Pimentel Vs LEB

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EN BANC
OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, ERROL B. G.R. No. 230642

COMAFAY, JR., RENE B.
GOROSPE, EDWIN R. SANDOVAL,
VICTORIA B. LOANZON, ELGIN
MICHAEL C. PEREZ, ARNOLD E.
CACHO, AL CONRAD B.
ESPALDO, ED VINCENT S.
ALBANO, LEIGHTON R. SIAZON,
ARIANNE C. ARTUGUE,
CLARABEL ANNE R. LACSINA,
KRISTINE JANE R. LIU, ALYANNA
MARI C. BUENVIAJE, IANA
PATRICIA DULA T. NICOLAS,
IREN A. TOLENTINO AND AUREA
I. GRUYAL,
Petitioners,
-versus-
LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD

(LEB), REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHAIR, HON. EMERSON B~
AQUENDE, AND LEB MEMBER,
HON. ZENAIDA N. ELEPANO,
Respondents;
ATTYS. ANTHONY D. BENGZON,

FERDINAND M. NEGRE,
MICHAEL Z. UNTALAN,
JONATHAN Q. PEREZ,
SAMANTHA WESLEY K.
ROSALES, ERIKA M. ALFONSO,
KRYS VALEN 0. MARTINEZ,
RYAN CEAZAR P. ROMANO AND
KENNE,TH C. VARONA,
Resolution 2 G.R. Nos. 230642 and 242954,
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
Respondents-in-Intervention,
APRIL D. CABALLERO, JEREY C.

CASTARDO, MC WELLROE P.
BRINGAS, RHUFFY D. FEDERE,
CONRAD THEODORE A.
MATUTINO AND NUMEROUS
OTHER SIMILARY SITUATED, ST.
THOMASMORESCHOOLOFLAW
AND BUSINESS, INC.,
REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT, RODOLFO C.
RAPISTA, FOR HIMSELF AND AS
FOUNDER, DEAN AND
PROFESSOR, OF THE COLLEGE
OF LAW, JUDY MARIE RAPISTA-
TAN, LYNNART WALFORD A. TAN,
NEIL JOHN VILLARICO AS LAW
PROFESSORS AND - AS
CONCERNED CITIZENS,
- Petitioners-Intervenors.
X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
FRANCIS JOSE LEAN L.

ABAYATA, GRETCHEN M.
G.R. No. 242954
VASQUEZ, SHEENAH S.
ILUSTRISMO, RALPH LOUIE
SALANO, AIREEN MONICA B.
GUZMAN, DELFINO ODIAS,
DARYL DELA CRUZ, CLAIRE
SUICO, AIVIE S. PESCADERO,
NINA CHRISTINE DELA PAZ,
SHEMARK K. QUENIAHAN, AL
JAY T. l\tlEJOS, ROCELLYN L.
DANO,* MICHAEL ADOLFO,
RONALD A. ATIG, LYNETTE C.
LUMAYAG, MARY , CHRIS
LAG ERA, TIMOTHY B.
FRANCISCO, SHIELA MARIE C.
DANDAN, MADELINE C. DELA
PENA, DARLIN R. VILLAMOR,
LORENZANA L. LLORICO, AND
• Also referred to as "Jocelyn L. Dafio'· in some parts of the rollo.

Resolution 3 G.R Nos. 230642 and 242954,
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
JAN IVAN M. SANTAJVIARIA,
Petitioners,
-versus-
HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA,

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND
LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD,
HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHAIRPERSON, · EMERSON B.
AQUENDE,
Respondents.
X------------------ ------ X
RE: REQUEST FOR
CLARIFICATION REGARDING A.M. NO. 20-03-04-SC
THE STATUS AND TREATMENT
OF THE PHILIPPINE LAW
SCHOOL ADMISSION TEST
(PHILSAT) IN THE LIGHT OF THE
SUPREME COURT DECISION Present:
IN G.R. NO. 230642 (OSCAR B.
PIMENTEL, ET AL. vs. LEGAL
GESMUNDO, CJ,
EDUCATION BOARD) AND G.R.
PERLAS-BERNABE,
NO. 242954 (FRANCIS JOSE LEAN
LEO~tN,
L. ABAYATA, ET AL. vs. HON.
CAGUIOA,
SALVADOR MEDIALDEA,
HERNANDO,
EXECUTIVE AND LEGAL
CARANDANG,
EDUCATION BOARD, HEREIN
LAZARO-JAVIER,
REPRESENTED BY ITS
INTING,
CHAIRPERSON, EMERSON B.
ZALAMEDA,
AQUENDE)
LOPEZ, M.,
GAERLAN,
THE BOARD 01:r TRUSTEES OF'
ROSARIO,
THE PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION
LOPEZ, J., and
OF LAW SCHOOLS (PALS),
DIMAAlVIPAO, JJ
REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHAIRPERSON, DEAN JOAN S.
LARGO, AND ITS PRESIDENT
DEAN MARISOL DL. ANENIAS, Promulgated:
intervenor: November 9, 2021

x --------------------_··_ -- ~ --
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
RESOLUTION
ZALAMEDA, J.:
Congress, with the expressed policy of "uplifting" the standards of

legal education, passed Republic Act No. (RA) 7662 and introduced certain
reforms to the legal education system, including the creation of an
administrative body with the power to, among others, prescribe minimum
standards for law school admission and law school accreditation. These
reforms, however, were met with resistance, on constitutional grounds, from
those who seek to impart, as well as those who strive to acquire, legal
knowledge. The Court, as the final arbiter of all legal questions properly
brought before it, will strive to put these legal issues to rest.
The Case
This resolves the joint Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision
dated 10 September 2019) 1 of respondents Legal Education Board (LEB)
and Executive Secretary Salvador Medialdea (respondents, collectively),
filed through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the Partial Motion
for Reconsideration with Joint Comment/Opposition on respondent's Motion
for Reconsideration2 (Partial Motion for Reconsideration) of petitioners in
G.R. No. 242954 (petitioners), and the Petition-In-Intervention3 of the
Philippine Association of Law Schools (PALS). The aforesaid motions and
petition seek reconsideration of the Decision dated 10 September 2019, 4
rendered by the Court En Banc, through former Associate Justice Jose C.
Reyes, Jr., in the consolidated petitions, docketed as G.R. Nos. 242954 and
230642. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED.
The jurisdiction of the Legal Education Board over legal education

is UPHELD.
The Court further declares:
As CONSTITUTIONAL:
1
Rollo, Vol. IV, pp.2185-2209.
2
Id. at 2241-2277.
3
Id. at 2304-2327.
4
Id at 1893-1999.
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
1. Section 7 (c) of R.A. No. 7 662 insofar as it gives the Legal

Education Board the power to set the standards of
accreditation for law schools taking into account, among
others, the qualifications of the members of the faculty
without encroaching upon the academic freedom of
institutions of higher learning; and
2. Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal

Education Board the power to prescribe the minimum
requirements for admission to legal education and
minimum qualifications of faculty members without
encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of
higher learning.
As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for encroaching upon the power of

the Court:
1. Section 2, par. 2 of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it unduly

includes "continuing legal education" as an aspect of legal
education which is made subject to Executive supervision
and control;
2. Section 3(a)(2) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 7(2) of

LEBMO No. 1-2011 on the objective of legal education to
increase awareness among members of the legal profession
of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of
society;
3. Section 7(g) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 1l(g) of

LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as it gives the Legal Education
Board the power to establish a law practice internship as a
requirement for taking the Bar; and
4. Section 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section ll(h) of

LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as it gives the Legal Education
Board the power to adopt a system of mandatory
continuing legal education and to provide for the
mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses
and for such duration as it may deem necessary.
As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being ultra vires:
1. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of

excluding, restricting, and qualifying admissions to law
schools in violation of the institutional academic freedom
on who to admit, particularly:
a. Paragraph 9 of LEBMO No. 7-2016 which provides

that all college graduates or graduating students
applying for admission to the basic law course shall
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
be required to pass the PhiLSAT as a requirement

for admission to any law school in the Philippines
and that no applicant shall be admitted for
enrollment as a first year student in the basic law
courses leading to a degree of either Bachelor of
Laws or Juris Doctor unless he/she has passed the
PhiLSAT taken within two years before the start of
studies for the basic law course;
b. LEBMC No. 18-2018 which prescribes the passing

of the PhiLSAT as a prerequisite for admission to
law schools;
Accordingly, the temporary restraining order issued

on March 12, 2019 enjoining the Legal Education
Board from implementing LEBMC No. 18-2018 is
made PERMANENT. The regular admission of
students who were conditionally admitted and
emolled is left to the discretion of the law schools in
the exercise of their academic freedom; and
c. Sections 15, 16,and 17ofLEBMONo.1-2011;

dictating the qualifications and classification of faculty
members, dean, and dean of graduate schools of law in
violation of institutional academic freedom on who may
teach, particularly:
a. Sections 41.2( d), 50, 51, and 52 of LEBMO No. 1-

2011;
b. Resolution No. 2014-02;
c. Sections 31 (2), 33, 34, and 35 of LEBMO No. 2;
d. LEBMO No. 17-2018; and

dictating the policies on the establishment of legal
apprenticeship and legal internship programs in violation of
institutional academic freedom on what to teach,
particularly:
a. Resolution No. 2015-0S;

b. Section 24(c) of LEBMO No. 2; and
c. Section 59(d) ofLEBMO No. 1-2011.
SO ORDERED.
After the rendition of the Court's Decision, PALS filed a Letter dated
27 February 2020, docketed as A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC (Re: Request for
Clarification Regarding the Status and Treatment of the PhiLSAT) and
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
consolidated with G.R. Nos. 230642 and 242954. 5 Thereafter, the Court
issued a Resolution dated 16 June 2020, treating the letter as a Motion for
Leave to Intervene, and required PALS to file the proper pleading-in-
intervention and the other parties to file their respective comments thereto.
On 28 August 2020, the Court received a copy of the Petition-in-

Intervention filed by PALS. 6 With its continuing mission to uplift the
standards of Philippine legal education to meet global standards of
excellence, PALS claims that it stands to be adversely affected by any
decision rendered by the Court on the constitutional issues raised in G.R.
Nos. 230642 and 242954.
In the main, PALS prays for the declaration of unconstitutionality of

LEB Memorandum Order No. 7, Series of2016 (LEBMO No. 7-2016) in its
entirety. It submits, in particular, that: (1) LEBMO No. 7-2016 is
unconstitutional as it infringes upon academic freedom insofar as it
prescribes a passing score to qualify for admission to law school;7 (2) the
status of the PhiLSAT as a pre-requisite for admission to law school is
unclear despite the Court's nullification of Section 9 of LEBMO No. 7-2016
in view of the LEB's issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 52 dated 26
February 2020 (LEBMC No. 52-2020), allowing the conditional admission
of enrollees who have not taken the PhiLSAT; 8 (3) discussions on
amendments to LEBMO No. 7-2016 should be held in abeyance pending
final resolution by this Court of the issues against it; 9 and (4) following the
suggestion of former Associate (now Chief) Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo
(Chief Justice Gesmundo), the PhiLSAT should be set aside and PALS,
under the supervision of the LEB, should instead be authorized to conduct a
unified, standardized, and acceptable law school admission examination. 10
PALS likewise posits that LEB Memorandum Order No. 22, Series of 2019
(LEBMO No. 22-2019), in conjunction with LEB Memorandum Circular
No. 6 dated 14 July 2017 (LEBMC No. 6-2017) and LEB Resolution No.
2012-02, which additionally require law schools to report the number and
date of the LEB Certification (LEBC) issued to the student in their
Transcript of Records (TOR), infringes on the Court's power to promulgate
rules concerning admission to the practice of law and interferes with the
administration by law schools of their graduating students. 11
5 Rollo, (A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC), pp. 6-16.

6
Rollo, (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. 4, pp. 2304-2323.
7
Id. at 2309.
s . Id.
9 Id. at 2380.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 2319-2321.
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
For their part, respondents reiterate their position that the protection of
academic freedom does not make schools immune from reasonable
restrictions imposed by the State to promote the right of all citizens to
quality education at all levels and to advance public welfare. 12
In defending the constitutionality of LEBMO No. 7-2016,

respondents emphasize that striking down the issuance in its entirety would
render meaningless this Court's · declarations sustaining the State's
supervisory and regulatory authority over legal education and power to
impose a standardized admission test, and the reasonableness of the
issuance. 13
Respondents further contend that the mandatory nature of the

PhiLSAT was articulated in the Court's ruling and maintain that there is no
reason to invalidate the same considering that (i) it is similar to the National
Medical Admission Test (NMAT) which was declared constitutional; 14 (ii)
there is compelling State interest to ensure the highest quality of legal
education and impose a law school qualifying examination; 15 and (iii) it does
not constitute an unfair and unreasonable academic requirement as it is
merely a minimum qualification for students' admission to law schools and
only those who want to obtain a Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor degree are
required to pass the same, while those who merely want to have basic
knowledge of the law may learn from audit classes allowed under Section
2(c) of LEB Memorandum Order No. 2 (LEBMO No. 2). 16 They likewise
claim that discussions on the PhiLSAT aim to give stakeholders every
opportunity to be heard. Any agreement reached during consultation will
only be effected after the finality of this case. 17
As to the other LEB issuances, respondents asseverate that (i) the

requirement relative to the TOR under LEBMO No. 22-2019 is a necessary
consequence of the examination results which the Court had declared to be
unconstitutional; (ii) Sections 15, 16, and 17 of LEB Memorandum Order
No. 1, Series of 2011 (LEBMO No. 1-2011), which provide for the
requirements for admission of foreign graduates, Bachelor of Laws and/or
Doctor of Jurisprudence programs, and graduate programs in law,
respectively, are reasonable measures adopted pursuant to the State's power
12 Id at 2365-2368.
13
Id at 2370.
14 Id at 2368-2370.
15 Id at 2370-2374.
16
Id. at 2365-2366.
17
Id. at 2380-2382.
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
to supervise and regulate legal education; 18 and (iii) the prescribed minimum
qualifications for faculty members and deans of law schools are reasonable
requirements germane to the State's objective of promoting quality of legal
education, pursuant to the State's role as parens patriae. 19
Finally, respondents pray for the Court to declare as valid: 1)

paragraph 9 of LEBMO No. 7-2016; 2) LEB Memorandum Circular No. 18
dated 08 June 2018 (LEBMC No. 18-2018); 3) Sections 15, 16, and 17 of
LEBMO No. 1-2011; 4) Sections 41.2(d), 50, 51, and 52 of LEBMO No. 1-
2011; 5) Resolution No. 2014-02; 6) Sections 31(2), 33, 34, and 35 of
LEBMO No. 2; 7) LEB Memorandum Order No. 17, Series of 2018
(LEBMO No. 17-2018); 8) Resolution No. 2015-08; 9) Section 24(c) of
LEBMO No. 2; and 10) Section 59(d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011. They also
prayed for the lifting of the TRO. 20
In their Partial Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners remain

adamant that RA 7 662 is unconstitutional as the LEB infringes upon the
constitutional power and prerogative of the Supreme Court. According to
petitioners, the power of the Supreme Court to admit people to the practice
of law encompasses the admission of law students to law schools. They
reiterate that the Supreme Court's involvement in the study of law is
manifested in Section 5, Rule 13 8 of the Rules of Court, which provides the
minimum standards for the law school curricula, and Rule 138-A of the
same Rules, which allows the appearance of law students before judicial and
quasi-judicial bodies. 21 They point out that while there may be a few who do
not intend to practice law after graduating, the raison d'etre of studying law
is still to produce lawyers. As such, the curricula of law schools must
conform to the minimum requirements set by the Supreme Court for taking
the Bar exams.
Petitioners also differentiate NMAT and PhiLSAT as to impact of the

cut-off score in the admission policies and standards of the schools and the
sanctions for non-compliance thereto.
Likewise, petitioners claim that Sections 15, 16, and 17 of LEBMO

No. 1-2011 were correctly declared unconstitutional as they unduly restrict
the academic freedom of law schools in determining who to accept as
18
Id at 2219-2222.
19 Id. at 2223-2229.
20 Id. at 2233.
21
Id. at 2250-2251.
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
students. 22
Petitioners further insist that while the Court affirmed the LEB's
authority to impose minimum requirements on faculty hiring, the LEB's
execution of such power through its various issuances was arbitrary and
unreasonable. They argue that the master's degree requirement for faculty
members is unrealistic in light of logistical and financial considerations.
Moreover, they asseverate that the LEB usurps the right of schools to assess
the fitness and aptitude of its faculty member to teach; failing to consider
that legal expertise is not only obtained through continued studies but
likewise through law practice in specialized fields. The arbitrariness of such
a requirement is even highlighted by the fact that members of the LEB are
themselves not holders of a master's degree. 23
Ultimately, petitioners seek to declare the unconstitutionality of RA

7662 in its entirety, deny the motion for reconsideration of respondents, and
affirm the Court's ruling in all other respects.
Issues
Summarizing the various arguments of the herein parties, the issues

for the Court's resolution are as follows:
1. Whether there is a cogent reason for this Court to

invalidate, on the ground of unconstitutionality, the
entirety of RA 7662 and LEBMO No. 7-2016, instead of
merely portions thereof;
2. Whether the Court erred in upholding the jurisdiction of the

LEB over legal education;
3. Whether the Court erred in holding that the requirement to

pass the PhiLSAT or have a valid certificate of exemption
within two (2) years prior to application in law school,
along with the imposition by the LEB of a passing score of
55%, is unconstitutional for violating the academic
freedom of law schools on who may be admitted as its
22
Id at 2267.
23
/dat 2269-2273.
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
students;
4. Whether the Court's ruling rendered the PhiLSAT optional;
5. Whether the Court erred in making permanent the TRO it

issued on 12 March 2019, where regular admission of
students who were conditionally admitted and enrolled is
left to the discretion of the law schools in the exercise of
their academic freedom;
6. Whether the Court erred in invalidating Sections 15, 16,

and 17 ofLEBMO No. 1-2011;
7. Whether there is cogent reason to amend or reverse the

Court's declaration as to the unconstitutionality of the
LEB's issuances relating to the minimum requirements on
qualifications and classification of faculty members, dean,
and dean of graduate schools of law, in violation of
institutional academic freedom on who may teach,
particularly: a) Sections 41.2 (d), 50, 51, and 52 of
LEBMO No. 1-2011; b.) Resolution No. 2014-02; c.)
Sections 31 (2), 33, 34, and 35 of LEBMO No. 2; and d.)
LEBMO No. 17-2018; and
8. Whether LEBMO No. 22-2019, LEBMC No. 6-2017, and

LEB Resolution No. 2012-02 are unconstitutional because
they unduly infringe on the law schools' administration of
their graduating students, and arbitrarily put more burden
on the graduating class.
Ruling of the Court
Before this Court resolves the foregoing issues, We deem it proper to

address first the propriety of PALS' intervention purportedly in
representation of the interests of one hundred and twenty-seven (127) law
schools from all over the country whose exercise of academic freedom will
ultimately be affected by this case. 24
Indeed, in several cases, associations were accorded legal personality
24 Id. at 2306.
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
to represent its members, 25 especially where said associations advanced

constitutional issues which deserved the attention of this Court in view of
said issues' seriousness, novelty, and weight as precedents. 26 Here, apart
from a general averment regarding its representation of the interests of its
constituent members, PALS did not offer any other argument to justify its
intervention. Considering, however, the lack of objection on the part of
respondents and the importance of the resolution of this case not only to the
public, but also to the Bench and the Bar, 27 the Court, in the exercise of its
sound discretion, finds cause to allow PALS to intervene. Prudence and
public interest considerations warrant the allowance of the intervention of
PALS to make way for fuller ventilation of all substantive issues relating to
the matter at hand. 28
Guided by the legal issues raised, the Court embarked on another

zealous assessment of the prevailing circumstances, as well as a
conscientious reexamination of the pronouncements made in the assailed
Decision. After thorough deliberations, the Court resolves the pending
incidents as follows:
The Court stresses that there is a

compelling State interest to uplift the
quality of legal education
Nelson Mandela once said that education is the most powerful

weapon which you can use to change the world. However, having such a
weapon is one thing; ensuring your weapon is sharp, and top-grade is
another.
Considering the current state of legal education in the country, the

Court agrees with the respondents that there is a compelling State interest to
ensure the country's highest quality of legal education. 29 As former Associate
Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. (former Justice A.B. Reyes, Jr.) remarked, "there
25 Chinese Flour Importers Association, Manila, Phils. v. Price Stabilization Board, 89 Phil. 439 (1951)
[Per J. Bautista Angelo] citing Gallego et al. vs. Kapisanan Timbulan ng mga Manggagawa, 83 Phil.
124 (1949).
26 Francisco, Jr. v. House o_f Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, X97-898 (2003), G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, 160310, 160318, 160342, 160343, 160360, 160362, 160370, 160376,
160392, 160397, 160403 & 160405, 10 November 2003 [Per J. Carpio-Morales].
27 Garcillano v. House of Representatives Committees on Public Iriformation, 595 Phil. 775, 796 (2008),
G.R. Nos. 170338 & 179275, 23 December 2008 [Per J. Nachura].
28 See Francisco, Jr. v. House ofRepresentatives, supra at note 6.
29 Rollo, p. 2370.
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
is no doubt that the ultimate goal of attaining quality legal education is a

legitimate and lofty objective. 1130
In the Philippines, legal education, at first blush, appears to be all well

and good. That is mainly attributable to the old folks putting lawyers and the
study of law on a pedestal, far from the reach of any other professions,
including medicine. This theory, in tum, may have been conjured primarily
because of the much-ballyhooed Bar examination. Viewed from a broader
and modem perspective, however, the country's legal education indubitably
needs some housecleaning to reach the touchstone of excellence set by the
international arena.
In his essay entitled The State of Philippine Legal Education

Revisited, Mariano F. Magsalin, Jr. (Dean Magsalin), former Dean of
Arellano Law School and Secretary-General of PALS, perceptively
remarked on this pressing and important matter, thus:
Imagine a "virtual" panel of the most erudite and specialized law

mentors imparting their field of expertise, assisted and complemented by
the state-of-the-art teaching tools, in downloadable real time for the
consumption of students in the comfort and convenience of their homes,
workstations or wherever their personal digital assistants would take them.
Feedback or recitation, examinations and grade dissemination are all done
through e-mail or its faster and higher-resolution counterpart. Verily, the
paper chase is still on but pursued in a different matrix. This is, or should
be, according to some Western legal educators, legal education in the
digital age.
A counterpoint to this idyllic scenario is Philippine legal education,

the development of which may be characterized at best, as spinning on its
wheels. For decades, the future of law students has been obdurately
consigned to an impractical, inefficient, wagering system, totally
subservient to an antiquated bar examination requirement. Many
Philippine lawyers have labelled themselves as the best in Asia because of
what they perceive to be a difficult rite of passage that is the bar
examination, and yet, the Philippine law schools have not figured at all as
a factor in surveys of the best universities in Asia.
Reforms in Philippine legal education have moved glacially. While

many foreign schools have already responded and adapted to the demands
of an increasingly globalized and borderless world, the concerns of many
law schools in the Philippines are still centered on survival and viability.
Competition is at best described as cutthroat and unfair. 31
30 See Former J. A.B. Reyes, Jr. Concurring Opinion in Pimentel v. LEB, p. 15.
31
Magsalin, M.F., Jr., (July 2003). The State of Philippine Legal Education Revisited, Arellano Law and
Policy Review, Volume 4 No. 1, p. 40. <https://arellanolaw.edu/alpr/v4n 1c.pdf> (accessed on 23 August
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
Certainly, such a noble aspiration is not far-fetched. The country does

not need to pray for the stars to align to achieve such a goal. It can happen if
all the stakeholders want it to happen. Dean Magsalin wrote the essay in
July 2003. Seventeen ( 17) years later, his dream was finally realized with a
virtual school employed since the past school year, not only by law schools
but all academic institutions in the Philippines. Unfortunately, it was not
directly caused by any reform initiated by schools. This breakthrough was
impelled, of all things, by the inappropriate intervention of the coronavirus
disease pandemic.
Notwithstanding the development caused by the pandemic, the

country's legal education could be careering to a rabbit hole, or perhaps,
unheedingly already lingering there. Since the 90s, the Bar examinations -
which attracts thousands of hopefuls year in and year out - yielded a
passing rate ranging from below 20% to a bit above 30%, with the 1999
result of 16.59% as the lowest recorded. 32 The 2016 examination, which
netted a percentage of 59.06%, seemingly was an aberration. 33 The historical
passing rate may have led to the view that the Bar examination is a
combination of difficulty and luck. However, it cannot be denied that many
examinees are ill-prepared to face, let alone hurdle, the examination. This
situation persists, notwithstanding that the curriculum of every law school is
heavily Bar-centered. What is more, it cannot be discounted that, as pointed
out in the Court's ruling, there is a cr..ronic malady permeating the
educational institutions where a great majority of schools are money-making
devices of persons who organize and administer them. 34
Corollary to this, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria admitted the existence

of non-performing law schools. 35 Other luminaries and academicians have
expressed a similar observation. As Dean Magsalin spelled out in his essay:
2021).
32 In a Philippine Daily Inquirer story, it was noted that the 1999 Bar result was the lowest while 2012
result, with a 17.76%, was the second lowest. The Committee was even constrained to reduce the passing
percentage from 75% to only 70%, otherwise only 361 or 6% of the 5,343 Bar examinees would have
passed the examination. Torres-Tupas, Tetch. 20 I 2 bar result is second lowest passing rate in history-
SC Committee. newsinfo.inquirer.net, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 20 March 2013,
<https://news info. inqu irer.net/3 76867/2012-bar-result-is-second-lowest-passing-rate-in-history-sc-
committee#ixzz74 MKgoO6a> (accessed on 23 August 2021).
33 The 2016 result broke the 16-year old record of 39.63% obtained in the 1998 Bar examination. It is
now the second highest record, with 75.17% set in 1954 Bar examination as the highest. Lopez, Virgil.
Provincial law grads dominate Bar Top JO; passing rate at 59.06. gmanetwork.com, GMA News
Online Your News Authority, <https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/609309/59-06-percent-
pass-2016-bar-exams-report/story/> (accessed on 23 August 2021).
34 See Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. Nos. 230642 & 242954, 10 September 2019 [Per J. J.C.
Reyes, Jr.], p. 40.
35
See J. Jardeleza's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Pimentel v. LEB, p. 13.
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
x x x From the listing of schools whose graduates took the bar

examinations from 1992-2002 and the number of their graduates who
passed the bar examinations, it can be easily seen that there are many
schools that have dismally failed to prepare their students for these
examinations. Twenty-six of seventy-five law schools had a zero passing
average at least twice, with two schools having zero average at least eight
times, during the I I-year period. Only around fifteen schools have
managed to consistently produce annually at least 15 new lawyers with
seven schools having at least 35 new lawyer~ a year.
XXX
Indeed, these complaints have beset Philippine law schools for

decades and they will continue to pester the legal education system for
years to come unless something is seriously done to address the situation.
For example, the lack of funding and adequate facilities is a matter
directed to the governn1ent agency in charge of licensing or accrediting
law schools. A school without adequate funding and facilities should not
be allowed to operate in the first place. Certainly, a school should not
depend solely on tuition fees to maintain itself but it should have adequate
funding from alternative resources. 36
These are just a few notable circumstances showing that legal

education has long been primed for some facelift. Legal education in the
Philippines has lagged because of the stakeholders' laxity or complacency
and failure or refusal to adapt and evolve. For instance, most schools in the
country have been, for a long time, stuck with the archaic Socratic-
Langdellian modes of teaching. However, some students do not have the
mettle to argue orally and spontaneously but have what it takes to perform
well and excel when presented with other methods of learning, such as
problem-based teaching and clinical legal education.
While other jurisdictions have long recognized and adopted alternative

teaching options suited for such students, a few law schools in the
Philippines have injected much-needed changes here and there, but only
because they can, not because they need to. On the other hand, most schools
still have not strived to do better because there is nothing to incentivize
them. Worse, there is nothing to demotivate them from being deficient and
indolent.
RA 7662 serves the call to revamp legal education. It is a necessary

evil, if it can be fairly called as such, paving the way for the much-needed
uplifting of the standards of legal education in the Philippines through the
LEB.
36
Magsalin, The State of Philippine legal Education Revisited, 44-45.
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
Petitioners failed to proffer a cogent

reason for the Court to declare the entire
RA 7662 unconstitutional
Even after another rumination, the Court still sees no cogent reason to
declare the entire RA 7662 unconstitutional based on the alleged
encroachment of the Supreme Court's authority 37 and violation of academic
freedom. 38 As Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier (Justice Lazaro-
Javier) aptly pointed out, the presumption is that the legislature intended to
enact a valid, sensible, and just law that operates no further than may be
necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. 39 Every presumption
should be indulged in favor of constitutionality. The burden of proof is on
the party alleging an unequivocal breach of the Constitution. 40 Moreover, the
invocation of the abovementioned constitutional aphorisms, without more,
cannot invalidate a law. Jurisprudence teaches that to justify the nullification
of the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
not a doubtful and equivocal breach. 41 As the landmark case of Ermita-
Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of
Manila 42 instructs, "there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for
evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on
its face."
Accordingly, petitioners have the heavy burden of proving by

sufficient evidence the unconstitutionality of RA 7662. As it is, however,
except for the provisions of RA 7662 which the Court had earlier declared
unconstitutional on their face, petitioners miserably failed to yield a solid
and persuasive reason against the constitutionality of the subsisting
provisions of RA 7662. Thus, the presumption of the constitutionality of the
law must prevail.
Sections 2 paragraphs 2 and 3(a)(2), as

well as Section 7{g) and {h), of RA 7662
remain unconstitutional for unduly
encroaching on the power of the
Supreme Court
37 Rollo, p. 2245.
38 Id. at 2256.
39 See J. Lazaro-Javier's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Pimentel v. LEE, p. 27.
40
See Farinas v. The Executive Secretary, 463 Phil. 179, 197 (2003) [Per J. Callejo, Sr.].
41 See J. Panganiban's Dissenting Opinion in Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral
ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531, 652 (2004) [Per CJ Puno].
42 127 Phil. 3 06, 315 (1967) [Per J. Fernando].
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
The above notwithstanding, the Court hastens to clarify that Sections

2 paragraphs 2, 3(a)(2), 7(g), and 7(h) of RA 7662 remain unconstitutional
as declared in the Decision of the Court. These provisions read:
Section 2. Declaration of Policies. It is hereby declared the policy

of the State to uplift the standards of legal education xxx
Towards this end, the State shall undertake appropriate reforms in

the legal education system, require proper selection of law
students, maintain quality among law schools, and require legal
apprenticeship and continuing legal education.
Section 3. General and Specific Objective of Legal Education. - (a)

Legal education in the Philippines is geared to attain the following
objectives:
XXX
(2) to increase awareness among members of the legal

profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed
sectors of society; xxx
Section 7. Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving

the objectives of this Act, the Board shall have the following
powers and functions:
XXX
g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for

taking the Bar which a law student shall undergo with any duly
accredited private or public law office or firm or legal assistance
group anytime during the law course for a specific period that the
Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months.
For this purpose, the Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines
for such accreditation and the specifications of such internship
which shall include the actual work of a new member of the Bar.
(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this

purpose, the Board may provide for the mandatory attendance of
practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the
Board may deem necessary; and x x x [Emphases supplied.]
Indeed, the foregoing provisions unduly infringed on matters which

fall within the exclusive domain of the Supreme Court.
Sections 2 paragraphs 2, 3(2), and 7(h) were struck down by this

Court because, by their very terms, these provisions pertain to matters
affecting members of the legal profession.
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
Admittedly, the study of the law is a comprehensive, widespread, and

life-long process. Hence, it is not confined to the four comers of a law
school and its pedagogy. However, synthesizing Section 3(b) of RA 7662,
there should be no question that the legislative purpose of the law is aimed
particularly towards law students. The goal of RA 7662 is to improve legal
education for law students to learn the essential skills and competencies that
would make them not only strive but thrive in the fast-changing world
outside the law school.
The Court finds no difficulty upholding the purpose of the law to

improve legal education in the country. However, extending the LEB's
authority to those who have already been accepted to the bar is a legislative
overreach. As explained in the Decision, in authorizing the LEB to
compel mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for
such duration as the LEB deems necessary, the legislature encroached upon
the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the Integrated Bar. 43
Respondents' tenuous assertion that the continuing legal education under RA
7662 is limited to the training of lawyer-professors does not justify the
existence of said provision. 44 It still unlawfully intruded into the power of
the Court to promulgate rules concerning the Integrated Bar, which
necessarily includes the continuing legal education of lawyer-professors, as
the term practice of law encompasses the teaching thereof. 45
Similarly, the Court declared Section 7(g) unconstitutional because its

phraseology unduly stretched the authority of the LEB by authorizing it "to
establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar." With
Section 7(g), "the LEB is no longer confined within the parameters of legal
education, but now dabbles on the requisites for admissions to the bar
examinations, and consequently, admissions to the bar. "46 As underscored in
the Decision, however, "the jurisdiction to determine whether an applicant
may be allowed to take the bar examinations belongs to the Court. "47 Section
7(g) unlawfully encroached into the constitutionally sanctioned authority of
the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law.
It is worth noting, as well, that in the Decision, the Court had

explained that Section 7(g) was likewise violative of the academic freedom
43
See Pimentel v. LEB, supra at note 14 , p. 76.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 74.
41 Id.
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
of law schools. As the Court held, while the clause legal internship does not
immediately strike as being intrusive of the academic freedom of law
schools, how the LEB exercised its authority under Section 7(g) effectively
amounted to control. It blatantly overstepped the authority of law schools to
determine what to teach by dictating upon the law schools how to undertake
the legal apprenticeship and requiring law schools to submit their
apprenticeship program for assessment and evaluation prior to endorsement
of the same to this Court for approval. 48
For the foregoing reasons, the Court cannot agree with the proposition
that Section 7, paragraphs (g) and (h) is not unconstitutional in view of their
"dual aspect that caters to both legal education and practice of law," 49 and
that the determination of whether the particular activities involved in the
actual exercise of the powers mentioned therein would belong to one or the
other would have to be made from the specific circumstances of the
activities concerned. 50
In sum, the Court acknowledges and upholds the authority of the LEB
to carry out the purpose of the law, which is in line with the State's
constitutional mandate to promote quality education. However, the foregoing
provisions unduly expand the scope of the LEB's authority by giving a
construction to the term "legal education" inconsistent with the law's clear
intent. By their terms, the provisions no longer just ventured into improving
the study of the law in law schools, but clearly and directly encroached upon
the Court's exclusive constitutional authority to promulgate rules concerning
the Integrated Bar, the practice of law, and admissions to the bar. As such,
they cannot be given imprimatur by this Court.
The Court reiterates that the authority

to super,;ise and regulate legal
education is lodged with the political
departments, as exercised through
regulatory measures enacted through
the police power of the State 51
There is no merit in petitioners' insistence that RA 7662 must be

struck down as the study of law is not covered by the regulatory powers of
48 Id. at 100-10 I.
49 Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of J. Lazaro-Javier, p. 17.
50 Id
51
See Pimentel v. LEE, supra at note 14, p. 55.
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
the Executive branch, 52 and that superv1smg legal education legally and
rightfully belongs to the Supreme Court. 53
As highlighted by former Justice A.B. Reyes, Jr., "education is a

continuing concern that is impressed with public interest. The importance of
education in our country is apparent from the numerous constitutional
provisions highlighting the obligation of the State to nurture and protect the
quality of our educational system xxx and xxx make it xxx relevant to the
needs of the people and the society." 54 Moreover, the Court had belabored to
clarify that historically and constitutionally, the political departments, not
the Supreme Court, have actually and directly exercised supervision and
regulation over legal education. 55 "The legislative history of the Philippine
legal educational system, [as extensively discussed in the Decision], evinces
that the State, through statutes enacted by the Congress and administrative
regulations issued by the Executive, consistently exercises police power over
legal education. "56
Jurisprudence describes police power as the power to regulate the

exercise of rights, including all constitutional rights, by prescribing
regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety, and general welfare of the people. 57 It flows from the recognition
that salus populi est suprema lex - the welfare of the people is the supreme
law. 58 While police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power
may be delegated. By a valid delegation, the power may be exercised by the
President and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies of
municipal corporations or local governments under an express delegation by
the Local Government Code of 1991. 59 In the case of legal education, the
legislature, through Section 4 of RA 7662, created the LEB to carry out the
purpose of the law of uplifting the standards of legal education in the
country.
From the foregoing, it is indubitable that "as a professional

educational program, legal education properly falls within the supervisory
52 Rollo, p. 2245.
53 Id. at 2244.
54 Former J. A. Reyes, Jr. 's Concurring Opinion in Pimentel v. LEE, pp. 2-3.
55 See Pimentel v. LEE, supra at note 14, pp. 38-53.
56
Id at 55.
57 See Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71, 175 (1948) [Per J. Feria]; emphasis and italics supplied.
58 See Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., 557 Phil. 121, 141
(2007) [Per J. Carpio-Morales].
59 Id
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
and regulatory competency of the State. "60 It belongs to the political

departments as an exercise of the State's police power. 61
The authority of the State, through the

LEB, to supervise and regulate legal
education can be read together with the
power of the Court concerning the
admission to the practice of law
In the Decision, this Court held:
In general, R.A. No. 7662, as a law meant to uplift the quality

of legal education, does not encroach upon the Court's jurisdiction to
promulgate rules under Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the Constitution. It is
well-within the jurisdiction of the State, as an exercise of its inherent
police power, to lay down laws relative to legal education, the same being
imbued with public interest.
While the Court is undoubtedly an interested stakeholder

in legal education, it cannot assume jurisdiction where it has none.
Instead, in judicial humility, the Court affirms that the supervision
and regulation of legal education. is a political exercise, where judges
are nevertheless still allowed to participate not as an independent
branch of government, but as part of the sovereign people. 62
Relative to this, petitioners persist in arguing that the Supreme Court's

power to admit individuals in the legal profession extends to the admission
of law students to law schools as legal education is a facet of lawyerhood,
the former being the preliminary step to the practice of law. They assert that
the practice of law and the study of law are intimately intertwined, made
pronounced by RA 7662's declaration that legal education in the Philippines
aims to prepare the students for law practice.
These contentions seem to operate on the presumption that the grant,

per se, of the power to the LEB to regulate legal education does not (or will
not) leave room for the Court's exercise of its constitutional power over
admissions to the Bar (and as petitioners argue, over legal education), such
that upholding one would necessarily mean an infringement or interference
60 Pimentel v. LEE, supra at note 14, p. 55.

61
Id. at 53 and 55.
62
Id. at 102; emphasis supplied.
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
in the exercise of the other. The Court thus takes this occasion to clarify its
ruling.
Indeed, while the Constitution does not textually confer upon this
Court the power to regulate legal education, it is undeniable that it has
legitimate interests thereon.
To be clear, the Court reiterates its stance that it will not arrogate unto
itself the powers Congress vested upon the LEB. However, there is nothing
in RA 7662 which states that the LEB has authority over all matters relating
to legal education to the absolute exclusion of all others, including the
Supreme Court. In fact, a fair and conscientious reading of the law would
support the view that Congress specifically intended for all stakeholders to
have a say in matters of legal education. For one, the LEB is itself composed
of individuals coming from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, active law
practitioners, PALS, and even from the sector of law students. The LEB
Chairman is, under the terms of the statute, preferably a former justice of the
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals. 63 In addition, the members of the
LEB are to be appointed by the President from a list of nominees prepared
with prior authorization from the Supreme Court, through the Judicial and
Bar Council. To the mind of the Court, this is an acknowledgment on the
part of the Congress of the pivotal role played by the judiciary over legal
education.
More importantly, there is nothing to gain from treating legal

education and the legal profession as separate, discrete, and completely
unrelated fields for purposes of uplifting legal education standards. Rather,
one should look at legal education and practice as segments in a continuum:
x x x the skills and values of competent and responsible lawyers are

developed along a continuum that neither begins nor ends in law school,
but starts before law school, reaches its most formative and intensive stage
during the law school experience, and continues throughout the lawyer's
professional career. 64
63 RA 7662, Sec. 4.
64 See Robert Macerate, Esq.'s Foreword. Stuckey, R. and others. (2007). Best Practices in Legal
Education: A Vision and a Roadmap. Clinical Legal Education Association, p. vi.
<https://www.cleaweb.org/Resources/Documents/best practices-full. pdf>.
Foreword referred to the conclusion of The Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing
the Gap which is found in the Report published in July 1992 entitled Legal Education and Professional
Development, otherwise known as the Macrate Report.
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
Fittingly, Chief Justice Gesmundo conveyed the same view as he

elucidated on the impossibility of completely separating the interests of the
Supreme Court and the law schools and the other branches of government
with respect to legal education. 65
The Court makes this conclusion bearing in mind that where one
interpretation divines a conflict between this Court and an administrative
agency over the matter of legal education, while another allows for
administrative regulation to subsist peacefully with the interests of this
Court, the latter should be favored:
We must be reminded that the government (through the administrative

agencies) and the courts are not adversaries working towards different
ends; our roles are, rather, complementary. As the United States Supreme
Court said in Far East Conference v. United States:
x x x [C]ourt and agency are not to be regarded as wholly

independent and unrelated instrumentalities of justice, each
acting in the performance of its prescribed statutory duty
without regard to the appropriate function of the other in
securing the plainly indicated objects of the statute. Court and
agency are the means adopted to attain the prescribed end,
and, so far as their duties are defined by the words of the
statute, those words should be construed so as to attain that
end through coordinated action. Neither body should repeat in
this day the mistake made by the courts of law when equity was
struggling for recognition as an ameliorating system of justice;
neither can rightly be regarded by the other as an alien intruder,
to be tolerated if must be, but never to be encouraged or aided
by the other in the attainment of the common aim. 66
The public would be better served by a system that welcomes input

from agencies of government working together, within and across
institutions, 67 instead of one which pits government agencies against each
other.
RA 7662 is not necessarily repugnant to

the academic freedom of law schools
65 See CJ Gesmundo 's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Pimentel v. LEE, p. 19.
66 Alfonso v. Land Bank of the Philippines, 801 Phil. 217 (2016), G.R. Nos. 181912 & 183347, 29
November 2016 [Per J. Jardeleza] citing Far East Conference vs. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
67 See Sullivan, W.M., et al. (2007). Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law. The
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, pp. 4 and 10.
<http://arch ive.camegiefoundation. org/pub lications/pdfs/el ibrary/ e librmy_pdf_63 2. pdf>.
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
The Court respectfully disagrees with the proposition that RA 7662

and the "entire concept of the Legal Education Board, are unconstitutional
for intruding on the academic freedom of law schools and the universities
and colleges to which they belong. 1168
Institutional academic freedom encompasses the essential freedoms of

a university to determine for itself on academic grounds (i) who may teach,
(ii) what may be taught, (iii) how it shall be taught, and (iv) who may be
admitted to study. 69
It may be said that the broad grant of academic freedom in favor of

institutions of higher learning is in recognition of the critical role these
institutions play in society. An academician postulated that academic
freedom should preserve the indigenous values served by universities, i.e.,
(i) a detached or disinterested pursuit of knowledge and understanding, (ii) a
manner of discourse that, at its best, is careful, critical, and ambitious, and
(iii) a capacity for mature and independent judgment to those entering
adulthood. 70
In this country, Section 5(2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution,

dictates that all institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom.
However, the concept of academic freedom is not native to this jurisdiction.
It began in medieval Europe and gained more popularity in academic and
legal circles as a formidable shield against State interference after United
States of America (US) Justice Felix Frankfurter (Justice Frankfurter)
included it in his Concurring Opinion in the celebrated case of Sweezy v.
New Hampshire. 71
While forever etched in the annals of American jurisprudence, Justice

Frankfurter's insightful articulation failed to delineate the limit of such
freedom as he merely lifted it from the 1957 Open Universities of Africa.
Therein, two (2) faculty members opposed the South African government's
plan to pursue its apartheid program to bar admission of non-whites into the
universities. 72
68 J. Leonen's Dissenting and Concurring Opinion in Pimentel v. LEB, p. 2.

69 Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, 160-A Phil. 929,944 (1975) [Per J. Fernando].
70 See Byrne, J.P. (1989). Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment. The Yale Law
Journal,99(251 ). <https :// digitalcommons. law. yale. edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7244&context=yIi>.
71 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
72 See Hiers, R.H. (2004). Institutional Academic Freedom - A Constitutional Misconception: Did Grutter
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
The vacuum in Justice Frankfurter's discourse left the interpretation of

his prominent quote to the wide imagination of its readers. Some
assumptions eventually gave birth to the notion that the four (4) essential
freedoms subsumed in academic freedom are an all-encompassing authority
of schools of higher learning to exist freely without government
intervention. Upon the other hand, some scholars have propounded a sound
interpretation on Justice Frankfurter's quote that "[i]t is the business of a
university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to
speculation, experiment, and creation .... " For these scholars, this means that
the institution's freedom carries the concomitant obligation to see that its
activities inside the school would not merit interference from any branch of
the State. 73 Put differently, institutions of higher learning should not only
guard their so-called freedom from State restraint but must guard their
freedom against their action, which could trigger intrusion by the State. This
interpretation has found support from subsequent rulings of the US Supreme
Court and in this jurisdiction.
In the Philippine setting, the four (4) essential freedoms subsumed in

the concept of academic freedom of institutions of higher learning were, as
pointed out by Justice Leonen, first discussed in the seminal 1975 case of
Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology
(Garcia). 74 From then on, jurisprudence has continued to recognize the
autonomy of institutions of higher learning in the exercise of their academic
freedom. This includes the autonomy to determine who may be admitted to
study, 75 which extends to the right to decide whom to exclude or expel 76 and
whom to confer the honor and distinction of being their graduates. 77 Such
discretion may not generally be disturbed. It may only be successfully
impugned when there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion in its
exercise 78 or if the said freedom collides with a student's exercise of
v. Bollinger Perpetuate the Confusion. Journal of College and University Law, 30(3), 533-534 [citation
omitted]. <https ://scholarship. law. ufl. edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgirefere1=https://www.google.com/&httpsred
ir=l&article=l 755&context=facultypub> (accessed on 23 August 2021).
73 Id.
74 Garcia, supra at note 69.
75 Tangonan v. Pano, 221 Phil. 601 (1985) [Per J. Cuevas]; University of the Philippines Board of Regents
v. Ligot-Telan, 298 Phil. 108 (1993) [Per J. Romero]; University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 300 Phil. 819 (1994) [Per J. Nocon]; and De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 565
Phil. 330 (2007) [Per J. Reyes, R.T.].
76 Licup v. University of San Carlos, 258-A Phil. 417 (1989) [Per J. Gancayco] and Ateneo De Manila
University v. Capulong, 294 Phil. 654,676-677. [Per J. Romero].
77
University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 287, 307 (1999) [Per J.
Mendoza]; and Morales v. Board of Regents of the University of the Phils., 487 Phil. 449,474 (2004)
[Per J. Chico-Nazario].
78
University of San Carlos v. Court ofAppeals, 248 Phil. 798, 803 ( 1988) [Per J. Gan cay co] and Calawag
v. University of the Philippines Visayas, 716 Phil. 208 (2013) [Per J. Brion].
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
constitutionally preferred rights such as religious freedom 79 and free

speech. 80
Nevertheless, Garcia and subsequent rulings of the Court, far from

legitimizing an unimpeded exercise of academic freedom by institutions of
higher learning, had, in fact, readily acknowledged the existence of the
State's right to reasonably interfere with the exercise of academic freedom
"when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. "81
Clearly, the cry for academic freedom, without more, cannot be a

sufficient justification to invalidate the law. To quote Justice Lazaro-Javier,
"[a]cademic freedom is not the trump card that annihilates the exercise of
police power. "82 Academic freedom is not absolute, with its optimum impact
best realized where the freedom is exercised judiciously and does not
degenerate into an unbridled license. 83 Instead, it is a privilege that assumes
a correlative duty to exercise it responsibly. 84 It is thus difficult to accept that
the State has no right to participate or be involved in the education the
academic institutions of higher learning provide. On the contrary, it would
be an abandonment of duty on the part of the State if it does not supervise
and regulate educational institutions on a simplistic invocation of academic
freedom by the law schools. Academic freedom cannot derogate the State's
constitutional authority to reasonably supervise and regulate schools.
Corollarily, while enshrined in the Constitution, academic freedom

and police power cannot be exercised without any restraint. A delineation on
these rights is inherently imposed as it has been said that absolute power
corrupts absolutely85 while absolute freedom often leads to anarchy and
chaos. Thus, a law school and the people comprising it must exercise
academic freedom responsibly. The State, on the other hand, can wield its
police power on the condition that the same must be done reasonably and
proportionately, at the very least. Though presumably done lawfully
pursuant to academic freedom or police power, any act cannot be stamped
with validity by this Court when it fails to comply with such parameters.
79 Va/mores v. Achacoso, 813 Phil. 1032 (2017) [Per J. Caguioa].

80 Villar v. TIP, 220 Phil. 379, 382-383 (1985) [Per CJ Fernando].
81
Garcia, supra at note 69.
82 Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of J. Lazaro-Javier, p. 2.
83 See Ateneo de Manila University v. Hon. Capulong, supra note 76 at 673 ..
84 See Cudia v. Philippine Military Academy, 754 Phil. 590 (2015) [Per CJ Peralta].
85
"This famous sentence is attributed to Lord Acton. It is stated that John Edward Acton, the first baron,
has expressed this opinion in his letter written to Bishop Mandell. The letter was written in 1887. The
original statements go thus[:] 'Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great
men are almost always bad men.' However, it is stated that Lord Acton is not the primary originator of
this quotation." Retrieved from https://literarydevices.net/absolute-power-corrupts-absolutely/.
(accessed on 23 August 2021)
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
Former Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza was on point in stating

that the exercise of academic freedom must be balanced with vital state
interest such as prescribing regulations to promote education and the general
welfare of the people. 86 The need for harmony and balance in the exercise of
academic freedom and police power was likewise aptly encapsulated by
former Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion in his Manila Bulletin article,
captioned Legal Education and Law Schools, thus:
When police power and academic freedom intersect, as they inevitably

must in legal education, lessons from the Constitution hold that the State
has the upper hand, but only to the extent necessary to serve the demands
of public interest. In this calibrated manner, academic freedom is
meaningfully preserved. 87
To be sure, balancing and harmonizing the pertinent provisions of the

Constitution, instead of adopting an absolutist approach of one constitutional
provision over the other, is a settled rule in constitutional construction, thus:
It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that no

one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the
others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon
a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if
by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand
together.
In other words, the Court must harmonize them, if practicable,

and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word
operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and
nugatory. 88 [Emphases supplied.]
In line with this, it bears to note that Senior Associate Justice Estela
M. Perlas-Bernabe (Justice Perlas-Bernabe) agrees that "State participation
in admission requirements is not completely foreclosed by academic
freedom." 89 Referring to the constitutional deliberations, she emphasized
that the right of every citizen to select a course of study under Section 5 (3 ),
Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution is subject to fair, reasonable, and
86 See former J. Jardeleza's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Pimentel v. LEB, p. 12.
87 <https://mb.com.ph/2019/07117 /legal-education-and-law-schools/> (accessed on 23 August 2021 ).
88 Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary, 272 Phil. 147, 162 (1991) [Per CJ Fernan].
89 Concurring Opinion ofSAJ Perlas-Bernabe, p. 9 [emphasis supplied].
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
equitable admission and academic requirements, which "requirements refer

not only to those imposed by the educational institutions but also by the
government" and the Framers "left it to Congress to determine what these
requirements will be, including the decision on whether to retain or abolish
the then national college entrance examination, as a prerequisite to
admission to institutions of higher learning. 1190
Chief Justice Gesmundo is likewise on the same side, affirming the

authority of the State, through the LEB, to supervise and regulate law
schools, but subject to the latter's academic freedom. 91 He even emphasized
the importance of the role of the LEB, in coordination with various
stakeholders, in improving legal education. 92
The Court cautions anew that the

State's exercise of its authority over
legal education extends only to
reasonable supervzswn and
regulation, not control
The mandate of the LEB to supervise and regulate law schools is a

police power measure in furtherance of RA 7662's objective to promote
quality legal education. However, while the academic freedom of law
schools under the Constitution cannot derogate the State's constitutional
authority to supervise and regulate schools, the Court stresses once again, as
it did in its Decision, that the exercise of such authority, through the LEB,
must be merely supervisory and regulatory. It should not amount to
control. 93 The State's supervisory authority over legal education is one of
oversight. It includes the authority to check, but not to interfere. 94
Moreover, the supervision and regulation of legal education as an exercise of
police power, to be valid, must be reasonable and should not transgress the
Constitution. 95 Its reasonableness must be viewed in relation to the public's
right to education concomitant with the State's constitutional duty to protect
and promote the right of its citizens to quality education at all levels. 96
90 Id., see note at 32, citing Record, Constitutional Commission (R.C.C.) No. 71, Vol. IV, 01 September
1986.
91 See CJ Gesmundo's Concurring Opinion in Pimentel,: LEE, p. 26.
92 Id. at 27.
93 See Pimentel v. LEE, supra at note 34, pp. 60 and 102. See also J. Caguioa's Concurring Opinion in
Pimentel v. LEE, pp. 5-7.
94 See Pimentel v. LEE, supra at note 34, p. 57.
95 Id. at 58.
96 Id. at 64.
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
Given the foregoing, the Court reiterates that "Section 7( e) of R.A.

No. 7662, insofar as it gives the LEB the power to prescribe the minimum
standards for law admission is faithful to the reasonable supervision and
regulation clause. It merely authorizes the LEB to prescribe minimum
requirements not amounting to control. "97 However, the LEB will do well to
remember to exercise its discretion soundly, consistent only with its
authority under the statute and the Constitution. It should not gravely abuse
its discretion as this Court shall not shirk from its sworn duty to enforce the
Constitution. In clear cases, it will not hesitate to give effect to the supreme
law by setting aside a statute in conflict therewith. 98 The Court shall exercise
the power of judicial review by the mere enactment of a law or approval of a
challenged action when such is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution. 99 This includes violation of the fundamental rights of
institutions of higher learning under their academic freedom. 100
The imposition of taking an aptitude

exam as a requirement for law school
admission is not per se unreasonable;
the imposition of a minimum passing
rate, however, unreasonably infringes
on the freedom of schools to
determine who to accept as students
Being a composite part of the education system, legal education may

be regulated and supervised by the political departments through a valid
exercise of police power as part of the State's policy and duty to provide
quality education that suits the needs of people and society. Fallowing the
Constitution, however, the exercise of police power must be reasonable and
must not be violative of the academic freedom of schools; otherwise, the
exercise thereof may not pass the test of constitutionality. The legislature
made sure to acknowledge these constitutional limits with the unequivocal
language employed in RA 7662.
How far police power can go against the academic freedom of schools
is essentially subject to the test of lawful subject and lawful method. The test
to determine the validity of a police measure are as follows: ( 1) the interests
of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
97
Id. at 78.
98 See Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Hon. Aquino III, G.R. No. 210500, 02 April 2019, 899 SCRA 492, citation
omitted [Per J. Leonen].
99 See Pimentel v. LEE, supra at note 34, at 30; See also CJ Gesrnundo's Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion in Pimentel v. LEE, p. 27.
100
See CJ Gesrnundo's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Pimentel v. LEE, p. 27.
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. 101 Further instructive on this matter is Council of Teachers and
Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of
Education, 102 where the Court examined the intent of the Framers concerning
Section 4 ( 1), Article XIV of the Constitution, to wit:
... The Framers were explicit, however, that this supervision refers
to external governance, as opposed to internal governance which was
reserved to the respective school boards, thus:
XXX
When we speak of State supervision and

regulation, we refer to the external governance of
educational institutions, particularly private educational
institutions as distinguished from the internal governance
by their respective boards of directors or trustees and their
administrative officials. Even without a provision on
external governance, the State would still have the inherent
right to regulate educational institutions through the
exercise of its police power. We have thought it advisable to
restate the supervisory and regulatory functions of the State
provided in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions with the
addition of the word "reasonable." We found it necessary to
add the word "reasonable" because of an obiter dictum of
our Supreme Court in a decision in the case of Philippine
Association of Colleges and Universities vs. The Secretary
oj Education and the Board ofTextbooks in 1955. xx x
The addition, therefore, of the word

"reasonable" is meant to underscore the sense of the
committee, that when the Constitution speaks of State
supervision and regulation, it does not in any way mean
control. We refer only to the power of the State to
provide regulations and to see to it that these
regulations are duly followed and implemented. It does
not include the right to manage, dictate, overrule and
prohibit. Therefore, it does not include the right to
dominate." [Emphases in the original; underscoring
supplied.]
Here, the Court maintains that the State has the authority to administer
an aptitude test in the exercise of its police power and given the existence of
a compelling State interest to uplift the standards of legal education.
101 See Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, 572 Phil. 270,283 (2008) [Per J. Reyes, R.T.] .
102
G .R. Nos. 216930, 217451, 217752, 218045, 218098, 218123 & 218465, 09 October 2018 [Per J.
Cagu ioa] .
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
In the study of medicine, the Court accentuated this compelling State

interest when it upheld the State's three-flunk rule in the qualifying
examination of prospective students in medicine in Department of
Education Culture and Sports v. San Diego (San Diego), 103 thus:
It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and
enrich our system of education by directing the student to the course for
which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations.
Otherwise, we may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice
Holmes, not because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a
nation of misfits. 104
Similarly, the compelling State interest in law schools is spurred

primarily by the need to upgrade the quality of legal education that has
become languid over time and infiltrated by individuals or organizations
who are not qualified. It is in this light that the legislature, during the Senate
deliberations on RA 7662, recognized the necessity of prescribing an
aptitude test for this purpose. 105 The Court later acknowledged it through its
approval of the Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matter's proposed
amendment to Section 7(e) of RA 7662, as well as in Bar Matter No. 1161. 106
Following the constitutionally-provided limits, however, the LEB

must still show that the current PhiLSAT, being a State-sanctioned exam, is
reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose of RA 7662 and not unduly
invasive and oppressive of private rights, particularly the academic freedom
of law schools.
In this respect, the Court is of the considered view that the

requirement of the LEB for prospective students to take the PhiLSAT does
not per se render it unconstitutional for as long as the results will only be
recommendatory, with the law schools retaining the discretion to accept the
applicant based on their policies and standards. As an eligibility requirement,
though, the current PhiLSAT is not a lawful method to attain the lawful
subject of the State. Requiring the schools to accept only those who took and
passed the exam amounts to a dictatorial control of the State, through LEB,
and runs afoul of the intent of the Constitution.
103
259 Phil. 1016 (1989) [Per J. Cruz].
104 Id at 1024.
105 See Pimentel v. LEE supra at note 34, at 79-80.
106
Id at 80-81.
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
As Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) aptly

noted, the PhiLSAT, in its current formulation, is not merely
recommendatory but is an absolute requirement on law school applicants
and effectively dictates upon law schools who may be admitted to study. 107 It
takes away the autonomy of law schools and unduly replaces it with the
ministerial duty to comply with the LEB's order. A law school's admission
policy becomes confined to follow the standards imposed by the LEB under
pain of sanctions and fines provided in Section 15 of LEBMO No. 7-2016.
This is an impermissible intrusion into the academic freedom of law schools.
In the metaphorical road towards the legal profession, where the law schools
are the vehicles and the administrators are the drivers, the State has the
authority to impose safety rules, post guide signs, and establish checkpoints.
However, it is not the business of the State to determine and dictate who
may ride the vehicle.
What makes matters worse is that the LEB did not even seek the
participation of law schools in any discussion before formulating the
relevant issuances relating to the current PhiLSAT. There was also no prior
study conducted to determine the propriety of PhiLSAT. The LEB merely
likened it to the NMAT of medical schools and the Law School Admission
Test abroad. 108 It is crystal clear that the LEB arbitrarily flexed its power and
exceeded its permissible authority by totally depriving law schools of a fair
and reasonable opportunity to be heard given the lack of consultations before
the formulation of LEBMO No. 7-2016. Indeed, it is quite ironic that the
formulation of PhiLSAT, as one of the State's measures to uplift the standard
of legal education by doing away with mediocrity, appears to have been
done haphazardly.
Respondents persevere in arguing for the continued existence of the

current PhiLSAT by likening it to the NMAT, an aptitude exam taken by
prospective medical students, the validity of which was upheld by the Court
in Tablarin v. Hon. Gutierrez (Tablarin). 109
PhiLSAT may be said to be akin to, but also different from, the Board
of Medical Education (BME)'s legally mandated NMAT for prospective
medical students. Indeed, the path of PhiLSAT may be said to mirror that of
its counterpart. The NMAT came about after Congress enacted RA 23 82, 110
which created the BME. Under the said law, the BME was authorized, inter
107
Dissenting and Concurring Opinion of J. Leanen, p. 5.
108
See J. Leonen's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Pimentel v. LEE, pp. 17-18.
w9 236 Phil. 768 (I 987) [Per J. Feliciano].
110
The Medical Act of 1959 (1959).
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
alia, to determine and prescribe the requirements for admission into a

recognized college of medicine. Those minimum requirements for applicants
to medical schools were further encapsulated in the law, particularly Section
7 thereof. One of these minimum requirements was the issuance of a
certificate of eligibility (COE) for entrance to a medical school, which then
spawned Department Order No. 52, Series of 1985 (DO No. 52-1985),
establishing the NMAT as an additional requirement for the issuance of a
COE for admission into medical schools starting the school year 1986-
1987 .111
The NMAT was naturally met with howls of protest from the affected
sectors, leading to several cases, including the petition in Tablarin, which the
Court ultimately resolved in favor of the State's exercise of police power.
Three (3) decades later, the legal world - or at least the legal education -
was introduced to a similar situation with the PhiLSAT.
A solid argument against calls for the nullification of the PhiLSAT is

the Court's previous declaration to uphold the constitutionality of the
pertinent statute and order creating the NMAT. In Tablarin, the Court ruled
in favor of the constitutionality, reasonableness, and value of the NMAT in
this wise:
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an

admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated
objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical
schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the
country." Given the widespread use today of such admission tests in, for
instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical
College Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably in other countries
with far more developed educational resources than our own, and taking
into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to
prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably
related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in
this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public
:from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in
those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or
trauma. 112
Tablarin may be old, but the above-quoted elucidation still holds

relevance in this day and age. It may have involved students from medicine,
but the desideratum for quality education applies to all. There is no rhyme or
reason to distinguish between medical and law students regarding the
111 See Tablarin supra at note 109.

112
Id.at 109.
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
expectation of quality education. Under Section 1, Article XIV of the 1987

Constitution, the State is required to protect and promote the right of all
citizens to quality education at all levels. This mandate encompasses all
forms of threats and hurdles against quality education. Such constitutional
mandate is executed through enactments by which the State can exercise
reasonable regulatory and supervisory authority over all educational
institutions. 113 Just like in the study of medicine, the need for quality
education in law cannot be overemphasized. The products of law schools
will have the significant task of helping in the dispensation of justice and the
protection of life, liberty, and property.
At this juncture, PhiLSAT's parallelism with NMAT ends.
As explained at length by the Court in its Decision, LEBMO No. 7-

2016, which gave birth to the PhiLSAT, suffers from several constitutional
infirmities. The two (2)-year limitation for prospective students to take the
PhiLSAT, together with the additional requirement to pass the same, or have
an unexpired certificate of exemption, as set forth under Sections 7, 8, 9, and
10 of LEBMO No. 7-2016, are arbitrary and ultra vires in nature; hence,
unconstitutional. Although the State has a compelling interest to uplift the
standards of legal education in the country, Section 9 ofLEBMO No. 7-2016
is unconstitutional for unreasonably encroaching into the sphere of academic
freedom of law schools to determine for themselves who to admit as
students.
In this vein, respondents' analogy between PhiLSAT and NMAT

becomes amiss. A perusal of DO No. 52-1985 reveals that the BME uses
percentile rank for its cut-off score for the NMAT, which cut-off score is
determined in consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical
Colleges. In stark contrast, the LEB solely determined the 55% passing
score for the PhiLSAT without providing any justification for how it arrived
with the same. Also, the PhiLSAT uses a straightforward, absolute metric by
using the percentage score obtained by an individual test-taker, which
involves determining how many right and wrong answers an individual
obtained in the test. The NMAT, on the other hand, uses percentile ranking
wherein the percentile scores show how well a test-taker did relative to
others who have taken the test. While the use of the percentage score may be
replaced with a percentile score under LEBMO No. 7-2016, only the LEB
may prescribe the same.
113 Constitution, Article XIV, Section 4.(1) The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and
private institutions in the educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of
all educational institutions.
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
Markedly, with the foregoing dissimilarities between NMAT and

PhiLSAT, it is not difficult to see why the ruling in Tablarin upholding the
validity ofNMAT cannot be invoked by respondents. While Tablarin may be
used to uphold the authority of the State to administer an aptitude exam, it
cannot justify the LEB's control over the affairs of law schools, particularly
concerning their discretion in choosing their enrollees.
Relative to this, it bears noting that Tablarin and the other cases
involving NMAT did not touch on the academic freedom of medical schools.
Petitioners therein, who were prospective medical students, questioned the
validity of the NMAT based on their right to quality education and the equal
protection clause. As astutely underscored by Associate Justice Alfredo
Benjamin S. Caguioa (Justice Caguioa), the Court might have even arrived
at a different conclusion in Tablarin had the issues been examined through
the lens of institutional academic freedom. 114 However, as no medical school
participated in the proceedings therein, the Court was not exposed to the
broad spectrum of the NMAT and decided the petition only through the
prism of the State's police power. In the end, Tablarin confirmed the State's
right to regulate education only; it did not discuss allowable limits of such
regulatory authority in the context of academic freedom and legal education.
Thus, while the Court upheld the Nl\1AT as a valid exercise of police power,
it was not adjudicated to be a reasonable supervisory and regulatory
measure.
Fortunately, the right to academic freedom has been opportunely

invoked by petitioner-intervenor St. Thomas More School of Law and
Business, which claims injury "in the form of reduced number of enrollees
due to the PhiLSAT requirement and the curtailment of its discretion on who
to admit in its law school." 115 Borrowing the wise words of former Associate
Justice Isagani A. Cruz, "[r]ights are but weapons on the wall if, like
expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons,
must be a promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill
the role assigned to them in the free society, if they are kept bright and sharp
with use by those who are not afraid to assert them." 116 Accordingly, the
failure of medical schools to invoke their right in Tablarin should not
114
Concurring Opinion of J. Caguioa, pp. 3-4; See also J. Leonen's Dissenting and Concurring Opinion in
Pimentel v. LEE, p. 12.
115 Pimentel v. LEE, supra at note 34, at 36.
116
Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 232 Phil. 615 (1987), G.R. No. 74457, 20 March 1987 [Per J.
Cruz].
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
prejudice the law schools who are now wielding their weapon and asserting
their right to academic freedom.
LEBMO No. 7-2016 should be

stricken down in its entirety, along
with all the LEB memoranda,
circulars, and issuances pertaining
thereto and the PhiLSAT
A perusal of the Decision reveals that while it declared

unconstitutional the act and practice of the LEB of excluding, restricting,
and qualifying admissions to law schools, only Section 9 of LEBMO No. 7-
2016 was categorically invalidated for being unconstitutional; all the other
provisions in the LEBMO, including Section 1 which declares as a policy
the requirement of taking the LEE-administered PhiLSAT, were given force
and effect.
Notably, both PALS and petitioners claim that the Court's ruling on
the PhiLSAT is ambiguous on whether the requirement to take the PhiLSAT
is now optional or mandatory. The ambiguity is sowing confusion because
PALS presumes that by striking down Section 9 of LEBMO No. 7-2016, the
Court has rendered the PhiLSAT optional. In contrast, respondents construe
the ruling of the Court as still giving authority to the LEB to conduct the
PhiLSAT, thereby prompting it to issue LEBMC No. 52-2020.
The Court declares the entire LEBMO No. 7-2016 unconstitutional.
Synthesizing the provisions of LEBMO No. 7-2016, it is evident that

unless prospective students have a certificate of exemption, they are
compelled to take and pass the said exam as an eligibility requirement for
law school. Under pain of sanction or fine, law schools are prohibited from
accepting prospective students who do not meet the said requirements. For
being unreasonably exclusionary, restrictive, and qualifying, the Court
declared Section 9 of LEBMO No. 7-2016 unconstitutional. Indeed, Justice
Perlas-Bernabe was apt to call the requirem~nts under Section 9 thereof as
an effective "sifting mechanism" 11 7 in which "[t]he token regard for
117
SAJ Perlas-Bernabe's Concurring Opinion in Pimentel v. LEB, p. 2.
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
institutional academic freedom comes into play, if at all, only after the
applicants had been 'pre-selected' without the school's participation." 11 8
With the unconstitutionality of Section 9 of LEBMO No. 7-2016, the

other provision which provides life support to the current exclusionary,
restrictive, and qualifying PhiLSAT is Section 1 thereof. As it is, even
without Section 9, prospective students muse still take a rigorous eligibility
exam, or they would not qualify for law school. Being a compulsory
eligibility requirement, it is violative of academic freedom.
Similar to the requirement of passing, the act of mandating the taking

of PhiLSAT as an admission requirement to any basic law course under
Section 1 is an unreasonable imposition which unduly limits the choice of
law schools on who to admit. It impairs the law schools' de facto control
over the admission and examination of their students. Law schools are left
with no other recourse but to refuse the admission of those who failed to
take the compulsory exam, regardless of the merit of the student's reason for
such failure. This is an absurdity that is difficult to justify even by the noble
aspirations of the State, more so when one considers LEB Chairperson
Emerson B. Aquende's revelation that "there is no statistical basis to show
the propensity of the PhiLSAT to improve the quality of legal education." 119
To be sure, many potentially qualified students could not take the

exam due to various reasons. Some of these reasons are even attributable to
the LEB. The exam entails financial costs that not every prospective law
student can easily afford without suffering any financial dent. Chief Justice
Gesmundo aptly discussed the financial and logistical burdens which the
current admission examination brings to the prospective examinees, thus:
Under the PhiLSAT, the LEB initially imposed a testing fee of

Pl,500.00 per examination, which was subsequently lowered to
Pl ,000.00; and there are only seven (7) testing centers across the country-
Baguio City, Metro Manila, Legazpi City, Iloilo City, Cebu City, Davao
City, and Cagayan De Oro City. Also, the LEB failed to explain why it had
to impose said fee for a mere written examination. x x x
Further, the LEB also failed to consider the transportation and

logistical expenses that would be incurred by an examinee coming from
the far-flung areas to take the examination in the limited seven (7) testing
centers. A student from the province [of Leyte] explained the immense
difficulty of taking the PhiLSAT [in Cebu City]. x x x
11 8 Pimentel v. LEE supra at note 34, at 86.

11 9
SAJ Perlas-Bernabe's Concurring Opinion in Pimentel v. LEB, p. 5.
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
It must be underscored that the study of law should not be hindered

by financial and geographical hardships; rather, it must be reasonable and
accessible to the examinees. Otherwise, it would defeat the purpose of a
unified admission examination - to ensure that those intellectually capable
to become law students, regardless of social status, shall be admitted to the
study of law. 120
With the foregoing, the Court must likewise pull the plug on Section 1
and thereby put an end to the exclusionary and unreasonably intrusive
eligibility exam under LEBMO No. 7-2016.
More importantly, the Court holds that the entire memorandum must
be struck down. As intimated by Justice Perlas-Bernabe 121 and Justice
Caguioa, 122 despite the separability clause in LEBMO No. 7-2016, several
other provisions must likewise be invalidated for being closely related and
meant to implement the PhiLSAT as a mandatory and exclusionary exam.
Generally, with a separability clause, the nullity of one provision shall

not invalidate the act's other provisions. 123 However, when the parts of a
statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant
a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part
will vitiate the rest. 124 Moreover, it is a general rule of construction that the
meaning of the law is not to be extracted from a single part but from a
general consideration or view of the act as a whole. 125 Particular words,
clauses, and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated
expressions. 126
The legal basis from which the PhiLSAT draws its existence is
LEBMO No. 7-2016. However, since the overall intent behind LEBMO No.
7-2016 is to administer an exclusionary test through PhiLSAT, 127 "[a]ll of its
provisions, whether key or ancillary, form an integral composite that lays
down a holistic framework that is operatively interdependent and hence,
cannot be extricated from one another." 128
12
° CJ Gesmundo 's Separate Concurring and Dissenting O pinion in Pimentel v. LEB, pp. 17-19.
12 1
See Concurring Opinion of SAJ Perlas-Bernabe, pp. 5-8.
122 See Concurring Opinion of J. Cag uioa, pp. 4-7 .
123
See Film Development Council of the Phils. v. Colon Heritage Realty Corp ., 760 Phil. 519 (2015), G.R. No.
203754 & 204418, 16 June 2015 [Per J. Velasco, Jr.].
124 Id.
125 Aquino v. Quezon City, 529 Phil. 486, 498 (2006) [Per J. Azcuna].
126
National Tobacco Administration v. COA , 370 Phil. 793 (1999) [Per J. Puris ima].
121 Id.
128
Concurring Opinion of SAJ Perl as-Bernabe, p. 5.
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
Notably, Section 7 of LEBMO No. 7-2016 sets the passing score at

55% "or such percentile score as may be prescribed by the LEB";
Section 8 refers to the issuance of a COE only to those who passed the test;
Section 10 exempts certain graduates from "taking and passing" it; Section
11 states that law schools can prescribe additional requirements such as a
PhiLSAT score "higher than the cut-off or passing score set by the
LEB"; Section 12 requires the schools to submit reports indicating the
PhiLSAT scores of the admitted students; Section 14 obligates law school
deans to submit to LEB written justifications for the admission of applicants
below the cut-off or passing score of the PhiLSAT; and Section 15 imposes
severe administrative sanctions on law schools that violate LEBMO No. 7-
2016. It is unmistakably clear that these provisions are intimately connected
to, or are necessary components of, the LEB's measure in excluding,
restricting, and qualifying admissions to law schools. Thus, they must be
declared unconstitutional.
With the unconstitutionality of the foregoing provisions, what remains

is the availability of the PhiLSAT as an aptitude test. Sections 2, 3, 4, 6, and
13 of LEBMO No. 7-2016 respectively provide the test design of the
PhiLSAT, who may qualify to take the same, who will administer the exam,
the schedule and venue, the testing fee, and the removal of the general
average requirement under LEBMO No. 1-2011. Sections 16, 17, and 18 of
LEBMO No. 7-2016 provide the Separability, Repealing, and Effectivity
Clauses, respectively.
These remaining provisions are not unconstitutional or invalid per se.

However, Sections 16, 17, and 18 of LEBMO No. 7-2016, being merely
ancillary, can no longer stand on their own. Meanwhile, the rest would
appear that they can stand on their own, in furtherance of the State's
authority, through the LEB, to administer a constitutionally compliant
aptitude test pursuant to its powers under RA 7662. To stress, however, the
problems created by the current PhiLSAT were precisely because the LEB
set the parameters by itself. The LEB failed to collaborate with the law
schools and conduct relevant studies before formulating LEBMO No. 7-
2016. The opinion of law schools on the propriety and rationality of the
provisions of LEBMO No. 7-2016 was undeniably vital in crafting a
reasonable aptitude exam. Sections 5 and 6, for instance, appear to make an
aptitude exam impractical and arbitrary due to the financial burdens linked
to the testing fees and logistical considerations.
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
Accordingly, it would be more appropriate to strike down all

remaining provisions. This gives the LEB a fresh start, devoid of any
arbitrary preconceived ideas when it sits down with the law schools or PALS
for genuine and meaningful discussions on a possible acceptable
replacement of the present PhiLSAT.
To this end, it is fitting to point all the stakeholders to Chief Justice

Gesmundo's win-win solution which provides viable parameters that the
parties may adopt in coming up with a standardized and acceptable law
admission test. Among other things, the examination must be unrestrictive of
academic freedom, cost-efficient, accessible, and an effective tool in
assessing incoming law students. The law admission test should likewise not
be the sole basis for admission to the study of the law. Undergraduate
achievements, motivation, or cultural backgrounds that the admission test
cannot measure must also be considered. Besides the admission test, the law
school must still be given the discretion to determine who to admit as
students consistent with its academic freedom. 129
With LEBMO No. 7-2016 being unconstitutional, all the LEB

memoranda, circulars, and issuances pertaining to it and the PhiLSAT, which
are inconsistent with this Court's declaration, are deemed vacated and of no
force and effect. Accordingly, the Court no longer finds it necessary to dwell
on respondents' prayer to lift the TRO, which enjoined the LEB from
implementing LEBMC No.18-2018. All conditionally-admitted students
may thus continue their enrollment and be regularized in accordance with
the exercise of the academic freedom of their respective law schools. With
this, the students may now take off the suffocating mask of uncertainty over
their status and breathe in all the legal knowledge they can absorb.
Sections 15 (3), 16, and 17 of

LEBMO No. 1-2011 are
unconstitutional for being ultra vires
Respondents argue that paragraph 3 of Section 15 of LEBMO No. 1-

2011, which pertains to the LEB's sole authority to determine the eligibility
of a foreign graduate to enter law school, is a valid exercise of police power
to place our local students on equal footing with their foreigner counterparts.
Under this provision, while local students would need to prove to the
government that they studied a requisite pre-law course, foreigners who
129
See CJ Gesmundo's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Pimentel v. LEE, pp. 18-19.
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
want to enter a Philippine law school need only present their credentials to
their school of choice without being subjected to validation by the
government. Additionally, respondents asseverate that assuming for the sake
of argument this paragraph is void, the entire provision should not be struck
down, considering that the first paragraph was upheld by the Court, and
given that the petitioners failed to point out any objectionable part to it.
The Court partially agrees.
The requirement regarding admission of international students is

legally impermissible as the students' eligibility is strictly left for the LEB to
decide. This unduly takes away the right of the academic institution to
exercise its discretion whether to accept the student or not, thereby
transgressing its academic freedom to determine who to admit.
This notwithstanding, the Court agrees with respondents that the

entirety of Section 15 should not be invalidated. Notably, the first paragraph
pertains to the requirement for a certification from the Secretary of
Education that the applicant completed the required four (4)-year pre-law
course. Far from being arbitrary, Section 15(1) is a reasonable requirement
to ensure that the applicant is qualified to take the course. The Court even
similarly requires it for admission to the Bar examination.
On Section 16 of LEBMO No. 1-2011, which additionally requires a

prescribed number of units in Mathematics, Science, and English for
admission, respondents argue anew that the said requirement is a valid
exercise of the State's supervisory regulatory power. Corollarily, respondents
assert that the existence of Rule 13 8 of the Rules of Court is of no moment
as said rule concerns only admission to the Bar examinations, not to law
school.
Indeed, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court pertains only to the

requirement of the Court anent the Bar examinations, thus, irrelevant to the
determination of the validity of the questioned provision. Nevertheless,
Section 16 is still void as it is couched in a language that effectively denies
the academic institution's autonomy to, at the very least, conditionally accept
the student with deficient units in Mathematics, English, and Social Science
subjects. Trite to point out, the LEB, in the exercise of the delegated police
power of the State, may impose reasonable and minimum qualifications of
prospective law students for as long as it does not suppress the autonomy of
the academic institution to choose its students.
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
Finally, the Court sustains its ruling that the prohibition against
accepting applicants for the Master of Laws without a Bachelor of Laws or
Juris Doctor degree under Section 17 of LEBMO No. 1-2011 is void for
infringing the right of the school to determine who to admit to their graduate
degree programs. This section provides:
Section 17. Board Prerequisites for Admission to Graduate

Programs in Law. - Without prejudice to other requirements that
graduate schools may lay down, no applicant shall be admitted for
the Master of Laws (LI.M.) or equivalent master's degree in law
or juridical science, without an LLB. or a J.D. degree. Admission
of non- Members of the Philippine Bar to the master's degree shall be
freedom vested in the graduate school of law. The candidate for the
doctorate degree in juridical science, or doctorate in civil law or
equivalent doctorate degree must have completed a Master of
Laws (LI.M.) or equivalent degree.
Graduate degree programs in law shall have no bearing on

membership or non-membership in the Philippine Bar. [Emphases
supplied.]
To recall, the Court held that such requirement "effectively nullifies

the option of admitting non-law graduates on the basis of relevant
professional experience that a law school, pursuant to its own admissions
policy, may otherwise have considered." 130
There is no monopoly of knowledge. Legal education would be more

robust by allowing an engineer, a metallurgist, a businessperson, an
agriculturist, and other graduates to further improve their crafts through this
course. To note, it is also the general objective of RA 7662 to train persons
for leadership and to contribute towards the promotion and advancement of
justice and the improvement of its administration, the legal system, and legal
institutions in light of the historical and contemporary development of law in
the Philippines and other countries. Certainly, the pursuit of these objectives
is not exclusive for law students or law practitioners.
Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaapao (Justice Dimaampao) expressed

his objection against the constitutionality of Section 17 of LEBMO No. 1-
2011. He proffers that the Master of Laws programs should be restricted to
those who have completed a law course so that the purpose of RA 7662 may
130
Pimentel v. LEB, supra at note 34.
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
be genuinely accomplished. 131 He posits that in as much as constitutionality

of the requirement of aptitude exam is upheld as a reasonable exercise of the
State's police power, "all the more reason should the prerequisite of an LLB.
or J.D. degree be rendered as sensibly logical before someone may enroll in
an LL.M. course." 132
As underscored in the Decision, Section 5 (2), Article XIV of

the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic
freedom. Nothing short of marked arbitrariness, or grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the schools, or overriding public welfare could justify State
interference with the academic judgment of higher educational
institutions. 133 It has been the Court's firm stance ever since, and the facts
before Us show no reason to apply the exception in this case.
Being a non-law graduate per se is not a compelling reason for the

State to interfere with the law schools' academic freedom by requiring them
to completely discriminate against non-law graduates when it comes to their
Masters of Laws program. True, a "Magister Legum is not a mere frivolous
epithet, and achieving it is not a doddle. 134 Nonetheless, the questions
regarding the challenges of non-law graduates to a Master of Laws program
are limiting beliefs that could even be a roadblock to developing and
expanding the master's program in Philippine law schools. Such fear may
even be overstated since non-law graduates studying abroad have shown that
they can cope, nay excel in LL.M. programs, and assimilate with other
students despite the considerable handicap they initially have:
The ways that they improve the classroom is that they tend to be
the students who think outside the box," Nottingham's Sangeeta Shah
says. They don't think in terms of rigid laws. They think, this is where I
need to get, let me figure out how to do it. They tend to be creative
thinkers. Not that law students aren't creative thinkers, but it just enriches
the classroom. It makes it a better place. 135
While it may be true that "one can become word-perfect in all the law
materials available yet could still be inept if one did not experience the
apposite priming and inculcation which is law school," 136 it is not al ways the
case. A person may brag about being a graduate of law but still deficient, if
not inept. In the same breadth, a non-law graduate could very well have a
13 1 Separate Concurring of J. Dimaampao, p. 4.

132 /d.at!0.
133 Garcia, supra at note 69 at 494 citing former Justice Teehankee's Concurring Opinion in Garcia.
134
Reflections of J. Dimaampao, p. 11.
135 <(https://llm-guide.com/articles/pursuing-an-llm-without-a-background-in-law, citing the response of
Sangeeta Shah, an Associate Professor in the School of Law of the University of Nottingham>
(accessed on 2 I October 202 I).
136 Reflections of J. Dimaampao, p. I0.
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
deep understanding of the law through self-learning, guidance from mentors,

or even through related work experience.
To be sure, the great Abraham Lincoln had received little fonnal

education in his life, and yet through continuous learning and constant
hunger for self-improvement, he was able to become a lawyer successfully,
and then as a president of the United States of America. In the Philippine
setting, former Senator Jose W. Diokno topped the Philippine bar
examinations without a law degree. 137 It can be said that these success
stories are extreme and rare instances of greatness, but they still buttress the
argument that a non-law student can cope and excel in a Master of Laws
program if they want to.
Illustrating the wisdom of Section 17, Justice Dimaampao observed

that the LL.M. programs in the Philippines show the need for foundational
knowledge and are stiuctured in a particular format that incontrovertibly
intends to prepare lawyers, judges, and law professors for global legal
practice. 138 By way of an example, he extensively discussed the current
structure and parameters of the master's curriculum of the University of the
Philippines (UP) College of Law.
It must be emphasized that the Master of Laws curriculum of the UP

College of Law was designed based on the criteria it personally crafted. The
eligibility requirements were formulated thusly not because of a State
decree, but precisely because the college has the freedom to determine
for itself, on academic grounds, the curriculum it will offer for its
master's program and who may be qualified to enroll therein. In line
with this, the Court find it apropos to state that the UP College of Law, for
all of its greatness, is still just one of the many law schools in the country. Its
Master of Laws program does not represent what the other schools offer or
would like to offer, in as much as the curriculum of one university cannot
accurately reflect the trend in legal studies in the country.
Further, in other jurisdictions, students from non-law backgrounds can

pursue LL.M. 139 Foreign schools are able to do this through viable
workarounds, such as requiring the kind and number of non-legal students
they accept or requiring non-law students to demonstrate an interest in
137 <https://dio kno.ph/jwd> (accessed on 2 1 October 202 1).

138 Separate Concurring Opinion of J. Dimaampao, p. •k
139 Id.
and A.M. No . 20-03-04-SC
law, 140 as in the case of one law school in England:
7. Can I apply ifl do not have a law degree?
Students without a law background may apply to the LLM

programme, but they need to demonstrate a high level of
professional or academic experience in areas closely related to the
subjects they wish to study. Recent graduates who have neither
studied law nor passed a "conversion" course are only admitted in
exceptional circumstances. 141
Similarly, University of Queensland in Australia provides the same

opportunity to non-law graduates, thus:
Which postgraduate law degrees can I apply for if I don't have a law
degree?
If you hold a non-law bachelor degree, you may wish to consider

the Master of International Commercial Law, Masters of International
Commercial Law/Commerce, Master of International Law, or Masters of
International Relations/International Law. The Master of International
Commercial Law (& dual) is designed for business, finance, commerce,
accounting or economics graduates. The Master of International Law ( &
dual) is designed for social science, political science and arts graduates. 142
The State and this Court would do well to let the law schools
exercise their authority to adopt a similar program or adjust their
current Master of Laws curriculum to align with their organizational
mission and vision or what they believe could help the school thrive and
be globally competitive.
In the medical field, the country has had an influx of international

students who opted to enroll in various medical courses offered in the
country for a multitude of good reasons, including the renowned academic
excellence and cost competitiveness of our medical schools. With Section 17
of LEBMO No. 1-2011, law schools will be unduly denied the similar
opportunity to be marketable among foreign non-law graduates who would
140
<https://llm-guide.com/articles/pursuing-an-llm-without-a-background-in-law#:- :text=Some
%20schools %20don't%20accept, apply%20to%20similar%20master's%20degrees> (accessed on 20
October 2021 ).
141
<https://www.lse.ac.uk/law/study/ llm/faqs> (accessed on 21) October 2021 ).
142
<https://support. future-students. uq .edu.au/app/answers/detai 1/a_ id/ 1277 /-/which-postgraduate-law-
degrees-can-i-app ly-for-if-i-dont-have-a-law-degree%3 F> (accessed on 20 October 202 1).
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
like to pursue a master's degree in law. In addition, the country's own non-
law graduates would be constrained to pursue their master's degree outside
the country instead of being proud products of Philippine graduate schools
of law. It is disheartening to think that Filipino non-law graduates could
create a name for themselves outside the country as barristers or
international human rights advocate because the foreign law schools gave
them a chance that their country unreasonably denied them.
Clearly, for the Court to declare the constitutionality of Section 17 of

LEBMO No. 1-2011 would unduly give the State the right to order at once
the disqualification of a non-law graduate from being considered for
admission, even though the law schools can, in the exercise of their
academic freedom, find a way to sufficiently address the perceived
deficiency of these prospective students. Viewed in this light, the
requirement of having a J.D. or LLB. for purposes of admission into a
Master of Laws program will be no different from the imposition of the
current PhiLSAT.
Ultimately, the Court holds that the questions raised pertaining to the
fitness of a student to endeavor a higher level of legal studies should be
matters exclusively for the law schools to consider and thresh out in the
exercise of their academic freedom.
The LEB issuances prescribing the

qualifications and classifications for
faculty members, deans, and deans of
graduate schools of law violate the
academic freedom of law schools on
who may teach
Respondents contend that the LEB's authority to prescribe the

minimum qualifications of faculty members and deans of law schools cannot
be made subservient to the demands of academic freedom, as there is an
inherent limit to the right of the school to choose who may teach.
Furthermore, the requirement for a professor in law school to have a master's
degree is germane to the State's objective of promoting quality education in
law schools. According to respondents, the State is just fulfilling its role to
act as parens patriae.
Additionally, respondents assert that the requirement for a master's

degree is reasonable because law schools have sufficient time to comply, and
since the same applies only to those who do not possess the requisite
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
experience. In any case, aside from the existence of numerous exemptions

thereto, this requirement has already been partially complied with by the
schools and is supported by the ruling in Son v. University of Santo Tomas, 143
where the Court upheld the master's degree requirement for faculty members
in tertiary education.
The Court affirms its ruling.
There is no question that the master's degree requirement for tertiary

education teachers is permissible. This is settled. Here, what is unacceptable
for being unreasonable is how the LEB exercised its authority to impose
such requirement as discussed at length in the assailed Decision. The
issuances under consideration violate the law schools' right to set their own
faculty standards and evaluate the qualifications of their teachers. In so
doing, the LEB issuances infringe on the academic freedom of the schools to
choose who may teach their students. While the State may act in furtherance
of its role as parens patriae, it should not act like an overbearing parent who
makes life choices for its adult child without regard to the latter's own
choices or opinion.
LEBMC No. 6-2017, LEB Resolution

No. 2012-02, and LEB Resolution No.
2012-06 are invalid insofar as they
require the submission of an
application for LEB Certification
PALS and Justice Caguioa 144 correctly pointed out that LEBMC No.
6-2017 and LEB Resolution No. 2012-02 unduly interfere with the law
schools' management of their graduating students.
In the Whereas Clause of LEB Resolution 2012-12, 145 it was spelled

out that a special order 146 (S.O.) is not an imperative requirement for higher
education institutions to graduate. It was also stated that since state colleges
are exempt from the requirement of S.O. for their graduates, higher private
143
G.R. No. 211273, 18 April 2018 [Per J. Del Castillo] .
144
See J. Caguioa's Concurring Opinion in Pimentel v. LEB, p. 39.
145
Entitled "A Resolution Eliminating the Requirement of Special Orders for Graduates of the Basic Law
Degrees and Graduate Law Degrees and Replacing them With a Per Law School Certification Approved
by the Legal Board".
146
An S.O. is a document issued by the CHED certifying that students have completed the required four
(4)-year course and complied with all the requirements.
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
education institutions shall also enjoy such exemption. In lieu of the S.O.,
however, same resolution requires law schools to submit a letter and a
certification under oath, within 60 days before the end of the academic year,
signed by the registrar and the law dean and noted by the school president or
head. Complementing said resolution, the LEB issued Resolution No. 2012-
06, relieving law schools of the need to secure the Revised CHED Form for
their graduates but requiring the law schools to instead submit a letter and a
Certification containing the names of the graduating students and the exact
date of graduation, inter alia. Respondents justify the new requirement as
giving effect to the LEB's regulatory authority and providing a reasonable
check on the exercise by law schools of the freedom to determine who
should graduate from their law course.
Since an S.O. is not required for graduating law students, the LEB
should have contented itself with eliminating such requirement or coming up
with a less burdensome and non-intrusive replacement. Instead, the LEB
imposed inflexible and burdensome requirements under LEBMC No. 6-
2017, such as, (i) requiring the inclusion of the names of all students
expected to graduate in the application for LEBC, "notwithstanding that
some of them have yet to comply with the requirements for graduation fully
and may possibly not graduate," thereby imposing additional burden on the
part of the school to notify the LEB for the cancellation of the LEBC
Number corresponding to the student/s who failed to graduate; (ii)
mandating the law schools to observe the required signatories for the letter
and certification, disallowing substitution by subordinate or other school
officials; and (iii) enjoining the law schools to fix their graduations dates
ahead of the 60-day deadline for submission. "Appropriate sanctions" await
law schools that allow their students to graduate without the LEBC
Numbers, while incomplete applications or those without the signatures of
the required signatories will be returned. All of these amount to control, not
regulation.
Consequently, the Court declares invalid LEBMC No. 6-2017, LEB

Resolution No. 2012-02, and Resolution No. 2012-06 insofar as these
issuances require law schools to submit a letter and Certification instead of
anS.O.
As a final note, once the dust settles after the battle between police
power and academic freedom, the hope is that the LEB and law schools
collaborate towards the shared goal of uplifting legal education in the
country. The resistance by the law schools against the initial measures
implemented by the LEB should not be seen as an act against the
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
advancement of legal education, but as an opportunity for improvement.

After all, the enemy of progress is not opposition but complacency.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Partial Motion for

Reconsideration with Joint Comment/Opposition on Respondent's Motion
for Reconsideration of petitioners in GR No. 242954 is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Petition-in-Intervention of the Philippine Association of
Law Schools is likewise PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly:
a) LEBMC No. 6-2017, LEB Resolution No. 2012-02, and Resolution

No. 2012-06 are declared INVALID insofar as these issuances require
the law schools to submit a letter and Certification in place of a
Special Order.
b) The entire LEBMO No. 7-2016 is declared

UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, all existing memoranda,
circulars, issuances by the Legal Education Board relating to LEBMO
No. 7-2016 and the conduct of the current Philippine Law School
Admission Test administered by the Legal Education Board are
hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE. They are deemed without force
and effect.
The Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated September 10,
2019) filed by respondents Legal Education Board and Executive Secretary
Salvador Medialdea is PARTIALLY GRANTED, in that paragraphs 1 and
2 of Section 15, LEBMO No. 1-2011 are declared VALID.
All other claims of petitioners, respondents, and the Philippine

Association of Law Schools are DENIED.
The Court's Decision dated 10 September 2019 STANDS in all other

respects.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
WE CONCUR:
t{>!J_~ fV., ~4 °t~·

MP.~
ESTELA M.1>ERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
-~
RA~LL.HERNANDO
Associate Justice
_fp1, Or~
AMY~ l!-i~-JAVIER
Associate Justice
HENR
s~u::=~AN
Associate Justice
JHOSE~OPEZ
Associate Justice
'-

and A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
ALr !~~
~!f Justice

Pimentel Vs LEB

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3&.cpublic of tlJc flbilippinc:s

OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, ERROL B. G.R. No. 230642

LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD

ATTYS. ANTHONY D. BENGZON,

APRIL D. CABALLERO, JEREY C.

FRANCIS JOSE LEAN L.

• Also referred to as "Jocelyn L. Dafio'· in some parts of the rollo.

JAN IVAN M. SANTAJVIARIA,

HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA,

intervenor: November 9, 2021

Congress, with the expressed policy of "uplifting" the standards of

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED.

The jurisdiction of the Legal Education Board over legal education

The Court further declares:

1. Section 7 (c) of R.A. No. 7 662 insofar as it gives the Legal

2. Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal

As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for encroaching upon the power of

1. Section 2, par. 2 of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it unduly

2. Section 3(a)(2) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 7(2) of

3. Section 7(g) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 1l(g) of

4. Section 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section ll(h) of

As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being ultra vires:

1. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of

a. Paragraph 9 of LEBMO No. 7-2016 which provides

be required to pass the PhiLSAT as a requirement

b. LEBMC No. 18-2018 which prescribes the passing

Accordingly, the temporary restraining order issued

c. Sections 15, 16,and 17ofLEBMONo.1-2011;

2. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of

a. Sections 41.2( d), 50, 51, and 52 of LEBMO No. 1-

3. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of

a. Resolution No. 2015-0S;

On 28 August 2020, the Court received a copy of the Petition-in-

In the main, PALS prays for the declaration of unconstitutionality of

5 Rollo, (A.M. No. 20-03-04-SC), pp. 6-16.

In defending the constitutionality of LEBMO No. 7-2016,

Respondents further contend that the mandatory nature of the

As to the other LEB issuances, respondents asseverate that (i) the

Finally, respondents pray for the Court to declare as valid: 1)

In their Partial Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners remain

Petitioners also differentiate NMAT and PhiLSAT as to impact of the

Likewise, petitioners claim that Sections 15, 16, and 17 of LEBMO

Ultimately, petitioners seek to declare the unconstitutionality of RA

Summarizing the various arguments of the herein parties, the issues

1. Whether there is a cogent reason for this Court to

2. Whether the Court erred in upholding the jurisdiction of the

3. Whether the Court erred in holding that the requirement to

4. Whether the Court's ruling rendered the PhiLSAT optional;

5. Whether the Court erred in making permanent the TRO it

6. Whether the Court erred in invalidating Sections 15, 16,

7. Whether there is cogent reason to amend or reverse the

8. Whether LEBMO No. 22-2019, LEBMC No. 6-2017, and

Ruling of the Court

Before this Court resolves the foregoing issues, We deem it proper to

Indeed, in several cases, associations were accorded legal personality

to represent its members, 25 especially where said associations advanced

Guided by the legal issues raised, the Court embarked on another

The Court stresses that there is a