Onsumer Atch Anada: Canadian Housing Prices - Beware of The Average
Onsumer Atch Anada: Canadian Housing Prices - Beware of The Average
Onsumer Atch Anada: Canadian Housing Prices - Beware of The Average
Economics
Avery Shenfeld (416) 594-7356 [email protected] Benjamin Tal (416) 956-3698 [email protected] Peter Buchanan (416) 594-7354 [email protected] Warren Lovely (416) 594-8041 [email protected] Krishen Rangasamy (416) 956-3219 [email protected] Emanuella Enenajor (416) 956-6527 [email protected]
Defying Gravity
Avg. National Residential House Price (y/y % chg) 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 -5.0
na da
an c an c
The average house price is still rising by 8.6% on a year-over-year basis. However, take Vancouver out of the picture and this rate slows to 5.6%. Exclude both
http://research. cibcwm.com/res/Eco/ EcoResearch.html
Ex -V
-0 ov 9 -0 M 9 ar -1 Ju 0 lN 10 ov M 10 ar -1 1
Ju l
CIBC World Markets Inc. PO Box 500, 161 Bay Street, Brookfield Place, Toronto, Canada M5J 2S8 Bloomberg @ WGEC1 (416) 594-7000 C I B C W o r l d M a r k e t s C o r p 3 0 0 M a d i s o n A v e n u e , N e w Yo r k , N Y 1 0 0 1 7 ( 2 1 2 ) 8 5 6 - 4 0 0 0 , ( 8 0 0 ) 9 9 9 - 6 7 2 6
Ex -V
&
To ro n
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
Ca
to
500
450
400
350
300
0.5
less than $500K, 64%
20 06
20 07
20 08
20 09
20 10
Source: Bloomberg
limited. Our analysis of data obtained from Landcor Data Corporation suggests that only 10% of the close to 4,500 transactions involving foreign money over the past five years were above the $1 million mark, with an average purchasing price of just under $600,000. In fact, according to the information provided by Landcor, foreign money accounted for only 2.6% of all sales (mostly condominiums) during the same period (Chart 2). However, that could be a serious underestimate, as it is based on where property tax assessments are mailed, and would exclude offshore buying on behalf of children or other local proxies. Furthermore, there are many reasons to believe that a significant portion of what is perceived to be buying by offshore investors is, in fact, driven by Chinese immigrants that are integrated into the community but still maintain strong links to mainland China, with many residing and working in China while their family establish roots in BC1. Note that, this activity is much more dominant in specific parts of the city, such as the west side. So looking beyond the average price numbers reveals a highly segmented and multi-dimensional market that is probably influenced by different forces. But even a multidimensional market can overshootand the likelihood is that prices in the Canadian market and its sub-segments are higher than what can be explained by factors such as income growth, rent and household formation. Given that, the housing market will eventually correct. The only question is what will be the mechanism of that
2
correction. A crash is, of course, the shortest route to equilibrium. But for such a scenario to materialize we need two pre-conditions: 1) a significant and quick rise in interest rates akin to the one that led to the 1991 recession and housing market correction, and/or 2) a high-risk mortgage market that is highly sensitive to any changes in economic realities, including hikes in interest rates. In fact, one can make the point that the US crash was a combination of these two conditions as the subprime market in the US started to melt only after the Fed began hiking and reset teaser rates, for hundreds of thousands of subprime mortgage holders, by roughly 400 basis points.
Chart 4
Pre-Conditions for a Crash in the Canadian Context In Canada, a sharp and brisk tightening cycle is unlikely. The market expects a gradual increase in short-term rates in the coming years (Chart 3). The rising number of mortgage holders that carry a variable rate mortgage (Chart 4) will be the first to feel the pain, but if history is any guide, they will return quickly to the comfort of a five-year fixed rate the minute the Bank of Canada starts hiking. What about the risk profile of the Canadian mortgage space? We zoom in on two sub-segments of the mortgage market that traditionally accounted for most defaults: mortgage holders that carry a debt-service ratio of more than 40% and those with less than 20% equity on their house. As illustrated in Chart 5, just over 6% of households have a debt service ratio of more than 40%a number that has risen by a full percentage point since 2008. Note, however, that this ratio is still well below the ratio seen in 2003, when the effective interest rate on debt was more than a full percentage point higher, and no correction in house prices ensued. All other things being equal, even a 300-basis-points rate hike by the Bank of Canada would take this ratio to only just over 8%. Not surprisingly, Vancouver has the highest ratio of households with high debt-service ratio, followed by Toronto (Chart 6). Moving on to the equity position, just over 17% of the Canadian residential real estate pool is in properties with
Chart 5
ALTA QUE
less than a 20% equity position. Note that this number has been rising over the past few years (Chart 7). More than 80% of households with less than 20% equity position are first time buyers. Digging deeper and looking at the households with both low equity positions and high debt-service ratios, we found that this fragile segment of the market accounts for only 4.6% of total mortgagesa number that has been on an upward trend over the past few years (Chart 8). Shock the system with a 300-basis-points rate hike
Chart 7
18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8
r0 3
r0 4
r0 5
r0 6
r0 7
r0 8
r0 9
r1 0
Ap
Ap
Ap
Ap
Ap
Ap
Ap
Effective Mortgage Interest Rates (L) Share of Households with >40% service ratios (R)
Ap
r1 1
Apr 08
Apr 09
Apr 10
Apr 11
and that number would rise to a still-tempered 6.5%. Historically, even in that group, the default rate has been well below 1%. Thus, short of a huge macro shock, there does not appear to be the risk of large scale forced selling that would typically be the trigger for a precipitous plunge in the national average house price. As a result, while house prices are likely to adjust as interest rates eventually climb, the national pace of any correction is likely to be gradual. That could still entail a period in which housing underperforms other assets as an investment class, until rising incomes and a tame price trajectory brings the market back to equilibrium.
Note:
This report is issued and approved for distribution by (a) in Canada, CIBC World Markets Inc., a member of the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada, the Toronto Stock Exchange, the TSX Venture Exchange and a Member of the Canadian Investor Protection Fund, (b) in the United Kingdom, CIBC World Markets plc, which is regulated by the Financial Services Authority, and (c) in Australia, CIBC Australia Limited, a member of the Australian Stock Exchange and regulated by the ASIC (collectively, CIBC) and (d) in the United States either by (i) CIBC World Markets Inc. for distribution only to U.S. Major Institutional Investors (MII) (as such term is defined in SEC Rule 15a-6) or (ii) CIBC World Markets Corp., a member of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. U.S. MIIs receiving this report from CIBC World Markets Inc. (the Canadian broker-dealer) are required to effect transactions (other than negotiating their terms) in securities discussed in the report through CIBC World Markets Corp. (the U.S. broker-dealer). This report is provided, for informational purposes only, to institutional investor and retail clients of CIBC World Markets Inc. in Canada, and does not constitute an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any securities discussed herein in any jurisdiction where such offer or solicitation would be prohibited. This document and any of the products and information contained herein are not intended for the use of private investors in the United Kingdom. Such investors will not be able to enter into agreements or purchase products mentioned herein from CIBC World Markets plc. The comments and views expressed in this document are meant for the general interests of wholesale clients of CIBC Australia Limited. This report does not take into account the investment objectives, financial situation or specific needs of any particular client of CIBC. Before making an investment decision on the basis of any information contained in this report, the recipient should consider whether such information is appropriate given the recipients particular investment needs, objectives and financial circumstances. CIBC suggests that, prior to acting on any information contained herein, you contact one of our client advisers in your jurisdiction to discuss your particular circumstances. Since the levels and bases of taxation can change, any reference in this report to the impact of taxation should not be construed as offering tax advice; as with any transaction having potential tax implications, clients should consult with their own tax advisors. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. The information and any statistical data contained herein were obtained from sources that we believe to be reliable, but we do not represent that they are accurate or complete, and they should not be relied upon as such. All estimates and opinions expressed herein constitute judgments as of the date of this report and are subject to change without notice. This report may provide addresses of, or contain hyperlinks to, Internet web sites. CIBC has not reviewed the linked Internet web site of any third party and takes no responsibility for the contents thereof. Each such address or hyperlink is provided solely for the recipients convenience and information, and the content of linked third-party web sites is not in any way incorporated into this document. Recipients who choose to access such third-party web sites or follow such hyperlinks do so at their own risk. 2011 CIBC World Markets Inc. All rights reserved. Unauthorized use, distribution, duplication or disclosure without the prior written permission of CIBC World Markets Inc. is prohibited by law and may result in prosecution.