify:
32 So what am I to do, short of providing a 73
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33 thousand-page catalog of the hundreds of formal and More specifically, the grammar of a language is defined 74
34 functional approaches? It seems reasonable to begin as those aspects of cognitive organization in which 75
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35 by excluding from discussion those formal theories resides a speaker’s grasp of established linguistic 76
36 convention. It can be characterized as a structured 77
37 ∗ Correspondence to: [email protected] inventory of conventional linguistic units.5 emphasis 78
AQ1 38
University• of Washington, University of British Columbia, and in original) 79
39 Simon Fraser University 80
Formal structure assumes its own reality, communica-
40 81
DOI: 10.1002/wcs.006 tively, cognitively, and neurologically.6
41 82

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 Opinion wires.wiley.com/cogsci

1 Few if any functionalists, however, go so far as to (if any) functionalists believe that the autonomy of 60
2 posit that this ‘real’ formal structure patterns in a syntax is correct. 61
3 system that makes no reference to the semantic and 62
I consider the following to be the distinguishing
4 discourse properties that it encodes. 63
5 hallmark of functional linguistics: 64
On the other side of the fence, only a small
6 65
number of generative grammarians (formal linguists
7 2. External explanation: Grammatical structure is 66
8 par excellence) have rejected the possibility of 67
functional explanation of formal structure tout court. shaped in large part by the functions that
9 language serves, the most important of which 68
10 Consider the following quotes from Noam Chomsky 69
and Cedric Boeckx: is that of conveying meaning in the act of
11 70
12 communication. 71
13 Surely there are significant connections between 72
14 structure and function; this is not and has never been 73
Most functionalists thereby conclude that it is
15 in doubt. . . . Searle argues that ‘it is reasonable to 74
incorrect to try to separate grammar (and syntax
16 suppose that the needs of communication influenced 75
[language] structure’. I agree.7 in particular) from meaning, discourse, and use.
17 76

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18 It is worth noting that Greenberg’s universals are 77
19 really surfacing properties of language that typically 78
20 can be explained in functionalist terms and allow for EVIDENCE FOR THE AUTONOMY 79
21 a variety of exceptions. (Boeckx8 to appear: ms, 1–2) OF SYNTAX 80

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22 There are two parts to putting the autonomy of syntax 81
23 Very few generative grammarians, however, take the 82
on an empirical basis. To establish its correctness, one

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24 next step and explore in any detail how structure 83
must demonstrate that:
25 might be a response to communicative function.a 84

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26 The paper is organized as follows. First, 85
27 I characterize those hypotheses that I consider 3. a. There exists an extensive set of purely formal 86
28 essential to formal linguistics and to functional generalizations orthogonal to generalizations 87
29 linguistics, respectively (§2). I then provide arguments governing meaning or discourse. 88
30 FoG1 FoG2 FoG3 FoG4 FoG5 etc. (FoG = 89
that these hypotheses are supported by the available
31 90
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empirical evidence (§3) and (§4). I go on to argue Formal Generalization)
32 91
33 that there is no logical or empirical incompatibility in b. These generalizations ‘interlock’ in a system. 92
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34 upholding both hypotheses at the same time (§5). Last 93

35 section is a brief conclusion. FoG1 FoG2 94
36 95
37 96
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38 FORMAL LINGUISTICS AND FoG3 97

39 FUNCTIONAL LINGUISTICS FoG4 FoG5 98
40 99
41 I consider the autonomy of syntax to be the 100
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42 distinguishing hallmark of formal linguistics: Both (3a) and (3b) are crucial. It is not enough 101
43 just to point to formal generalizations, because all 102
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44 1. Autonomy of syntax: The rules (principles, con- but the most extreme functionalists would agree that 103
45 straints, etc.) that determine the combinatorial they exist. Rather, it is necessary to show that these 104
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46 generalizations are fully intertwined in a system. 105

possibilities of the formal elements of a language
47 106
make no reference to constructs from meaning, Support for the autonomy of syntax is provided
48 107
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49 discourse, or language use. by displaced wh-phrases in English, that is construc- 108

50 tions like those in (4–7): 109
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51 In other words, syntax forms a system ‘unto itself’. The 110

52 Wh-constructions in English: 111
definition in (1) leaves open the possibility—which is
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53 Questions: 112
surely correct—that there are systematic interrelations
54 4. Whoi did you see—i ? 113
between syntax on one hand and meaning and use on
55 114
56 the other. However, it rejects the idea that the former Relative Clauses: 115
57 is so beholden to the latter that there is no place for 116
a system containing exclusively formal primitives. As 5. The woman whoi I saw—i
58 117
59 noted in §1, I think that it is fair to say that very few Free Relatives: 118

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 WIREs Cognitive Science Formalism and functionalism in linguistics

1 6. I’ll buy what(ever)i you are selling—i . b. Although 10 million Americans voted for her 60
2 Wh (Pseudo) Clefts: in the primaries, Hillary Clinton was not 61
3 7. Whati John lost —i was his keys. nominated. 62
4 63
5 In each construction type, a wh-word is displaced 64
6 from its normal position in phrase structure to the Or take questions where the wh-word itself is 65
7 left edge of its clause, creating a dependency between embedded in the phrase that moves. Which book and 66
8 the it and a co-indexed gap, as indicated by ‘—i ’ in To whom in (10) are the phrases that are displaced, 67
9 (4–7). Here, we find a nice example of a structural though they themselves are not the operators: 68
10 generalization that does not map smoothly onto a 69
11 semantic or discourse-functional one. The structures 70
12 10. a. Which book did you read? = for which x, x 71
of these constructions are all essentially the same.
13 is a book, you read x. 72
Despite the structural parallelism, however, the wh-
14
words in the four constructions play very different b. To whom did you write an angry letter? = 73
15
semantic and discourse-functional roles. In simple for which x, x is a person or persons, you 74
16 75
wh-questions (4), sentence-initial position serves to sent an angry letter to x.
17 76

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18 focus the request for a piece of new information, 77
19 where the entire clause is presupposed except for a Nor does the fronted wh-element act reliably as a 78
20 single element. Relative clauses (5) have nothing to do scope marker, as partial Wh-Movement in German 79
21 with focusing. The fronted phrase is a topic, not a and Romani, in which a main clause wh-element 80

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22 focus, merely repeating the information of the head occurs within a subordinate clause, illustrates.12 As 81
23 noun woman. Free relatives (6), by definition, have 82
the examples indicate, in German and Romani the

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24 no head noun. The fronted wh-phrase seems to fulfill 83
25 elements translated as ‘with whom’ and ‘whom’, 84
the semantic functions of the missing head noun. And respectively, have scope over the entire sentences, yet 85

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26 pseudo-clefts (7) are different still. The clause in which
27 they occur in the embedded clauses: 86
the wh-word is fronted represents information that the
28 87
speaker can assume that the hearer is thinking about. 11. Wasi glaubt [IP Hans [CP mit wem]i [IP Jakob jetzt ti spricht]]]? 88
29
30 But the function of the wh-word itself is not to elicit 89
what think Hans with whom Jacob now speak
31 new information (as is the case with such phrases in 90
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32 questions), but rather to prepare the hearer for the ‘With whom does Hans believe Jacob is now talking? 91
33 focused (new) information in sentence-final position. 92
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34 In other words, there is a profound mismatch between 12. Soi [[IP Do emı̀ri mislinol [CP [kas]i [IP i Arı̀fa dikhl’a ti ]] 93
35 a formal generalization on one hand and meaning and 94
what thatDemir think whom the Arif saw
36 function on the other. 95
37 Occasionally, it is claimed that the function of 96
EC

‘Whom does Demir think Arifa saw?’

38 a fronted wh-phrase is to set up an operator-variable 97
39 configuration or to act as a scope marker. In the In other words, wh-constructions exhibit a profound 98
40 simplest cases, that might be true, as in questions mismatch between a formal generalization and both 99
41 100
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like (8): meaning and function. What is more, there is a

42 101
43 significant crosslinguistic disparity when it comes 102
8. What did Mary eat? = for what x, Mary ate x.
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44 to the analogs of English wh-constructions. For 103

45 example, many languages have different pronouns 104
But when the full range of wh-constructions is for relatives and interrogatives or no pronouns at all 105
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46
considered, there is no support for the idea that their in relative clauses. That fact as well indicates that 106
47
48 semantic role is to encode operator-variable relations. the morphological similarity shown in English has no 107
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49 So in (9a) there is no operator-variable configuration compelling discourse functional motivation. 108

50 corresponding to the gap and its antecedent (which are Wh-constructions support (3b) as well, because 109
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51 coindexed with subscript i). Rather, the coreference the relevant structural generalizations interlock with 110
52 relation is similar to that of a personal pronoun and its each other within the broader structural system of 111
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53 antecedent, rather than an operator-variable relation, English syntax. For example, as is well known, for 112
54 as indicated by the paraphrase in (9b): 113
each wh-construction, the wh-word can be indefinitely
55 114
56 far from its associated gap: 115
57 9. a. Hilary Clinton, whoi ten million Americans 116
58 voted for —i in the primaries, was not 13. a. Whoi did you ask Mary to tell John to see 117
59 nominated. —i ? (question). 118

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 Opinion wires.wiley.com/cogsci

1 b. The woman whoi I asked Mary to tell John In Estonian, sentential negation is integrated into the 60
2 to see —i (relative clause). class of auxiliaries: 61
3 Estonian (Blevins18 , to appear) 62
c. I’ll buy what(ever)i you ask Mary to tell
4 63
5 John to sell —i . (free relative). 64
6 d. Whati John is afraid to tell Mary that he lost 17. Negative forms pattern with perfects, which 65
7 —i is his keys. (wh-cleft). are based on a form of the copula OLEMA: 66
8 67
9 But as (14) shows, wh-words cannot move out of a 68
10 subordinate clause embedded within a complex noun Property Auxiliary/Particle Main Verb Form 69
11 phrase, a restriction predicted by the formal principle NEG(ATIVE) NONPAST ei (UNINFLECTED) STEM 70
12 known as Subjacency:b PAST PARTICIPLE
71
13 72
14 PERFECT OLEMA 73
14. a. *Whoi did you believe the claim that John
15 saw —i ? (question). 74
16 75
17 b. *The woman whoi I believed the claim that 76
In many—possibly most—languages, negation is

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18 John saw —i (relative clause). 77
represented by a derivational affix:
19 c. *I’ll buy what(ever)i Mary believes the claim Turkish17 78
20 that John is willing to sell —i . (free relative). 79
21 80

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d. *Whati John believes the claim that Mary 18. V + Refl + Recip + Cause + Pass + Neg +
22 81
23 lost —i is his keys. (wh-cleft). Possible + Tense/Mood + Person/Number 82

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24 83
25 Importantly, Subjacency constrains movement oper- 84
ations that involve no (overt) wh-element at all. For In Evenki, the negative element belongs to the class of

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26 nouns (a#cin has a plural form and takes case endings 85
27 example, Subjacency accounts for the ungrammatical- 86
ity of (15): like ordinary nouns):
28 87
29 Evenki (Tungus)17 88
30 15. *Mary is taller than I believe the claim that 89
31 Susan is. 90
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19. a. nuηan a#cin ‘he is not here’.
32 91
33 Many other syntactic processes interlock structurally b. nuηartin a#cir ‘they are not here’. 92
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34 with wh-constructions, from Case Assignment to 93

35 Subject-Auxiliary-Inversion. In other words, such And in English, the word not is an adverb in the same 94
36 constructions provide evidence for the idea of an class as never, always, just, and barely.19–23 95
37 96
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autonomous structural system. To summarize, languages have syntactic systems

38 Consider now an argument for autonomy based 97
that do not map smoothly onto semantic properties,
39 on the crosslinguistic typology of sentential negation. 98
40 as is consistent with the autonomy of syntax. 99
Presumably, the semantics of negation is essentially
41 100
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the same from language to language. Yet, the

42 101
morphosyntactic realization of negation varies wildly EVIDENCE FOR EXTERNAL
43 102
across languages. For example, in some languages,
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44 EXPLANATION 103
45 such as Tongan, negation is encoded by a complement- 104
taking verb. ‘Ikai behaves like a verb in the seem class The evidence for external explanation of grammatical
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46 105
47 (we know there is a complement because ke occurs structure is also very compelling. To begin, a theme 106
48 only in embedded clauses): pervading much work in the functionalist tradition 107
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49 Tongan.16,17 is that language structure to a considerable degree 108

50 has an ‘iconic’ motivation. Roughly, that means that 109
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51 16. a. Na’e ‘alu ‘a Siale. the form, length, complexity, or interrelationship 110
52 ASP go ABSOLUTE Charlie. of elements in a linguistic representation reflects the 111
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53 ‘Charlie went’. form, length, complexity, or interrelationship of ele- 112

54 113
b. Na’e ‘ikai [S ke ‘alu ‘a ments in the concept that that representation encodes.
55 114
Siale]. Iconicity would seem to have its roots in the fact
56 115
57 ASP NEG ASP go ABSOLUTE that comprehension is facilitated when syntactic units 116
58 Charlie. are isomorphic to units of meaning. Experimental 117
59 ‘Charlie did not go’. evidence shows that the semantic interpretation of a 118

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 WIREs Cognitive Science Formalism and functionalism in linguistics

1 sentence proceeds on line as the syntactic constituents 21. Prepositional Noun Modifier Hierarchy 60
2 are recognized. To illustrate the effects of iconicity by (PrNMH): If a language is prepositional, then 61
3 pointing to a concrete crosslinguistic universal,24 has if RelN then GenN, if GenN then AdjN, and if 62
4 claimed that if in a language the temporal order of AdjN then DemN. 63
5 64
6 syntactic constituents that describe events symbolizes 65
7 anything about the actual order in which these events The PrNMH states that if a language allows long 66
8 are said to take place, the symbolism is iconic in things to intervene between a preposition and its 67
9 that the earlier-mentioned event is to be taken as the object, then it allows short things. This hierarchy 68
10 one that takes place earlier. Indeed, Event-Related predicts the possibility of prepositional phrases with 69
11 Potential (ERP) studies have shown that non-iconic the structures depicted in (22) (along with an 70
12 temporal ordering of clauses (e.g., ‘Before X, Y’) is exemplifying language): 71
13 both harder to process and involves different neural 72
14 73
activation than iconic ordering (e.g., ‘After X, Y’).25
15 22. a. PP [P NP [—N. . .] (Arabic, Thai) 74
16 Other universals of syntax seem designed to 75
facilitate conversational interaction. For example, it b. PP [P NP [—N. . .]; PP [P NP [Dem N. . .]
17 76

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has been claimed that virtually all languages have (Masai, Spanish)
18 77
19 constructions whose function is to place topic before c. PP [P NP [—N. . .]; PP [P NP [Dem N. . .]; 78
20 comment.26,27 This feature has been attributed at least PP [P NP [Adj N. . .] (Greek, Maya) 79
21 since28 to the demands of conversational efficiency. 80

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d. PP [P NP [—N. . .]; PP [P NP [Dem N. . .];
22 The idea is that placing topics (i.e., old information) 81
PP [P NP [Adj N. . .]; PP [P NP [PossP N. . .]
23 before comments (i.e., new information) aids both 82

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(Maung)
24 83
speaker and hearer by forming a bridge between what e.
25 PP [P NP [—N. . .]; PP [P NP [Dem N. . .]; 84
is known to both and the new material that is about

PR
26 PP [P NP [Adj N. . .]; PP [P NP [PossP N. . .]; 85
27 to be revealed (a principle that Mathesius referred to [P [Rel N. . .] (Amharic) 86
PP NP
28 as ‘Communicative Dynamism’). 87
29 Other types of external explanations appear 88
30 to be rooted in processing efficiency. One of the The parsing-based explanation of the hierarchy is 89
31 straightforward. The longer the distance between the 90
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first ever proposed is Zipf’s Law,29 which states
32 that words occurring frequently in speech will be P and the N in a structure like (23), the longer it takes 91
33 to recognize all the constituents of the PP. Given the 92
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shorter on average than less frequent items. By

34 idea that grammars try to reduce the recognition time, 93
way of illustration, note that articles, prepositions,
35 the hierarchy follows. 94
36 auxiliaries, and conjunctions tend to be shorter than 95
37 nouns and verbs. Along similar lines, there appears 96
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PP
38 to be pressure to allow the hearer to identify the 97
P NP
39 constituents of the sentence and its component phrases 98
40 as rapidly as possible. The following universal would 23. X N 99
41 appear to have precisely that motivation: 100
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42 101
43 Because relative clauses tend to be longer than posses- 102
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44 20. If a language has prepositions, then if the sive phrases, which tend to be longer than adjectives, 103
45 which tend to be longer than demonstratives, which 104
demonstrative follows the noun, then the
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46 are always longer than ‘silence’, the hierarchy is pre- 105

47 relative clause follows the noun.30 106
dicted on parsing grounds.
48 107
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49 108
50 Given the theory of Hawkins,10,11 a prepositional 109
THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE
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51 language in which relatives preceded the noun, but 110

52 demonstratives followed, would create difficulties in
AUTONOMY OF SYNTAX AND 111
FUNCTIONAL EXPLANATION
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53 terms of recovering the constituent structure and 112

54 hence the meaning of the phrases that manifested 113
As noted above, a pervasive view is that once one
55 114
that particular correlation. characterizes a system as discrete and algebraic, as in
56 115
57 Consider another example of a robust typologi- formal grammar, one gives up any hope of explaining 116
58 cal generalization. Hawkins30 proposed the following that system functionally. The following quote from 117
59 hierarchy: two leading functionalists is typical: 118

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 Opinion wires.wiley.com/cogsci

1 The autonomy of syntax cuts off [sentence case where there is processing pressure to postpose 60
2 structure] from the pressures of communicative a proper subpart of some semantic unit or where 61
3 function. In the [formalist] vision, language is pure preference for topic before predication conflicts with 62
4 and autonomous, unconstrained and unshaped by pressure to have long elements before short elements, 63
5 64
purpose or function.31 as in Japanese. The evolutionary problem, then, is to
6 65
Bates and MacWhinney’s view is mistaken, provide grammar with the degree of stability rendering
7 66
8 however. Actually, it seems to be only linguists who it immune from the constant push-pull of conflicting 67
9 have this odd idea. In every other discipline that I am forces. A natural solution to the problem is to provide 68
10 aware of, formal and functional accounts are taken language with a relatively stable core immune to 69
11 to be complementary, not contradictory. Take, for the immanent pressure coming from all sides. That 70
12 example, a formal system like the game of chess. is, a natural solution is to embody language with 71
13 There exists a finite number of discrete rules. Given a structural system at its core. Put another way, 72
14 the layout of the board, the pieces, and how the an autonomous syntax as an intermediate system 73
15 pieces move, one can ‘generate’ every possible game between form and function is a clever design solution 74
16 of chess. But functional considerations went into the to the problem of how to make language both 75
17 76

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design of a system, namely to make it a pleasurable learnable and usable. This system allows language
18 77
pastime. And external factors can change the system. to be nonarbitrary enough to facilitate acquisition
19 78
20 In fact, rules of chess have changed over the centuries. and use and yet stable enough not be pushed this way 79
21 And they can change again if the international chess and that by the functional force of the moment. 80

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22 authority decides that they should. Furthermore, 81
23 in any game of chess, the moves are subject to 82

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24 the conscious will of the players, just as in the act 83
25 of speaking, there is the conscious decision of the CONCLUSION 84

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26 speaker to say something. In other words, chess is a 85
Formalism and functionalism in linguistics are often
27 formal system and is explained functionally. If chess 86
28 taken to be diametrically opposed approaches. How- 87
can be that way, then why not language? ever, close examination of the relevant phenomena
29 Or consider a biological example. Take any 88
30 reveals that the two are complementary, rather than 89
bodily organ, say, the liver. The liver can be described being irrevocably in opposition to each other. One
31 90
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32 as an autonomous structural system, but, still, it can be a formal linguist and a functional linguist at 91
33 has been shaped by its function and its use. The the same time, without there being any contradiction. 92
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34 liver evolved in response to selective pressure for a 93

35 more efficient role in digestion. And the liver can 94
36 be affected by external factors. A lifetime of heavy 95
37 drinking of alcohol can shape the structure of the liver ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 96
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38 for the worse. So, the liver, again, is an autonomous 97

39 structural system, but has been shaped functionally. I would like to thank Peter Culicover and two 98
40 So I do not see any merit in pointing to the correctness anonymous referees for their helpful input. 99
41 of external explanation as a wedge against generative 100
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42 101
grammar or formal approaches in general.
43 102
I close by offering some speculative remarks
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44 NOTES 103
45 on why syntax is autonomous. After all, there is 104
no logical necessity that it should be. We begin by a
I stress here ‘communicative’ function, because many
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46 105
47 observing that language serves many functions, which generative syntacticians have argued that the syntactic 106
48 pull on it in many different directions. For this reason, system reflects a disposition towards an efficient 107
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49 virtually all linguists agree that there can be no simple internal functioning (see, for example, Ref 9 and much 108
50 relationship between form and function. However, subsequent work). One of the few linguists who has 109
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51 several functional forces do seem powerful enough to consistently combined basic generative principles with 110
52 have ‘left their mark’ on grammar, among which are explanations based on communicative function is John 111
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53 the force pushing form and meaning into alignment A. Hawkins (see especially Refs 10,11 ). 112
54 (pressure for iconicity) and the force favoring the b While Subjacency is a constraint on grammars, 113
55 114
identification of the structure of the sentence as rapidly there seems little doubt that its origins lie in pro-
56 115
57 as possible (processing pressure). Even these two cessing demands.11,13 Some scholars have argued 116
58 pressures can conflict with each other, however—in that Subjacency effects are purely processing- 117
59 some cases dramatically. Consider, for example, any based,14,15 though such is not the majority position. 118

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1 60
2 61
3 62
4 REFERENCES 63
5 64
6 1. Postal PM. Aspects of Phonological Theory. New York: 16. Churchward CM. Tongan Grammar. London: Oxford 65
7 Harper and Row; 1968. University Press; 1953. 66
AQ2 8 67
2. Hopper PJ. Emergent grammar, vol. •13: Berkeley Lin- 17. Payne JR. Negation. In Shopen T, ed. Language Typol-
9 guistics Society; 1987, 139–157. ogy and Syntactic Description: Clause Structure, vol. 68
10 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1985, 69
11 3. Hajicová E. Prague School syntax and semantics. In 70
197–242.
12 Koerner EFK, Asher RE, eds. Concise History of the 71
Language Sciences: From the Sumerians to the Cogni- 18. Blevins JP. Periphrasis as syntactic exponence. In
13 72
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