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JSON Web Token Cheatsheet For Java

JSON Web Token Cheatsheet for Java

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Rizki Kurniawan
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
115 views

JSON Web Token Cheatsheet For Java

JSON Web Token Cheatsheet for Java

Uploaded by

Rizki Kurniawan
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
Available Formats
Download as PDF or read online on Scribd
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9123/22, 8:37 AM ISON Web Token for Java - OWASP Cheat Sheet Series JSON Web Token Cheat Sheet for Java Introduction Many applications use JSON Web Tokens (JWT) to allow the dient to indicete its identity for further exchange after authentication. From JWT.O: JSON Web Token (JWT) is an open standard (RFC 7519) that defines a compact and self- contained way for securely transmitting information between parties as a JSON object. This information can be verified and trusted because itis digitally signed. JWTs can be signed using a secret (with the HMAC algorithm) or a public/private key pair using RSA. JSON Web Token is used to carry information related to the identity and characteristics (claims) of ‘a client. This information is signed by the server in order for it to detect whether it was tampered with after sending itt the client. This will prevent an attacker from changing the identity or any characteristics (for example, changing the role from simple user to admin or change the client login). This token is created during authentication (is provided in case of successful authentication) and is verified by the server before any processing. Itis used by an application to allow a client to present a token representing the users “identity card! to the server and allow the server to verify the validity and integrity of the token in a secure way, all of this in a stateless and portable approach (portable in the way that client and server technologies can be different including also the transport channel even if HTTP is the most often used). Token Structure Token structure example taken from JWT.I0: [Base64 (HEADER) ] . [Base64 (PAYLOAD) ]..[Base64(SIGNATURE) | eyJnbGei04 JTUZT INiTsINRSCCTSTkpXVCII ey JzdNTi04TxHjMONTYSODKwTiwibaF tZST6TkpvaG4gRG91TimiVARtaWaionRydAV9. TJVA9SOrH7E2cBab3BRMHrHDCEFxjo¥ZgeF ONFH7HgQ Chunk 1: Header Intps:ifcheatshectseries.owasp.orgicheatsheetsliSON_Web_Token_for_Java_Cheat_Sheethtm! ane 9123122, 8:37 AM ISON Web Token for Java - OWASP Chest Sheet Series 4 “Hs256", 2 cuwr" } Chunk 2: Payload { sub": °1284567896", john Doe", true admin": + Chunk: Signature HMACSHA256( base64UrlEncode(header) + "." + base64UrlEncode(payload), KEY ) Objective This cheatsheet provides tips to prevent common security issues when using JSON Web Tokens (JWT) with Java. ‘The tips presented in this article are part of a Java project that was created to show the corect ‘way to handle creation and validation of JSON Web Tokens. You can find the Java project here, it uses the official JWT library. In the rest of the article, the term token refers to the JSON Web Tokens (JWT). Consideration about Using JWT Even if a JWT token is"easy"to use and allow to expose services (mostly REST sty) in a stateless way, i's not the solution that fits for all applications because it comes with some caveats, like for ‘example the question of the storage of the token (tackled in this cheatsheet) and cthers... If your application does net need to be fully stateless, you can considerusing traditional session system provided by all web frameworks and follow the advice from the dedicated session management cheat sheet, However, for stateless applications, when well implemented, its a good candidate. Intps:ifcheatshectseries.owasp.orgicheatsheetsliSON_Web_Token_for_Java_Cheat_Sheethtm! ane 9123122, 8:37 AM ISON Web Token for Java - OWASP Chest Sheet Series Issues None Hashing Algorithm ‘Symptom This attack, described here occurs when an attacker alters the token and changes the hashing algorithm to indicate, through, the none keyword, that the integrity of the token has already been verified. As explained in the link above some libraries treated tokens signed with the none algorithm as a valid token with a verified signature, so an attacker can alter the token claims and token will be trusted by the application, How to Prevent First, use a JWT library that is not exposed to this vulnerability. Last, during token validation, explicitly request that the expected algorithm was used. Implementation Example // ¥0C key ~ Block serialization and storage as String in JW# menory private transient byte[] keyHMAC = ...; /[Create a verification context for the token requesting //explicitly the use of the HMAC-256 hashing algorithm WIVerifier verifier = JWT. require(Algorithm.HYAC256(keyHMAC) ).build() ; /Nerify the token, if the verification fail then a exception is throm DecodedNT decodedToken = verifier .verify(token) ; Token Sidejacking symptom This attack occurs when a token has been intercepted/stolen by an attacker and they use it to gain access to the system using targeted user identity How to Prevent Away to prevent it is to add a “user context" in the token. A user context will be composed of the following information: Intps:ifcheatshectseries.owasp.orgicheatsheetsliSON_Web_Token_for_Java_Cheat_Sheethtm! ane 9123/22, 8:37 AM ISON Web Token for Java - OWASP Cheat Sheet Series ‘+ Arandom tring thet will be generated during the authentication phase. it willbe sent to the lient as an hardened cookie (fags: HitpOnly + Secure + Samesite + cookie prefixes). + ASHA256hash of the random string will be stored in the token (instead of the raw value) in order to prevent any XSSissues allowing the attacker to read the random string value and setting the expected cookie. IP addresses should not be used because thete are some legitimate situations in which the IP address can change during the same session. For example, when an user accesses an application through their mobile device and the mobile operator changes during the exchange, then the IP address mey (often) change. Moreover, using the IP address can potentially cause issues with European GDPR compliance. During token validation, if the received token does nct contain the right context (for example fit has been replayed), then it must be rejected Implementation example Code to create the token after successful authentication. // FIC key ~ Block serialization and storage as String in JVM menory private transient byte[] keyHMAC = ...; // Random data generator private SecureRandom secureRandom = new SecureRandom() ; //Generate a random string that will constitute the fingerprint for this user byte[] randomFgp = new byte[5@]; secureRandon .nextBytes(randonF gp) ; ‘String userFingerprint = DatatypeConverter ,printHexBinary(randonFgp); //hdd the fingerprint in a hardened cookie - Add cookie manually because //SameSite attribute is not supported by javax.servlet .hhttp.Cookie class String FingerprintCookie = "_Secure-Fgp=" + userFingerprint ; SameSite=Strict; HttpOnly; Secure”; response. addHeacer( "Set-Cookie, fingerprintCookie); //Compute 2 SHA256 hash of the fingerprint in order to store the //fingerprint hash (instead of the raw value) in the token //to prevent an XSS to be able to read the fingerprint and //set the expected cookie itself NessageDigest digest = MessageDigest .getInstance("SHA-256"); byte[] userFingerprintDigest = digest.digest(userFingerprint .getBytes(“utt-8")); String userFingerprintHash DatatypeConverter .printHexBinary(userFingerprintDigest); /[oreate the token with @ validity of 15 minutes and client context (Fingerprint) information Intps:ifcheatshectseries.owasp.orgicheatsheetsliSON_Web_Token_for_Java_Cheat_Sheethtm! ana 9123/22, 8:37 AM ISON Web Token for Java - OWASP Cheat Sheet Series Calendar ¢ = Calendar.getInstance() ; Date now = ¢.getTime(); e.add (Calendar .MINJTE, 15); Date expirationDate = c.getTime() Map headerClains = new HashNap<>(); headerClains.put("typ", "JNT"); String token = JWT create() .WwithStb ject (login) «huithExpiresAt (expirationdate) swithIssuer (this. issuerID) cwithIssuedat(now) -withNotBefore (now) cwithClaim("userFingerprint”, userFingerprintHash) «swithHeader (headerClaims) sign Algorithm. HAC256 (this.keyHMAC) ); Code to validate the token. 71 HMAC key - Block serialization and storage as String in JV memory private transient bytel] KeyHMAC = .».; //Retrieve the user fingerprint from the dedicated cookie String userFingerprint = null; if (request .getCockies() != null && request.getCookies().length > @) { List- cookies Arrays.strean(request .getCookies()) «collect (Collectors.toList()); Optional cookie = cookies.stream().filter(c -> "_.Secure-Fgp" sequals(¢.getNane())) -findFirst() ; if (cookie.isPresent()) { userFingerprint = cookie.get().getValue() ; } 7 [Compute 2 SHA256 hash of the received fingerprint in cookie in order to compare //it to the fingerprint hash stored in the token MessageDigest digest = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256"); byte[] userFingerprintDigest = digest. digest(userFingerprint .getBytes( "utf-8")) ; String userFingerprintHlash = DatatypeConverter .printHexBinary(userFingerprintDigest); /[ereate a verification context for the token JWIVerifier verifier = JNT.require(Algorithm .HYAC256(keyHMAC) ) swithTssuer(issuerID) swithClaim("userFingerprint", userFingerprintHash) sbuild(); /Nerify the token, if the verification fail then an exception is throm DecodedWT decodedToken = verifier .verify( token); Intps:ifcheatshectseries.owasp.orgicheatsheetsliSON_Web_Token_for_Java_Cheat_Sheethtm! sine 9123122, 8:37 AM ISON Web Token for Java - OWASP Chest Sheet Series No Built-In Token Revocation by the User ‘Symptom This problem is inherent to JWT because a token only becomes invalid when it expires. The user has no built-in feature to explicitly revoke the validity of a token. This means that if itis stolen, a user cannot revoke the token itself thereby blocking the attacker. How to Prevent ‘Away to protect against this is to implement a token block list that will be used to mimic the “logout feature that exists with traditional session management system. The block list will keep a digest (SHA-256 encoded in HEX) of the token with a revocation date. This entry must endure at least until the expiration of the token. When the user wants to “logout" then it call a dedicated service that will add the provided user token to the block list resulting in an immediate invalidation of the token for further usage in the application. Implementation Example BLOCK LIST STORAGE A database table with the following structure will be used as the central block list storage. create table if not exists revoked_token(jwt_token_digest varchar(258) prinary key, revocation_date tinestenp default now()); ‘TOKEN REVOCATION MANAGEMENT Code in charge of adding a token to the block list and checking if a token is revoked. pe % Handle the revocation of the token (logout). % Use @ DB in order to allow miltiple instances to check for revoked token * and allow cleanup at centralized DB level. */ public class TokenRevoker { /** DB Comection */ @Resource(” jdbe/storeDS") private DataSource storeDS; pe * Verify if a digest encoded in HEX of the ciphered token is present * in the revocation table Intps:ifcheatshectseries.owasp.orgicheatsheetsliSON_Web_Token_for_Java_Cheat_Sheethtm! ene 9123/22, 8:37 AM ISON Web Token for Java - OWASP Cheat Sheet Series * @param jwtInHex Token encoded in HEX * ereturn Presence flag * @throws Exception Tf any issue occur during conmunication with DB * public boolean isTokenRevoked(String jwtInHex) throws Exception { boolean tokentsPresent = false; Af (jwtInHex {= null @& !jwtInHex.trim().istimpty()) { 1/Decode the ciphered token byte[] cipheredtoken = DatatypeConverter .parseHexBinary( jutInHex) ; //Compute 2 S+A256 of the ciphered token MessageDigest digest = MessageDigest .getInstance( "SHA-256"); byte[] cipheredTokenDigest = digest .digest(cipheredToken) ; String jwtTokenDigestinex = DatatypeConverter .printHexBinary(cipheredTokenDigest) ; 1/Search token digest in HEX in DB ‘try (Connection con = this.storeDS.getConnection()) { String query = "select jwt_token_digest fron revoked_token where Jwt_token.digest = 2°; try (Preparedstatenent pStatenent = con.preparestatenent(query)) { pStatenent.setString(1, jweTokenDigestInHex) ; try (Resultset rSet = pStatenent .executecuery()) { tokentsPresent = rSet.next() ; ) + return tokenTsPresent; pe % Add 2 digest encoded in HEX of the ciphered token to the revocation token table + @param jwtInHex Token encoded in HEX * @throws Exception If any issue occur during communication with DB *7 public void revokeToken(String jwtInHex) throws Exception { Af (jwtIniex != null && !wtInHex.trim().istinpty()) { [Decode the ciphered token byte[] cipheredToken = DatatypeConverter .parseHexBinary( jwtInHex) ; 1/ompute 2 $8256 of the ciphered token Nessagedigest digest = MessageDigest .getInstance(“SHA-256"); byte[] cipheredtokenDigest = digest .digest(cipheredToken); String jwtTokenDigestiniex = DatatypeConverter.printHexBiinary(cipheredTokenDigest) ; //Oheck if the token digest in HEX is already in the DB and add it if it Intps:ifcheatshectseries.owasp.orgicheatsheetsliSON_Web_Token_for_Java_Cheat_Sheethtm! mma 9123122, 8:37 AM ISON Web Token for Java - OWASP Chest Sheet Series is absent if (!this.isTokenRevoked(jwtInHex)) { try (Connection con = this.storeDs.getconnection()) { String query = “insert into revoked_token(jwt_token_ digest) values(?)"; int insertedRecorécount; try (PreparedStotenent pStatenent = con.prepareStaterent(query)) pStatement.cetString(1, jwtTokenDigestInHex) ; insertedRecordCount = pStatement .executelpdate() ; > if (ansertedRecordcount = 1) { ‘hrow new TllegalStateException(“Nunber of inserted record is invalid,” + "1 expected but is " + insertedRecordCount) ; ) ; } } } Token Information Disclosure ‘symptom This attack occurs when an attacker has access to a token (or a set of tokens) and extracts information stored in it (the contents cf JWT tokens are base64 encoded, but is not encrypted by default) in order to obtain information about the system. Information can be for exarmple the security roles, login format... Howto Prevent ‘A way to protect against this attack is to cipher the token using, for example, a symmetric algaithm, It's also important to pretect the ciphered data against attack like Padding Oracle or any other attack using ayptanalysis. In order to achieve all these goals, the AES-GCIM algorithm is used which provides Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data. More details from here: AEAD primitive (Authenticated Encryption with Associated Date) provides functionality of symmetric authenticated encryption Intps:ifcheatshectseries.owasp.orgicheatsheetsliSON_Web_Token_for_Java_Cheat_Sheethtm! ane 9123/22, 8:37 AM ISON Web Token for Java - OWASP Cheat Sheet Series Implementations of this primitive are secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks When encrypting a plaintext one can optionally provide associated data that should be authenticated but not encrypted. That is, the encryption with associated data ensures authenticity (ie. who the sender is) and integrity (ie. da secrecy has not been tampered with) of that data, but not its See RFCS116: https://tools. ietf.org/html/rfes116 Note: Here ciphering is added mainly to hide intemal information butit’s very important to remember that the frst protection against tampering of the JWT token is the signature. So, the token signature andits verification must be always in place. Implementation Example TOKEN GPHERING Code in charge of managing the ciphering. Google Tink dedicated crypto library is used to handle ciphering operations in order to use built-in best practices provided by this library. pe + Handle ciphering and deciphering of the token using AES-GOM. * + @see "https: //ai thub.com/google/ tink /blob /master /docs /JAVA-HONTO.md" */ public class TokenCipher { * Constructor - Register AEAD configuration + @throws Exception If any issue occur during AEAD configuration registration */ public TokenCipher() throws Exception { AeadConfig.register(); y rn * Cipher a JWT * @param jut Token to cipher * @param keysetHandle Pointer to the keyset handle * @retumn The ciphered version of the token encoded in HEX * @throws Exception If any issue occur during token ciphering operation Intps:ifcheatshectseries.owasp.orgicheatsheetsliSON_Web_Token_for_Java_Cheat_Sheethtm! one 9123/22, 8:37 AM ISON Web Token for Java - OWASP Cheat Sheet Series */ public String cipherToken(String jwt, KeysetHandle keysetHlandle) throws Exception { i Nerify paraneters if (jut == null || jwt.isEmpty() || keysetHandle == null) { ‘throw new TllegalArgurentException("Both parameters must be specified!"); //Get the primitive head aead = AeadFactory.getPrimitive(keysetHandle) ; W/Cipher the token byte[] cipheredToken = aead.encrypt(jwt.getBytes(), nul); return DatatypeConverter .printHexBinary(cipheredToken) ; } i * Decipher a JNT * @param jwtInHex Token to decipher encoded in HEX * @param keysetHandle Pointer to the keyset handle * @return The token in clear text * @throvs Exception If any issue occur during token deciphering operation * public String decipherToken(String jwtInHex, KeysetHandle keysetHandle) throws Exception { /Nerify paraneters if (jwtInHex = null || jwtInHex.isEmpty() || keysetHandle == null) { ‘throw new TllegalArgurentException("Both parameters must be specified 1"); ) / [Decode the ciphered token byte] eipheredToken = DatatypeConver ter.parseHexBinary(jwtTnHex) ; //Get the prinitive head aead = AeadFactory.getPrimitive(keysetHandle) ; //Decipher the token byte[] decipheredToken = aead.decrypt(cipheredToken, null); return new String(decipheredToken) ; > } CREATION / VAUDATION OF THE TOKEN Use the token ciphering handler during the creation and the validation of the token. Load keys (ciphering key was generated and storedusing Google Tink) and setup cipher. Intps:ifcheatshectseries.owasp.orgicheatsheetsliSON_Web_Token_for_Java_Cheat_Sheethtm! sone 9123/22, 8:37 AM ISON Web Token for Java - OWASP Cheat Sheet Series //load keys from configuration text/json files in order to avoid to storing keys as 9 String in JVM menory privete transient byte[] keyHMAC = Files.readAlIBytes(Paths.get("sre", conf*, "key-hmac. txt”); private transient KeysetHandle keyCiphering CleartextkeysetHandle .read(JsonkeysetReader.withFile( Paths.get("src", “nain’, "conf", *key-ciphering. json”) toFile())) ; main", /finit token ciphering handler TokenCipher tokenCipher = new TokenCipher(); Token creation. //enerate the JIT token using the JNT API... //Cipher the token (String JSON representation) String cipheredToken = tokenCipher .cipherToken( token, this .keyCiphering) ; //Send the ciphered token encoded in HEX to the client in HITP response... Token validation. //Retrieve the ciphered token encoded in HEX from the HTTP request... /[ecipher the token String token = tokenCipher .decipherToken(cipheredToken, this-keyCiphering) ; /Nerify the token using the JWT APL... /Nerify access... Token Storage on Client Side ‘Symptom This oocurs when an application stores the token in a menner exhibiting the following behavior: ‘+ Automatically sent by the browser (Cookie storage). «+ Retrieved even ifthe browser is restarted (Use cf browser lacalStorage container). «+ Retrieved in case of XSS issue (Cookie accessible to JavaScript code or Token stored in broviserlocal/session storage). Howto Prevent 11. Store the token using the browser sessionStarage container. 2. Addit asa Bearer HTTP Authentication header with JaveScript when calling services. 3. Add fingerprint information to the token, Intps:ifcheatshectseries.owasp.orgicheatsheetsliSON_Web_Token_for_Java_Cheat_Sheethtm! sine 9123122, 8:37 AM ISON Web Token for Java - OWASP Chest Sheet Series By storing the token in browser sessionStorage container it exposes the token to being stolen through a XSS attack. However, fngerprints added to the token prevent reuse cf the stolen token by theattacker on their machine. To close a maximum of exploitation surfaces for an attacker, add a browser Content Security Policy to harden the execution context, Note: + Theremaining case is when an attacker uses the user's browsing context asa proxy touse the ‘target application through the legitimete user but the Content Security Policy can prevent ‘communication with non expected domains. « Its also possible to implement the authentication service in a way that the token is issued within a hardened cooke, but in this case, protection against a Cross-Site Request Forgery attack must be implemented Implementation Example JavaScript code to store the token after authentication. /* Wardle request for JWT token and local. storage*/ function authenticate() { const login = §(*#login” const postData = “logit val(); + encodeURIComponent (login) + “&password=test $.post(“/services/authenticate", postdata, function (data) { if (data.status = “Authentication successful!") { sessionStorage.setItem("token", data.token) ) else { sessionStorage. renovelten("token”); ) » -feil(function (JqXHR, textStatus, error) { sessionStorage.renoveTten("token") ; » JavaScript code to add the token as a Bearer HTTP Authentication header when calling a service, for example a service to validate token here. /* Handle request for JWT token validation */ function validateToken() { var token = sessionStorage.getIten( token"); if (token ndefined || token Intps:ifcheatshectseries.owasp.orgicheatsheetsliSON_Web_Token_for_Java_Cheat_Sheethtm! rane 9123122, 8:37 AM ISON Web Token for Java - OWASP Chest Sheet Series HinfoZone").removeClass(); jinfozone").addClase(“alert alert-warning"); $(*#infozone).text("Obtein a JWT token first :)"); rewurn; } S.ajax({ url: "/https/www.scribd.com/services/velidate’, type: "Post", beforesend: function (xhr) { xhr .setRequestHeader( "Authorization", "bearer ° + token); by success: function (data) { » error: function (jqXHR, textStatus, error) { hb Di; + Weak Token Secret ‘Symptom \When the token is protected using an HMAC based algorithm, the security of the tokenis entirely dependent on the strength of the secret used with the HMAC. If an attacker can obtain a valid JWT, they can then carry out an offline attack and attempt to crack the secret using tools such as John the Ripper or Hasheat, If they are successful, they Would then be able to modify the token andre-sign it withthe key they had obtained, This could let them escalate their privileges, compromise other users! accounts, or perform cther actions depending on the contentsof the JWT. There are anumber cf guides that document this processin greeter detail. Howto Prevent The simplest way to prevent this attackis to ensure that the sectet used to sign the JWTs is strong and unique, in order to make it harder for an attacker to crack. As this secret would never need to be typed by a human. it should be at least 64 characters, and generated using a secure source of randomness. Altematively, consider the use of tokens that are signed with RSA rather than using an HMAC and secret key. Further Reading Intps:ifcheatshectseries.owasp.orgicheatsheetsliSON_Web_Token_for_Java_Cheat_Sheethtm! sane 9123122, 8:37 AM ISON Web Token for Java - OWASP Chest Sheet Series ‘* (WT) (Attack). Playbook -A projectdocuments the knownattacks and potential security vuherabilties and misconfigurations of JSON Web Tokens. ¢ JWT Best Practices Internet Draft Intps:ifcheatshectseries.owasp.orgicheatsheetsliSON_Web_Token_for_Java_Cheat_Sheethtm!

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