MODULE 4: CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSALS TO COMMIT A FELONY (ART.

8, RPC) AND FELONIES AS

TO SEVERITY (ART. 7 AND 9, RPC)

ARTICLE 7. When Light Felonies are Punishable. — Light felonies are punishable only when they have been
consummated, with the exception of those committed against person or property.

ARTICLE 9. Grave Felonies, Less Grave Felonies and Light Felonies. — Grave felonies are those to which the
law attaches the capital punishment or penalties which in any of their periods are afflictive, in accordance with
article 25 of this Code.

ARTICLE 25. Penalties Which May Be Imposed. — The penalties which may be imposed, according to this
Code, and their different classes, are those included in the following:

Principal Penalties
Capital punishment:
Death.
Afflictive penalties:
Reclusión perpetua,
Reclusión temporal,
Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification,
Perpetual or temporary special disqualification,
Prisión mayor.
Correctional penalties:
Prisión correccional,
Arresto mayor,
Suspensión,
Destierro.
Light penalties:
Arresto menor,
Public censure.
Penalties common to the three preceding classes:
Fine, and
Bond to keep the peace.
Accessory Penalties
Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification,
Perpetual or temporary special disqualification,
Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the profession or calling.
Civil interdiction,
Indemnification,
Forfeiture or confiscation of instruments and proceeds of the offense,
Payment of costs.

1. Dungo v. People, G.R. No. 209464, 1 July 2015

G.R. No. 209464 July 1, 2015

DANDY L. DUNGO and GREGORIO A. SIBAL, JR., Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

The fraternal contract should not be signed in blood, celebrated with pain, marred by injuries, and
perpetrated through suffering. That is the essence of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8049 or the Anti-Hazing Law
of 1995.

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the April 26, 2013 Decision 1
and the October 8, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
05046, which affirmed the February 23, 2011 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Calamba City
(RTC). The RTC found petitioners Dandy L. Dungo (Dungo) and Gregorio A. Sibal, Jr. (Sibal), guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049 and sentenced them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The Facts

On February 1, 2006, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Calamba, Laguna, filed the Information 4 against the
petitioners before the R TC, the accusatory portion of which reads: That on or about 2:30 in the early morning
of January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol, Calamba ,City, Province of Laguna and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, during an initiation rite and being then
members of Alpha Phi Omega fraternity and present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty other
members and officers, whose identity is not yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault and use personal violence upon one M4-RLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof and as
condition for his admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him to physical harm, resulting to his death, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
On February 7, 2006, upon motion, the RTC admitted the Amended Information 5 which reads: That on
or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol,
Calamba City, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above name
accused, during a planned initiation rite and being then officers and members of Alpha Phi Omega fraternity
and present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and officers, whose identity is
not yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and use
personal violence upon one MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof and as condition for
his admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him to physical harm, resulting to his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.

On February 7, 2006, Dungo filed a motion to quash for lack of probable cause, 6 but it was denied by the trial
court because the ground cited therein was not provided by law and jurisprudence. When arraigned, the
petitioners pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.7 Thereafter, trial ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented twenty (20) witnesses to prove the crime charged. Their testimonies are
summarized as follows:

At around 3:20 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, the victim Marlon Villanueva (Villanueva) was
brought to the emergency room of Dr. Jose P. Rizal District Hospital (JP Rizal Hospital). Dr. Ramon
Masilungan (Dr. Masilungan), who was then the attending physician at the emergency room, observed that
Villanueva was motionless, not breathing and had no heartbeat. Dr. Masilungan tried to revive Villlanueva for
about 15 to 30 minutes. Villanueva, however, did not respond to the resuscitation and was pronounced dead.
Dr. Masilungan noticed a big contusion hematoma on the left side of the victim's face and several injuries on
his arms and legs. He further attested that Villanueva 's face was cyanotic, meaning that blood was no longer
running through his body due to lack of oxygen; and when he pulled down Villanueva's pants, he saw large
contusions on both legs, which extended from the upper portion of the thighs, down to the couplexial portion,
or back of the knees.

Dr. Masilungan disclosed that two (2) men brought Villanueva to the hospital. The two told him that they
found Villanueva lying motionless on the ground at a store in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City, and brought him
to the hospital. When he asked them where they came from, one of them answered that they came from Los
Baños, Laguna, en route to San Pablo City. He questioned them on how they found Villanueva, when the
latter was in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City. One of the men just said that they were headed somewhere else.

Dr. Masilungan reduced his findings in a medico-legal report.8 Due to the nature, extent and location of the
injuries, he opined that Villanueva was a victim of hazing. He was familiar with hazing injuries because he
had undergone hazing himself when he was a student, and also because of his experience in treating victims
of hazing incidents.

Dr. Roy Camarillo (Dr. Camarillo), Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory
(PNP-CL) in Region IV, Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Calamba City, testified that he performed an autopsy
on the body of Villanueva on January 14, 2006 and placed down his findings in an autopsy report. 9 Upon
examination of the body, he found various external injuries in the head, trunk and extremities. There were
thirty-three (33) external injuries, with various severity and nature. He concluded that the cause of death was
subdural hemorrhage due to head injury contusion-hematoma. Based on multiple injuries and contusions on
the body, and his previous examinations of hazing injuries, Dr. Camarillo opined that these injuries were
hazing-related. During the autopsy, he retrieved two (2) matchsticks from the cadaver with the marking of
Alpha Phi Omega (APO) Fraternity.10
Susan Ignacio (Ignacio) was the owner of the sari-sari store located at Purok 5, Pansol, Calamba City, in front
of Villa Novaliches Resort, which was barely ten steps away. On January 13, 2006, at around 8:30 to 9:00
o'clock in the evening, she was tending her store when she saw a jeepney with more than twenty (20)
persons arrive at the resort. Ignacio identified Dungo as the person seated beside the driver of the jeepney. 11
She estimated the ages of these persons in the group to be between 20 to 30 years old. They were in civilian
clothes, while the other men wore white long-sleeved shirts. Before entering the resort, the men and women
shook hands and embraced each other. Three (3) persons, riding on a single motorcycle, also arrived at the
resort.

Ignacio saw about fifteen (15) persons gather on top of the terrace of the resort who looked like they were
praying, and then the lights of the resort were turned off. Later that evening, at least three (3) of these persons
went to her store to buy some items. During her testimony, she was shown photographs and she identified
Christopher Braseros and Sibal as two of those who went to her store. 12 It was only on the morning of January
14, 2006 that she learned from the policemen visiting the resort that the deceased person was Villanueva.

Donato Magat (Magat), a tricycle driver plying the route of Pansol, Calamba City, testified that at around 3:00
o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, he was waiting for passengers at the comer of Villa Novaliches
Resort. A man approached him and told him that someone inside the resort needed a ride.
Magat went to the resort and asked the two (2) men at the gate who needed a ride. Afterwards, he saw three
(3) men in their 20's carrying another man, who looked very weak, like a vegetable, towards his tricycle.
Magat touched the body of the man being carried and sensed it was cold.

Magat asked the men what happened to their companion. They replied that he had too much to drink. Then
they instructed Magat to go to the nearest hospital. He drove the tricycle to JP Rizal Hospital. Upon their
arrival, two of his passengers brought their unconscious companion inside the emergency room, while their
other companion paid the tricycle fare. Magat then left to go home. Several days after, he learned that the
person brought to the hospital had died.

Abelardo Natividad (Natividad) and Seferino Espina y Jabay (Espina) were the security guards on duty at JP
Rizal Hospital, from 11 :00 o'clock in the evening of January 13, 2006 until 7:00 o'clock in the morning of
January 14, 2006. In the early morning of January 14, 2006, two men, who signed on the
logbook13 under the names Brandon Gonzales and Jerico Paril, brought the lifeless body of a person.
Pursuant to the standard operating procedure of the hospital, the security guards did not allow the two men
to leave the hospital because they called the police station .so that an investigation could be conducted. Two
policemen arrived later at the hospital. During his testimony, Natividad identified Sibal and Dupgo as the two
persons who brought Villanueva to the hospital.

PO2 Alaindelon Ignacio (P02 Ignacio). testified that on January 14, 2006 at around 3:30 o'clock in the early
morning, Natividad called up the PNP Calamba City Station to report that a lifeless body of a man was
brought to JP Rizal Hospital. When P02 Ignacio arrived, he saw Villanueva' s corpse with contusions and
bite marks all over his body. P02 Ignacio and his policemen companions then brought Dungo and Sibal to
the police station. He asked them about what happened, but they invoked their right to remain silent. The
policemen then proceeded to Brgy. Pansol at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning. After finding Villa
Novaliches Resort, they knocked on the door and the caretaker, Maricel Capillan (Capillan), opened it.
The police asked Capillan if there were University of the Philippines Los Baños (UP Los Baños) students
who rented the resort on the evening of January 13, 2006. Capillan said yes and added that about twenty
(20) persons arrived onboard a jeepney and told her that they would be renting the resort from 9:30 o'clock
in the evening up to 7:00 o'clock the following morning.

Gay Czarina Sunga (Sunga) was a food technology student at UP Los Baños during the academic year of
2005-2006 and a member of the Symbiosis UPLB Biological Society. Around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
January 13, 2006, she was at their organization's tambayan in the UPLB Biological Sciences Building, when
she noticed three (3) men seated two meters away from her. She identified the two of the three men as Sibal
and Dungo.14 They were wearing black shirts with the logo of APO. Later at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, two
more men arrived and, with their heads bowed, approached the three men. One of them was Villanueva, who
was carrying a 5-gallon water container. Dungo then stood up and asked Villanueva why the latter did not
report to him when he was just at their tambayan. Dungo then punched Villanueva twice, but the latter just
kept quiet with his head bowed. Fifteen minutes later, all the men left.

Joey Atienza (Atienza) had been a good friend of Villanueva since 2004. They were roommates at the UP
Los Baños Men's Dormitory and housemates at the DPS Apartment in Umali Subdivision, Los Baños,
Laguna. According to Atienza, on January 9, 2006, Villanueva introduced him to Daryl Decena (Decena) as
his APO - Theta Chapter batchmate, who was also to undergo final initiation rites on January 13, 2006.

Severino Cuevas, Director of the Students Affairs at UP Los Baños, testified that Dungo and Sibal were both
members of the APO Fraternity, and that there was no record of any request for initiation or hazing activity
filed by the said fraternity.

McArthur Padua of the Office of the Registrar, UP Los Baños, testified that Villanueva was a B.S. Agricultural
Economics student at the UP Los Baños,15 as evidenced by his official transcript of record.16

Atty. Eleno Peralta and Dina S. Carlos, officers of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) of the UP Los
Baños, testified that an administrative disciplinary case was filed on March 31, 2006 against the APO
Fraternity regarding the death of Villanueva. They confirmed that Capilla of Villa Novaliches Resort and
Irene Tan (Tan) of APO Sorority Theta Chapter appeared as witnesses for the complainant. 17

Roman Miguel De Jesus, UP - Office of the Legal Aid (UP-OLA) supervising student, testified that he met
Tan of the APO Sorority sometime between July and August 2006 in UP Diliman: to convince her to testify in
the criminal case. Tan, however, refused because she feared for her safety. She said that after testifying in
the SDT hearing, her place in Imus, Cavite was padlocked and vandalized.

Evelyn Villanueva, mother of victim Villanueva, testified that, as a result of the death of her son, her family
incurred actual damages consisting of medical, burial and funeral expenses in the aggregate amount of
₱140,000.00 which were evidenced by receipts.18 Her husband also incurred travel expenses in the amount
of ₱7,000.00 in returning to the Philippines to attend his son's wake and burial, as supported by a plane
ticket.19 She further attested that she experienced mental anguish, sleepless nights, substantial weight loss,
and strained family relationship as a result of her son's death.

Version of the Defense

The defense presented seven (7) witnesses to prove the innocence of the petitioners. Their testimonies are
summarized as follow:

Richard Cornelio (Cornelio), an APO Fraternity member, testified that on January 13, 2006, around 4:00 to
4:30 o'clock in the afternoon, he met Dungo at the UP Los Baños Graduate School. Dungo asked him if he
would attend the initiation ceremony, and Cornelio answered in the negative because he had other things to
do. At 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Cornelio again met Dungo and his girlfriend while eating
a hamburger at the Burger Machine along Raymundo Street, Umali Subdivision, Los Baños, Laguna
(Raymundo Street). He asked Dungo if he would attend the initiation ceremony.
Dungo replied that he would not because he and his girlfriend had something to do.

Ana Danife Rivera (Rivera), the girlfriend of Dungo, testified that on January 13, 2006 at around 1 :00
o'clock in the afternoon, Dungo came and visited her at her boarding house on Raymundo Street.
Around 4:00 o'clock of the same afternoon, they went to the UP Los Baños Graduate School and saw
Cornelio. Afterwards, they went back to her boarding house and stayed there from 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon to 7:00 o'clock in the evening. Then, they went to Lacxo Restaurant for dinner and left at around
10:00 o'clock in the evening. On their way back to her boarding house, they encountered Cornelio again at
the Burger Machine. Dungo then stayed and slept at her boarding house. Around 2:00 o'clock in the early
morning of January 14, 2006, they were roused from their sleep by a phone call from Sibal, asking Dungo to
go to a resort in Pansol, Calamba City. Dungo then left the boarding house.

Dungo testified that around 1:00 o'clock in the early afternoon of January 13, 2006, he arrived at the
boarding house of his girlfriend, Rivera, on Raymundo Street. At around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, they
went to the UP Los Baños Graduate School and inquired about the requirements for a master's degree.
They walked back to the boarding house and met Cornelio. They talked about their fraternity's
,final initiation ceremony for that night in Pansol, Calamba City. Dungo and Rivera then reached the latter's
boarding house around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. At around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, they went out for
dinner at the Lacxo Restaurant, near Crossing Junction, Los Baños. They ate and stayed at the restaurant for
at least one and a half hours. Then they walked back to the boarding house of Rivera and, along the way,
they met Cornelio again at the Burger Machine along Raymundo Street. Cornelio asked Dungo if he would
attend their fraternity's final initiation ceremony, to which he replied in the negative. Dungo and Rivera
reached the boarding house around 9:00 o'clock in the evening and they slept there.

Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of January 14, 2006, Dungo was roused from his sleep because
Sibal was palling him on his cellphone. Sibal asked for his help, requesting him to go to Villa Novaliches
Resort in Pansol, Calamba City. Upon Dungo 's arrival at the resort, Sibal led him inside. There, he saw
Rudolfo Castillo (Castillo), a fellow APO fraternity brother, and Villanueva, who was unconscious. Dungo told
them that they should bring Villanueva to the hospital. They all agreed, and Castillo called a tricycle that
brought them to JP Rizal Hospital. He identified himself before the security guard as Jerico Paril because he
was scared to tell his real name.

Gilbert Gopez (Gopez) testified that he was the Grand Chancellor of the APO -Theta Chapter for years 2005-
2006. At around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of January 13, 2006, he was at the tambayan of their fraternity in
UP Los Baños because their neophytes would be initiated that night. Around 8:30 o'clock in the evening, they
met their fraternity brothers in Bagong Kalsada, Los Baños. He noticed that their neophyte, Villanueva, was
with Castillo and that there was a bruise on the left side of his face. Then they boarded a jeepney and
proceeded to Villa Novaliches Resort in Pansol, Calamba City. There, Gopez
instructed Sibal to take Villanueva to the second floor of the resort. He confronted Castillo as to what
happened to Villanueva. Around 11:00 or 11:30 o'clock in the evening, Gopez decided to cancel the final
rites. He told Sibal to stay at the resort and accompany Villanueva and Castillo. Together with the other
neophytes, Gopez left the resort and went back to UP Los Baños.

Sibal testified that he was a DOST Scholar at the UP Los Baños from 2002 to 2006, taking up B.S.
Agricultural Chemistry. He was a Brother Actuary of the APO - Theta Chapter, and was in charge of fraternity
activities, such as tree planting, free medical and dental missions, and blood donations. On January 13,
2006, at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, he was at the fraternity's tambayan for the final initiation rites of
their neophytes. After preparing the food for the initiation rites, Sibal, together with some neophytes, went to
Bagong Kalsada, Los Baños, where he saw fellow fraternity brother Castillo with their neophyte Villanueva,
who had a bruised face. Thereafter, they boarded a jeepney and proceeded to Villa Novaliches Resort in
Pansol, Calamba City. Once inside the resort, he accompanied Villanueva upstairs for the latter to take a
rest. A few minutes later, he went down and confronted Castillo about the bruises on Villanueva's face. He
was angry and irritated with Castillo. He then stayed outside the resort until Gopez and the other neophytes
came out and told him that the final initiation rite was cancelled, and that they were returning to UP Los
Baños. Sibal wanted to go with them but ;he was ordered to stay with Villanueva and Castillo.

After the group of Gopez left, Sibal checked on the condition of Villanueva, who was sleeping on the second;
floor of the resort. Then he went outside for one hour, or until 1 :00 o 'dock in the early morning of January 14,
2006. Sibal entered the resort again and saw Villanueva, who looked unconscious, seated in one of the
benc6es on the ground floor. Sibal inquired about Villanueva's condition but he was ignored by Castillo. He
then called Dungo for help. After Dungo arrived at the resort, they hailed a tricycle and brought Villanueva to
JP Rizal Hospital. There, he gave a false name to the security guard as he heard that Dungo had done the
same.

The RTC Ruling

On February 23, 2011, the RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of violating Section 4 of the Anti-
Hazing Law and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial court stated that the
prosecution established the presence of Dungo and Sibal (1) at the UP Los Banos Campus on January 13,
2006 around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, by the testimony of Sunga and (2) at the Villa Novaliches Resort
around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day by the testimony of Ignacio. With the extensive
testimonies of Dr. Masilungan and Dr. Camarillo, the prosecution also proved that Villanueva died from
hazing injuries.
According to the RTC, the evidence of the prosecution undeniably proved that Villanueva, a UP Los Bafios
student, was a neophyte of the APO - Theta Chapter Fraternity; that Dungo and Sibal were members of the
said fraternity; that on the evening of January 13, 2006, Dungo and Sibal, together with the other fraternity
members, officers and alumni, brought and transported Villanueva and two other neophytes to Villa
Novaliches Resort at Barangay Pansol, Calamba City, for the final initiation rites; that the initiation rites were
conducted inside the resort, performed under the cover of darkness and secrecy; that due to the injuries
sustained by Villanueva, the fraternity members and the other two neophytes haphazardly left the resort; and
that Dungo and Sibal boarded a tricycle and brought the lifeless body of Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital,
where Villanueva was pronounced dead.
The RTC explained that even if there was no evidence that Dungo and Sibal participated to bodily assault
and harm the victim, it was irrefutable that they brought Villanueva to the resort for their final initiation rites.
Clearly, they did not merely induce Villanueva to attend the final initiation rites, but they also brought him to
Villa Novaliches Resort.

The RTC held that the defense of denial and alibi were self-serving negative assertions. The defense of
denial and alibi of Dungo, which was corroborated by the testimony of his girlfriend Rivera and his co-
fraternity brother, could not be given credence. The witnesses presented by the defense were partial and
could not be considered as disinterested parties. The defense of denial of Sibal likewise failed. The
corroborative testimonies of his fraternity brothers were suspect because they had so much at stake in the
outcome of the criminal action.

The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Dandy Dungo and Gregorio Sibal GUILTY of violating Section 4
of the Anti-Hazing Law and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and order
them to jointly and severally pay the family /heirs of Deceased Marlon Villanueva the following sums of
money:

1. ₱141,324.00 for and as actual damages;

2. ₱200,000.00 for and as moral damages;

3. ₱100,000.00 for and as exemplary damages; and

4. ₱50,000.00 for the death of Marlon Villanueva.

SO ORDERED.20

Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a notice of appeal. In their brief, they contended that the prosecution failed to
establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating R.A. No. 8049. They also assailed the
constitutionality of Section 4 of the said law, which stated that mere presence in the hazing was prima facie
evidence of participation therein, because it allegedly violated the constitutional presumption of innocence of
the accused.

The CA Ruling

The CA ruled that the appeal of Dungo and Sibal was bereft of merit. It stated that, in finding them guilty of
violating R.A. No. 8049, the RTC properly relied on circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution. The
CA painstakingly discussed the unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence to convict Dungo and Sibal as
principals in the crime of hazing.

It further found that the defense of denial and alibi of Dungo and Sibal failed to cast doubt on the positive
identification made by the prosecution witnesses; and that denial, being inherently weak, could not prevail
over the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime. The CA also stated that Dungo
and Sibal were not only convicted based on their presence in the venue of the hazing, but also in their act of
bringing the victim to Villa Novaliches Resort for the final initiation rites.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 23, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36
of Calamba City in CRIM. Case No. 13958-2006-C, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Violation of R.A. 8049 is hereby AFFIRMED in TOTO.

SO ORDERED.21

Dungo and Sibal moved for reconsideration, but their motion was denied by the CA in the assailed
October 8, 2013 Resolution.

Hence, this petition.

SOLE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR HE JUDGMENTS OF THE RTC AND THE CA A QUO CONSTITUTE A
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE
AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AGAINST THEM BECAUSE THE OFFENSE PROVED AS FOUND AND
PRONOUNCED THEREBY IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION, NOR DOES
ONE INCLUDE OR NECESSARILY INCLUDE THE OTHER. 22

Petitioners Dungo and Sibal argue that the amended information charged them as they "did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and use personal violence upon one Marlon Villanueva y Mejilla." 23
Yet, both the RTC and the CA found them guilty of violating R.A. No. 8049 because they "[i]nduced the victim
to be present"24 during the initiation rites. The crime of hazing by inducement does not necessarily include the
criminal charge of hazing by actual participation. Thus, they cannot be convicted of a crime not stated or
necessarily included in the information. By reason of the foregoing, the petitioners contend that their
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them has been violated.

In its Comment,25 filed on May 23, 2014, the Office of the Solicitor General (DSG) asserted that Dungo and
Sibal were charged in the amended information with the proper offense and convicted for such. The phrases
"planned initiation" and "in conspiracy with more or less twenty members and officers" in the amended
information sufficiently cover "knowingly cooperated in carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be
present thereat." The planned initiation rite would not have been accomplished were it not for the acts of the
petitioners in inducing the victim to be present thereat and it was obviously conducted in conspiracy with the
others.26 In their Reply27 filed on September 10, 2014, Dungo and Sibal insisted that there was a variance
between the, offense charged of "actually participated in the infliction of physical harm," and the offense
"knowingly cooperated in carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present thereat."28 The
prosecution, moreover, failed to establish conspiracy because no act or circumstance was proved pointing to
a joint purpose and design between and among the petitioners and the other twenty accused.

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Procedural Matter
An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher court
authority.29 The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of
law.30

Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03, dated
October 15, 2004, governs the procedure on the appeal from the CA to the Court when the penalty imposed
is either reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.31 According to the said provision, "[i]n cases where the
Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter
judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal
filed with the Court of Appeals."

Hence, an accused, upon whom the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment had been imposed
by the CA, can simply file a notice of appeal to allow him to pursue an appeal as a matter of right before
the Court. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question including one not
raised by the parties.32 Section 13(c), Rule 124 recognizes the constitutionally conferred jurisdiction of the
Court in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. 33

An accused, nevertheless, is not precluded in resorting to an appeal by certiorari to the Court via Rule 45
under the Rules of Court. An appeal to this Court by petition for review on certiorari shall raise only questions
of law.34 Moreover, such review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted
only when there are special and important reasons. 35 In other words, when the CA imposed a penalty of
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an accused may: (1) file a notice of appeal under Section 13( c ),
Rule 124 to avail of an appeal as a matter of right before the Court and open the entire case for review on any
question; or (2) file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to resort to an appeal as a matter of
discretion and raise only questions of law.

In this case, the CA affirmed the R TC decision imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua upon the
petitioners. The latter opted to appeal the CA decision via a petition for certiorari under Rule 45.
Consequently, they could only raise questions of law. Oddly, the petitioners began to assail the existence of
conspiracy in their reply,36 which is a question of fact that would require an examination of the evidence
;presented. In the interest of justice, however, and due to the novelty of the issue presented, the Court
deems it proper to open the whole case for review.37 Substantive Matter

In our contemporary society, hazing has been a nightmare of parents who send their children to college or
university. News of deaths and horrible beatings primarily among college students due to hazing injuries
continue to haunt us. Horrid images of eggplant-like buttocks and thighs and pounded arms and shoulders of
young men are depicted as a fervent warning to those who dare undergo the hazing rites. The meaningless
death of these promising students, and the agony, cries and ordeal of their families, resonate through the
very core of our beings. But no matter how modem and sophisticated our society becomes, these barbaric
acts of initiation of fraternities, sororities and other organizations continue to thrive, even within the elite
grounds of the academe.

The history and phenomenon of hazing had been thoroughly discussed in the recent case of Villareal v.
People.38 It is believed that the fraternity system and its accompanying culture of hazing were transported by
the Americans to the Philippines in the late 19th century.39 Thus, a study of the laws and
jurisprudence of the United States (US) on hazing can enlighten the current predicament of violent
initiations in fraternities, sororities and other organizations.

United States Laws and Jurisprudence on Hazing

There are different definitions of hazing, depending on the laws of the states. 40 In the case of People v.
Lenti,41 the defendant therein challenged the constitutionality of the state law defining hazing on the ground
of vagueness. The court rejected such contention and held that it would have been an impossible task if the
legislature had attempted to define hazing specifically

because fraternal organizations and associations never suffered for ideas in contriving new forms of hazing.
Presently, the acceptable definition of hazing is the practice of physically or emotionally abusing newcomers
to an organization as a means of initiation.42

Hazing can be classified into various categories including, but not limited to, acts of violence, acts of
humiliation, sexual-related acts, and alcohol-related acts.43 The physical form of hazing may include beating,
branding, paddling, excessive exercise, drinking, and using drugs. Sexual hazing have included simulated
sex acts, sodomy and forced kissing.44 Moreover, hazing does not only result in physical injuries and
hospitalization, but also lead to emotional damage and traumatic stress. 45

Based on statistics and alarming frequency of hazing, states have attempted to combat hazing through the
passage of state laws that prohibit such acts.46 Forty-four states, with the exception of Alaska, Hawaii,
Montana, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Wyoming, have passed anti-hazing laws.47 The severity of these
laws can range from minor penalties to a prison sentence for up to six years. 48 In the states of Illinois, Idaho,
Missouri, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin, hazing that result in death or "great bodily harm" is categorized as a
felony.49

In Florida, the Chad Meredith Act,50 a law named after a student who died in a hazing incident, was enacted
on July 1, 2005. It provides that a person commits a third degree felony when he or she intentionally or
recklessly commits any act of hazing and the hazing results in serious bodily injury or death. If a person only
creates substantial risk of physical injury or death, then hazing is categorized as a first degree misdemeanor.
A similar provision can be observed in the Penal Law of New York. 51

Interestingly, some states included notable features in their anti-hazing statute to increase its effectiveness.
In Alabama, Arkansas, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, South Carolina and Texas, the law imposes a duty
on school personnel to report hazing.52 In fact, in Alabama, no person is allowed to knowingly permit,
encourage, aid, or assist any person in committing the offense of hazing, or willfully acquiesces in its
commission.53

Also, some states enacted statutes that have been interpreted to mean that persons are guilty of hazing even
if they have the consent of the victim.54 In New Jersey, consent is not a defense to a hazing charge, and its
law permits the prosecution of offenders under other applicable criminal statutes. 55 By including these various
provisions in their anti-hazing statutes, these states have removed the subjective inquiry of consent from
consideration, thus, presumably allowing courts to effectively and properly adjudicate hazing cases. 56
In the US, hazing victims can either file a criminal action, based on anti-hazing statutes, or a civil suit, arising
from tort law and constitutional law, against the members of the local fraternity, the national fraternity and
even against the university or college concerned. 57 Hazing, which threatens to needlessly harm students,
must be attacked from whatever legal means are possible.58

In State v. Brown,59 a member of the Alpha Kappa Alpha at Kent State University was indicted for
complicity to hazing. The group physically disciplined their pledges by forcing them to stand on their
heads, beating them with paddles, and smacking and striking initiates in the face and head. The Ohio
court held that evidence presented therein was more than sufficient to sustain a conviction.

Excessive intake of alcohol in the fraternity initiations can be considered as hazing. In Oja v. Grand Chapter
of Theta Chi Fraternity Inc.,60 a 17-year old college freshman died as a result of aspirating his own vomit after
consuming excessive amounts of alcohol in a fraternity initiation ritual. The defendants in the said case
contended that they only furnished the alcohol drinks to the victim. The court denied the defense because
such acts of the fraternity effectively contributed to the death of the victim as part of their hazing.

Even in high school, hazing could exist. In Nice v. Centennial Area School District,61 a tenth-grade wrestler
at William Tennet High School was subjected to various forms of hazing, including a ritual where the victim
was forcibly held down, while a teammate sat on his face with his buttocks exposed. The parents of the
student sued the school because it failed to prevent the incident despite its knowledge of the hazing rites.
The court approved the settlement of the parties in the amount ofUS$151,000.00.

More recently, the case of Yost v. Wabash College62 involved the hazing of an 18-year-old freshman, who
suffered physical and mental injuries in the initiation rites conducted by the Phi Kappa Psi fraternity. As a
pledge, the victim was thrown into a creek and was placed in a chokehold, until he lost consciousness. The
court upheld that action against the local fraternity because, even if the student consented, the fraternity had
the duty to ensure the safety of its activities.

The US anti-hazing laws and jurisprudence show that victims of hazing can properly attain redress before the
court. By crafting laws and prosecuting offenders, the state can address the distinct dilemma of hazing.

Anti-Hazing Law in the Philippines

R.A. No. 8049, or the Anti-Hazing Law. of 1995, has been enacted to regulate hazing and other forms of
initiation rites in fraternities, sororities, and other organizations. It was in response to the rising incidents of
death of hazing victims, particularly the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa. 63 Despite its passage, reports of
deaths resulting from i hazing continue to emerge. Recent victims were Guillo Servando of the College of St.
Benilde, Marc Andre Marcos and Marvin Reglos of the San', Beda College - Manila, and Cris Anthony
Mendez of the University of the Philippines - Diliman. With the continuity of these senseless tragedies, one
question implores for an answer: is R.A. No. 8049 a sufficient deterrent against hazing?
To answer the question, the Court must dissect the provisions of the law and scrutinize its effect,
implication and application.

Criminal law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called acts mala in se; and acts which
would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called acts mala prohibita. This distinction
is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done. The rule on the subject is that in
acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated?
When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial. 64 When the doing of an act is prohibited by law,
it is considered injurious to public welfare, and the doing of the prohibited act is the crime itself. 65
A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found in the Revised Penal Code (RPC), while all
mala prohibita crimes are provided by special penal laws. In reality, however, there may be mala in se crimes
under special laws, such as plunder under R.A. No. 7080, as amended. 66 Similarly, there may be mala
prohibita crimes defined in the RPC, such as technical malversation.67

The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes is the determination of the
inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act. If the punishable act or. omission is immoral in itself,
then it is a crime mala in se,- on the contrary, if it is not immoral in itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its
commission b)". reasons of public policy, then it is mala prohibita. In the final analysis, whether or not a
crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.68

The crime of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 is malum prohibitum. The Senate deliberations would show that
the lawmakers intended the anti-hazing statute to be ma/um prohibitum, as follows: SENATOR
GUINGONA: Most of these acts, if not all, are already punished under the Revised Penal Code.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA If hazing is done at present and it results in death, the charge would be murder or
homicide.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in death, it may be frustrated homicide or serious physical
injuries.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse does so it can be penalized under
rape or acts of lasciviousness.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale for making a new offense under this definition of the
crime of hazing?
SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group of persons either composing a sorority, fraternity or any
association from making this requirement of initiation that has already resulted in these specific acts or
results, Mr. President.

That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land that no group or association can
require the act of physical initiation before a person can become a member without being held criminally
liable.

xxx xxx xxx

SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that imposition? Because the distinguished
Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a mere organization, he is not seeking the punishment of an
initiation into a club or organization, he is seeking the punishment of certain acts that resulted in death,
etcetera as a result of hazing which are already covered crimes.

The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage hazing, abusive hazing, but it may be
a legitimate defense for invoking two or more charges or offenses, because these very same acts are
already punishable under the Revised Penal Code

That is my difficulty, Mr. President.

SENATOR LINA. x x x
Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling difference: When a person or group of persons
resort to hazing as a requirement for gaining entry into an organization, the intent to commit a wrong is not
visible or is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these specific crimes, Mr. President, let us say there is
death or there is homicide, mutilation, if one files a case, then the intention to commit a wrong has to be
proven. But if the crime of hazing is the basis, what is important is the result from the act of hazing.

To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter the sororities or fraternities; that they
should really shun this activity called "hazing." Because, initially, these fraternities or sororities do not even
consider having a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts of lasciviousness are even committed initially, Mr.
President.

So, what we want to discourage, is the so-called initial innocent act. That is why there is need to institute this
kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority ay magre-recruit. Wala talaga silang
intensiybng makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay pa iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o pito na
namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin talaga iyong neophyte. So, kung maghihintay
pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng murder kung namatay na, ay after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung
sasabihin natin sa mga kabataan na: "Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at kung
mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa inyo."

xxx xxx xxx

SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the distinguished Sponsor. But I am again
disturbed by his statement that the prosecution does not have to prove the intent that resulted in
the death, that resulted in the serious physical injuries, that resulted in the acts of lasciviousness or
deranged mind. We do not have to prove the willful intent of the accused in proving or establishing the crime
of hazing. This seems, to me, a novel situation where we create the special crime without having to go into
the intent, which is one of the basic elements of any crime.

If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to initiate, then there is no offense. And even
the distinguished Sponsor admits that the organization, the intent to initiate, the intent to have a new society
or a new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What are punishable are the acts that lead to the result. But if
these results are not going to be proven by intent, but just because there was hazing, I am afraid that it will
disturb the basic concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President.

SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being criminalized because in the context of
what is happening in the sororities and fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no one will admit that their
intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are already criminalizing the fact of inflicting physical pain.
Mr. President, it is a criminal act and we want it stopped, deterred, discouraged.

If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the masters intended to kill or the masters
intended to maim. What is important is the result of the act of hazing. Otherwise, the masters or those who
inflict the physical pain can easily escape responsibility and say, "We did not have the intention to kill. This is
part of our initiation rites. This is normal. We do not have any intention to kill or maim."

This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged therefore with the ordinary crime of
homicide, mutilation, etcetera, where the prosecution will have a difficulty proving the elements if they are
separate offenses.

xxx xxx xxx

SENATOR LINA. x x x

I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the idea of intent or whether it is mala in
se or mala prohibita. There can be a radical amendment if that is the point that he wants to go to.

If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a special law on hazing. We will not
include this anymore under the Revised Penal Code. That is a possibility. I will not foreclose that
suggestion, Mr. President.69

[Emphases Supplied]

Having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle of mala in se adhered
to under the RPC, the Congress did not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it created a special law
on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita. 70 In Vedana v. Valencia,71 the Court noted that in our
nation's very recent history, the people had spoken, through the Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of
hazing, an act previously considered harmless by custom, as
criminal.72 The act of hazing itself is not inherently immoral, but the law deems the same to be against
public policy and must be prohibited. Accordingly, the existence of criminal intent is immaterial in the crime
of hazing. Also, the defense of good faith cannot be raised in its prosecution.73

Section 1 of R.A. No. 8049 defines hazing as an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into
membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant in some
embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks
or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury.
From the said definition, the elements of the crime of hazing can be determined:

1. That there is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a
fraternity, sorority or organization.

2. That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity, sorority or organization; and

3. That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situations
such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise
subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury.

From the said definition of hazing, it is apparent that there must be an initiation rite or practice performed by
the fraternities, sororities or organization. The law, however, did not limit the definition of these groups to
those formed within academic colleges and universities. 74 In fact, the second paragraph of Section 1 provides
that the term "organization" shall include any club or the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Philippine
National Police (PNP), Philippine Military Academy (PMA), or officer and cadet corp of the Citizen's Military
Training and Citizen's Army Training. Even the president, manager, director or other responsible officer of a
corporation engaged in hazing as a requirement for employment are covered by the law.75 R.A. No. 8049
qualifies that the physical, mental and psychological testing and training procedure and practices to
determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular members of the
AFP and the PNP, as approved by the Secretary of National Defense and the National Police Commission,
duly recommended by the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Director General of the PNP, shall not be
considered as hazing.

And not all forms of initiation rites are prohibited by the law. Section 2 thereof provides that initiation rites of
fraternities, sororities or organizations shall be allowed provided that the following requisites are met:

1. That the fraternity, sorority or organization has a prior written notice to the school authorities or head
of organization;

2. The said written notice must be secured at least seven (7) days before the conduct of such
initiation;

3. That the written notice shall indicate:

a. The period of the initiation activities, which shall not exceed three (3) days;

b. The names of those to be subjected to such activities; and

c. An undertaking that no physical violence be employed by anybody during such initiation
rites. Section 3 of R.A. No. 8049 imposes an obligation to the head of the school or
organization or their representatives that they must assign at least two (2)
representatives, as the case may be, to be present during these valid initiations. The duty
of such representative, is to see to it that no physical harm of any kind shall be inflicted
upon a recruit, neophyte or applicant.

Noticeably, the law does not provide a penalty or sanction to fraternities, sororities or organizations that fail to
comply with the notice requirements of Section 2. Also, the school and organization administrators do not
have a clear liability for non-compliance with Section 3.

Any person who commits the crime of hazing shall be liable in accordance with Section 4 of the law,
which provides different classes of persons who are held liable as principals and accomplices.

The first class of principals would be the actual participants in the hazing. If the person subjected to hazing or
other forms of initiation rites suffers any physical injury or dies as a result thereof, the officers and members
of the fraternity, sorority or organization who actually participated in the infliction of physical harm shall be
liable as principals. Interestingly, the presence of any person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of
actual participation, unless he prevented the commission of the acts punishable herein. 76

The prescribed penalty on the principals depends on the extent of injury inflicted to the victim. 77 The penalties
appear to be similar to that of homicide, serious physical injuries, less serious physical injuries, and slight
physical injuries under the RPC,78 with the penalties for hazing increased one degree higher. Also, the law
provides several circumstances which would aggravate the imposable penalty.79

Curiously, although hazing has been defined as consisting of those activities involving physical or
psychological suffering or injury, the penalties for hazing only covered the infliction of physical harm. At best,
the only psychological injury recognized would be causing insanity to the victim. Conversely, even if the
victim only sustained physical injuries which did not incapacitate him, there is still a prescribed penalty. 80

The second class of principals would be the officers, former officers, or alumni of the organization, group,
fraternity or sorority who actually planned the hazing. 81 Although these planners were not present when
the acts constituting hazing were committed, they shall still be liable as principals. The provision took in
consideration the non-resident members of the organization, such as their former officers or alumni.

The third class of principals would ht; officers or members of an organization group, fraternity or sorority
who knowingly cooperated in carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present thereat. 82
These officers or members are penalized, not because of their direct participation in the infliction of
harm, but due to their indispensable cooperation in the crime by inducing the victim to attend the hazing.

The next class of principals would be the fraternity or sorority's adviser who was present when the acts
constituting hazing were committed, and failed to take action to prevent them from occurring. 83 The
liability of the adviser arises, not only from his mere presence in the hazing, but also his failure to
prevent the same.

The last class of principals would be the parents of the officers or members of the fraternity, group, or
organization.84 The hazing must be held in the home of one of the officers or members. The parents must
have actual knowledge of the hazing conducted in their homes and failed to take any action to avoid the
same from occurring.

The law also provides for accomplices in the crime of hazing. The school authorities, including faculty
members, who consented to the hazing or who have actual knowledge thereof, but failed to take any action to
prevent the same from occurring shall be punished as accomplices.85 Likewise, the owner of the place where
the hazing was conducted can also be an accomplice to the crime. 86 The owner of the place shall be liable
when he has actual knowledge of the hazing conducted therein and he failed to take any steps to stop the
same. Recognizing the malum prohibitum characteristic of hazing, the law provides that any person charged
with the said crime shall not be entitled to the mitigating circumstance that there was no intention to commit
so grave a wrong.87 Also, the framers of the law intended that the consent of the victim shall not be a defense
in hazing. During the discussion of whether sodomy shall be included as a punishable act under the law, the
issue of consent was tackled: SENATOR LINA x x x

But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that the act may even be entered into
with consent. It is not only sodomy. The infliction of pain may be done with the consent of the neophyte. If
the law is passed, that does not make the act of hazing not punishable because the neophyte accepted the
infliction of pain upon himself.

If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator said, "Well, he allowed it upon himself. He
consented to it." So, if we allow that reasoning that sodomy was done with the consent of the victim, then we
would not have passed any law at all. There will be no significance if we pass this bill, because it will always
be a defense that the victim allowed the infliction of pain or suffering. He accepted it as part of the initiation
rites.
But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to prohibit. That the defense of consent will
not apply because the very act of inflicting physical pain or psychological suffering is, by itself, a punishable
act. The result of the act of hazing, like death or physical injuries merely aggravates the act with higher
penalties. But the defense of consent is not going to nullify the criminal nature of the act.

So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the offense if it is committed without
consent of the victim, then the whole foundation of this proposed law will collapse.

SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President.

SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the committee amendment? (Silence.) The Chair hears none;
the same is approved.88

[Emphasis supplied]
Further, the law acknowledges that the offended party in the crime of hazing can seek different courses of
action. n '.'provides that the responsible officials of the school or of the police, military or citizen's army
training organization, may impose the appropriate administrative sanctions on the person or the persons
charged under this provision even before their conviction. 89 Necessarily, the offended party can file either
administrative, civil, or criminal actions against the offenders.90

The study of the provisions of R.A. No. 8049 shows that, on paper, it is complete and robust in penalizing the
crime of hazing. It was made malum prohibitum to discount criminal intent and disallow the defense of good
faith. It took into consideration the different participants and contributors in the hazing activities. While not all
acts cited in the law are penalized, the penalties imposed therein involve various and serious terms of
imprisonment to discourage would-be offenders. Indeed, the law against hazing is ideal and profound. As to
whether the law can be effectively implemented, the Court begs to continue on the merits of the case.

The Information properly charged the

offense proved
The petitioners claim that the amended, information avers a criminal charge of hazing by actual participation,
but the only offense proved during the trial was hazing by inducement. Their1 contention must fail. The
Amended Information reads:

That on or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol, Calamba
City, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
during a planned initiation rite and being then officers and members of Alpha Phi Omega fraternity and
present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and officers, whose identity is not yet
known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and use personal violence upon one
MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof and as condition for his admission to the fraternity,
thereby subjecting him to physical harm, resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.91

On the manner of how the Information should be worded, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, is
enlightening:

Section 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.

It is evident that the Information need not use the exact language of the statute in alleging the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense. The test is whether it enables a person of common
understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment properly. 92

The Court agrees with the OSG that the "planned initiation rite" as stated in the information included the act
of inducing Villanueva to attend it. In ordinary parlance, a planned event can be understood to have
different phases. Likewise, the hazing activity had different stages and the perpetrators had
different roles therein, not solely inflicting physical injury to the neophyte. One of the roles of the petitioners in
the hazing activity was to induce Villanueva to be present. Dungo and Sibal not only induced Villanueva to be
present at the resort, but they actually brought him there. They fulfilled their roles in the planned hazing rite
which eventually led to the death of Villanueva. The hazing would not have been accomplished were it not for
the acts of the petitioners that induced the victim to be present.

Secrecy and silence are common characterizations of the dynamics of hazing. 93 To require the prosecutor to
indicate every step of the planned initiation rite in the information at the inception of the criminal case, when
details of the clandestine hazing are almost nil, would be an arduous task, if not downright impossible. The
law does not require the impossible (lex non cognit ad impossibilia).

The proper approach would be to require the prosecution to state every element of the crime of hazing, the
offenders, and the accompanying circumstances in the planned initiation activity which has been satisfied in
the present case. Accordingly, the amended information sufficiently informed the petitioners that they were
being criminally charged for their roles in the planned initiation rite.

Conspiracy of the offenders was duly proven

The petitioners assail that the prosecution failed to establish the fact of conspiracy. The
Court disagrees.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to commit a felony. 94 The
overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself
or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the
criminal plan.95

In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to
enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the crime,
usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of
some complete whole.96 Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular
purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose
intended.97

The lawmakers deliberated on whether the prosecution was still obliged to prove the conspiracy
between the offenders under R.A. 8049, to wit:

SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming there was a group that initiated and a person died. The
charge is murder. My question is: Under this bill if it becomes a law, would the prosecution have to prove
conspiracy or not anymore?

SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x x x

SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are present. First, would the prosecution have to prove conspiracy?
Second, would the prosecution have to prove intent to kill or not?
SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if that occurs, there is no need to
prove intent to kill.
SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder.

SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It should be hazing, Mr. President. 98

The Court does not categorically agree that, under R.A. No. 8049, the prosecution need not prove
conspiracy. Jurisprudence dictates that conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive
and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of
the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to
cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the
commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. 99

R.A. No. 8049, nevertheless, presents a novel provision that introduces a disputable presumption of actual
participation; and which modifies the concept of conspiracy. Section 4, paragraph 6 thereof provides that the
presence of any person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of participation as principal, unless he
prevented the commission of the punishable acts. This provision is unique because a disputable presumption
arises from the mere presence of the offender during the hazing, which can be rebutted by proving that the
accused took steps to prevent the commission of the hazing.

The petitioners attempted to attack the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049 before the CA, hut did
not succeed. "[A] finding of prima facie evidence x x x does not shatter the presumptive innocence the
accused enjoys because, before prima facie evidence arises, certain facts have still to be proved; the trial
court cannot depend alone on such evidence, because precisely, it is merely prima facie. It must still satisfy
that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. Neither can it rely on the weak
defense the latter may adduce."100

Penal laws which feature prima facie evidence by disputable presumptions against the offenders are not new,
and can be observed in the following: (1) the possession of drug paraphernalia gives rise to prima facie
evidence of the use of dangerous drug;101 (2) the dishonor of the check for insufficient funds is prima facie
evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit; 102 and (3) the possession of any good which
has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.103

Verily, the disputable presumption under R.A. No. 8049 can be related to the conspiracy in the crime of
hazing. The common design of offenders is to haze the victim. Some of the overt acts that could be
committed by the offenders would be to (1) plan the hazing activity as a requirement of the victim's initiation
to the fraternity; (2) induce the victim to attend the hazing; and (3) actually participate in the infliction of
physical injuries.

In this case, there was prima facie evidence of the petitioners' participation in the hazing because of their
presence in the venue. As correctly held by the RTC, the presence of Dungo and Sibal during the hazing at
Villa Novaliches Resort was established by the testimony of Ignacio. She testified that she saw Sibal emerge
from the resort and approach her store, to wit:

MR. DIMACULANGAN
Q: And how many persons from this group did you see again?
WITNESS
A: Three (3), sir.

Q: Where did they come from, did they come out from the resort? Where did this 3 people or this group of
people coming from?

A: Inside the resort, sir.

Q: And around what time was this? A: Around

9:00, sir.
Q: And what did they do if any if they came out of the resort? A: They
went to my store, sir.
xxxx

Q: Did you have any other visitors to your store that night?

xxxx

A: "Meron po".

Q: Who were these visitors?

A: I don't know their names but I recognize their faces, sir.

Q: If I show you pictures of these people, will you be able to identify them before this Court. A:
Yes, sir.
xxxx

Q: Mrs. Ignacio, I am showing you this picture of persons marked as Exhibit "L" in the Pre-Trial, can you
please look over this document carefully and see if any of the persons whom you said visited your store is
here?
xxxx

A: "Siya rin po." COURT:

Make it of record that the witness pinpointed to the first picture appearing on the left picture on the first
row.

xxxx

ATIY. PAMAOS:

For the record, your Honor, we manifest that the picture and the name pointed by the witness has been
previously marked as Exhibit "L-3" and previously admitted by the defense as referring to Gregorio Sibal, Jr.,
accused in this case…104

Ignacio, also positively identified Dungo as among the guests of Villa Novaliches Resort on the night of the
hazing, to wit:

COURT

Q: xx x Now, when you say other people you could identify who are not in the pictures then how would you
know that these people are indeed those people you could identify?

WITNESS

A: "Iyon pong ... di ba po nagkuwento ako na dumating sila tapos nag shake hands at saka iyong
nagyakapan po ... "

Q: And what will be the significance of the alleged embrace and shake hands for you to say that you
could identify those people?

A: "Hindi po. Noong dumating po sila nasa isang jeep, meron pong lalaki doon sa may tabi ng driver bumaba
siya tapos po noong bumaba siya tapos iyong mga kasamahan nya sa likod nagbaba-an din, iyon po nagbati-
an po sila."

Q: And from these greeting, how could you identify these people?

A: "Ngayon ko lang po napag masdan ang taong iyon, hindi ko po alam na akusado po sa kabila iyon." Q:
And who was that person?
A: "Siya po, iyon po."

Q: Who are you pointing to?

A: "Iyon pong naka-dilaw na ... " (Witness pointing to Dandy Dungo)

Q: So, are you telling the Court that this person you positively saw seated beside the driver came out and
subsequently embraced and shook hands with the other people from the jeepney, is that your testimony?
A: Yes, your Honor.105

The testimony of Ignacio was direct and straightforward. Her testimony was given great weight because she
was a disinterested and credible witness. The prosecution indubitably established the presence of Dungo
and Sibal during the hazing. Such gave rise to the prima facie evidence of their actual participation in the
hazing of Villanueva. They were given an opportunity to rebut and overcome the prima facie evidence of the
prosecution by proving that they prevented the commission of the hazing, yet they failed to do so.

Because of the uncontroverted prima facie evidence against the petitioners, it was shown that they
performed an overt act in the furtherance of the criminal design of hazing. Not only did they induce the victim
to attend the hazing activity, the petitioners also actually participated in it based on the prima facie evidence.
These acts are sufficient to establish their roles in the conspiracy of hazing.
Hence, generally, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. 106
Exceptionally, under R.A. No. 8049, the participation of the offenders in the criminal
conspiracy can be proven by the prima facie evidence due to their presence during the hazing, unless they
prevented the commission of the acts therein.

The guilt of the petitioners was proven beyond reasonable doubt

Aside from inducing Villanueva to attend the initiation rites and their presence during the hazing, the
petitioners? guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the sequence of circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution. Their involvement in the hazing of Villanueva is not merely based on prima
facie evidence but was also established by circumstantial evidence.

In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law's own starting perspective on the status of the
accused - in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is
proven beyond reasonable doubt.107 In criminal law, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such
degree of proof that produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.108

While it is established that nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for a conviction, this
exacting standard does not preclude resort to circumstantial evidence when direct evidence is not available.
Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. For
in the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to
discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions where concealment is
highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted on under all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons
who commit heinous crimes in secret or secluded places will be hard, if not impossible, to prove.109 Needless
to state, the crime of hazing is shrouded in secrecy. Fraternities and sororities, especially the Greek
organizations, are secretive in nature and their members are reluctant to give any information regarding
initiation rites.110 The silence is only broken after someone has been injured so severely that medical attention
is required. It is only at this point that the secret is revealed and the activities become public.111 Bearing in
mind the concealment of hazing, it
is only logical and proper for the prosecution to resort to the presentation of circumstantial evidence to prove
it.

The rules on evidence and precedents to sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial
evidence require the existence of the following requisites: (1) there are more than one circumstance; (2) the
inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.112 To justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence,
the combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the
criminal liability of the accused. Jurisprudence requires that the circumstances must be established to form an
unbroken chain of events leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion
of all others, as the author of the crime.113

The CA meticulously wrote in detail the unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence which established the
petitioners' gult in the death of Villanueva as follows:

1. Marlon Villanueva is a neophyte of Alpha Phi Omega, as testified by his roommate Joey
Atienza.
2. At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of January 13, 2006, Sunga was staying at their tambayan,
talking to her organization mates. Three men were seated two meters way from her. She identified
two of the men as appellants Sibal and Dungo, while she did not know the third man. The three men
were wearing black shirts with the seal of the Alpha Phi Omega.

3. Later at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, two more men coming from the entomology wing arrived and
approached the three men. Among the men who just arrived was the victim, Marlon Villanueva. One
of the men wearing black APO shirts handed over to the two fraternity neophytes some money and
told the men "Mamalengke na kayo." He later took back the money and said, "Huwag na, kami na
lang."

4. One of the men wearing a black APO shirt, who was later identified as appellant Dungo, stood up
and asked Marlon if the latter already reported to him, and asked him why he did not report to him
 when he was just at the tambayan. Dungo then continuously punched the victim on his arm. This
went on for five minutes. Marlon just kept quiet with his head bowed down. Fifteen minutes later, the
men left going towards the Entomology wing.

5. The deceased Marlon Villanueva was 'last seen alive by Joey Atienza at 7:00 in the evening of 13
January 2006, from whom he borrowed the shoes he wore at the initiation right [sic]. Marlon told
Joey that it was his "finals" night.

6. On January 13, 2006 at around 8:30 to 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Susan Ignacio saw more than
twenty (20) persons arrive at the Villa Novaliches Resort onboard a jeepney.1âwphi1 She estimated
the ages of these persons to be between 20 to 30 years old. Three (3) persons riding a single
motorcycle likewise arrived at the resort.

7. Ignacio saw about fifteen (15) persons gather on top of the terrace at the resort who looked like
they were praying. Later that evening, at least three (3) of these persons went to her store to buy
some items. She did not know their names but could identity [sic] their faces. After she
was shown colored photographs, she pointed to the man later identified as Herald Christopher Braseros.
She also pointed out the man later identified as Gregorio Sibal, Jr.

8. Donato Magat, a tricycle driver plying the route of Pansol, Calamba City, testified that around 3:00
o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, he was waiting for passengers at the corner of Villa
Novaliches Resort when a man approached him and told him that someone inside the resort needed
a ride. Magat then went to the resort and asked the two (2) men standing by the gate who will be
riding his tricycle.

9. The four (4) men boarded his tricycle but Magat noticed that when he touched the body of the
man who was being carried, it felt cold. The said man looked very weak like a vegetable.

10. Seferino Espina y Jabay testified that he worked as a security guard at the J.P. Rizal Hospital
and was assigned at the emergency room. At around 3:00 o'clock in the early morning of January
14, 2006, he was with another security guard, Abelardo Natividad and hospital helper Danilo Glindo
a.k.a. Gringo, when a tricycle arrived at the emergency room containing four (4) passengers,
excluding the driver. He was an arm's length away from said tricycle. He identified two of the
passengers thereof as appellants Dungo and Sibal. Espina said he and Glinda helped the
passengers unload a body inside the tricycle and brought it to the emergency room.

11. Afterwards, Espina asked the two meq for identification cards. The latter replied that they did
not bring with them any I.D. or wallet.1âwphi1 Instead of giving their true names, the appellants
listed down their names in the hospital logbook as Brandon Gonzales y Lanzon and Jericho Paril y
Rivera. Espina then told the two men not to leave, not telling them that they secretly called the
police to report the incident which was their standard operating procedure when a dead body was
brought to the hospital.

12. Dr. Ramon Masilungan, who was then the attending physician at the emergency room,
observed that Marlon was motionless, had no heartbeat and already cyanotic.

13. Dr. Masilungan tried to revive Marlon for about 15 to 20 minutes. However, the latter did not
respond to resuscitation and was pronounced dead. Dr. Masilungan noticed a big contusion
hematoma on the left side of the victim's face and several injuries on his arms and legs. He further
attested that Marlon's face was already cyanotic.

14. When Dr. Masilungan pulled down Marlon's pants, he saw a large contusion on both legs which
extended from the upper portion of his thigh down to the couplexial portion or the back of the knee.
15. Due to the nature, extent and location of Marlon's injuries, Dr. Masilungan opined that he was a
victim of hazing. Dr. Masilungan is familiar with hazing injuries, having undergone hazing when he
was a student and also because of his experience treating victims of hazing incidents.

16. Dr. Roy Camarillo, Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory in Region IV, Camp
Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Calamba City, testified that he performed an autopsy on the cadaver of the
victim on January 14j 2006; that the victim's cause of death was blunt head trauma. From 1999 to
 2006, he was able to conduct post-mortem examination of the two (2) persons whose
deaths were attributed to hazing. These two (2) persons sustained multiple contusions and injuries on
different parts of their body, particularly on the buttocks, on both upper and lower extremities. Both persons
died of brain hemorrhage. Correlating these two cases to the injuries found on the victim's body, Dr.
Camarillo attested that the victim, Marlon Villanueva, sustained similar injuries to those two (2) persons.
Based on the presence of multiple injuries and contusions on his body, he opined that these injuries were
hazing-related.114

Petitioners Dungo and Sibal, on the other hand, presented the defense of denial and alibi. These defenses,
however, must fail. Time and time again, this Court has ruled that denial and alibi are the weakest of all
defenses, because they are easy to concoct and fabricate. 115 As properly held by the RTC, these defenses
cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal identification of the petitioners by prosecution witnesses
Sunga and Ignacio. The testimonies of the defense witnesses also lacked credibility and reliability. The
corroboration of defense witness Rivera was suspect because she was the girlfriend of Dungo, and it was
only logical and emotional that she would stand by the man she loved and cared for. The testimonies of their
fellow fraternity brothers, likewise, do not hold much weight because they had so much at stake in the
outcome of the case. Stated differently, the petitioners did not present credible and. disinterested witnesses
to substantiate their defenses of denial and alibi.

After a careful review of the records, the Court agrees with the CA and the R TC that the circumstantial
evidence presented by the prosecution was overwhelming enough to establish the guilt of the petitioners
beyond a reasonable doubt. The unbroken chain of events laid down by the CA leaves us no other conclusion
other than the petitioners' participation in the hazing. They took part in the hazing and, together; with their
fellow fraternity officers and members, inflicted physical injuries to Villanueva as a requirement of his initiation
to the fraternity. The physical injuries eventually took a toll on the body of the victim, which led to his death.
Another young life lost.

With the fact of hazing, the identity, of the petitioners, and their participation therein duly proven, the moral
certainty that produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind has been satisfied.

Final Note

Hazing has been a phenomenon that has beleaguered the country's educational institutions and
communities. News of young men beaten to death as part of fraternities' violent initiation rites supposedly to
seal fraternal bond has sent disturbing waves to lawmakers. Hence, R.A. No. 8049 was signed into to law
on June 7, 1995. Doubts on the effectiveness of the law were raised. The Court, however, scrutinized its
provisions and it is convinced that the law is rigorous in penalizing the crime of hazing.

Hopefully, the present case will serve as a guide to the bench and the bar on the application of R.A. No. 8049.
Through careful case-build up and proper presentation of evidence before the court, it is not impossible for
the exalted constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused to be overcome and his guilt for the crime
of hazing be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must bear in mind the secretive nature of
hazing, and carefully weave its chain of circumstantial evidence. Likewise, the defense must present a
genuine defense and substantiate the same through credible and reliable witnesses. The counsels of both
parties must also consider hazing as a malum prohibitum crime and the law's distinctive provisions.

While the Court finds R.A. No. 8049 adequate to deter and prosecute hazing, the law is far from perfect. In
Villareal v. People,116 the Court suggested that the fact of intoxication and the presence of non- resident or
alumni fraternity members during hazing should be considered as aggravating circumstances that would
increase the applicable penalties. Equally, based on the discussion earlier, this Court suggests some further
amendments to the law. First, there should be a penalty or liability for noncompliance with Section 2, or the
written notice requirement, and with Section 3, or the representation requirement. Second, the penalties
under Section 4 should also consider the psychological harm done to the victim of hazing. With these
additional inputs on R.A. No. 8049, the movement against hazing can be invigorated. R.A. No. 8049 is a
democratic response to the uproar against hazing. It demonstrates that there must, and should, be another
way of fostering brotherhood, other than through the culture of violence and suffering. The senseless deaths
of these young men shall never be forgotten, for justice is the spark that lights the candles of their graves.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The April 26, 2013, Decision and the October 8, 2013 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 05046 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Let copies of this
Decision be furnished to the Secretary of the Department of Justice as guidance for the proper
implementation and prosecution of violators of R.A. No. 8049; and to the Senate President and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti- Hazing Law to
include the penalty for noncompliance with its Section 2 and 3, and the: penalty for the psychological harms
to the surviving victims of hazing.

SO ORDERED.

2. People v. Aguilos, G.R. No. 121828, 27 June 2003

G.R. No. 121828 June 27, 2003, PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
EDMAR AGUILOS, ODILON LAGLIBA Y ABREGON and RENE GAYOT PILOLA, accused, RENE
GAYOT
PILOLA, Appellant.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is the appeal of appellant Rene Gayot Pilola for the reversal of the Decision 1 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 164, convicting him of murder, sentencing him to suffer reclusion
perpetua and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the victim Joselito Capa y Rulloda in the amount of
₱50,000 for the latter’s death. The
Indictment
On June 7, 1998, Edmar Aguilos, Odilon Lagliba y Abregon and appellant Rene Gayot Pilola were charged
with murder in an Information which reads:

That on or about the 5th day of February, 1988 in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together with one Ronnie Diamante who is still at-large and no fixed address and
mutually helping and aiding with one another, armed with double-bladed knives and a bolo and with intent to
kill, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault hack and stab one Joselito Capa y Rulloda, as a result of which the latter
sustained hack and stab wounds on the different parts of his body, which directly caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

Of the three accused, Odilon Lagliba was the first to be arrested3 and tried, and subsequently convicted of
murder.4 The decision of the trial court became final and executory. Accused Edmar Aguilos remains at
large while accused Ronnie Diamante reportedly died a month after the incident. Meanwhile, herein
appellant Rene Gayot Pilola was arrested. He was arraigned on March 9, 1994, assisted by counsel, and
pleaded not guilty to the charge.5 Thereafter, trial of the case ensued.

The Evidence of the Prosecution6

On February 5, 1988, at around 11:30 p.m., Elisa Rolan was inside their store at 613 Nueve de Pebrero
Street, Mandaluyong City, waiting for her husband to arrive. Joselito Capa and Julian Azul, Jr. were drinking
beer. Edmar Aguilos and Odilon Lagliba arrived at the store. Joselito and Julian invited them to join their
drinking spree, and although already inebriated, the two newcomers obliged. In the course of their drinking,
the conversation turned into a heated argument. Edmar nettled Julian, and the latter was peeved. An
altercation between the two ensued. Elisa pacified the protagonists and advised them to go home as she
was already going to close up. Edmar and Odilon left the store. Joselito and Julian were also about to leave,
when Edmar and Odilon returned, blocking their way. Edmar took off his eyeglasses and punched Julian in
the face. Elisa shouted: "Tama na. Tama na." Edmar and Julian ignored her and traded fist blows until they
reached Aling Sotera’s store at the end of the street, about twelve to fifteen meters away from Elisa’s store.
For his part, Odilon positioned himself on top of a pile of hollow blocks and watched as Edmar and Julian
swapped punches. Joselito tried to placate the protagonists to no avail.

Joselito’s intervention apparently did not sit well with Odilon. He pulled out his knife with his right hand and
stepped down from his perch. He placed his left arm around Joselito’s neck and stabbed the latter. Ronnie
and the appellant, who were across the street, saw their gangmate Odilon stabbing the victim and decided to
join the fray. They pulled out their knives, rushed to the scene and stabbed Joselito. Elisa could not tell how
many times the victim was stabbed or what parts of his body were hit by whom. The victim fell in the canal.
Odilon and the appellant fled, while Ronnie went after Julian and tried to stab him. Julian ran for dear life.
When he noticed that Ronnie was no longer running after him, Julian stopped at E. Rodriguez Road and
looked back. He saw Ronnie pick up a piece of hollow block and with it bashed Joselito’s head. Not content,
Ronnie got a piece of broken bottle and struck Joselito once more. Ronnie then fled from the scene. Joselito
died on the spot. Elisa rushed to Joselito’s house and informed his wife and brother of the incident.7

The next day, Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz, Supervising Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation, conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Joselito and prepared Autopsy Report No. N-88-
375,8 with the following findings:

POSTMORTEM FINDINGS

The Evidence of the Prosecution6

On February 5, 1988, at around 11:30 p.m., Elisa Rolan was inside their store at 613 Nueve de Pebrero
Street, Mandaluyong City, waiting for her husband to arrive. Joselito Capa and Julian Azul, Jr. were drinking
beer. Edmar Aguilos and Odilon Lagliba arrived at the store. Joselito and Julian invited them to join their
drinking spree, and although already inebriated, the two newcomers obliged. In the course of their drinking,
the conversation turned into a heated argument. Edmar nettled Julian, and the latter was peeved. An
altercation between the two ensued. Elisa pacified the protagonists and advised them to go home as she
was already going to close up. Edmar and Odilon left the store. Joselito and Julian were also about to leave,
when Edmar and Odilon returned, blocking their way. Edmar took off his eyeglasses and punched Julian in
the face. Elisa shouted: "Tama na. Tama na." Edmar and Julian ignored her and traded fist blows until they
reached Aling Sotera’s store at the end of the street, about twelve to fifteen meters away from Elisa’s store.
For his part, Odilon positioned himself on top of a pile of hollow blocks and watched as Edmar and Julian
swapped punches. Joselito tried to placate the protagonists to no avail.

Joselito’s intervention apparently did not sit well with Odilon. He pulled out his knife with his right hand and
stepped down from his perch. He placed his left arm around Joselito’s neck, and stabbed the latter. Ronnie
and the appellant, who were across the street, saw their gangmate Odilon stabbing the victim and decided to
join the fray. They pulled out their knives, rushed to the scene and stabbed Joselito. Elisa could not tell how
many times the victim was stabbed or what parts of his body were hit by whom. The victim fell in the canal.
Odilon and the appellant fled, while Ronnie went after Julian and tried to stab him. Julian ran for dear life.
When he noticed that Ronnie was no longer running after him, Julian stopped at E. Rodriguez Road and
looked back. He saw Ronnie pick up a piece of hollow block and with it bashed Joselito’s head. Not content,
Ronnie got a piece of broken bottle and struck Joselito once more. Ronnie then fled from the scene. Joselito
died on the spot. Elisa rushed to Joselito’s house and informed his wife and brother of the incident.7

The next day, Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz, Supervising Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation, conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Joselito and prepared Autopsy Report No. N-88-
375,8 with the following findings:

POSTMORTEM FINDINGS

Pallor, conjunctivae and integument, marked and generalized.

Contused abrasions: temple, right, 3.0 x 3.0 cm.; mandibular region, right, 2.0 x 8.0 cm.; back,
suprascapular region, left, 3.0 x 4.0 cm.; deltoid region, right, 1.0 x 3.0 cm.

Lacerated wound, scalp, occipital region, 4.0 cm.

Incised wounds: forehead, right side, 5.5 cm.; arm, left, upper third, posterior aspect, 1.5 cm. Stab
wounds:
1. Elliptical, 1.8 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, medial extremity is sharp,
lateral extremity is blunt; located at the anterior chest wall, level of 3rd intercostal space, right,
5.0 cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, upward and medially, non-penetrating, with
an approximate depth of 3.0 cm.;

2. Elliptical, 1.5 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp and
the other is blunt; located at the antero-lateral aspect of chest, level of 3rd intercostal space, left, 3.0
cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, downward and medially, into the left thoracic
cavity, penetrating the left ventricle of the heart with an approximate depth of
10.0 cm.;

3. Elliptical, 3.0 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp and
the other is blunt; located at the antero-lateral aspect of chest, level of 4th intercostal space, 12.0
cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, downward and medially, penetrating upper
lobe of left lung with an approximate depth of 9.0 cm.;

4. Elliptical, 2.0 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp and the
other is blunt; located at the antero-lateral aspect of chest, level of 5th intercostal space, left, 15.0
cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, downward and medially, penetrating the left
thoracic cavity and then lower lobe of left lung and then penetrating the left ventricle of the heart with
an approximate depth of 11.0 cm.;

5. Elliptical, 1.3 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp and
the other is blunt; located at the lateral chest wall, level of 7 th intercostal space, left, 16.0 cm. from
anterior median line; directed backward, upward and medially, into the left thoracic cavity and then
penetrating the lower lobe of left lung with an approximately depth of 10.0 cm.;

6. Elliptical, 4.0 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp and
the other is blunt; located at the lumbar region, left, 14.0 cm. from anterior median line; directed
backward, upward and medially, into the abdominal cavity and then penetrating ileum;

7. Elliptical, 1.5 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity is sharp, lower
extremity is blunt; located at the chest, lateral, level of 9th intercostal space, left; 14.0 cm. from
posterior median line; directed forward, upward and medially, non-penetrating with an approximate
depth of 4.0 cm.;
8. Elliptical, 2.0 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity is blunt, lower
extremity is sharp; located at the abdomen, postero-lateral aspect, 15.0 cm. from posterior
median line; directed forward, upward and laterally, into the abdominal cavity and then
perforating the spleen and pancreas with an approximate depth of 13.0 cm.;

9. Elliptical, 5.0 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity is blunt, lower
extremity is sharp; located at the left arm, upper third, anterior; directed backward, downward and
medially, involving skin and underlying soft tissues with an approximate depth of
6.0 cm.;

10. Elliptical, 2.3 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity is sharp, lower
extremity is blunt; located at the left forearm, upper third, anterior; directed backward, upward and
medially and communicating with another wound, arm, left, medial aspect, 2.0 cm.;

11. Elliptical, 2.0 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity blunt, lower
extremity, sharp; located at the left arm, lower third, posterior aspect, directed forward, downward
and medially, communicating with another wound, arm, left, lower third, posterior aspect, 1.5 cm.

Hemothorax, left – 900 c.c.

Hemopericardium – 300 c.c.
Hemoperitoneum – 750 c.c.
Brain and other visceral organs, pale.
Stomach-filled with rice and other food particles. CAUSE
OF DEATH: Multiple stab wounds.
The Evidence of the Appellant

The appellant denied stabbing the victim and interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that at around
11:00 p.m. of February 5, 1988, he was in the house of his cousin, Julian Cadion, at 606 Nueve de Pebrero
Street, Mandaluyong City. He suddenly heard a commotion coming from outside. Julian rushed out of the
house to find out what was going on. The appellant remained inside the house because he was suffering
from ulcer and was experiencing excessive pain in his stomach. The following morning, the appellant
learned from their neighbor, Elisa Rolan, that Joselito had been stabbed to death. The appellant did not
bother to ask who was responsible for the stabbing.9

Julian alias "Buboy" Cadion corroborated the appellant’s testimony. He testified that the appellant was in
their house on the night of February 5, 1988 and was suffering from ulcer. The appellant stayed home on
the night of the incident.10

Agripina Gloria, a female security guard residing at Block 30, Nueve de Pebrero, 612, Int. 4, Allison St.,
Mandaluyong City, testified that on February 5, 1988, at around 11:00 p.m., she heard a commotion
outside. Momentarily, she saw Ronnie rush into the kitchen of the house of her niece Teresita; he took a
knife and run towards Nueve de Pebrero Street where Edmar and Julian were fighting. She then followed
Ronnie and saw Joselito trying to pacify the protagonists. Ronnie grabbed Joselito and instantly stabbed
the latter, who for a while retreated and fell down the canal. Not content, Ronnie repeatedly stabbed
Joselito. Thereafter, Ronnie ran towards the direction of the mental hospital. Agripina did not see Odilon
or the appellant anywhere within the vicinity of the incident.11

On May 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, to wit:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds RENE GAYOT PILOLA of 606 Nueve de Febrero Street, Mandaluyong City,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and
there being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, he is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Pilola is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of deceased Joselito Capa alias Jessie in the amount of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as indemnity for his death jointly and solidarily with Odilon
Lagliba who was earlier convicted herein. With cost against the accused.12

In the case at bar, the appellant assails the decision of the trial court contending that:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY ANENT THE
ASSAILED INCIDENT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE AND INCONSISTENT
TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS ELISA ROLAN AND IN SETTING ASIDE THE EVIDENCE
PROFFERED BY ACCUSED- APPELLANT.

III

THE TRIAL COURT MANIFESTLY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME

CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.13

The appellant avers that Elisa is not a credible witness and her testimony is barren of probative weight. This
is so because she contradicted herself when she testified on direct examination that Ronnie struck the head
of the victim with a hollow block. However, on cross-examination, she stated that it was Edmar who struck
the victim. The inconsistency in Elisa’s testimony impaired her credibility.

The contention of the appellant does not hold water.

First. The identity of the person who hit the victim with a hollow block is of de minimis importance. The
victim died because of multiple wounds. The appellant is charged with murder for the killing of the victim
with a knife, in conspiracy with the other accused.

Second. The perceived inconsistency in Elisa’s account of events is a minor and collateral detail that does
not affect the substance of her testimony, as it even serves to strengthen rather than destroy her credibility. 14

Third. Elisa has been consistent in her testimony that the appellant was one of the men who stabbed the
victim, the others being Ronnie and Odilon. Elisa’s testimony is corroborated by the autopsy report of Dr.
Bienvenido Muñoz and his testimony that the victim sustained eleven stab wounds. The doctor testified that
there were two or more assailants:

Q Could you tell the court what instrument could have been used by the perpetrator in inflicting those two
incise wounds?

A Those incise wounds were caused by a sharp instrument like a knife or any similar instrument.

Q Now you also found out from the body of the victim eleven stab wounds? A
Yes, sir.
Q Now, tell the court in which part of the body of the victim where these eleven stab wounds [are]
located?

A Shall I go one by one, all the eleven stab wounds? Q All

the eleven stab wounds?

A One stab wound was located at the front portion of the chest, right side. Another stab wound was located
also on the chest left side, another stab wound was located at the antero lateral aspect, it’s the front of the
chest almost to the side. And also another one, also at the chest, another stab wound was at the left side of
the chest and another one was at the lumbar region of the abdomen left side or where the left kidney is
located, lumbar area. Another one at the side of the chest, left side of the chest.
Another stab wound in the abdomen; another stab wound at the left arm. Another one at the left forearm
and the last one in the autopsy report is located at the left arm. These are all the eleven stab wounds
sustained by the victim.

A The instrument used was a sharp pointed edge or a single bladed instrument like a knife, kitchen knife,
balisong or any similar instrument.

Q Considering the number of stab wounds, doctor, will you tell us whether there were several
assailants?

A In my opinion, there were more than one assailant (sic) here because of the presence of different types
of stab wounds and lacerated wounds. This lacerated wound could not have been inflicted by the one
holding the one which inflicted the instrument.. (discontinued) which inflicted the stab wounds.

Q So there could have been two or three assailants? A

More than one.15
The physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of the veracity of Elisa’s testimony. 16

Fourth. Even the appellant himself declared on the witness stand that he could not think of any reason why
Elisa pointed to him as one of the assailants. In a litany of cases, we have ruled that when there is no
showing of any improper motive on the part of a witness to testify falsely against the accused or to falsely
implicate the latter in the commission of the crime, as in the case at bar, the logical conclusion is that no
such improper motive exists, and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.17

Fifth. The trial court gave credence and full probative weight to Elisa’s testimony. Case law has it that the
trial court’s calibration of the testimonial evidence of the parties, its assessment of the credibility of
witnesses and the probative weight thereof is given high respect, if not conclusive effect, by the appellate
court.

The appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove that he conspired with Ronnie and Odilon in
stabbing the victim to death. He contends that for one to be a conspirator, his participation in the criminal
resolution of another must either precede or be concurrent with the criminal acts. He asserts that even if it
were true that he was present at the situs criminis and that he stabbed the victim, it was Odilon who had
already decided, and in fact fatally stabbed the victim. He could not have conspired with Odilon as the
incident was only a chance encounter between the victim, the appellant and his co- accused. In the absence
of a conspiracy, the appellant cannot be held liable as a principal by direct participation. Elisa could not
categorically and positively assert as to what part of the victim’s body was hit by whom, and how many times
the victim was stabbed by the appellant. He asserts that he is merely an accomplice and not a principal by
direct participation.

We are not persuaded by the ruminations of the appellant.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.18
Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proved separately from and with the same
quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. After all, secrecy and
concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy. It may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common
purpose and design.19 Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts
towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts,
though apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.20 There may be conspiracy even if an
offender does not know the identities of the other offenders,21 and even though he is not aware of all the
details of the plan of operation or was not in on the scheme from the beginning.22 One need only to knowingly
contribute his efforts in furtherance of it.23 One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the
criminal designs of his co-conspirators. If conspiracy is established, all the conspirators are liable as co-
principals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation since in contemplation of law, the act of
one would be the act of all.24 Each of the conspirators is the agent of all the others.25

To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed
an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy. 26 The mere presence of an accused at the situs
of the crime will not suffice; mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act without cooperation or
agreement to cooperate on the part of the accused is not enough to make him a party to a conspiracy.
There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common
design and purpose.27 Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to
the occurrence. From the legal standpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense,
the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution.28 As a rule, the concurrence of wills,
which is the essence of conspiracy, may be deduced from the evidence of facts and circumstances, which
taken together, indicate that the parties cooperated and labored to the same end.29

Even if two or more offenders do not conspire to commit homicide or murder, they may be held criminally
liable as principals by direct participation if they perform overt acts which mediately or immediately cause
or accelerate the death of the victim, applying Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code:

Art. 4. Criminal liability. – Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which
he intended.

In such a case, it is not necessary that each of the separate injuries is fatal in itself. It is sufficient if the
injuries cooperated in bringing about the victim’s death. Both the offenders are criminally liable for the same
crime by reason of their individual and separate overt criminal acts.30 Absent conspiracy between two or more
offenders, they may be guilty of homicide or murder for the death of the victim, one as a principal by direct
participation, and the other as an accomplice, under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code:

Art. 18. Accomplices. – Accomplices are the persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must concur: (a) the community of criminal design;
that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his
purpose; (b) the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission
of the crime.31 Accomplices come to know about the criminal resolution of the principal by direct participation
after the principal has reached the decision to commit the felony and only then does the accomplice agree to
cooperate in its execution. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely
assent to the plan of the principal by direct participation and cooperate in its accomplishment. 32 However,
where one cooperates in the commission of the crime by performing overt acts which by themselves are acts
of execution, he is a principal by direct participation, and not merely an accomplice.33

In this case, Odilon all by himself initially decided to stab the victim. The appellant and Ronnie were on the
side of the street. However, while Odilon was stabbing the victim, the appellant and Ronnie agreed to join
in; they rushed to the scene and also stabbed the victim with their respective knives. The three men
simultaneously stabbed the hapless victim. Odilon and the appellant fled from the scene together,
while Ronnie went after Julian. When he failed to overtake and collar Julian, Ronnie returned to where
Joselito fell and hit him with a hollow block and a broken bottle. Ronnie then hurriedly left. All the overt acts
of Odilon, Ronnie and the appellant before, during, and after the stabbing incident indubitably show that
they conspired to kill the victim.

The victim died because of multiple stab wounds inflicted by two or more persons. There is no evidence
that before the arrival of Ronnie and the appellant at the situs criminis, the victim was already dead. It
cannot thus be argued that by the time the appellant and Ronnie joined Odilon in stabbing the victim, the
crime was already consummated.

All things considered, we rule that Ronnie and the appellant conspired with Odilon to kill the victim; hence,
all of them are criminally liable for the latter’s death. The appellant is not merely an accomplice but is a
principal by direct participation.

Even assuming that the appellant did not conspire with Ronnie and Odilon to kill the victim, the appellant is
nevertheless criminally liable as a principal by direct participation. The stab wounds inflicted by him
cooperated in bringing about and accelerated the death of the victim or contributed materially thereto.34

The trial court correctly overruled the appellant’s defense of alibi. Alibi is a weak, if not the weakest of
defenses in a criminal prosecution, because it is easy to concoct but hard to disprove. To serve as basis for
acquittal, it must be established by clear and convincing evidence. For it to prosper, the accused must prove
not only that he was absent from the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, but also that it was
physically impossible for him to have been present then.35 In this case, the appellant avers that at the time
of the stabbing incident, he was resting in the house of his cousin at 606 Nueve de Pebrero Street as he
was suffering from stomach pain due to his ulcer.36 But the appellant failed to adduce any medical certificate
that he was suffering from the ailment. Moreover, Elisa positively identified the appellant as one of the men
who repeatedly stabbed the victim. The appellant’s defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive and
straightforward identification of the appellant as one of the victim’s assailants. The appellant himself
admitted that his cousin’s house, the place where he was allegedly resting when the victim was stabbed,
was merely ten to fifteen meters away from the scene of the stabbing. Indeed, the appellant’s defense of
denial and alibi, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving and
cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the positive testimony of prosecution eyewitness Elisa
Rolan.37

The appellant’s defenses must crumble in the face of evidence that he fled from the situs criminis and later
left his house. The records show that despite being informed that he was sought after by the authorities as a
suspect for the killing of the victim, the appellant suddenly and inscrutably disappeared from his residence at
Nueve de Pebrero. As early as May 5, 1988, a subpoena for the appellant was returned unserved because he
was "out of town."38 The appellant’s own witness, Julian Cadion, testified that the appellant had left and was
no longer seen at Nueve de Pebrero after the incident, thus:

Q So, how long did you stay at 606 Nueve de Pebrero after February 5, 1988?

A One week only, sir, and then three weeks after, I returned to Nueve de Pebrero.
Q The whole week after February 5, 1988, was Rene Pilola still living at 606 Nueve de Pebrero?
A I did not see him anymore, sir.

Q And then three weeks thereafter, you went back to Nueve de Pebrero. Is that what you were then
saying?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, at the time that you went back to 606 Nueve de Pebrero, was Rene Pilola there? A I
did not see him anymore, sir.39
The records show that the appellant knew that he was charged for the stabbing of the victim. However,
instead of surrendering to the police authorities, he adroitly evaded arrest. The appellant’s flight is evidence
of guilt and, from the factual circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, no reason can be deduced from it
other than that he was driven by a strong sense of guilt and admission that he had no tenable defense. 40

The Crime Committed by the Appellant and the

Proper Penalty Therefor

The trial court correctly convicted the appellant of murder qualified by treachery.1âwphi1 Abuse of superior
strength likewise attended the commission of the crime. There is treachery when the offender commits any
of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed
victim without the slightest provocation on his part.41 In this case, the attack on the unarmed victim was
sudden. Odilon, without provocation, suddenly placed his arm around the victim’s neck and forthwith
stabbed the latter. The victim had no inkling that he would be attacked as he was attempting to pacify Edmar
and Julian. Ronnie and the appellant, both also armed with deadly weapons, rushed to the scene and
stabbed the victim, giving no real opportunity for the latter to defend himself. And even as the victim was
already sprawled on the canal, Ronnie bashed his head with a hollow block. The peacemaker became the
victim of violence.

Unquestionably, the nature and location of the wounds showed that the killing was executed in a treacherous
manner, preventing any means of defense on the part of the victim. As testified to by Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz,
the victim was stabbed, not just once, but eleven times mostly on the chest and the abdominal area. Six of
the stab wounds were fatal, causing damage to the victim’s vital internal organs. 42

The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed by treachery. 43 There is no

mitigating circumstance that attended the commission of the felony. The penalty for murder under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Since no aggravating and mitigating
circumstances attended the commission of the crime, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua, conformably
to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.

Civil Liabilities of the Appellant

The trial court correctly directed the appellant to pay to the heirs of the victim Joselita Capa the amount of
₱50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, in accord with current jurisprudence. 44 The said heirs are likewise
entitled to moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000, also conformably to current jurisprudence. 45 In
addition, the heirs are entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of ₱25,000.46

WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated May 3, 1995, of Branch 164 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in
Criminal Case No. 73615, finding appellant Rene Gayot Pilola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The appellant is hereby directed to pay to the heirs of
the victim Joselito Capa the amount of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity; the amount of ₱50,000 as moral
damages; and the amount of ₱25,000 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.
 3. People v. Larranaga, 421 SCRA 530, 3 February 2004
G.R. Nos. 138874-75 January 31, 2006 PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias "PACO;" JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias
"WESLEY;" ALBERT CAÑO alias "ALLAN PAHAK;" ARIEL BALANSAG; DAVIDSON VALIENTE
RUSIA alias 'TISOY TAGALOG;" JAMES ANTHONY UY alias "WANGWANG;" and JAMES
ANDREW UY alias
"MM," Appellants.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Most jurisdictions recognize age as a barrier to having full responsibility over one’s action. 1 Our legal
system, for instance, does not punish a youth as it would an adult, and it sees youthful misconduct as
evidence of unreasoned or impaired judgment. Thus, in a myriad of cases, we have applied the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority embodied in Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code -- the rationale of
which is to show mercy and some extent of leniency in favor of an accused who, by reason of his age, is
presumed to have acted with less discernment. The case at bar is another instance when the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority must apply.

For our resolution is the motion for reconsideration 2 filed by brothers James Anthony and James Andrew,
both surnamed Uy, praying for the reduction of the penalties we imposed upon the latter on the ground
that he was a minor at the time the crimes were committed.

A brief review of the pertinent facts is imperative.

On February 3, 2004, we rendered a Decision 3 convicting the Uy brothers, together with Francisco Juan
Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño and Ariel Balansag of the crimes of (a) special
complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape; and (b) simple kidnapping
and serious illegal detention. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City in Criminal Cases Nos.
CBU 45303 and 45304 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias ‘PACO;’
JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias ‘WESLEY;’ ALBERTO CAÑO alias ‘ALLAN
PAHAK;’ ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias ‘MM,’ are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH by lethal injection;

(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias ‘PACO’;
JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias ‘WESLEY;’ ALBERTO CAÑO alias ‘ALLAN
PAHAK;’ ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias ‘MM,’ are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and are sentenced to suffer
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA;

(3) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellant JAMES ANTHONY UY who was a minor at the time
the crime was committed, is likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex
crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, he is declared
guilty of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
TWELVE (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years
of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as MAXIMUM;

(4) Appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Marijoy and Jacqueline, in each
case, the amounts of (a) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages;
(c) ₱150,000.00 as moral damages; and (d) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is
constitutional and the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

In accordance with Article 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of RA No. 7659,
upon the finality of this Decision let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the
President for the possible exercise of Her Excellency’s pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.

On March 23, 2004, the Uy brothers filed a motion for reconsideration anchored on the following
grounds:

ACCUSED JAMES ANDREW S. UY WAS, LIKE HIS YOUNGER BROTHER JAMES ANTHONY S. UY, A
MINOR AT THE TIME THE OFFENSES AT BAR ALLEGEDLY HAPPENED LAST JULY 16, 1997;

II
THE IDENTITY OF THE DEAD BODY OF THE WOMAN FOUND IN TAN-AWAN, CARCAR, CEBU
LAST JULY 18, 1997 WAS NEVER CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED THUS THE NEED FOR ITS
EXHUMATION FOR DNA TESTING.4

The issues raised in the above motion being intertwined with those raised by Larrañaga, Aznar, Adlawan,
Caño and Balansag in their separate motions for reconsideration, we deemed it appropriate to consolidate
the motions. After a painstaking evaluation of every piece and specie of evidence presented before the trial
court in response to the movants’ plea for the reversal of their conviction, still we are convinced that the
movants’ guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, in our Resolution dated July 21, 2005, we
denied all the motions. However, left unresolved is the issue of James Andrew’s minority.

Hence, this disquisition.

In their motion, the Uy brothers claim that James Andrew was only seventeen (17) years and two hundred
sixty two (262) days old at the time the crimes were committed. To substantiate such claim, he begs leave
and pleads that we admit at this stage of the proceedings his (1) Certificate of Live Birth issued by the
National Statistics Office, and (2) Baptismal Certificate. In the ultimate, he prays that his penalty be
reduced, as in the case of his brother James Anthony.

Considering that the entry of James Andrew’s birth in the proffered Certificate of Live Birth is not legible, we
required the Solicitor General (a) to secure from the City Civil Registrar of Cotobato, as well as the National
Statistics Office, a clear and legible copy of James’ Certificate of Live Birth, and thereafter, (b) to file an
extensive comment on the Uy brothers’ motion, solely on the issue of James Andrew’s minority.

On November 17, 2005, the Solicitor General submitted his comment.1âwphi1 Attached therewith are clear
and legible copies of James’ Certificate of Live Birth duly certified by the Office of the City Civil Registrar of
Cotobato and the National Statistics Office. Both documents bear the entry October 27, 1979 as the date of
his birth, thus, showing that he was indeed only 17 years and 262 days old when the crimes were
committed on July 16, 1997.

Consequently, the Solicitor General recommended that the penalty imposed on James Andrew be
modified as follows:

In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303 for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with homicide and rape, the death penalty should be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, for the crime of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua should be reduced to twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum, similar to the
penalty imposed on his brother James Anthony in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303.
The motion is meritorious.

Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 68. – Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. – When the offender is a
minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraph next to the
last of article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:

xxx

2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.

Thus, the imposable penalty on James Andrew, by reason of his minority, is one degree lower than the
statutory penalty. The penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape, being death, one degree lower therefrom is reclusion perpetua.5 On the other hand, the
penalty for simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention is reclusion perpetua to death. One degree lower
therefrom is reclusion temporal.6 There being no aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be
imposed on James Andrew is reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, he should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum
period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.7

Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed upon
James Andrew; while in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, the imposable penalty upon him is twelve (12)
years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in
its medium period, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. Our Decision dated February 3, 2004
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, James Andrew Uy is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; while in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, the penalty
of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years of
reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

4. People v. Garchitorena, 597 SCRA 420, August 28, 2009

G.R. No. 175605

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.

ARNOLD GARCHITORENA Y CAMBA a.k.a. JUNIOR; JOEY PAMPLONA a.k.a. NATO and JESSIE
GARCIA Y
ADORINO, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For automatic review is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 00765 which
affirmed an earlier Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binan City, Branch 25 in Criminal Case
No.9440-B, finding accused-appellants Arnold Garchitorena y Gamba, a.k.a. "Junior," Joey Pamplona,
a.k.a. "Nato," and Jessie Garcia y Adorino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing them
to suffer the penalty of death and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the victim in the amount of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages,
₱16,700.00 as actual damages, ₱408,000.00 for loss of earning capacity and to pay the costs of the suit.

The conviction of accused-appellants stemmed from an Information3 dated January 22, 1996, filed with the
RTC for the crime of Murder, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about September 22, 1995, in the Municipality of Binan, Province of Laguna, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Arnold Garchitorena y Gamba, alias "Junior", Joey
 Pamplona alias "Nato" and Jessie Garcia y Adorino, conspiring, confederating together and mutualy helping
each other, with intent to kill, while conveniently armed with a deadly bladed weapon, with abuse of superior
strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Mauro Biay y
Almarinez with the said weapon, thereby inflicting upon him stab wounds on the different parts of his body
which directly caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of his surviving heirs.

That the crime was committed with the qualifying aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned, accused-appellants, duly assisted by their counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Thereafter, trial ensued.

The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses; namely, Dulce Borero, elder sister of the victim Mauro Biay
and eyewitness to the killing of her brother; Dr. Rolando Poblete, who conducted an autopsy on the body of the
victim and prepared the post-mortem report; and Amelia Biay, the victim’s widow. The evidence for the
prosecution, as culled from the CA Decision under review, is as follows

In the proceedings before the trial court, witness for the prosecution Dulce Borero testified that on
September 22, 1995, at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, she was selling "balut" at Sta. Inez, Almeda
Subdivision, Brgy. Dela Paz, Binan, Laguna. Her brother, Mauro Biay, also a "balut" vendor", was also at
the area, about seven (7) arms length away from her when she was called by accused Jessie Garcia.
Borero testified that when her brother Mauro approached Jessie, the latter twisted the hand of her brother
behind his back and Jessie’s companions- accused Arnold Garchitorena and Joey Pamplona – began
stabbing her brother Mauro repeatedly with a shiny bladed instrument. Joey was at the right side of the
victim and was strangling Mauro from behind. Witness saw her brother Mauro struggling to free himself
while being stabbed by the three (3) accused., until her brother slumped facedown on the ground. Arnold
then instructed his two co-accused to run away. During cross-examination, Borero claims that she wanted
to shout for help but nothing came out from her mouth. When the accused had left after the stabbing
incident, witness claimed that she went home to call her elder brother Teodoro Biay, but when they
returned to the scene, the victim was no longer there as he had already been brought to the Perpetual
Help Hospital. They learned from the tricycle driver who brought Mauro top the hospital that their brother
was pronounced dead on arrival.

Dr. Rolando Poblete, the physician who conducted an autopsy on victim Mauro Biay and prepared the
post-mortem report, testified that the victim’s death was caused by "hypovolemic shock secondary to
multiple stab wounds." Witness specified the eight (8) stab wounds suffered by the victim – one in the
neck, two in the chest, one below the armpit, two on the upper abdomen, one at the back and one at the
left thigh – and also a laceration at the left forearm of Mauro. According to the expert witness, the nature
of stab wounds indicate that it may have been caused by more than one bladed instrument.

The victim’s widow, Amelia Biay, testified that she incurred burial expenses amounting to ₱16,700.00 due
to the death of her husband. Also, her husband allegedly earned a minimum of ₱300.00 a day as a "balut"
vendor and ₱100.00 occasionally as a part-time carpenter.

The accused-appellants denied the charge against them. Specifically, accused-appellant Joey Pamplona
denied that he participated in the stabbing of Mauro Bay, accused-appellant Jessie Garcia interposed the
defense of alibi, while accused-appellant Arnold Garchitorena interposed the defense of insanity.
Succinctly, the CA Decision summed up their respective defenses:

On the other hand, accused Joey Pamplona denied that he participated in the stabbing of Mauro Biay. Joey
Pamplona claims that he was seated on a bench when co-accused Arnold came along. Then the "balut"
vendor arrived and Joey saw Arnold stand up, pull something from the right side of his pocket and stab the
"balut" vendor once before running away. Joey Pamplona testified that after the stabbing incident, due to
fear that Arnold might also stab him, he also ran away to the store of a certain Mang Tony, a barangay
official and related the incident to Aling Bel, the wife of Mang Tony. Joey Pamplona said that he stayed at
Mang Tony’s store until his father arrived and told him to go home.

Danilo Garados testified that on Septemebr 22, 1995, he was at the store of Mang Tony to buy
cigarettes and saw Arnold and Joey seated on the bench near the artesian well. Arnold and Joey
allegedly called Mauro Biay and he saw Arnold stabbing Mauro. Jessie Garcia was not there and Joey
allegedly ran away when Arnold stabbed Mauro.

Clavel Estropegan testified that on September 22, 1995, around 9:00 p.m. Joey Pamplona entered her
store and told her that Junior or Arnold Garchitorena was stabbing somebody. She did not hear any
commotion outside her house which is just four houses away from the artesian well. However, she
closed her store for fear that Arnold will enter her house.

Barangay Captain Alfredo Arcega testified that he investigated the stabbing incident and, although he had
no personal knowledge, he found out that it was Arnold Garchitorena who stabbed Mauro Biay. Upon
questioning Arnold, the latter admitted that he did stab Mauro.

Defense witness Miguelito Gonzalgo testified that on September 22, 1995, he was in his shoe factory at his
house located at 186 Sta. Teresita Street, Almeda Subdivision, Binan when he heard Mauro Biay shouting,
and so he went out of his house. He allegedly saw two persons "embracing" each other near the artesian
well. He recognized these two persons as Mauro and Arnold. He saw Arnold pulling out a knife from the
body of Mauro and the latter slowly fell down on his side. After Arnold washed his hands at the artesian well
and walked away towards the house of his aunt, this witness approached Mauro and seeing that the victim
was still breathing, went to get a tricycle to bring Mauro to the hospital. When he got back to the area, there
were many people who helped board Mauro in the tricycle and they brought him to the Perpetual Help
Hospital in Binan.

The other co-accused Jessie Garcia took the stand and claimed that on September 22, 1995, between 8:00
and 9:00 in the evening, he was still riding a bus from his work in Blumentritt. He arrived at his home in
Binan only at 11:00 p.m. On September 24, 1995, he was fetched by two (2) policemen and two (2)
Barangay Tanods from his house and brought to the Binan Police Station for questioning. Thereafter, he was
put in jail and incarcerated for six (6) months without knowing the charges against him. He was only
informed that he was one of the suspects in the killing of Mauro Biay by his mother.

With respect to Arnold Garchitorena, Dr. Evelyn Belen, Medical Officer III and resident physician of the
National Center for Mental Health, testified that she examined the accused Arnold and based on the history
of the patient, it was found that he had been using prohibited drugs like shabu and marijuana for two (2)
years prior to the stabbing incident in 1995. The patient is allegedly suffering from schizophrenia, wherein
he was hearing auditory voices, seeing strange things and is delusional.

However, Dr. Belen also testified that the accused Garchitorena had remissions or exaservation and
understands what he was doing and was aware of his murder case in court.4

On May 9, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision,5 as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court finds accused
Arnold Garchitorena y Gamboa alias Junior, Joey Pamplona alias Nato and Jessie Garcia y Adorino
GUILTY beyond reasonable of the crime of "MURDER" as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, by Republic Act 7659, (Heinous Crimes). Accordingly, all of them are
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH.

Furthermore, all of the accused are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally Amelia Biay, widow of the
victim Mauro Biay, the following sums:

a) 50,000.00 – as and for civil indemnity

b) 50,000.00 – as and for moral damages

c) 50,000.00 – as and for exemplary damages

d) 16,700.00 – as and for actual damages

e) 408,000.00 – as and for loss of the earning capacity of Mauro Biay; and
 f) To pay the costs of suit.

Likewise, the Provincial Warden of the Provincial Jail, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, is hereby ordered to
transfer/commit the three (3) accused to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, immediately upon
receipt hereof.

Considering that death penalty was meted against all of the accused, let the entire records of the above-
entitled case be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment pursuant to Rule 122,
Sec.10 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

SO ORDERED.6

Accused-appellants appealed to the CA. Pamplona and Garcia reiterated their denial of the charge against
them. Garchitorena who never denied his participation in the killing, insisted, however, insisted that he is
exempt from criminal liability because he was suffering from a mental disorder before, during and after the
commission of the crime.

On May 31, 2006, the CA rendered the Decision7 now under review, affirming RTC’s Decision in toto,
thus:

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the
appealed March 9, 2001 Decuision of the Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna, Branch 25, in Criminal
Case No. 9440-B finding herein accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder is AFFIRMED in its entirety.

SO ORDERED.

In arriving at the assailed Decision, the CA ratiocinated as follows:

After studying the records of this case, we do not find any reason to overturn the ruling of the trial
court.

Despite the testimony of defense witnesses that it was only accused-appellant Arnold Garchitorena who
stabbed the victim Mauro Biay, we find reason to uphold the trial court’s giving credence to prosecution
witness Dulce Borero who testified as an eyewitness on the circumstances surrounding the incident and the
manner by which the crime committed.

Defense witness Garados testified that he was at the store and saw both Arnold and Joey at the vicinity
where the stabbing incident happened, seated on a bench near the artesian well, when they called the victim
Mauro. Defense witness Gonzalgo was in his house when he heard the commotion and went outside to see
Arnold and Mauro "embracing" near the artesian well and the former pulling a knife from the body of the
latter. On the other hand, prosecution witness Borero was merely seven arms length away from the incident
and could easily see the victim Mauro overpowered and attacked by his assailants, Arnold Garchitorena,
Joey Pamplona and Jessie Garcia. She witnessed the stabbing incident in its entirely and positively identified
the accused and their criminal acts. It is a well-settled rule that the evaluation of testimonies of witnesses by
the trial court is received on appeal with the highest respect because such court has the direct opportunity to
observe the witnesses on the stand and determine if they are telling the truth or not. (People vs. Cardel, 336
SCRA 144)

Evidence presented by the prosecution shows that the accused conspired to assault the victim Mauro Biay.
Accused Jessie Garcia was the one who called the victim and prompted the latter to approach their group
near the artesian well. When the victim was near enough, accused Jessie Garcia and co-accused Joey
Pamplona restrained Mauro Biay and overpowered him. Witness Borero then saw the two accused, Jessie
Garcia and Joey Pamplona, together with their co-accused Arnold Garchitorena instructed his two co-
accused to run. Conspiracy is apparent in the concerted action of the three accused. There is conspiracy
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it (People vs. Pendatun, 434 SCRA 148). Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner
in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused which show a joint or common
purpose and design, a concerted action and community of interest among the accused (People vs. Sicad, et
al., 391 SCRA 19).
Likewise, we affirm the trial court’s appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength to qualify the crime into murder. "While it is true that superiority in number does not per se mean
superiority in strength, the appellants in this case did not only enjoy superiority in number, but were armed
with a weapon, while the victim had no means with which to defend himself. Thus, there was obvious
physical disparity between the protagonists and abuse of superior strength attended the killing when the
offenders took advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the offense." (People of the
Phils. vs. Parreno, 433 SCRA 591). In the case at bar, the victim was rendered helpless when he was
assaulted by the three accused. He was restrained and overpowered by the combined strength and the
weapons used by his assailants.

We do not find improbable Borero’s failure to act or shout for help upon witnessing the stabbing of her
brother Mauro Biay. It is an accepted maxim that different people react differently to a given situation or type
of situation and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or
startling experience. xxx There is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking
incident. The workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable. (People
of the Philippines vs. Aspuria, 391 SCRA 404)

Accused-appellant Jessie Garcia’s denial of any involvement cannot prevail over Borero’s positive
identification. As ruled by the trial court, allegations that accused Jessie Garcia was somewhere else
when the crime was committed is not enough. He must likewise demonstrate that he could not have been
present at the crime scene, or in its vicinity. He also could have sought the help of his co-worker, employer
or anyone in the area to support his defense of alibi. Indeed, we affirm that accused Jessie Garcia’s
allegation that he was elsewhere when the crime was committed is not substantiated by evidence. Alibi
can easily be fabricated. Well-settled is the rule that alibi is an inherently weak defense which cannot
prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the victim. (People of the Phils. vs. Cadampog,
428 SCRA 336)
Finally, the defense of insanity cannot be given merit when the expert witness herself, Dr. Belen, attested
that accused Arnold Garchitorena was experiencing remission and was even aware of his murder case in
court. The trial court had basis to conclude that during the commission of the crime, Arnold was not totally
deprived of reason and freedom of will. In fact, after the stabbing incident, accused Arnold Garchitorena
instructed his co-accused to run away from the scene. We agree that such action demonstrates that Arnold
possessed the intelligence to be aware of his and his co-accused’s criminal acts. A defendant in a criminal
case who interpose the defense of mental incapacity has the burden of establishing the fact that he was
insane at the very moment when the crime was committed. There must be complete deprivation of reason in
the commission of the act, or that the accused acted without discernment, which must be proven by clear
and positive evidence. The mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not preclude imputability. Indeed,
a man may act crazy but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so. (People of the
Philippines vs. Galigao, 395 SCRA 195)

Having found the court a quo’s decision to be supported by the evidence on record, and for being in
accord with prevailing jurisprudence, we find no reason to set it aside.

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the
appealed March 9, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25, in Criminal
Case No. 9440-B finding herein accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder is AFFIRMED in its entirely.

SO ORDERED.

The case was elevated to this Court for automatic review. The People and the accused-appellants opted not
to file any supplemental brief. The respective assignments of errors contained in the briefs that they filed
with the CA are set forth hereunder.

For accused-appellant Pamplona:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL AND TOTAL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
PROSECUTION WITNESS DULCE BORERO
 II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLANT

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT WHEN HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN DULY
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

For accused-appellant Garcia:

I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE ALLEGED
EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT GIVEN BY DULCE BORERO, ELDER SISTER OF THE VICTIM AND
PROSECUTION WITNESS, IN RESPECT OF THE PARTICIPATION OF THE HEREIN ACCUSED
DESPITE GLARING INCONSISTENCIES, INHERENT IMPROBABILITIES AND UNRELIABLE
DECLARATION ATTENDING THE SAME; AND, ON THE OTHERHAND, IN DISREGARDING THE
COHERENT, CONSISTENT AND CREDIBLE EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF DEFENSE WITNESSES –
ALL IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE RULES GOVERNING QUANTUM OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES
AND THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENSE EXISTING IN FAVOR OF ACCUSED GARCIA;

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN COMPLETELY DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI

INTERPOSED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT JESSIE GARCIA WHO WAS SOMEWHERE ELSE AT THE
TIME AS TO RENDER IT PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO HAVE BEEN AT THE SCENE OF
THE CRIME AND EVEN IF THE SAME IS SUBSTANTIATED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE,
THAT IS, THE TESTIMONIES OF OITHER DEFENSE WITNESSES WHO WERE ONE IN SAYING THAT
HE WAS NOT PRESENT THEREAT;

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTERING A VERDICT OF CONVICTION FOR JESSIE GARCIA
INSTEAD OF ACQUITTAL WHEN NONE OF THE OTHER ACCUSED, AFTER HAVING ADMITTED
THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE CRIME, IMPLICATED HIM;

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED, IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN THE
ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE THEREFOR.

For accused-appellant Garchitorena:

THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE OVER THE TESTIMONY OF AN
EXPERT WITNESS.

II

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED ARNOLD GARCHITORENA TO HAVE WILLFULLY

EXECUTED THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF.

Accused-appellant Pamplona capitalized on Dulce Borero’s inaction at the time when she had
supposedly witnessed the slaying of her younger brother. He argued that if she really witnessed the
crime, she would have had readily helped her brother Mauro instead of fleeing. Accused-appellant Garcia
anchored his acquittal on his defense of alibi, while accused-appellant Garchitorena used his alleged
mental disorder, specifically, schizophrenia, as a ground to free himself from criminal liability.
The core issues raised by the both accused-appellants Pamplona and Garcia are factual in nature and
delve on the credibility of the witnesses.
Since the accused-appellants raise factual issues, they must use cogent and convincing arguments to show
that the trial court erred in appreciating the evidence. They, however, have failed to do so.

Accused-appellant Pamplona contends that the trial court’s decision was rendered by a judge other than the
one who conducted trial. Hence, the judge who decided the case failed to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses on the stand so as to gauge their credibility. This argument does not convince the Court for the
reason it has consistently maintained, to wit:

We have ruled in People v. Sadiangabay (G.R. No. 87214, March 30, 1993, 220 SCRA 551), that the
circumstance alone that the judge who wrote the decision had not heard the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses would not taint his decision. After all, he had the full record before him, including the transcript of
stenographic notes which he could study. The efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact
that its writer only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial, unless there is a clear
showing of a grave abuse of discretion in the factual findings reached by him. 8

A perusal of the trial court’s decision readily shows that it was duly based on the evidence presented
during the trial. It is evident that he thoroughly examined the testimonial and documentary evidence before
him and carefully assessed the credibility of the witnesses. This Court finds no plausible ground to set
aside the factual findings of the trial court, which were sustained by the CA.lavvph!l

The eyewitness Dulce Borero’s testimony clearly established Pamplona and Garcia’s participation and,
consequently, their culpability in the appalling murder of Mauro Biay:9

"Fiscal Nofuente (To the witness)

Q: Madam witness, do you know Mauro Biay? A: Yes

sir.
xxx

Q: Do you know likewise the cause of his death? A: Yes

sir.
Q: What was the cause of his death? A: He
was repeatedly stabbed sir.
Q: You said that Mauro Biay was repeatedly stabbed, who stabbed Mauro Biay repeatedly? A:
Arnold Gatchitorena, was stabbing repeatedly the victim sir.
Q: Was Arnold Gatchitorena alone when he stabbed Mauro Biay? A:
They were three (3) who were stabbing Mauro Biay, sir.
Q: You said that they were three who were stabbing Mauro Biay, who are the other two? A:
Jessie Garcia and Joey Pamplona sir.
Q: So that when you said three, you are referring to Arnold Gatchitorena, Joey Pamplona and
Jessie Garcia?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Now, when [did] this stabbing incident [happen]? A: On

September 22, 1995 sir.
Q: Do you know what was [the] time when this incident happened on September 22, 1995? A:
9:00 o’clock in the evening sir.
Q: Where [did] this stabbing [happen]?

A: At Sta. Inez, Almeda Subdivision, dela Paz, Biñan, Laguna sir.

Q: Could you tell Madam Witness, where in particular place in Sta. Inez, Almeda Subdivision this
stabbing incident happened?

A: In the street near the artesian well sir. Q: Do

you know where is that street?
A: Sta Inez St., Almeda Subdivision, dela Paz, Biñan, Laguna sir.

Q: You said a while ago that accused Arnold Gatchitorena, Jessie Garcia, Joey Pamplona
repeatedly [stabbed] Mauro Biay, do you know these three accused?

A: Yes sir. xxx

Q: Will you kindly step down from your seat and tap the three accused that you have pointed to us to
be the persons who stabbed and killed your brother Mauro Biay?

Court: Police Officer Dionisio will you kindly accompany the witness. P02
Dionisio: Yes sir.
Fiscal: I would like to manifest Your Honor, that the witness was crying when she was pointing to the
three accused, uttering that "Sila ang pumatay sa aking kapatid!".
xxx

Q: What is the name of that person wearing that blue t-shirts? A:

Arnold Gatchitorena sir.
Q: We would like to confirm if he is really Arnold Gatchitorena pointed to by the witness?

Interpreter: The person pointed to by the witness wearing blue t-shirts identified himself as
Arnold Gatchitorena.

Fiscal: Do you know the name of second person whom you tapped on his side wearing white t-
shirts?

A: Yes sir.

Q: What is his name?

A: Jessie Garcia sir.

Interpreter: The person pointed to by the witness identified himself as certain Jessie Garcia.

Fiscal: Likewise Madam Witness, do you know the name of a person in longsleeves polo shirts-
checkered?

A: Yes sir, Joey Pamplona sir.

Interpreter: The person pointed by the witness identified himself as certain Joey Pamplona. xxx
Q: How far were you from Mauro Biay when he was being stabbed by the three accused Joey
Pamplona, Jessie Garcia, and Arnold Gatchitorena?

A: Seven (7) arms length sir.

Q: You said that your brother was stabbed successively by the three accused, how did it
[happen] Madam Witness?

A: They called him sir. Q: Who

was called? A: Mauro Biay sir.
Q: Who called Mauro Biay?
A: It was Jessie who called sir.

Q: When you said Jessie, are you referring to Jessie Garcia, one of the accused in this case?
A: Yes sir.
Q: When Mauro Biay was called by Jessie Garcia, what was [M]auro Biay doing there? A:
Mauro Biay approached sir.
Q: By the way Madam Witness, do you know why Mauro Biay was in that place where the
incident happened?
A: Yes sir.

Atty. Pajares: Witness would be incompetent Your Honor. Court:

Witness may answer.
Fiscal: Why was he there? A: He was
selling "balot" sir. xxx
Fiscal: When Mauro Biay approached Jessie Garcia, what [did] Mauro Biay do, if any? A:
Jessie Garcia twisted the hand of my brother and placed the hand at his back sir. Q: Who
were the companions of Jessie Garcia when he called [M]auro Biay?
A: Joey Pamplona and Jr. Gatchitorena sir.

Q: When you said Jr. Gatchitorena are you referring to Arnold Gatchitorena? A:
Yes sir.
Q: So that when Jessie Garcia called Mauro Biay, he was together with Arnold Gatchitorena and
Joey Pamplona?

A: Yes sir.

Q: If you know Madam Witness, what did Joey Pamplona and Arnold Gatchitorena do after
Jessie Garcia twisted the arm of Mauro Biay on his back?

A: Arnold Gatchitorena repeatedly stabbed [M]auro Biay at his back and also Jessie Garcia also
stabbed my brother sir.
xxx

Q: Were you able to know the weapon used to stab Mauro Biay? A: It
was like a shiny bladed instrument sir.
Q: Now, what was the position of Mauro Biay when being stabbed by the three accused? A:
He was struggling to free himself sir.
Q: You said that he was struggling to free himself, why did you say that he was struggling to free
himself?

A: Because I could see sir. Q: You

see what?
A: Because that three were repeatedly stabbing Mauro Biay sir.

Q: Aside from stabbing Mauro Biay, what was Joey Pamplona doing to Mauro Biay, if you can still
remember?

A: He was also repeatedly stabbing my brother sir.

Q: Aside from that stabbing, what else if any Joey Pamplona was doing to Mauro Biay?

A: Aside from stabbing Mauro Biay Joey Pamplona was also struggling [strangling] the neck of
Mauro Biay sir.

Q: You said that Mauro Biay was stabbed by the three accused successively, was Mauro Biay hit by
these stabbing?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Why do you know that he was hit by stabbing of the three? A:

Because I saw the blood oozing from the part of his body sir.
Q: Now, what happened to Mauro Biay, when he was stabbed and hit by the successive stabbing of
the three accused?

A: The victim Mauro Biay was suddenly slumped face down on the ground sir. Xxx
Q: What did you learn if any when you went to the hospital to see your brother
[M]auro Biay?
 A: He was already dead sir.

Even under cross-examination, Dulce Borero was unwavering, straightforward, categorical and
spontaneous in her narration of how the killing of her brother Mauro took place. 10 Notably, her
testimony as to the identification of Garchitorena as the one who stabbed Mauro Biay was even
corroborated by defense witness Miguelito Gonzalgo,11 thus:

Q: From the time you saw these two persons near the artesian well, what happened after that, mr.
witness?

A: Mauro Biay slumped on the floor and I saw Junior stabbed once more the victim but I am not sure
if the victim was hit at the back, ma’am.

Q: How far were you from the two when you saw the incident, mr. witness? A:
More or less 7 to 8 meters, ma’am.
Q: Were there anything blocking your sight from the place where you were standing to the place of
incident, mr. witness?

A: None, ma’am.

Absent any showing of ill motive on the part of Borero, we sustain the lower court in giving her testimony full
faith and credence. Moreover, the prosecution’s version is supported by the physical evidence.12 Borero’s
testimony that the victim was successively stabbed several times conforms with the autopsy report that the
latter suffered multiple stab wounds.13

Accused-appellant Pamplona’s argument that there were inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution
witnesses Borero is not convincing. He specifically points out that in the direct examination of Borero, she
stated that it was Jessie Garcia who twisted the hand of Mauro Biay backwards when the latter approached
the former.14 In the cross-examination, she stated that it was Joey Pamplona who strangled the victim when
the latter approached Jessie Garcia.

The seeming inconsistencies between her direct testimony and her cross-examination testimonies are not
sufficient ground to disregard them. In People v. Alberto Restoles y Tuyo, Roldan Noel y Molet and Jimmy
Alayon y De la Cruz,15 we ruled that:

…minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as they may even tend to strengthen
rather than weaken their credibility. Inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect
to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity,
or the weight of their testimony. Such minor flaws may even enhance the worth of a testimony, for they
guard against memorized falsities.

Moreover, such inconsistencies did not contradict the credibility of Borero or her narration of the incident.
On the contrary, they showed that her account was the entire truth. In fact, her narration was in harmony
with the account of defense witness Gonzalgo. We note further that both the Sworn Statement 16 of Borero
and her testimony before the lower court17 were in complete congruence.
Undoubtedly, accused-appellants’ identities as the perpetrators were established by the prosecution. The
prosecution witness was able to observe the entire incident, because she was there. Thus, we find no
reason to differ with the trial court’s appreciation of her testimony. Positive identification, where categorical
and consistent, and not attended by any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses on the
matter, prevails over alibi and denial.18

Accused-appellant Garcia’s alibi has no leg to stand on. In People v. Desalisa,19 this Court ruled that:

…for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place
when the crime was committed, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime or its immediate vicinity through clear and convincing evidence.
Here, the crime was committed at Binan, Laguna. Although Garcia testified that he was still riding a bus
from his work in Blumentritt and arrived in Binan only at 11:00 P.M. or two hours after the killing incident,
still, he failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the place of the crime or its
immediate vicinity. His alibi must fail.

Accused-appellant Garchitorena’s defense of insanity has also no merit. Unlike other jurisdictions, Philippine
courts have established a more stringent criterion for the acceptance of insanity as an exempting
circumstance.20 As aptly argued by the Solicitor General, insanity is a defense in the nature of confession
and avoidance. As such, it must be adequately proved, and accused-appellant Garchitorena utterly failed to
do so. We agree with both the CA and the trial court that he was not totally deprived of reason and freedom
of will during and after the stabbing incident, as he even instructed his co-accused- appellants to run away
from the scene of the crime.

Accused-appellant Garcia also argues that there was no conspiracy, as "there was no evidence
whatsoever that he aided the other two accused-appellants or that he participated in their criminal
designs."21 We are not persuaded. In People v. Maldo,22 we stated:

"Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential, for conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the
accused prior to, during or subsequent to the incident. Such acts must point to a joint purpose, concert of
action or community of interest. Hence, the victim need not be actually hit by each of the conspirators for the
act of one of them is deemed the act of all." (citations omitted, emphasis ours)

In this case, conspiracy was shown because accused-appellants were together in performing the concerted
acts in pursuit of their common objective. Garcia grabbed the victim’s hands and twisted his arms; in turn,
Pamplona, together with Garchitorena, strangled him and straddled him on the ground, then stabbed him.
The victim was trying to free himself from them, but they were too strong. All means through which the
victim could escape were blocked by them until he fell to the ground and expired. The three accused-
appellants’ prior act of waiting for the victim outside affirms the existence of conspiracy, for it speaks of a
common design and purpose.

Where there is conspiracy, as here, evidence as to who among the accused rendered the fatal blow is
not necessary. All conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the intent and the character of
their participation, because the act of one is the act of all.23
The aggravating circumstance of superior strength should be appreciated against the accused- appellants.
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor, considering that a situation of superiority of strength is notoriously advantageous for the
aggressor and is selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. 24 This circumstance
was alleged in the Information and was proved during the trial. In the case at bar, the victim certainly could
not defend himself in any way. The accused-appellants, armed with a deadly weapon, immobilized the
victim and stabbed him successively using the same deadly weapon.

All told, the trial court correctly convicted the accused-appellants of murder, considering the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Since an aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength attended the commission of the crime, each of the accused-appellants should be sentenced to
suffer the penalty of death in accordance with Article 6325 of the Revised Penal Code. Murder, under Article
24826 of the Revised Penal Code, is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Following Article 63 of the
same code, the higher penalty of death shall be applied.

In view, however, of the passage of R.A. No. 9346,27 otherwise known as the Anti-Death Penalty Law, which
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole should instead be
imposed. Accordingly, accused-appellants shall be sentenced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole in lieu of the penalty of death.

While the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty provided for by law for a heinous
offense is still death and the offense is still heinous.28 Consequently, the civil indemnity for the victim is still
₱75,000.00. In People v. Quiachon,29 we explained that even if the penalty of death was not to be imposed on
appellant because of the prohibition in Republic Act No. 9346, the civil indemnity of
₱75,000.00 was still proper. Following the ratiocination in People v. Victor,30 the said award is not
dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty, but on the fact that qualifying circumstances
warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the crime.

Hence, we modify the award of civil indemnity by the trial court from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00. Civil
indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the
commission of the crime. Likewise the award of ₱50,000.00 for moral damages is modified and increased to
₱75,000.00, consistent with recent jurisprudence 31 on heinous crimes where the imposable penalty is death,
it is reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A. 9346. The award of moral damages does not require
allegation and proof of the emotional suffering of the heirs, since the emotional wounds from the vicious
killing of the victim cannot be denied.32 The trial court’s award of exemplary damages in the amount of
₱50,000.00 shall, however, be reduced to ₱30,000.00, also pursuant to the latest jurisprudence on the
matter.33

As to the award of actual damages amounting to ₱16,700.00, we modify the same. In People v.
Villanueva,34 this Court declared that "…when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to
less than ₱25,000.00, as in this case, the award of temperate damages for ₱25,000.00 is justified in lieu of
actual damages of a lesser amount." In the light of such ruling, the victim’s heirs in the present case should,
therefore, be awarded temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00.

The award of ₱408,000.00 for loss of earning capacity is justified. As a rule, documentary evidence
should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of
exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary
evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws, in which case judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased’s line of work
no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less
than the minimum wage under current labor laws.35 It cannot be disputed that the victim, at the time of his
death, was self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. The
computation arrived at by the trial court was in accordance with the formula for computing the award for loss
of earning capacity.36 Thus,

Award for lost = 2/3 [80-age at time of death] x [gross annual income –
50%
earnings (GAI)]

= 2/3 [80-29] x ₱24,000.00 – ₱12,000.00

= (34) x (₱12,000.00)

= ₱408,000.00

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00765, finding the three-accused
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder is hereby AFFIRMED WITH the following
MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of death imposed on accused-appellants is REDUCED to RECLUSION
PERPETUA without eligibility for parole pursuant to RA 9346; (2) the monetary awards to be paid jointly
and severally by the accused-appellants to the heirs of the victim are as follows: ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱25,000.00 as
temperate damages in lieu of actual damages; (3) ₱408,000.00 for loss of earning capacity; and (4) interest
is imposed on all the damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% from this date until fully paid. 37

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

5. People v. Carandang, G.R. No. 175926, 6 July 2011

G.R. No. 175926 July 6, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.

RESTITUTO CARANDANG, HENRY MILAN AND JACKMAN CHUA, Accused-Appellants.
 DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal by Henry Milan and Jackman Chua from the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 01934 dated May 10, 2006. Said Decision affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
convicting them and one Restituto Carandang for two counts of murder and one count of frustrated murder in
Criminal Cases No. Q-01-100061, Q-01-100062 and Q-01-100063, the Informations for which read:
Criminal Case No. Q-01-100061

That on or about the 5th day of April 2001, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, taking advantage of superior strength and with treachery and
evident premeditation, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of PO2 DIONISIO
ALONZO Y SALGO, by then and there shooting the latter several times with the use of a firearm of
unknown caliber hitting him on the different parts of the body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal
gunshot wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of
the immediate heirs of said PO2 DIONISIO ALONZO Y SALGO.

That the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities.2

Criminal Case No. Q-01-100062

That on or about the 5th day of April, 2001, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, taking advantage of superior strength and with treachery and
evident premeditation, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of SPO2 WILFREDO
RED Y PILAR, by then and there shooting the latter several times with the use of a firearm of unknown
caliber, hitting him on the different parts of the body and as soon as the said victim fell on the ground, by
placing a hand grenade (sic) underneath the body which directly caused an explosion and mutilated the
body which directly caused the death of SPO2 WILFREDO RED Y PILAR, to the damage and prejudice of
the heirs of the victim in such amount as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the Civil Code.

That the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities. 3

Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063

That on or about the 5th day of April, 2001, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill with evident
premeditation and with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and
employ personal violence upon the person of SPO1 WILFREDO MONTECALVO Y DALIDA, by then and
there shooting the latter with the use of a firearm of unknown caliber, hitting him on his neck, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal injuries, the offender thus performing all the acts of execution which
would have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by
reasons or causes independent of the will of the perpetrators, that is the timely and able medical assistance
rendered to said SPO1 WILFREDO MONTECALVO Y DALIDA, to the damage and prejudice of the said
offended party.

That the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities.4

On May 15, 2001, accused-appellants Carandang, Milan and Chua pleaded not guilty to the crimes
charged.
The prosecution evidence, culled from the testimonies of Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Wilfredo
Montecalvo, SPO1 Rodolfo Estores, Police Senior Inspector (P/Sr. Insp.) Virgilio Calaro, P/Supt. Manuel
Roxas and Dr. Wilson Tan, yielded the following version of the facts:

In the afternoon of April 5, 2001, the drug enforcement unit of the La Loma Police Station 1 received a
request for assistance from the sister of accused Milan regarding a drug deal that would allegedly take
place in her house at Calavite St., Brgy. Salvacion, Quezon City. The station commander called SPO2
Wilfredo Pilar Red and instructed him to talk to Milan’s sister, who was in their office. SPO2 Red,
accompanied by Police Officer (PO) 2 Dionisio Alonzo, SPO1 Estores and SPO1 Montecalvo, talked to
Milan’s sister. Thereafter, SPO2 Red formed a team composed of the officers who accompanied him
during the interrogation, with him as team leader. The team received further instructions from the station
commander then proceeded to Calavite Street aboard two vehicles, a mobile patrol car and an unmarked
car.5

When the team reached the place at around 4:00 p.m., 6 they alighted from their vehicles and surrounded
Milan’s house. SPO1 Montecalvo’s group went to the left side of the house, while SPO2 Red’s group
proceeded to the right. The two groups eventually met at the back of the house near Milan’s room. The
door to Milan’s room was open, enabling the police officers to see Carandang, Milan and Chua inside.
SPO2 Red told the group that the persons inside the room would not put up a fight, making them confident
that nothing violent would erupt. However, when the group introduced themselves as police officers, Milan
immediately shut the door.7

PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red pushed the door open, causing it to fall and propelling them inside the room.
PO2 Alonzo shouted "Walang gagalaw!" Suddenly, gunshots rang, hitting PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red who
dropped to the floor one after the other. Due to the suddenness of the attack, PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red
were not able to return fire and were instantly killed by the barrage of gunshots. SPO1 Montecalvo, who was
right behind SPO2 Red, was still aiming his firearm at the assailants when Carandang shot and hit him.
SPO1 Montecalvo fell to the ground. SPO1 Estores heard Chua say to Milan, "Sugurin mo na!" Milan lunged
towards SPO1 Montecalvo, but the latter was able to fire his gun and hit Milan. SPO1 Estores went inside
the house and pulled SPO1 Montecalvo out.8

Reinforcements came at around 4:30 p.m. upon the arrival of P/Sr. Insp. Calaro, Chief Operations Officer of
the La Loma Police Station 1, and P/Supt. Roxas, the Deputy Station Commander of Police Station 1 at the
time of the incident.9 SPO1 Montecalvo was brought to the Chinese General Hospital. Milan stepped out of
the house and was also brought to a hospital,10 but Carandang and Chua remained holed up inside the
house for several hours. There was a lengthy negotiation for the surrender of Carandang and Chua, during
which they requested for the presence of a certain Colonel Reyes and media man Ramon Tulfo.11 It was
around 11:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight when Carandang and Chua surrendered. 12 SPO2 Red and PO2 Alonzo
were found dead inside the house, their bodies slumped on the floor with broken legs and gunshot and
grenade shrapnel wounds.13

Dr. Winston Tan, Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, conducted
the post-mortem examination of the bodies of SPO2 Red and PO2 Alonzo. He found that the gunshot
wounds of Red and Alonzo were the cause of their deaths.14

According to SPO1 Montecalvo’s account, Dr. Bu Castro of the Chinese General Hospital operated on
him, removing a bullet from the right portion of his nape. SPO1 Montecalvo’s hospitalization expenses
amounted to ₱14,324.48. He testified that it was a nightmarish experience for him as he feared that he
might be paralyzed later on.15

The defense presented the three accused as witnesses, testifying as follows:

Carandang claims that he had no firearm during the incident, and that it was the police officers who fired all
the shots. He was in Milan’s house during the incident in order to ask Milan to accompany him to convert his
cellular phone’s SIM card. When he arrived at Milan’s place, he found Milan and Chua playing a card game.
A short time later, there was banging on the door. The door of the house was destroyed and gunfire
suddenly erupted, prompting him to take cover under a bed. Chua cried out to him that he was hit and that
he might lose blood. Milan ran outside and sustained injuries as well. There was an explosion near the door,
causing burns on Carandang’s left arm. Gunfire continued coming from different directions for two to three
minutes. Suddenly, the place became dark as the lights went out.16

Since gunshots were still heard every now and then, Carandang stayed in the house and did not come
out. Col. Tor, the new Chief of the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Sikatuna, negotiated for
Carandang to come out. Carandang requested for the presence of his wife, Col. Doroteo Reyes and
media man Ramon Tulfo. He went out of the house at around midnight when the three arrived.17

Milan testified that he was at home in Calavite St. at the time of the incident. He knew Carandang for seven
months. Chua was their neighbor. While playing a card game inside his room, they heard someone
pounding at the door. He stood and approached the door to check. The door was destroyed, and two
unidentified men barged in. Gunshots erupted. He was hit on the left side of his body. He ran out of the
room, leaving Chua and Carandang behind. As he was doing so, he saw his mother lying down and
shouting "Itigil niyo ang putukan; maraming matatanda dito!" Milan was then hit on his left leg by another
gunshot.18

Chua testified that he went to the house of Milan at around noontime of April 4, 2001 to play a card game.
They played inside Milan’s ground floor room. Five to ten minutes later, Carandang arrived and laid down on
the bed. Chua did not pay much attention as Milan and Carandang discussed about cellular phones. Later,
they heard a loud banging in the door as if it was being forced open. Milan stood up to see what was
happening. Chua remained seated and Carandang was still on the bed. The door was forcibly opened. Chua
heard successive gunshots and was hit on his left big toe. He ducked on the floor near the bed to avoid
being hit further. He remained in that position for several hours until he lost consciousness. He was already
being treated at the Chinese General Hospital when he regained consciousness. In said hospital, a paraffin
test was conducted upon him.19

P/Sr. Insp. Grace Eustaquio, Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, later testified that the paraffin
test on Chua yielded a negative result for gunpowder nitrates, but that performed on Carandang produced a
positive result. She was not able to conduct a paraffin test on Milan, who just came from the operating room
when she saw him. Milan seemed to be in pain and refused to be examined. 20

On April 22, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision21 finding Carandang, Milan and Chua guilty of two
counts of murder and one count of frustrated murder:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused RESTITUTO CARANDANG, HENRY MILAN AND JACKMAN CHUA
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder described and penalized under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 63 of the same Code, for the killing of SPO2 Wilfredo Pilar Red
and PO2 Dionisio Alonzo qualified by treachery and acting in conspiracy with each other, they are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of murder and to indemnify the heirs of
the victims, jointly and severally, as follows:

To the heirs of SPO2 Wilfredo Red:

1. ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

2. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;

3. ₱149,734.00 as actual damages; and

4. ₱752,580.00 as compensatory damages To the

heirs of PO2 Dionisio Alonzo:
1. ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

2. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;

3. ₱139,910.00 as actual damages; and

4. ₱522,960.00 as compensatory damages.

Likewise, finding the accused Restituto Carandang, Henry Milan and Jackman Chua guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated murder, described and penalized under Article 249 in relation
to Article 6, paragraph 2, having acted in conspiracy with each other and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, they are hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years of prision mayor to
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, and to indemnify the victim Wilfredo Montecalvo
as follows:

1. ₱14,000.00 as actual damages;

2. ₱20,000.00 as moral damages;

 3. ₱20,000.00 as reasonable attorney’s fees; and

4. To pay the costs.22

Carandang, Milan and Chua appealed to this Court. 23 The appeals were separately docketed as G.R. Nos.
160510-12.24 Pursuant, however, to the decision of this Court in People v. Mateo, 25 the appeals were
transferred26 to the Court of Appeals, where they were assigned a single docket number, CA-G.R. CR.- H.C.
No. 01934.
On May 10, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision modifying the Decision of the trial
court:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76, in
Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061-63 finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of Murder and one (1) count of Frustrated Murder is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as
follows:

1) In Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061 and Q-01-100062, accused-appellants are hereby ordered to
pay the heirs of PO2 Dionisio S. Alonzo and SPO2 Wilfredo P. Red an indemnity for loss of earning
capacity in the amount of ₱2,140,980.69 and ₱2,269,243.62, respectively; and

2) In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, accused-appellants are hereby instead sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

With costs against the accused-appellants.27

Milan and Chua appealed to this Court anew.28 Carandang did not appeal, and instead presented a letter
informing this Court that he is no longer interested in pursuing an appeal. 29 On April 9, 2008, Milan and
Chua filed a Supplemental Appellant’s Brief to further discuss the Assignment of Errors they presented in
their September 28, 2004 Appellant’s Brief:

I.

The court a quo erred in holding that there was conspiracy among the appellants in the case at bar.

II.

Assuming arguendo that conspiracy exists, the court a quo gravely erred in convicting them of the
crime of murder and frustrated murder instead of homicide and frustrated homicide only, the
qualifying circumstance of treachery not having been duly proven to have attended the
commission of the crimes charged.30

The trial court had ruled that Carandang, Milan and Chua acted in conspiracy in the commission of the
crimes charged. Thus, despite the established fact that it was Carandang who fired the gun which hit SPO2
Red, PO2 Alonzo and SPO1 Montecalvo, all three accused were held equally criminally responsible
therefor. The trial court explained that Carandang, Milan and Chua’s actuations showed that they acted in
concert against the police officers. The pertinent portion of the RTC Decision reads:

Milan, Carandang and Chua were all inside the room of Milan. Upon arrival of police officers Red, Alonzo
and the others and having identified themselves as police officers, the door was closed and after Alonzo and
Red pushed it open and as Alonzo shouted, "walang gagalaw," immediately shots rang out from inside the
room, felling Alonzo, then Red, then Montecalvo. Chua was heard by Estores to shout to Milan: "Sugurin mo
na" (tsn, October 16, 2001, page 8). And as Milan lunged at Montecalvo, the latter shot him.

That the three acted in concert can be gleaned from their actuations. First, when they learned of the
presence of the police officers, they closed the door. Not one of them came out to talk peacefully with the
police officers. Instead, Carandang opened fire, Alonzo and Red did not even have the chance to touch
their firearms at that instant.31
In affirming this ruling, the Court of Appeals further expounded on the acts of Milan and Chua showing that
they acted in concert with Carandang, to wit:

In the present case, when appellants were alerted of the presence of the police officers, Milan immediately
closed the door. Thereafter, when the police officers were finally able to break open said door, Carandang
peppered them with bullets. PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red died instantly as a result while SPO1 Montecalvo
was mortally wounded. Then, upon seeing their victims helplessly lying on the floor and seriously wounded,
Chua ordered Milan to attack the police officers. Following the order, Milan rushed towards Montecalvo but
the latter, however, was able to shoot him.

At first glance, Milan’s act of closing the door may seem a trivial contribution in the furtherance of the crime.
On second look, however, that act actually facilitated the commission of the crime. The brief moment during
which the police officers were trying to open the door paved the way for the appellants to take strategic
positions which gave them a vantage point in staging their assault. Thus, when SPO2 Red and PO2 Alonzo
were finally able to get inside, they were instantly killed by the sudden barrage of gunfire. In fact, because of
the suddenness of the attack, said police officers were not able to return fire.

Insofar as Chua is concerned, his participation in the conspiracy consisted of lending encouragement and
moral ascendancy to his co-conspirators as evidenced by the fact that he ordered Milan to attack the already
fallen police officers with the obvious intention to finish them off. Moreover, he did not immediately surrender
even when he had the opportunity to do so but instead chose to stay with Carandang inside the room until
their arrest.32

Milan and Chua object to the conclusion that they were in conspiracy with Carandang due to their acts of
closing the door and not peaceably talking to the police officers. According to them, those acts were caused
by their being frightened by the police officers who were allegedly in full battle gear. 33 Milan and Chua
further assert that the fortuitous and unexpected character of the encounter and the rapid turn of events
should have ruled out a finding of conspiracy.34 They claim that the incident happened so fast, giving them
no opportunity to stop Carandang.35

Appellants contest the factual finding that Chua directed Milan to go after SPO1 Montecalvo, alleging that
they were both unarmed and that there was no way for Milan to attack an armed person. What really
happened, according to them, was that Milan ran out of the room for safety and not to attack SPO1
Montecalvo.36 Milan claims that he was already injured in the stomach when he ran out, and it was
natural for him to seek safety.

Assuming arguendo that Chua uttered "Sugurin mo na!" to Milan, appellants argue that no crime was
committed due to the same as all the victims had already been shot when said words were shouted.37
Furthermore, it appears to have been uttered as a result of indiscretion or lack of reflection and did not
inherently carry with it inducement or temptation.38

In the Supplemental Brief, Milan and Chua point out that the assault on the victims was the result of the
impulsive act of Carandang and was not a result of any agreement or a concerted action of all the
accused.39 They claim that when the shootout ensued, Chua immediately dove down near the bed while
Milan ran out of the room out of fear.40 It is allegedly hard to imagine that SPO1 Montecalvo with certainty
heard Chua utter the phrase "Sugurin mo na," considering that the incident happened so fast, there were
lots of gunshots.41

To summarize, Milan’s and Chua’s arguments focus on the lack of direct evidence showing that they
conspired with Carandang during the latter’s act of shooting the three victims. However, as we have held
in People v. Sumalpong, 42 conspiracy may also be proven by other means:

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. Evidence need not establish the actual agreement among the conspirators showing
a preconceived plan or motive for the commission of the crime. Proof of concerted action before, during and
after the crime, which demonstrates their unity of design and objective, is sufficient. When conspiracy is
established, the act of one is the act of all regardless of the degree of participation of each. 43

In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with Carandang was established by their
acts (1) before Carandang shot the victims (Milan’s closing the door when the police officers introduced
themselves, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush), and (2) after the shooting (Chua’s directive to Milan to
attack SPO1 Montecalvo and Milan’s following such instruction). Contrary to the suppositions of appellants,
these facts are not meant to prove that Chua is a principal by inducement, or that Milan’s act of attacking
SPO1 Montecalvo was what made him a principal by direct participation. Instead, these facts are convincing
circumstantial evidence of the unity of purpose in the minds of the three. As co-conspirators, all three are
considered principals by direct participation.

Appellants’ attempt to instill doubts in our minds that Chua shouted "sugurin mo na" to Milan, who then ran
towards SPO1 Montecalvo, must fail. SPO1 Estores’s positive testimony 44 on this matter prevails over the
plain denials of Milan and Chua. SPO1 Estores has no reason to lie about the events he witnessed on April
5, 2001. As part of the team that was attacked on that day, it could even be expected that he is interested in
having only the real perpetrators punished.

Furthermore, we have time and again ruled that factual findings of the trial court, especially those affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record. 45 It was
the trial court that was able to observe the demeanors of the witnesses, and is consequently in a better
position to determine which of the witnesses are telling the truth. Thus, this Court, as a general rule, would
not review the factual findings of the courts a quo, except in certain instances such as when: (1) the
conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence
on which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of
evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings of the trial court; (9)
the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the
issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.46
Neither can the rapid turn of events be considered to negate a finding of conspiracy. Unlike evident
premeditation, there is no requirement for conspiracy to exist that there be a sufficient period of time to
elapse to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection. Instead, conspiracy arises on the very
moment the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the subject felony. 47

As held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, Milan’s act of closing the door facilitated the commission
of the crime, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush. The sudden gunshots when the police officers pushed
the door open illustrate the intention of appellants and Carandang to prevent any chance for the police
officers to defend themselves. Treachery is thus present in the case at bar, as what is decisive for this
qualifying circumstance is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victims to defend
themselves or to retaliate.48

The trial court correctly sentenced appellants to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case
Nos. Q-01-100061 and Q-01-100062. The penalty for murder under Article 248 49 of the Revised Penal
Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Applying Article 63 50 of the same Code, since there was no other
modifying circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the penalty that should be
imposed is reclusion perpetua.

In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, the Court of Appeals correctly modified the penalty for the frustrated
murder of SPO1 Montecalvo. Under Article 50 51 in connection with Article 61, paragraph 252 of the Revised
Penal Code, the penalty for frustrated murder is one degree lower than reclusion perpetua to death, which is
reclusion temporal. Reclusion temporal has a range of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years. Its medium period,
which should be applied in this case considering that there is no modifying circumstance other than the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, is 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months – the range
of the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty under Section 153 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The minimum term of the indeterminate penalty should then be within the range of the penalty next lower to
reclusion temporal, and thus may be any term within prision mayor, the range of which is 6 years and 1 day
to 12 years. The modified term of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years, 8 months
and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum, is within these ranges.

The civil liabilities of appellants should, however, be modified in accordance with current jurisprudence.
Thus, in Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061 and Q-01-100062, the award of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for
each victim must be increased to ₱75,000.00.54 In cases of murder and homicide, civil indemnity of
₱75,000.00 and moral damages of ₱50,000.00 are awarded automatically, without need of allegation and
proof other than the death of the victim.55 Appellants are furthermore solidarily liable to each victim for
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, which is awarded when the crime was committed with an aggravating
circumstance, be it generic or qualifying.56 However, since Carandang did not appeal, he is only solidarily
liable with Milan and Chua with respect to the amounts awarded by the Court of Appeals, since the Court of
Appeals’ Decision has become final and executory with respect to him. The additional amounts (₱25,000.00
as civil indemnity and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages) shall be borne only by Milan and Chua, who are
hereby held liable therefor solidarily.

In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, the solidary liability of Milan and Chua for moral damages to SPO1
Wilfredo Montecalvo is likewise increased to ₱40,000.00, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. 57
An award of ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages is also warranted.58 The additional amounts (₱20,000.00
as moral damages and ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages) are likewise to be solidarily borne only by
Milan and Chua.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01934 dated May 10, 2006
is hereby AFFIRMED, with the following MODIFICATIONS:

1. In Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061 and Q-01-100062, appellants Henry Milan and Jackman Chua
are held solidarily liable for the amount of ₱25,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages to the heirs of each of the victims, PO2 Dionisio S. Alonzo and SPO2 Wilfredo
P. Red, in addition to the amounts to which they are solidarily liable with Restituto Carandang as
held in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01934. Thus, to summarize the rulings of the lower courts and this
Court:

a. The heirs of SPO2 Wilfredo Red are entitled to the following amounts:

i. ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 of which shall be solidarily borne by

Carandang, Milan and Chua, while ₱25,000.00 shall be the solidary liability of Milan
and Chua only;

ii.₱50,000.00 as moral damages to be solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua;

iii. ₱149,734.00 as actual damages to be soldarily borne by Carandang, Milan and

Chua;

iv. ₱2,140,980.00 as indemnity for loss of earning capacity to be solidarily borne by

Carandang, Milan and Chua; and

v.₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages to be solidarily borne by Milan and Chua only;

b. The heirs of PO2 Dionisio Alonzo are entitled to the following amounts:

i. ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 of which shall be solidarily borne by

Carandang, Milan and Chua, while ₱25,000.00 shall be the solidary liability of Milan
and Chua only;

ii.₱50,000.00 as moral damages to be solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua;

iii. ₱139,910.00 as actual damages to be solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and

Chua;

iv. ₱2,269,243.62 as indemnity for loss of earning capacity to be solidarily borne by

Carandang, Milan and Chua;

v.₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages to be solidarily borne by Milan and Chua only;

2. In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, appellants Henry Milan and Jackman Chua are held solidarily
liable for the amount of ₱20,000.00 as moral damages and ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages to
SPO1 Wilfredo Montecalvo, in addition to the amounts to which they are solidarily liable with
Restituto Carandang as held in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01934. Thus, to summarize the rulings of the
lower courts and this Court, SPO1 Wilfredo Montecalvo is entitled to the following amounts:
 i. ₱14,000.00 as actual damages to be solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua;

ii.₱40,000.00 as moral damages, ₱20,000.00 of which shall be solidarily borne by Carandang,

Milan and Chua, while ₱20,000.00 shall be the solidary liability of Milan and Chua only;

iii. ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages to be solidarily borne by Milan and Chua only; and

iv. ₱20,000.00 as reasonable attorney’s fees, to be solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and
Chua.

3. Appellants are further ordered to pay interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of Six
Percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this judgment.1avvphi1

SO ORDERED.

6. People v. Dadao, G.R. No. 201860, 22 January 2104

G.R. No. 201860, January 22, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARCELINO DADAO, ANTONIO SULINDAO,

EDDIE MALOGSI (DECEASED) AND ALFEMIO MALOGSI, * Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal from a Decision1 dated May 16, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
00364, entitled People of the Philippines v. Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi and Alfemio
Malogsi, which affirmed with modifications the Decision 2 dated January 31, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, Branch 11 that convicted appellants Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao,
Eddie Malogsi (deceased) and Alfemio Malogsi for the felony of murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, in Criminal Case No. 93-1272.

The genesis of this court case can be traced to the charge of murder against the appellants in the trial
court via an Information3 dated July 16, 1993. The accusatory portion of said indictment reads:
That on or about the 11th day of July 1993, at 7:30 in the evening more or less at barangay Salucot,
municipality of Talakag, province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with (sic) one another,
with intent to kill, by means of treachery, armed with guns and bolos, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and criminally attack, assault and sho[o]t PIONIO YACAPIN, hitting his back and left leg, inflicting wounds
that cause[d] his death thereafter.

To the damage and prejudice [of] the heirs of the deceased PIONIO YACAPIN in such sum they are
entitled under the law.

Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

On September 27, 1993, the appellants were arraigned. All four (4) accused pleaded “NOT GUILTY” to
the charge leveled against them.4crallawlibrary

The factual backdrop of this case as condensed in the trial court’s assailed January 31, 2005 judgment
and adopted by the Court of Appeals in its similarly assailed May 16, 2011 Decision is reproduced
hereunder:

Evidence for the Prosecution

Prosecution’s first witness, Ronie Dacion, a 14[-] year old stepson of the victim, Pionio Yacapin, testified
that on July 11, 1993 at about 7:30 in the evening he saw accused Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao,
Eddie Malogsi and [A]lfemio Malogsi helping each other and with the use of firearms and bolos, shot to
death the victim, Pionio Yacapin in their house at Barangay Salucot, Talakag, Bukidnon.

The testimony of the second witness for the prosecution, Edgar Dacion, a 12[-] year old stepson of the
victim, corroborates the testimony of his older brother Ronie Dacion.

Prosecution’s third witness, Nenita Yacapin, the widow of the victim, also corroborates the testimony of the
prosecution’s first and second witness. The said witness further testified that she suffered civil and moral
damages [due to] the death of her husband.

Prosecution’s fourth witness, Bernandino Signawan, testified that at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening of
July 11, 1993, Ronie and Edgar Dacion reached to [sic] his house and related to him that their stepfather
was killed by accused Eddie Malogsi, [A]lfemio Malogsi, Marcelino Dadao and Antonio Sulindao. Witness
Signawan further testified that on the following morning, he and the other people in Ticalaan including the
barangay captain, Ronie and Edgar Dacion returned to the house of the victim and found the latter already
dead and in the surrounding [area] of the house were recovered empty shells of firearms.

Prosecution’s fifth witness, SPO2 Nestor Aznar, testified that he was the one who prepared the sketch of the
hut where the incident happened and further testified that the four accused were in the custody of the
government and in the following morning of the incident, he was at the scene of the crime and found in the
yard of the hut eight (8) garand empty shells caliber 30m[m].

The prosecution presented its sixth and last witness, Modesto Libyocan, who testified that on the evening
of July 11, 1993, at Barangay Salucot, he saw in the house of the victim, Pionio Yacapin, lights
caused by flashlights and heard several gunshots from the house of the victim, and that the family left their
house on that evening and went to Ticalaan where they learned that Pionio Yacapin was killed in his house
and that early the following morning, July 12, 1993, he was with some companions, barangay officials of
Ticalaan in the house of the victim where they found him dead and sustaining gunshot wounds.

Evidence for the Defense

Defense’s first witness, Police Inspector Vicente Armada, testified that on July 30, 1993, at 11:00 in the
morning, he conducted an examination for paraffin test on all four accused with the findings that they
yielded negative result
x x x.

The defense presented Eddie Malogsi, one of the accused, as its second witness, who testified that on July
11, 1993 at 7:30 in the evening, he was at the farm of a certain Boyle together with his brother, [A]lfemio
Malogsi, one of the accused herein, being a worker of that farm. He further testified that on the said date
and time, he never fired a gun.

Defense’s third witness, [A]lfemio Malogsi, another accused in this case, corroborates the testimony of his
brother and co-accused, Eddie Malogsi, that on the said date and time above-mentioned, he was at the
farm of a certain Boyle with his brother and that they heard several gunshots. He further testified that he
never owned a garand rifle.

Another accused, Antonio Sulindao, defense’s fourth witness, testified that on the date and time above-
mentioned, he was at Salucot together with his family and at 7:30 x x x in the evening, he heard some gun
shots. He further testified among others, that he has no grudge x x x with the victim prior to the incident.

The testimony of defense’s fifth witness, Fernandez Saplina, [was to] establish the defense of denial and
alibi in so far as accused Marcelino Dadao, that on the whole evening of July 11, 1993, accused Marcelino
Dadao was all the time at his house in San Fernandez, Salucot, Talacag, Bukidnon, and there was no
occasion that said accused went outside or left his house on the said date and time. The said witness
further testified that he visited the accused at the municipal jail of Talakag, Bukidnon, where he was
detained for having been the suspect in the killing of Pionio Yacapin.

The defense presented its sixth witness, Camilo Dumalig, who corroborates the testimony of Fernandez
Saplina to the effect that accused Marcelino Dadao has been residing at San Fernandez, Salucot, Talakag,
Bukidnon at the time of the incident on July 11, 1993 which place is about 7 kilometers from the place of the
incident.

Defense’s seventh witness, Venancio Payonda, father-in-law of accused Antonio Sulindao, testified that the
latter was in his house the whole day of July 11, 1993.

The defense presented as its last witness, accused Marcelino Dadao, who testified that three (3) months
prior to July 11, 1993, he had been staying at the house of one Fernandez Saplina at Sitio San Fernandez,
Salucot, Talakag, Bukidnon, which is about 7 kilometers away from the house of the victim. He further
testified that on July 11, 1993, he did not leave the house of Fernandez Saplina until the following morning. 5
After trial was concluded, a guilty verdict was handed down by the trial court finding appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murdering Pionio Yacapin. The assailed January 31, 2005 Decision disposed of the
case in this manner:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused, EDDIE MALOGSI, [A]LFEMIO MALOGSI,
ANTONIO SULINDAO and MARCELINO DADAO, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder,
as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the said four accused
are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and are ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim, the amount of SEVENTY[-]FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00) as moral damages and
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages and to pay the cost of the suit.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 2-92, dated January 20, 1992, the bailbonds of all
four accused are hereby ordered cancelled and the latter are ordered detained, pending resolution of any
Appeal that may be pursued in this case.6

Appellants elevated their case to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellate
court acted on a Manifestation filed by Rogelio Tampil, bondsman for Eddie Malogsi, who sought the
cancellation of the memorandum of encumbrance that was reflected in his land title (Original Certificate of
Title No. P-13825, Entry No. 165683) for the reason that Eddie Malogsi had already died on August 25,
2003. Thus, on February 11, 2008, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution granting Tampil’s request.7
Subsequently, after considering the pleadings and memoranda of the parties, the Court of Appeals issued its
May 16, 2011 Decision, the dispositive portion of which states: ACCORDINGLY, this appeal is DISMISSED,
and the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the modification the P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P25,000.00 as temperate damages shall be awarded in addition to the moral and exemplary damages
already awarded by the lower court.8

Hence, appellants, through counsel, seek final recourse with the Court and reiterate the following
assignment of errors from their Appellants’ Brief filed with the Court of Appeals:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED
DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENSE.

III

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF

ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH WHEN THE SAME WAS NOT ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION. 9

The foregoing arguments were later on amplified by appellants’ Supplemental Brief.

Appellants reiterate that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because the testimonies of the
witnesses for the prosecution were afflicted with inconsistencies and improbabilities, thus, making them of
doubtful veracity. Furthermore, appellants faulted the trial court for disbelieving their alibis and for
disregarding the fact that the paraffin test which all of them were subjected to produce a negative result.
Appellants also underscored the fact that they did not take flight despite the knowledge that they were made
suspects in the murder of Pionio Yacapin. Lastly, appellants maintain that the qualifying circumstance of
abuse of superior strength should not have been appreciated as it was not alleged in the criminal
information filed against them.

The petition is without merit.

In fine, the pivotal issue raised by appellants in questioning the validity of their conviction for the crime of
murder is whether or not the eyewitness testimonies presented by the prosecution, specifically that of the
two stepsons (Ronie and Edgar Dacion) and the widow (Nenita Yacapin) of the deceased victim, Pionio
Yacapin, are credible enough to be worthy of belief.

We have consistently held in jurisprudence that the resolution of such a factual question is best left to the
sound judgment of the trial court and that, absent any misapprehension of facts or grave abuse of
discretion, the findings of the trial court shall not be disturbed. In People v. De la Rosa,11 we yet again
expounded on this principle in this wise:

[T]he issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of [the] witness, which is best addressed by
the trial court, it being in a better position to decide such question, having heard the witness and observed
his demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These are the most significant factors in
evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting
testimonies. Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to
determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness to believe. Verily,
findings of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or
circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted so as to materially
affect the disposition of the case. x x x.

Jurisprudence also tells us that where there is no evidence that the witnesses of the prosecution were
actuated by ill motive, it is presumed that they were not so actuated and their testimony is entitled to full
faith and credit.12 In the case at bar, no imputation of improper motive on the part of the prosecution
witnesses was ever made by appellants.

Furthermore, appellants contend that the prosecution witnesses made inconsistent and improbable
statements in court which supposedly impair their credibility, such as whether or not the stepsons of the
victim left for Ticalaan together to report the incident, whether the accused were still firing at the victim when
they left or not, and whether or not the accused went after the stepsons after shooting the victim. We have
reviewed the relevant portions of the transcripts pointed out by the appellants and have confidently arrived at
the conclusion that these are matters involving minor inconsistencies pertaining to details of immaterial
nature that do not tend to diminish the probative value of the testimonies at issue. We elucidated on this
subject in Avelino v. People,13 to wit:

Given the natural frailties of the human mind and its capacity to assimilate all material details of a given
incident, slight inconsistencies, and variances in the declarations of a witness hardly weaken their probative
value. It is well-settled that immaterial and insignificant details do not discredit a testimony on the very
material and significant point bearing on the very act of accused-appellants. As long as the testimonies of
the witnesses corroborate one another on material points, minor inconsistencies therein cannot destroy
their credibility. Inconsistencies on minor details do not undermine the integrity of a prosecution witness.
(Emphasis omitted.)

Notwithstanding their conflicting statements on minor details, Ronie, Edgar and Nenita positively
identified appellants as the perpetrators of the dastardly crime of murder committed on the victim which
they categorically and consistently claimed to have personally witnessed.

In order to counter the serious accusation made against them, appellants put forward the defense of alibi
which necessarily fails in the face of positive identification. It is a time-honored principle in jurisprudence
that positive identification prevails over alibi since the latter can easily be fabricated and is inherently
unreliable.14 Hence, it must be supported by credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses, and if not,
is fatal to the accused.15 An examination of the record would indicate that Eddie and Alfemio Malogsi were
unable to present a corroborating witness to support their alibi that they were working at a farm owned by a
certain Boyle on the date and time of Pionio Yacapin’s murder. While the witnesses presented by the
defense to corroborate the respective alibis of Marcelino Dadao and Antonio Sulindao consisted of friends
and relatives who are hardly the disinterested witnesses that is required by jurisprudence.
With regard to appellants’ assertion that the negative result of the paraffin tests that were conducted on their
persons should be considered as sufficient ground for acquittal, we can only declare that such a statement
is misguided considering that it has been established in jurisprudence that a paraffin test is not conclusive
proof that a person has not fired a gun.16 It should also be noted that, according to the prosecution, only
Eddie and Alfemio Malogsi held firearms which were used in the fatal shooting of Pionio Yacapin while
Marcelino Dadao and Antonio Sulindao purportedly held bolos. Thus, it does not come as a surprise that the
latter two tested negative for powder burns because they were never accused of having fired any gun.
Nevertheless, the evidence on record has established that all four accused shared a community of criminal
design. By their concerted action, it is evident that they conspired with one another to murder Pionio
Yacapin and should each suffer the same criminal liability attached to the aforementioned criminal act
regardless of who fired the weapon which delivered the fatal wounds that ended the life of the victim.

In People v. Nelmida,17 we elaborated on the principle of criminal conspiracy and its ramifications in this
manner:

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and then decide to commit it. It arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to
commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. Once established, each and every one of the
conspirators is made criminally liable for the crime actually committed by any one of them. In the absence of
any direct proof, the agreement to commit a crime may be deduced from the mode and manner of the
commission of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action,
and community of interest. As such, it does not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as each of the actors
incurs the same criminal liability, because the act of one is the act of
all. (Citation and emphasis omitted.)

As to appellants’ argument that their act of bravely reporting to the police station to answer the serious
charge of murder against them instead of fleeing militates against a finding of any criminal liability on their
part especially in light of the dubious evidence presented by the prosecution, we can only dismiss this as a
hollow line of reasoning considering that human experience as observed in jurisprudence instructs us that
non-flight does not necessarily connote innocence. Consequently, we have held:

Flight is indicative of guilt, but its converse is not necessarily true. Culprits behave differently and even
erratically in externalizing and manifesting their guilt. Some may escape or flee - a circumstance strongly
illustrative of guilt - while others may remain in the same vicinity so as to create a semblance of regularity,
thereby avoiding suspicion from other members of the community. 18

Contrary to appellants’ claim that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength was used by
the trial court to qualify the act of killing committed by appellants to murder despite it not having been
alleged in the criminal information filed against them, the text of the assailed January 31, 2005 Decision of
the trial court clearly shows that, even though abuse of superior strength was discussed as present in the
commission of the crime, it was not appreciated as either a qualifying or generic aggravating circumstance.

As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the lower court appreciated treachery, which was alleged in
the information, as an aggravating circumstance which qualified the offense to murder. This is proper
considering that, even if abuse of superior strength was properly alleged and proven in court, it cannot serve
to qualify or aggravate the felony at issue since it is jurisprudentially settled that when the circumstance of
abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter. 19crallawlibrary

Time and again, we have declared that treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.20 Furthermore, we have also held that the essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and
without warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting
victim no chance to resist or escape.21 In the case at bar, the manner by which Pionio Yacapin was killed
carried all the indubitable hallmarks of treachery. We quote with approval the following discussion of the
Court of Appeals on this matter, to wit:

Treachery, which was alleged in the information, was duly proven by the prosecution. The Court notes, in
particular, the testimony of Nenita Yacapin who declared that when the victim was making a fire in the
kitchen, she heard shots and she saw the barrel of the gun inserted on the bamboo split walling of their
 house. Exhibit “B”, the anatomical chart certified by the Philippine National Police (PNP) personnel, shows
the relative location of the gunshot wounds sustained by the victim. The chart indicates that the victim was
shot from behind. Clearly, the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or
to retaliate.22 (Citations omitted.)

After reviewing the penalty of imprisonment imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
we declare that the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua on the appellants is correct and should
be upheld. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides for the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the felony of murder. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code.23
Anent the award of damages, it is jurisprudentially settled that when death occurs due to a crime, the
following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or
compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases.24crallawlibrary

Thus, the award of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 25 is proper. Likewise, the award of
temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages, in the amount of P25,000.00 26 is warranted considering
that the death of the victim definitely caused his heirs some expenses for his wake and burial though they
were not able to present proof.

However, we must modify the amounts of moral and exemplary damages already awarded in order to
conform to existing jurisprudence. Therefore, the exemplary damages awarded should be increased from
P20,000.00 to P30,000.00.27 Moreover, there being no aggravating circumstance present in this case, the
award of moral damages in the amount of P75,000.00 should be decreased to
P50,000.00.28 Lastly, the interest rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all damages awarded from the date
of finality of this ruling until fully paid.29crallawlibrary

Finally, we observe that the Court of Appeals did not rule on the effect of the death of Eddie Malogsi during
the pendency of this case. Considering that no final judgment had been rendered against him at the time of
his death, whether or not he was guilty of the crime charged had become irrelevant because even assuming
that he did incur criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto, these were totally extinguished by his death,
following Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and, by analogy, our ruling in People v. Bayotas.30
Therefore, the present criminal case should be dismissed with respect only to the deceased Eddie Malogsi.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated May 16, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 00364 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that:

(1) The amount of exemplary damages to be paid by appellants Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao and
Alfemio Malogsi is increased from Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00);

(2) The amount of moral damages to be paid by appellants Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao and Alfemio
Malogsi is decreased from Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00);

(3) Appellants Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao and Alfemio Malogsi are ordered to pay the private
offended party interest on all damages at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of
finality of this judgment; and

(4) Criminal Case No. 93-1272 is DISMISSED with respect to Eddie Malogsi in view of his death during the
pendency of this case.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 7. People v. Octa, G.R. No. 195196, 13 July 2015

G.R. No. 195196 July 13, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.

ESTANLY OCTA y BAS, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

Before us is a Notice of Appeal1 dated 30 July 2010 from the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated 19 July
2010 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03490, affirming the Decision3 dated 15 May 2008 in Criminal Case No. 04-
224073 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 48, Manila, convicting accused-appellant Estanly
Octa y Bas, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom.

As culled from the records, the prosecution's version is herein quoted:

In the morning of September 25, 2003, around 6:40 A.M., Johnny Corpuz (Johnny) and Mike Adrian
Batuigas (Mike Adrian) were on board a Honda Civic Car colored silver with Plate No. UPT 697 travelling on
Buenos Aires St., Sampaloc, Manila when their way was blocked by a Mitsubishi box type Lancer car
colored red-orange. The four (4) armed occupants of the Lancer car alighted. Johnny did not open the door
of the Honda Civic car but one of the armed men fired his pistol at the left window of the civic car, thus
compelling Johnny to open the locked door of the car. The armed men went inside the car and Johnny was
ordered to transfer at the back seat at that time. Inside the car, Johnny was handcuffed, blindfolded and was
even boxed. The armed men asked for the names and telephone numbers of his mother-in-law. The armed
men called his mother-in-law giving the information that Johnny was in their custody and they would just
meet each other at a certain place. They travelled for a while and then they stopped and Johnny was
brought to a safehouse.

After Johnny and Mike were kidnapped, the kidnappers communicated with Johnny’s wife Ana Marie Corpuz
(Ana Marie) giving the information that they have intheir custody her husband Johnny and her brother Mike
Adrian. Ana Marie tried to confirm the kidnapping incident by talking to her husband, who confirmed to his
wife that he and Mike Adrian were indeed kidnapped and they were in the custody of their abductors. Ana
Marie sought the assistance of the PACER [Police AntiCrime and Emergency Response] and stayed in a
PACER safehouse located at P. Tuazon, Cubao, Quezon City. During her stay, she had several
communications with her husband’s kidnappers. The latter started demanding the amount of ₱20 million for
the release of her husband and her brother but the amount was considerably reduced up to the time that
Ana Marie was able to raise the amount of ₱538,000.00 which was accepted by the kidnappers.

Finally, on September 30, 2003 at 10PM, the kidnappers set up the manner on how the ransom money
would be delivered. Ana Marie travelled to Quiapo Church, then to Quezon City circle up to SM Fairview
and to Robinsons Fairview. She was made to stop at Red Lips Beer House and go to the nearby Caltex
Auto Supply where she would see a man wearing a red cap and who would ask her "saan yong padala ni
boss". She was instructed to deliver the wrapped bundled ransom money to the man wearing red cap.

When she saw the man with red cap, she was asked for the money. At first, she did not give the money
because she wanted to be sure that she was giving the money to the right man. Using her own cellphone,
she called up the man who had been instructing her all along and asked him to confirm if the man in front of
her is the right man to give the ransom money to, saying "kausapin mo muna ito kung siya ba." The man in
the phone and the man in the red cap talked for a while in another dialect which Ana Marie did not
understand. When she asked the man to give back her cellphone to her, he refused and, instead instructed
her to give the money to him. She described the man wearing red cap to be goodlooking, lightly built, in his
early 20s, around 5’4" in height and with dimples, which she later identified in court as accused Estanly
Octa.

On October 1, 2003, Johnny was released by his captors after the payment of ransom money. He was
detained for the duration of six (6) days. After his release, he removed his blindfold and handcuffs but he
could hardly regain his sight and see things. He flagged down a private pick-up and learned that he was in
Camarin, Caloocan City. He asked a favor that he be driven to Meycauayan, Bulacan where he took a
jeepney to Monumento, and from there, he took a taxi bound home. When he was released, his brother-in-
law Mike Adrian was also released.4

The defense recounted a different set of facts, to wit:

x x x [O]n September 25, 2003, he was still in Daet, Camarines Norte working as a welder in the welding
shop of his uncle Edwin delos Reyes. He went to Daet on the second week of August 2003 and returned to
Manila when he was called by his father sometime in November 2003. In addition to his defense of denial
and alibi, he clings to the theory that he himself was a victim of abduction. He testified that, on December 1,
2003, while crossing the street, his way was blocked by a van and thereafter, two (2) persons alighted and a
gun was poked at him then he was boarded inside the van. His hands were tied and eyes covered. The
incident happened at Susano Road, Camarin, Caloocan City. He was eventually brought to the PACER
Office, Camp Crame, Quezon City. He claims that he was tortured to admit the charge filed against him. At
the PACER’s office, he was presented to a State Prosecutor of the DOJ but he claimed he was not assisted
by counsel. He said that he did not submit himself for medical examination. He categorically stated that,
when he was inquested by a State Prosecutor, he did not tell of the alleged torture that he suffered because
he was afraid.5

On 4 December 2003, accused-appellant was arrested by the operatives of the Police Anti-Crime and
Emergency Response (PACER) on S[u]sano Road, Camarin, Caloocan City, in connection with another
kidnap for ransom incident. He was identified by prosecution witness Ana Marie Corpuz from a police line-up
as the person who had received the ransom money from her. 6 Consequently, on 26 February 2004, an
Information7 was filed against accused-appellant charging him with the crime of kidnapping for ransom as
follows:

That on or about 6:40 a.m. of September 25, 2003, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually
helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously kidnap and deprive JOHNNY
L.CORPUZ and MIKE ADRIAN BATUIGAS, a minor, of their liberty and against their will by means of threats
and intimation with the use of firearms, and then bring them through the use of a motor vehicle to a house,
wherein they were detained for a period of six (6) days, and that the abduction of the said victims was for the
purpose of extorting Php538,000.00 was actually delivered to the above-mentioned accused in exchange for
the release of the victims.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8

When arraigned on 5 July 2004, accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Trial on the merits then ensued.9

On 15 May 2008, the RTC rendered a Decision,10 the dispositive portion of which is herein quoted:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Estanly Octa y Bas guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the felony
charge [sic] and pursuant to law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer maximum prison term of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the private aggrieved party of the following:

1. The amount of 538,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;

2. The amount of 100,000.00 as moral damages; and

3. The amount of 50,000.00 as exemplary damages and cost.

In view of the conviction of the accused, the Manila City Jail is ordered to commit his person to the
National Penitentiary immediately without necessary [sic] delay.

SO ORDERED.11

In so ruling, the RTC ruled that prosecution witness Ana Marie Corpuz, wife of victim Johnny Corpuz,
steadfastly testified that she gave the ransom money in the amount of 538,000 to accused-appellant. She
did not waiver in identifying and describing him as good-looking, wearing red cap, light in built, in his early
20’s, 5’4" and with dimples. The assertion of Ana Marie Corpuz that accused-appellant was sporting
dimples was squarely corroborated by the court’s observation when he took the witness stand. 12
The trial court also viewed the act of receiving ransom money as sufficient evidence to establish
accused-appellant’s conspiratorial act in the kidnapping for ransom of the victims in this case. 13

With respect to the defense of denial and alibi, the RTC found them to be inherently weak as opposed to the
straightforward testimony of Corpuz. The claim of accused-appellant that he was abducted did not convince
the court either, inasmuch as it was not supported by evidence, nor was it the subject of an investigation. 14

Upon intermediate appellate review, the CA rendered a Decision15 promulgated on 19 July 2010, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the appeal in this case is DENIED and the assailed
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, in Manila in Criminal Case No. 04-224073 finding Estanly
Octa y Bas guilty of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
ordered him to pay 538,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages, 100,000.00 as moral damages and
50,000.00 as exemplary damages and cost, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.16
The CA found the positive identification of accused-appellant by prosecution witness Ana Marie Corpuz to
be unwavering and steadfast. It stressed that his positive identification, when categorical, consistent,
straightforward, and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter,
would prevail over mere alibi and denial.17 Such positive identification constituted direct evidence, and not
merely circumstantial evidence.18

Moreover, the CA ruled that accused-appellant had been rightly found to be a co-conspirator in this case. At
the time he received the ransom money, the crime of kidnapping was still continuing, since both victims were
still illegally detained by the kidnappers. Accused-appellant’s act of taking the ransom money was an overt
act made in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.19

Hence, the instant appeal.20 ISSUES

In seeking a reversal of the decisions of the CA and the RTC, accused-appellant Octa argues that:

1. The trial court gravely erred in convicting him despite the prosecutions’ failure to positively identify
him as the ransom taker;21

2. The trial court gravely erred in finding him to be a conspirator to the crime charged; 22 and

3. The trial court gravely erred in convicting him of the crime charged based on circumstantial
evidence.23

THE COURT’S RULING

We deny accused-appellant’s appeal.

When the credibility of a witness is at issue,

the findings of fact of the trial court are
accorded high respect if
not conclusive effect, more so if those
findings have been affirmed by the
appellate court.

In his Brief, accused-appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
he was the one who received the ransom money. He primarily argues that prosecution witness Ana Marie
Corpuz could not have positively ascertained the identity of the ransom taker, because the area where the
transaction took place was dark, and the man was wearing a cap. Neither did Corpuz declare in her
Sinumpaang Salaysay that the person who received the ransom money was sporting a dimple, a fact that
she mentioned on direct examination.24 Accused-appellant further insinuates that the police might have
influenced his out-of-court identification in the line-up when they informed Corpuz that they had
apprehended some people who were suspects in other kidnap for ransom cases, and that information might
have conditioned her mind that the ransom taker had already been apprehended. 25
We disagree.
In People v. Basao,26 the Court held that:

[T]the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently
performed by the trial judge, who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess
their credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected on the record. The demeanor of the person
on the stand can draw the line between fact and fancy. The forthright answer or the hesitant pause, the
quivering voice or the angry tone, the flustered look or the sincere gaze, the modest blush or the guilty
blanch – these can reveal if the witness is telling the truth or lying through his teeth.27

xxxx

[Thus], when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions
anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This is more true if such
findings were affirmed by the appellate court, since it is settled that when the trial court’s findings have been
affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court. Without any clear
showing that the trial court and the appellate court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance, the rule should not be disturbed." 28

In this case, both the RTC and the CA found Corpuz to be a credible witness who had categorically
testified that she saw the face of the ransom taker, and that he was actually the accused-appellant.

The fact that Corpuz failed to declare in her Sinumpaang Salaysay that the ransom taker was sporting a
dimple was not fatal to her testimony because she was able to positively and categorically identify
accused-appellant during the police line-up and in open court.

Even accused-appellant’s insinuation that Corpuz could have been influenced by the police during the line-
up cannot be given weight in the face of his positive identification as the ransom taker. On this point, we
agree with the observation of the CA that "assuming arguendo that the accused-appellant’s out of court
identification was defective, her subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have initially
attended it. We emphasize that the ‘inadmissibility of a police line-up identification x x x should not
necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an independent in-court identification.’"29

To hold an accused guilty as a co- principal

by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown
to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity.

Accused-appellant also claims that he cannot be considered as a conspirator to the kidnapping in the
absence of concrete proof that he actually participated in the execution of the essential elements of the
crime by overt acts indispensable to its accomplishment. His receipt of the ransom money transpired only
after the kidnapping had been consummated and was not an essential element of the crime. 30

We disagree.

On point is our dissertation in People v. Bautista,31 to wit:

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it.1awp++i1 Where all the accused acted in concert at the time of the
commission of the offense, and it is shown by such acts that they had the same purpose or common
design and were united in its execution, conspiracy is sufficiently established. It must be shown that all
participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate a common
purpose or design to commit the felony.

xxxx

Evidently, to hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have
performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation
in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. x x x.
 xxxx

Taking these facts in conjunction with the testimony of Dexter, who testified that accused-appellant was the
one who received the ransom money x x x then the commonality of purpose of the acts of accused-
appellant together with the other accused can no longer be denied. Such acts have the common design or
purpose to commit the felony of kidnapping for ransom.

Thus, accused-appellants’ argument that he is a mere accomplice must fail. He is liable as a principal for
being a co-conspirator in the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom under Art. 267 of the RPC, as amended by
R.A. 7659 x x x.32 (Emphasis ours)

Moreover, the CA is correct in its observation that at the time accused-appellant received the ransom
money, the crime of kidnapping was still continuing, since both victims were still being illegally detained by
the kidnappers.33 While his receipt of the ransom money was not a material element of the crime, it was
nevertheless part of the grand plan and was in fact the main reason for kidnapping the
victims.34 Ransom is money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured
person or persons; or payment that releases from captivity. 35 Without ransom money, the freedom of the
detained victims cannot be achieved. The positive identification of accused-appellant constitutes direct, and
not merely circumstantial, evidence.

Accused-appellant's contention that he was convicted based only on circumstantial evidence deserves
scant consideration. We agree with the conclusion of the CA that "[Corpuz] testified that she gave the
ransom money to accused-appellant, and as the trial court declared, his act of receiving the ransom
money is sufficient conspiratorial act in the commission of the kidnapping for ransom. The positive
identification of the accused-appellant then constitutes direct evidence, and not merely circumstantial
evidence."36

With respect to the penalty imposed, we agree with the imposition by the RTC and the CA on accused-
appellant of the penalty of reclusion perpetua, considering the prohibition on the death penalty.37 To
conform to recent jurisprudence,38 we hereby modify the exemplary damages awarded by increasing the
amount from ₱50,000 to ₱100,000.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR.-HC No. 03490 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to
suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay ₱538,000 as actual damages, ₱100,000 as moral
damages, and ₱100,000 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

8. People v. Feliciano, G.R. No. 196735, 5 May 2104

G.R. No. 196735 May 5, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, vs.

DANILO FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS VICTOR MEDALLA, CHRISTOPHER SOLIVA, WARREN L.

ZINGAPAN, and
ROBERT MICHAEL BELTRAN ALVIR, Accused-appellants.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

It is in the hallowed grounds of a university where students, faculty, and research personnel should feel
safest. After all, this is where ideas that could probably solve the sordid realities in this world are peacefully
nurtured and debated. Universities produce hope. They incubate all our youthful dreams.
Yet, there are elements within this academic milieu that trade misplaced concepts of perverse
brotherhood for these hopes. Fraternity rumbles exist because of past impunity. This has resulted in a
senseless death whose justice is now the subject matter of this case. It is rare that these cases are
prosecuted. It is even more extraordinary that there are credible witnesses who present themselves
courageously before an able and experienced trial court judge.

This culture of impunity must stop. There is no space in this society for hooliganism disguised as fraternity
rumbles. The perpetrators must stand and suffer the legal consequences of their actions. They must do so
for there is an individual who now lies dead, robbed of his dreams and the dreams of his family. Excruciating
grief for them will never be enough.

It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7) members of
the Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the
University of the Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked men carrying baseball
bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required hospitalization. One of them, Dennis
Venturina, died from his injuries.

An information1 for murder, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q95-6113 3, was filed against several members
of the Scintilla Juris fraternity, namely, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor L. Medalla, Warren L. Zingapan,
Robert Michael Beltran Alvir, Christopher L. Soliva, Reynaldo G. Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo, George
Morano, Raymund E. Narag, Gilbert Merle Magpantay, Benedict Guerrero, and Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 219. The information reads:

That on or about the 8th day of December 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise, conspiring, confederating with other persons whose true
names, identities and whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained, and mutually helping one another,
with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, and with evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior
strength, armed with baseball bats, lead pipes, and cutters, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of DENNIS F. VENTURINA, by
then and there hitting him on the head and clubbing him on different parts of his body thereby inflicting upon
him serious and mortal injuries which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of said DENNIS F. VENTURINA. (Emphasis supplied)

Separate informations were also filed against them for the attempted murder of Sigma Rho fraternity
members Cesar Mangrobang, Jr.,2 Cristobal Gaston, Jr.,3 and Leandro Lachica,4 and the frustrated
murder of Sigma Rho fraternity members Mervin Natalicio5 and Amel Fortes.6 Only 11 of the accused
stood trial since one of the accused, Benedict Guerrero, remained at large.

A trial on the merits ensued.

The facts, according to the prosecution, are as follows:

Leandro Lachica, Amel Fortes, Derinis Venturina, Mervin Natalicio, Cristobal Gaston, Jr., Felix
Tumaneng,7 and Cesar Magrobang, Jr. are all members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. On December 8,
1994, at around 12:30 to 1 :00 p.m., they were having lunch at Beach House Canteen, located at the
back of the Main Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City. 8 Suddenly, Dennis
Venturina shouted, "Brads, brods!"9

According to Leandro Lachica, Grand Archon of Sigma Rho Fraternity, he looked around when Venturina
shouted, and he saw about ten (10) men charging toward them. 10 The men were armed with baseball bats
and lead pipes, and their heads were covered with either handkerchiefs or shirts. 11 Within a few seconds,
five (5) of the men started attacking him, hitting him with their lead pipes.12 During the attack, he recognized
one of the attackers as Robert Michael Beltran Alvir because his mask fell off. 13

Lachica tried to parry the blows of.his attackers, suffering scratches and contusions. 14

He was, however, able to run to the nearby College of Education.15 Just before reaching it, he looked back
and saw Warren Zingapan and Julius Victor L. Medalla holding lead pipes and standing where the
commotion was.16 Both of them did not have their masks on.17 He was familiar with Alvir, Zingapan, and
Medalla because he often saw them in the College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP) and
Zingapan used to be his friend.18 The attack lasted about thirty (30) to forty-five (45) seconds.19

According to Mervin Natalicio, the Vice Grand Archon of Sigma Rho, he looked to his left when Venturina
shouted.20 He saw about fifteen (15) to twenty (20) men, most of who were wearing masks, running toward
them.21 He was stunned, and he started running.22 He stumbled over the protruding roots of a tree.23 He got
up, but the attackers came after him and beat him up with lead pipes and baseball bats until he fell down. 24
While he was parrying the blows, he recognized two (2) of the attackers as Warren Zingapan and
Christopher L. Soliva since they were not wearing any masks.25 After about thirty (30) seconds, they
stopped hitting him.26
He was lying on his back and when he looked up, he saw another group of four (4) to five (5) men coming
toward him, led by Benedict Guerrero.27 This group also beat him up.28 He did not move until another group
of masked men beat him up for about five (5) to eight (8) seconds.29

When the attacks ceased, he was found lying on the ground.30 Several bystanders brought him to the
U.P. Infirmary where he stayed for more than a week for the treatment of his wounds and fractures. 31

According to Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., member of Sigma Rho, he also looked back when Venturina shouted
and saw a group of men with baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them wore pieces of cloth around their
heads.32 He ran when they attacked, but two (2) men, whose faces were covered with pieces of cloth,
blocked his way and hit him with lead pipes.33 While running and parrying the blows, he recognized them as
Gilbert Merle Magpantay and Carlo Jolette Fajardo because their masks fell off. 34 He successfully evaded
his attackers and ran to the Main Library.35 He then decided that he needed to help his fraternity brothers
and turned back toward Beach House.36 There, he saw Venturina lying on the ground.37 Danilo Feliciano, Jr.
was beating Venturina up with a lead pipe while Raymund E. Narag was aiming to hit Venturina. 38 When
they saw him, they went toward his direction.39 They were about to hit him when somebody shouted that
policemen were coming. Feliciano and Narag then ran away.40

Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. then saw Amel Fortes. Fortes accompanied him to his car so they could bring
Venturina to the U.P. Infirmary.41 When they brought the car over, other people, presumably bystanders,
were already loading Venturina into another vehicle.42 They followed that vehicle to the U.P. Infirmary where
they saw Natalicio.43 He stayed at the infirmary until the following morning.44

According to Cristobal Gaston, Jr., member of Sigma Rho, he immediately stood up when he heard
someone shout, "Brods!"45 He saw a group of men charging toward them carrying lead pipes and baseball
bats.46 Most of them had pieces of cloth covering their faces.47 He was about to run when two (2) of the
attackers approached him.48 One struck him with a heavy pipe while the other stabbed him with a bladed
instrument.49 He was able to parry most of the blows from the lead pipe, but he sustained stab wounds on
the chest and on his left forearm.50

He was able to run away.51 When he sensed that no one was chasing him, he looked back to Beach House
Canteen and saw Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Warren Zingapan, and George Morano. 52 He decided to go back to
the canteen to help his fraternity brothers.53 When he arrived, he did not see any of his fraternity brothers
but only saw the ones who attacked them.54 He ended up going to their hang-out instead to meet with his
other fraternity brothers.55 They then proceeded to the College of Law where the rest of the fraternity was
already discussing the incident.56

According to Amel Fortes, member of Sigma Rho, he also ran when he saw the group of attackers coming
toward them.57 When he looked back, he saw Danilo Feliciano, Jr. hitting Venturina. 58 He was also able to
see Warren Zingapan and George Morano at the scene.59

Leandro Lachica, in the meantime, upon reaching the College of Education, boarded a jeepney to the
College of Law to wait for their other fraternity brothers. 60 One of his fraternity brothers, Peter Corvera, told
him that he received information that members of Scintilla Juris were seen in the west wing of the Main
Library and were regrouping in SM North.61 Lachica and his group then set off for SM North to confront
Scintilla Juris and identify their attackers.62

When they arrived in SM North, pillboxes and stones were thrown at them.63 Lachica saw Robert Michael
Beltran Alvir and Warren Zingapan and a certain Carlo Taparan. 64 They had no choice but to get away from
the mall and proceed instead to U.P. where the Sigma Rho Fraternity members held a meeting. 65
On the night of December 8, 1994, the officers of Sigma Rho advised the victims to lodge their complaints
with the National Bureau of Investigation.66 Their counsel, Atty. Frank Chavez, told the U.P. Police that the
victims would be giving their statements before the National Bureau of Investigation, promising to give the
U.P. Police copies of their statements. In the meantime, Venturina was transferred from the U.P. Infirmary to
St. Luke's Hospital on December 8, 1994. He died on December 10, 1994.67 On December 11, 1994, an
autopsy was conducted on the cadaver of Dennis Venturina.68 Dr. Rolando Victoria, a medico-legal officer of
the National Bureau of Investigation, found that Venturina had "several contusions located at the back of the
upper left arm and hematoma on the back of both hands," 69 "two (2) lacerated wounds at the back of the
head,70 generalized hematoma on the skull,"71 "several fractures on the head,"72 and "inter-cranial
hemorrhage."73 The injuries, according to Dr. Victoria, could have been caused by a hard blunt object.74 Dr.
Victoria concluded that Venturina died of traumatic head injuries.75

On December 12, 1994, Lachica, Natalicio, Mangrobang, Fortes, and Gaston executed their respective
affidavits76 before the National Bureau of Investigation and underwent medico-legal examinations77 with their
medicolegal officer, Dr. Aurelio Villena. According to Dr. Villena, he found that Mervin Natalicio had
"lacerated wounds on the top of the head, above the left ear, and on the fingers; contused abrasions on both
knees; contusion on the left leg and thigh," 78 all of which could have been caused by any hard, blunt object.
These injuries required medical attendance for a period of ten (10) days to thirty (30) days from the date of
infliction.79

Dr. Villena found on Amel Fortes "lacerated wounds on the head and on the right leg which could have
been caused by a blunt instrument." 80 These injuries required hospitalization for a period of ten (10) days to
thirty (30) days from date of infliction.81 He also found on Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. a "healed abrasion on the
left forearm which could possibly be caused by contact with [a] rough hard surface and would require one
(1) to nine (9) days of medical attention."82 He found on Leandro Lachica "contusions on the mid auxiliary
left side, left forearm and lacerated wound on the infra scapular area, left side."83 On Christopher Gaston,
Jr. he found "lacerated wounds on the anterior chest, left side, left forearm; swollen knuckles of both hands;
contusions on the mid auxiliary left side, left forearm and lacerated wound on the infra scapular area, left
side."84

On September 18, 1997, after the prosecution presented its evidence-in-chief, the court granted the
demurrer to evidence filed by Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. on the ground that he was not identified by the
prosecution's witnesses and that he was not mentioned in any of the documentary evidence of the
prosecution.85

Upon the presentation of their evidence, the defense introduced their own statement of the facts, as
follows:

According to Romeo Cabrera,86 a member of the U.P. Police, he was on foot patrol with another member of
the U.P. Police, Oscar Salvador, at the time of the incident. They were near the College of Arts and
Sciences (Palma Hall) when he vaguely heard somebody shouting, "Rumble!" They went to the place where
the alleged rumble was happening and saw injured men being helped by bystanders. They helped an injured
person board the service vehicle of the Beach House Canteen. They asked what his name was, and he
replied that he was Mervin Natalicio. When he asked Natalicio who hit him, the latter was not able to reply
but instead told him that his attackers were wearing masks. Oscar Salvador 87 corroborated his testimony.

Benjamin Lato,88 a utility worker of the Beach House Canteen, likewise testified that the identities of the
attackers were unrecognizable because of their masks. He, however, admitted that he did not see the attack;
he just saw a man sprawled on the ground at the time of the incident.

Frisco Capilo,89 a utility worker of U.P. assigned to the Main Library, was buying a cigarette at a vendor
located nearby. From there, he allegedly saw the whole incident. He testified that ten (10) men, wearing
either masks of red and black bonnets or with shirts covering their faces, came from a red car parked
nearby. He also saw three (3) men being hit with lead pipes by the masked men. Two (2) of the men fell
after being hit. One of the victims was lifting the other to help him, but the attackers overtook him.
Afterwards, the attackers ran away. He then saw students helping those who were injured. He likewise
helped in carrying one of the injured victims, which he later found out to be Amel Fortes.

A U.P. student and member of the Sigma Alpha Nu Sorority, Eda Panganiban, 90 testified that she and her
friends were in line to order lunch at the Beach House Canteen when a commotion happened. She saw
around fifteen (15) to eighteen (18) masked men attack a group of Sigma Rhoans. She did not see any mask
fall off. Her sorority sister and another U.P. student, Luz Perez,91 corroborated her story that the masked men
were unrecognizable because of their masks. Perez, however, admitted that a member of Scintilla Juris
approached her to make a statement.

Another sorority sister, Bathalani Tiamzon,92 testified on substantially the same matters as Panganiban and
Perez. She also stated that she saw a person lying on the ground who was being beaten up by about three
(3) to five (5) masked men. She also stated that some of the men were wearing black masks while some
were wearing white t-shirts as masks. She did not see any mask fall off the faces of the attackers.

According to Feliciana Feliciano,93 accused-appellant Danilo Feliciano, Jr.'s motlier, her son was in
Pampanga to visit his sick grandfather at the time of the incident. She alleged that her son went to
Pampanga before lunch that day and visited the school where she teaches to get their house key from
her.

According to Robert Michael Beltran Alvir,94 he had not been feeling well since December 5, 1994. He
said that he could not have possibly been in U.P. on December 8, 1994 since he was absent even from
work. He also testified that he wore glasses and, thus, could not have possibly been the person identified
by Leandro Lachica. He also stated that he was not enrolled in U.P. at the time since he was working to
support himself.

According to Julius Victor Medalla,95 he and another classmate, Michael Vibas, were working on a school
project on December 8, 1994. He also claimed that he could not have participated in the rumble as he had
an injury affecting his balance. The injury was caused by an incident in August 1994 when he was struck in
the head by an unknown assailant. His testimony was corroborated by Jose Victor Santos 96 who stated that
after lunch that day, Medalla played darts with him and, afterwards, they went to Jollibee. Christopher
Soliva,97 on the other hand, testified that he was eating lunch with his girlfriend and another friend in Jollibee,
Philcoa, on December 8, 1994. They went back to U.P. before 1:00 p.m. and went straight to their fraternity
hang-out where he was told that there had been a rumble at the Main Library. He also met several Sigma
Rhoans acting suspiciously as they passed by the hang-out. They were also told by their head, Carlo
Taparan, not to react to the Sigma Rhoans and just go home. Anna Cabahug, 98 his girlfriend, corroborated
his story.

Warren Zingapan99 also testified that he was not in U.P. at the time of the incident. He claimed to have gone
to SM North to buy a gift for a friend's wedding but ran into a fraternity brother. He also alleged that some
Sigma Rhoans attacked them in SM North that day.

On February 28, 2002, the trial court rendered its decision 100 with the finding that Robert Michael Alvir,
Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Christopher Soliva, Julius Victor Medalla, and Warren Zingapan were guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder and were sentenced to, among other penalties, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.101 The trial court, however, acquitted Reynaldo Ablanida, Carlo Jolette
Fajardo, Gilbert Magpantay, George Morano, and Raymund Narag. 102 The case against Benedict Guerrero
was ordered archived by the court until his apprehension. 103 The trial court, m evaluating the voluminous
evidence at hand, concluded that:

After a judicious evaluation of the matter, the Court is of the considered view that of the ten accused, some
were sufficiently identified and some were not. The Court believes that out of the amorphous images during
the pandemonium, the beleaguered victims were able to espy and identify some of the attackers etching an
indelible impression in their memory. In this regard, the prosecution eyewitnesses were emphatic that they
saw the attackers rush towards them wielding deadly weapons like baseball bats, lead pipes, pieces of
wood and bladed ones, and pounce on their hapless victims, run after them, and being present with one
another at the scene of the crime during the assault. Although each victim had a very strong motive to place
his fraternity rivals permanently behind bars, not one .of them testified against all of them. If the prosecution
eyewitnesses, who were all Sigma Rhoans, were simply bent on convicting Scintilla Juris members for that
matter, they could have easily tagged each and every single accused as a participant in the atrocious and
barbaric assault to make sure that no one else would escape conviction. Instead, each eyewitness named
only one or two and some were candid enough to say that they did not see who delivered the blows against
them.104
Because one of the penalties meted out was reclusion perpetua, the case was brought to this court on
automatic appeal. However, due to the amendment of the Rules on Appeal,105 the case was remanded to
the Court of Appeals.106 In the Court of Appeals, the case had to be re-raffled several Times107 before it was
eventually assigned to Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. for the writing of the decision.

On December 26, 2010, the Court of Appeals, in a Special First Division of Five, affirmed 108 the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, with three (3) members concurring 109 an one (1) dissenting.110

The decision of the Court of Appeals was then brought to this court for review.

The issue before this court is whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
accused-appellants attacked private complainants and caused the death of Dennis Venturina.
On the basis, however, of the arguments presented to this court by both parties, the issue may be
further refined, thus:

1. Whether accused-appellants' constitutional rights were violated when the information against them
contained the aggravating circumstance of the use of masks despite the prosecution presenting
witnesses to prove that the masks fell off; and

2. Whether the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals correctly ruled, on the basis of the
evidence, that accused-appellants were sufficiently identified.

An information is sufficient when the

accused is fully apprised of the charge
against him to enable him to prepare
his defense

It is the argument of appellants that the information filed against them violates their constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. They argue that the prosecution should
not have included the phrase "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information since they
were presenting testimonial evidence that not all the accused were wearing masks or that their masks fell
off.

It is enshrined in our Bill of Rights that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law."111 This includes the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
and "to be informed of the nature and accusation against him."112

Upon a finding of probable cause, an information is filed by the prosecutor against the accused, in compliance
with the due process of the law. Rule 110, Section 1, paragraph 1 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that:

A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense
given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended pary; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.

In People v. Wilson Lab-ea,113 this court has stated that:

The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of common understanding to know the
charge against him, and the court to render judgment properly. x x x The purpose is to allow the accused to
fully prepare for his defense, precluding surprises during the trial.114

Contrary to the arguments of the appellants, the inclusion of the phrase "wearing masks and/or other forms of
disguise" in the information does not violate their constitutional rights.
It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the
information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated
as such.115 It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of "wearing
masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that effect,
to be admissible by the trial court.

In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows the accused to
remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes.

The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the accused were
masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as an aggravating
circumstance.116 What is important in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there was a
concealment of identity by the accused. The inclusion of disguise in the information was, therefore, enough
to sufficiently apprise the accused that in the commission of the offense they were being charged with, they
tried to conceal their identity.

The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not wearing masks is also not
violative of their right to be informed of their offenses.

The information charges conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy presupposes that "the act of one is
the act of all."117 This would mean all the accused had been one in their plan to conceal their identity even if
there was evidence later on to prove that some of them might not have done so.

In any case, the accused were being charged with the crime of murder, frustrated murder, and attempted
murder. All that is needed for the information to be sufficient is that the elements of the crime have been
alleged and that there are sufficient details as to the time, place, and persons involved in the offense.

II

Findings of the trial court, when

affirmed by the appellate court, are
entitled to great weight and credence

As a general rule, the findings of fact by the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are given
great weight and credence on review. The rationale for this was explained in People v. Daniel Quijada, 118
as follows:

Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are
accorded great weight and respect. For, the trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through
the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the
sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a
ready reply;
or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or
sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full
realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien.119

There are, of course, recognized exceptions to this rule. In People v. Leticia Labarias,120 this court stated that:

It is the policy of this Court to sustain the factual findings of the trial court on the reasonable assumption that
it is in a better position to assess the evidence before it, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, who
reveal much of themselves by their deportment on the stand. The exception that makes the rule is where
such findings arc clearly arbitrary or erroneous as when they are tainted with bias or hostility or are so
lacking in basis as to suggest that they were reached without the careful study and perceptiveness that
should characterize a judicial decision.121 (Emphasis supplied)

In criminal cases, the exception gains even more importance since the presumption is always in favor of
innocence. It is only upon proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt that a conviction is sustained.

In this case, a total of eleven (11) witnesses for the prosecution and forty-two (42) witnesses for the defense
were put on the stand from 1995 to 2001. In an eighty-three (83)-page decision, the trial court acquitted six
(6) and convicted five (5) of the accused. On the basis of these numbers alone, it cannot be said that the trial
court acted arbitrarily or that its decision was "so lacking in basis" that it was arrived at without a judicious
and exhaustive study of all the evidence presented.
Inasmuch, however, as the trial court's findings hold great persuasive value, there is also nothing that
precludes this court from coming to its own conclusions based on an independent review of the facts and
the evidence on record.

The accused were sufficiently identified

by the witnesses for the prosecution

The trial court, in weighing all the evidence on hand, found the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution to be credible. In its decision, the trial court stated that:

x x x. Although each victim had a very strong motive to place his fraternity rivals permanently behind bars,
not one testified against all of them. If the prosecution eyewitnesses, who were all Sigma Rhoans, were
simply bent on convicting Scintilla Juris members for that matter, they could have easily tagged each and
every accused as a participant in the atrocious and barbaric assault to make sure no one would escape
conviction. Instead, each eyewitness named only one or two and some were candid enough to say that they
did not see who delivered the blows against them.

Thus, the prosecution witnesses, Ernest Paulo Tan, Dennis Gaio and Darwin Asuncion, testified to have
seen it all but they could not, and did not, disclose any name. Lachica, on the other hand, said that he did
not have the opportunity to see and identify the person who hit him in the back and inflicted a two- inch
cut. His forearm was also hit by a lead pipe but he did not see who did it. Natalicio, one of the other three
who were hospitalized, was severely beaten by three waves of attackers totalling more than 15 but he
could only name 3 of them. He added, however, that he would be able to recognize those he saw if he
would see them again. Of them, Mangrobang pointed to at least 5 but he stressed that he did not see
Zingapan, Soliva, Guerrero, Del Rosario, Daraoay, Denoista, and Penalosa during the onslaught. Gaston
could have named any of the accused as the one who repeatedly hit him with a heavy pipe and stabbed
him but he frankly said their faces were covered. Like Natalicio, Fortes was repeatedly beaten by several
groups but did not name any of the accused as one of those who attacked him. The persons he identified
were those leading the pack with one of them as the assailant of Venturina, and the two others who he
saw standing while he was running away. He added that he saw some of the accused during the attack
but did not know then their names.122 (Emphasis supplied)

We agree.

The trial court correctly held that "considering the swiftness of the incident," 123 there would be slight
inconsistencies in their statements. In People v. Adriano Cabrillas,124 it was previously observed that:

It is perfectly natural for different witnesses testifying on the occurrence of a crime to give varying details as
there may be some details which one witness may notice while the other may not observe or remember. In
fact, jurisprudence even warns against a perfect dovetailing of narration by different witnesses as it could
mean that their testimonies were prefabricated and rehearsed.125 (Emphasis supplied)

According to their testimonies, Lachica was able to identify Alvir, Zingapan, and Medalla; 126

Natalicio was able to identify Medalla, Zingapan, and Soliva; 127 and Fortes was able to identify Feliciano,
Medalla, and Zingapan.128 Their positive identification was due to the fact that they either wore no masks or
that their masks fell off.

It would be in line with human experience that a victim or an eyewitness of a crime would endeavor to find
ways to identify the assailant so that in the event that he or she survives, the criminal could be apprehended.
It has also been previously held that:

It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see the looks and faces of their
assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often the face of the assailant
and body movements thereof, creates a lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from their
memory.129

In the commotion, it was more than likely that the masked assailants could have lost their masks. It had
been testified by the victims that some of the assailants were wearing masks of either a piece of cloth or a
handkerchief and that Alvir,130 Zingapan,131 Soliva,132 and Feliciano133 had masks on at first but their masks
fell off and hung around their necks.

Equally telling was the testimony of defense witness Frisco Capilo during cross-examination who
observed that some of the attackers were wearing masks and some were not, thus:

Q Mr. Capilo, do you know this Scintilla Juris Fraternity?

A No, sir.
Q During the incident of December 8, 1994, there were a lot of people eating in the Beach House
Canteen, and then running towards different directions, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q And some people were wearing masks and some were not? A
Yes, sir.134
While the attack was swift and sudden, the victims would have had the presence of mind to take a look at
their assailants if they were identifiable. Their positive identification, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, must be upheld to be credible.

It has been argued that the trial court did not give Mangrobang's testimony credence while Gaston's
testimony was found to be "hazy." This argument is unmeritorious.

It should be noted that it was the trial court itself that stated that the acquittal of the Scintilla Juris members
identified by Mangrobang "should not be. misinterpreted to mean that the tt:'.stimony of Mangrobang was an
absolute fabrication."135 The court went on to state that they "were exonerated merely because they were
accorded the benefit of the doubt as their identification by Mangrobang, under tumultuous and chaotic
circumstances were [sic] not corroborated and their alibis, not refuted." 136 There was, therefore, no basis to
say that Mangrobang was not credible; it was only that the evidence presented was not strong enough to
overcome the presumption of innocence.

Gaston's testimony, on the other hand, was considered "hazy" 137 by the trial court only with regard to his
identification of Zingapan's companion. Gaston testified that he saw Zingapan with Morano, with Zingapan
moving and Morano staying in place. Fortes, however, testified that both Zingapan and Morano were
running after him. Lachica also testified that it was Medalla, not Morano, who was with Zingapan. Because
of this confusion, the trial court found that there was doubt as to who was really beside Zingapan. The
uncertainty resulted into an acquittal for Morano. Despite this, the court still did not" impute doubt in their
testimonies that Zingapan was present at the scene.

Be that as it may, the acquittals made by the trial court further prove that its decision was brought about
only upon a thorough examination of the evidence presented: It accepted that there were inconsistencies
in the testimonies of the victims but that these were minor and did not affect their credibility. It ruled that
"[s]uch inconsistencies, and even probabilities, are not unusual 'for there is no person with perfect
faculties or senses."'138

Evidence as part of the res gestae may

be admissible but have little persuasive
value in this case

According to the testimony of U.P. Police Officer Salvador, 139 when he arrived at the scene, he interviewed
the bystanders who all told him that they could not recognize the attackers since they were all masked.
This, it is argued, could be evidence that could be given as part of the res gestae.
As a general rule, "[a] witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his personal knowledge; that is,
which are derived from his own perception, x x x."140 All other kinds of testimony are hearsay and are
inadmissible as evidence. The Rules of Court, however, provide several exceptions to the general rule,
and one of which is when the evidence is part of res gestae, thus:

Section 42. Part of res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a starting occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence
as part of res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving
it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.141
In People v. Rodrigo Salafranca,142 this court has previously discussed the admissibility of testimony
taken as part of res gestae, stating that:

A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res
gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.

xxxx

The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the undersigned incidents of a
particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act." In a general way, res gestae
refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its
character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of
deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made
by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after
the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity
for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a
part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven
or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the
transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony.143

There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school campus is a
startling occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders were made immediately after the
startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as evidence given in res gestae.
In People v. Albarido,144 however, this court has stated that "in accord to ordinary human experience:" x x x
persons who witness an event perceive the same from their respective points of reference.
Therefore, almost always, they have different accounts of how it happened. Certainly, we cannot expect the
testimony of witnesses to a crime to be consistent in all aspects because different persons have different
impressions and recollections of the same incident. x x x 145

(Emphasis supplied)

The statements made by the bystanders, although admissible, have little persuasive value since the
bystanders could have seen the events transpiring at different vantage points and at different points in time.
Even Frisco Capilo, one of the bystanders at the time of the attack, testified that the attackers had their
masks on at first, but later on, some remained masked and some were unmasked.

When the bystanders' testimonies are weighed against those of the victims who witnessed the entirety of
the incident from beginning to end at close range, the former become merely corroborative of the fact that
an attack occurred. Their account of the incident, therefore, must be given considerably less weight than
that of the victims.

The belated identification by the victims

do not detract from their positive
identification of the appellants

It is argued that the fact that the victims stayed silent about the incident to the U.P. Police or the Quezon
City Police but instead executed affidavits with the National Bureau of Investigation four (4) days after
the incident gives doubt as to the credibility of their testimonies.

U.P. Police Officer Romeo Cabrera146 testified that on their way to the U.P. Infirmary, he interviewed the
victims who all told him they could not recognize the attackers because they were all wearing masks.
Meanwhile, Dr. Mislang147 testified to the effect that when she asked Natalicio who attacked them, Natalicio
answered that he did not know because they were masked.

It must be remembered that the parties involved in this case belong to rival fraternities. While this court does
not condone their archaic and oftentimes barbaric traditions, it is conceded that there are certain practices
that are unique to fraternal organizations.

It is quite possible that at this point in time, they knew the identities of their attackers but chose not to
disclose it without first conferring with their other fraternity brothers. This probability is bolstered by the
actions of Sigma Rho after the incident, which showed that they confronted the members of Scintilla Juris in
SM North. Because of the tenuous relationship of rival fraternities, it would not have been prudent for Sigma
Rho to retaliate against the wrong fraternity.

Their act of not disclosing the correct information to the U.P. Police or to Dr. Mislang does not make the
police officer or the doctor's testimonies more credible than that of the victims. It should not be forgotten that
the victims actually witnessed the entire incident, while Officer Salvador, Officer Cabrera, and Dr. Mislang
were merely relaying secondhand information.

The fact that they went to the National Bureau of Investigation four (4) days after the incident also does not
affect their credibility since most of them had been hospitalized from their injuries and needed to recover
first.

Since a fraternity moves as one unit, it would be understandable that they decided to wait until all of them
were well enough to go to the National Bureau of Investigation headquarters in order to give their
statements.

Seniority is also often the norm in fraternities. It was upon the advice of their senior "brads" and their legal
counsel that they executed their sworn statements before the National Bureau of Investigation four (4)
days after the incident.

The decision to report the incident to the National Bureau of Investigation instead of to the U.P. Police was
the call of their legal counsel who might have deemed the National Bureau of Investigation more equipped
to handle the investigation. This does not, however, affect the credibility of the witnesses since they were
merely following the legal advice of their counsel.

Indeed, there is reason to believe that the National Bureau of Investigation is better equipped than the
U.P. Police to handle the investigation of the case. As stated in the U.P. College of Economics website:

The UP Diliman Police (UPDP) is tasked with maintaining campus security. Their station is located in
front of the College of Architecture.

The primary missions of the UPDP are to maintain peace and order, secure and protect lives and property,
enforce basic laws, applicable Quezon City Ordinances, and University Rules and Regulations including
policies and standards; and to perform such other functions relative to the general safety and security of
the students, employees, and residents in the U.P. Diliman Campus. x x x. 148 (Emphasis supplied)

It can be seen that the U.P. Police is employed by U.P. primarily for campus security. They are by no
means an actual police force that is equipped to handle a full-blown murder investigation. Fraternity-
related violence in U.P. has also increasingly become more frequent, which might possibly have
desensitized the U.P. Police in such a way that would prevent their objectivity in the conduct of their
investigations. The victims' reliance on the National Bureau of Investigation, therefore, is understandable.

III

Alibi cannot prevail over the positive

identification of the victim

It is settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the victim. 149 In People v.
Benjamin Peteluna,150 this court stated that:

It is a time-honored principle that the positive identification of the appellant by a witness destroys the
defense of alibi and denial. Thus:
x x x. It is well-entrenched that alibi and denial are inherently weak and have always been viewed with
disfavor by the courts due to the facility with which they can be concocted. They warrant the least credibility
or none at all and cannot prevail over the positive identification of the appellant by the prosecution
witnesses. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that appellant was somewhere else when the crime
was committed; he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such
defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating
justification [,] is inherently weak and if uncorroborated regresses to blatant impotence. Like alibi, it also
constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the
declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.151

In this case, the victims were able to positively identify their attackers while the accused-appellants merely
offered alibis and denials as their defense. The credibility of the victims was upheld by both the trial court
and the appellate court while giving little credence to the accused-appellants' alibis. There is, thus, no
reason to disturb their findings.

Accused-appellants were correctly

charged with murder, and there was
treachery in the commission of the
crime

According to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused-appellants were
correctly charged with murder. Article 248 states:

ART. 248. Murder. -Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall
be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;

xxxx

It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, a group of men armed with lead pipes and baseball bats
attacked Dennis Venturina and his companions, which resulted in Venturina's death.

As correctly found by the trial court and the appellate court, the offense committed against Dennis Venturina
was committed by a group that took advantage of its superior strength and with the aid of armed men. The
appellate court, however, incorrectly ruled out the presence of treachery in the commission of the offense.

It has been stated previously by this court that:

[T]reachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.152

Similarly, in People v. Leozar Dela Cruz,153 this court stated that:

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that
the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the
hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For treachery to be considered,
two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no
opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted.154 (Emphasis supplied)

The appellate court, in affirming the conviction of the accused-appellants, ruled that contrary to the findings
of the trial court, there was no treachery involved. In particular, they ruled that although the attack was
sudden and unexpected, "[i]t was done in broad daylight with a lot of people who could see them" 155 and
that "there was a possibility for the victims to have fought back or that the people in the canteen could have
helped the victims."156

This reasoning is clearly erroneous. The victims in this case were eating lunch on campus. They were not at
a place where they would be reasonably expected to be on guard for any sudden attack by rival fraternity
men.

The victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead pipes and baseball bats. The only way
they could parry the blows was with their arms. In a situation where they were unnamed and
outnumbered, it would be impossible for them to fight back against the attackers. The attack also
happened in less than a minute, which would preclude any possibility of the bystanders being able to
help them until after the incident.

The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for the victims to retaliate or even to
defend themselves. Treachery, therefore, was present in this case.

The presence of conspiracy makes all

of the accused- appellants liable for
murder and attempted murder

In the decision of the trial court, all of the accused-appellants were found guilty of the murder of Dennis
Venturina and the attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. Leandro Lachica, Arnel
Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston, Jr. The appellate court, however, modified their liabilities and found that the
accused-appellants were guilty of attempted murder only against Natalicio and Fortes, and not against
Mangrobang, Lachica, and Gaston.

It is the appellate court's reasoning that because Lachica and Mangrobang "were no longer chased by the
attackers,"157 it concluded that accused-appellants "voluntary desisted from pursuing them and from inflicting
harm to them, which shows that they did not have the intent to do more than to make them suffer pain by
slightly injuring them."158 It also pointed out that the wound inflicted on Gaston "was too shallow to have
been done with an intent to kill."159

Thus, it concluded that the accused-appellants would have been guilty only of slight physical injuries. This is
erroneous.

It should be remembered that the trial court found that there was conspiracy among the accused-
appellants160 and the appellate court sustainedthis finding.161

Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching liability to all of the accused, regardless of their degree
of participation, thus: Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as
co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the commission
of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act
of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two or more
persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding
severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law
responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no
one is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime,
each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." The
imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this Court held
that

... it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into consideration the
close and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the commission of which they all
acted by common agreement ... The crime must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which
existed between the ... accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they are
all equally responsible

Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the commission of
the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and
the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of participation of each of the
perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. x x x.162 (Emphasis supplied)

The liabilities of the accused-appellants m this case arose from a single incident wherein the accused-
appellants were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, all in agreement to do the highest amount of
damage possible to the victims. Some were able to run away and take cover, but the others would fall prey
at the hands of their attackers. The intent to kill was already present at the moment of attack and that intent
was shared by all of the accused-appellants alike when the presence of conspiracy was proven. It is,
therefore, immaterial to distinguish between the seriousness of the injuries suffered by the victims to
determine the respective liabilities of their attackers. What is relevant is only as to whether the death occurs
as a result of that intent to kill and whether there are qualifying, aggravating or mitigating circumstances that
can be appreciated.

The appellate court, therefore, erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty only of slight physical injuries.
It would be illogical to presume that despite the swiftness and suddenness of the attack, the attackers
intended to kill only Venturina, Natalicio, and Fortes, and only intended to injure Lachica, Mangrobang, and
Gaston. Since the intent to kill was evident from the moment the accused-appellants took their first swing,
all of them were liable for that intent to kill.1âwphi1

For this reason, the accused-appellants should be liable for the murder of Dennis Venturina and the
attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and
Cristobal Gaston, Jr.
A Final Note

It is not only the loss of one promising young life; rather, it is also the effect on the five other lives whose
once bright futures are now put in jeopardy because of one senseless act of bravado. There is now more
honor for them to accept their responsibility and serve the consequences of their actions. There is,
however, nothing that they can do to bring back Dennis Venturina or fully compensate for his senseless
and painful loss.

This is not the first fraternity-related case to come to this court; neither will it be the last. Perhaps this case
and many cases like it can empower those who have a better view of masculinity: one which valorizes
courage, sacrifice and honor in more life-saving pursuits.

"Giting at dangal" are words of the anthem of the University of the Philippines. It colors the stories of many
who choose to expend their energy in order that our people will have better lives. Fraternity rumbles are an
anathema, an immature and useless expenditure of testosterone. It fosters a culture that retards manhood. It
is devoid of "giting at dangal."

This_ kind of shameful violence must stop.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR N). 01158 dated November 26, 2010 is
AFFIRMED insofar as the accused-appellants Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor Medalla, Christopher
Soliva, Warren L. Zingapan, and Robert Michael Beltran Alvir are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of Murder in. Criminal Case No. Q95-61133 with the MODIFICATION that they be fouhd GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Attempted Murder in Criminal Case Nos. Q95-61136, Q95-61135, Q95-61134, Q95-
61138, and Q95-61137.

SO ORDERED.

10. People v. Morilla, G.R. No. 189833, 5 February 2014

G.R. No. 189833 February 5, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.

JAVIER MORILLA Y AVELLANO, Accused-Appellant.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:
Before us is an appeal filed by accused-appellant Javier Morilla y Avellano (Morilla) from the Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction and that of his co-accused Ronnie Mitra y Tena (Mayor
Mitra) by the trial court, sentencing them 2 to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
₱10,000,000.00 each.

The Regional Trial Court Judgment

On 15 October 2001, Morilla, Mayor Mitra, Willie Yang y Yao (Yang) and Ruel Dequilla y Regodan
(Dequilla) were charged in a criminal information as follows:

That on or about October 13, 2001, in Barangay Kiloloran, Municipality of Real, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, one of them an
incumbent mayor of the Municipality of Panukulan, Quezon Province, who all belong to an
organized/syndicate crime group as they all help one another, for purposes of gain in the transport of illegal
drugs, and in fact, conspiring and confederating together and mutually aiding and abetting one another, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously transport by means of two (2) motor vehicles, namely a
Starex van bearing plate number RWT-888 with commemorative plate to read "Mayor" and a municipal
ambulance of Panukulan, Quezon Province, methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug which is
commonly known as shabu, and with an approximate weight of five hundred three point sixty eight (503.68)
kilos, without authority whatsoever.3

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City4 on 1 August 2007 convicted Morilla and his co-
accused Mayor Mitra, then incumbent Mayor of Panukulan, Quezon, of illegal transport 5 of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, with an approximate weight of five
hundred three point sixty eight (503.68) kilos. However, it absolved Dequilla and Yang due to the
prosecution’s failure to present sufficient evidence to convict them of the offense charged. The
dispositive of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Ronnie Mitra y Tena
and Javier Morilla y Avellana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. Accordingly, both
accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
₱10,000,000.00 each. Accused Willie Yang y Yao and Ruel Dequilla y Regodan are hereby ACQUITTED for
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt and are ordered immediately released
from custody unless held for some other lawful cause.

The methamphetamine hydrochloride ordered retained by the Court as representative sample which is still
in the custody of the PNP Crime Laboratory is ordered turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency for proper disposition.6

The trial court found valid the search conducted by police officers on the vehicles driven by Mayor Mitra and
Morilla, one with control number 888 and the other an ambulance with plate number SFK-372, as the police
officers have already acquired prior knowledge that the said vehicles were suspected to be used for
transportation of dangerous drugs. During the checkpoint in Real, Quezon, the information turned out to be
accurate and indeed, the two accused had in their motor vehicles more than five hundred kilos of
methamphetamine hydrochloride.7

The trial court dismissed the arguments of Mayor Mitra that he was without any knowledge of the contents of
the sacks and that he was merely requested to transport them to Manila on board his Starex van. He
explained that he only accommodated the request of a certain Ben Tan because the latter bought his fishing
boat. It likewise dismissed the defense of ambulance driver Morilla of lack of knowledge of the illegality of
the contents. Morilla insisted that he thought that he was just transporting wooden tiles and electronic spare
parts together with Dequilla. The other passenger of the ambulance, Yang, in his defense, did not bother to
inquire about the contents of the vehicle as he was merely an accommodated passenger of the ambulance.

The court rejected the defenses presented by Morilla and Mayor Mitra as they were caught in flagrante
delicto of transporting dangerous drugs in two vehicles driven by each of them. Absent any convincing
circumstance to corroborate their explanations, the validity of their apprehension was sustained.8

The ruling of conspiracy between Mayor Mitra and Morilla was based on the testimonies of the four accused
themselves. It was found by the trial court that the two vehicles, the Starex van driven by Mayor Mitra and
the ambulance van driven by Morilla, left Infanta, Quezon en route to Manila. The Starex van which was
ahead of the ambulance was able to pass the checkpoint set up by the police officers. However, the
ambulance driven by Morilla was stopped by police officers. Through the untinted window, one of the police
officers noticed several sacks inside the van. Upon inquiry of the contents, Morilla replied that the sacks
contained narra wooden tiles.

Unconvinced, the police officers requested Morilla to open the rear door of the car for further inspection.
When it was opened, the operatives noticed that white crystalline granules were scattered on the floor,
prompting them to request Morilla to open the sacks. At this moment, Morilla told the police officers that he
was with Mayor Mitra in an attempt to persuade them to let him pass. 9 His request was rejected by the
police officers and upon inspection, the contents of the sacks turned out to be sacks of methamphetamine
hydrochloride.10 This discovery prompted the operatives to chase the Starex van of Mayor Mitra. The police
officers were able to overtake the van and Mayor Mitra was asked to stop. They then inquired if the mayor
knew Morilla. On plain view, the operatives noticed that his van was also loaded with sacks like the ones
found in the ambulance. Thus, Mayor Mitra was also requested to open the door of the vehicle for
inspection. At this instance, Mayor Mitra offered to settle the matter but the same was rejected. Upon
examination, the contents of the sacks were likewise found to contain sacks of methamphetamine
hydrochloride.11

The two other accused in this case, Dequilla and Yang, were acquitted by the trial court for failure on the
part of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The court ruled that Dequilla’s and
Yang’s mere presence inside the vehicle as passengers was inadequate to prove that they were also
conspirators of Mayor Mitra and Morilla.12

The Court of Appeals Decision

On 13 July 2009, the appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court. It upheld the finding of conspiracy
between Mayor Mitra and Morilla in their common intent to transport several sacks containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride on board their respective vehicles. The singularity of their intent to illegally
transport methamphetamine hydrochloride was readily shown when Morilla agreed to drive the ambulance
van from Infanta, Quezon to Manila together with Mayor Mitra, who drove the lead vehicle, the Starex van.13

The appellate court likewise dismissed the argument of lack of knowledge of the illegal contents of the
sacks. The claim that the sacks were loaded with wooden tiles was implausible due to the obvious
disparity of texture and volume.14

Court’s Ruling We affirm

the ruling but modify the penalty imposed.
In his supplemental brief, Morilla raised the issues: (1) whether he may be convicted for conspiracy to
commit the offense charged sans allegation of conspiracy in the Information, and (2) whether the
prosecution was able to prove his culpability as alleged in the Information. 15

We dismiss his arguments.

Morilla primarily cites the provision on Sec. 1(b), Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure 16 to
substantiate his argument that he should have been informed first of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. He pointed out that the Information itself failed to state the word conspiracy but
instead, the statement "the above-named accused, one of them an incumbent mayor of the Municipality of
Panukulan, Quezon Province, who all belong to an organized/syndicated crime group as they all help one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport x x x." He argued that conspiracy
was only inferred from the words used in the Information.17

Even assuming that his assertion is correct, the issue of defect in the information, at this point, is deemed to
have been waived due to Morilla’s failure to assert it as a ground in a motion to quash before entering his
plea.18

Further, it must be noted that accused Morilla participated and presented his defenses to
contradict the allegation of conspiracy before the trial and appellate courts. His failure or neglect to
assert a right within a reasonable time warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.19

The finding of conspiracy by both courts is correct.

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it.20 To determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to commit a felony. 21

Morilla argues that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he was apprehended is not
sufficient to prove that he was part of a syndicated group involved in the illegal transportation of
dangerous drugs.

This argument is misplaced.

In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to
enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the
crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are
parts of some complete whole.22 In this case, the totality of the factual circumstances leads to a conclusion
that Morilla conspired with Mayor Mitra in a common desire to transport the dangerous drugs. Both vehicles
loaded with several sacks of dangerous drugs, were on convoy from Quezon to Manila. Mayor Mitra was
able to drive through the checkpoint set up by the police operatives. When it was Morilla’s turn to pass
through the checkpoint, he was requested to open the rear door for a routinary check. Noticing white
granules scattered on the floor, the police officers requested Morilla to open the sacks. If indeed he was not
involved in conspiracy with Mayor Mitra, he would not have told the police officers that he was with the
mayor.

His insistence that he was without any knowledge of the contents of the sacks and he just obeyed the
instruction of his immediate superior Mayor Mitra in driving the said vehicle likewise bears no merit.

Here, Morilla and Mayor Mitra were caught in flagrante delicto in the act of transporting the dangerous drugs
on board their vehicles. "Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act means "to carry or convey from
one place to another."23 It was well established during trial that Morilla was driving the ambulance following
the lead of Mayor Mitra, who was driving a Starex van going to Manila. The very act of transporting
methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum prohibitum since it is punished as an offense under a special
law. The fact of transportation of the sacks containing dangerous drugs need not be accompanied by proof
of criminal intent, motive or knowledge.24

In a similar case of People v. Libnao,25 this Court upheld the conviction for illegal transportation of
marijuana of Libnao and Nunga, who were caught carrying a bag full of marijuana leaves when they
were flagged down on board a passing tricycle at a checkpoint.

However, we modify the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Originally, under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6425,26 the penalty for illegal transportation of
methamphetamine hydrochloride was imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a
fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1683,27 the
penalty was amended to life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty to thirty thousand pesos.
The penalty was further amended in Republic Act No. 7659, 28 where the penalty was changed to reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos.

From the foregoing, we sustain the imposed penalty of fine of ₱10,000,00.00 to be paid by each of the
accused but amend the penalty to reclusion perpetua following the provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 and
the principle of retroactive application of lighter penalty. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at
least thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon. It also carries with it accessory
penalties, namely: perpetual special disqualification, etc. Life imprisonment, on the other hand, does not
appear to have any definite extent or duration and carries no accessory penalties. 29

The full particulars are in Ho Wai Pang v. People,30 thus:

As to the penalties imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the appellate court, we find the same in
accord with law and jurisprudence. It should be recalled that at the time of the commission of the crime on
September 6, 1991, Section 15 of R.A. No. 6425 was already amended by Presidential Decree No. 1683.
The decree provided that for violation of said Section 15, the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from ₱20,000.00 to ₱30,000.00 shall be imposed. Subsequently, however, R.A. No. 7659 further
introduced new amendments to Section 15, Article III and Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended. Under the new amendments, the penalty prescribed in Section 15 was changed from "life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from ₱20,000.00 to ₱30,000.00" to "reclusion perpetua to death
and a fine ranging from ₱500,000.00 to ₱10 million." On the other hand, Section 17 of
R.A. No. 7659 amended Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425 in that the new penalty provided by the
amendatory law shall be applied depending on the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved.

The trial court, in this case, imposed on petitioner the penalty of reclusion perpetua under R.A. No. 7659
rather than life imprisonment ratiocinating that R.A. No. 7659 could be given retroactive application, it being
more favorable to the petitioner in view of its having a less stricter punishment.1âwphi1

We agree. In People v. Doroja, we held:

"In People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994) this Court ruled (a) that the amendatory law,
being more lenient and favorable to the accused than the original provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
should be accorded retroactive application, x x x."

And, since "reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than life imprisonment, and considering the rule that
criminal statutes with a favorable effect to the accused, have, as to him, a retroactive effect," the penalty
imposed by the trial court upon petitioner is proper. Consequently, the Court sustains the penalty of
imprisonment, which is reclusion perpetua, as well as the amount of fine imposed by the trial court upon
petitioner, the same being more favorable to him.31

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the assailed 13 July 2009 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 02967 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION with respect to the
penalty to be imposed as Reclusion Perpetua instead of Life Imprisonment and payment of fine of
₱10,000,000.00 by each of the accused. SO ORDERED

11. People v. Bokingco, G.R. No. 187536, 10 August 2011

G.R. No. 187536 August 10, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.

MICHAEL BOKINGO alias "MICHAEL BOKINGCO" and REYNANTE COL, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

For review is the Amended Decision1 dated 14 November 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR- H.C.
No. 00658, finding appellants Michael Bokingco2 (Bokingco) and Reynante Col (Col) guilty as conspirators
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

On 31 July 2000, an Information3 was filed against appellants charging them of the crime of murder
committed as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of February, 2000 in the City of Angeles, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping each other, armed with a claw hammer and with intent to kill by means of treachery,
evident premeditation, abuse of confidence, and nighttime, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and maul NOLI PASION, by hitting and beating his head and other parts of his
body with said hammer, thereby inflicting upon said NOLI PASION fatal wounds on his head and body
which caused his death.4

On arraignment, Bokingco entered a guilty plea while Col pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial,
Bokingco confessed to the crime charged.5

The victim, Noli Pasion (Pasion) and his wife, Elsa, were residing in a house along Mac Arthur Highway in
Balibago, Angeles City. Pasion owned a pawnshop, which formed part of his house. He also maintained two
(2) rows of apartment units at the back of his house. The first row had six (6) units, one of which is
Apartment No. 5 and was being leased to Dante Vitalicio (Vitalicio), Pasion’s brother-in-law, while the other
row was still under construction at the time of his death. Appellants, who were staying in Apartment No. 3,
were among the 13 construction workers employed by Pasion.6

The prosecution’s evidence show that at around 1:00 a.m. on 29 February 2000, Vitalicio was spin-drying his
clothes inside his apartment when Pasion came from the front door, passed by him and went out of the back
door.7 A few minutes later, he heard a commotion from Apartment No. 3. He headed to said unit to check. He
peeped through a screen door and saw Bokingco hitting something on the floor. Upon seeing Vitalicio,
Bokingco allegedly pushed open the screen door and attacked him with a hammer in his hand. A struggle
ensued and Vitalicio was hit several times. Vitalicio bit Bokingco’s neck and managed to push him away.
Bokingco tried to chase Vitalicio but was eventually subdued by a co-worker. Vitalicio proceeded to his house
and was told by his wife that Pasion was found dead in the kitchen of Apartment No. 3. Vitalicio went back to
Apartment No. 3 and saw Pasion’s body lying flat on the kitchen floor. Pasion and Vitalicio were brought to
the hospital. Pasion expired a few hours later while Vitalicio was treated for his injuries. 8

Elsa testified that she was in the master’s bedroom on the second floor of the house when she hears
banging sounds and her husband’s moans. She immediately got off the bed and went down. Before
reaching the kitchen, Col blocked her way. Elsa asked him why he was inside their house but Col
suddenly ran towards her, sprayed tear gas on her eyes and poked a sharp object under her chin. Elsa
was wounded when she bowed her head to avoid the tear gas. 9 Col then instructed her to open the vault
of the pawnshop but Elsa informed him that she does not know the combination lock. Elsa tried offering
him money but Col dragged her towards the back door by holding her neck and pulling her backward.
Before they reached the door, Elsa saw Bokingco open the screen door and heard him tell Col: "tara,
patay na siya."10 Col immediately let her go and ran away with Bokingco. Elsa proceeded to Apartment
No. 3. Thereat, she saw her husband lying on the floor, bathed in his own blood.11

PO3 Quirino Dayrit (PO3 Dayrit) was stationed at Police Station No. 4 in Barangay Salakot, Balibago,
Angeles City. At 1:20 a.m. of 29 February 2000, he received a phone call regarding the incident. He,
together with a certain P/Insp. Maniago, proceeded to Apartment No. 3 and conducted an investigation. He
noticed a pool of blood on the cemented floor of the kitchen. He also saw a claw hammer with a green lead
pipe handle approximately 13 inches long near the kitchen sink. A lead pipe measuring 40 inches and a
chisel were also found in the nearby construction site. The police went to Angeles University Medical Center
afterwards. PO3 Dayrit saw Pasion lying in one of the beds while Vitalicio was still loitering around the
emergency room. He approached Vitalicio and Elsa who both informed him of the incident. 12 He prepared a
police report on the same day narrating the result of his investigation.13

Evelyn Gan, the stenographic reporter of Prosecutor Lucina Dayaon, jotted down notes during the
preliminary investigation. She attests that Bokingco admitted that he conspired with Col to kill Pasion and
that they planned the killing several days before because they got "fed up" with Pasion.14

The necropsy report prepared by Dr. Joven G. Esguerra (Dr. Esguerra), contained the following findings:

1. Marked pallor of lips and nailbeds

2. Body in rigor mortis

3. Contusion with hematoma, right medial infraorbital region extending to the right of the root of the
nose.

4. Contusion with hematoma, left post-auricular region.

5. Contusion with hematoma, right angle of mandible.

6. Contusion with hematoma, right mandibular region.

 7. Contusion with hematoma, left occipital region.
8. Contusion with hematoma, right fronto-parietal region.

9. Contusion with hematoma, right supraorbital region.

10. Abrasions, linear, confluent, proximal third, right leg anterior 2 ½ x 6 ½ cm.

11. Contusion with hematoma, left shoulder, level of head of left humerus.

12. Stab wound, anterior chest along the anterior median line, 7 cm above the nipple line, 0.8cm
length, 0.5 cm wide and 1 cm deep, hitting and puncturing the manubrium sterni, not entering the
thoracic cavity. Both extremities round.

13. 2 stab wounds, non-penetrating, anterior chest, 13 cm to the left of the anterior median line, 3
cm below injury (12) 14 cm the right of the anterior median line 4 ½ on below injury (12). Wound 0.8
cm in length, both extremities round.

14. Lacerated wound, semi-lunar shape, 3 cm length, left shoulder.

15. Lacerated wound, right eyebrow area, C-shaped 2 ½ cm length.

16. Lacerated wound, lateral angle, right eye, 0.8 cm length.

17. Lacerated wound, right supraorbital region, medial aspect, 2 cm length.

18. Lacerated wound, semi-lunar, 5 cm length, occipital region 5 cm length involving all layers of the
scalp with brain tissue seen on the gaping wound.

19. Lacerated wound, 4 cm length, C-shaped 2 ½ cm to the right of injury (18) 1 ½ cm below,
wound involving the whole scalp.

20. Lacerated wound, left post-auricular region, C-shaped 4 cm length, 3 cm length.

21. Lacerated wound left post-auricular region, region of the squamous part of the left temporal bone,
C-shaped (2) 3.5 cm and 4 cm lengths.

22. Lacerated wound, right mandibular region 4 cm length, 1 cm wide.

23. Lacerated wound, stellate, 5.5 x 5 x 5 cm, right fronto-parietal region with brain tissue out of the
gaping wound.

24. Lacerated wound, right submandibular region 0.3 x 3.5 cm.

25. Lacerated wound, right cheek 0.8 cm length.

26. Depressed, complete fracture, occipital bone right with stellate linear extensions, with
gaping, with brain tissue maceration.
27. Skull fracture, right fronto-parietal region, depressed, complete, C-shaped with linear
extensions, with gaping of bone with brain tissue maceration and expulsion.

28. Hemorrhage, massive, subdural and epidural.

29. Brain tissue damage.15

Dr. Esguerra concluded that the injuries sustained by Pasion on his skull proved fatal. 16

Appellants testified on their own behalf. Bokingco recalled that he was sleeping in Apartment No. 3 at
around 1:20 a.m. on 29 February 2000 when he was awakened by Pasion who appeared to be
intoxicated. The latter wanted to know why he did not see Bokingco at the construction site on 28
February 2000. When Bokingco replied that he just stayed at the apartment the whole day, Pasion
suddenly hit him in the head. This prompted Bokingco to take a hammer and hit Pasion. They both
struggled and Bokingco repeatedly hit Pasion. Bokingco escaped to Manila right after the incident. He
was subsequently arrested in Mindanao on 11 June 2000. 17 During the cross-examination, Bokingco
admitted that he harbored ill feelings towards Pasion.18

Col confirmed that he was one of the construction workers employed by Pasion. He however resigned on
26 February 2000 because of the deductions from his salary. He went home to Cainta, Rizal, where he was
apprehended and brought to Camp Olivas. Upon reaching the camp, he saw Bokingco who pointed to him
as the person who killed Pasion. He insisted that he doesn’t know Bokingco very well. 19

On 16 December 2004, the trial court rendered judgment 20 finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder, viz:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused MICHAEL BOKINGO alias MICHAEL BOKINGCO and REYNANTE
COL guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, and there being the two aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of
confidence to be considered against both accused and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of
guilty in favor of accused Bokingo only, hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of DEATH.
Each accused is ordered to indemnify the heirs of victim Noli Pasion in the amount of Seventy five thousand
pesos (P75,000.00) to pay the heirs of the victim Seventeen thousand six hundred pesos (P17,600.00) as
actual damages, Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) as attorney’s fees, Twenty five thousand pesos
(P25,000.00) as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.21

In its Decision dated 24 July 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court but
reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua in view of Republic Act No. 7659, thus:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant

REYNANTE COL is found GUILTY as conspirator beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER as defined in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by treachery and
evident premeditation and with the attendant aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of
confidence, with no mitigating circumstances. The proper imposable penalty would have been death.
However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua. Accused-appellant is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of victim Noli Pasion in the amount
of Seventy five thousand pesos (₱75,000.00); Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages;
Twenty five thousand pesos (₱25,000.00) as exemplary damages; Twenty five thousand pesos
(₱25,000.00) as temperate damages; Fifteen thousand pesos (₱15,000.00) as attorney’s fees; and to pay
the costs.22

Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration23 and called the appellate court’s attention on the omission to
rule on Bokingco’s fate when it rendered the challenged decision. Appellants also noted the absence of
other evidence, aside from Bokingco’s admission, to prove that conspiracy existed in the instant case.
Appellants maintained that the admission made by Bokingco cannot be used as evidence against his
alleged co-conspirator. Appellants also took exception to the findings of the lower courts that the aggravating
circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, nighttime and abuse of confidence attended the
commission of the crime.24

The Court of Appeals merely modified its Decision by including the criminal liability of Bokingco in its
dispositive portion of its Amended Decision, which reads:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants MICHAEL

BOKINGCO and REYNANTE COL are found GUILTY as conspirators beyond reasonable doubt of
MURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
qualified by treachery and evident premeditation and with the attendant aggravating circumstances of
nighttime and abuse of confidence, with no mitigating circumstances. The proper imposable penalty would
have been death. However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, the accused-appellant are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without the possibility of parole (in accordance with Section 3 of the
said law). Each of the accused-appellants is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of victim Noli Pasion in
the amount of Seventy five thousand pesos (₱75,000.00); Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral
damages; Twenty five thousand pesos (₱25,000.00) as exemplary damages; Twenty five thousand pesos
(₱25,000.00) as temperate damages; Fifteen thousand pesos (₱15,000.00) as attorney’s fees; and to pay
the costs.25

Appellants filed a notice of appeal. In its Resolution dated 26 October 2009, this Court required the
parties to submit their Supplemental Briefs within 30 days from notice thereof if they so desire.26
Appellants manifested that they are no longer filing a Supplemental Brief and are adopting their
arguments in the Appellant’s Brief submitted before the Court of Appeals. 27 The appellee likewise
manifested that it is dispensing with the filing of a Supplemental Brief. 28 The instant case was thus
submitted for deliberation.

In seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals’ Amended Decision, two issues were raised: 1) whether the
qualifying circumstances were properly appreciated to convict appellant Bokingco of murder and 2) whether
appellant Col is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator.

There is no question that Bokingco attacked and killed Pasion. Bokingco made two (2) separate and
dissimilar admissions: first, in his extrajudicial confession taken during the preliminary investigation where
he admitted that he and Col planned the killing of Pasion; and second, when he testified in open court that
he was only provoked in hitting Pasion back when the latter hit him in the head. On the basis of his
extrajudicial confession, Bokingco was charged for murder qualified by evident premeditation and treachery.

Appellants maintain that they could not be convicted of murder. They question the presence of treachery in
the commission of the crime considering that no one from the prosecution witnesses testified on how Pasion
was attacked by Bokingco. They also submit that evident premeditation was not proven in the case. They
belittle Bokingco’s extrajudicial admission that he and Col planned the killing. The attendance of the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence was likewise assailed by appellants. They
aver that nighttime was not purposely sought but it was merely co- incidental that the crime took place at that
time. Neither has trust and confidence been reposed on appellants by the victim to aggravate the crime by
abuse of confidence. Appellants claim that they were living in an apartment owned by Pasion, not because
the latter trusted them but because they worked in the construction of the victim’s apartment.

On the other hand, the OSG emphasizes that the prosecution has established that Pasion was defenseless
when fatally attacked by Bokingco and there was no opportunity for him to defend himself from the
unexpected assaults of Bokingco. The OSG agrees as well with the trial court’s findings that evident
premeditation, nighttime, and abuse of confidence attended the commission of the crime.

We agree with appellants that treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify the crime to murder in the
absence of any proof of the manner in which the aggression was commenced. For treachery to be
appreciated, the prosecution must prove that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to
defend himself, and that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack
employed by him.29 Nobody witnessed the commencement and the manner of the attack. While the witness
Vitalicio managed to see Bokingco hitting something on the floor, he failed to see the victim at that time. 30

Bokingco admitted in open court that he killed Pasion.31 But the admitted manner of killing is inconsistent
with evident premeditation. To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution must establish the
confluence of the following requisites: (a) the time when the offender was determined to commit the crime;
(b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of
time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.32 It is indispensable to show how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how
much time had elapsed before it was carried out. 33 In the instant case, no proof was shown as to how and
when the plan to kill was devised. Bokingco admitted in court that he only retaliated when Pasion allegedly
hit him in the head.34 Despite the fact that Bokingco admitted that he was treated poorly by Pasion, the
prosecution failed to establish that Bokingco planned the attack.

It was during the preliminary investigation that Bokingco mentioned his and Col’s plan to kill Pasion.35
Bokingco’s confession was admittedly taken without the assistance of counsel in violation of Section 12,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

xxxx

(2) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.

In People v. Sunga,36 we held that "the right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can be
deemed ‘critical stages’ in the criminal process. The preliminary investigation can be no different from the in-
custody interrogations by the police, for a suspect who takes part in a preliminary investigation will be
subjected to no less than the State's processes, oftentimes intimidating and relentless, of pursuing those
who might be liable for criminal prosecution." 37 In said case, Sunga made an uncounselled admission
before the police. He later acknowledged the same admission before the judge in a preliminary
investigation. Sunga was thrust into the preliminary investigation and while he did have a counsel, for the
latter’s lack of vigilance and commitment to Sunga’s rights, he was virtually denied his right to counsel.
Thus, the uncounselled admission was held inadmissible. 38 In the instant case, the extrajudicial confession
is inadmissible against Bokingco because he was not assisted at all by counsel during the time his
confession was taken before a judge.

The finding that nighttime attended the commission of the crime is anchored on the presumption that there
was evident premeditation. Having ruled however that evident premeditation has not been proved, the
aggravating circumstance of nighttime cannot be properly appreciated. There was no evidence to show that
Bokingco purposely sought nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense.

Abuse of confidence could not also be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in this case. Taking into
account that fact that Bokingco works for Pasion, it may be conceded that he enjoyed the trust and
confidence of Pasion. However, there was no showing that he took advantage of said trust to facilitate the
commission of the crime.

A downgrade of conviction from murder to homicide is proper for Bokingco for failure of the
prosecution to prove the presence of the qualifying circumstances.

Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the applicable penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal.
There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance alleged and proven in the instant case, the penalty
should be applied in its medium period pursuant to Article 64(1) of the Revised Penal Code, which ranges
from a minimum of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to a maximum of 17 years and 4 months. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty shall be within the range of prision mayor in any of its
periods as minimum to reclusion temporal in its medium period as the maximum.
The range of prision mayor is from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years, while reclusion temporal in its medium
period, ranges from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. Therefore, the indeterminate
penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, eight months and one day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum is appropriate under the circumstances.39 The award of exemplary
damages should be deleted as no aggravating circumstance was proven.

Col, on the other hand, was charged as a co-conspirator. He contends that to hold him guilty as co-
conspirator, it must be established that he performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Applying Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, Col asserts that Bokingco’s uncounselled testimony
that appellants planned to kill Pasion bears no relevance considering the fact that there was no other
evidence which will prove the conspiracy. Col also claims that Elsa’s statements during trial, such as the
presence of Col inside her house and his forcing her to open the vault of the pawnshop, as well as the
alleged statement she heard from Bokingco "Tara, patay na siya," are not adequate to support the finding
of conspiracy.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) justifies Col’s conviction of murder by conspiracy by mentioning
that starting from the declaration of Bokingco, the victim’s wife, Elsa, also positively declared that Col
blocked and attacked her with a knife when she tried to check on her husband. She was left alone by Col
when he was told by Bokingco that the victim was already dead. For the OSG, appellants’ acts are indicative
of conspiracy. The OSG contends that the prosecution witnesses had no ill-motive to lie and falsely accuse
appellants of the crime of murder.
The lower courts concluded that there was conspiracy between appellants. We disagree.

This Court is well aware of the policy to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the trial court,
owing to their unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct, and
attitude under grueling examination.40 However, this rule admits of exceptions, namely:

1) when the trial court’s findings of facts and conclusions are not supported by the evidence on record, or

2) when certain facts of substance and value likely to change the outcome of the case have been
overlooked by the lower court, or 3) when the assailed decision is based on a misapprehension of
facts.41 The second exception obtains in this case.

Indeed, to convict Col as a principal by direct participation in the case before us, it is necessary that
conspiracy between him and Bokingco be proved. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement to commit an unlawful act. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and
after the commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the
offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and
design, concerted action, and community of interest.42 Unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the
unlawful objective are essential to establish the existence of conspiracy. 43

As a rule, conspiracy must be established with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself and must be
shown as clearly as the commission of the crime.44

The finding of conspiracy was premised on Elsa’s testimony that appellants fled together after killing her
husband and the extrajudicial confession of Bokingco.

Nobody witnessed the commencement of the attack. Col was not seen at the apartment where Pasion
was being attacked by Bokingco. In fact, he was at Elsa’s house and allegedly ordering her to open the
pawnshop vault, thus:

Q: Do you remember any unusual incident that happened on that time and date when you were in
your master’s bedroom?

A: I heard a bumping sound (kalabog) at the back portion of our building where we reside. x x x
x
Q: What did you do when you heard those sounds in the wee hours of the morning on that day
when you were in your master’s bedroom?

A: I wondered why and I immediately went down to the kitchen since the door of the kitchen was
directly leading to the back door or back portion of the building where the apartments were situated.

Q: Why, on what floor is this master’s bedroom located? A:

Second floor.
Q: Were you actually able to go down and see what was happening?

A: Yes, sir, but I was only able to reach the stairs leading to the kitchen. I was not able to go out of
the kitchen because I was blocked.

Q: You were blocked by whom? A: By

Reynante Col.
Q: Are you referring to the same Reynante Col, the accused in this case? A:
Yes, sir.
xxxx

Q: You said you were blocked by Reynante Col. How did he block you?

A: As soon as I reached the stairs, I was blocked by Reynante Col and he was situated near the
back door of the pawnshop. There is a pawnshop in the front portion of our residence.
 Q: When you saw him near the door of your pawnshop, did you confront him? A:
Yes, sir.
Q: How did you confront him?

A: I asked him, Reynante, what are you doing here? Q:

What was the reaction of Reynante Col?
A: He ran towards me and sprayed something into my eyes and he put a sharp object under my
chin. (Witness demonstrating by putting her hand under her chin)

Q: How far was he before he attacked you?

A: Probably, from the witness stand up to the chair of Fiscal Hilario. Maybe two steps away from him.
(Around 3 meters)

Q: Were you able to identify what this spray is and what part of your body was hit?
A: My eyes were sprayed with tear gas.

Q: What did you feel when your eyes was (sic) sprayed with tear gas? A: It
was "mahapdi" (painful).
Q: When you felt pain in your eyes, how were you able to see something or a sharp weapon
under your chin?

A: Before he sprayed the tear gas to my eyes, I was able to see him poke the sharp object under my
chin and I bowed my head a little to avoid the tear gas. I was wounded under my chin and I felt the
sharpness of the object.45

xxxx

Q: What else happened while he was doing that to you?

A: He sprayed tear gas in my eyes and told me to be silent.
Q: What else, if any, did he tell you?
A: To open the combination of the vault.

Q: Did you comply to his order that you open the combination of the vault?
A: No, sir. I do not know the combination.
Q: What vault are you referring to?
A: Vault of the pawnshop.
Q: Where is that pawnshop located with reference to your residence?
A: At the first floor is the pawnshop and at the back is our kitchen.
Q: When you refused to open the vault of the pawnshop, what did Reynante Col do about it?
A: He did not say anything.
Q: How about you, was there anything else you did?
A: I offered him money so he will not kill me.
Q: When you offered him money so he will not kill you, did he agree?
A: No, sir.
Q: What else happened next when he did not agree to your offer of money?
A: He dragged me going towards the back door.46

Based on these acts alone, it cannot be logically inferred that Col conspired with Bokingco in killing
Pasion. At the most, Col’s actuations can be equated to attempted robbery, which was actually the initial
information filed against appellants before it was amended, on motion of the prosecution, for murder.47

Elsa testified that she heard Bokingco call out to Col that Pasion had been killed and that they had to leave
the place. This does not prove that they acted in concert towards the consummation of the crime. It only
proves, at best, that there were two crimes committed simultaneously and they were united in their efforts to
escape from the crimes they separately committed.

Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco had already killed Pasion even
before he sought Col. Their moves were not coordinated because while Bokingco was killing Pasion
because of his pent-up anger, Col was attempting to rob the pawnshop.1avvphi1

In as much as Bokingco’s extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against him, it is likewise inadmissible

against Col, specifically where he implicated the latter as a cohort. Under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another. Res inter
alios acta alteri nocere non debet. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the
confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused, and is considered as hearsay against them.48
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator. Section 30, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court provides that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator provided that the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than by such act or declaration. 49 In order that the admission of a conspirator may
be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that first, the conspiracy be first proved by
evidence other than the admission itself; second, the admission relates to the common object; and third, it
has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.50 As we have previously
discussed, we did not find any sufficient evidence to establish the existence of conspiracy. Therefore, the
extrajudicial confession has no probative value and is inadmissible in evidence against Col.

Bokingco’s judicial admission exculpated Col because Bokingco admitted that he only attacked Pasion
after the latter hit him in the head.

All told, an acquittal for Col is in order because no sufficient evidence was adduced to implicate him.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00658 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Reynante Col is ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable
doubt. The Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause the immediate release of accused-appellant, unless he
is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court of action taken within ten (10) days from
notice.

Appellant Michael Bokingco is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide. He is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six years (6) and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to 14
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum Appellant is further ordered to
indemnify the heirs of Noli Pasion in the amount of Seventy five thousand pesos (₱75,000.00); Fifty
thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages; Twenty five thousand pesos (₱25,000.00) as temperate
damages; Fifteen thousand pesos (₱15,000.00) as attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

12. Fernan v. People, G.R. No. 145927, 24 August 2007

G.R. No. 145927 August 24, 2007

SIMON FERNAN, JR. and EXPEDITO TORREVILAS,1 Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The instant petition under Rule 45 originated from 119 criminal cases 2 filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB)
involving no less than 36 former officials and employees of the then Ministry of Public Highways (MPH) and
several suppliers of construction materials for defalcation of public funds arising from numerous transactions
in the Cebu First Highway Engineering District in 1977. Because of the sheer magnitude of the illegal
transactions, the number of people involved, and the ingenious scheme employed in defrauding the
government, this infamous 86 million highway scam has few parallels in the annals of crime in the country.

The Case

Petitioners Simon Fernan, Jr. and Expedito Torrevillas seek the reversal of the December 4, 1997
Decision3 of the SB in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. 1640, 1641, 1642, 1643, 1818, 1819, 1820,
1821, 1822, 1823, 1879, 1880, 1881, 1882, 1883, 1884, 1885, 1886, 1887, 1888, 1889, 2839, 2840, 2841,
2842, 2843, 2844, 2845, 2846, 2847, 2848, 2849, 2850, 2851, 2852, 2853, 2854, 2855, 2856, 2857, 2858,
2859, 2860, 2861, 2862, 2863, 2864, 2865, 2866, 2867, 2868, 2869, 2870, 2871, 2872, 2873, 2874, 2875,
2876, 2877, 2878, 2879, 2880, 2881, 2882, 2883, 2884, 2885, 2886, 2887, 2888, 2889, 2890, 2891, 2892,
2893, 2894, 2895, 2896, 2897, 2898, 2899, 2900, 2901, 2902, 2903, 2904, 2905, 2906, 2907, 2908, 2909,
2910, 2911, 2912, 2913, 2915, 2917, 2918, 2919, 2920, 2921, 2922, 2923, 2924, 2925, 2926, 2927, 2928,
2929, 2930, 2931, 2932, 2936, 2937, 2938, and 2939,4 all entitled People of the Philippines v. Rocilo Neis,
et al., finding them guilty of multiple instances of estafa through falsification of public documents; 5 and the
subsequent August 29, 2000 SB Resolution which denied their separate pleas for reconsideration.

Petitioner Fernan, Jr. disputes the adverse judgment in only six (6) cases, namely: 2879, 2880, 2881,
2885, 2914, and 2918; while petitioner Torrevillas seeks exoneration in nine (9) cases, namely: 2855,
2856, 2858, 2859, 2909, 2910, 2914, 2919, and 2932.
Both petitioners assert their strong belief that their guilt has not been established beyond reasonable
doubt and, hence, exculpation is in order.

The Facts

The SB culled the facts6 this way:

On June 21, 1978, COA Regional Director Sofronio Flores Jr. of COA Regional Office No. 7, directed
auditors Victoria C. Quejada and Ruth I. Paredes to verify and submit a report on sub-allotment advises
issued to various highway engineering districts in Cebu, particularly, the Cebu City, Cebu 1st, Cebu 2nd
and the Mandaue City Highway Engineering Districts. Complying with the directive, they conducted an
investigation and in due course submitted their findings. Their report (Exhibit C) confirmed the issuance of
fake Letters of Advice of Allotments (LAAs) in the districts mentioned. They discovered that two sets of
LAAs were received by the districts. One set consists of regular LAAs which clearly indicated the covering
sub-allotment advices and were duly signed by Mrs. Angelina Escaño, Finance Officer of the MPH Regional
Office. The LAAs were numbered in proper sequence and duly recorded in the logbook of the Accounting,
Budget and Finance Division. The other set consists of fake LAAs which do not indicate the covering sub-
allotment advice and were signed by Chief Accountant Rolando Mangubat and Engr. Jose Bagasao,
instead of the Finance Officer. These fake LAAs were not numbered in proper sequence; they were mostly
undated and were sometimes duplicated. They could not be traced to the files and records of the
Accounting, Budget and Finance Division. The accounting entry for the disbursements made on the fake
LAAs was debited to the Accounts-Payable Unliquidated Obligations (8-81-400) and credited to the
Checking Account with the Bureau of Treasury (8-70-790). Nevertheless, the expenditures were taken from
obligations of the current year (1978) because all the supporting papers of the payment vouchers were
dated in that year. The entries in the journal vouchers filed with the MPH Regional Office were adjusted
every month to 8-81-400 (unliquidated or prior years obligation), 8-83- 000 (liquidated or current year
obligations) and 8-70-700 (Treasury/Agency Account). All of these were approved for the Finance Officer by
Chief Accountant Rolando Mangubat. Mangubat, however, had no authority to approve them because since
October 1977, he had already been detailed to the MPH Central Office. There were indications that the
practice had been going on for years.

xxxx

Due to these serious irregularities, then President Marcos created a Special Cabinet Committee on MPH
Region VII "Ghost Projects Anomalies" which in turn organized a Special Task Force composed of
representatives from the Finance Ministry Intelligence Bureau (FMIB), National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), the Bureau of Treasury and the Commission on Audit. The mission of the task force was to conduct a
wider and more extended investigation in all the fifteen (15) highway engineering districts of MPH Region
VII, including the Cebu First Highway Engineering District, the 1977 questionable disbursements of which
are the subject matter of these cases.

xxxx

For a better understanding of these highways cases, the flow in the release of funds to the various agencies
of the government and the control devices set up for disbursement and accounting of public funds should first
be explained. A chart (Exhibit B) graphically shows the flow of allotments from the Ministry down to the district
level.

On the basis of appropriation laws and upon request made by heads of agencies, the then Ministry of
Budget released funds to the various agencies of the government by means of an Advice of Allotment (AA)
and a Cash Disbursement Ceiling (CDC). The Advice of Allotment is an authority for the agency to incur
obligations within a specified amount in accordance with approved programs and projects. The Cash
Disbursement Ceiling is an authority to pay. Upon receipt of the AA and CDC from the Budget, the Central
Office of the agency prepares the Sub-Advice of Allotment (SAA) and the Advice of Cash Disbursement
Ceiling (ACDC) for each region, in accordance with the disbursement allotment. These are sent to the
Regional Office. Upon receipt, the Budget Officer of the region prepares the corresponding Letters of Advice
of Allotment (LAA) which are forwarded to the various districts of the region (The amount that goes to each
district is already indicated in the Advice of Allotment). Only upon receipt of the LAA is the district office
authorized to incur obligations.

Now, how are funds released by the Regional Office to the different districts and ultimately paid out to
contractors, the District Engineer submits to the Regional Director a request for allotment in accordance with
the program of work prepared by the former. This procedure starts with the preparation of a Requisition for
Supplies and Equipment (RSE) in the District Office by the Senior Civil Engineer, approved by the District
Engineer, and signed by the Chief Accountant of the Highway Engineering District, who certifies as to the
availability of funds. The RSE is then submitted to the Regional Director for approval. Once it is approved, a
Request for Obligation of Allotment (ROA) is prepared by the Chief Accountant of the district Senior Civil
Engineer. The ROA signifies that a certain amount of district funds has been set aside or earmarked for the
particular expenditures stated in the RSE. On the basis of the ROA, the District Office puts up
advertisements, [conducts] biddings, makes awards and prepares purchase orders which are served on the
winning bidder. The District Office also prepares a summary of deliveries with the corresponding delivery
receipts and tally sheets, conducts inspection and prepares the General Voucher for the payment of
deliveries. Once the General Voucher (GV) has been prepared, the corresponding check in the form of a
Treasury Check Account for Agency (TCAA) is drawn by the Disbursing Officer and finally released to the
contractor.

At the end of every month, the Report of Checks Issued by Deputized Disbursing Officer (RCIDD) is
prepared, listing all the checks issued during that period. The RCIDDO is submitted to the accounting
division of the region. Upon receipt of the RCIDDO, the Regional Office draws a journal voucher, debiting
the account obligation (liquidated or unliquidated obligation, whichever is applicable), and crediting the
account Treasury Check Account for Agency (TCAA). The RCIDDO is recorded in the Journal of Checks
Issued by Deputized Disbursing Officers (JCIDDO) and posted in the general ledger at the end of each
month.

Simultaneous with the flow of the RCIDDO, the ROAs are summarized in the Reports of Obligations
Incurred (ROI) in the District Office, once or twice a month, depending upon the volume of transactions. The
ROI is then submitted to the Regional Office. Upon receipt of the ROI, the accountant of the Regional Office
draws a journal voucher taking up the following entry: debiting the appropriation allotted (0-90-000) and
crediting the obligation incurred (0-82-000). This is recorded in the general voucher and posted to the
general ledger at the end of each month. The journal voucher is prepared, closing the account 8-70-709 to
8-71-100-199 at the end of each month. It is also recorded and posted to the general ledger. At the end of
the month, the balances of each account shown in the general ledger are summarized in a statement called
the trial balance. The trial balance is submitted to the MPH Central Office in Manila where it is consolidated
with other trial balances submitted by other regional offices.

xxxx

The elaborate accounting procedure described above with its system of controls was set up obviously to
make sure that government funds are properly released, disbursed and accounted for. In the hands of
untrustworthy guardians of the public purse, however, it proved to be inadequate. There were loopholes
which an unscrupulous person adroit in government accounting could take advantage of to surreptitiously
draw enormous sums of money from the government.

Sometime in February, 1977, accused Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant), Delia Preagido (Accountant
III), Jose Sayson (Budget Examiner), and Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II), all of MPH Region VII, met at the Town
and Country Restaurant in Cebu City and hatched an ingenious plan to siphon off large sums of money from
government coffers. Mangubat had found a way to withdraw government money through the use of fake
LAAs, vouchers and other documents and to conceal traces thereof with the connivance of other
government officials and employees. In fine, the fraudulent scheme involved the splitting of LAAs and RSEs
so that the amount covered by each general voucher is less than P50,000.00 to do away with the approval
of the Regional Auditor; the charging of disbursements to unliquidated obligations due the previous year to
provide the supposed source of funds; and the manipulation of the books of account by negation or
adjustment, i.e., the cancellation of checks through journal vouchers to conceal disbursements in excess of
the cash disbursement ceiling (CDC), so as not to reflect such disbursements in the trial balances submitted
to the Regional Office.

Mangubat enticed Preagido, Cruz and Sayson to join him. All three agreed to help him carry out his plan.
They typed the fake LAAs during Saturdays. Cruz and Sayson also took charge of negotiating or selling the
fake LAAs to contractors at 26% of the gross amount. Preagido on her part manipulated the General
Ledger, Journal Vouchers and General Journal thru negative entries to conceal the illegal disbursements.
Thus, in the initial report of the auditors (Exhibit D), it was discovered that the doubtful allotments and other
anomalies escaped notice due to the following manipulations:

"The letter-advice covering such allotments (LAA) were generally not signed by the Finance Officer nor
recorded in the books of accounts. Disbursements made on the basis of these fake LAAs were charged to
the unliquidated Obligations (Account 8-81-400), although the obligations being paid were not among those
certified to the unliquidated obligations (Account 8-81-400) at the end of the preceding year. To conceal the
overcharges to authorized allotments, account 8-81-400 and the excess of checks issued over authorized
cash disbursements ceiling, adjustments were prepared monthly through journal vouchers to take up the
negative debit to Account 8-81-400 and a negative credit to the Treasury Checking Account for Agencies
Account 8-70-790. These journal vouchers in effect cancelled the previous entry to record the
disbursements made on the basis of the fake LAAs. Thus, the affected accounts (Accounts 8-81-400 and 8-
70-790), as appearing in the trial balance would not show the irregularity. The checks, however, were
actually issued."

The four formed the nucleus of the nefarious conspiracy. Other government employees, tempted by the
prospect of earning big money, allowed their names to be used and signed spurious documents.

Although the anomalies had been going on for sometime (February 1977 to June 1978), the PNB and
Bureau of Treasury had no inkling about it until the NBI busted the illegal operations. (Some of the
recipients of the stolen funds spent lavishly and bought two cars at a time). The reason for this is that, at
that time, the PNB and Bureau of Treasury were not furnished copy of the mother CDC and the local branch
of the PNB did not receive independent advice from the PNB head office in Manila. There were no deposits
of money made with the PNB from which withdrawals could be charged. Only CDCs were presented to it,
and not knowing that some of the CDCs were fake, the PNB branch paid out the checks drawn against
them. The bank had also no way of knowing what amount was appropriated for the district; consequently, it
did not know if the limit had already been exceeded. Only an insider steep in government accounting,
auditing and banking procedures, particularly their flaws and loopholes, could have pulled off such an
ingenious and audacious plan.

xxxx

Focusing our attention now on the anomalies committed in the Cebu First District Engineering District,
hereinafter referred to as the Cebu First HED for brevity, the Court finds that the same pattern of fraud
employed in the other highway engineering districts in MPH Region VII was followed. The Cebu First HED
received from Region VII thirty-four Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAAs) in the total sum of P4,734,336.50
and twenty-nine (29) corresponding Sub-Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (SACDCs), amounting to
P5,160,677.04 for the period January 1, 1977 to December 31, 1977. But apart from this, the Cebu First
HED appears to have also received for the same period another set of eighty-four (84) LAAs amounting to
P4,680,694.76 which, however, could not be traced to any Sub-Advice of Allotment (SAA) or matched to the
Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (ACDCs) received from the MPH and Regional Office. This is highly
irregular and not in consonance with accounting procedures.

It was also made to appear that the payments were made for alleged prior year’s obligations and
chargeable to Account 8-81-400, obviously because, they were not properly funded. Furthermore, the list of
projects in Region VII for 1977 showed that Cebu First HED completed rehabilitation and/or improvement of
roads and bridges in its districts from February to May 1977, with expenditures amounting to P613,812.00.
On the other hand, the expenditures for barangay roads in the same district in 1977 amounted to
P140,692.00, and these were all completed within the period from November to December 1977. These
completed projects were properly funded by legitimate LAAs and CDCs in the total amount of only
P754,504.00. However, an additional amount of P3,839,810.74 was spent by the Cebu First HED for
maintenance of roads and bridges for the same year (1977) but the same could not be traced to any
authoritative document coming from the MPH.

xxxx

A total of 132 General Vouchers, emanating from fake LAAs and ACDCs, were traced back to Rolando
Mangubat, Regional Accountant of Region VII and Adventor Fernandez, Regional Highway Engineer, also
of Region VII. Those LAAs and ACDCs became the vehicles in the disbursement of funds amounting to
P3,839,810.74, through the vouchers purportedly issued for the purchase and delivery of the
aforementioned materials allegedly used for the maintenance and repair of the national highways within the
Cebu First HED. Despite the enormous additional expenditure of P3,839,810.74, the roads and bridges in
the district, as found out by the NBI, did not show any improvement. As testified to by several barangay
captains, the road maintenance consisted merely of spreading anapog or limestone on potholes of the
national highway.

Obviously, the vouchers for payments of alleged maintenance of roads and bridges in the additional amount
of P3,839,810.74 were prepared for no other purpose than to siphon the said amount from the government
coffer into the pockets of some officials and employees of Region VII and the Cebu First HED, as well as
the suppliers and contractors who conspired and confederated with them.

The nuclei of this massive conspiracy, namely: Rolando Mangubat, Jose Sayson, and Edgardo Cruz, all of
MPH Region VII, were found guilty in all 119 counts and were accordingly sentenced by the SB. The other
conniver, Delia Preagido, after being found guilty in some of the cases, became a state witness in the
remainder. On the basis of her testimony and pertinent documents, Informations were filed, convictions
were obtained, and criminal penalties were imposed on the rest of the accused.

On the other hand, petitioners were both Civil Engineers of the MPH assigned to the Cebu First Highway
Engineering District. Petitioner Fernan, Jr. was included among the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 2879,
2880, 2881, 2885, 2914, and 2918 allegedly for having signed six (6) tally sheets or statements of deliveries
of materials, used as bases for the preparation of the corresponding number of general vouchers. Fund
releases were made to the suppliers, contractors, and payees based on these general vouchers.

The Information against Fernan, Jr. in SB Criminal Case No. 2879 reads as follows:

The undersigned accuses Rocilo Neis, Rolando Mangubat, Adventor Fernandez, Angelina Escaño, Delia
Preagido, Camilo de Letran, Manuel de Veyra, Heracleo Faelnar, Basilisa Galvan, Matilde Jabalde,
Josefina Luna, Jose Sayson, Edgardo Cruz, Leonila del Rosario, Engracia Escobar, Abelardo Cardona,
Leonardo Tordecilla, Agripino Pagdanganan, Ramon Quirante, Mariano Montera, Mariano Jarina, Leo
Villagonzalo, Asterio Buqueron, Zosimo Mendez, Simon Fernan, Jr. and Juliana de los Angeles for estafa
thru falsification of public and commercial documents, committed as follows:

That on, about and during the period from December 1, 1976 up to January 31, 1977, both dates inclusive,
in the City of Cebu and in Cebu Province, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused
Rocilo Neis, Assistant District Engineer of Cebu HED I; Rolando Mangubat, the Chief Accountant of Region
VII of the Ministry of Public Highways and Adventor Fernandez, Regional Highway Engineer of same
Regional Office, conniving with each other to defraud the Philippine Government with the indispensable
cooperation and assistance of Angelina Escaño, Finance Officer of Region VII of the Ministry of Public
Highways; Delia Preagido, Assistant Chief Accountant of same Regional Office; Camilo de Letran, Chief
Accountant of Cebu I HED; Manuel de Veyra, Regional Director, MPH, Region VII; Heracleo Faelnar, then
Assistant Director MPH Region VII; Basilisa Galvan, Budget Officer, MPH, Region VII; Matilde Jabalde,
Supervising Accounting Clerk, MPH, Region VII; Josefina Luna, Accountant II, MPH, Region VII; Jose
Sayson, Budget Examiner, MPH, Region VII, Edgardo Cruz, Accountant I, MPH, Region VII; Leonila del
Rosario, Chief Finance and Management Service, MPH, Central Office; Engracia Escobar, Chief
Accountant, MPH, Central Office; Abelardo Cardona, Assistant Chief Accountant, MPH, Central Office;
Leonardo Tordecilla, Supervising Accountant, MPH, Central Office; Agripino Pagdanganan, Budget Officer
III, MPH, Central Office; Ramon Quirante, Property Custodian of Cebu I HED; Mariano Montera, Senior
Civil Engineer Engineer of Cebu I HED; Mariano Jarina, Clerk in the Property Division of Cebu I HED; Leo
Villagonzalo, Auditor’s Aide of Cebu I HED; Zosimo Mendez, Auditor of Cebu I HED; Asterio Buqueron,
Administrative Officer of Cebu I HED; Simon Fernan, Jr., Civil Engineer of Cebu I HED and Juliana de los
Angeles, an alleged supplier, all of whom took advantage of their official positions, with the exception of
Juliana de los Angeles, mutually helping each other did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
falsify and/or cause the falsification of the following documents, to wit:

1. Request for Allocation of Allotment

2. Letter of Advice of Allotment

3. Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling

4. General Voucher No. B-15 5. Check

No. 9933064
6. Abstract of Bids

7. Purchase Order

8. Statement of Delivery

9. Report of Inspection

10. Requisition for Supplies or Equipment

11. Trial Balance

by making it appear that Regional Office No. VII of the Ministry of Public Highways regularly issued an
advice of cash disbursement ceiling (ACDC) and the corresponding letter of advice of allotment (LAA) to
cover the purchase of 1,400 cu. m. of item 108 7 for use in the repair of the Cebu Hagnaya Wharf road from
Km. 50.30 to Km. 60.00, when in truth and in fact, as all the accused knew, the same were not true and
correct; by making it appear in the voucher that funds were available and that there were appropriate
requests for allotments (ROA) to pay the aforesaid purchase; that a requisition for said item was made and
approved; that a regular bidding was held; that a corresponding purchase order was issued in favor of the
winning bidder; that the road construction materials were delivered, inspected and used in the supposed
project and that the alleged supplier was entitled to payment when in truth and in fact, as all the accused
know, all of the foregoing were false and incorrect and because of the foregoing falsifications, the above-
named accused were able to collect from the Cebu I HED the total amount of TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND
PESOS (P28,000.00), Philippine Currency, in payment of the non- existing deliveries; that the said amount
of P28,000.00 was not reflected in the monthly trial balance submitted to the Central Office by Region VII
showing its financial condition as the same was negated thru the journal voucher, as a designed means to
cover-up the fraud; and the accused, once in possession of the said amount, misappropriated, converted
and misapplied the same for their personal needs, to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine
Government in the total amount of TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P28,000.00), Philippine
Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
The Informations in the six (6) cases involving Fernan, Jr. were essentially identical save for the
details as highlighted in boldface above. For ease of reference, Fernan, Jr.’s criminal cases are
detailed below:
Crimin Dates of Main Items Amount
al Commission Documents Allegedly of
Case Falsified Purchased Fraud
No.
2879 December 1, 1976 up 1. General Voucher 1,400 cu. m. of item PhP
to January 31, 1977 No. B-15. 108 for use in the 28,000.00
2. Check No. repair of the Cebu
9933064; Hagnaya Wharf
Road from Km.
50.30 to Km. 60.00
2880 December 1, 976 up to 1. Request for 1,400 cu. m. of item PhP 28,000.00
January 31,1977 Allocation of 108 for use in the
Allotment 101- 12- repair of the Bogo-
105-76. Curva-Medellon road
2. General Voucher from Km. 110.00 to
No. B- 55. Km. 119.00
Check No.
9933104;
2881 January 2, 1977, up to 1. Request for Approximately 1,500 PhP 31,000.00
February 28, 1977 Allocation of Allotment cu. m. of item 108
101-2- 56-77. for use in the repair
2. General Voucher and rehabilitation of
No. B- 245. damaged roads and
Check No. bridges by Typhoon
9933294; Aring at the
Tabogon-Bogo
provincial road from
Km. 92 to Km. 98
2885 January 2, 1977, up to 1. Request for materials for use in PhP 30,000.00
January 31, 1977 Allocation of the repair and
Allotment 101- 12- rehabilitation of the
112-76. Daan-Bantayan
road from Km.
2. General Voucher
127.00 to Km. 136
No. B- 76.
Check No.
9933125;
2914 October 1, 1977, up to 1. General Voucher 1,200 cu. m. of item PhP 27,000.00
November 30, 1977 No. B- 927. 108 for use in the
Check No. rehabilitation of the
9403425; Cajel-Lugo, Barbon
barangay road
2918 January 2, 1977, up to 1. General Voucher 1,500 cu. m. of item PhP 30,000.00
February 28, 1977 No. B- 107. 108 for the
Check No. rehabilitation of the
9933157; Cebu North
Hagnaya Wharf
Road from Km. 71
to Km. 76

On the other hand, petitioner Torrevillas was one of the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 2855, 2856, 2858,
2859, 2909, 2910, 2914, 2919, and 2932.

The Information against Torrevillas in SB Criminal Case No. 2855 reads as follows:

The undersigned accuses Rocilo Neis, Rolando Mangubat, Adventor Fernandez, Angelina Escaño, Delia
Preagido, Camilo de Letran, Manuel de Veyra, Heracleo Faelnar, Basilisa Galvan, Matilde Jabalde, Josefina
Luna, Jose Sayson, Edgardo Cruz, Leonila del Rosario, Engracia Escobar, Abelardo Cardona, Leonardo
Tordecilla, Agripino Pagdanganan, Ramon Quirante, Jorge de la Peña, Leo Villagonzalo, Asterio Buqueron,
Expedito Torrevillas, Mariano Montera and Rufino V. Nuñez for estafa thru falsification of public and
commercial documents, committed as follows:

That on, about and during the period from June 1, 1977 up to June 30, 1977, both dates inclusive, in the
City of Cebu and in Cebu Province, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Rocilo
Neis, Assistant District Engineer of Cebu HED I; Rolando Mangubat, the Chief Accountant of Region VII of
the Ministry of Public Highways and Adventor Fernandez, Regional Highway Engineer of same Regional
Office, conniving with each other to defraud the Philippine Government with the indispensable cooperation
and assistance of Angelina Escaño, Finance Officer of Region VII of the Ministry of Public Highways; Delia
Preagido, Assistant Chief Accountant of same Regional Office; Camilo de Letran, Chief Accountant of Cebu
I HED; Manuel de Veyra, Regional Director, MPH, Region VII; Heracleo Faelnar, then Assistant Director
MPH Region VII; Basilisa Galvan, Budget Officer, MPH, Region VII; Matilde Jabalde, Supervising
Accounting Clerk, MPH, Region VII; Josefina Luna, Accountant II, MPH, Region VII; Jose Sayson, Budget
Examiner, MPH, Region VII, Edgardo Cruz, Accountant I, MPH, Region VII; Leonila del Rosario, Chief
Finance and Management Service, MPH, Central Office; Engracia Escobar, Chief Accountant, MPH, Central
Office; Abelardo Cardona, Assistant Chief Accountant, MPH, Central Office; Leonardo Tordecilla,
Supervising Accountant, MPH, Central Office; Agripino Pagdanganan, Budget Officer III, MPH, Central
Office; Ramon Quirante, Property Custodian of Cebu I HED; Jorge de la Peña, Auditor of Cebu I HED; Leo
Villagonzalo, Auditor’s Aide of Cebu I HED; Asterio Buqueron, Administrative Officer of Cebu I HED;
Expedito Torrevillas, representative of the Engineer’s Office, Cebu I HED; Mariano Montera, Senior Civil
Engineer Engineer of Cebu I HED; and Rufino V. Nuñez, an alleged supplier, all of whom took advantage of
their official positions, with the exception of Rufino V. Nuñez, mutually helping each other did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify and/or cause the falsification of the following documents, to wit:

1. Request for Allocation of Allotment – 101-10-186-76; 10-190-76; 10-192-76; 10-188-76; 10-

180-76

2. Letter of Advice of Allotment

3. Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling

4. General Voucher No. B-613

5. heck No. 9403099

6. Abstract of Bids

7. Purchase Order

8. Statement of Delivery

9. Report of Inspection

10. Requisition for Supplies or Equipment

11. Trial Balance

by making it appear that Regional Office No. VII of the Ministry of Public Highways regularly issued an
advice of cash disbursement ceiling (ACDC) and the corresponding letter of advice of allotment (LAA) to
cover the purchase of 153.63 m. t. of item 3108 for use in asphalting of the Toledo-Tabuelan Road at Km.
108.34 to Km. 109.52, when in truth and in fact, as all the accused knew, the same were not true and
correct; by making it appear in the voucher that funds were available and that there were appropriate
requests for allotments (ROA) to pay the aforesaid purchase; that a requisition for said item was made and
approved; that a regular bidding was held; that a corresponding purchase order was issued in favor of the
winning bidder; that the road construction materials were delivered, inspected and used in the supposed
project and that the alleged supplier was entitled to payment when in truth and in fact, as all the accused
know, all of the foregoing were false and incorrect and because of the foregoing falsifications, the above-
named accused were able to collect from the Cebu I HED the total amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND
FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY ONE PESOS & 85/100 (P48,431.85), Philippine Currency, in payment of the
non-existing deliveries; that the said amount of P48,431.85 was not reflected in the monthly trial balance
submitted to the Central Office by Region VII showing its financial condition as the same was negated thru
the journal voucher, as a designed means to cover-up the fraud; and the accused, once in possession of the
said amount, misappropriated, converted and misapplied the same for their personal needs, to the damage
and prejudice of the Philippine Government in the total amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED THIRTY ONE PESOS & 85/100 (P48,431.85), Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
The Torrevillas cases were substantially the same save for the details highlighted in the aforequoted
typical accusatory pleading. For ease of reference, Torrevillas’ criminal cases are particularized as
follows:
Criminal Dates of Commission Main Documents Items Allegedly Amount of
Case No Falsified Purchased Fraud
2855 June 1, 1977, up to June 1. Request for 153.63 m. t. of item 310 PhP 48,431.85
30, 1977 Allocation of for use in asphalting of
Allotment 101-10- the Toledo-Tabuelan
186-76; 10-190- 76; Road from Km. 108.34 to
10-192-76; 10-188- Km. 109.52
76; 10-180-76.
2. General Voucher
No. B-613.
3. Check No.
9403099.

2856 June 1, 1977 up 1. Request for 153.76 m. t. of item 310 PhP 48,472.84
to June 30, 1977 Allocation of for use in the asphalting
Allotment101-10-15- of the Toledo- Tabuelan
76; 9-201- 76; 8-152- road from Km 108.34 to
76; 8-153- 76;9-181- Km. 109.52
76; 9-184-76
2. General Voucher
No. B-619;
3. Check No. 9403105;
2858 June 1, 1977, up to July 1. Request for 151.35 m. t. of item 310 PhP 47,713.09
31, 1977 Allocation Allotment for use in the asphalting
101-6-234-76; 6- of the Toledo-Tabuelan
237- 76; 6-239-76; Road from Km. 108.34 to
6-241-76; 6-240-76 Km. 109.52
2. General Voucher
No. B-629;
3. Check No.
9403115;
2859 June 1, 1977 up to June 1. Request for 110.01 m. t. of item 310 PhP 34,680.65
31, 1977 Allocation of for use in asphalting of
Allotment 101-7-63- the Toledo-Tabuelan
76; 8-102-76; 8-121- Road from Km. 108.34 to
76 Km.109.52
2. General Voucher
No. B-631;
3. Check No.
9403117;
2909 September 1, 1977 up to 1. General Voucher 1,200 cu.m. of item 108 PhP 27,900.00
November 30, 1977 No. B-928; for use in the
2. Check No. rehabilitation of the
9403426; Buanoy-Cantibas,
Balaban barangay road
2910 September 1, 1977, up 1. General Voucher 1,200 cu. m. of item 108 PhP 27,900.00
to No. B-929. for use in the
November 30, 1977 2. Check No. rehabilitation of the
9403427; Magay-Canamukan,
Compostela barangay
road
2914 October 1, 1977, up to 1. General Voucher 1,200 cu. m. of item 108 PhP 27,000.00
November 30, 1977 No. B-927. for use in the
rehabilitation of the Cajel-
2. Check No. Lugo, Barbon barangay
 9403425; road
2919 January 2, 1977, up to 1. General Voucher 1,550 cu. m. of item 108 PhP 31,000.00
February 28, 1977 No. B-244; for use in the repair and
rehabilitation of damaged
2. Check No. roads and bridges at the
9933293; Toledo-Tabuelan national
road from Km. 71 to Km.
83
2932 June 1, 1977, up to July 1. Request for 250 gals of aluminum PhP 44,762.58
31, 1977 Allocation of paint 324 gals of red lead
Allotment 101-7-83- paint for use in the
76; 7-84-76; 7-124- maintenance of national
76; 8-153-76; 8- roads and bridges
170-76;
2. General Voucher
B- 643;
3. Check No.
9403130;

The Sandiganbayan’s Ruling

The anti-graft court was fully convinced of the guilt of petitioner Fernan, Jr.; and in its December 4, 1997
Decision, it found him criminally liable in the six (6) cases against him, thus:

In Criminal Case No. 2879, the Court finds accused JOSE SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, MARIANO
MONTERA, ZOSIMO MENDEZ, MARIANO JARINA and SIMON FERNAN, Jr., GUILTY beyond
reasonable
doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized
in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six
(6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five
Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount
of Twenty Eight Thousand Pesos (P 28,000.00); and, to pay their proportionate share of the costs. 9
(Emphasis supplied.)

In Criminal Case No. 2880, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON
QUIRANTE, MARIANO MONTERA, ZOSIMO MENDEZ, and SIMON FERNAN, Jr., GUILTY beyond
reasonable
doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized
in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six
(6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five
Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount
of Twenty Eight Thousand Pesos (P 28,000.00); and, to pay their proportionate share of the costs. 10
(Emphasis supplied.)

In Criminal Case No. 2881, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON
QUIRANTE, ZOSIMO MENDEZ and SIMON FERNAN, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles
318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six
(6) years
of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred
Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of
Thirty One Thousand Pesos (P 31,000.00); and, to pay their proportionate share of the costs. 11 (Emphasis
supplied.)

In Criminal Case No. 2885, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN JOSE SAYSON, RAMON
QUIRANTE, ZOSIMO MENDEZ and SIMON FERNAN, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles
318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six
(6) years
of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred
Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P 30,000.00); and, to pay their proportionate share of the
costs.12 (Emphasis supplied.)

In Criminal Case No. 2914, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON
QUIRANTE, EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS and SIMON FERNAN, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
co- principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in
Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six
(6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five
Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the
amount of Twenty Seven Thousand Pesos (P 27,000.00); and, to pay their proportionate share of the
costs.13 (Emphasis supplied.)

In Criminal Case No. 2918, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON
QUIRANTE, ZOSIMO MENDEZ, SIMON FERNAN, Jr. and ISMAEL SABIO, Jr. GUILTY beyond
reasonable
doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized
in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six
(6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five
Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the
amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P 30,000.00); and, to pay their proportionate share of the costs. 14
(Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner Torrevillas suffered the same fate and was convicted in the nine (9) criminal cases, to wit: In
Criminal Case No. 2855, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON
QUIRANTE, MARIANO MONTERA, and EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
co- principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles
318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstances
in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of
prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred
Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Forty
Eight Thousand Four Hundred Thirty One Pesos and 85/100 (P 48,431.85); and, to pay their proportionate
share of the costs.15 (Emphasis supplied.)

In Criminal Case No. 2856, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON
QUIRANTE, MARIANO MONTERA and EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
co- principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles
318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstances
in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of
prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred
Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Forty
Eight Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Two Pesos and 84/100 (P 48,472.84); and, to pay their proportionate
share of the costs.16 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 2858, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON
QUIRANTE, MARIANO MONTERA and EXPEDITO TOREVILLAS, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
co- principals in the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in
Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal relation to Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to
an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by
law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally
the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Forty Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Thirteen Pesos and
9/100 (P47,713.09); and, to pay their proportionate share of the costs.

In Criminal Case No. 2859, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON
QUIRANTE, MARIANO MONTERA and EXPEDITO TOREVILLAS, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
co- principals in the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in
Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six
(6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five
Hundred Pesos (P3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount
of Thirty Four Thousand Six Hundred Eighty pesos and 65/100 (P34,680.65); and , to pay their
proportionate share of the costs.17

In Criminal Case No. 2909, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON
QUIRANTE, FLORO JAYME and EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles
318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six
(6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five
Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount
of Twenty Seven Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos (P 27,900.00); and, to pay their proportionate share of the
costs.18 (Emphasis supplied.)

In Criminal Case No. 2910, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON
QUIRANTE, FLORO JAYME and EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318
and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstances in
attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum,
with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P
3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Twenty Seven
Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos (P 27,900.00); and, to pay their proportionate share of the costs.19 (Emphasis
supplied.)

In Criminal Case No. 2914, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON
QUIRANTE, EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS and SIMON FERNAN, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
co- principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in
Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six
(6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five
Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the
amount of Twenty Seven Thousand Pesos (P 27,000.00); and, to pay their proportionate share of the costs.
(Emphasis supplied.)

In Criminal Case No. 2919, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON
QUIRANTE, MARIANO MONTERA, ZOSIMO MENDEZ, EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS and ISMAEL SABIO, Jr.
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public
Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code, and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to
pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the
Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Thirty One Thousand Pesos (P 31,000.00); and, to pay their
proportionate share of the costs.20 (Emphasis supplied.)

In Criminal Case No. 2932, the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON
QUIRANTE, MARIANO MONTERA, PEDRITO SEVILLE and EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and
penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no
modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging
from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand
Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the
amount of Forty Four Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty Two Pesos and 58/100 (P 44,762.58); and, to pay their
proportionate share of the costs.21 (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioners made the supplication before the court a quo to recall the adverse judgments against them
which was declined by the August 29, 2000 SB Resolution.

Firm in their belief that they were innocent of any wrongdoing, they now interpose the instant petition to
clear their names.

The Issues

Petitioners put forward two (2) issues, viz:

The honorable Sandiganbayan totally ignored petitioners constitutional right to be presumed

innocent when it ruled that the burden of convincing the hon. Court that the deliveries of the road
materials attested to have been received by them were not ghost deliveries rests with the accused
and not with the prosecution.

II

The honorable sandiganbayan erred in convicting petitioners as co-conspirators despite the

prosecution’s failure to specifically prove beyond reasonable doubt the facts and circumstances that
would implicate them as co-conspirators and justify their conviction.

The Court’s Ruling

We are not persuaded to nullify the verdict.
Petitioners’ guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt

Petitioners mainly asseverate that their guilt was not shown beyond a peradventure of doubt and the
State was unable to show that government funds were illegally released based on alleged ghost
deliveries in conjunction with false or fake tally sheets and other documents which they admittedly signed.

We are not convinced.

Our Constitution unequivocally guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved.22 This sacred task unqualifiedly means proving the guilt of the accused
beyond a reasonable doubt. Definitely, "reasonable doubt" is not mere guesswork whether or not the
accused is guilty, but such uncertainty that "a reasonable man may entertain after a fair review and
consideration of the evidence." Reasonable doubt is present when

after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidences, leaves the minds of the [judges] in that
condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the
charge; a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding, and satisfies the reason and judgment of
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it.23
A thorough scrutiny of the records is imperative to determine whether or not reasonable doubt exists as to
the guilt of accused Fernan, Jr. and Torrevillas.

Petitioners were charged with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents as
defined and penalized under Articles 318 and 171 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, thus:

ART. 318. Other deceits. – The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the amount of the
damage caused and not more than twice such amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall
defraud or damage another by any deceit not mentioned in the preceding articles of this chapter.

ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee; or notary or ecclesiastical minister. – The penalty of
prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or
notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the
following acts:

xxxx

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

The complex crime is pruned into the following essential elements:

For estafa

1. Deceit: Deceit is a specie of fraud. It is actual fraud, and consists in any false representation or
contrivance whereby one person overreaches and misleads another, to his hurt. There is deceit
when one is misled, either by guile or trickery or by other means, to believe to be true what is really
false.24

2. Damage: Damage may consist in the offended party being deprived of his money or property as a
result of the defraudation, disturbance in property right, or temporary prejudice.25

For falsification

1. That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public;

2. That he takes advantage of his official position;

3. That he falsifies a document by committing any of the acts defined under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code.26

Before the SB, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated September 1, 1988 was entered into
between the State and the accused with the following stipulations and admissions:

To expedite the early termination of the instant cases and abbreviate the testimony of Mrs. Delia
Preagido, the prosecution and the accused have agreed to reproduce and adopt as the testimony of
Preagido in the instant cases, her previous testimonies in Criminal Cases Nos. 889, etc. (Mandaue
City HED ’78 cases), on May 18 and 19, 1982 and in Criminal Cases Nos. 1446- 1789, etc. (Danao
City HED ’77 cases) on November 10, 1987 and March 14, 1988, both on direct and cross
examination x x x without prejudice to whatever direct and/or cross examination question, that may be
propounded by the Prosecution and the accused on said State witness, which questions will only be
limited to the fake or irregular LAA’s and SACDC’s issued to Cebu I HED in 1977, the sale of such
fake or irregular LAA’s and SACDC’s issued to Cebu I HED in 1977, the sale of such fake or irregular
LAA’s and SACDC’s in said engineering district in the said year and the participation of the accused
thereon;
 (1) That in the event Mrs. Delia Preagido is presented to testify as a State witness in the instant
cases without reproducing and adopting her previous testimonies in the Mandaue City HED ’78 and
the Danao City HED ’77 cases, she will identify documents and exhibits which have been
previously marked and identified by other prosecution witness x x x.

(2) That in the previous testimonies of Mrs. Delia Preagido in the Mandaue City HED ’78 and the
Danao City HED ’77 cases, she identified twenty-six separate lists containing names of officials and
employees of MPH, Regional Office No. VII, of the various Highways Engineering Districts in MPH,
Region VII, and the MPH Central Office who have allegedly received money or various sums from
1977 to 1978 out of the proceeds or sales of fake LAA’s in 1977 and 1978 and, therefore, to obviate
Mrs. Preagido’s previous testimony of these lists, the Prosecution hereby reproduces and adopts
specifically such testimony and the markings of the lists, i.e., Exhibits ‘KKK’, ‘KKK-1’ to ‘KKK-25’ in
the Mandaue City HED ’78 cases and Exhibits ‘0000’, ‘0000-1’ to ‘0000-25’ in the Danao City HED
’77 cases, substituted or re-marked accordingly as ‘Exhibits ‘LL’, ‘LL-1’ to ‘LL-25’ in the instant
cases.27

As a result of this MOA, the testimony of state witness Preagido on the modus operandi of the conspirators,
or the unique and distinct method of procedure by which the malversation of public funds in Region VII of
the MPH was perpetrated and accomplished, dealt a major blow to the defenses raised by petitioners.
Preagido’s vital testimony, wherein she identified the methods, documents, exhibits, and other pertinent
papers that led to the crafting of fake Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAAs), 28 general vouchers,
disbursement of funds for non-existent projects, general vouchers, and other documents, was not even
successfully refuted or overturned by petitioners.

Preagido confirmed and admitted under oath that the illegal disbursement of public funds pertained to non-
existent projects and was supported by fake LAAs, fake general vouchers, and other pertinent papers that
were also falsified. The fake LAAs and general vouchers were, in turn, supported by signed tally sheets
that pertained to alleged ghost deliveries of road construction materials for non-existent or illegal projects.

The fake tally sheets, delivery receipts, reports of inspection, requests for supplies and materials, and
other related documents signed on separate occasions by petitioners, which were attached as supporting
documents to corresponding general vouchers; the alleged amounts and quantities of road construction
materials delivered; and the specific fake general vouchers, checks, and other pertinent documents issued
which led to the illegal disbursement of funds are summarized as follows:

Petitioner Fernan, Jr.

Criminal Specific Main Documents Items Allegedly Purchased FAKE LAAs Amount of
Case Exhibits Falsified That Fraud
No authorized
purchase

2879 T-86-f-1, 1. General Voucher 1,400 cu. m. of item 108 for Not numbered PhP28,000.00
etc. (Tally No. B- 15. use in the repair of the contrary to
Sheets) 2. Check No. Cebu Hagnaya Wharf Road official
9933064; from Km. 50.30 to Km. procedure
60.00
2880 T-87-f-1, 1. Request for 1,400 cu. m. of item 108 for Not numbered PhP28,000.00
etc. (Tally Allocation of use in the repair of the contrary to
Sheets) Allotment 101- 12- Bogo-Curva-Medellon road official
105-76. from Km. 110.00 to Km. procedure
2. General Voucher 119.00
No. B- 55.
Check No. 9933104;
2881 T-104-g- 1. Request for Approximately 1,500 cu. m. Not numbered PhP31,000.00
1, etc. Allocation of of contrary to
(Tally Allotment 101- 2-56- item 108 for use in the repair official
Sheets) 77. and rehabilitation of procedure
2. General Voucher damaged roads and bridges
 No. B- 245. by Typhoon Aring at the
Check No. 9933294; Tabogon-Bogo provincial
road from Km. 92 to Km. 98
2885 T-89-f-1, 1. Request for Materials for use in the Not numbered PhP30,000.00
etc. (Tally Allocation of repair and rehabilitation of contrary to
Sheets) Allotment 101- 12- the Daan- Bantayan road official
112-76. from Km. 127.00 to Km. procedure
2. General Voucher 136
No. B- 76;
Check No. 9933125;
2914 T-115-g- 1. General Voucher 1,200 cu. m. of item 108 for PhP27,000.00
1, etc. No. B- 927. use in the rehabilitation of
(Tally Check No. 9403425; the Cajel-Lugo, Barbon
Sheets) barangay road
2918 T-116-f-1, 1. General Voucher 1,500 cu. m. of item 108 for Not numbered PhP30,000.00
etc.(Tally No. B- 107. the rehabilitation of the Cebu contrary to
Sheets) Check No. 9933157; North Hagnaya Wharf Road official
from Km. 71 to Km. 76 procedure

Petitioner Torrevillas

Crimina Specific Exhibits Main Documents Items Allegedly FAKE LAAs that Amount of
l Case Falsified Purchased authorized Fraud
No purchase
2855 T-33-f (Delivery 1. Request for Allocation 153.63 m. t. of item Not numbered PhP48,43
Receipt); T-33- f-1 of Allotment 101-10186- 310 for use in contrary to official 1.85
(Daily Tally Sheet); 76; 10-190-76; 10-192-76; asphalting of the procedure
10-188-76; 10-180-76. Toledo-Tabuelan Road
2.General Voucher No. B- from Km. 108.34 to
613 Km. 109.52
3.Check No. 9403099;
2856 T-34-f (Delivery 1. Request for Allocation 153.76 m. t. of item Not numbered PhP
Receipt); T-34- f1 of 310 for use in the contrary to official 48,472.84
(Daily Tally Allotment 101-10- 15-76; asphalting of the procedure
Sheet); 9-201-76; 8-152-76; 8- Toledo-Tabuelan to
153- 76;9-181-76; 9- Km. 109.52
184-76
2.General Voucher No.
B- 619;
3.Check No. 9403105.

2858 T-35-f (Delivery 1. Request for 151.35 m. t. of item 310 Not numbered PhP47,71
Receipt);T-35-f-1 Allocation Allotment for use in the asphalting contrary to official 3.09
(Daily Tally 101-6-234-76; 6-237-76; of the Toledo Tabuelan procedure
Sheet); 6-239-76; 6-241-76; 6- Road from Km. 108.34
240-76 to Km. 109.52
2.General Voucher No. B-
629;
Check No. 9403115

2859 T-36-f (Delivery 1. Request for 110.01 m. t. of item Not numbered PhP
Receipt); T-36-f-1 Allocation of 310 contrary to official 34,680.65
(Daily Tally Allotment 101-7-63-76; 8- for use in asphalting procedure
Sheet); 102-76; 8-121-76 of the Toledo-
2. General Voucher No. Tabuelan Road from
B- 631; Km. 108.34 to
Km.109.52
3. Check No. 9403117.
2909 T-113-b (Request 1. General Voucher 1,200 cu.m. of item 108 Not numbered PhP27,90
for Supplies and No. B- 928; for use in the contrary to official 0.00
Equipment); T- rehabilitation of the procedure
113-d (Report of 2.Check No. Buanoy-Cantibas,
Inspection); T-113- 9403426; Balaban barangay road
c (Abstract of
Sealed Quotation)
2910 T-114-c 1. General Voucher 1,200 cu. m. of item Not numbered PhP27,90
(Request for No. B- 929; 108 for use in the contrary to official 0.00
Supplies and rehabilitation of the procedure
Equipment); T- 2.Check No. Magay-Canamukan,
114-e (Report of 9403427; Compostela barangay
Inspection); T- road
114-f
(Abstract of
Sealed
Quotation)
2914 T-115-c (Request 1. General Voucher 1,200 cu. m. of item Not numbered PhP27,00
for Supplies and No. B- 927; 108 for use in the contrary to official 0.00
Equipment); T- rehabilitation of the procedure
115-e (Report of 2.Check No. Cajel-Lugo, Barbon
Inspection); T-115- 9403425; barangay road
f (Abstract of
Sealed Quotation)
2919 T-117-g 1. General Voucher 1,550 cu. m. of item Not numbered PhP31,00
(Delivery No. B- 244; 108 for use in the contrary to official 0.00
Receipt); T- 117- 2.Check No. repair and rehabilitation procedure
g-1, etc. (Daily 9933293; of damaged roads and
Tally Sheets) bridges at the Toledo-
Tabuelan national road
from Km. 71 to Km. 83
2932 1. Request for Allocation 250 gals of aluminum Not numbered PhP
of Allotment 101-7-83- paint 324 gals of red contrary to official 44,762.58
76; 7-84-76; 7-124-76; 8- lead paint for use in the procedure
153-76; 8-170-76 maintenance of
2.General Voucher B- national roads and
643; bridges
3.Check No. 9403130;.
On the part of petitioners, they readily admitted that they either signed the tally sheets and/or delivery
receipts, reports of inspection, requests for supplies and materials, and other related documents which
became part of the supporting documents that led to the issuance of general vouchers and eventually the
disbursement of public funds.29 The tally sheets are statements of delivery that purportedly indicated the
specified quantities of materials for the construction and maintenance of roads that have been delivered on
supposed project sites on given dates at specific places.

As a result of petitioners’ signatures in the tally sheets and/or delivery receipts, reports of inspection,
requests for supplies and materials, and other supporting documents—which became the basis for payment
to suppliers—public funds were released via general vouchers and checks to the said suppliers despite the
fact that the latter did not make any deliveries in accordance with projects allegedly funded by mostly fake
LAAs.

The accusation that there were no actual deliveries of road construction and maintenance materials in
support of projects or otherwise funded by LAAs was proven true by the testimonies of the various
barangay captains and residents of the barangay who were supposed to be benefited by the construction
and repair activities of the Cebu First Highway Engineering District. The testimonies of these barangay
captains and residents are summarized as follows:30

1. MACARIO LIMALIMA, Barangay Captain of Barangay Antipolo, Medellin, Cebu, testified that his
 barangay is traversed by the national highway stretching to a distance of 2 kilometers and 750 meters (Km.
122; Km. 123 to 125). He described the road as full of potholes. Except for filling up these potholes with
"anapog" or crushed limestone, no major repairs were undertaken on the said road in 1978 or in previous
years. (TSN., pp. 6-14, June 5, 1986).31

2. FELOMINO ORBISO, Barangay Captain of Cawit, Medellin, Cebu, from 1972 to 1981, testified that his
barangay is traversed by the national highway, stretching from Km. 125 to Km. 127.9. He described the
road as a rough or dirt road. No improvement was ever made on this road whether during the year when
he gave his statement to the NBI (1978) or in previous years. The road remained in bad shape, with
numerous potholes which the camineros merely filled up with limestone. (TSN., pp.14-19, June 5, 1986).32

3. TIMOTEO ANCAJAS, Barangay Captain of Paypay, Daan Bantayan, Cebu, from 1972 to 1982, testified
that his barangay is traversed by the national highway, stretching from Km. 132 to Km. 134 ½, or a distance
of 2 ½ kilometers. He described the portion of the highway as a rough road with potholes. He stated that
the only improvement done on this road was the filling up of the potholes with "anapog" or crushed
limestone and this was done only once in 1977. It even took the camineros three months from the time the
limestones were delivered to start working on the road. (TSN., pp. 20-26, June 5, 1986).33

4. LUCIA PEÑAFLOR, Barangay Captain of Don Pedro, Bogo, Cebu, from 1966 to 1982, testified that her
barangay is traversed by the national highway, stretching from Km. 103 to Km. 105 ½, up to the boundary
of San Remigio, and from the boundary to Daan Bantayan, a distance of more than 3 kilometers. It was
only in 1984 or 1985 when this portion of the national highway was asphalted. Prior to that, the road was
maintained by filling up the potholes with crushed limestone or "anapog." These potholes started to
appear between January and June of 1977. However, as alleged by her in her affidavit (Exh. II-1-d), these
potholes were filled up only from January to June, 1978. (TSN., pp. 28-46, June 5, 1986).34

5. MARCELO CONEJOS, Barangay Captain of Tapilon, Daan Bantayan, from 1972 to 1982, testified that his
barangay is traversed by the national highway, stretching from Km. 130 to Km. 134, or a distance of 4
kilometers. In 1977, said portion of the national highway was in bad condition and that nothing was done to
improve it until 1982, except for the time when the potholes were filled up with crushed limestones. (TSN.,
pp. 48-56, June 5, 1986).35

6. REMEDIOS FELICANO, Barangay Captain of Looc, San Remigio, Cebu from 1977 to 1982, testified that
her barangay is traversed by the national highway, stretching form Km. 109 to Km. 110. She described said
portion of the national highway as "stoney." The only maintenance work undertaken to improve the road was
the filling up of potholes with crushed limestone which camineros gathered from the roadside. (TSN., pp.57-
67, June 5, 1986).36

7. ALBERTO BRANSUELA, a resident of Barangay San Jose, Catmon, Cebu, from 1974 to 1978, testified
that barangay San Jose is traversed by the national highway (Km. 58), covering a distance of ½ kilometer
more or less. He stated that while this portion of the national highway was already asphalted as of 1977,
there were potholes which the camineros filled up with anapog taken from the roadside. (TSN., pp. 69- 80),
June 5, 1986).37

8. CARIDAD PUNLA, Acting Barangay Captain of Barangay Corazon, Catmon, Cebu, from 1977 to 1982,
testified that the Poblacion of Catmon is traversed by the national highway, stretching from Km. 57 to Km.
58. In 1977, only more than ½ of this portion of the national highway was cemented while the remaining
portion was asphalted. While said portion of the national highway already had cracks and potholes as of
1977, the real problem was the uneven elevation of the surface of the shoulder of the road. No general
repair was undertaken by the authorities to correct the uneven elevation, except for the work done by the
camineros who covered up the potholes. (TSN., pp. 81-89, June 5, 1986).38

9. FELIPE MOLIT, Barangay Captain of Bao, Sugud, Cebu, from 1975 to 1982, testified that barangay Bao
was traversed by the national highway, stretching from Km. 59 to Km. 60 1/2. He described said portion of
the national highway as a gravel road surfaced with anapog. In 1977, the said road already had potholes
which maintenance men filled up with anapog beginning in March, 1977. The anapog was hauled in from
Km. 64, the usual excavation place of anapog. It took only 3 truckloads of anapog to cover the entire length
of the 1 ½ kilometers traversing their barangay. (TSN., pp. 90-99, June 5, 1986).39
10. LEONARDO PINOTE, Barangay Captain of Barangay Argawanon, San Remigio, Cebu, from 1972 to
1980, testified that his barangay is traversed by the national highway covering a distance of ½ kilometers
more or less. In 1977, this portion of the national highway was a rough road with potholes. In the same year,
camineros worked on the road, using wheelbarrows, shovels and rakes, pitching up the potholes with
anapog. (TSN., pp. 29-35, June 6, 1986).40

11. PEDRO ORSAL, Barangay Captain of Poblacion, San Remigio, Cebu, from January 1972 to 1980,
testified that his barangay is traversed by the national highway, from Km. 107 to Km. 110, or a distance of
three kilometers more or less. In 1977, the road from Km. 107 to Km. 108 was a gravel road. It was properly
maintained by the highways people, and every time potholes appeared on the road, they would be filled-up
with anapog. This material was dumped along the road by trucks of the Bureau of Public Highways. On the
other hand, the road leading to the heart of the poblacion was asphalted, but with potholes. In 1977, the
potholes were filled up by camineros with gravel delivered by dump trucks of the Bureau of Public Highways.
It was only in 1978 when the road was re-asphalted and extended from the junction of the poblacion to the
adjacent barrio of Looc. x x x (TSN., pp.36-45, June 6, 1986).41

The inescapable conclusion from the aforementioned testimonies of the barangay captains and residents of
Cebu whose respective barangay are traversed by the national highway is that there were no actual major
repair works undertaken on the national highway except the filling of potholes by crushed limestone
(anapog). Clearly, there were no deliveries of supplies and materials for asphalting and repair of roads
described in the tally sheets and other supporting documents signed by petitioners.

While petitioner Torrevillas presented Vice-Mayor Emigdio Tudlasan of Tabuclan, Cebu, who testified that
he saw the asphalting of the Tabuclan Road from kilometers 18 to 19, said testimony is not conclusive on
the actual delivery of the supplies indicated in the tally sheets, as Tudlasan was not present at the time of
alleged delivery. Moreover, his testimony runs counter to the testimonies of Barangay Captain Remedios
Feliciano of Looc, San Remigio, Cebu and Barangay Captain Pedro Orsal of Poblacion, San Remigio, Cebu.
Feliciano testified that she was Barangay Captain of Looc, San Remigio, Cebu from 1977 to 1982; that her
barangay is traversed by the national highway, stretching from km. 109 to km. 110; and that the only work
undertaken to improve the road was the filling up of potholes with crushed limestone which camineros
gathered from the roadside. On the other hand, Orsal testified that he was Barangay Captain of Poblacion,
San Remigio, Cebu, from January 1972 to 1980; that his barangay is traversed by the national highway,
from km. 107 to km. 110; that in 1977, the road from km. 107 to km. 108 was a gravel road maintained by
the highways people, and every time potholes appeared on the road, they would be filled-up with anapog,
which was dumped along the road by the Bureau of Public Highways; and that it was only in 1978 when the
road was re-asphalted and extended from the junction of the poblacion to the adjacent barrio of Looc.

Compared to the testimony of Vice-Mayor Tudlasan, the testimonies of Barangay Captains Feliciano and
Orsal are entitled to more weight and credit, and are more credible considering the fact that they are
residents of the area where the road supposedly to be repaired is located plus the fact that they saw only
limestone, not asphalt, that was used in the repair of the road in 1977. The testimonies of Feliciano and
Orsal are further buttressed by the findings and statements of government witnesses, namely–– Ruth Inting
Paredes, Supervising Commission on Audit (COA) Auditor assigned to Region VII; Felicitas Cruz Ona,
Supervising COA Auditor assigned to the main COA office; Federico A. Malvar, Senior National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Agent of the Anti-Graft Section and member of the COA NBI team assigned to
investigate the anomalies; Rogelio C. Mamaril, Supervising NBI Agent of the Anti-Fraud and Action Section;
and Delia Comahig Preagido, Accountant III, MPH, Region VII––to the effect that the general vouchers and
LAAs that corresponded to the aforementioned tally sheets signed by petitioner Torrevillas were fake or
falsified. Undeniably, the government witnesses have no motive to testify falsely against petitioner
Torrevillas and, hence, credible. We conclude that there were no actual deliveries of supplies for asphalting
of road and repair on kilometers 108 and 109, which were the subjects of Criminal Case Nos. 2855, 2856,
2858, and 2859.

Glaring is the finding of the SB that the Cebu First Highway Engineering District, to which petitioners were
assigned, had fake LAAs totaling to PhP 4,924,366.50, while the fake Cash Disbursement Ceilings issued
amounted to PhP 6,271,150.42 The Cebu First Highway Engineering District had also issued checks per
unrecorded reports in the total sum of PhP 1,135,176.82.43 Therefore, the total illegal disbursements in the
Cebu First Highway Engineering District alone were a staggering PhP 12,330,693.32 circa 1977.

Of this total, petitioner Fernan, Jr. freely admitted signing tally sheets which pertained to non-existent
deliveries of road construction supplies and materials totaling PhP 146,000, 44 including PhP 27,000 in
Criminal Case No. 2914 where petitioner Torrevillas was among the co-accused.45 These tally sheets were
attached as the supporting papers to fake general vouchers which facilitated the release of check
payments to suppliers.

These checks were allegedly paid to suppliers Juliana de los Angeles (Criminal Case Nos. 2879, 2880,
2881, 2885, and 2914) and Ismael Sabio, Jr. (Criminal Case No. 2918).46

On his part, petitioner Torrevillas voluntarily admitted to signing tally sheets, reports of inspection, requisitions
of supplies and equipment, and other pertinent documents totaling an even greater amount of PhP
337,861.01,47 including PhP 27,000 in Criminal Case No. 2914 where petitioner Fernan, Jr. was among the
co-accused.48 These documents signed by petitioner Torrevillas were likewise attached as supporting papers
to fake general vouchers which facilitated the release of check payments to suppliers.

These checks were allegedly paid to suppliers Rufino V. Nuñez (Criminal Case Nos. 2855, 2856, 2858, and
2859), Juliana de los Angeles (Criminal Case Nos. 2909, 2910, and 2914), Ismael Sabio, Jr. (Criminal Case
No. 2919), and Manuel Mascardo (Criminal Case No. 2932).49

These general vouchers and checks could not be traced to genuine LAAs. Ergo, there were no actual
deliveries of supplies and materials for the road repair and rehabilitation in Region VII, which were the
subjects of the criminal cases where petitioners were charged.

We find no reason to disturb the findings of the court a quo that all the essential elements of the crime of
estafa through falsification of public documents were present. There is no question that petitioners, at the
time of the commission of the crime, were public officers—civil engineers—assigned to the MPH. Their
signing of tally sheets and related documents pertaining to the alleged deliveries of supplies for road repair
and construction constitutes intervention and/or taking advantage of their official positions, especially
considering that they had the duty to inspect the purported deliveries and ascertain the veracity of the
documents and the statements contained in them.

The tally sheets bearing their signatures contained false recitals of material facts which the petitioners had
the duty to verify and confirm. These tally sheets were attached as supporting documents to fake LAAs and
subsequently became the bases for the disbursement of public funds to the damage and prejudice of the
government. Indubitably, there exists not even an iota of doubt as to petitioners’ guilt.

The essential elements of estafa through falsification of public documents are present in the cases
against petitioners, as follows:

1. Deceit: Petitioners Fernan, Jr. and Torrevillas made it appear that supplies for road construction and
maintenance were delivered by suppliers allegedly in furtherance of alleged lawful projects when in fact said
supplies were not delivered and no actual asphalting or repair of road was implemented. In doing so,
petitioners:

1.1. Were public officers or employees at the time of the commission of the offenses;

1.2. Took advantage of their official position as highway engineers; and

1.3. Made untruthful statements in several narrations of fact.

2. Damage: The government disbursed PhP 146,000 in the case of Fernan, Jr. and PhP 337,861.01 in the
case of Torrevillas, as payments to various suppliers for the delivery of non-existent supplies.

By way of defense, petitioners posit that the tally sheets and other documents could in fact be traced to
genuine LAAs that were in the custody of the NBI. Unfortunately, these genuine LAAs were not introduced
in evidence. It is an age-old axiom that s/he who alleges something must prove it.

Petitioners’ assertion that the documents they signed were all genuine and duly covered by genuine LAAs
was substantiated only by their own self-serving and uncorroborated testimonies. We hesitate to give
much weight and credit to their bare testimonies in the face of clear, convincing, overwhelming, and hard
evidence adduced by the State.

If the genuine LAAs were vital to their defense, and they firmly believed that the documents were indeed in
the custody of the NBI, then petitioners could have easily procured the compulsory process to compel the
production of said documents. However, petitioners miserably failed to avail of subpoena duces tecum
which the court a quo could have readily granted. The inability to produce such important and exculpatory
pieces of evidence proved disastrous to petitioners’ cause. Their conviction was indeed supported by proof
beyond reasonable doubt which was not overturned by defense evidence.

Petitioners acted in conspiracy with one another

Petitioners vigorously claim error on the part of the lower court when it made the finding that they were co-
conspirators with the other parties accused despite the dearth of evidence to amply demonstrate complicity.

We are not convinced by petitioners’ postulation.

Indeed, the burden of proving the allegation of conspiracy falls to the shoulders of the prosecution.
Considering, however, the difficulty in establishing the existence of conspiracy, settled jurisprudence
finds no need to prove it by direct evidence. In People v. Pagalasan, the Court explicated why direct
proof of prior agreement is not necessary:

After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy. Conspiracies are
clandestine in nature. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may
be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each
other, were in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be
shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be
intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose.50

In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, we categorized two (2) structures of multiple conspiracies, namely: (1) the so-
called "wheel" or "circle" conspiracy, in which there is a single person or group (the "hub") dealing
individually with two or more other persons or groups (the "spokes"); and (2) the "chain" conspiracy, usually
involving the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive communication and
cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and
wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer. 51

We find that the conspiracy in the instant cases resembles the "wheel" conspiracy. The 36 disparate
persons who constituted the massive conspiracy to defraud the government were controlled by a single
hub, namely: Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant), Delia Preagido (Accountant III), Jose Sayson (Budget
Examiner), and Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II), who controlled the separate "spokes" of the conspiracy. Petitioners
were among the many spokes of the wheel.

We recall the painstaking efforts of the SB through Associate Justice Cipriano A. Del Rosario, Chairperson
of the Third Division, in elaborating the intricate web of conspiracy among the accused, thus:

Mangubat enticed Preagido, Cruz and Sayson to join him. All three agreed to help him carry out his plan.
They typed fake LAAs during Saturdays. Cruz and Sayson also took charge of negotiating or selling fake
LAAs to contractors at 26% of the gross amount. Preagido manipulated the general ledger, journal vouchers
and general journal through negative entries to conceal the illegal disbursements. In the initial report of COA
auditors Victoria C. Quejada and Ruth I. Paredes it was discovered that the doubtful allotments and other
anomalies escaped notice due to the following manipulations:

"The letter-advices covering such allotments (LAA) were not signed by the Finance Officer nor (sic)
recorded in the books of accounts. Disbursements made on the basis of these fake LAAs were charged to
the unliquidated obligations (Account 8-81-400), although the obligations being paid were not among those
certified to the unliquidated obligations (Account 8-81-400) at the end of the preceding year. To conceal the
overcharges to authorized allotments, account 8-81-400 (sic) and the excess of checks issued over
authorized cash disbursements ceiling, adjustments were prepared monthly through journal vouchers to
take up the negative debit to Account 8-81-400 and a negative credit to the Treasury Checking Account for
Agencies Account 8-70-790. These journal vouchers in effect cancelled the previous entry to record the
disbursements made on the basis of fake LAAs. Thus the affected accounts (Accounts 8-81-400 and 8-70-
790), as appearing in the trial balance, would not show the irregularity.
The checks, however, were actually issued."52

The four formed the nucleus of the nefarious conspiracy. Other government employees, tempted by the
prospect of earning big money, allowed their names to be used and signed spurious documents.
xxxx

3. Cebu First Highway Engineering District Anomalies

Focusing our attention now on the anomalies committed in the Cebu First District Engineering District,
hereinafter referred to as the Cebu First HED for brevity, the Court finds that the same pattern of fraud
employed in the other highway engineering districts in MPH Region VII was followed. The Cebu First HED
received from Region VII thirty-four Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAAs) in the total sum of P4,734,336.50
and twenty-nine (29) corresponding Sub-Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (SACDCs), amounting to
P5,160,677.04 for the period January 1, 1977 to December 31, 1977. But apart from this, the Cebu First
HED appears to have also received for the same period another set of eighty-four (84) LAAs amounting to
P4,680,694.76 which however, could not be traced to any Sub-Advice of Allotment (SAA) OR MATCHED TO
THE Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (ACDCs) received from the MPH and Regional Office. This is
highly irregular and not in consonance with accounting procedures.

It was also made to appear that the payments were made for alleged prior year’s obligations and
chargeable to Account 81-400, obviously because, they were not properly funded. Furthermore, the list of
projects in Region VII for 1977 showed that Cebu first HED completed rehabilitation and/or improvement of
roads and bridges in its districts from February to May, 1977, with expenditures amounting to P613,812.00.
On the other hand, the expenditures for barangay roads in the same district in 1977 amounted to
P140,692.00, and these were all completed within the period from November to December, 1977. These
completed projects were properly funded by legitimate LAAs and CDCs in the total amount of only
P754,504.00. However, an additional amount of P3,839,810.74, was spent by the Cebu First HED for
maintenance of roads and bridges for the same year (1977) but the same could not be traced to any
authoritative document coming from the MPH.

The following payments for materials purchased for the year 1977 were made to appear as payment for prior
year’s obligation and were paid out of fake LAAs:
Supplier No. of Kind of
Measurement Amount
Vouchers Materials
Rufino Nuñez 29 Item 310 4,640,275 mt P1,374,135.00
J. delos Angeles 21 Item 108 22,290 cu.m. 433,300.00
Iluminada Vega 11 Item 108 8,325 cu.m. 191,500.00
Florencio Gacayan 10 Item 108 7,800 cu.m. 156,000.00
Ismael Sabio, Jr. 6 Item 108 6,198 cu.m. 123,960.00
FBS Marketing 3 Lumber 70,610.00
Cebu Hollow Blocks 2 Hollow Blocks 19,880.00
Bienvenido Presillas 4 Equip. Rental 29,580.00
T.R. Eustaquio Ent. 1 Office Supplies 7,461.90

Santrade Mktg. 1 Johnson

8,392.90
Products
Pelagia Gomez 1 Item 108 2,000 cu.m. 40,000.00
M & M Ent. 1 Paints 49,736.20
Freent Ind. 1 Office Supplies 590.20
 The NBI also discovered that there were purchases of materials in 1977 that were charged to current
obligations but paid out of spurious LAAs, to wit:

Supplier No. of Kind of

Measurement Amount
Vouchers Materials
Rufino Nuñez 11 Item 310 162,549 m.t.
P529,475.00
Item 108 5,000 cu.m.
Juliana delos Angeles 16 Item 108 13,280 cu.m. P276,400.00

Item 111 1,00 cu.m. 24,000.00

Item 200 307 cu.m. 7,982.00

Iluminada Vega 3 Item 108 3,600 cu.m. 72,090.00
Florencio Gacayan 2 Item 108 2,400.00 cu.m. 48,000.00
Vicon Ent. 1 Steel Frame 19,042.74
Ismael Sabio, Jr. 5 Item 108 6,950 cu.m. 139,000.00

Jabcyl Mktg. 3 Bridge Materials

Total……… P1,339,663.74

Grand Total P3,839,810.74

A total of 132 General Vouchers, emanating from fake LAAs and ACDCs, were traced back to Rolando
Mangubat, Regional Accountant of Region VII and Adventor Fernandez, Regional Highway Engineer, also of
Region VII. Those LAAs and ACDCs became the vehicles in the disbursement of funds amounting to
P3,839,810.74, through the vouchers purportedly issued for the purchase and delivery of the
aforementioned materials allegedly used for the maintenance and repair of the national highways within the
Cebu First HED. Despite the enormous additional expenditure of P3,839,810.74, the roads and bridges in
the district, as found out by the NBI, did not show any improvement (Exhibit II). As testified to by several
barangay captains, the road maintenance consisted merely of spreading anapog or limestone on potholes of
the national Highway.

Obviously, the vouchers for payments of alleged maintenance of roads and bridges in the additional amount
of P3,839,810.74 were prepared for no other purpose than to siphon off the said amount from the
government coffer into the pockets of some officials and employees of Region VII and the Cebu First HED,
as well as the suppliers and contractors who conspired and confederated with them. 53

After a close re-examination of the records, the Court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the anti- graft
court that petitioners are co-conspirators of the other accused, headed by Chief Accountant Rolando
Mangubat, who were similarly convicted in practically all the 119 counts of estafa. Undisturbed is the rule
that this Court is not a trier of facts and in the absence of strong and compelling reasons or justifications, it
will accord finality to the findings of facts of the SB. The feeble defense of petitioners that they were not
aware of the ingenuous plan of the group of accused Mangubat and the indispensable acts to defraud the
government does not merit any consideration. The State is not tasked to adduce direct proof of the
agreement by petitioners with the other accused, for such requirement, in many cases, would border on
near impossibility. The State needs to adduce proof only when the accused committed acts that constitute a
vital connection to the chain of conspiracy or in furtherance of the objective of the conspiracy. In the case at
bench, the signing of the fake tally sheets and/or delivery receipts, reports of inspection, and requests for
supplies and materials by petitioners on separate occasions is vital to the success of the Mangubat Group in
siphoning off government funds. Without such fabricated documents, the general vouchers covering the
supply of materials cannot be properly accomplished and submitted to the disbursing officer for the
preparation of checks.

State witness Ruth Paredes, Supervising COA Auditor, elaborated on the procedure regarding the award of
the contract more specifically to the payment of the contractor or supplier. Once the Request for Supplies
and Equipment is approved by the Regional Office, the Request for Obligation of Allotment (ROA) or the
request for funds is signed by the District Engineer pursuant to the approved plans and budget and signed
by the district accountant as to availability of funds.

The district office will advertise the invitation to bid and award the contract to the lowest bidder. The
Purchase Order (PO) is prepared and addressed to the winning bidder. Upon delivery of the supplies and
materials, the supplier bills the district office for payment. Consequently, the requisitioning officer will
prepare the general voucher which must be accompanied by the following documents:

a. The ROA;

b. The PO;

c. The abstract of Bid together with the Bid quotations;

d. The delivery receipts together with the tally sheets; and

e. The tax clearance and tax certificate of the supplier.

After the preparation and submission of the general voucher and the supporting documents, the disbursing
officer shall prepare and draw a check based on said voucher. The check is countersigned by an officer of
the district office and/or the COA Regional Director based on the amount of the check.

Thus, it is clear that without the tally sheets and delivery receipts, the general voucher cannot be prepared
and completed. Without the general voucher, the check for the payment of the supply cannot be made and
issued to the supplier. Without the check payment, the defraudation cannot be committed and successfully
consummated. Thus, petitioners’ acts in signing the false tally sheets and/or delivery receipts are
indispensable to the consummation of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents. Surely, there
were ghost or false deliveries of supplies and materials as convincingly shown by the testimonies of the
barangay captains, officials, and residents of the areas where the materials were allegedly used. More
importantly, if there were actual deliveries of materials made, then there would be no need to fake the LAAs
because the suppliers will have to be paid the cost of said materials plus a reasonable profit. As a result,
there is nothing or not much to share with the more than 30 or so co-conspirators, for the suppliers would
not be too dim-witted to part with even their cost in buying the materials they allegedly supplied. Moreover,
the fake delivery receipts and tally sheets signed by petitioners were linked to the general vouchers upon
which check payments were made to the suppliers who were found guilty of participating in the fraud. With
respect to petitioner Fernan, Jr., he signed tally sheets on the ghost deliveries of Juliana de los Angeles and
Ismael Sabio, Jr. On the part of petitioner Torrevillas, he signed false tally sheets and delivery receipts on
supplies allegedly delivered by Rufino V. Nuñez, Juliana de los Angeles, Ismael Sabio, Jr., and Manuel
Mascardo. Lastly, the checks issued to these suppliers based on general vouchers supported by the false
tally sheets and general vouchers signed by petitioners cannot be traced to any genuine LAAs, resulting in
the inescapable conclusion that these LAAs were unauthorized; hence, fake or fabricated. These are
undisputed tell-tale signs of the complicity by petitioners with the Mangubat syndicate.

In People v. Mangubat, the court a quo elucidated the conspiracy in the Cebu highway scam in a
trenchant manner:

Where the acts of each of the accused constitute an essential link in a chain and the desistance of even one
of them would prevent the chain from being completed, then no conspiracy could result as its
consummation would then be impossible or aborted. But when each and everyone of the accused in the
instant cases performed their assigned tasks and roles with martinet-like precision and accuracy, by
individually performing essential overt acts, so much so that the common objective is attained, which is to
secure the illegal release of public funds under the guise of fake or simulated public documents, then each
and everyone of said accused are equally liable as co-principals under the well-established and universally-
accepted principle that, once a conspiracy is directly or impliedly proven, the act of one is the act of all and
such liability exists notwithstanding no-participation in every detail in the execution of the offense.54

In sum, the required quantum of proof has been adduced by the State on the conspiracy among the
accused including petitioners. The conviction of petitioners must perforce be sustained.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the December 4, 1997 Decision of the SB in the
consolidated criminal cases subject of this petition. No costs
.
SO ORDERED.
 13. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo v. People, G.R. No. 220598, 19 July 2016

G.R. No. 220598

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Petitioner,

vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division),
Respondents. xx
G.R. No. 220953

BENIGNO B. AGUAS, Petitioner, vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

We resolve the consolidated petitions for certiorari separately brought to assail and annul the resolutions
issued on April 6, 20151 and September 10, 2015,2 whereby the Sandiganbayan respectively denied their
demurrer to evidence, and their motions for reconsideration, asserting such denials to be tainted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Antecedents

On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (GMA); Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget and Accounts Officer Benigno
Aguas; PCSO General Manager and Vice Chairman Rosario C. Uriarte; PCSO Chairman of the Board of
Directors Sergio 0. Valencia; Members of the PCSO Board of Directors, namely: Manuel L. Morato, Jose
R. Taruc V, Raymundo T. Roquero, and Ma. Fatima A.S. Valdes; Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman
Reynaldo A. Villar; and COA Head of Intelligence/Confidential Fund Fraud Audit Unit Nilda B. Plaras with
plunder. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-O 174 and assigned to the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan.

The information3 reads:

The undersigned Assistant Ombudsman and Gratl Investigation and Prosecution Officer III, Office of the
Ombudsman, hereby accuse GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ROSARIO C. URIARTE, SERGIO O.
VALENCIA, MANUEL L. MORA TO, JOSE R. TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, MA. FATIMA A.S. V
ALOES, BENIGNO B. AGUAS, REYNALDO A. VILLAR and NILDA B. PLARAS, of the crime of PLUNDER,
as defined by, and penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No.
7659, committed, as follows:

That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused GLORIA MA CAP A
GAL-ARROYO, then the President of the Philippines, ROSARIO C. URIARTE, then General Manager and
Vice Chairman, SERGIO O. VALENCIA, then Chairman of the Board of Directors, MANUEL L. MORA TO,
JOSE R. TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, MA. FATIMA A.S. V ALOES, then members of the
Board of Directors, BENIGNO B. AGUAS, then Budget and Accounts Manager, all of the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), REYNALDO A. VILLAR, then Chairman, and NILDA B. PLARAS,
then Head of Intelligence/Confidential Fund Fraud Audit Unit, both of the Commission on Audit, all public
officers committing the offense in relation to their respective offices and taking undue advantage of their
respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and
confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate
and/or acquire. Directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of THREE
HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
FIFTEEN PESOS (PHP365,997,915.00), more or less, through any or a combination or a series of overt
or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means, described as follows:

(a) diverting in several instances, funds from the operating budget of PCSO to its
Confidential/Intelligence Fund that could be accessed and withdrawn at any time with
 minimal restrictions, and converting, misusing, and/or illegally conveying or transferring the
proceeds drawn from said fund in the aforementioned sum, also in several instances, to
themselves, in the guise of fictitious expenditures, for their personal gain and benefit;

(b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several instances, the
above-mentioned amount from the Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts,
and or unlawfully transferring or conveying the same into their possession and control
through irregularly issued disbursement vouchers and fictitious expenditures; and

(c) taking advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships,

connections or influence, in several instances, to unjustly enrich themselves in the
aforementioned sum, at the expense of, and the damage and prejudice of the Filipino
people and the Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

By the end of October 2012, the Sandiganbayan already acquired jurisdiction over GMA, Valencia, Morato
and Aguas. Plaras, on the other hand, was able to secure a temporary restraining order (TRO) from this
Court in Plaras v. Sandiganbayan docketed as G.R. Nos. 203693-94. Insofar as Roquero is concerned, the
Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction as to him by the early part of 2013. Uriarte and Valdes remained at
large.

Thereafter, several of the accused separately filed their respective petitions for bail. On June 6, 2013, the
Sandiganbayan granted the petitions for bail of Valencia, Morato and Roquero upon finding that the
evidence of guilt against them was not strong.4 In the case of petitioners GMA and Aguas, the
Sandiganbayan, through the resolution dated November 5, 2013, denied their petitions for bail on the
ground that the evidence of guilt against them was strong.5 The motions for reconsideration filed by GMA
and Aguas were denied by the Sandiganbayan on February 19, 2014.6 Accordingly, GMA assailed the
denial of her petition for bail in this Court, but her challenge has remained pending and unresolved to date.

Personal jurisdiction over Taruc and Villar was acquired by the Sandiganbayan in 2014. Thereafter, said
accused sought to be granted bail, and their motions were granted on different dates, specifically on March
31, 20147 and May 9, 2014,8 respectively.

The case proceeded to trial, at which the State presented Atty. Aleta Tolentino as its main witness against
all the accused. The Sandiganbayan rendered the following summary of her testimony and evidence in its
resolution dated November 5, 2013 denying the petitions for bail of GMA and Aguas, to wit:

She is a certified public accountant and a lawyer. She is a member of the Philippine Institute of Certified
Public Accountants and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. She has been a CPA for 30 years and a
lawyer for 20 years. She has practiced accountancy and law. She became accounting manager of several
companies. She has also taught subjects in University of Santo Tomas, Manuel L. Quezon University,
Adamson University and the Ateneo de Manila Graduate School. She currently teaches Economics,
Taxation and Land Reform.

Presently, she is a Member of the Board of Directors of the PCSO. The Board appointed her as Chairman
of an Audit Committee. The audit review proceeded when she reviewed the COA Annual Reports of the
PCSO for 2006 2007 2008 and 2009 (Exhibits "D" "E" "F" and "G" respectively), and the annual financial
statements contained therein for the years 2005 to 2009. The reports were given to them by the COA.
These are transmitted to the PCSO annually after the subject year of audit.

One of her major findings was that the former management of the PCSO was commingling the charity fund,
the prize fund and the operating fund. By commingling she means that the funds were maintained in only
one main account. This violates Section 6 of Republic Act 1169 (PCSO Charter) and generally accepted
accounting principles.

The Audit Committee also found out that there was excessive disbursement of the Confidential and
Intelligence Fund (CIF). There were also excessive disbursements for advertising expenses. The internal
audit department was also merged with the budget and accounting department, which is a violation of
internal audit rules.
There was excessive disbursement of the CIF because the PCSO was given only P10 million in 2002, i.e.
P5 million for the Office of the Chairman and P5 million for the Office of the General Manager. Such
allocation was based on the letters of then Chairman Lopez (Exh. "I") and then General Manager Golpeo
(Exh. "J"), asking for P5 million intelligence fund each. Both were dated February 21, 2000, and sent to then
President Estrada, who approved them. This allocation should have been the basis for the original
allocation of the CIF in the PCSO, but there were several subsequent requests made by the General
Manager during the time of, and which were approved by, former President Arroyo.

The allocation in excess of P10 million was in violation of the PCSO Charter. PCSO did not have a budget
for this. They were working on a deficit from 2004 to 2009. The charter allows only 15% of the revenue as
operating fund, which was already exceeded. The financial statements indicate that they were operating on
a deficit in the years 2006 to 2009.
It is within the power of the General Manager to ask for additional funds from the President, but there
should be a budget for it. The CIF should come from the operating fund, such that, when there is no more
operating fund, the other funds cannot be used.

The funds were maintained in a commingled main account and PCSO did not have a registry of budget
utilization. The excess was not taken from the operating fund, but from the prize fund and the charity fund.

In 2005, the deficit was P916 million; in 2006, Pl,000,078,683.23. One of the causes of the deficit for 2006
was the CIF expense of P215 million, which was in excess of the approved allocation of P10 million. The net
cash provided by operating expenses in 2006 is negative, which means that there were more expenses than
what was received.

In the 2007 COA report, it was found that there was still no deposit to the prize and charity funds. The
COA made a recommendation regarding the deposits in one main account. There were also excessive
disbursements of CIF amounting to P77,478,705.

She received a copy of the PCSO corporate operating budget (COB) for the year 2008 in 2010 because
she was already a member of its Board of Directors. The 2008 approved COB has a comparative analysis
of the actual budget for 2007 (Exh. "K"). It is stated there that the budget for CTF in 2007 is only
P25,480,550. But the financial statements reflect P77 million. The budget was prepared and signed by then
PCSO General Manager Rosario Uriarte. It had accompanying Board Resolution No. 305, Series of 2008,
which was approved by then Chairperson Valencia, and board members Valdes, Morato, Domingo, and
attested to by Board Secretary Atty. Ronald T. Reyes.

In the 2008 COA report, it was noted that there was still no deposit to the prize and charity funds, adverted
in the 2007 COA report. There was already a recommendation by the COA to separate the deposits or
funds in 2007. But the COA noted that this was not followed. The financial statements show the
Confidential and the Extra-Ordinary Miscellaneous Expenses account is P38,293,137, which is more than
the P10 million that was approved.

In the Comparative Income Statement (Exh. "K"), the 2008 Confidential/Intelligence Expense budget was
approved for P28 million. The Confidential and Extra-Ordinary Miscellaneous Expenses is the account being
used for confidential and intelligence expenses. The amount in the financial statements is over the budgeted
amount of P28 million. Further, the real disbursement is more than that, based on a summary of
expenditures she had asked the treasurer to prepare.

In the Comparative Income Statement for 2009 Budget against the 2008 Actual Budget (Exh. "L"), the
budget for CIF and expenses was P60 million.

In the 2009 COA report, it was noted that there was still no deposit to the prize and charity funds, despite
the instruction or recommendation of COA. The funds were still deposited in one account. The COA
observation in 2007 states that there is juggling or commingling of funds.

After she had concluded the audit review, she reported her findings to the Board of Directors in one of their
executive meetings. The Board instructed her to go in-depth in the investigation of the disbursements of
CIF.
The Audit Committee also asked Aguas why there were disbursements in excess of P10 million. He
explained that there were board resolutions confirming additional CIF which were approved by former
President Arroyo. Aguas mentioned this in one of their meetings with the directors and corporate
secretary. The board secretary, Atty. Ed Araullo, gave them the records of those resolutions.

In the records that Araullo submitted to her, it appears that Uriarte would ask for additional CIF, by letter and
President Arroyo approves it by affixing her signature on that same letter-request. There were seven letters
or memoranda to then President Arroyo, with the subject "Request for Intelligence Fund."

She then asked their Treasurer, Mercy Hinayon, to give her a summary of all the disbursements from CIF
from 2007 to 2010. The total of all the amounts in the summaries for three years is P365,997,915.

After receiving the summaries of the disbursed checks, she asked Hinayon to give her the checks or copies
thereof. She also asked Dorothy Robles, Budget and Accounting Manager, to give her the corresponding
vouchers. Only two original checks were given to her, as the rest were with the bank. She asked her to
request certified true copies of the checks.

They were then called to the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, which was then investigating the operation
of PCSO, including the CIF. She was invited as a resource speaker in an invitation from Chairman
Teofisto Guingona III (Exh. "DD"). Before the hearing, the Committee Chairman went to the PCSO and
got some documents regarding the subject matter being investigated. Araullo was tasked to prepare all
the documents needed by the Committee. These documents included the CIF summary of disbursements,
letters of Uriarte and the approval of the former president.

She attended whenever there were committee hearings. Among those who also attended were the incoming
members if the PCSO Board Directors and the directors. Accused Valencia and Aguas were also present in
some hearings as resources speakers. They were invited in connection with the past disbursements of
PCSO related to advertising expenses, CIF, vehicles for the bishops, and the commingling of funds.

The proceedings in the Committee were recorded and she secured a copy of the transcript of stenographic
notes from the Office of the Blue Ribbon Committee. In the proceeding on June 7, 2011 (Exh. ''EE"), Uriarte
testified. The witness was about two to three meters away from Uriarte when the latter testified, and using a
microphone.

According to the witness, Uriarte testified that all the confidential intelligence projects she had proposed
were approved by President Arroyo; all the requests she gave to the President were approved and signed
by the latter personally in her (Uriarte's) presence; and all the documents pertaining to the CIF were
submitted to President Arroyo. On the other hand, Valencia and Taruc said they did not know about the
projects. Statements before the Committee are under oath.

After the Committee hearings, she then referred to the laws and regulations involved to check whether the
disbursements were in accordance with law. One of the duties and responsibilities of the audit committee
was to verify compliance with the laws.

She considered the following laws: R.A. 1169, as amended (PCSO Charter); P.D. 1445 (COA Code); LOI
1282; COA Circular 92-385, as amended by Circular 2003-002, which provides the procedure for approval of
disbursements and liquidation of confidential intelligence funds. She made a handwritten flowchart (Exh. "II")
of the allocations/disbursements/liquidation and audit of the CIF, based on LOI 1282 and the COA Circulars.
A digital presentation of this flowchart was made available.

The first step is the provision or allotment of a budget because no CIF fund can be disbursed without the
allocation. This is provided in the second whereas clause of Circular 92-385. For GOCCs, applying Circular
2003-002, there must be allocation or budget for the CIF and it should be specifically in the corporate
operating budget or would be taken from savings authorized by special provisions.

This was not followed in the PCSO CIF disbursement in 2008. The disbursement for that year was
P86,555,060. The CIF budget for that year was only P28 million, and there were no savings because they
were on deficit. This was also not followed for the year 2009. The CIF disbursement for that year was
P139,420,875. But the CIF budget was only P60 million, and there was also no savings, as they were in
deficit. For the year 2010, the total disbursement, as of June 2010, was P141,021,980. The budget was only
P60 million.
The requirements in the disbursement of the CIF are the budget and the approval of the President. If the
budget is correct, the President will approve the disbursement or release of the CIF. In this case, the
President approved the release of the fund without a budget and savings. Also, the President approved the
same in violation of LOI 1282, because there were no detailed specific project proposals and specifications
accompanying the request for additional CIF. The requests for the year 2008, 2009 and 2010 were uniform
and just enumerated the purposes, not projects. They did not contain what was required in the LOI.

The purpose of this requirement is stated in the LOI itself. The request for allocations must contain full
details and specific purposes for which the fund will be used. A detailed presentation is made to avoid
duplication of expenditures, as what had happened in the past, because of a lack of centralized planning
and organization or intelligence fund.

There was no reason for each additional intelligence fund that was approved by then President Arroyo.

The third step is the designation of the disbursing officer. In this case, the Board of Directors designated
Uriarte as Special Disbursing Officer (SDO) for the portion of the CIF that she withdrew. For the portion
withdrawn by Valencia, there was no special disbursing officer designated on record.

The designation of Uriarte was in violation of internal control which is the responsibility of the department
head, as required by Section 3 of Circular 2003-002. When she went through copies of the checks and
disbursement vouchers submitted to her, she found out that Uriarte was both the SDO and the authorized
officer to sign the vouchers and checks. She was also the payee of the checks. All the checks withdrawn
by Uriarte were paid to her and she was also the signatory of the checks.

Aside from Uriarte, Valencia also disbursed funds in the CIF. For the funds withdrawn by Valencia, he
was also the authorized officer to sign the vouchers and checks. He was also the payee of the checks.

The confidential funds were withdrawn through cash advance. She identified the vouchers and checks
pertaining to the disbursements made by Uriarte and Valencia in 2008, 2009 and 2010. The checks of
Uriarte and Valencia had the treasurer as cosignatory. The treasurer who signed depends on when the
checks were issued

She knows the signatures of Uriarte, Valencia and Aguas because they have their signatures on the records.

Uriarte and Valencia signed the vouchers to certify to the necessity and legality of the vouchers; they also
signed to approve the same, signify they are "okay" for payment and claim the amount certified and
approved as payee. Gloria P. Araullo signed as releasing officer, giving the checks to the claimants.

Accused Aguas signed the vouchers to certify that there are adequate funds and budgetary allotment, that
the expenditures were properly certified and supported by documents, and that the previous cash advances
were liquidated and accounted for. This certification means that the cash advance voucher can be released.
This is because the COA rule on cash advance is that before any subsequent cash advance is released, the
previous cash advance must be liquidated first. This certification allowed the requesting party and payee to
get the cash advance from the voucher. Without this certification, Uriarte and Valencia could not have been
able to get the cash advance. Otherwise, it was a violation of P.D. 1445 (Government Auditing Code).

The third box in the flowchart is the designation of the SDO. Board Resolutions No. 217, Series of2009
(Exh."M"), No. 2356, Series of 2009 (Exh."N"), and No. 029, Series of 2010 (Exh. "O"), resolved to designate
Uriarte as SDO for the CIF. These resolutions were signed and approved by Valencia, Taruc, Valdes,
Uriarte, Roquero and Morato. The witness is familiar with these persons' signature because their signatures
appear on PCSO official records.

Valencia designated himself as SDO upon the recommendation of COA Auditor Plaras. There was no board
resolution for this designation. There was just a certification dated February 2, 2009 (Exh. "Z 4"). This
certification was signed by Valencia himself and designates himself as the SDO since he is personally taking
care of the funds which are to be handled with utmost confidentiality. The witness is familiar with Valencia's
signature because it appears on PCSO official documents. Under COA rules, the Board of Directors has
authority to designate the SDO. The chairman could not do this by himself.

Plaras wrote a letter dated December 15, 2008 to Valencia. It appears in the letter that to substantiate the
liquidation report, Plaras told Valencia to designate himself as SDO because there was no disbursing
officer. It was the suggestion of Plaras. Plaras is the head of the CIF Unit under then COA Chairman Villar.
Liquidation vouchers and supporting papers were submitted to them, with corresponding fidelity bond.

COA Circulars 92-385 and 2003-002 indicate that to disburse CIF, one must be a special disbursing officer
or SDO. All disbursing officers of the government must have fidelity bonds. The bond is to protect the
government from and answer for misappropriation that the disbursing officer may do. The bond amount
required is the same as the amount that may be disbursed by the officer. It is based on total accountability
and not determined by the head of the agency as a matter of discretion. The head determines the
accountability which will be the basis of the bond amount.

The Charter states that the head of the agency is the Board of Directors, headed by the Chairman. But
now, under the Governance of Government Corporation law, it is the general manager.
Plaras should have disallowed or suspended the cash advances because there was no fidelity bond and the
disbursing officer was not authorized. There was no bond put up for Valencia. The records show that the
bond for Uriarte was only for the amount of Pl.5 million. This is shown in a letter dated August 23, 2010, to
COA Chairman Villar through Plaras from Aguas (Exh. "B5"), with an attachment from the Bureau of
Treasury, dated March 2, 2009. It appears there that the bond for Uriarte for the CIF covering the period
February 2009 to February 2010 was only Pl.5 million.

Aguas submitted this fidelity bond certification, which was received on August 24, 2010, late, because under
the COA Circulars, it should have been submitted when the disbursing officer was designated. It should
have been submitted to COA because a disbursing officer cannot get cash advances if they do not have a
fidelity bond.

Once an SDO is designated, the specimen signature must be submitted to COA, together with the fidelity
bond and the signatories for the cash advances.

The approval of the President pertains to the release of the budget, not its allocation. She thinks the action of
the Board was done because there was no budget. The Board's confirmation was needed because it was in
excess of the budget that was approved. They were trying to give a color of legality to them approval of the
CIF in excess of the approved corporate operating budget. The Board approval was required for the amount
to be released, which amount was approved in excess of the allotted budget for the year. The President
cannot approve an additional amount, unless there is an appropriation or a provision saying a particular
savings will be used for the CIF. The approvals here were all in excess of the approved budget.

Cash advances can be given on a per project basis for CIF. For one to get a cash advance, one must state
what the project is as to that cash advance. No subsequent cash advance should be given, until previous
cash advances have been liquidated and accounted for. If it is a continuing project, monthly liquidation
reports must be given. The difference in liquidation process between CIF and regular cash advances is that
for CIF, the liquidation goes to the Chair and not to the resident auditor of the agency or the GOCC. All of
the liquidation papers should go to the COA Chair, given on a monthly basis.

In this case, the vouchers themselves are couched generally and just say cash advance from CIF of the
Chairman or from the GM's office in accordance with her duties. There is no particular project indicated for
the cash advance. Also, the requirement that prior advances be liquidated first for subsequent advances to
be given was not followed. The witness prepared a summary of the cash advances withdrawn by the two
disbursing officers covering the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 (Exh. "D5"). The basis for this summary is the
record submitted to them by Aguas, which were supposedly submitted to COA. It shows that there were
subsequent cash advances, even if a prior advance has not yet been liquidated.

Valencia submitted liquidation reports to Villar, which consists of a letter, certification and schedule of cash
advances, and liquidation reports. One is dated July 24, 2008 (Exh. "G 5") and another is dated February 13,
2009 (Exh. "H5").

When she secured Exhibit "G5", together with the attached documents, she did not find any supporting
documents despite the statement in Exhibit "G5" that the supporting details of the expenses that were incurred
from the fund can be made available, if required. Aguas, the person who processed the cash advances said
he did not have the details or suppmiing details of documents of the expenditures.
Normally, when liquidating CIF, the certification of the head of the agency is necessary. If there were
vouchers or receipts involved, then all these should be attached to the liquidation report. There should also
be an accomplishment report which should be done on a monthly basis. All of these should be enclosed in a
sealed envelope and sent to the Chairman of the COA, although the agency concerned must retain a
photocopy of the documents. The report should have a cover/transmittal letter itemizing the documents, as
well as liquidation vouchers and other supporting papers. If the liquidation voucher and the supporting
papers are in order, then the COA Chairman or his representative shall issue a credit memorandum.
Supporting papers consist of receipts and sales invoices. The head of the agency would have to certify that
those were all actually incurred and are legal. In this case, there were no supporting documents submitted
with respect to Valencia's cash advances in 2008. Only the certifications by the SDO were submitted. These
certifications stated that he has the documents in his custody and they can be made available, if and when
necessary.

When she reviewed the CIF, she asked Aguas to produce the supporting documents which were indicated
in Valencia's certification and Aguas's own certification in the cash advance vouchers, where he also
certified that the documents supporting the cash advance were in their possession and that there was
proper liquidation. Aguas replied that he did not have them.

She identified the letter of Uriarte to Villar dated July 24, 2008 as well as a transmittal letter by Uriarte for
August 1, 2008, a certification and schedule of cash advances and an undetailed liquidation report. Among
the attachments is Board Resolution 305, a copy of the COB for 2008, a document for the second half of
2008, a document dated April 2, 2009, and a document for liquidation of P2,295,000. She also identified
another letter for P50 million, dated February 13, 2009, attached to the transmittal letter.

There is a certification attached to those two letters amounting to P2,295,000. Also attached is the
schedule of cash advances by Aguas and a liquidation report where Aguas certified that the supporting
documents are complete and proper although the supporting documents and papers are not attached to
the liquidation report, only the general statement. These documents were submitted to them by Aguas.

She was shown the four liquidation reports (Exhibits "M5", "N5", "05" and "P5") attached to the transmittal
letter and was asked whether they were properly and legally accomplished. She replied that they were
couched in general terms and the voucher for which the cash advance was liquidated is not indicated and
only the voucher number is specified. She adds that the form of the liquidation is correct, but the details are
not there and neither are the supporting papers.

The liquidation report was dated July 24, 2008, but it was submitted only on August 1, 2008 to COA, and it
supposedly covered the cash advances of Uriarte from January to May 2008. This is stated in her summary
of liquidation that was earlier marked. There were no supporting papers stated on or attached to the
liquidation report.

She identified a set of documents to liquidate the cash advances from the CIF for the second semester of
2008 by Uriarte. The transmittal letter of Uriarte was received by the COA on April 2, 2009. Upon inquiry with
Aguas, he said that he did not have any of the supporting papers that he supposedly had according to the
certification. According to him, they are with Uriarte. Uriarte, on the other hand, said, during the Senate
hearing, that she gave them to President Arroyo.

When Plaras wrote Valencia on December 15, 2008, Aguas wrote back on behalf of Valencia, who had
designated himself as SDO. However, their designations, or in what capacity they signed the voucher are not
stated. Among the attachments is also a memorandum dated April 2, 2008 (Exhibit "P 5"), containing the
signature of Arroyo, indicating her approval to the utilization of funds. Another memorandum, dated August
13, 2008, indicating the approval of Arroyo was also attached to the transmittal letter of Aguas on April 4,
2009. These two memoranda bear the reasons for the cash advances, couched in general terms. The
reasons were donated medicines that were sold and authorized expenditures on endowment fund. The
reasons stated in the memoranda are practically the same. Uriarte did not submit any accomplishment
reports regarding the intelligence fund. Aguas submitted an accomplishment report, but the accomplishments
were not indicated in definite fashion or with specificity.

The witness narrated, based on her Summary of Liquidation Reports in 2009, that the total cash advance
made by Uriarte was P132,760,096. Arroyo approved P90 million for release. P10 million in January 2009
and April 27, 2009, and then P50 million in May 6, 2009.In July 2, 2009, P10 million or a total of P70 million.
In October 2009, P20 million or a total of P90 million. The amount that was cash advanced by Valencia was
P5,660,779. Therefore, the total cash advances by these two officials were P138,420,875, but all of these
were never liquidated in 2009. Uriarte and Valencia only submitted a liquidation voucher and a report to
COA on April I2, 2010. For the January 22, 2009 disbursements, the date of the liquidation voucher was
June 30, 2009, but it was submitted to COA on April 12, 2010. Witness identified the transmittal letter for
P28 million by Uriarte, dated October 19, 2009, which was received by the COA only on April 12, 2010, with
an accompanying certification from Uriarte as to some of the documents from which the witness's Summary
of Liquidation was based.

The cash advances made by Uriarte and Valencia violated par. I, Sec. 4 and Sec. 84 of P.D. I445 and par.
2, III, COA Circular No. 92-385.

Since these cash advances were in excess of the appropriation, in effect, they were disbursed without any
appropriation. These cash advances were also made without any specific project, in violation of par. 2 of
COA Circular No. 92-385. In this case, the cash advances were not for a specific project. The vouchers only
indicate the source of the fund. The vouchers did not specify specific projects.

The total cash advances for the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 to accused Uriarte and Valencia is more than
P366,000,000. Valencia cash advanced PI 3.3 million. The rest was made by Uriarte.

The memoranda to President Arroyo stated only the problems encountered by the PCSO. These problems,
as stated in each memorandum, included donated medicines sometimes ending up in store for sale,
unofficial use of ambulances, rise of expenditures of endowment fund, lotto sweepstakes scams, fixers for
programs of the PCSO, and other fraudulent schemes. No projects were mentioned.

As regards the sixth step - the credit notice, the same was not validly issued by the COA. The credit notice is
a settlement or an action made by the COA Auditors and is given once the Chairman, in the case of CIF
Fund, finds that the liquidation report and all the supporting papers are in order. In this case, the supporting
papers and the liquidation report were not in order, hence, the credit notice should not have been issued.
Further, the credit notice has to follow a specific form. The COA Chairman or his representative can: 1)
settle the cash advance when everything is in order; 2) suspend the settlement if there are deficiencies and
then ask for submission of the deficiencies; or 3) out rightly disallow it in case said cash advances are illegal,
irregular or unconscionable, extravagant or excessive. Instead of following this form, the COA issued a
document dated January 10, 2011, which stated that there is an irregular use of the price fund and the
charity fund for CIF Fund. The document bears an annotation which says, "wait for transmittal, draft" among
others. The document was not signed by Plaras, who was the Head of the Confidential and Intelligence Fund
Unit under COA Chairman Villar. Instead, she instructed her staff to "please ask Aguas to submit the
supplemental budget." This document was not delivered to PCSO General Manager J.M. Roxas. They
instead received another letter dated January 13, 2011 which was almost identical to the first document,
except it was signed by Plaras, and the finding of the irregular use of the prize fund and the charity fund was
omitted. Instead, the work "various" was substituted and then the amount of P137,5000,000. Therefore,
instead of the earlier finding of irregularity, suddenly, the COA issued a credit notice as regards the total of
P140,000,000. The credit notice also did not specify that the transaction had been audited, indicating that no
audit was made.

A letter dated May 11, 2009 from the COA and signed by Plaras, states that the credit notice is hereby
issued. Thus, it is equivalent to the credit notice, although it did not come in the required form. It merely
stated that the credit notice is issued for P29,700,000, without specifying for which vouchers and for which
project the credit notice was being given. It merely says "First Semester of 2008". In other words, it is a
"global" credit notice that she issued and it did not state that she made an audit.

Another letter, dated July 14, 2010 and signed by Plaras, supposedly covers all the cash advances in
2009, but only up to the amount of P116,386,800. It also did not state that an audit was made.

There were no supporting papers attached to the voucher, and the certification issued is not in conformity
with the required certification by COA Circular 2003-002. The certification dated July 24, 2008 by Valencia
was not in conformity with the certification required by COA. The required form should specify the project for
which the certification was being issued, and file code of the specific project. The certification dated July 24,
2008, however, just specified that it was to certify that the P2 million from the 2008 CIF Fund was incurred
by the undersigned, in the exercise of his functions as PCSO Chairman for the various projects, projects and
activities related to the operation of the office, and there was no specific project or program or file code of
the intelligence fund, as required by COA. Furthermore, the certification also did not contain the last
paragraph as required by COA. Instead, the following was stated in the certification: "He further certifies that
the details and supporting documents and papers on these highly confidential missions and assignments are
in our custody and kept in our confidential file which can be made available if circumstances so demand." No
details or supporting documents were reviewed by the witness, and though she personally asked Aguas, the
latter said that he did not have the supporting papers, and they were not in the official files of the PCSO.
Two people should have custody of the papers, namely, The Chairman of COA and the PCSO or its Special
Disbursing Officer. The witness asked Aguas because Valencia was not there, and also because Aguas was
the one who made the certification and was in-charge of accounting. The vouchers, supposedly certified by
Aguas, as Budget and Accounting Department Manager, each time cash advances were issued, stated that
the supporting documents are complete, so the witness went to him to procure the documents.

A certification dated February 13, 2009, stating that P2,857,000 was incurred by Valencia in the exercise of
his function as PCSO Chairman, related to the operations of his office without the specific intelligence
project. In the same document, there is a certification similar to one in the earlier voucher. No details of this
certification were submitted by Aguas.

Another certification dated July 24, 2008 was presented, and it also did not specify the intelligence and
confidential project, and it did not contain any certification that the amount was disbursed legally or that no
benefits was given to any person. Similarly, the fourth paragraph of the same document states that Uriarte
certified that details and supporting papers of the cash advance that she made of P27,700,000 are "kept in
their confidential" (sic). The same were not in the PCSO official records.

The certification dated October 19, 2009 for the amount of P2,498,300, was submitted to the witness by
Aguas. It also did not conform to the COA requirements, as it also did not specify the use of the cash
advance, did not contain any certification that the cash advance was incurred for legal purposes, or that no
benefits to other people were paid out of it. Again, no supporting documents were found and none were
given by Aguas. Similarly, a certification dated February 8, 2010 for the amount of P2,394,654 was
presented, and it also does not conform with the COA circular, as it only stated that the amount was spent or
incurred by Valencia for projects covering the period of July 1 to December 31, 2009 to exercise his function
as PCSO Chairman, thus no particular intelligence fund or project was stated. As in the other certifications,
though it was stated that the details were in the confidential file, it appeared that these were not in the
possession of PCSO. Another certification dated October 19, 2009 submitted by Uriarte was examined by
the witness in the course of her audit, and found that it also did not conform to the requirements, as it only
stated that the P25 million and P10 million intelligence and confidential fund dated January 29, 2009 and
April 27, 2009 were used in the exercise of her function as PCSO Vice Chairman and General Manager.

All the documents were furnished by Aguas during the course of the audit of the financial transactions of
PCSO. Other documents given by Aguas include a letter by Valencia to COA Chairman Villar, which was
attached to the letter dated July 24, 2008. For the Certification issued by Valencia for P2,857,000, there
was also a certification attached dated February 13, 2009. As to Exhibit "J 5", together with the certification,
there was a letter but no other documents were submitted. Similarly, as to Exhibit "M 6", it was attached to a
letter dated October 19, 2009 and was submitted to the witness by Aguas. Exhibit "N 6" was attached to the
letter of Valencia dated February 8, 2010, the October 19, 2009 certification was attached to the October
19, 2009 letter to Chairman Villar.

The certification dated June 29, 2010, signed by Valencia in the amount of P2,075,000, also does not
conform with the COA requirement as it only specifies that the fund was disbursed by Valencia under his
office for various programs in the exercise of his function as Chairman. Though there was a certification that
the supporting papers were kept in the office, these papers were not found in the records of the PCSO and
Aguas did not have any of the records. The certification was attached to the letter of Valencia to Villar dated
June 29, 2010.

In the certification dated June 29, 2010 signed by Uriarte in the amount of P137 ,500,000, the witness also
said that the certification did not conform to the COA Circular because it only stated that the amount was
disbursed from a special intelligence fund, authorized and approved by the President under the disposition
of the Office of the Vice Chairman. Despite the statement certifying that there were documents for the audit,
no documents were provided and the same were not in the official files of PCSO . The certification was
attached to a letter by Uriarte dated July 1, 2010 addressed to Villar.
In the certification dated October 19, 2009 signed by Uriarte in the amount of P2,500,000, the witness made
the same finding that it also did not conform to the COA Circular, as it did not specify the project for which
the cash advance was obtained and there were also no records in the PCSO. It was attached to the letter
dated October 19, 2009.

Finally, in the certification dated February 9, 2010 signed by Uriarte in the amount of P73,993,846, the
witness likewise found that it did not conform with the requirements of the COA, as all it said was the
amount was used for the exercise of the functions of the PCSO Chairman and General Manager. The
documents related to this were also not in the PCSO records and Aguas did not submit the same. It was
attached to a letter dated February 8, 2010 from Uriarte to Villar.

There are two kinds of audit on disbursements of government funds: pre-audit and post-audit. Both are
defined in COA Circular 2009-002. Pre-audit is the examination of documents supporting the transaction,
before these are paid for and recorded. The auditor determines whether: (1) the proposed expenditure was
in compliance with the appropriate law, specific statutory authority or regulations; (2) sufficient funds are
available to enable payment of the claim; (3) the proposed expenditure is not illegal, irregular, extravagant,
unconscionable or unnecessary, and (4) the transaction is approved by the proper authority and duly
supported by authentic underlying evidence. On the other hand, the post-audit requirement is the process
where the COA or the auditor will have to do exactly what was done in the pre-audit, and in addition, the
auditor must supplement what she did by tracing the transaction under audit to the books of accounts, and
that the transaction is all recorded in the books of accounts. The auditor, in post-audit, also makes the final
determination of whether the transaction was not illegal, irregular, extravagant, excessive, unconscionable
or unnecessary.

In this case, no audit was conducted. In a letter dated May 11, 2009 signed by Plaras, it was stated that a
credit advice was given. However, the letter did not conform to the requirements or form of a credit notice.
Such form was in COA Circular 2003-002, and should specify the liquidation report number, the amount,
check numbers, and the action taken by the auditor. The auditor should also include a certification that these
have been audited. In this instance, no certification that the transaction was audited was given by Plaras.
Other similar letters did not conform with the COA Circular. All transactions of the government must be
subject to audit in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
Nevertheless, the requirements for audit are the same.

The effect of the issuance of the credit notice by the COA was that the agency will take it up in the books
and credit the cash advance. This is the seventh step in the flowchart. Once there is a cash advance, the
liability of the officers who obtained the cash advance would be recorded in the books. The credit notice,
when received, would indicate that the account was settled. The agency will credit the receivable or the cash
advance, and remove from the books as a liability of the person liable for the cash advance. The effect of
this was that the financial liabilities of Uriarte and Valencia were removed from the books, but they could still
be subject to criminal liability based on Sec. 10 of COA Circular 91-368 (Government Accounting and
Auditing Manuals, Vol. 1, implementing P.O. 1445), which states: "The settlement of an account whether or
not on appeal has been made within the statutory period is no bar to criminal prosecution against persons
liable." From the 2008 COA Annual Audited Financial Statements of PCSO, it was seen that the procedure
was not followed because the liability of the officers was already credited even before the credit notice was
received. In the financial statements, it was stated that the amount due from officers and employees, which
should include the cash advances obtained by Uriarte and Valencia, were not included because the amount
stated therein was P35 million, while the total vouchers of Uriarte and Valencia was P86 million.

The witness also related that she traced the records of the CIF fund (since such was no longer stated as a
receivable), and reviewed whether it was recorded as an expense in 2008. She found out that the recorded
CIF fund expense, as recorded in the corporate operating budget as actually disbursed, was only
P21,102,000. As such, she confronted her accountants and asked them "Saan tinago itong amount na to?"
The personnel in the accounting office said that the balance of the P86 million or the additional P21 million
was not recorded in the operating fund budget because they used the prize fund and charity fund as
instructed by Aguas. Journal Entry Voucher No. 8121443 dated December 31, 2008, signed by Elmer
Camba, Aguas (Head of the Accounting Department), and Hutch Balleras (one of the staff in the Accounting
Department), showed that this procedure was done.

The contents of the Journal Entry Voucher are as follows:

(a) Accounts and Explanation: Due to other funds. This means that the amount of P63,750,000 was
credited as confidential expense from the operating fund. The amount was then removed from the
operating fund, and it was passed on to other funds.

(b) PF Miscellaneous, Account No. 424-1-L P41,250,000 and CF Miscellaneous for 424-2-G for
P22,500,000. PF Miscellaneous means Prize Fund Miscellaneous and CF stands for Charity Fund
Miscellaneous. This means that funds used to release the cash advances to Uriarte and Valencia were
from the prize fund and charity.

Attached to the Journal Entry Voucher was a document which reads "Allocation of Confidential and
Intelligence Fund Expenses", and was the basis of Camba in doing the Journal Entry Voucher. In the same
document, there was a written annotation dated 12-31-2008 which reads that the adjustment of CIF, CF
and IF, beneficiary of the fund is CF and PF and signed by Aguas.

The year 2009 was a similar case, as the witness traced the recording of the credit notice at the end of 2009,
and despite the absence of the credit notice, the Accounting Department removed from the books of PCSO
the liability of Uriarte and Valencia, corresponding to the cash advances obtained in 2009. She based this
finding on the COA Annual Audit Report on the PCSO for the year ended December 31, 2009. It was stated
in the Audit Report that the total liability due from officers and employees was only P87,747,280 and it was
less than the total cash advances of Uriarte and Valencia, which was P138 million. As a result, the witness
checked the corresponding entry for the expenses in the corporate operating budget and found out that the
same was understated. The CIF expenses were only P24,968,300, as against the actual amount per
vouchers, which was P138,420,875. Upon checking with the Accounting Department, the department
showed her another Journal Entry Voucher No. 9121157, dated December 29, 2009, where the personnel
removed immediately the expense and recorded it as expense for the prize fund and charity fund by the end
of December 31.

The contents of the Journal Entry Voucher, especially the notation "due from'', means the accountability of
those who had cash advance was instead credited. It was removed, and the amount was P106 million. The
entry was confidential expense for P15,958,020 and then the due to other funds was P90,428,780. The
explanation for "424" was found in the middle part, stating: "424-1-L" of miscellaneous prize fund was used
in the amount of P58,502,740 and the charity fund was used in the amount of P31, 916,040. The total
amount of the receivables from Uriarte and Valencia that was removed was P106,386,800 and P90,428,780
respectively which came from the prize fund and charity fund.

The witness reported the discrepancy because there were violations of R.A. 1169, Sec. 6, which provides for
the different funds of PCSO namely: prize fund (55% of the net receipts), charity fund (30% of the net
receipts), and operating fund (15% ). The proceeds of the lotto and sweepstakes ticket sales provide the
money for these different funds, removing first the printing cost and the net proceeds (98%) is divided among
the three funds mentioned. The prize fund is the fund set aside to be used to pay the prizes for the winnings
in the lotto or sweepstakes draws, whether they are jackpot or consolation prizes. Incentives to the lotto
operators or horse owners are also drawn from this fund, as all of the expenses connected to the winnings of
the draw. On the other hand, the charity fund is reserved for charity programs approved by the board of
PCSO, and constitutes hospital and medical assistance to individuals, or to help facilities and other charities
of national character. Operating expenses are charged to the expenses to operate, personnel services, and
MOOE. One kind of fund cannot be used for another kind as they become a trust fund which should only be
used for the purpose for which it was authorized, not even with the approval of the board.

The amounts obtained from the charity fund and prize fund for 2008 was P63,750,000, and in 2009
P90,428,780. The Board of Directors was given a copy of the COA Audit Reports for years 2008 and 2009.
The Board of Directors for both years was composed of: Chairman Valencia, and Board Members Morato,
Roquero, Taruc and Valdez. Uriarte was the Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors. The witness did not
know whether the Board checked the COA reports, but there was no action on their part, and neither did
they question the correctness of the statements. They also had the Audit Committee (which was composed
of members of the board) at that time, and one of the duties of the Audit Committee was to verify the
balances.

The witness identified the documents referring to the confirmation by the Board of Directors of PCSO of the
CIF. Board Resolution No. 217, approved on February 18, 2009, confirms the CIF approved by the
President. It did not state which CIF they were approving. They also assigned Uriarte as the Special
Disbursing Officer of the CIF, but it did say for what year. The signatories to the same Board Resolution
were Valencia, Taruc, Valdes, Uriarte, Roquero and Morato. The same were the witness's findings for
Board Resolution No. 2356 S. 2009, approved on December 9, 2009. As for Board Resolution No. 29, S.
2010, approved on January 6, 2010, the Board confirmed the fund approved by the President for 2010,
though the approval of the President was only received on August 13, 2010 as shown in the Memorandum
dated January 4. In effect, the Board was aware of the requests, and because they ratified the cash
advances, they agreed to the act of obtaining the same.

Apart from the President violating LOI 1282, the witness also observed that the President directly dealt with
the PCSO, although the President, by Executive Order No. 383 dated November 14, 2004, and Executive
Order No. 455 dated August 22, 2005, transferred the direct control and supervision of the PCSO to the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), and later to the Department of Health (DOH). A
project should first be approved by the Supervising and Controlling Secretary of the Secretary of Health; that
the President had transferred her direct control and supervision, and lost the same. The witness said her
basis was administrative procedure. In this regard, President Aquino now has transferred the control and
supervision of the PCSO back to the Office of the President through Executive Order No. 14, S. 2010, dated
November 19, 2010.

Uriarte should not have gone directly to the President to ask for the latter's approval for allocation.
Nonetheless, the release of the CIF must still be approved by the President. 9

The State also presented evidence consisting in the testimonies of officers coming from different law
enforcement agencies10 to corroborate Tolentino's testimony to the effect that the PCSO had not
requested from their respective offices any intelligence operations contrary to the liquidation report
submitted by Uriarte and Aguas.

To complete the evidence for the Prosecution, Atty. Anamarie Villaluz Gonzales, Office-in-Charge and
Department Manager of the Human Resources of PCSO; Flerida Africa Jimenez, Head of the Intelligence
and Confidential Fund Audit Unit of the COA; and Noel Clemente, Director of COA were presented as
additional witnesses.

After the Prosecution rested its case, GMA, Aguas, Valencia, Morato, Taruc V, Roquero and Villar
separately filed their demurrers to evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for
plunder against them.

On April 6, 2015, the Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers to evidence of Morato, Roquero, Taruc and
Villar, and dismissed the charge against them. It held that said accused who were members of the PCSO
Board of Directors were not shown to have diverted any PCSO funds to themselves, or to have raided the
public treasury by conveying and transferring into their possession and control any money or funds from
PCSO account; that as to Villar, there had been no clear showing that his designation of Plaras had been
tainted with any criminal design; and that the fact that Plaras had signed "by authority" of Villar as the COA
Chairman could not criminally bind him in the absence of any showing of conspiracy.

However, the Sandiganbayan denied the demurrers of GMA, Aguas and Valencia, holding that there was
sufficient evidence showing that they had conspired to commit plunder; and that the Prosecution had
sufficiently established a case of malversation against Valencia, pertinently saying:

Demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence
which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or
sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a
verdict. The court then ascertains whether there is a competent or sufficient evidence to sustain
the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.

xxxx

Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in character, weight or
amount as will legally justify the judicial or official action demanded to accord to circumstances. To be
considered sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove (a) the commission of the crime, and (b) the precise
degree of paiiicipation therein by the accused (Gutib v. CA, 110 SCAD 743, 312 SCRA 365 [1999]).
 xxx xxx xxx

A. Demurrer filed by Arroyo and Aguas:

It must be remembered that in Our November 5, 2013 Resolution, We found strong evidence of guilt
against Arroyo and Aguas, only as to the second predicate act charged in the Information, which
reads:

(b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several instances, the above-mentioned
amount from the Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts, and/or unlawfully transferring or
conveying the same into their possession and control through irregularly issued disbursement vouchers and
fictitious expenditures.

In the November 5, 2013 Resolution, We said:

It should be noted that in both R.A. No. 7080 and the PCGG rules, the enumeration of the possible
predicate acts in the commission of plunder did not associate or require the concept of personal
gain/benefit or unjust enrichment with respect to raids on the public treasury, as a means to commit
plunder. It would, therefore, appear that a "raid on the public treasury" is consummated where all the acts
necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present. Thus a "raid on the public treasury" can be
said to have been achieved thru the pillaging or looting of public coffers either through misuse,
misappropriation or conversion, without need of establishing gain or profit to the raider. Otherwise
stated, once a "raider" gets material possession of a government asset through improper means
and has free disposal of the same, the raid or pillage is completed. x x x

xxxx

Clearly, the improper acquisition and illegal use of CIF funds, which is obviously a government asset, will
amount to a raid on the public treasury, and therefore fall into the category of ill-gotten wealth.

xxxx

xxx It is not disputed that Uriarte asked for and was granted authority by Arroyo to use additional CIF funds
during the period 2008-2010. Uriarte was able [to] accumulate during that period CIF funds in the total
amount of P.352,681,646. This was through a series of withdrawals as cash advances of the CIF funds
from the PCSO coffers, as evidenced by the disbursement vouchers and checks issued and encashed by
her, through her authorized representative.

These flagrant violations of the rules on the use of CIF funds evidently characterize the series of
withdrawals by and releases to Uriarte as "raids" on the PCSO coffers, which is part of the public
treasury. These were, in every sense, "pillage," as Uriarte looted government funds and appears to
have not been able to account for it. The monies came into her possession and, admittedly, she
disbursed it for purposes other than what these were intended for, thus, amounting to "misuse" of the
same. Therefore, the additional CIF funds are ill-gotten, as defined by R.A. 7080, the PCGG rules,
and Republic v. Sandiganbayan. The encashment of the checks, which named her as the "payee,"
gave Uriarte material possession of the CIF funds which she disposed of at will.

As to the determination whether the threshold amount of P50million was met by the prosecution's evidence,
the Court believes this to have been established. Even if the computation is limited only to the cash
advances/releases made by accused Uriarte alone AFTER Arroyo had approved her requests and the
PCSO Board approved CIF budget and the "regular" P5million CIF budget accorded to the PCSO Chairman
and Vice Chairman are NOT taken into account, still the total cash advances through accused Uriarte's
series of withdrawals will total P189,681,646. This amount surpasses the P50million threshold.

The evidence shows that for the year 2010 alone, Uriarte asked for P150 million additional CIF funds,
and Arroyo granted such request and authorized its use. From January 8, 2010 up to June 18, 2010,
Uriarte made a series of eleven (11) cash advances in the total amount of P138,223,490. According
to Uriarte's testimony before the Senate, the main purpose for these cash advances was for the
"roll-out" of the small town lottery program. However, the accomplishment report submitted by Aguas
shows that P137,500,000 was spent on non-related PCSO activities, such as "bomb threat,
kidnapping, terrorism and bilateral and security relations." All the cash advances made by Uriarte in
2010 were made in violation of LOI 1282, and COA Circulars 2003-002 and 92-385. These were thus
improper use of the additional Cff funds amounting to raids on the PCSO coffers and were ill-gotten
because Uriarte had encashed the checks and came into possession of the monies, which she had
complete freedom to dispose of but was not able to properly account for.

These findings of the Court clearly point out the commission by Uriarte of the crime of Plunder under
the second predicate act charged in the Information. As to Arroyo's participation, the Court stated in
its November 5, 2013 Resolution that:

The evidence shows that Arroyo approved not only Uriarte's request for additional CIF funds in 2008-
2010, but also authorized the latter to use such funds. Arroyo's "OK" notation and signature on
Uriartc's letter-requests signified unqualified approval of Uriarte's request to use the additional
CIF funds because the last paragraph of Uriarte's requests uniformly ended with this phrase:
"With the use of intelligence fund, PCSO can protect its image and integrity of its operations.

The letter-request of Uriarte in 2010 was more explicit because it categorically asked for: "The approval on
the use of the fifty percent of the PR Fund as PCSO Intelligence Fund will greatly help PCSO in the
disbursement of funds to immediately address urgent issues."

Arroyo cannot, therefore, successfully argue that what she approved were only the request for the grant or
allocation of additional CIF funds, because Arroyo's "OK" notation was unqualified and, therefore,
covered also the request to use such funds, through releases of the same in favor of Uriarte. 11

The Sandiganbayan later also denied the respective Motions for Reconsideration of GMA and Aguas,
observing that:

In this case, to require proof that monies went to a plunderer's bank account or was used to
acquire real or personal properties or used for any other purpose to personally benefit the
plunderer, is absurd. Suppose a plunderer had already illegally amassed, acquired or accumulated P50
Million or more of government funds and just decided to keep it in his vault and never used such funds for
any purpose to benefit him, would that not be plunder? Or, if immediately right after such amassing, the
monies went up in flames or recovered by the police, negating any opportunity for the person to actually
benefit, would that not still be plunder? Surely, in such cases, a plunder charge could still prosper and the
argument that the fact of personal benefit should still be evidence-based must fail.

Also, accused Arroyo insists that there was no proof of the fact of amassing the ill-gotten wealth, and that
the "overt act" of approving the disbursement is not the "overt act" contemplated by law. She further
stresses that there was no proof of conspiracy between accused Arroyo and her co-accused and that the
Prosecution was unable to prove their case against accused Arroyo. What accused Arroyo forgets is that
although she did not actually commit any "overt act" of illegally amassing CIF funds, her act of
approving not only the additional CIF funds but also their releases, aided and abetted accused
Uriarte's successful raids on the public treasury. Accused Arroyo is therefore rightly charged as a
coconspirator of Uriarte who accumulated the CIF funds. Moreover, the performance of an overt act is
not indispensable when a conspirator is the mastermind.12

Considering that the Sandiganbayan denied the demurrers to evidence of GMA and Aguas, they have
come to the Court on certiorari to assail and set aside said denial, claiming that the denial was with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Issues

GMA pleads that the denial of her demurrer to evidence was in patent and flagrant violation of Republic Act
No. 7080, the law on plunder, and was consequently arbitrary and oppressive, not only in grave abuse of
discretion but rendered without jurisdiction because:

First Ground

On the basis of the above Resolutions, the Sandiganbayan has denied petitioner Arroyo's Demurrer
to Evidence and considering the reasons for doing so, would find petitioner Arroyo guilty of the
offense of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 as charged in the Information notwithstanding the
following:

a. While the gravamen, indeed corpus delicti of the offense of plunder under R.A. No. 7080, and as
charged in the Information, is that the public officer ... "amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section l(d) hereof,
in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00)", the
Sandiganbayan Resolutions extirpate this vital element of the offense of plunder;

b. In point of fact, not a single exhibit of the 637 exhibits offered by the prosecution nor a
single testimony of the 21 witnesses of the prosecution was offered by the prosecution to
prove that petitioner amassed, accumulated or acquired even a single peso of the alleged ill-
gotten wealth amounting to P365,997,915.00 or any part of that amount alleged in the
Information;

c. Implicitly confirming the above, and aggravating its error, on the basis solely of petitioner
Arroyo's authorization of the release of the Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts,
the Sandiganbayan ruled that she has committed the offense of plunder under R.A. No. 7080 for the
reason that her release of CIF funds to the PCSO amount to a violation of Sec. l(d) [11 of R.A. No.
7080 which reads, as follows:

1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on

the public treasury;

which, "did not associate or require the concept of personal gain/benefit or un.just enrichment with
respect to raids on the public treasury", thereby disregarding the gravamen or the corpus delicti of
the offense of plunder under R.A. No. 7080.

Second Ground

Worsening the above error of the Sandiganbayan, the Resolutions, with absolutely no justification in
law or in the evidence, purportedly as the "mastermind" of a conspiracy, and without performing
any overt act, would impute to petitioner Arroyo the "series of withdrawals as cash advances of the
CIF funds from the PCSO coffers" by Uriarte as "raids on the PCSO coffers, which is part of the
public treasury" and "in every sense, 'pillage' as Uriarte looted government funds and appears to
have not been able to account for it". Parenthetically, Uriarte has not been arrested, was not
arraigned and did not participate in the trial of the case.

Third Ground
That as an obvious consequence of the above, denial of petitioner Arroyo's Demurrer To Evidence
for the reasons stated in the Sandiganbayan Resolutions, amounting no less to convicting her on the
basis of a disjointed reading of the crime of plunder as defined in R.A. No. 7080, aggravated by the
extirpation in the process of its "corpus delicti" - the amassing, accumulation or acquisition of ill-
gotten wealth, hence, of a crime that docs not exist in law and consequently a blatant deprivation of
liberty without due process of law.

Fourth Ground

The Information alleges that the ten (10) persons accused in Crim. Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174,
namely: Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Rosario C. Uriarte, Sergio 0. Valencia, Manuel L. Morato, Jose R.
Taruc V, Raymundo T. Roquero, [M]a. Fatima A.S. Valdes, Benigno B. Aguas, Reynaldo A. Villar and
Nilda B. Plaras" ... all public officers committing the offense in relation to their respective offices
and taking undue advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships,
connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and/or acquire, directly or indirectly, ill-
gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE MILLION NINE
HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTEEN PESOS (PHP365,997,915.00), more
or less, through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or
means, described as follows ... " or each of them, P36,599,791.50 which would not qualify the
offense charged as "plunder" under R.A. No. 7080 against all ten (10) accused together, for which
reason the Information docs not charge the offense of plunder and, as a consequence, all
proceedings thereafter held under the Information arc void.13

On his part, Aguas contends that:

A. In light of the factual setting described above and the evidence offered and admitted, docs proof
beyond reasonable doubt exist to warrant a holding that Prosecution proved the guilt of the
accused such that there is legal reason to deny Petitioner's Demurrer'?

B. Did the Prosecution's offered evidence squarely and properly support the allegations in
the Information'?

PETITIONER STRONGLY SUBMITS THAT PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH BY PROOF

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE EXISTENCE OF THE CORE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME
OF PLUNDER.14

On the other hand, the Prosecution insists that the petitions for certiorari should be dismissed upon the
following grounds, namely:

A. CERTIORARI IS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY FROM AN ORDER OR RESOLUTION DENYING

DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.

B. THERE IS NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BECAUSE THE SANDIGANBAYAN MERELY

INTERPRETED WHAT CONSTITUTES PLUNDER UNDER LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN LIGHT OF
FACTS OF THE CASE. IT DID NOT JUDICIALLY LEGISLATE A "NEW" OFFENSE.
1. ACTUAL PERSONAL GAIN, BENEFIT OR ENRICHMENT IS NOT AN ELEMENT OF PLUNDER
UNDER R.A. No. 7080.

2. EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT ARROYO, BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION, CONSPIRED WITH

HER CO- ACCUSED AND PARTICIPATED IN THE COMPLEX, ILLEGAL SCHEME WHICH
DEFRAUDED PCSO IN HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF PESOS, WHICH CONSTITUTES PLUNDER.

3. ARROYO IS NOT SIMILARLY SITUATED WITH ACCUSED PCSO BOARD MEMBERS AND
CANNOT THUS DEMAND THAT THE SANDIGANBA YAN DISMISS THE PLUNDER CASE AGAINST
HER.

C. ARROYO'S BELATED, COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE INFORMATION CHARGING HER AND CO-
ACCUSED FOR PLUNDER IS HIGHLY IMPROPER, ESPECIALLY AT THIS LA TE STAGE OF THE
PROCEEDING.

1. THE FACTS CONSTITUTING THE OFFENSE ARE CLEARLY ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION.

2. ARROYO'S ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCEEDINGS ARISING FROM OR RELATING TO

SB-12- CRM-0174 PROVES THAT SHE HAS ALWAYS KNOWN AND UNDERSTOOD THE NATURE
AND SCOPE OF THE ACCUSATIONS AGAINST HER.

D. ARROYO IS NOT ENTITLED TO A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE THE

CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN SB-12-CRM-0174 CANNOT BE ENJOINED.15

Based on the submissions of the parties, the Court synthesizes the decisive issues to be considered and
resolved, as follows:

Procedural Issue:

1. Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the denial of the demurrers to
evidence.

Substantive Issues:
1. Whether or not the State sufficiently established the existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas, and
Uriarte;

2. Whether or not the State sufficiently established all the elements of the crime of plunder:

a. Was there evidence of amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the total amount of not
less than P50,000,000.00?

b. Was the predicate act of raiding the public treasury alleged in the information proved by the
Prosecution?

Ruling of the Court

The consolidated petitions for certiorari are meritorious

I.
The Court cannot be deprived of its jurisdiction to
correct grave abuse of discretion

The Prosecution insists that the petition for certiorari of GMA was improper to challenge the denial of her
demurrer to evidence; that she also thereby failed to show that there was grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Sandiganbayan in denying her demurrer to evidence; and that, on the contrary, the
Sandiganbayan only interpreted what constituted plunder under the law and jurisprudence in light of the
established facts, and did not legislate a new offense, by extensively discussing how she had connived with
her co-accused to commit plunder.16

The Court holds that it should take cognizance of the petitions for certiorari because
the Sandiganbayan, as shall shortly be demonstrated, gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued by
the trial court because of the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of
law.17 Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that "the order denying the
motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal
or by certiorari before judgment." It is not an insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that the denial of
the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory order that did not terminate the
proceedings, and the proper recourse of the demurring accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their
conviction they may then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as among the errors to be reviewed.18
Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of certiorari may issue should not be limited,19
because to do so –

x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the court
that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition
or mandamus. In the exercise of our superintending control over other courts, we are to be guided
by all the circumstances of each particular case 'as the ends of justice may require.' So it is that the
writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.20

The Constitution itself has imposed upon the Court and the other courts of justice the duty to correct errors
of jurisdiction as a result of capricious, arbitrary, whimsical and despotic exercise of discretion by expressly
incorporating in Section 1 of Article VIII the following provision:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to
the contrary or for the sake of the convenience of one side. This is because the Court has the bounden
constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus,
notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence, the
petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy
of certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.21 As we shall soon show,
the Sandiganbayan as the trial court was guilty of grave abuse of discretion when it capriciously denied the
demurrers to evidence despite the absence of competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment
for plunder, and despite the absence of the factual bases to expect a guilty verdict. 22

II.
The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove
the existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony, and decide to commit it.23 In this jurisdiction, conspiracy is either a crime in itself or a mere
means to commit a crime.

As a rule, conspiracy is not a crime unless the law considers it a crime, and prescribes a penalty for it. 24
The exception is exemplified in Article 115 (conspiracy and proposal to commit treason), Article 136
(conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d'etat, rebellion or insurrection) and Article 141 (conspiracy to
commit sedition) of the Revised Penal Code. When conspiracy is a means to commit a crime, it is
indispensable that the agreement to commit the crime among all the conspirators, or their community of
criminal design must be alleged and competently shown.

We also stress that the community of design to commit an offense must be a conscious one.25 Conspiracy
transcends mere companionship, and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to
conspiracy. Even knowledge of, or acquiescence in, or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute
one a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose.26 Hence, conspiracy must be established, not by conjecture,
but by positive and conclusive evidence.

In terms of proving its existence, conspiracy takes two forms. The first is the express form, which requires
proof of an actual agreement among all the co-conspirators to commit the crime. However, conspiracies are
not always shown to have been expressly agreed upon. Thus, we have the second form, the implied
conspiracy. An implied conspiracy exists when two or more persons are shown to have aimed by their acts
towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts,
though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiment.27 Implied conspiracy is proved through the mode and manner
of the commission of the offense, or from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of
the crime indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a concert of action and a community of interest.28

But to be considered a part of the conspiracy, each of the accused must be shown to have performed at
least an overt act in pursuance or in furtherance of the conspiracy, for without being shown to do so none of
them will be liable as a co-conspirator, and each may only be held responsible for the results of his own
acts. In this connection, the character of the overt act has been explained in People v. Lizada:29

An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a
particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination
following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance
of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison d'etre for the law
requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting
merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so,
irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the
act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the crime, or an
overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason
that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the
accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation
of the design. It is sufficient if it was the "first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the
commission of the offense after the preparations are made." The act done need not constitute the last
proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal relation
to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary
relation to the offense. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

In her case, GMA points out that all that the State showed was her having affixed her unqualified "OK" on
the requests for the additional CIFs by Uriarte. She argues that such act was not even an overt act of
plunder because it had no immediate and necessary relation to plunder by virtue of her approval not being
per se illegal or irregular. However, the Sandiganbayan, in denying the Motions for Reconsideration of GMA
and Aguas vis-a-vis the denial of the demurrers, observed that:

xxxx accused Arroyo insists that there was no proof of the fact of amassing the ill-gotten wealth, and that
the "overt act" of approving the disbursement is not the "overt act" contemplated by Jaw. She further
stresses that there was no proof of conspiracy between accused Arroyo and her co-accused and that the
Prosecution was unable to prove their case against accused Arroyo. What accused Arroyo forgets is that
although she did not actually commit any "overt act" of illegally amassing CIF funds, her act of approving not
only the additional CIF funds but also their releases, aided and abetted accused Uriarte's successful raids
on the public treasury. Accused Arroyo is therefore rightly charged as a co- conspirator of Uriarte who
accumulated the CIF funds. Moreover, the performance of an overt act is not indispensable when a
conspirator is the mastermind.30

It is in this regard that the Sandigabayan gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of its
jurisdiction. To start with, its conclusion that GMA had been the mastermind of plunder was plainly
conjectural and outrightly unfounded considering that the information did not aver at all that she had been
the mastermind; hence, the Sandigabayan thereby acted capriciously and arbitrarily. In the second place,
the treatment by the Sandiganbayan of her handwritten unqualified "OK" as an overt act of plunder was
absolutely unwarranted considering that such act was a common legal and valid practice of signifying
approval of a fund release by the President. Indeed, pursuant to People v. Lizada, supra, an act or conduct
becomes an overt act of a crime only when it evinces a causal relation to the intended crime because the act
or conduct will not be an overt act of the crime if it does not have an immediate and necessary relation to the
offense.

In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,31the Court recognized two nuances of appreciating conspiracy as a means to

commit a crime, the wheel conspiracy and the chain conspiracy.

The wheel conspiracy occurs when there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing individually with two
or more other persons or groups (the spokes). The spoke typically interacts with the hub rather than with
another spoke. In the event that the spoke shares a common purpose to succeed, there is a single
conspiracy. However, in the instances when each spoke is unconcerned with the success of the other
spokes, there are multiple conspiracies.32

An illustration of wheel conspiracy wherein there is only one conspiracy involved was the conspiracy
alleged in the information for plunder filed against former President Estrada and his co-conspirators.
Former President Estrada was the hub while the spokes were all the other accused individuals. The rim
that enclosed the spokes was the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation
and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.

On the other hand, the American case of Kotteakos v. United States33 illustrates a wheel conspiracy where
multiple conspiracies were established instead of one single conspiracy. There, Simon Brown, the hub,
assisted 31 independent individuals to obtain separate fraudulent loans from the US Government. Although
all the defendants were engaged in the same type of illegal activity, there was no common purpose or
overall plan among them, and they were not liable for involvement in a single conspiracy.
Each loan was an end in itself, separate from all others, although all were alike in having similar illegal
objects. Except for Brown, the common figure, no conspirator was interested in whether any loan except
his own went through. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there existed 32 separate
conspiracies involving Brown rather than one common conspiracy.34

The chain conspiracy recognized in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan exists when there is successive
communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between
manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer.35

This involves individuals linked together in a vertical chain to achieve a criminal objective. 36 Illustrative of
chain conspiracy was that involved in United States v. Bruno,37of the US Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. There, 88 defendants were indicted for a conspiracy to import, sell, and possess narcotics. This
case involved several smugglers who had brought narcotics to retailers who, in turn, had sold the narcotics
to operatives in Texas and Louisiana for distribution to addicts. The US Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit ruled that what transpired was a single chain conspiracy in which the smugglers knew that the
middlemen must sell to retailers for distribution to addicts, and the retailers knew that the middle men must
purchase drugs from smugglers. As reasoned by the court, "the conspirators at one end of the chain knew
that the unlawful business would not and could not, stop with their buyers; and those at the other end knew
that it had not begun with their sellers." Each conspirator knew that "the success of that part with which he
was immediately concerned was dependent upon success of the whole." This means, therefore, that "every
member of the conspiracy was liable for every illegal transaction carried out by other members of the
conspiracy in Texas and in Louisiana."38

Once the State proved the conspiracy as a means to commit a crime, each co-conspirator is as criminally
liable as the others, for the act of one is the act of all. A co-conspirator does not have to participate in every
detail of the execution; neither does he have to know the exact part performed by the co- conspirator in the
execution of the criminal act.39 Otherwise, the criminal liability of each accused is individual and
independent.

The Prosecution insisted that a conspiracy existed among GMA, Uriarte, Valencia and the Members of
the PCSO Board of Directors, Aguas, Villar and Plaras. The Sandiganbayan agreed with the Prosecution
as to the conspirators involved, declaring that GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte had conspired and committed
plunder.

A review of the records of the case compels us to reject the Sandiganbayan's declaration in light of the
information filed against the petitioners, and the foregoing exposition on the nature, forms and extent of
conspiracy. On the contrary, the Prosecution did not sufficiently allege the existence of a conspiracy
among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.

A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an implied conspiracy
to commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of their collective actions prior to, during and after
the implied agreement. It is notable that the Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among all of the
accused was by express agreement or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain conspiracy.

This was another fatal flaw of the Prosecution.

In its present version, under which the petitioners were charged, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080
(Plunder Law) states:

Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. – Any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or
series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at
least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of
penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as
provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all
ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of
stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State. [As Amended by
Section 12, Republic Act No. 7659 (The Death Penalty Law)]

Section l(d) of Republic Act No. 7080 provides:

Section 1. Definition of terms. - As used in this Act, the term:

 xxxx

d. "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person
within the purview of Section two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies,
nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following
means or similar schemes:

1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury;
2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer
concerned;

3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or
any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries;

4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of
interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking;

5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or

implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

6. By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to

unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino
people and the Republic of the Philippines.

The law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must be identified as the one who amassed,
acquired or accumulated ill-gotten wealth because it plainly states that plunder is committed by any public
officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill- gotten wealth in
the aggregate amount or total value of at least P50,000,000.00 through a combination or series of overt
criminal acts as described in Section l(d) hereof. Surely, the law requires in the criminal charge for plunder
against several individuals that there must be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be
members of her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons. In other words, the allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the information was
appropriate because the main plunderer would then be identified in either manner. Of course, implied
conspiracy could also identify the main plunderer, but that fact must be properly alleged and duly proven by
the Prosecution.

This interpretation is supported by Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,40where the Court explained the nature of the
conspiracy charge and the necessity for the main plunderer for whose benefit the amassment,
accumulation and acquisition was made, thus:

There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national
economy" is made up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore,
different parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused and their
different criminal acts have a commonality - to help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the different participation of
each accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each
accused agreed to receive protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of
the tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle
Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from
commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to
participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth
of and/or for former President Estrada. [bold underscoring supplied for emphasis]
Here, considering that 10 persons have been accused of amassing, accumulating and/or acquiring ill- gotten
wealth aggregating P365,997,915.00, it would be improbable that the crime charged was plunder if none of
them was alleged to be the main plunderer. As such, each of the 10 accused would account for the aliquot
amount of only P36,599,791.50, or exactly 1/10 of the alleged aggregate ill-gotten wealth, which is far below
the threshold value of ill-gotten wealth required for plunder.

We are not unmindful of the holding in Estrada v. Sandiganabayan41 to the effect that an information
alleging conspiracy is sufficient if the information alleges conspiracy either: (1) with the use of the word
conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by allegations of
the basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would
know what is being conveyed, and with such precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a
plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. We are not talking about the sufficiency of the
information as to the allegation of conspiracy, however, but rather the identification of the main plunderer
sought to be prosecuted under R.A. No. 7080 as an element of the crime of plunder. Such identification of
the main plunderer was not only necessary because the law required such identification, but also because
it was essential in safeguarding the rights of all of the accused to be properly informed of the charges they
were being made answerable for. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of the crime charged
to be set out in the information is to enable all the accused to suitably prepare their defense because they
are presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constituted the offense charged.42

For sure, even the Sandiganbayan was at a loss in this respect. Despite the silence of the information on who
the main plunderer or the mastermind was, the Sandiganbayan readily condemned GMA in its resolution
dated September 10, 2015 as the mastermind despite the absence of the specific allegation in the information
to that effect. Even worse, there was no evidence that substantiated such sweeping generalization.

In fine, the Prosecution's failure to properly allege the main plunderer should be fatal to the cause of the
State against the petitioners for violating the rights of each accused to be informed of the charges against
each of them.

Nevertheless, the Prosecution insists that GMA, Uriarte and Aguas committed acts showing the existence
of an implied conspiracy among themselves, thereby making all of them the main plunderers. On this score,
the Prosecution points out that the sole overt act of GMA to become a part of the conspiracy was her
approval via the marginal note of "OK" of all the requests made by Uriarte for the use of additional
intelligence fund. The Prosecution stresses that by approving Uriaiie's requests in that manner, GMA
violated the following:

a. Letter of Instruction 1282, which required requests for additional confidential and intelligence funds
(CIFs) to be accompanied with detailed, specific project proposals and specifications; and

b. COA Circular No. 92-385, which allowed the President to approve the release of additional CIFs only if
there was an existing budget to cover the request.

The insistence of the Prosecution is unwarranted. GMA's approval of Uriarte's requests for additional CIFs
did not make her part of any design to raid the public treasury as the means to amass, accumulate and
acquire ill-gotten wealth. Absent the specific allegation in the information to that effect, and competent
proof thereon, GMA' s approval of Uriarte' s requests, even if unqualified, could not make her part of any
criminal conspiracy to commit plunder or any other crime considering that her approval was not by any
means irregular or illegal.

The Prosecution takes GMA to task for approving Uriarte's request despite the requests failing to provide
"the full detail [ ofJ the specific purposes for which said funds shall be spent and shall explain the
circumstances giving rise to the necessity for the expenditure and the particular aims to be accomplished."
It posits that the requests were not specific enough, contrary to what is required by LOI 1282.

LOI 1282 reads:

LETTER OF INSTRUCTION No. 1282

To: All Ministries and Offices Concerned

In recent years intelligence funds appropriated for the various ministries and certain offices have been, as
reports reaching me indicate, spent with less than full regard for secrecy and prudence. On the one hand,
there have been far too many leakages of information on expenditures of said funds; and on the other hand,
where secrecy has been observed, the President himself was often left unaware of how these funds had
been utilized.

Effective immediately, all requests for the allocation or release of intelligence funds shall indicate in full detail
the specific purposes for which said funds shall be spent and shall explain the circumstances giving rise to
the necessity for the expenditure and the particular aims to be accomplished.

The requests and the detailed explanations shall be submitted to the President personally.

It is imperative that such detailed presentations be made to the President in order to avoid such
duplication of expenditures as has taken place in the past because of the lack of centralized planning
and organized disposition of intelligence funds.

Full compliance herewith is desired. Manila,

January 12, 1983.
(Sgd.) FERDINANDE. MARCOS
President of the Philippines

However, an examination of Uriarte' s several requests indicates their compliance with LOI No. 1282. The
requests, similarly worded, furnished: (a) the full details of the specific purposes for which the funds would
be spent; (b) the explanations of the circumstances giving rise to the necessity of the expenditure; and (c)
the particular aims to be accomplished.
The specific purposes and circumstances for the necessity of the expenditures were laid down as
follows:

In dispensing its mandate, PCSO has been constantly encountering a number of fraudulent schemes and
nefarious activities on a continuing basis which affect the integrity of our operations, to wit:

1. Donated medicines sometimes end up in drug stores for sale even if they were labeled "Donated by
PCSO- Not for Sale";

2. Unwarranted or unofficial use of ambulances by beneficiarydonees;

3. Unauthorized expenditures of endowment fund for charity patients and organizations;

4. Lotto and sweepstakes scams victimizing innocent people of winning the jackpot and selling tampered
tickets as winning tickets;

5. Fixers for the different programs of PCSO such as Ambulance Donation Project, Endowment Fund
Program and Individual Medical Assistance Program;

6. Other fraudulent schemes and activities which put the PCSO in bad light.43

A reading of the requests also reveals that the additional CIFs requested were to be used to protect PCSO's
image and the integrity of its operations. The Court thus cannot share the Prosecution's dismissiveness of
the requests for not being compliant with LOI No. 1282. According to its terms, LOI No. 1282 did not detail
any qualification as to how specific the requests should be made. Hence, we should not make any other
pronouncement than to rule that Uriarte's requests were compliant with LOI No.
1282.

COA Circular No. 92-385 required that additional request for CIFs would be approved only when there was
available budget. In this regard, the Prosecution suggests that there was no longer any budget when GMA
approved Uriarte's requests because the budget had earmarked intelligence funds that had already been
maxed out and used. The suggestion is not acceptable, however, considering that the funds of the PCSO
were comingled into one account as early as 2007. Consequently, although only 15% of PCSO's revenues
was appropriated to an operation fund from which the CIF could be sourced, the remaining 85% of PCSO's
revenues, already co-mingled with the operating fund, could still sustain the additional requests. In short,
there was available budget from which to draw the additional requests for CIFs.

It is notable that the COA, although frowning upon PCSO's co-mingling of funds, did not rule such co-
mingling as illegal. As such, sourcing the requested additional CIFs from one account was far from illegal.

Lastly, the Prosecution's effort to show irregularities as badges of bad faith has led it to claim that GMA had
known that Uriarte would raid the public treasury, and would misuse the amounts disbursed. This
knowledge was imputed to GMA by virtue of her power of control over PCSO.

The Prosecution seems to be relying on the doctrine of command responsibility to impute the actions of
subordinate officers to GMA as the superior officer. The reliance is misplaced, for incriminating GMA under
those terms was legally unacceptable and incomprehensible. The application of the doctrine of command
responsibility is limited, and cannot be true for all litigations. The Court ruled in Rodriguez v. Macapagal-
Arroyo44that command responsibility pertains to the responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by
subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or
domestic conflict. The doctrine has also found application in civil actions for human rights abuses. But this
case involves neither a probe of GMA' s actions as the Commander-in- Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, nor of a human rights issue. As such, it is legally improper to impute the actions of Uriarte to
GMA in the absence of any conspiracy between them.

On the part of Aguas, the Sandiganbayan pronounced him to be as much a member of the implied
conspiracy as GMA was, and detailed his participation in this manner:

In all of the disbursement vouchers covering the cash advances/releases to Uriarte of the CIF funds,
Aguas certified that:

CERTIFIED: Adequate available funds/budgetary allotment in the amount of P ; expenditure

properly certified; supported by documents marked (X) per checklist and back hereof; account codes
proper; previous cash advance liquidated/accounted for.

These certifications, after close scrutiny, were not true because: 1.) there were no documents which lent
support to the cash advances on a per project basis. The particulars of payment simply read: "To draw cash
advance form the CIF Fund of the Office of the Vice-Chairman and General Manager". No particular purpose
or project was specified contrary to the requirement under COA Circular 2003-002 that cash advances must
be on a per project basis. Without specifics on the project covered by each cash advance. Aguas could not
certify that supporting documents existed simply because he would not know what project was being funded
by the cash advances; and 2.) There were no previous liquidations made of prior cash advances when
Aguas made the certifications. COA circular 2003-002 required that cash advances be liquidated within one
(1) month from the date the purpose of the cash advance was accomplished. If the completion of the
projects mentioned were for more than one month, a monthly progress liquidation report was necessary. In
the case of Uriarte' s cash advances certified to by Aguas, the liquidation made was wholesale, i.e. these
were done on a semi-annual basis without a monthly liquidation or at least a monthly liquidation progress
report. How then could Aguas correctly certify that previous liquidations were accounted for? Aguas's
certification also violated Sec. 89 of P.D. 1445 which states:

Limitations on cash advance. No cash advance shall be given unless for a legally authorized specific
purpose. A cash advance shall be reported on and liquidated as soon as the purpose for which it was
given has been served. No additional cash advance shall be allowed to any official or employee unless
the previous cash advance given to him is first settled or a proper accounting thereof is made.

There is a great presumption of guilt against Aguas, as his action aided and abetted Uriarte's being able to
draw these irregular CIF funds in contravention of the rules on CIF funds. Without Aguas's certification, the
disbursement vouchers could not have been processed for payment. Accordingly, the certification that
there were supporting documents and prior liquidation paved the way for Uriarte to acquire ill-gotten wealth
by raiding the public coffers of the PCSO.

By just taking cognizance of the series and number of cash advances and the staggering amounts
involved, Aguas should have been alerted that something was greatly amiss and that Uriarte was up to
something. If Aguas was not into the scheme, it would have been easy for him to refuse to sign the
certification, but he did not. The conspiracy "gravamen" is therefore present in the case of Aguas.
Moreover, Aguas's attempt to cover-up Uriarte's misuse of these CIF funds in his accomplishment report
only contributed to unmasking the actual activities for which these funds were utilized. Aguas' s
accomplishment report, which was conformed to by Uriarte, made it self-evidence that the bulk of the CIF
funds in 2009 and 2010 were allegedly spend for non-PCSO related activities, e.g. bomb threats,
kidnapping, terrorism, and others.45

Thus, the Sandiganbayan concluded that Aguas became a part of the implied conspiracy when he signed
the disbursement vouchers despite the absence of certain legal requirements, and issued certain
certifications to the effect that the budgetary allotment/funds for cash advance to be withdrawn were
available; that the expenditures were supported by documents; and that the previous cash advances had
been liquidated or accounted for.

We opine and declare, however, that Aguas' certifications and signatures on the disbursement vouchers
were insufficient bases to conclude that he was into any conspiracy to commit plunder or any other crime.
Without GMA's participation, he could not release any money because there was then no budget available
for the additional CIFs. Whatever irregularities he might have committed did not amount to plunder, or to
any implied conspiracy to commit plunder.

Under the circumstances, the Sandiganbayan's finding on the existence of the conspiracy to commit
plunder was unsustainable. It then becomes unavoidable for the Court to rule that because the Prosecution
failed to properly allege the elements of the crime, as well as to prove that any implied conspiracy to
commit plunder or any other crime existed among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte there was no conspiracy to
commit plunder among them. As a result, GMA and Aguas could be criminally responsible only for their
own respective actions, if any.

III.
No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring ill-
gotten wealth of at least P50 Million
was adduced against GMA and Aguas

The Sandiganbayan sustained the sufficiency of the evidence to convict the petitioners for plunder on the
basis that the Prosecution established all the elements of plunder.

After a review of the records, we find and rule that the Prosecution had no case for plunder against the
petitioners.

To successfully mount a criminal prosecution for plunder, the State must allege and establish the
following elements, namely:

1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by herself or in connivance with members of her family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That the offender amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of
the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of
public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift,
share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer;
(c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or
any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or
any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business
enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special
interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to
unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines; and,

3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at
least P50,000,000.00.46
The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth valued at not
less than P50,000,000.00. The failure to establish the corpus delicti should lead to the dismissal of the
criminal prosecution.

As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten
wealth worth at least P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution adduced no evidence showing that either GMA or
Aguas or even Uriarte, for that matter, had amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any
amount. There was also no evidence, testimonial or otherwise, presented by the Prosecution showing
even the remotest possibility that the CIFs of the PCSO had been diverted to either GMA or Aguas, or
Uriarte.

The absolute lack of evidence on this material but defining and decisive aspect of the criminal
prosecution was explicitly noted in the concurring and partial dissenting opinion of Justice Rodolfo A.
Ponferrada of the Sandiganbayan, to wit:

Here the evidence of the prosecution failed to show the existence of the crime of plunder as no evidence
was presented that any of the accused, accumulated and/or acquired ill-gotten wealth. In fact, the principal
witness of the prosecution when asked, said that she does not know the existence or whereabouts of the
alleged ill-gotten wealth, to wit:

Q: Of course, you don't know where is this ill-gotten wealth are (sic) now?

A: Yes, Your Honors. We don't know whether they saved it, squandered it or what? We don't know,
Your Honor.47 [bold emphasis supplied]

After Atty. Tolentino, as the Prosecution's main witness, conceded lack of any knowledge of the
amassing, accumulating or acquiring of ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00, nothing more
remained of the criminal prosecution for plunder. Hence, the Sandiganbayan should have granted the
demurrers of GMA and Aguas, and dismissed the criminal action against them.

IV.
The Prosecution failed to prove the predicate
act of raiding the public treasury

The Sandiganbayan observed that the Prosecution established the predicate act of raiding the public
treasury, to wit:

Secondly, the terms "unjust enrichment," "benefit," and "pecuniary benefit" are only mentioned in the
predicate acts mentioned in par. 2, 5 and 6 of Section 1 (d) of the Plunder Law. Paragraph 1 of the same
section where "raids on the public treasury" is mentioned did not mention "unjust enrichment" or "personal
benefit". Lastly, the predicate act covering "raids on the public treasury" is lumped up with the phrases
misappropriation, conversion, misuse and malversation of public funds. Thus, once public funds, as in the
case of CIF funds, are illegally accumulated, amassed or acquired. To the tune of PSO Million or more,
there will be no need to establish any motive to gain, or much more establish where the money eventually
ended up. As stated in Our Resolution dated November 5, 2013:

It should be noted that in both R.A. No. 7080 and the PCGG rules, the enumeration of the possible
predicate acts in the commission of plunder did not associate or require the concept of personal
gain/benefit or unjust enrichment with respect to raids on the public treasury, as a means to commit
plunder. It would, therefore, appear that a "raid on the public treasury" is consummated where all the acts
necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present. Thus a "raid on the public treasury" can be
said to have been achieved thru the pillaging or looting of public coffers either through misuse,
misappropriation or conversion, without need of establishing gain or profit to the "raider" gets material
possession of a government asset through improper means and has free disposal of the same, the raid or
pillage is completed.

xxxx
Clearly, the improper acquisition and illegal use of CIF funds, which is obviously a government asset, will
amount to a raid on the public treasury, and therefore fall into the category of ill-gotten wealth.

xxxx

x x x It is not disputed that Uriarte asked for and was granted authority by Arroyo to use additional CIF
funds during the period 2008 - 2010. Uriarte was able to accumulate during that period CIF funds in the
total amount of P352,681,646. This was through a series of withdrawals as cash advances of the CIF funds
from the PCSO coffers, as evidenced by the disbursement vouchers and checks issued and encashed by
her, through her authorized representatives.

These flagrant violations of the rules on the use of CIF funds evidently characterize the series of
withdrawals by and releases to Uriarte as "raids" on the PCSO coffers, which is part of the public treasury.
These were, in every sense, "pillage," as Uriarte looted government funds and appears to have not been
able to account for it. The monies came into her possession and, admittedly, she disbursed it for purposes
other than what these were intended for, thus amounting to "misuse" of the same. xxx
In this case, to require proof that monies went to a plunderer's bank account or was used to acquire real or
personal properties or used for any other purpose to personally benefit the plunderer, is absurd.
Suppose a plunderer had already amassed, acquired or accumulated P50 Million or more of government
funds and just decide to keep it in his vault and never used such funds for any purpose to benefit him, would
that not be plunder? Or, if immediately right after such amassing, the monies went up in flames or recovered
by the police, negating any opportunity for the purpose to actually benefit, would that not still be plunder?
Surely, in such cases, a plunder charge could still prosper and the argument that the fact of personal benefit
should still be evidence-based must fail.48

The Sandiganbayan contended that in order to prove the predicate act of raids of the public treasury, the
Prosecution need not establish that the public officer had benefited from such act; and
that what was necessary was proving that the public officer had raided the public coffers. In support of this,
it referred to the records of the deliberations of Congress to buttress its observation.

We do not share the Sandiganbayan' s contention.

The phrase raids on the public treasury is found in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080, which provides:

Section I .Definition of Terms. - x x x

xxxx

d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person
within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies,
nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following
means or similar schemes:

1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury;

xxxx

To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to look at the
accompanying words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds. This process is
conformable with the maxim of statutory construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct construction of a
particular word or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings may be
made by considering the company of the words in which the word or phrase is found or with which it is
associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases,
and its meaning may, therefore, be modified or restricted by the latter.49

To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own; to
misappropriate means to own, to take something for one's own benefit;50 misuse means "a good, substance,
privilege, or right used improperly, unforeseeably, or not as intended;"51 and malversation occurs when "any
public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall
appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence,
shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially." 52 The common thread
that binds all the four terms together is that the public officer used the property taken. Considering that raids
on the public treasury is in the company of the four other terms that require the use of the property taken, the
phrase raids on the public treasury similarly requires such use of the property taken. Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan gravely erred in contending that the mere accumulation and gathering constituted the
forbidden act of raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on the public
treasury requires the raider to use the property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.

The Prosecution asserts that the Senate deliberations removed personal benefit as a requirement for
plunder. In not requiring personal benefit, the Sandiganbayan quoted the following exchanges between
Senator Enrile and Senator Tañada, viz.:

Senator Emile. The word here, Mr. President, "such public officer or person who conspired or knowingly
benefited". One does not have to conspire or rescheme. The only element needed is that he "knowingly
benefited". A candidate for the Senate for instance, who received a political contribution from a plunderer,
knowing that the contributor is a plunderer and therefore, he knowingly benefited from the plunder, would he
also suffer the penalty, Mr. President, for life imprisonment?

Senator Tañada. In the committee amendments, Mr. President, we have deleted these lines 1 to 4 and part
ofline 5, on page 3. But, in a way, Mr. President, it is good that the Gentleman is bringing out these questions,
I believe that under the examples he has given, the Court will have to ...

Senator Emile. How about the wife, Mr. President, he may not agree with the plunderer to plunder the
country but because she is a dutiful wife or a faithful husband, she has to keep her or his vow of fidelity to
the spouse. And, of course, she enjoys the benefits out of the plunder. Would the Gentleman now impute to
her or him the crime of plunder simply because she or he knowingly benefited out of the fruits of the plunder
and, therefore, he must suffer or he must suffer the penalty of life imprisonment?

The President. That was stricken out already in the Committee amendment.

Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. Lines l to 4 and part of line 5 were stricken out in the Committee
amendment. But, as I said, the eamples of the Minority Floor Leader are still worth spreading the Record.
And, I believe that in those examples, the Court will have just to take into consideration all the other
circumstances prevailing in the case and the evidence that will be submitted.

The President. In any event, 'knowingly benefited' has already been stricken off." 53

The exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator Tañada reveal, therefore, that what was removed from
the coverage of the bill and the final version that eventually became the law was a person who was not the
main plunderer or a co-conspirator, but one who personally benefited from the plunderers' action. The
requirement of personal benefit on the part of the main plunderer or his co-conspirators by virtue of their
plunder was not removed.

As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but, more importantly, that GMA
and Aguas had personally benefited from the same. Hence, the Prosecution did not prove the predicate act
of raids on the public treasury beyond reasonable doubt.
V.
Summation

In view of the foregoing, the Court inevitably concludes that the Sandiganbayan completely ignored the
failure of the information to sufficiently charge conspiracy to commit plunder against the petitioners; and
ignored the lack of evidence establishing the corpus delicti of amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-
gotten wealth in the total amount of at least P50,000,000.00 through any or all of the predicate crimes. The
Sandiganbayan thereby acted capriciously, thus gravely abusing its discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.

Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction.54 To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be grave,
as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and the abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to
having acted without jurisdiction.55

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the resolutions
issued in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 and September 10,
2015; GRANTS the petitioners' respective demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12-
CRM-0174 as to the petitioners GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO and BENIGNO AGUAS for insufficiency
of evidence; ORDERS the immediate release from detention of said petitioners; and MAKES no
pronouncements on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

14. Go-Tan v. Tan, G.R. No. 168852, September 30, 2008

G.R. No. 168852 September 30, 2008
SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN, Respondents.*

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Resolution1 dated March 7, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case
No. Q-05-54536 and the RTC Resolution2 dated July 11, 2005 which denied petitioner's Verified Motion for
Reconsideration.

The factual background of the case:

On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were married. 3 Out of
this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle 4 and Kristen Denise.5 On January 12, 2005, barely
six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective
Order (TPO)6 against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan
(respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing
verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4),
(h)(5), and (i)7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,8 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act of 2004."

On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice9 granting petitioner's prayer for a TPO.

On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent
Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the Petition,10 contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction
over their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.

On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition 11 to respondents' Motion to Dismiss arguing
that respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a liberal interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the
protection and safety of victims of violence.

On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution 12 dismissing the case as to respondents on the ground that,
being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not included/covered as respondents under R.A. No.
9262 under the well-known rule of law "expressio unius est exclusio alterius."13

On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for Reconsideration 14 contending that the doctrine of
necessary implication should be applied in the broader interests of substantial justice and due process.

On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the Verified Motion for Reconsideration 15 arguing that
petitioner's liberal construction unduly broadened the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since the relationship
between the offender and the alleged victim was an essential condition for the application of R.A. No. 9262.

On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution16 denying petitioner's

Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned that to include respondents under the coverage of
R.A. No. 9262 would be a strained interpretation of the provisions of the law.

Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to wit:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW OF

SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004".17

Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the provisions of Section 47 of R.A.
No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and,
accordingly, the provision on "conspiracy" under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorily applied to R.A. No.
9262; that Steven and respondents had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her
insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in
repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically; that respondents should be included as
indispensable or necessary parties for complete resolution of the case.

On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3 thereof
explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a
dating or sexual relationship; that allegations on the conspiracy of respondents require a factual
determination which cannot be done by this Court in a petition for review; that respondents cannot be
characterized as indispensable or necessary parties, since their presence in the case is not only unnecessary
but altogether illegal, considering the non-inclusion of in-laws as offenders under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262.

The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.

Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as "any act or a series of
acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom
the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her
child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result
in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty."

While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage,
former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of
conspiracy under the RPC.

Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC, thus:

SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other applicable
laws, shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)

Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the future may be
punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary. (Emphasis
supplied)

Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to
crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law is silent on a
particular matter.

Thus, in People v. Moreno,18 the Court applied suppletorily the provision on subsidiary penalty under
Article 39 of the RPC to cases of violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise known as the "Revised Motor
Vehicle Law," noting that the special law did not contain any provision that the defendant could be
sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

In People v. Li Wai Cheung,19 the Court applied suppletorily the rules on the service of sentences
provided in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the accused who was found guilty of multiple violations of
R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," considering the lack of similar
rules under the special law.

In People v. Chowdury,20 the Court applied suppletorily Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the RPC to define the
words "principal," "accomplices" and "accessories" under R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," because said words were not defined therein, although the
special law referred to the same terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal
recruitment.

In Yu v. People,21 the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39
of the RPC to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law," noting the
absence of an express provision on subsidiary imprisonment in said special law.

Most recently, in Ladonga v. People,22 the Court applied suppletorily the principle of conspiracy under
Article 8 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary provision therein.

With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied
suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be
supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily
applicable, may be applied suppletorily.

Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action in
concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the
precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators
are principals.23

It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of violence
against women and their children may be committed by an offender through another, thus:

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and
their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxx

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms
or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall
include, but not be limited to, the following acts:

(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;

(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;

(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child
against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of
the woman or her child; and

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence
against the woman or her child may include individuals other than the offending husband, thus:

SEC. 8. Protection Orders. – x x x The protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall include
any, some or all of the following reliefs:
 (a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or
through another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act; 1avvphi1.net

(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus:

SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of
victims of violence against women and their children. (Emphasis supplied)

It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law24 and that this intent must be effectuated by the
courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects the intent of the legislature for
liberal construction as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the law according to its true intent,
meaning and spirit - the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and children.

Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius" finds no
application here. It must be remembered that this maxim is only an "ancillary rule of statutory construction." It
is not of universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering
legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated
purpose of the legislature.25

The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great length on the attendance of circumstances
evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of Steven and respondents to cause verbal, psychological and
economic abuses upon her. However, conspiracy is an evidentiary matter which should be threshed out in a
full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in the present petition since this Court is not a trier of
facts.26 It is thus premature for petitioner to argue evidentiary matters since this controversy is centered only
on the determination of whether respondents may be included in a petition under R.A. No. 9262. The
presence or absence of conspiracy can be best passed upon after a trial on the merits.

Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No.
9262, the Court will no longer delve on whether respondents may be considered indispensable or
necessary parties. To do so would be an exercise in superfluity.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated March 7, 2005 and July
11, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 are hereby
PARTLY REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of the petition against respondents is
concerned.

SO ORDERED.

15. Republic Act No. 10951

REPUBLIC ACT No. 10951

An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and Damage on Which a Penalty is Based
and the Fines Imposed Under the Revised Penal Code, Amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815,
Otherwise Known as "The Revised Penal Code", as Amended

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippine Congress Assembled:

Section 1. Article 9 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as "The Revised Penal Code" is hereby amended
to read as follows:

"Art. 9. Grave felonies, less grave felonies and light felonies. - Grave felonies are those to which the law
attaches the capital punishment or penalties which in any of their periods are afflictive, in accordance with
Article 25 of this Code.
"Less gave felonies are those which the law punishes with penalties which in their maximum period are
correctional in accordance with abovementioned article.

"Light felonies are those infractions of law or the commission of which the penalty of arresto menor or a fine
not exceeding Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) or both is provided."

Section 2. Article 26 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 26. When afflictive, correctional, or light penalty. - A fine, whether imposed as a single or as an
alternative penalty, shall be considered an afflictive penalty, if it exceeds One million two hundred
thousand (₱1,200,000); a correctional penalty, if it does not exceed One million two hundred thousand
pesos (₱1,200,000) but is not less than Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000); and a light penalty, if it be less
than Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000)."

Section 3. Article 114 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is hereby further amended to
read as follows:

"Art. 114. Treason - Any Filipino citizen who levies war against the Philippines or adheres to her enemies,
giving them aid or comfort within the Philippines or elsewhere, shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to
death and shall pay a fine not to exceed Four million pesos (₱4,000,000).

"No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two (2) witnesses at least to the
same overt act or on confession of the accused in open court.

"Likewise, an alien, residing in the Philippines, who commits act of treason as defined in paragraph 1 of this
article shall be punished by reclusion temporal to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed Four million
pesos (₱4,000,000)."

Section 4. Article 115 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 115. Conspiracy and proposal to commit treason; Penalty - The conspiracy or proposal to commit the
crime of treason shall be punished respectively, by prisión mayor and a fine not exceeding Two million
pesos (₱2,000,000), and prisión correccional and a fire not exceeding One million pesos (₱1,000.000)."

Section 5. Article 129 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally obtained - In
addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any offense, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding
(₱200,000) shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall procure a search warrant
without just cause, or, having legally procured the same, shall exceed his authority or use unnecessary
severity in executing the same."

Section 6. Article 136 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 6968, is hereby amended to read
as follows:

"Art. 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d’etat, rebellion, or insurrection - The conspiracy and
proposal to commit coup d’etat shall be punished by prisión mayor in its minimum period and a fine which
shall not exceed One million pesos (₱1,000,000).

"The conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection shall be punished respectively, by
prisión correccional in its maximum period and a fine which shall not exceed One million pesos
(₱1,000,000) and by prisión correccional in its medium period and a fine not exceeding Four hundred
thousand pesos (₱400,000)."

Section 7. Article of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 140. Penalty for sedition - The leader of sedition shall suffer the penalty of prisión mayorin its
minimum period and fine not exceeding Two million pesos (₱2,000,000).
"Other persons participating therein shall suffer the penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period
and a fine not exceeding One million pesos (₱1,000,000)."
Section 8. Article 141 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 141. Conspiracy to commit sedition. - Persons conspiring to commit the crime of sedition shall be
punished by prisión correccional in its medium period and a fine not exceeding Four hundred thousand
pesos (₱400,000)."

Section 9. Article 142 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 142. Inciting to sedition. - The penally of prisión correccional in its maximum period and a fine not
exceeding Four hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000) shall be imposed upon any person who, without taking
any direct part in the crime of sedition, should incite others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which
constitute sedition by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, cartoons, banners, or other
representations tending to the same end, or upon any person or persons who shall utter seditious words or
speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government, or any of the duly constituted
authorities thereof, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing the functions of his
office, or which tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes or which suggest or
incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which lead or tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities
or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government, or who shall knowingly
conceal such evil practices."

Section 10. Article 143 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 143. Acts tending to prevent the meeting of Congress and similar bodies - The penalty of prisión
correccional or a fine ranging from Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) to Four hundred thousand pesos
(₱400,000), or both, shall be imposed upon any person who, by force or fraud, prevents the meeting of
Congress or of any of its committees or subcommittees, Constitutional Commissions or committees or
divisions thereof, or of any provincial board or city or municipal council or board."

Section 11. Article 144 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 144. Disturbance of proceedings - The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from Forty thousand pesos
(₱40,000) to Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000) shall be imposed upon any person who disturbs the
meetings of Congress or of any of its committees or subcommittees. Constitutional Commissions or
committees or divisions thereof, or of any provincial board or city or municipal council or board, or in the
presence of any such bodies should behave in such manner as to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the
respect due it."

Section 12. Article 147 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 147. Illegal associations. - The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods and
a fine not exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000) shall be imposed upon the founders,
directors, and presidents of associations totally or partially organized for the purpose of committing any of
the crimes punishable under this Code or for some purposed contrary to public morals. Mere members said
associations shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor."

Section 13. Article 148 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 148. Direct assaults - Any persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for
the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition, or shall
attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority of any of his agents, while
engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance, shall suffer the penalty of
prisión correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding Two hundred thousand
pesos (₱200,000), when the assault is committed with a weapon or when the offender is a public officer or
employee, or when the offender lays hands upon a person in authority. If none of these circumstances be
present, the penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding One hundred
thousand pesos (₱100,000) shall be imposed."

Section 14. Article 149 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 149. Indirect assaults - The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a
fine not exceeding One hundred thousand (₱100,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall make
use of force or intimidation upon any person coming to the aid of the authorities or their agents on occasion
of the commission of any of the crimes defined in the next preceding article."

Section 15. Article 150 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 150. Disobedience to summons issued by Congress, its committees or subcommittees, by the
Constitutional Commissions, its committees, subcommittees or divisions - The penalty of arresto mayor or a
fine ranging from Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) to Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000), or both
such fine and imprisonment, shall be imposed upon any person who, having been duly summoned to attend
as a witness before Congress, its special or standing committees and subcommittees, the Constitutional
Commissions and its committees, subcommittees, or divisions, or before any commission or committee
chairman or member authorized to summon witnesses, refuses, without legal excuse to obey such
summons, or being present before any such legislative or constitutional body or official, refuses to be sworn
or placed under affirmation or to answer any legal inquiry or to produce any books, papers, documents, or
records in his possession, when required by them to do so in the exercise of their functions. The same
penalty shall be imposed upon any person who shall induce disobedience to summons or refusal to be
sworn by any such body or official."

Section 16. Article 151 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 151. Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person - The penalty
of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000) shall be imposed
upon any person who not being included in the provisions of the preceding articles shall resist or seriously
disobey any person in authority, or the agents of such person, while engaged in the performance of official
duties.

"When the disobedience to an agent of a person in authority is not of a serious nature, the penalty of arresto
menor or a fine ranging from Two thousand pesos (₱2,000) to Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000) shall be
imposed upon the offender."

Section 17. Article 153 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 153. Tumults and other disturbances of public order; Tumultuous disturbance or interruption liable to
cause disturbance - The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prisión correccional in its minimum
period and a fine not exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000) shall be imposed upon any
person who shall cause any serious disturbance in a public place, office, or establishment, or shall interrupt
or disturb public performances, functions or gatherings, or peaceful meetings, if the act is not included in the
provisions of Article 131 and 132.

"The penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed upon persons causing any disturbance or interruption of
a tumultuous character.

"The disturbance or interruption shall be deemed to be tumultuous if caused by more three (3) persons who
are armed or provided with means of violence.

"The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who in any meeting, association, or
public place, shall make any outcry tending to incite rebellion or sedition or in such place shall display
placards or emblems which provoke a disturbance of the public order.

"The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not to exceed Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) shall be imposed
upon these person who in violation of the provisions contained in the last clause of Article 85, shall bury with
pomp the body of a person who has been legally executed."

Section 18. Article 154 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 154. Unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful utterances. - The penalty of arresto mayor and
a fine ranging from Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) to Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000) shall be
imposed upon:
 "1. Any person who by means of printing, lithography, or any other means of publication shall
publish or cause to be published as news any false news which may endanger the public order, or
cause damage to the interest or credit of the State;

"2. Any person who by the same means, or by words, utterances or speeches shall encourage
disobedience to the law or to the constituted authorities or praise, justify, or extol an, act punished by
law;

"3. Any person who shall maliciously publish or cause to be published any official resolution or
document without proper authority or before they have been published officially; or

"4. Any person who shall print, publish, or distribute or cause to be printed, published, or distributed
books, pamphlets, periodicals, or leaflets which do not bear the real printer’s name, or which are
classified as anonymous."

Section 19. Article 155 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 155. Alarms and scandals. — The penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Forty thousand
pesos (₱40,000) shall be imposed upon:

"1. Any person who within any town or public place, shall discharge any firearm, rocket,
firecracker, or other explosives calculated to cause alarm or danger;

"2. Any person who shall instigate or take an active part in any charivari or other disorderly
meeting offensive to another or prejudicial to public tranquility;

"3. Any person who, while wandering about at night or while engaged in any other nocturnal
amusements, shall disturb the public peace; or

"4. Any person who, while intoxicated or otherwise, shall cause any disturbance or scandal in
public places: Provided, That the circumstances of the case shall not make the provisions of
Article 153 applicable."

Section 20. Article 163 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 4202, is hereby amended to
read as follows:

"Art. 163. Making and importing and uttering false coins - Any person who make, imports, or utters false
coins, in connivance with counterfeiters, or importers, shall suffer:

1. Prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not to exceed Four
hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000), if the counterfeited coins be any of the coinage of the
Philippines.

2. Prisión correccional in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed Two hundred thousand
pesos (₱200,000), if the counterfeited coin be currency of a foreign country."

Section 21. Article 164 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 164. Mutilation of coins; Importation and utterance of mutilated coins - The penalty of prisión
correccional in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed Four hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000) shall
be imposed upon any person who shall mutilate coins of the legal currency of the Philippines or import or
utter mutilated current coins, or in connivance with mutilators or importers."

Section 22. Article 166 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 166. Forging treasury or bank notes or other documents payable to bearer; Importing, and uttering
such false or forged notes and documents - The forging or falsification of treasury or bank notes or
certificates or other obligations and securities payable to bearer and the importation and uttering in
connivance with forgers or importers of such false or forced obligation or notes shall be punished as follows:
 "1. By reclusion temporal in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed two million pesos
(₱2,000,000), if the document which has been falsified, counterfeited, or altered is an obligation or
security of the Philippines.

"The words ‘obligation or security of the Philippines’ shall mean all bonds, certificates of
indebtedness, national bank notes, coupons, Philippine notes, treasury notes, fractional notes,
certificates of deposit, bills, checks, or drafts for money, drawn by or upon authorized officers of the
Philippines, and other representatives of value, of whatever denomination, which have been or may
be issued under any act of Congress.

"2. By prisión mayor in its maximum period and a fine not to exceed one million pesos
(₱1,000,000), if the falsified or altered documents is a circulating note issued by any banking
association duly authorized by law to issue the same.

"3. By arresto mayor in its medium period and a fine not to exceed one million pesos
(₱1,000,000), if the falsified or counterfeited document was issued by a foreign government.

"4. By prisión mayor in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed Four hundred thousand pesos
(₱400,000), when the forged or altered document is a circulating note or bill issued by a foreign
bank duly authorized therefor."

Section 23. Article 167 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 167. Counterfeiting, importing and uttering instruments not payable to bearer. - Any person who shall
forge, import or utter, in connivance with the forgers or importers, any instrument payable to order or other
document of credit not payable to bearer, shall suffer the penalties of prisión correccional in its medium
and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding one million two hundred thousand pesos (₱1,200,000)."

Section 24. Article 170 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 170. Falsification of legislative documents. - The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum two
hundred thousand pesos (₱1,200,000) shall be imposed upon any person who, without proper authority
therefor alters any bill, resolution, or ordinance enacted or approved or pending approval by either House of
Congress or any provincial board or municipal council."

Section 25. Article 171 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. - The penalty of prisión
mayor and a fine not to exceed One million pesos (₱1,000,000) shall be imposed upon any public officer,
employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his of position shall falsify a document by committing any of
the following acts:

"1. Counterfeiting or using any handwriting, signature or rubric;

"2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not
in fact so participate;

"3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those
in fact made by them;

"4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

"5. Altering true dates;

"6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;

"7 issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when
no such original exists, or including in such a copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of
the genuine original; or
 "8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or
official book.

"The same penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical minister who shall commit any of the offenses
enumerated in the preceding paragraphs of this article, with respect to any record or document of such
character that its falsification may affect the civil status of persons."

Section 26. Article 172 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents. - The penalty of prisión
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than One million pesos
(₱1,000,000) shall be imposed upon:

"1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next
preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of
commercial document;

"2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall
in any private document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding
article; and

"3. Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or to the damage
of another or who, with the intent to cause such damage, shall use any of the false documents
embraced in the next preceding article, or in any of the foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be
punished by the penalty next lower in degree."

Section 27. Article 174 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 174. False medical certificates, false certificates of merits or service, etc. - The penalties of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed Two
hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000) shall be imposed upon:

"1. Any physician or surgeon who, in connection with the practice of his profession, shall issue a false
certificate; and

"2. Any public officer who shall issue a false certificate of merit of service, good conduct or
similar circumstances."

"The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any private person who shall falsify a certificate
falling within the classes mentioned in the two (2) preceding subdivisions."

Section 28. Article 176 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 176. Manufacturing and possession of instruments or implements for falsification. - The penalty of
prisión correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not to exceed One million pesos
(₱1,000,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall make or introduce into the Philippines any
stamps, dies, marks, or other instruments or implements intended to be used in the commission of the
offenses of counterfeiting or falsification mentioned in the preceding section of this Chapter.

"Any person who, with the intention of using them, shall have in his possession any of the instruments or
implements mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree than that
provided therein."

Section 29. Article 178 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 178. Using fictitious name and concealing true name - The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not to
exceed One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall publicly use
a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a crime, evading the execution of a judgment or causing
damage.
"Any person who conceals his true name and other personal circumstances shall be punished by arresto
menor or a fine not to exceed Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000)."

Section 30. Article 180 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 180. False testimony against a defendant. - Any person who shall give false testimony against the
defendant in any criminal case shall suffer:

"1. The penalty of reclusion temporal, if the defendant in said case shall have been sentenced to
death;

"2. The penalty of prisión mayor, if the defendant shall have been sentenced to reclusion
temporal or reclusion perpetua;

"3. The penalty of prisión correccional, if the defendant shall have been sentenced to any other
afflictive penalty; and

"4. The penalty of arresto mayor, if the defendant shall have been sentenced to a correctional penalty
or a fine, or shall have been acquitted.

"In cases provided in subdivisions 3 and 4 of this article the offender shall further a fine not to exceed
Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000)."

Section 31. Article 181 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 181. False testimony favorable to the defendant. - Any person who shall give false testimony in favor of
the defendant in a criminal case, shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor in its maximum period of prisión
correccional in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000), if the
prosecution is for a felony punishable by an afflictive penalty, and the penalty of arresto mayor in any other
case."

Section 32. Article 182 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 182. False testimony in civil cases - Any person found guilty of false testimony in a civil case shall
suffer the penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed One million two
hundred thousand pesos (₱1,200,000), if the amount in controversy shall exceed One million pesos
(₱1,000,000), and the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in its minimum
period and a fine not to exceed Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000), if the amount in controversy shall
not exceed said amount or cannot be estimated."

Section 33. Article 187 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 187. Importation and disposition of falsely marked articles or merchandise made of gold, silver, or
other precious metals or their alloys. - The penalty of prisión correccional or a fine ranging from Forty
thousand pesos (₱40,000) to Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000), or both, shall be imposed upon
any person who shall knowingly import or sell or dispose of any article or merchandise made of gold,
silver, or other precious metals, or their alloys, with stamps, brands, or marks which fail to indicate the
actual fineness or quality of said metals or alloys.

"Any stamp, brand label, or mark shall be deemed to fail to indicate the actual fineness of the article on
which it is engraved, printed, stamped, labeled or attached, when the test of the article shows that the
quality or fineness thereof is less by more than one-half karat, if made of gold, and less by more than four
one-thousandth, if made of silver, than what is shown by said stamp, brand, label or mark. But in case of
watch cases and flatware made of gold, the actual fineness of such gold shall not be less than more than
three one-thousandth than the fineness indicated by said stamp, brand, label, or mark."

Section 34. Article 201 of the same Act, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 960 and 969, is hereby
amended to read as follows:

"Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows - The penalty of
prisión mayor or a fine ranging from Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000) to Two hundred thousand pesos
(₱200,000), or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:

"1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals;

"2. a. The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the editors
publishing such literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;

"b. Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit indecent or
immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that the obscene literature or
indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are
prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone
crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or
pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited
drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public orders, morals, and good customs, established
policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts; and

"3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature
which are offensive to morals."

Section 35. Article 202 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 202. Prostitutes; Penalty. - For the purpose of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually
indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.

"Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this article shall be punished by arresto menor
or a fine not exceeding Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000), and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in its
medium period to prisión correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from Twenty thousand pesos
(₱20,000) to Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000), or both, in the discretion of the court."

Section 36. Article 209 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 209. Betrayal of trust by an attorney or solicitor.— Revelation of Secrets. - In addition to the proper
administrative action, the penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from Forty
thousand pesos (₱40,000) to Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000), or both, shall be imposed upon any
attorney-at-law or any person duly authorized to represent and/or assist a party to a case who, by any
malicious breach of professional duty or of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, shall prejudice his client, or
reveal any of the secrets of the latter learned by him in his professional capacity.

"The same penalty shall be imposed upon an attorney-at-law or any person duly authorized to represent
and/or assist a party to a case who, having undertaken the defense of a client or having received
confidential information from said client in a case, shall undertake the defense of the opposing party in the
same case, without the consent of his first client."

Section 37. Article 213 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 213. Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses. - The penalty of prisión correccional in its
medium period to prisión mayor in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from Forty thousand pesos
(₱40,000) to Two million pesos (₱2,000,000), or both, shall be imposed upon any public officer who:

"1. In his official capacity, in dealing with any person with regard to furnishing supplies, the making
of contracts, or the adjustment or settlement of accounts relating to public property or funds, shall
enter into an agreement with any interested party or speculator or make use of any other scheme, to
defraud the Government;

"2. Being entrusted with the collection of taxes, licenses, fees and other imposts, shall be guilty of
any of the following acts or omissions:

"(a) Demanding, directly or indirectly, the payment of sums different from or larger than those
authorized by law.
 "(b) Failing voluntarily to issue a receipt, as provided by law, for any sum of money
collected by him officially.

"(c) Collecting or receiving, directly or indirectly, by way of payment or otherwise things or

objects of a nature different from that provided by law.

"When the culprit is an officer or employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Bureau of Customs, the
provisions of the Administrative Code shall be applied."

Section 38. Article 215 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 215. Prohibited transactions. - The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging
from Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) to Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000), or both, shall be imposed
upon any appointive public officer who, during his incumbency, shall directly or indirectly become interested in
any transaction of exchange or speculation within the territory subject to his jurisdiction."

Section 39. Article 216 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 216. Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer. - The penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium period to prisión correccional in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from Forty thousand pesos
(₱40,000) to Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000), or both, shall be imposed upon a public officer
who directly or indirectly, shall become interested in any contract or business in which it is his official duty
to intervene.

"This provision is applicable to experts, arbitrators and private accountants who, in like manner, shall take
part in any contract or transaction connected with the estate or property in appraisal, distribution or
adjudication of which they shall have acted, and to guardians and executors with respect to the property
belonging to their wards or estate."

Section 40. Article 217 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 1060, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:

"Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property.— Presumption of malversation. - Any public officer who,
by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same,
or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other
person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:

"1. The penalty of prisión correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in
the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000).
"2. The penalty of prisión mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more
than Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) but does not exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos
(₱1,200,000).

"3. The penalty of prisión mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if
the amount involved is more than One million two hundred thousand pesos (₱1,200,000) but does not
exceed Two million four hundred thousand pesos (₱2,400,000).

"4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved is more than Two million four hundred thousand pesos (₱2,400,000) but does not
exceed Four million four hundred thousand pesos (₱4,400,000).

"5. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, if the amount involved is more than
Four million four hundred thousand pesos (₱4,400,000) but does not exceed Eight million eight
hundred thousand pesos (₱8,800,000). If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua.

"In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer t he penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the
property embezzled.
"The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such
missing funds or property to personal uses."<<

Section 41. Article 218 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 218. Failure of accountable officer to render accounts. - Any public officer, whether in the service or
separated therefrom by resignation or any other cause, who is required by law or regulation to render
account to the Commission on Audit, or to a provincial auditor and who fails to do so for a period of two (2)
months after such accounts should be rendered shall be punished by prisión correccional in its minimum
period, or by a fine ranging from Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) to One million two hundred thousand
pesos (₱1,200,000), or both."

Section 42. Article 219 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 219. Failure of a responsible public officer to render accounts before leaving the country. - Any public
officer who unlawfully leaves or attempts to leave the Philippines without securing a certificate from the
Commission on Audit showing that his accounts have been finally settled, shall be punished by arresto
mayor, or a fine ranging from Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) to Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000, or
both."

Section 43. Article 221 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 221. Failure to make delivery of public funds or property. - Any public officer under obligation to
make payment from Government funds in his possession, who shall fail to make such payment, shall
be punished by arresto mayor and a fine from five (5) to twenty-five (25) percent of the sum which he
failed to pay.

"This provision shall apply to any public officer who, being ordered by competent authority to deliver any
property in his custody or under his administration, shall refuse to make a delivery.

"The fine shall be graduated in such case by the value of the thing: Provided, That it shall not be leas
than Ten thousand pesos (₱10,000)."

Section 44. Article 226 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 226. Removal, concealment or destruction of documents. - Any public officer who shall remove,
destroy or conceal documents or papers officially entrusted to him, shall suffer:

"1. The penalty of prisión mayor and a fine not exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000),
whenever serious damage shall have been caused thereby to a third party or to the public interest.

"2. The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum and medium period and a fine not
exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000), whenever the damage caused to a third
party or to the public interest shall not have been serious.

"In either case, the additional penalty of temporary special disqualification in its maximum period to perpetual
disqualification shall be imposed."

Section 45. Article 227 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 227. Officer breaking seal - Any public officer charged with the custody of papers or property sealed by
proper authority, who shall break the seals or permit them to be broken, shall suffer the penalties of prisión
correccional in its minimum and medium periods, temporary special disqualification and a fine not
exceeding Four hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000)."

Section 46. Article 228 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 228. Opening of closed documents. - Any public officer not included in the provisions of the next
preceding article who, without proper authority, shall open or shall permit to be opened any closed papers,
documents or objects entrusted to his custody, shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor, temporary
special disqualification and a fine not exceeding Four hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000)."

Section 47. Article 229 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 229. Revelation of secrets by an officer. - Any public officer who shall reveal any secret known to him by
reason of his official capacity, or shall wrongfully deliver papers or copies of papers of which he may have
charge and which should not be published, shall suffer the penalties of prisión correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, perpetual special disqualification and a fine not exceeding Four hundred thousand pesos
(₱400,000) if the revelation of such secrets or the delivery of such papers shall have caused serious damage
to the public interest; otherwise, the penalties of prisión correccional in its minimum period, temporary special
disqualification and a fine not exceeding One hundred thousand (₱100,000) pesos shall be imposed."

Section 48. Article 230 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 230. Public officer revealing secrets of private individual. - Any public officer to whom the secrets of any
private individual shall become known by reason of his office who shall reveal such secrets, shall suffer the
penalties of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000)."

Section 49. Article 231 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 231. Open disobedience. - Any judicial or executive officer who shall openly refuse to execute the
judgment, decision or order of any superior authority made within the scope of the jurisdiction of the latter
and issue with all the legal formalities, shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor in its medium period to
prisión correccional in its minimum period, temporary special disqualification in its maximum period and a
fine not exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000)."

Section 50. Article 233 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 233. Refusal of assistance. - The penalties of arresto mayor in tits medium period to prisión
correccional in its minimum period, perpetual special disqualification and a fine not exceeding Two hundred
thousand pesos (₱200,000), shall be imposed upon a public officer who, upon demand from competent
authority, shall fail to lend his cooperation towards the administration of justice or other public service, if
such failure shall result in serious damage to the public interest, or to a third party; otherwise, arresto mayor
in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000)
shall be imposed."

Section 51. Article 234 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 234. Refusal to discharge elective office. - The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding Two
hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000), or both, shall be imposed upon any person who, having been elected
by popular election to a public office, shall refuse without legal motive to be sworn in or to discharge the
duties of said office."

Section 52. Article 235 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 235. Maltreatment of prisoners. - The penalty of prisión correccional in its medium period to prisión
mayor in its minimum period, in addition to his liability for the physical injuries or damage caused, shall be
imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall overdo himself in the correction or handling of a
prisoner or detention prisoner under his charge, by the imposition of punishments not authorized by the
regulations, or by inflicting such punishments in a cruel and humiliating manner.

"If the purpose of the maltreatment is to extort a confession, or to obtain some information from the prisoner,
the offender shall be punished by prisión mayor in its minimum period, temporary special disqualification and
a fine not exceeding One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000), in addition to his liability for the physical
injuries or damage."
Section 53. Article 236 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 236. Anticipation of duties of a public office. - Any person who shall assume the performance of the
duties and powers of any public or employment without first being sworn in or having given the bond
required by law, shall be suspended from such office or employment until he shall have complied with the
respective formalities and shall be fined from Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) to One hundred thousand
pesos (₱100,000)."

Section 54. Article 237 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 237. Prolonging performance of duties and powers.— Any public officer who shall continue to exercise
the duties and powers of his office, employment or commission, beyond the period provided by law,
regulation or special provisions applicable to the case, shall suffer the penalties prisión correccional in its
minimum period, special temporary disqualification in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding One
hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000)."

Section 55. Article 239 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 239. Usurpation of legislative powers. - The penalties of prisión correccional in its minimum period,
temporary special disqualification and a fine not exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000), shall
be imposed upon any public officer who shall encroach upon the powers of the legislative branch of the
Government, either by making general rules or regulations beyond the scope of his authority, or by
attempting to repeal a law or suspending the execution thereof."

Section 56. Article 242 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 242. Disobeying request for disqualification. - Any public officer who, before the question of

jurisdiction is decided, shall continue any proceeding after having been lawfully required to refrain from so
doing, shall be punished by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding One hundred thousand pesos
(₱100,000)."

Section 57. Article 243 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 243. Orders or requests by executive officers to any judicial authority. - Any executive officer who shall
address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not
exceeding One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000)."

Section 58. Article 244 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 244. Unlawful appointments. - Any public officer who shall knowingly nominate or appoint to any
public office any person lacking the legal qualifications therefor, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor
and a fine not exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000)."

Section 59. Article 259 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 259. Abortion practiced by a physician or midwife and dispensing of abortives. - The penalties
provided in Article 256 shall be imposed in its maximum period, respectively, upon any physician or
midwife who, taking advantage of their scientific knowledge or skill, shall cause an abortion or assist in
causing the same.

"Any pharmacist who, without the proper prescription from a physician shall dispense any abortive shall suffer
arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000)."

Section 60. Article 265 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 265. Less serious physical injuries. - Any person who shall inflict upon another physical injuries not
described in the preceding articles, but which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten (10)
days or more, or shall require medical assistance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious
physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.

"Whenever less serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted with the manifest intent to insult or offend
the injured person, or under circumstances adding ignominy to the offense, in addition to the penalty of
arresto mayor, a fine not exceeding Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000) shall be imposed.

"Any less serious physical injuries inflicted upon the offender’s parents, ascendants, guardians, curators,
teachers, or persons of rank, or persons in authority, shall be punished by prisión correccional in its
minimum and medium periods: Provided, That in the case of persons in authority, the deed does not
constitute the crime of assault upon such persons."

Section 61. Article 266 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. - The crime of slight physical injuries shall be
punished:

"1. By arresto mayor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the
offended party for labor from one (1) days to nine (9) days, or shall require medical attendance
during the same period.

"2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) and censure when the
offender has caused physical injuries which do not prevent the offended party from engaging in his
habitual work nor require medical assistance.

"3. By arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding Five thousand pesos (₱5,000)
when the offender shall ill-treat another by deed without causing any injury.’

Section 62. Article 268 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 18, is hereby further amended to
read as follows:

"Art. 268. Slight illegal detention. - The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed upon any private
individual who shall commit the crimes described in the next preceding article without the attendance of any
of the circumstances enumerated therein."The same penalty shall be incurred by anyone who shall furnish
the place for the perpetration of the crime.
"If the offender shall voluntarily release the person so kidnapped or detained within three (3) days from the
commencement of the detention, without having attained the purpose intended, and before the institution of
criminal proceedings against him, the penalty shall be prisión mayor in its minimum and medium periods
and a fine not exceeding One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000)."

Section 63. Article 269 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 269. Unlawful arrest. - The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding One hundred thousand
pesos (₱100,000) shall be imposed upon any person who, in any case other than those authorized by law,
or without reasonable ground therefor, shall arrest or detain another for the purpose of delivering him to the
proper authorities."

Section 64. Article 271 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 271. Inducing a minor to abandon his home. - The penalty of prisión correccional and a fine not
exceeding One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000) shall be imposed upon anyone who shall induce a
minor to abandon the home of his parents or guardians or the persons entrusted with his custody.

"If the person committing any of the crimes covered by the two (2) preceding articles shall be the father or
the mother of the minor, the penalty shall be arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding Forty thousand pesos
(₱40,000), or both."

Section 65. Article 276 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 276. Abandoning a minor. - The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding One hundred
thousand pesos (₱100,000) shall be imposed upon anyone who shall abandon a child under seven (7)
years of age, the custody of which is incumbent upon him.

"When the death of the minor shall result from such abandonment, the culprit shall be punished by prisión
correccional in its medium and maximum periods; but if the life of the minor shall have been in danger
only, the penalty shall be prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

"The provisions contained in the two (2) preceding paragraphs shall not prevent the imposition of the
penalty provided for the act committed, when the same shall constitute a more serious offense."

Section 66. Article 277 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 277. Abandonment of minor by person entrusted with his custody; Indifference of parents. - The
penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000) shall be
imposed upon anyone who, having charge off the rearing or education of a minor, shall deliver said minor
to a public institution or other persons, without the consent of the one who entrusted such child to his care
or in the absence of the latter, without the consent of the proper authorities.

"The same penalty shall be imposed upon the parents who shall neglect their children by not giving them
the education which their station in life requires and financial condition permits."

Section 67. Article 278 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows

"Art. 278. Exploitation of minors. - The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum and medium
periods and a fine not exceeding One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000) shall be imposed upon:

"1. Any person who shall cause any boy or girl under sixteen (16) years of age to perform any
dangerous feat of balancing, physical strength, or contortion.

"2. Any person who, being an acrobat, gymnast, rope-walker, diver, wild-animal tamer or circus
manager or engaged in a similar calling, shall employ in exhibitions of these kinds children under
sixteen (16) years of age who are not his children or descendants.

"3. Any person engaged in any of the callings enumerated in the next preceding paragraph who shall
employ any descendant of his under twelve years (12) years of age in such dangerous exhibitions.

"4. Any ascendant, guardian, teacher or person entrusted in any capacity with the care of a child
under sixteen (16) Years of age, who shall deliver such child gratuitously to any person following any
of the callings enumerated in paragraph 2 hereof, or to any habitual vagrant or beggar.

"If the delivery shall have been made in consideration of any price, compensation, or promise, the
penalty shall in every case be imposed in its maximum period.1âwphi1

"In either case, the guardian or curator convicted shall also be removed from office as guardian or
curator; and in the case of the parents of the child, they may be deprived, temporarily or perpetually,
in the discretion of the court, of their parental authority.

"5. Any person who shall induce any child under sixteen (16) years of age to abandon the home of
its ascendants, guardians, curators or teachers to follow any person engaged in any of the callings
mentioned in paragraph 2 hereof, or to accompany any habitual vagrant or beggar."

Section 68. Article 280 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 280. Qualified trespass to dwelling. - Any private person who shall enter the dwelling of another
against the latter’s will shall be punished by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding Two hundred
thousand pesos (₱200,000).

"If the offense be committed by means of violence or intimidation, the penalty shall be prisión correccional in
its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000).

"The provisions of this article shall not be applicable to any person who shall enter another’s dwelling for
the purpose of preventing some serious harm to himself, the occupants of the dwelling or a third person,
nor shall it be applicable to any person who shall enter a dwelling for the purpose of rendering some
service to humanity or justice, nor to anyone who shall enter cafes, taverns, inns and other public houses,
while the same are open."
Section 69. Article 281 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 281. Other forms of trespass. - The penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Forty thousand
pesos (₱40,000), or both, shall be imposed upon any person who shall enter the closed premises or the
fenced estate of another, while either or both of them are uninhabited, if the prohibition to enter be manifest
and the trespasser has not secured the permission of the owner or the caretaker thereof."

Section 70. Article 282 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 282. Grave threats. - Any person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon the person,
honor or property of the latter or of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime, shall suffer:

"1. The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the crime he threatened to
commit, if the offender shall have made the threat demanding money or imposing any other condition,
even though not unlawful, and said offender shall have attained his purpose. If the offender shall not
have attained his purpose, the penalty lower by two (2) degrees shall be imposed.

"If the threat be made in writing or through a middleman, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum
period.

"2. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding One hundred thousand pesos
(₱100,000), if the threat shall not have been made subject to a condition."

Section 71. Article 285 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 285. Other light threats. - The penalty of arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not
exceeding Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) shall be imposed upon:

"1. Any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next preceding article, shall
threaten another with a weapon, or draw such weapon in a quarrel, unless it be in lawful self- defense.

"2. Any person who, in the heat of anger, shall orally threaten another with some harm not
constituting a crime, and who by subsequent acts shows that he did not persist in the idea
involved in his threat: Provided, That the circumstances of the offense shall not bring it within the
provisions of Article 282 of this Code.

"3. Any person who shall orally threaten to do another any harm not constituting a felony."

Section 72. Article 286 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 7890, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:

"Art. 286. Grave coercions. - The penalty of prisión correccional and a fine not exceeding One hundred
thousand pesos (₱100,000) shall be imposed upon any person who, without any authority of law, shall, by
means of violence, threats, or intimidation, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law, or
compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong.
"If the coercion be committed in violation of the exercise of the right of suffrage, or for the purpose of
compelling another to perform any religious act, or to prevent him from exercising such right or from so doing
such act, the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed."

Section 73. Article 287 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 287. Light coercions. - Any person who, by means of violence, shall seize anything belonging to his
debtor for the purpose of applying the same to the payment of the debt, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period and a fine equivalent to the value of the thing, but in no case less than Fifteen
thousand pesos (₱15,000).

"Any other coercions or unjust vexations shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine ranging from One
thousand pesos (₱1,000) to not more than Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000), or both."

Section 74. Article 288 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 288. Other similar coercions; (Compulsory purchase of merchandise and payment of wages by means
of tokens. - The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine ranging from Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) to One
hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000), or both, shall be imposed upon any person, agent or officer of any
association or corporation who shall force or compel, directly or indirectly, or shall knowingly permit any
laborer or employee employed by him or by such firm or corporation to be forced or compelled, to purchase
merchandise or commodities of any kind.

"The same penalties shall be imposed upon any person who shall pay the wages due a laborer or
employee employed by him, by means of tokens or objects other than the legal tender currency of the
Philippines, unless expressly requested by the laborer or employee."

Section 75. Article 289 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 289. Formation, maintenance and prohibition of combination of capital or labor through violence or
threats. - The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding Sixty thousand pesos (₱60,000) shall be
imposed upon any person who, for the purpose of organizing, maintaining or preventing coalitions of capital
or labor, strike of laborers or lock-out of employers, shall employ violence or threats in such a degree as to
compel or force the laborers or employees in the free and legal exercise of their industry or work, if the act
shall not constitute a more serious offense in accordance with the provisions of this Code."

Section 76. Article 290 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 290. Discovering secrets through seizure of correspondence. - The penalty of prisión correccional in its
minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000) shall be
imposed upon any private individual who in order to discover the secrets of another, shall seize his papers
or letters and reveal the contents thereof.

"If the offender shall not reveal such secrets, the penalty shall be arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding
One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000).
"This provision shall not be applicable to parents, guardians, or person entrusted with the custody of minors
with respect to the papers or letters of the children or minors placed under their care or custody, nor to
spouses with respect to the papers or letters of either of them."

Section 77. Article 291 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 291. Revealing secrets with abuse of office. - The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding
One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000) shall be imposed upon any manager, employee or servant who, in
such capacity, shall learn the secrets of his principal or master and shall reveal such secrets."

Section 78. Article 292 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 292. Revelation of industrial secrets. - The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum and
medium periods and a fine not exceeding One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000) shall be imposed
upon the person in charge, employee or workman of any manufacturing or industrial establishment who,
to the prejudice of the owner thereof, shall reveal the secrets of the industry of the latter."

Section 79. Article 299 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 299. Robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to worship. - Any armed
person who shall commit robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to religious
worship, shall be punished by reclusion temporal, if the value of the property taken shall exceed Fifty
thousand pesos (₱50,000), and if—

"(a) The malefactors shall enter the house or building in which the robbery was committed, by any
of the following means:

"1. Through an opening not intended for entrance or egress.

"2. By breaking any wall, roof, or floor or breaking any door or window. "3. By
 using false keys, picklocks or similar tools.
"4. By using any fictitious name or pretending the exercise of public authority.

"Or if—

"(b) The robbery be committed under any of the following circumstances:

"1. By the breaking of doors, wardrobes, chests, or any other kind of locked or sealed furniture
or receptacle.

"2. By taking such furniture or objects away to be broken or forced upon outside the place of
the robbery.

"When the offenders do not carry arms, and the value of the property taken exceeds Fifty
thousand pesos (₱50,000), the penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed.
"The same rule shall be applied when the offenders are armed, but the value of the property
taken does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000).

"When said offenders do not carry arms and the value of the property taken does not exceed Fifty
thousand pesos (₱50,000), they shall suffer the penalty prescribed in the two (2) next preceding
paragraphs, in its minimum period.

"If the robbery be committed in one of the dependencies of an inhabited house, public building, or
building dedicated to religious worship, the penalties next lower in degree than those prescribed in
this article shall be imposed."

Section 80. Article 302 of the same Act, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 417, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:

"Art. 302. Robbery in an uninhabited place or in a private building. - Any robbery committed in an
uninhabited place or in a building other than those mentioned in the first paragraph of Article 299, if the
value of the property taken exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000), shall be punished by prisión
correccional in its medium and maximum periods provided that any of the following circumstances is
present:

"1. If the entrance has been effected through any opening not intended for entrance or egress.
"2. If any wall, roof, floor or outside door or window has been broken.
"3. If the entrance has been effected through the use of false keys, picklocks or other similar tools.
"4. If any door, wardrobe, chest, or any sealed or closed furniture or receptacle has been
broken.
"5. If any closed or sealed receptacle, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, has been
removed, even if the same be broken open elsewhere.

"When the value of the property taken does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000), the penalty next
lower in degree shall be imposed.

"In the cases specified in Articles 294, 295, 297, 299, 300, and 302 of this Code, when the property taken is
mail matter or large cattle, the offender shall suffer the penalties next higher in degree than those provided
in said articles."

Section 81. Article 309 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows: "Art.
309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
"1. The penalty of prisión mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is
more than One million two hundred thousand pesos (₱1,200,000) but does not exceed Two million
two hundred thousand pesos (₱2,200,000); but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter
amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one
(1) year for each additional One million pesos (₱1,000,000), but the total of the penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty (20) years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty
shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
 "2. The penalty of prisión correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the thing
stolen is more than Six hundred thousand pesos (₱600,000) but does not exceed One million two
hundred thousand pesos (₱1,200,000).

"3. The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the property
stolen is more than Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000) but does not exceed Six hundred thousand
pesos (₱600,000).

"4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prisión correccional in its minimum period, if the value of
the property stolen is over Five thousand pesos (₱5,000) but does not exceed Twenty thousand
pesos (₱20,000).

"5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over Five hundred pesos (₱500) but does not
exceed Five thousand pesos (₱5,000).

"6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed Five
hundred pesos (₱500).

"7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000), if the theft is
committed under the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the
value of the thing stolen does not exceed Five hundred pesos (₱500). If such value exceeds said
amount, the provisions of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.

"8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine of not exceeding Five thousand pesos (₱5,000),
when the value of the thing stolen is not over Five hundred pesos (₱500), and the offender shall
have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the
support of himself or his family."

Section 82. Article 311 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 311. Theft of the property of the National Library and National Museum.— If the property stolen be any
property of the National Museum, the penalty shall be arresto mayor or a fine ranging from Forty thousand
pesos (₱40,000) to One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000), or both, unless a higher penalty should be
provided under other provisions of this Code, in which case, the offender shall be punished by such higher
penalty."

Section 83. Article 312 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows
"Art. 312. Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property. - Any person who, by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, shall take possession of any real property or shall usurp any real
rights in property belonging to another, in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed
by him, shall be punished by a fine from fifty (50) to one hundred (100) per centum of the gain which he shall
have obtained, but not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (₱15,000).

"If the value of the gain cannot be ascertained, a fine from Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) to One
hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000) shall be imposed."

Section 84. Article 313 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 313. Altering boundaries or landmarks. - Any person who shall alter the boundary marks or monuments
of towns, provinces, or estates, or any other marks intended to designate the boundaries of the same, shall
be punished by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000), or both."

Section 85. Article 315 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, Presidential Decree No.
1689, and Presidential Decree No. 818, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:

"1st. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period to prisión mayor in its minimum
 period, if the amount of the fraud is over Two million four hundred thousand pesos (₱2,400,000) but
does not exceed Four million four hundred thousand pesos (₱4,400,000), and if such amount
exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional Two million pesos (₱2,000,000); but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code,
the penalty shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

"2nd. The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the
fraud is over One million two hundred thousand pesos (₱1,200,000) but does not exceed Two
million four hundred thousand pesos (₱2,400,000).

"3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in its minimum period,
if such amount is over Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) but does not exceed One million two hundred
thousand pesos (₱1,200,000).

"4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if such amount does not exceed Forty
thousand pesos (₱40,000): Provided, That in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by
any of the following means:

"1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely

"(a) altering the substance, quantity, or quality of anything of value which the offender shall deliver
by virtue of an obligation to do so, even though such obligation be based on an immoral or illegal
consideration.

"(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such
obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money,
goods, or other property.

"(c) By taking undue advantage of the signature of the offended party in blank, and by writing any
document above such signature in blank, to the prejudice of the offended party or any third person.

"2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

"(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.

"(b) By altering the quality, fineness or weight of anything pertaining to his art or business.

"(c) By pretending to have bribed any Government employee, without prejudice to the action for
calumny which the offended party may deem proper to bring against the offender. In this case, the
offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty.

"(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no
funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the
check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check
within three (3) clays from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check
has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prime facie evidence of deceit
constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.

"Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts as
defined in paragraph 2(d) hereof shall be punished by:

"1st The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, if the amount of fraud is over
Four million four hundred thousand pesos (₱4,400,000) but does not exceed Eight million
eight hundred thousand pesos (₱8,800,000). If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua.
 "2nd. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of
the fraud is over Two million four hundred thousand pesos (₱2,400,000) but does not exceed
Four million four hundred thousand pesos (₱4,400,000).
"3rd. The penalty of prisión mayor in its maximum period, if the amount of the fraud is over
One million two hundred thousand pesos (₱1,200,000) but does not exceed Two million
four hundred thousand pesos (₱2,400,000).

"4th. The penalty of prisión mayor in its medium period, if such amount is over Forty
thousand pesos (₱40,000) but does not exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos
(₱1,200,000).

"5th. By prisión mayor in its minimum period, if such amount does not exceed Forty
thousand pesos (₱40,000).

"3. Through any of the following fraudulent means:

"(a) By inducing another, by means of deceit, to sign any document.

"(b) By resorting to some fraudulent practice to insure success in a gambling game.

"(c) By removing, concealing or destroying, in whole or in part, any court record, office files,
document or any other papers."

Section 86. Article 318 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 318. Other deceits. - The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the amount of the damage
caused and not more than twice such amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall defraud or
damage another by any other deceit not mentioned in the preceding articles of this Chapter.

"Any person who, for profit or gain, shall interpret dreams, make forecasts, tell fortunes, or take advantage
of the credulity of the public in any other similar manner, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine
not exceeding Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000)."

Section 87. Article 328 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 328. Special cases of malicious mischief. - Any person who shall cause damage to obstruct the
performance of public functions, or using any poisonous or corrosive substance; or spreading any infection
or contagion among cattle; or who causes damage to the property of the National Museum or National
Library, or to any archive or registry, waterworks, road, promenade, or any other thing used in common by
the public, shall be punished:

"1. By prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the damage
caused exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000);

"2. Bv arresto mayor if such value does not exceed the abovementioned amount but is over Forty
thousand pesos (₱40,000); and

"3. By arresto menor, if such value does not exceed Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000)."
Section 88. Article 329 of the same Act, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3999, is hereby
amended to read as follows:

"Art. 329. Other mischiefs. - The mischiefs not included in the next preceding article shall be punished:

"1. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the damage caused
exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000);

"2. By arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value is over Forty thousand pesos
(₱40,000) but does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000); and
 "3. By arresto menor or a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more than
Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000), if the amount involved does not exceed Forty thousand pesos
(₱40,000) or cannot be estimated."

Section 89. Article 331 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 331. Destroying or damaging statues, public monuments or paintings. - Any person who shall destroy
or damage statues or any other useful or ornamental public monument, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its medium period to prisión correccional in its minimum period.

"Any person who shall destroy or damage any useful or ornamental painting of a public nature shall
suffer the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000), or both
such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court."

Section 90. Article 347 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 347. Simulation of births, substitution of one child for another and concealment or abandonment of a
legitimate child. - The simulation of births and the substitution of one child for another shall be punished by
prisión mayor and a fine of not exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000).

"The same penalties shall be imposed upon any person who shall conceal or abandon any legitimate
child with intent to cause such child to lose its civil status.

"Any physician or surgeon or public officer who, in violation of the duties of his profession or office. shall
cooperate in the execution of any of the crimes mentioned in the two (2) next preceding paragraphs, shall
suffer the penalties therein prescribed and also the penalty of temporary special disqualification."

Section 91. Article 355 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 355. Libel by means of writings or similar means. - A libel committed by means of writing, printing,
lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any
similar means, shall be punished by prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine
ranging from Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) to One million two hundred thousand pesos (₱1,200,000), or
both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party."

Section 92. Article 356 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 356. Threatening to publish and offer to prevent such publication for a compensation. - The penalty of
arresto mayor or a fine from Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) to Four hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000),
or both, shall be imposed upon any person who threatens another to publish a libel concerning him or the
parents, spouse, child, or other member of the family of the latter, or upon anyone who shall offer to prevent
the publication of such libel for a compensation or money consideration."

Section 93. Article 357 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 357. Prohibited publication of acts referred to in the course of official proceedings. - The penalty of
arresto mayor or a fine of Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) to Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000), or
both, shall be imposed upon any reporter, editor or manager of a newspaper, daily or magazine, who shall
publish facts connected with the private life of another and offensive to the honor, virtue and reputation of
said person, even though said publication be made in connection with or under the pretext that it is
necessary in the narration of any judicial or administrative proceedings wherein such facts have been
mentioned."

Section 94. Article 358 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 358. Slander. - Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión
correccional in its minimum period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise the penalty shall be
arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000)."

Section 95. Article 359 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 359. Slander by deed. - The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in
its minimum period or a fine ranging from Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000) to One hundred thousand
pesos (₱100,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall perform any act not included and punished
in this title, which shall cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon another person. If said act is not of a
serious nature. the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Twenty thousand pesos
(₱20,000)."

Section 96. Article 364of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 364. Intriguing against honor. - The penalty of arresto menor or fine not exceeding Twenty
thousand pesos (₱20,000) shall be imposed for any intrigue which has for its principal purpose to
blemish the honor or reputation of a person."

Section 97. Article 365 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 1790, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:

"Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence.— Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act
which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prisión correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony,
the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have
constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
"Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it
would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be
imposed.

"When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of
another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damages to three (3) times such value, but which shall in no case be Less than Five thousand pesos
(₱5,000).

"A fine not exceeding Forty thousand pesos (₱40.000) and censure shall be imposed upon any person,
who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have
constituted a light felony.

"In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the
rules prescribed in Article 64.1âwphi1

"The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

"1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first
two (2) paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in
degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.

"2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, the death of a
person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prisión correccional in its
medium and maximum periods.

"Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which
material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing
or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

"Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage
impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.

"The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender
who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in his hands to give."

Section 98. Separability Clause. - Should any provision of this Act be declared invalid, the remaining
provisions shall continue to be valid and subsisting.

Section 99. Repealing Clause. - All laws, executive orders, or administrative orders, rules and regulations
or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Act are hereby amended, repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 100. Retroactive Effect. - This Act shall have retroactive effect to the extent that it is favorable to the
accused or person serving sentence by final judgment.

Section 101. Transitory Provision; Applicability to Pending Cases. - For cases pending before the courts
upon the effectivity of this Act where trial has already started, the courts hearing such cases shall not lose
jurisdiction over the same by virtue of this Act.

Section 102. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect within fifteen (15) days after its publication in at least
two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved.