Moral Perception and Particularity

Author(s): Lawrence Blum

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Ethics, Vol. 101, No. 4 (Jul., 1991), pp. 701-725
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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Moral Perceptionand Particularity*
LawrenceBlum

Iris Murdoch's series of essays The Sovereignty

ofGoodand her novels call
our attentionto the importantrole of moral perception in the moral
life.' How do agents come to perceive situationsin the way they do?
How does a situationcome to have a particularcharacterfora particular
moralagent?What is the relationbetweenour moral-perceptual capacities
and otherpsychologicalcapacitiesessentialto the morallife?These ques-
tionshave drawn scant attentionin contemporaryethicaltheory.2Moral
philosophy'scustomaryfocus on action-guidingrules and principles,on
choice and decision, on universalityand impartiality, and on obligation
and rightaction have masked the importanceof moral perception to a
full and adequate depiction of moral agency.An agent may reason well
in moral situations,uphold the stricteststandards of impartialityfor
testingher maxims and moral principles,and be adept at deliberation.
Yet unless she perceives moral situationsas moral situations,and unless
she perceivestheirmoral characteraccurately,her moral principlesand
skillat deliberationwill be for nought and may even lead her astray.In
fact one of the most importantmoral differencesbetween people is
between those who miss and those who see various moral featuresof
situationsconfrontingthem.
I will relate moral perception (in particularsituations)to the phe-
nomenon of moraljudgment,understoodhere as the facultywhichbridges

* Earlier draftsof thisarticlewere presentedat Sonoma State Universityand to some

students and facultyat the Universityof California at Berkeley. I wish to thank those
audiences for stimulatingdiscussions. I wish to thank Stephen Darwall for his comments
on mypresentationat the Conferenceon Impartiality(at Hollins College, June 1990); and
other participantsin the conferencefor their discussion of the paper. Finally,I wish to
thank Marcia Homiak, David Wong, Owen Flanagan, Stephen Nathanson, and Margaret
Holland for veryhelpful commentson various drafts.
1. Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty ofGood (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970).
2. Importantexceptionsto thisclaim-and worksto whichI am indebted-are Martha
Nussbaum, "The Discernmentof Perception,"in Proceedings oftheBostonArea Colloquium
on AncientPhilosophy, ed. J. Cleary (Washington,D.C.: UniversityPress of America, 1985),
and The Fragilityof Goodness(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1986), pp. 298-
306; Charles Larmore, Patternsof Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1987), chap. 1; Nancy Sherman, TheFabricofCharacter(Oxford: Clarendon, 1989),
esp. chap. 2; John Kekes, Moral Traditionand Individuality(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
UniversityPress, 1989), chap. 7.
Ethics101 (July 1991): 701-725
? 1991 by The Universityof Chicago. All rightsreserved.0014-1704/91/0104-0004$01.00

701
702 Ethics July1991
the gap between moral rules (and principles)and particularsituations.
I will show that the phenomenon of moraljudgment does speak to an
importantlacuna in principle-basedtheoriesof morality.Yet I will also
explore the limitations-as a wayof capturingwhatis missingin theories
which focus only on the general or the universal-of the metaphor of
"bridgingthe gap between the general and the particular."
Thus moral perception,I willargue, cannot be identifiedwithmoral
judgment. In a given situation moral perception comes on the scene
prior to moral judgment; moral perception can lead to moral action
outsidetheoperationofjudgmententirely;and, moregenerally,perception
involvesmoral capacitiesnot encompassed by moraljudgment.I willalso
argue that moral perception should not be conceived of as a unified
capacity,butthatitinvolvesmultifarious moraland psychological processes.
Finally,while I willbe criticizingprinciple-basedtheoriesforfailing
to recognize the importanceof the operation of moral perception and
moraljudgment, the boundaries are not sharp between those capacities
involved in moral perception and judgment and those more commonly
associated with the moral agent portrayedin principle-basedtheories
(rationality,commitmentto principles,sense of duty,testingmaximsfor
moralacceptability, and thelike).Moral perceptionis formedand informed
by our general values and principles,and the converse is true as well.
I willnot be discussingimpartialityper se but,rather,a featureoften
(though perhaps not necessarily) connected with it-namely, action-
guiding principleas the heart of morality.Principle-basedethical views
need not be "impartialist";W. D. Ross (The Rightand the Good) is an
example. However,at the end I willmake some briefremarksconnecting
my critiquewithother familiarcritiquesof impartialistviews.
I willbegin withthreeexamples of the operationof moralperception
in particularsituationsand willdrawon thesein thesubsequentdiscussion.
I
Example1. -John and Joan are sittingridingon a subwaytrain.There
are no emptyseats and some people are standing;yetthe subwaycar is
not packed so tightlyas to be uncomfortablefor everyone. One of the
passengersstandingis a woman in her thirtiesholding two relativelyfull
shopping bags. John is not particularlypaying attentionto the woman,
but he is cognizant of her.
Joan,by contrast,is distinctlyaware thatthe woman is uncomfortable.
Thus differentaspects of the situationare "salient" forJohn and Joan.
That is, whatis fullyand explicitlypresenttoJohn'sconsciousnessabout
the woman is thatshe is standingholding some bags; but what is in that
sense salient forJoan is the woman's discomfort.That an aspect of a
situationis not salientforan agent does not mean she is entirelyunaware
of it. She could be aware of it in a less than fullyexplicitway. One can
imagine, for example, that Joan asks John, "Does that woman seem
uncomfortableto you?" This question mighthave the effectof making
 Blum Moral Perception 703
Johnrealizethatat some levelhe had been awareofthewoman'sdiscomfort
all along but thathe had failed fullyto take it in. This mightbe because
he simplywas not paying more attentionto the situation.
It seems natural here to talk of awareness of a situation,or of an
aspect of it, existing"at differentlevels." An aspect or feature can be
more or less salientfor,or "takenin" by,an agent. This notionof salience,
admittingof degrees, preservesthisidea; by contrast,thatof "perceiving
situationsunder differentdescriptions"-sometimes used to express the
way the same situationcan be seen differently by differentperceivers
does not readilydo so. (This is not meant to deny that some aspect of
a situationnot encompassed in an agent's salience-consciousnesscould
be totallyoutside of the perceiver'sawareness.)3
In thissituation,the differencebetweenwhat is salientforJohn and
forJoan is of moral significance.Joan salientlyperceives(hereafterI will
just say "perceives") the woman's good (i.e., her comfort)as at stake in
a way that John does not. Joan perceives a morallyrelevant value at
stake,whileJohn does not.
One morally significantaspect of this differenceis the way that
perceptionis the settingforaction.John's perceptionprovideshim with
no reason to offerto help thewoman.4Whereas,in involvingthewoman's
good, Joan's perception of the situation already provides her with a
reason for action not based in her self-interest or projects.
But the moral significanceof the differencebetween John's and
Joan's perception of the situationlies not only in the relation between
that perception and the takingof beneficentaction. It lies in the factof
perceptionitself.We can see thismore clearlyif we imagineJohn's and
Joan's perceptionsto be fairlytypicalof each of them.John, let us say,
oftenfailsto take in people's discomfort,whileJoan is characteristically
sensitiveto such discomfort.It is thus in characterforthe discomfortto
be salientforJoan but not forJohn. That is to say, a morallysignificant
aspect of situationsfacingJohn fails to be salient for him, and this is a
3. Note that to speak of a feature of a situationas "salient" for an agent does not
(necessarily)mean thatthe agent takes thatfeatureto be action-warranting. It only means
thatthe given featureoccupies the agent's most explicitlevel of consciousnessconcerning
the situation. I mean for perceptual salience to provide the settingin which an agent
decides to act but not to be definitionallytied to action or reasons for action. A salient
perceptionof some morallysignificantaspect of a situationcould in some situationsinform
sympathy,indignation,or regretyetnot action. In factit mightbe misleadinghere to refer
to the "agent" the way I am doing (but I can thinkof no bettersingleterm).For the aspect
of the individual as a full moral person withwhich I am concerned here is not so much
her agency but somethingwhich takes place prior to her takingherselfto be called upon
to exercise that agency. Unless she already perceives her situationin a certainway in the
firstplace, she will not engage her agency. See n. 8 below.
4. This may be overstated.John might believe that out of politeness he as a male
should give up his seat for a female, or for an older female, and he mightofferher his
seat forthisreason. One mightor mightnotcall such an act of politenessmorallysignificant,
but in any case it would be a differentmoral significancethan to offerher the seat out of
a perception of her discomfort.
704 Ethics July1991
defectin his character- perhaps not a veryserious moral defect,but a
defectnevertheless.5 He missessomethingof the moralrealityconfronting
him.
Again, the deficiencylies not only in his failureto act. For we can
contrastwithJohn someone who does perfectlyclearlyperceive other
people's discomfortbut is totallyunmoved by it; he simplydoes not care,
and thisis whyhe does not offerto help. John,as I am envisioninghim,
is not callous and uncaringin thisway.We can imagine him as someone
who,when others'discomfortis broughtto hisattention,is as sympathetic
and willingto offerhelp as a person of average moral sensitivities.His
failureto act stemsfromhis failureto see (withthe appropriatesalience),
not fromcallousness about other people's discomfort.His deficiencyis
a situationalself-absorptionor attentionallaziness.6So thereis a different
moral significanceto "failingto act" depending on the characteror ex-
planation of thatfailure.(To say thatmoral perceptionis of significance
in its own rightis not to take a stand on whetherit is betterto perceive
and not to act than not to perceive in the firstplace. Accurate moral
perceptionis a good in its own right,but like other moral goods it is so
only ceterisparibus.)
Example2. -Theresa is the administratorof a department.One of
her subordinates,Julio, has been strickenwitha debilitatingcondition
in his leg causing him frequent pain. He approaches Theresa to help
work out a plan by which the company and in particularshe and his
divisioncan accommodate his disability.Theresa is unable to appreciate
Julio'sdisabilityand the impactitis havingon hiswork.While in principle
Theresa accepts the company's legal obligation requirementto accom-
modate to Julio's disability,in factshe continuallyoffersJulio less than
he needs and is entitledto.
More generally, Theresa makes Julio feel uncomfortablein ap-
proachingher and giveshim the impressionthatshe thinkshe is perhaps
too self-pityingand should just "pull himselftogether."It is not that
Theresa failsentirelyto see Julio as "disabled" and as "in pain," but she
does fail fullyto grasp what thismeans forhim and failsfullyto take in

5. This is not to imply that a failure of perception is morallysignificantonly as a

revelationof a larger defect of character.The failureof perception can be significantin
its own rightwithinthe given situation,just as a motive can be bad in itselfon a given
occasion, as well as in itsrevealingof a general defectof character.Instancesof perception
and motives in specificsituationscan be morallycriticizableeven when theyare out of
characterfor the agent. Regarding the subwayexample, however,it may be misleadingto
say that it is morallycriticizablefor a passenger to fail to perceive the discomfortof a
passenger on a particularoccasion; the failure may be too insignificant, and the moral
relationshipbetween the seated and the standingpassenger too attenuated,forit to count
as a moral failure. It may, however,be criticizableinsofaras thisfailureis expressiveof a
general failureto perceive discomfort.
6. Another case would be someone who "tunes out" in crowded,overstimulateden-
vironmentslike subwaysbut is quite sensitivein one-on-one interactions.
 Blum Moral Perception 705
or acknowledge that pain. The level of his pain and its impact on his
mental state is insufficiently
salient for Theresa.
Theresa is failing to perceive or acknowledge somethingmorally
significant-namely,Julio's physicalpain and his distressat the impact
of his conditionon his work situation.Yet (let us imagine) Theresa has
a distinctpersonal resistance to acknowledgingJulio's pain. It is not
simplya matter,as it is forJohn (as I am envisioninghim), of situational
self-absorption, or somethingwhichcould be correctedsimplyby calling
Theresa's attentionto it. (For Julio has repeatedlytried to do precisely
this.)PerhapsTheresa unconsciouslyidentifiespain withweakness.When
people evince pain in her presence, or describe pain which they have
had, Theresa becomes uncomfortable.She is inclined to thinktheyare
overdoingit; she findsherselfhaving feelingsof contempttowardsuch
persons, though perhaps she is not aware of this. (One can imagine
various psychodynamicaccounts of this:Theresa may have an irrational
fear of pain herselfand may have developed a defense against thisfear
by not wantingto acknowledge pain in others.)
The failure to be in touch with part of the moral realitywhich
confrontsher is a deficiencyin Theresa's responseto thissituation(bound
up with a deficiencyof character as well).7 Note that in this situation
adequate moral perception is not only a matter of making "moral
discriminations"-noting morallydistinctelementsin the situation.It is
also a matter of the moral aspect of the situation-here, Julio's
disability-weighing adequately withinone's (Theresa's) view of the sit-
uation. Theresa must have a certaindegree of empathyforJulio in his
situationin order forher to perceivehis pain withan appropriatedegree
of salience. The notion of "moral discrimination"overintellectualizes
Theresa's task (and failure) in the situationand omits the necessarily
affectivedimensionto the empathicunderstandingwhichis often(though
by no means always) required for fullyadequate moral perception.8
Theresa's deficiencyis bound up with,but not exhausted by, her
failureto takeadequate stepsto provideaccommodationtoJulio'sdisability.
Theresa and Julio have a role relationshipwhichgrounds her obligation
under the law or company policy to provide accommodation to Julio.
But I thinkwe regard this role relationshipas doing more than this. It
grounds the thoughtthat Theresa ought to appreciateJulio's situation

7. I mean to be using the notion of "moral reality"pre-theoretically,withouttaking

any stand on the current debates on "moral realism." My notion of "moral reality"is,
however,in some degree inspired by Iris Murdoch's work. So I want to make clear that I
am not accepting the Platonic cast of her view of moral reality.I would argue that there
are two somewhatdistinctpicturesof "moral reality"in Murdoch-the firstquite Platonic
and the second meaning somethinglike "otherpersons and theirsituations."My own sense
of the termis closer to the latterMurdochian notion,though perhaps somewhatbroader.
8. On the role of emotion in understandingthe situationof others,see Nussbaum,
"Discernmentof Perception";Sherman,FabricofCharacter;and Lawrence Blum, "Emotion
and Reality"(Boston University Colloquium forthe Philosophyof Science, 1986, typescript).
706 Ethics July1991
and explains why her not appreciating (with the appropriate salience)
his disabilityis a morallycriticizablefailureon her part. Because of their
workrelationship,his stateof being is verymuch partof her moralreality.
Can it be replied to the claim thatperceptionof morallysignificant
aspects of situationsis of moral value in its own rightthat in fact this
perceptionis morallyneutral,since a person could have accurate moral
perception,yet misuse what she perceives to harm the other person, or
otherwiseto commita wrongact?But even ifthe premiseof thisargument
is true,the conclusion does not follow.Any psychologicalphenomenon
can be put to bad use, includingdevotionto dutyor principle(theprinciples
mightbe bad ones), compassion or sympathy(whichmay lead someone
to neglectmoral requirements).But we do not say thatdevotionto duty
or principleare morallyneutraljust because theycan be put to bad use.
What it would take for Theresa to allow others' pain to be salient
forher in the appropriateway (and circumstances)would involvecoming
to gripswithand workingthroughher resistances.Whydoes she identify
pain withweakness?She would have to come to understandherselfbetter
in theseareas. Self-knowledge wouldbe integralto hermoralimprovement.
Note that this self-reflection would have littleto do with "impartiality"
or principle. Though it involves thinkingabout oneself in relation to
others,it is not a formof thoughtcharacterizedby impartiality(on this
point, see Margaret Walker's paper, in this issue), or by the attemptto
arrive at principles. It is rather reflectionthat tries to understand a
particularindividual (oneself) withregard to her moral character.This
point may seem obvious but is worthmentioning,as one sometimesfinds
the acknowledgmentof a need formoral reflectioncitedas an argument
in favorof principle-basedor impartialistviews of ethicsas against one
more stronglycenteredin virtueor emotion. In fact,moral reflectionby
itselfis neutral as between such theories.
Example3. -Tim, a whitemale, is waitingfora taxiat a trainstation.
Waitingnear him are a black woman and her daughter.A cab comes by,
past the woman and her daughter,and stops in frontof him. Tim, with
relief,gets in the cab.
Tim's reliefat havinggottena cab mightblockfromhis fullawareness
the cab driver'shaving passed up the black motherand child in favorof
him. What is salient in Tim's perception mightsimplybe the presence
of the cab.
But suppose that once in the cab Tim, idly ruminating,puts the
pieces of the situationtogetherand comes to see it now (in retrospect)
in a differentway. He sees the driveras having intentionallypassed up
the woman and child. Suppose he also infersthatthe driverdid thisout
of racism (e.g., because he just prefersnot to have blacks in his cab or
does not want to go into neighborhoodswhere he imagines the woman
will ask him to go [though these are morallydistinctreasons theyare,
perhaps in differentways,both racistor involveracism]).WhetherTim
is correctin this inferenceis not so importantas whetherthe inference
 Blum Moral Perception 707
is a plausible one, which I am assuming it to be. This perception of
racism becomes his "take" on the situation. He now sees an issue of
injustice in the situation in a way he did not at first.He gains moral
insightregardingthe situation.He thinksabout whyhe did notrecognize
the injusticein the situationbeforegettingin the cab. Priorto any action
Tim mighttake in the situation,it is (ceterisparibus) a (morally)better
thing for him to have recognized the racial injusticethan to not have
done so.
Note some featuresof moral perceptionin thissituation,in contrast
to examples 1 and 2. First,Tim's (ultimate,notinitial)takeon the situation
involvesboth construaland inferencein the way that the other agents'
do not. Tim has to construe the situationin a certain way in order to
see it as "the cab driverpassing up the woman and her child." And he
has to inferthe racistmotive.Both these processes involvesome degree
of imagination,not necessarilyrequired in the other two cases, though
the differencemay well be only one of degree.
The example also brings out the way that perception depends on
the agent's already possessing certain moral categories.Let us imagine
(though this seems very implausible) that Tim has never heard of nor
experienced racial discriminationbefore, so that while he mightcome
to thinkitunfairof the driverto have passed up a prospectivepassenger,
he (Tim) would neverthelessfailto grasp the furtherwrongnessinvolved
in racial injustice. Lacking the moral concept of "racism" (or "racial
discrimination")he would then not have been able to perceivethe racism
in the situation.(Of course, the agents in examples 1 and 2 must have
the conceptsof "discomfort,""pain," and "disability"to gain an adequate
moral perception of theirsituationstoo.)
I count Tim's construal of the driver passing up the prospective
passenger,and his inferenceof racism,withinthe rubricof "perception,"
for I am including within"perception"anythingcontributingto or en-
compassed within the agent's take on the situation-his salience-per-
ception-prior to his deliberatingabout what to do. Tim is not led to
suppose the racistmotiveas a resultof deliberatingabout how to act in
the situation;he is merelyidlyfocusingon the situation,not necessarily
intentionallyor even fullyconscious that he is doing so. The point is
(and this will be discussed in more detail below) that perceptionoccurs
priorto deliberationand priorto takingthe situationto be one in which
one needs to deliberate. It is preciselybecause the situationis seen in a
certain way that the agent takes it as one in which she feels pulled to
deliberate.

9. Note thatthisdefinitionof situationalperceptionis relativeto a deliberativeevent.

Once an agent begins deliberatingin a situation,the process of deliberationcan further
affecther perceptionof the situation.(If I am rememberingaccurately,I am indebted for
this point to Michael Slote and Margaret Walker at the Hollins conference.) It can lead
her to see differentaspects, to see as applicable moral conceptswhichshe initiallydid not,
and to see previous aspects witha differentdegree of salience. That perceptionwill then
708 Ethics July1991
II
One familiarline of criticismof impartialismor of any principle-(or
rule-) based ethic emphasizes the particularity of (moral) situations.It is
not the rule but some other moral capacityof the agent which tells her
thatthe particularsituationshe facesfallsunder a givenrule.The accurate
or adequate assessmentof particularsituations-a knowledgeor perception
of particulars-is not accounted for by the mere possession of rules
themselves.
This perceptionof particularsituationsis takenup byCharlesLarmore
in his book PatternsofMoral Complexity, 10in which he points out that
Kant recognized the need for somethingto bridge rule and particular
situation,and Kant called thisthe power of 'judgment": 'Judgmentwill
be thefacultyof subsumingunder rules; thatis,ofdistinguishing whether
something does or does not stand under a given rule.... Judgment is
a peculiar talentwhichcan be practicedonly,and can not be taught....
Although admirable in understanding[an individual] may be wanting
in natural power of judgment. He may comprehend the universal in
abstracto,and yet not be able to distinguishwhethera case in concreto
comes under it.""1Larmore rightlycreditsAristotlewithhaving more to
say than Kant about the need for such judgment, for emphasizing the
particularityinvolved in exercising it, and for delineating its place in
ethical deliberationand conduct.
I will discuss furtherthe nature of such 'judgment" as a moral
operation required by but often omitted in the account of agency in
principle-basedethicaltheories.Then I willargue thatwhatI have called
''moral perception"incorporatesmoral operationsand capacitiesthatare
not captured by this notion of 'judgment." This discussion will yield a
morecomplexand multifaceted understanding of therole of "particularity"
in ethics.Moreover,some aspects of moral perception-and of the par-

provide the contextforthe next level of deliberation.Note thatseeing a situationin moral

categoriesdoes not entail seeing one's moral agency as engaged by that situation.People
oftensee a situationas involvinga wrong but not regard themselvesas morallypulled to
do anythingabout it. For example, even when Tim comes to see an injusticeas having
takenplace, he may thinkof thatinjusticeas over and done withand not implyinganything
for him to do about it. The issue of what makes a moral being see her sense of agency as
engaged by a situation-and how perception fitsinto this-deserves furtherexploration
than I can undertakehere. It is striking,I think,how unproblematicthisissue has typically
been taken to be withincontemporarymoral theory.For a veryinterestingempiricalstudy
raisingimportantissues on thismatter,see Carol Gilligan,In a Different Voice(Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard UniversityPress, 1982), chap. 3.
10. See n. 2 above.
11. Immanuel Kant, CritiqueofPure Reason,trans.L. W. Beck (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1965), p. 177:A133-A134. See also Kant in FoundationsoftheMetaphysics ofMorals,
trans. L. W. Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,1959), p. 5:389: "No doubt these laws
require a power ofjudgment sharpened by experience, partlyin order to decide in what
cases theyapply."
 Blum Moral Perception 709
ticularityconnected with them-become invisibleif we think that an
adequate ethicaltheoryconsistsof rules and principlessupplementedby
themoralcapacitieswhichallowus to bringthoserulesto bear on particular
situations.
There are twodistinctfeaturesof 'judgment" conceivedas Larmore
(followingKant) does, as linkingrules and particularsituations.One is
to knowwhata givenrule calls upon one to do in a givensituation.Many
rules or principles are formulatedin too coarse-graineda fashion to
capturethe relevantmoral detail in particularsituationsand thusrequire
somethingbeyondthe rule itselfto applythemadequatelyto the particular
situation.Larmorerightlypointsout thatsome principlesrequirea greater
role for the exercise of this functionofjudgment than do others.12 For
example, in the example of the purportedlyracistcab driver(example
3), suppose Tim, the rider,holds the principle that one should take a
stand against racism. How best to do this-or even discerningwhich of
the actions he can thinkof (e.g., makingthe drivergo back to the train
station on the off chance that the woman and her child have not yet
gottena cab, tellingthe driverhe disapproves of what he assumes to be
the driver'sracism,making the driverstop so he can get out of the cab,
engaging the driverin conversationabout whyhe passed up the woman
and child) would count as takinga stand against racism-is no simple
matter.It requiresjudgment about the particularitiesof the situation.13
So this capacity presents at least a necessarysupplement to traditional
principle-basedethics.For knowinghow to apply the principle-knowing
how to thinkabout the issues involved and to pick the best among the
possible actions instantiatingthe principle-involves a moral capacity
(or capacities) beyond commitmentor adherence to, or recognitionof
the validityof,the principleitself(e.g., the principleof tryingto counter
racism or injustice). Tim could be entirelyand sincerelycommittedto
opposing racism and injustice(and for the rightreasons), yetbe a poor
judge of what doing this actually involves in this or other particular
situations.14
One can see the need for this aspect of judgment to fillout the
conception of moral agency in a principle-basedethic by considering

12. Larmore, p. 5.
13. DiscussingAristotle'saccount of deliberation,David Wigginspointsout thatmuch
deliberationis not an attemptto findthe best means to a given end, but a search for the
"best specification"of that end. David Wiggins, "Deliberation and Practical Reason," in
Essayson Aristotle's Ethics,ed. A. Rorty(Berkeley: Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1980), p.
228. My point here is that knowinghow best to apply a principle(whichone already sees
as applicable to a givensituation)to the situationrequiresa kindof moraljudgment neither
encompassed nor guaranteed by the possession of the principle itself.It is a form of
judgment involvedwithgrasping the morallysignificantparticularsof a given situation.
14. For a more detailed argumentforthe view thatdifferentmoral capacitiesmay be
broughtintoplayin applyinga principlethanin comingto hold the principle,see Lawrence
Blum, "Gilligan and Kohlberg: Issues for Moral Theory," Ethics98 (1988): 485-86.
710 Ethics July1991
Kant's notion of "imperfectduties."15 In contrastto "perfect"duties,
imperfectduties (such as beneficence)do not prescribea specificaction
in a specificsituation; they prescribethe adoption of a general end or
maxim (e.g., the happiness of others) but do not specifyexactlyhow or
towardwhom the beneficentactions are to be carriedout. On one inter-
pretation,it is morally indifferentwhen and how one carries out the
duty-for example, helping others-as long as one does so on some
(appropriate) occasions.16 Such a view would appear to implythatthere
is no distinctivelymoral work to be done in choosing when to act from
imperfectdutyand in knowinghow to do so. Since thescope of imperfect
duties is verygreat,this could be taken as a defense of the view thatan
ethic of principleis adequate to cover virtuallythe entiredomain of the
moral life.
But this view of duty neglectsthat it is in facta moral matter,and
not merelyone of personal preferenceor moral indifference,how one
carriesout a dutyor precept. It takes moral sensitivity (a) to know what
counts as exemplifyingparticularmoral principles,(b) to know when it
is and is not appropriate to instantiategivenprinciples,and (c) to be able
oneself to carryout the action in question (e.g., of being beneficent).
This sensitivitygoes beyond possessing the principle (plus the strength
of will to act on it); it is neither guaranteed nor encompassed by the
commitmentto the principle (plus strengthof will) itself.
My argument here is meant not as a critique of the notion of an
"imperfectduty" but only to show that a distinctcapacity for moral
judgment,as the abilityto bringprincipleto bear on particularsituations,
is needed for moral agents to produce action in accord with imperfect
duties. While Kant recognized the need for such moral judgment, he
did not appear to regard this capacityas a distinctlymoral one, and, at
least in his major ethical writings,seemed to think his moral theory
complete withoutan account of what is specificallyinvolved in (moral)
judgment.
A second feature of moral judgment not generally taken up by
philosophersin the principle-basedtraditionsis the recognitionof features
of a situationas having moral significanceand thus as being features
whichmustbe takenintoaccountin constructing a principlefullyadequate

15. My account of imperfectduties is drawn fromThomas Hill's often-citedaccount

in "Kant on ImperfectDutyand Supererogation,"Kant-Studien 62.Jahrgang,Heft 1 (1971):
55-76. This account is followed in Marcia Baron, "Kantian Ethics and Supererogation,"
JournalofPhilosophy 84 (1987): 237-62.
16. See Hill, p. 64. In the same spirit,Onora O'Neill says, "What is leftoptional by
fundamentalimperfectobligationis selectionnot merelyof a specificway of enactingthe
obligation but of those for whom the obligation is to be performed"("Children's Right
and Children's Lives," in Constructions ofKant's PracticalPhilosophy
ofReason: Explorations
[Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1989]). In a brieffootnotegivinga provisional
definitionof perfectand imperfectduties,Kant saysthatperfectdutiesallow no exceptions
"in the interestof inclination,"thus implyingthat imperfectduties do allow for such
exceptions (FoundationsoftheMetaphysics ofMorals,39:422).
 Blum Moral Perception 711
to handle the situation.If I am presentedwitha specificsituationI must
know, for example, that the fact that it involves promise keeping and
harm to an individual are morallyrelevantfeatures,while the factthat
it involvestakinga walk or eating cereal does not. This component of
moraljudgment is antecedent to the one just discussed. For before the
issue of implementinga principle comes to the fore for the agent, she
mustknow thatspecificfeaturesof the situationbeforeher (as she char-
acterizesthatsituationto herself)are morallysignificantones and, hence,
"pull for" specificmoral principles.
This feature of moral judgment, as an issue for Kantian ethics in
particular,has been explored by Barbara Herman in "The Practice of
Moral Judgment."Herman says that if the categoricalimperativeis re-
garded as a testingprocedure foralready-formedmaximsof action,then
(given that a proposed action may fall under several descriptions),how
an agent knows which features of a situationare relevant and which
irrelevantin constructingthe to-be-testedmaxim of her action is itselfa
moral matter.The moral knowledge involved in a commitmentto the
categorical imperativecannot by itselfaccount for nor guarantee this
prior knowledge. For this feature of moral agency, Herman posits a
differentkind of moral knowledge,captured in what she calls "rules of
moral salience."17
Principle-basedtraditionshave generallyfailed to attend to or note
the specificmoral characterof eitherof these aspects of moraljudgment
of particularsituations:(1) knowinghow to apply rules or principlesand
(2) recognizinggiven featuresof a situationas morallysignificantones.
III
I now want to suggest that the phenomenon of moral perception en-
compasses somethingbeyond these two featuresof moraljudgment and
that discussionsofjudgment have oftentended eitherto conflatethese
different operationsor to neglectthose connectedwithmoral perception
entirely.(I am notmeaningto restmuchon myuse of thetermsjudgment'
and 'perception' here. Either term can be used to referto some of the
operations I have included within the other. What is importantis to
recognizethe range of distinctmoral operationsand capacitiesinvolved.)
To know what to do about the cab driver'spresumed racism,Tim
must know that racism is a morallysignificantfeature of the situation
that he must take into account in figuringout how best to act. (This is
Barbara Herman's point.) But such knowledge does not guarantee that
Tim perceivesthe racismin the driver'sbehavior in the firstplace. Such
perceivinginvolvesa differentkind of, or aspect of, moral sensibilityor
understanding.It means, as we have seen, thatTim mustsee the situation
in terms other than personal relief at findinga cab. He must see the

17. Barbara Herman, "The Practice of Moral Judgment,"Journalof Philosophy87

(1985): 414-36.
712 Ethics July1991
driver as having passed over the woman and child. He must use his
knowledgeand imaginationto suppose a racistmotive.Tim mustrecognize
thatwhat has transpiredis in factracismbefore he can get to the point
of using his knowledge that racism is a morallysignificantfeatureof a
situationto help himfigureout whatto do, or how to constructa principle
to guide his action, and then to determinewhat action best instantiates
that principle.'8
It is moral perceptionwhich constructswhat an agent is faced with
as "a (moral) situation"in the firstplace. The idea of moraljudgment
as bridging general rule and particular situation depends on a prior
individuatingof "the situation."It is moral perceptionwhich does that
individuating,thus providinga settingin whichmoraljudgment carries
out its task.
A second wayin whichmoralperceptiongoes beyondmoraljudgment
is thatsome morallysignificantperceptiontakesplace outsidethe context
of rulesand rule-applicationaltogether.In thesubwayexample (1), when
Joan perceivesthe standingwoman's discomfort,her offerto help need
not be mediated by a rule, principle,or precept; she may be acting out
of directcompassion,an emotion-basedsentimentin whichthe woman's
discomfortis directlytaken as a reason forhelping. So the role of moral
perceptionhere in tuningin to a morallysignificant featureof thesituation
is not to help the agentselectthe relevantrule (or constructan appropriate
maxim) and then to (test it and) apply it. Rather,the morallycharged
descriptionof the situationwhich is salient for that moral agent (e.g.,
that the woman is uncomfortable)itselfalready containsher reason for
action,a reason whichdraws her to act withoutmediationby principle.19
A thirdand more encompassingwaythatmoraljudgmentunderstood
as the bridgebetweenprincipleand actionnarrowsthe scope of morality
is in itsconfinement to thetaskofgeneratingmoralaction.Moralperception
and moral understandingof particularsituationsare significantnot only
fortheirrole in generating(right)action. Rightaction not informedby
understandingof the moral realitiesconfrontingone (even when done
froma morallygood motive)loses some, and sometimesall, of its moral
value. Suppose, for example, that Theresa (in example 2) is prevailed
upon by her superiorsto grantJulio the accommodationto his disability
that he requests. Perhaps she even becomes convinced that this is the

18. On pp. 423-24 of her article,Herman refersindifferently to the perceptionof

distressand the recognitionof distressas being morallysignificant.Thus she appears to
recognize what I am calling moral perception,but she fails to appreciate its distinctness
fromthe operation of moraljudgment.
19. I cannot here join the complex question whetherreasons of compassion such as
Joan operates fromhere can be derived from,are in some strongsense grounded in, or
are required to be restrictedby (impartialist)moral principles. I take up some of these
issues in "Iris Murdoch and the Domain of the Moral," PhilosophicalStudies50 (1986):
343-67. For a critiqueof the argumentof that piece, see JonathanAdler, "Particularity,
Gilligan,and the Two-Levels View: A Reply,"Ethics100 (1989): 149-56.
 Blum Moral Perception 713
rightthingto do yet is stillunable reallyto appreciateJulio's condition
withthe appropriatesalience. Even though she does the rightthing(and
may even do it for a moral reason, in coming to believe that it is her
duty), her action is diminished from a moral point of view by lacking
the appropriate moral understandingof Julio's condition. As argued
earlier,Theresa ought to perceive and understandJulio'sdisabilitywith
the appropriate salience, as part of her workrelationshipwithhim; and
this does not mean only (though it does entail) that she should engage
in the correctbehavior fromthe appropriate motive.
Moreover,as argued earlier,just or accurate moral perceptionis of
value in itsown right.We praise,admire,and encouragecorrectperception
and moral insightprior to and partlyindependent of its issuingin right
action. In the cab example, let us envision an observer of the scene,
Yasuko, who sees the cab driverpass up the black woman and her child.
Yasuko senses that the woman is not only irritatedand angryat having
not gottenthe cab which she had reason to expect would be available to
her but also experiences an affrontto her dignityand a sense of being
shamed because she too thinksthe driverpassed her up forracistreasons.
Thus Yasuko sees-perceives-a violationof dignitywhichescapes Tim.
Let us imaginethatYasuko's seeingtheviolationofdignityinthisparticular
case is connected to a more pervasivecharacteristic of her moral sen-
sitivities-namely, that she is more deeply concerned about and tuned
in to issues of dignityin people's lives than are most persons. She has a
deeper understandingof and insightinto injusticeand dignityand why
they are important.This sensitivitycannot be understood simplyas a
disposition to performcertain actions. It is more pervasive than that,
informingher emotional reactions to things,what she notices,what is
salientforher, and the like, and particularactions and emotionscan be
seen as stemmingfromthis sensitivity.20

20. The collapsing of the significanceof moral perception into judgment of right
action-and a consequentmaskingofitsfullvalue-is particularly strikinginJohnMcDowell's
influentialarticle "Virtue and Reason" (Monist62 [1979]: 331-50). For McDowell, citing
Iris Murdoch,givesa centralrole to perceptionin ethics.He rightlyconnectstheimportance
of perception to the limitationsof an ethic of articulatablerules or procedures, arguing
(followingAristotle)thatrules cannot capture the fullmoral sensibilityof a person of good
character.McDowell speaks of sensitivities to aspectsof moralrealityas (in a givensituation)
being "salient" for the agent. In doing so he points toward the Murdochian view that
awareness of moral realityis a moral task and accomplishmentin its own rightand action
is only one part of the appropriate response to the perceivingof moral reality.However,
as McDowell develops his argument,the notions of perception,salience, and sensitivity
become defined solelyin termsof the generatingof rightactions.What is to be perceived
becomes, for McDowell, thatconsiderationin a situationthe actingon whichwill produce
rightaction (cf. p. 331 and elsewhere). The notion of salience is cashed out as that moral
considerationamong all those present which would be picked out as the one to act on if
the agent is to engage in rightaction.Lost is theidea of moralrealitytheaccurateperception
of whichis both morallygood in itsown rightand also providesthe settingin whichmoral
response in its broadest sense takes place. Early in the article(p. 332) McDowell speaks of
"specialized sensitivities"to differentaspects of moral reality.(I discuss thisissue below in
714 Ethics July1991
To summarize:There are threeimportantly distinctmoraloperations
omittedfromtraditionalprinciple-basedaccounts of ethics and needed
at least to supplement it: (1) perceiving (what are in fact the morally
significant)featuresof a situationconfrontingone (includingherein the
perceptual individuatingof the 'situation'as a morallysignificantone in
the firstplace); (2) recognizingthose featuresas morallysignificantones,
to be taken into account in deliberatingabout what to do-specifically
about whichprinciplesgovernthesituation;(3) knowinghow to implement
the principlesone takes to be conclusive in determiningwhat to do-
discerningwhatactionsconstitutethe best specification of thoseprinciples.
And thereare twowaysthatmoral perceptionrevealsa limitto principles
themselves:(1) moral perception,and action stemmingfromit, can go
on outsidethe contextof principlesentirely;(2) accuratemoral perception
is good in its own right.

IV
Let us returnto somethingthatCharles Larmore saysabout "judgment."
Larmore says that Aristotlehimselfhad littleto say about the way in
whichsuchjudgment is exercised-only thatitis acquired by experience
and practice. Yet Larmore does not regard this absence as a defect in
Aristotle'sview. For he agrees that,"although we can understandwhat
kindsof situationscall formoraljudgment, the kindsof tasksthatmoral
judgment is to accomplish,and the preconditionsforitsacquisition,there

more detail.) This conception promises a vision of a complex moral reality,sensitivity to

differentaspects of which (e.g., injustice,discomfort,physicalpain, racism,dignity)is the
settingfor but is not definitionallytied to the productionof rightaction. But McDowell
does not deliver on this promise, for his idea that there is unityin the virtuesis taken to
imply that each "sensitivity"entails all the others (p. 333). A consequence of this is to
underminethe idea of a complex of sensitivities,reducingthissimplyto a unifiedawareness
of the single rightness-generating characteristicin the situation.McDowell's defense of
Aristotle'sview that onlyjudgment or discernment(perhaps guided by the idea of the
mean) can tell us the rightor noble thingto do in the particularsituationconfrontingthe
agent is an importantalternativepicture,or at least a corrective,to a principle-centered
views of ethics.Yet McDowell's notion ofjudgment is stillconfinedto the discernmentof
rightaction rather than to the broader compass of rightor good emotional, perceptual,
and imaginativeresponse to a situation.Aristotledoes not of course confine himselfto
rightaction; for him emotions are an integralpart of virtue,as has been emphasized by
bothNussbaum,"Discernmentof Perception";and Sherman,FabricofCharacter. Nevertheless,
the sensitivityto moral features-to moral reality-which I have argued to be of moral
significancein itsown rightis stillnot fullycaptured by supplementingthe notionof right
action withrightemotion. It is not only a matterof having the rightamount of anger (for
example) towardthe rightperson on the (appropriate)occasion in question,eitherbyitself
or accompanyinga rightor noble action. Such a view stillconfinesmoral life too much to
specificoccasions (calling foraction or emotion) and failsto bringout (as discussed above)
that both the action and the emotion appropriate on specificoccasions are expressionsof
sensitivitiesand formsof moral perceptionwhich pervade the agent's view of the world.
Sherman'saccount,and Nussbaum's to a slightlylesserextent,do in factattemptto attribute
to Aristotlethe broader view of moral perceptionwhich I am developing here.
 Blum Moral Perception 715
is very littlepositive we can say in general about the nature of moral
judgment itself."21
Perhaps one reason Larmore thinkslittlecan be said about moral
judgment is connected with the way he construesthe 'particularity'of
moral judgment. He appears to be thinkingthat because judgment is
particularistic,thereforenothinggeneralcan be said about it.22Particularity
here seems to be taken implicitlyas the inexpressiblecounterpartof
generalrules (as theearlierquote fromKant also suggests).Such a picture
contributesto mystifying the operation of situational perception and
judgment.
Our previous discussion suggeststhatthe way people perceive par-
ticularsituations, character
and theirabilityto discernthemorallysignificant
of particularsituations,is not mysteriousand ineffablebut is bound up
withgeneral featuresof people's characterand theirmoralmakeup. This
is partlybecause (as willbe discussedin greaterdetailbelow)the perception
of particularitiesis often a sensitivityto particularsorts of moral fea-
tures-injustice, racism,physicalpain, discomfort-and general things
can be said about what promotes those sensitivities, about the obstacles
to such sensitivities,and about how such sensitivitiesdevelop. Once par-
ticularityis broken down into particular sorts of moral features and
sensitivity to theirpresence, the door is open to exploringthe waysthat
imagination,attention,empathy,criticalreason, habit,exposure to new
moral categories,and the like contributeto the formationof those sen-
sitivities.
Besides the implicationof ineffability, a furtherway thatLarmore's
(and others') conception of moral judgment blocks inquiry into its
operations-and the operation of moral perceptionas well-is the idea
of "moral judgment" (or "practicaljudgment," "situationalintuition,'
'judgment of particulars")as a unitaryfaculty.This conceptionhas been
preserved, in fact, in the way I have up to now been talking about
perception-as if "perceivingthe particularitiesof situations"was one
single kind of psychological/moral process.23
But situationalperception is not a unifiedcapacity.Differentparts
of one's moral makeup are broughtto bear in "seeing" (and not seeing)
differentfeaturesof situations,of moralreality.Differentaspectsof moral
realitycan draw on differentsortsof sensitivitiesor formsof awareness.

21. Larmore, p. 19.

22. Ibid., p. 15.
23. Note thewayNussbaumrefersto moralperception,in a discussionof theimportance
of such perception to an ethical life: "The subtletiesof a complex ethical situationmust
be seized in a confrontationwiththe situationitself,by a facultythat is suited to address
it as a complex whole" ("Discernmentof Perception,"pp. 172-73); see also Nussbaum,
Fragility,p. 301 (top of page). The idea of such perceptionas "a faculty"is preciselywhat
I want to criticizehere, though as I mentionI have been guiltyof thismode of expression
and conceptualizationas well. (In factNussbaum's excellentdiscussionof perceptionhas
been formativein my own thinkingon these matters.)
716 Ethics July1991
In a way it is misleadingto speak of someone as "sensitiveto particulars"
(or "good at perceivingthe moral characterof particulars")toutcourt.
Some people are betterat perceivingsome sortsof particularsthan other
sorts.
Here are some morallydistinctfeaturesof situationswhich some
personsmaybe betterat perceivingthanothers:temptations to compromise
one's moralintegrity, suffering,racism,dishonesty,violationsof someone's
rights.Even the subcategoryof moral considerationshaving to do with
otherpersons'well-beingis not reallya unifiedone. For example,Theresa's
being "blocked" in her perceptionsof physicalpain would not preclude
her frombeing sensitiveto and understandingabout othersortsof needs
or concerns,even in the same otherpersons. Anotherexample: the hurt
of being treated unjustly(as in the example of Yasuko's perception of
the black woman) is (in part) a differentkind of injurythan a hurt not
necessarilyconnected withinjustice(e.g., disappointmentdue to failure
in a faircompetition,or personal rejectionwhere no one is to blame).
In the same, restrictedarea of moral considerationshaving to do
with others' well-being,a moral agent's sensitivitiescan also fail to be
unified across differenttypes of persons. Some people are generally
sensitiveto the feelings of adults but not of children,and others the
opposite. More generally,person A may be sensitiveto the plight of
members of certain groups or people sharing a certaincondition (e.g.,
blacks,Jews, the socially excluded) but less so, or not at all, to that of
others.24
The complexityof the way that moral sensitivityand perception
operate within persons-and the varietyof processes involved in an
individual's coming to have the multifarioussensitivities-can also be
seen in thevarietyof obstaclesto accuratemoralperception.For example,
what it would take forJohn to see the subwaywoman's discomfortmight
be simplyfor him to attend to her withouthis usual self-absorbeddis-
tractions.What it would take for Theresa to acknowledgeJulio's pain
would require her coming to termswithherself-working throughher
resistances.This would involve self-knowledgeand self-explorationin a
way perhaps not essential in John's case.
My view is not thatthere is some absolute number of distinctmoral
Afterall, the ones I have alreadymentionedcould be broken
sensitivities.
down even further.I mean only to point to an oversimplification in the
way sensitivityto particularityis portrayedwhen seen on the model of
a unitaryfaculty.Such a view fails to reveal-and thus blocks further
scrutinyinto-the multiplicity of psychicprocessesand capacitiesinvolved
in moral perception and moraljudgment.

24. The character of Mrs. Hoffman in Carol Ascher's The Flood (Freedom, Calif.:
Crossing Press, 1987) is a wonderfulexample of someone compassionate toward anyone
she is able to see as a victimof discrimination,or as a kind of refugee (e.g., due to the
flood), but oftenuncompassionate,insensitive,and harsh to others.
 Blum Moral Perception 717
This oversimplificationand overunificationof moral/psychicphe-
nomena is not confined to discussions of the limitationsof an ethic of
rule and principle.One can see it also in philosophies which centeron
emotion-basedphenomena such as sympathyor empathy.My discussion
suggeststhatsympathyand empathyare in a sense themselvesnot unitary
phenomenabut,rather,collectionsof at leastsomewhatdistinctsensitivities
to differentaspects of other people's well-being (discomfort,physical
pain,thehurtofinjustice,thehurtofdisappointment, etc.).One implication
of thisis thatwhen moralphilosophersand educatorstalkabout cultivating
sympathyand empathy, accomplishing this will involve nurturingor
developing some distinctsensitivitiesand willinvolvedifferenttasksand
processesfordifferentpersonswithrespectto different objectsof sympathy
or empathy.25
Larmore's idea that "practicaljudgment" is a unitaryfacultyabout
whichlittlecan be said (since it depends on intuitingparticulars)accom-
panies the idea that the only way one can improve one's capacity for
such judgment is through practice and habit. There is nothing to tell
people about how to exercisejudgment; one simplyhas to "do it." But
seeing the multifariousnature of practicaljudgment as perception of
particularsboth throwslighton the ways and extentto which practice
and habit do teach practicaljudgment and also broadens the methods
by which people can learn to perceive particulars.
Iris Murdoch'snotionof an "obstacle"(discussedabove),whichdistorts
or blocks accurate perception of moral reality,is helpful here. Such
obstacles may preventan individual frombeing able to learn fromex-
perience and practice how to perceive and judge well in some area of
life.For example, Theresa maydeal withmanypeople who have physical
pain yetmay never get any betterat graspingwhatis going on withthem
and judging what to do about it. Her own unconscious resistance to
opening herselfto others' physicalpain may constitutean obstacle not
only to accurate perceptionbut also to learning in the way suggestedin

25. E. V. Spelman, "The Virtue of Feeling and the Feeling of Virtue," in Feminist
Ethics:New Essays,ed. C. Card (Lawrence: UniversityPress of Kansas, 1991), develops this
point in connection with race and class differenceswithinthe same gender. She argues
that persons (and in particularwomen) who are caring and concerned toward others of
theirown race and class may yetnot be so towardwomen of otherraces and classes. Owen
Flanagan and KathrynJackson,"Justice,Care, and Gender: The Kohlberg-GilliganDebate
Revisited,"Ethics97 (1987): 622-37, make the point that several distinctmoral capacities
mightwell be part of what Gilligan calls the moralityof care. See also Owen Flanagan,
VarietiesofMoral Personality: Realism(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Ethicsand Psychological
UniversityPress, 1991), chaps. 9-11, for an importantassessmentof Gilligan's work. In
"Three Mythsof Moral Theory" (in Rorty,Mind in Action[Boston: Beacon, 1988], p. 291),
Amelie Rortynotes the diversityof attitudescovered by conceptslike "respect"and "love."
In general, Rorty'swork (in the above volume and elsewhere) is an importantsource of
insight into the multifariousnature of moral sentiments,attitudes,and virtues,and a
caution against the oversimplificationof the realm of moral psychologyfound in much
moral theory.
718 Ethics July1991
Aristotle'sidea of habit, practice,and experience.26Coming directlyto
grip with one's obstacles may in some cases be necessaryfor opening
oneself to certainaspects of one's moral reality,as well as to being able
to learn from experience and practice. Theresa may need to work
through-perhaps in some formof therapy-her deep and partlyun-
conscious association of physicalpain withweakness,though Murdoch
herselfwould be suspicious of such therapy,and, more generally,of any
attemptto come to gripswithone's moral obstaclesby focusingexplicitly
on them.27Yet Murdoch's pessimismabout moral change in the face of
such obstacles,though insightfulabout the dangers of self-absorptionin
the attemptto rid oneself of that veryself-absorption, seems overdone.
Progress in workingthrough and mitigatingthese moral obstacles can
be made.28

V
I want brieflyto situate the criticisms(developed through considering
moral perceptionand particularity)that I have made of principle-based
ethicaltheoriesin relationto some otherimportantand influential
criticisms
also made of impartialistor principle-basedviews: (1) Those whichchal-
formof moralprinciples-forexample,byclaiming
lenge the (impartialist)
thatsome principlesrequiregreatermoralconcerntowardpersonsrelated
to us.29 (2) Those addressing the relativeforceof moral and nonmoral
considerations(e.g., connected with the notion of a "personal point of
view"),criticizingimpartialismforthe assumptionthatimpartialmorality
necessarilytakes precedence over all other practical standpoints.30(3)

26. Shermaninterprets Aristotle'snotionof "habit"to includethekindof self-knowledge

and redirectionof emotion and perceptionthat I am contrastingwitha more mechanical
conception of habit (see FabricofCharacter,chap. 5).
27. I cannot finda citationfor this warinessabout therapyin Murdoch's Sovereignty
ofGood and suspect I may be rememberingsomethingsaid by a characterin one of her
novels. In any case, many of her novels do exemplifythis wariness or suspicion of psy-
chotherapyas involvingyet another form of diversionfromthe task of confrontingthe
moral realityexternal to oneself.
28. In thesectionfromwhichthepassage fromKantcitedearlieris taken-"Introduction
to 'Transcendental Judgmentin General"' -Kant seems somewhat contradictoryin his
views concerningthe prospectsfor improvingone's capacityforjudgment of particulars.
On the one hand, he agrees withAristotleabout the necessityfor practiceand adds that
lack of exposure to examples of particularkinds of situationsis a remediable source of
poor practicaljudgment. But in a footnoteon the same page (Immanuel Kant, Critiqueof
Pure Reason,trans. N. Kemp Smith,unabridged ed. [New York: St. Martin'sPress, 1965],
p. 178) he says,"Deficiencyin judgment is what is ordinarilycalled stupidityand forsuch
a failingthere is no remedy."
29. See, e.g.,JohnCottingham,"Ethicsand Impartiality," Studies43 (1983):
Philosophical
83-99; ChristinaHoff Sommers, "Filial Morality,"JournalofPhilosophy 83 (1986): 439-
58.
30. See, e.g., Bernard Williams,"A Critique of Utilitarianism,"in Utilitarianism:Pro
and Con,ed. J.J. C. Smartand B. Williams(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,1973);
and Thomas Nagel, The Viewfrom Nowhere(Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1986), chap.
 Blum Moral Perception 719
Those claimingthatimpartialismor principle-basedtheoriesdeny,or at
least cannot account for, the unique and irreplaceable worth of each
individual (eitherwithinthe contextof personal relationshipsor in gen-
eral).31(4) Those claimingthat'the particular' forexample, particular
judgment-is priorto and more significant in theethicallifethangeneral
principle.32
I mention these familiaralternativecriticismsof impartialismand/
or principle-basedethicspartlybecause theyare ofteninsufficiently dis-
tinguishedfrom the criticismI am mounting in this article (and from
each other as well). I want to make clear that I do not take myselfto be
making any of these criticisms.My view neitherentails nor is entailed
by any of them, though I believe that my criticismsare consistentwith
all of them. I can only very brieflyattempt to support these claims:
Regarding 1, issues of perceptionand particularity arise no matterwhat
the form("partialist"or "impartialist")of moral principles.Claim 2 deals
with issues entirelydistinctfrom perception and particularity(which
apply in both moral and nonmoral domains). The issue of unique worth
in 3 is not engaged by my notions of perceptionand judgment. Issues
of moral perceptionand judgment obtainwhetheror not each individual
has a unique worth.Regarding4, I do not claim a priorityforperception
and particularity over principles.I am sayingonlythat,even ifthe latter
is takenas an essentialfeatureof moralagency,theformerare nevertheless
both (partly)independent fromit and no less essentialto moral agency.
I do want,however,to focuson one furthercriticismof impartialist,
principle-basedtheories,associated withthe workof Carol Gilliganand
others.33This viewallegesthatimpartialism is defectivebecause itrepresents
only one domain or "voice" withinmorality,the other being captured
by the "moralityof care." Some elaborationsof thisviewbringin notions
of perception and particularityas integralto the moralityof care. For
care involvesattentionto and sensitivity to particularpersons and their
situationsin a way (it is alleged) not fullyrecognized by impartialist,
principle-basedmoralities.
This criticism
is partiallyvalid,I wantto argue,butpartiallyincomplete.
We need to distinguishthreetypes-or perhapsaspects-of 'particularity'.
The firstand second are involved in every situation-ones involving

10; David Brink,"UtilitarianMoralityand the Personal Point of View,"JournalofPhilosophy

83 (1986): 417-38.
31. See, e.g., Nussbaum, "Discernment of Perception,"p. 178; Stuart Hampshire,
"Moralityand Convention,"in Moralityand Conflict (Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1983), pp. 135-36.
32. See, e.g., Nussbaum, "Discernment of Perception"; Kekes, chap. 7; and John
Hardwig, "In Search of an Ethics of Personal Relationships,"in Personto Person,ed. G.
Giaham and H. LaFollette (Philadelphia: Temple UniversityPress, 1989).
33. Gilligan,In a Different
Voice;and Carol Gilligan,J. V. Ward, and J. McL. Taylor,
eds.,MappingtheMoralDomain(Cambridge,Mass.: CenterfortheStudyofGender,Education,
and Human Development, 1988).
720 Ethics July1991
justice as well as care, impersonal ones as well as those withinpersonal
relationships.By contrast, thethirdaspectof particularity
is moresignificant
in some moral situationsthan others.34
The firstaspectof particularity-theone I have been mostconcerned
withhere-is the perceptionof particularsituations.This is an issue for
any moral principleor concept. There is a gap between an intellectual
adherence to and grasp of principlesofjustice on the one hand, and the
recognitionof particularsituationsconfrontingone as violating(or oth-
erwiseimplicating)thoseprinciples-just as thereis a gap betweenholding
the value of 'caring for individuals'and recognizinga given situationas
one in whichthatvalue is called for.In our cab driverexample Tim may
well be a strongproponent ofjustice, but he initiallyfailsto see thathis
own situationinvolvesan injustice.What it takes to be sensitiveto actual
injusticeas it is implicatedin particularsituationsin one's lifeis not the
same as what it takes to see the characterand validityof principlesof
justice. These involvedifferent(thoughof course related)aspectsof one's
moral being. It is not as ifthe principlesthemselvesalreadyfullycontain
the sensitivity needed to recognize theirapplicability,violation,and the
like.This is true of any moral virtueor principle,not onlyones involving
care or compassionforparticularpersons.Hence proponentsof a morality
of care are wrong if they claim that 'particularity'is involved only in a
moralityof care and not in an impartialist,principle-baseddomain or
"voice."
While perceptual particularityis involvedin everysituation,I have
argued thatwhat allows an agent to perceive appropriatelyand well are
a varietyof related psychiccapacities-not a single monolithicfaculty.
To put it crudely,different'particularities'are governed by different
sensitivities.
A second aspect of particularityis what mightbe called the "parti-
cularisticattitude,"one whichtheresponsiblemoralagentbringsto every
situation.It involvesbeing alive to the waysthata given situationmight
differfromothers (to which it mightbe superficiallysimilar),not being
quick to assume thata noted featureof a situationcorrelateswithothers
withwhich it has been correlated(withinone's experience) in the past,
not being quick to assume thata principlewhichhas been conclusivein
similarsituationswillbe conclusivein the currentone, and the like. This
attitudecorrespondsto an injunctionto "keep in mind the particularity
of situations."This attitude cannot guarantee accurate, good, or just
situationalperception. If a person is simplyinsensitiveto certaintypes
of moral features of situations,she mayjust not perceive them, even
when keeping the particularisticinjunctionin mind. Nevertheless,this
34. Margaret Walker's "What Does the DifferentVoice Say? Gilligan's Women and
Moral Philosophy,"Journal ofValueInquiry23 (1989): 123-34, creditsGilliganwithat least
a confused recognitionof the broader scope of particularity forwhich I am arguing here.
My discussion of differentaspects of particularityin relation to care ethicsis indebted to
Walker'sexcellentaccount of differentstrandsin Gilligan's thought.
 Blum Moral Perception 721
attitudeis certainlyan aid to good perception and can become deeply
rooted in a moral sensibilityso that it does not have to be appealed
explicitlyto in each situation.
In contrastto perceptualparticularity and theparticularisticattitude,
thereis a thirdaspect of particularity which (fora given,situatedagent)
some situationsinvolvemore than others.I willcall this"detail" particu-
larity.It is here thatGilligan'sviewof thespecificconnectionof particularity
withan ethicsof care has merit.In general (though perhaps not always),
adequate moral concern for intimatesrequires a more detailed under-
standing and sensitivityto such persons as particularindividuals than
does moral concern forstrangers.One needs to know in more detail the
friend'sfeelings,concerns, and interestsand must thereforebe more
alive to how this mightdifferfromothers in the "same" situation,than
one does in order to act well towarda stranger.
Detail particularitydiffersfrom the particularisticattitudein that
the latterbids us to be alive to possiblyrelevantdifferencesbetween the
situationbefore us and othersto whichwe mightotherwiseassimilateit,
while the formerinvolves the process of actuallygaining more specific
and detailedknowledgeabout a particularsituation.Whiletheparticularistic
attitudeis requiredin everysituation,some situationsrequiremoredetailed
understandingof particularitiesthan others.
Detail particularity differsfromperceptualparticularity in not being
bound up so intimatelywithperception. Detail particularitybecomes a
factorsubsequent to perceptual particularity's having already come into
play. Once one perceives a particularsituationas a moral one, calling
for moral response, there remains an issue of the degree of detailed
understanding-a finer-grainedas contrasted with a more coarse-
grained-that one needs in order to make an adequate moral response.
The particularmoral issues raised in the situation,and the domain of
moral concern, alert one to the degree to which one presses toward a
more fine-grainedmoral understanding.35
VI
Let us bringout more explicitlyhow the phenomena of moral perception
and particularityconstitutecriticismsof principle-basedethicaltheories.
I fear that many theoristsof the latter mold will regard what I have
discussed here as mildlyinterestingbut as involvingnothinginhospitable
to a principle-basedaccount of ethics. Let me consider three different
positionsexpressiveof theviewthata principle-based ethiccan incorporate
moral perception,judgment, and particularity:(A) The conception of
moral agencyin a principle-basedethicalreadycontainsmoral perception
and particularisticsensitivities.(B) The commitmentto the primacyof

35. The distinguishingof three aspects of particularitypoints up a confusionin my

notion of particularityin "Particularityand Responsiveness,"in TheEmergence ofMorality
in YoungChildren(Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1987).
722 Ethics July1991
principleentailsa commitmentto develop perceptualand particularistic
sensitivities.(C) The conceptual resourcesof principle-basedtheoriescan
be mustered to express what is involved in moral perception and par-
ticularisticsensitivity.
A) The view here is that a moral agent cannot achieve a genuine
understandingof and commitmentto (universal,valid) moral principles
withoutalong the way developing sensitivity to situationsin whichthose
principlesare to be applied, knowledgeof how to apply them,awareness
of relevantsituationaldetail, and the like.36But unless this is made to
be true by definition,it seems entirelyimplausible. Surely, as argued
earlier,the moralcapacitiesnecessaryto see thevalidityof moralprinciples
(e.g.,to be able to testthemforuniversalizability
or forutilitarian
validation),
to appreciate why theyshould be adopted, and to sincerelyadopt such
principles-all this does not guarantee that one will not miss situations
in whichthose principlesapply, thatone willknowthe best specification
of those principlesin a given situation,that one will have the requisite
sensitivitiesto different aspectsofone's moralreality.Certainlyone would
not say of someone that she had fullygrasped the validityof a moral
principle if she never noticed when the principle applied; so the two
sorts of capacities are not entirelydistinct.But position A requires a
much strongerconnectionthan this.
B) This view (thatI willconsiderin its Kantian version,whichdraws
inspirationfromKant's DoctrineofVirtue)consistsin sayingthat if Kant
wantedpeople to adhere to theirdutyor duties,he musthave also wanted
them to recognize situationsin which they had duties; hence he must
have wanted moral agents to develop the capacities necessaryto master
such situationalrecognition.37That is, he must have wanted agents to
develop the perceptualsensibilities I have been discussinghere. In Doctrine
ofVirtue,Kant says that the cultivationof sympathycan aid in the per-
formanceof duty.So it could be said that according to Kant there is a
duty to cultivatesuch capacities and sensibilities.
I have earlierpointedto severalproblemswiththisview: (1) Accurate
moral perception- seeing injustice, distress, dishonesty where it
occurs-has (or anywaycan have) moral worthin itsown right,not only

36. This positionwas suggestedbyStephen Darwall in his remarkson mypresentation

at the Hollins conferenceon impartiality.
37. I take thispositionto be in the spiritof partsof Herman's "The Practiceof Moral
Judgment";see, e.g., p. 424: "Mightnottheabilityto discerndistressrequirethedevelopment
of affectivecapacities of response?. . . Then we will have found a Kantian argumentfor
the development of the affectivecapacities,and Kantian grounds for valuing them. Not,
of course, valuing them for themselves,but as morallynecessarymeans." See also Rorty,
"Virtues and Their Vicissitudes,"in Mind in Action,pp. 320-21: "Consistentrationality
recognizesthatin order formoral intentionsto issue in well-formedactions,the will must
be supportedbythe virtues.Since Kantian moralitycommandsthe acquisitionof the several
virtues . . ."
 Blum Moral Perception 723
as an (even necessary)means to performanceof principledaction.38 (2)
Not all morallygood action is done fromor covered by principleor duty.
But even withinthe ambit of principle-basedaction, positionB is
inadequate as a full defense of traditionalprinciple-basedethics as in-
corporatingperception,judgment, and particularity.It would be one
thingif principle-basedethicsclaimed to provide no more than a theory
of the determinationof adequate moral principles. In practice this is
much of what discussionsof principle-basedethicsdoes in factconcern
itselfwith.But such a conception of the enterpriseof moral philosophy
is too limited,foritacknowledgesitselfto be incompleteas a fullconception
of moral agency.Perhaps some practitionersof thisbrand of ethicsthink
thatto extend inquiryinto the fullnature of moral agencyis to abandon
pure philosophyfor somethingwhich is too much like "psychology."
Yet if one acknowledges the need for a full picture of moral
agency-or moral personhood-then my argument has been that sit-
uationalperception, judgment,and particularisticsensitivities
are as central
to that agency as is commitmentto principle. One gets a significantly
differentpicture of moral agency if one sees the complexityof these
capacities and their central role in good characterthan if one pictures
moral agency on the model of the possession of principle(perhaps plus
strengthof willto carrythemout). So, unless the principle-basedtheorist
can show thatthesecapacitiescan be accounted forwithinthe conceptual
resources of the principle-basedtheory,it is no defense of that theory
to saythatthe theoryis able to recognizethe need fortheseparticularistic
and perceptual sensitivities.
This leads us to position C, which claims just this. This position
cannotbe evaluatedin abstractionfroma particularprinciple-basedethic,
so let us consider Kantianism.39There are two versions of C: (1) The
conceptsof Kantianism-rationality,universality, ends-can be used to
capture the (proper) objects of perception,judgment, and particularity.
That is, what one needs to perceive,to judge, and to be sensitiveto are
themselvesKantianphenomena.(2) The structure of perception,judgment,
and particularisticsensitivityas moral/psychologicalcapacities can be
accounted forby Kantian concepts.
Even if C1 were true (which I do not believe it is), it would not be
sufficientto ground the claim thatone has accounted forperception(for
example) withinKantian categories.Suppose, forexample, thattreating
someone as an end encompassedrelievingher distress;thatis,the Kantian
notion of an "end" would have encompassed the object of situational
perception (namely,distress).Still,it would not followthat holding the

38. This point is argued in Nancy Sherman, "The Place of Emotions in Kantian
Morality,"in Identity,
Character, and Morality:Essaysin Moral Psychology,
ed. Owen Flanagan
and Amelie 0. Rorty(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990).
39. Position C (as well as B) can be found in Herman, pp. 426-28.
724 Ethics July1991
principlethat one should treatothers as ends encompasses the psychic
capacity which leads the agent to perceive distresswhen it is present.
Hence Kantian notions would not have fullyaccounted for moral per-
ception.
Yet, if positionA is abandoned, it is difficultto see the plausibility
of the other view, C2, either. Rationalityin one's maxims, testingfor
universalizability, and the like do not seem to capture what it is about
someone that makes her sensitiveto other persons' distressor able to
discernthe best specificationof a principleofjustice.These seem distinct
(though related) aspects of an individual's moral economy. Perhaps a
better candidate would be (again) 'treatingsomeone as an end. Yet if
whatone means by thisis commitmentto the principleof treatingothers
as ends, then such a commitmentwill guarantee neither seeing when
the principleis applicable (i.e., perception),nor knowingexactlythe best
way to implementthat principleeven when one sees thatit is applicable
(i.e.,judgment). On the other hand, if one includes the lattercapacities
withinone's verynotion of "treatingas an end," then one willhave made
C2 true only by definitionalfiat,ratherthan actuallydemonstratingthe
Kantian characterof the capacities of perceptionand judgment.
It mightbe worthexploringin the contextof a specificexample the
idea that sensitivity to an issue of principleguarantees perceptionof all
significant moral features of situations.
In the cab drivercase, let us imagine that as Tim thinksabout the
driver'saction he comes to see it as racist,unjust, and wrong. He sees
that the action violates principles of justice. Contrast Tim here with
Yasuko, who like Tim perceivesthe wrongnessof the cab driver'saction,
but in addition directlyperceivesthe indignitydone to the black woman
passed up by the driver.So Tim perceives the injustice-the violation
of principle-without perceivingthe indignityto the person who suffers
theinjustice.As thisexampleillustrates, itis possibleto graspthewrongness
of an unjust action withoutactuallyregisteringor takingin the affront
to dignitysustained by the suffererof the injustice.
If this is so it calls into question the idea that sensitivity
to actions
as violating principle (e.g., a principle of injustice) guarantees or can
account for sensitivityto the indignitysufferedby the victimsof the
violation of that principle. Thus it calls into question the idea that the
Kantian capacityforrecognizingviolationsof principleencompasses or
guarantees the perceptual sensitivityto the morallysignificantfeature,
the sufferingof indignity.40

40. What thisargumentsuggests,I think,is thatifthe Kantian notionof (respectfor)

dignityis understood as (respectfor) rationalagency,then thisnotionis inadequate to the
understandingof dignityinvolvedin the thoughtthattheblackwoman'sdignityis affronted
by being passed up by the cab driver.On thisnarrowand over-rationalistic conceptionof
dignityin Kant, see VictorJ. Seidler,Kant,Respect,and Injustice:TheLimitsofLiberalMoral
Theory(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986).
 Blum Moral Perception 725
One mightreply that the notion of dignityis itselfa Kantian one.
But itis interestingthen thatone can be sensitiveto violationsof Kantian
principle (e.g., a principle of racial justice) withoutthat guaranteeing
thatone be sensitiveto issuesof dignityin particularsituations.In addition
to throwinginto question whether-or what it means to say that-the
universalizability formulationof the categoricalimperativeis equivalent
to its"end" (or "dignity")formulation,thisis furtherencouragementfor
the view that commitmentto principlesdoes not guarantee situational
perception.
WhileI have argued in thissectionthatthe phenomenaof perception,
judgment, and particularisticsensitivities constitutea significantcritique
of principle-basedtheories, I want also to emphasize a less combative
point. Until recently,the Kantian-and more generallythe principle-
based, impartialist-traditionshave failedto acknowledgeand to explore
those capacitiesof perceptionand emotionthatneo-Kantians(and many
utilitariansand consequentialists)are now acknowledgingas essentialto
a moral lifeand to an adequate pictureof moral agency.My purpose in
thisarticlehas been firstand foremostto give those capacitiestheirdue,
to point out somethingof theircomplexity,and to indicatethe need for
furtherexplorationof theirnature.If philosophersidentifying withKan-
tianismor withthe impartialisttraditionshare these concerns,then the
differencesbetween us seem much less significantthan theyonce did.